Offprint from OXO R STU ES ET P OSOPY E T O R : R W O O VO U E X 3 Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 271 PU T R O T E E RE E E T WE E T E P YRR O S T S T E E S UR O O Z Z . ntroduction T issue of Plutarch’s attitude towards scepticism has attracted growing attention in the scholarly literature. t is commonly agreed that a clarification of this problem is needed for a better assessment of Plutarch’s philosophy. ut it is also well known that ‘scepticism’ is an ambiguous term, which raises several difficulties— terminological, historical, and philosophical. What can hardly be disputed is Plutarch’s veneration for the ‘divine’ Plato (see e.g. De capienda ex inimicis utilitate Per. . ). ut does this imply indifference towards ‘scepticism’, or even its downright rejection Scholars’ responses differ widely, ranging from the view that Plutarch was not interested in scepticism to the hypothesis that he might have had a sceptical phase. Some scholars have gone so far as to develop a sceptical interpretation of Plutarch’s philosophy as a whole. learly, if scholars disagree to such an extent, it is also because the © auro onazzi first draft of this paper was presented in uly at the Oxford Plutarch onference later it greatly benefited from seminars held in yon and Prague. mong others, wish to thank Thomas énatouïl, Riccardo hiaradonna, Pierluigi onini, rad nwood, oseph oural, and ames Warren for their many helpful suggestions and comments on previous versions of the article. . illon, ‘Plutarch’s ebt to Xenocrates’, in . Pérez iménez, . arcía ópez, and R. . guilar (eds.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles (adrid, ), – at . . Schroeter, Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis (reifswald, ), , , (from scepticism to dogmatism) . lucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (öttingen, ), n. , (from dogmatism to scepticism). . abut, ‘u scepticisme au dépassement de la raison: philosophie et foi religieuse chez Plutarque’ [‘Scepticisme’], in id., Parerga: choix d’articles de Daniel Babut (–) (yon, ), – id., ‘’unité de l’cadémie selon Plutarque: notes en marge d’un débat ancien et toujours actuel’ [‘’unité de l’cadémie’], in . onazzi, . évy, and . Steel (eds.), A Platonic Pythagoras: Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the Imperial Age (Turnhout, ), –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 272 Mauro Bonazzi problem has been improperly set. or the term ‘sceptic’, though of reek derivation, is more important and has a more determinate meaning for us than for the ancient reeks. ertainly, from the first century skeptikos was used to indicate those who questioned the possibility of acquiring knowledge—the kind of people we also regard as ‘sceptics’. ut in antiquity the adjective had a broader sense, which was dominant in Plutarch’s day and in his vocabulary. Skeptikos is built on the noun skepsis ‘research, investigation’. nd since investigation is a substantial component of philosophy as a whole, the employment of the term for qualifying one single philosophical movement or school might prove misleading. esides, even if one chooses to adopt this word, it is controversial whether what we now label ‘reek Scepticism’ in the singular ever really existed. f ‘scepticism’ is technically taken to refer to a philosophy casting doubt on the possibility of knowledge, in antiquity there were at least two ‘sceptical’ movements: the ellenistic cademy and (eo)Pyrrhonism. The problem would then be to establish whether these two schools might be reduced to one or whether their mutual divergences were greater than their affinities. Writing some decades after Plutarch, ulus ellius spoke of the controversy as a vetus quaestio, discussed by many reek writers (. . ). The Lamprias Catalogue informs us that Plutarch too had engaged in the debate. Unfortunately, the treatise On the Difference between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics (CL ) has gone missing, preventing any detailed scrutiny of Plutarch’s arguments. Some clues are none the less to be found in extant works, and it is the task of this paper to reconstruct the basic features of Plutarch’s position on the matter and, more generally, to underline the importance of this dispute for his philosophy. t is well known that Plutarch considered himself an cademic, without thereby exclusively committing himself to the ellenistic cademy. or Plutarch ‘cademic’ refers to the whole tradition stemming from Plato and extending to his own philosophy. t is, however, a reasonable as f. . Opsomer, In Search of the Truth: Academic Tendencies in Middle Platonism (russels, ), –. . évy, Cicero Academicus: recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne (Rome, ), . P. . onini, ‘’eredità academica e i fondamenti del platonismo in Plutarco’ [‘’eredità academica’], in . arbanti et al. (eds.), Henosis kai philia. Unione e amicizia: omaggio a Francesco Romano (atania, ), – at –, repr. in onini, Commentary and Tradition: Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Post-Hellenistic Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 273 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics sumption that in this lost treatise Plutarch chiefly concentrated on the ellenistic period, arguing, as the title indicates, for the difference between the ellenistic cademy and Pyrrhonism. s shall try to show, the main ground for the divergence between the two schools according to Plutarch lies in the distinction between two kinds of scepticism, which propose to call ‘empirical’ and ‘metaphysical’ scepticism (as will emerge, empiricism here refers to a philosophy which, in Plutarch’s eyes, assumes the existence only of sensible objects and senses). t may be objected that such categories hardly apply to scepticism as we know it. Yet, as shall argue, these qualifications play a major role in Plutarch’s perception of what Platonism amounts to. . Pyrrhonism, scepticism, and empiricism esides Plutarch’s treatise on the difference between Pyrrhonists and cademics, the Lamprias Catalogue also lists the title of another work, On Pyrrho’s Ten Tropes (CL ), which, if authentic, would further confirm the philosopher’s interest in Pyrrho and Pyrrhonism. This treatise too is lost, but references to Pyrrhonism in surviving works—and one in Table Talk in particular—enable us to reconstruct the reasons for Plutarch’s interest. The fifth question of the third book of Table Talk deals with wine and whether its effect is to make one warm or cold. efore embarking on the discussion, Plutarch briefly mentions ristotle and then summarizes what Epicurus argued in his Symposium. ucius estrius lorus, a close friend of Plutarch’s and someone endowed, as he says, with ‘a philosophical nature’ (philosophos phusis, Quaest. conv. ), interrupts him and dismisses Epicurus’ statements by claiming that they lead to Pyrrhonism: “τ ν δ᾿ οἶνον ἐπιθυμῶ μαθεῖν ὁπόθεν ὑπόνοιαν ὑμῖν τοῦ ψυχρ ς εἶναι παρέσχενὔ” “οἴει γ ρ”, ἔφην ἐγώ, “τοῦτον ἡμέτερον εἶναι τ ν λόγον;” “ἀλλ τίνος”, εἶπεν, “ἑτέρου;” “μέμνημαι μ ν ο ν”, ἔφην ἐγώ, “κα Ἀριστοτ λους ἐντυχ ν οὐ νεωστ λόγῳ περ τούτου τοῦ προβλήματος ἀλλ᾿ ἱκανῶς πάλαιὔ διείλεκται δ κα ᾿ Επίκουρος ἐν τῶ Συμποσίῳ πολλο ς λόγους, ν τ κεφάλαιόν ἐστιν ὡς ἐγ μαι τοιόνδεὔ φησ γ ρ οὐκ εἶναι θερμ ν αὐτοτελῶς τ ν οἶνον, ἀλλ᾿ ἔχειν τιν ς ἀτόμους Philosophy (erlin, ), – . Opsomer, ‘Plutarch’s Platonism Revisited’, in . onazzi and V. elluprica (eds.), L’eredità platonica: studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo (aples, ), – at –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 274 Mauro Bonazzi ἐν αὑτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεστικ ς ἑτέρας δ᾿ α ψυχρότητος· ν τ ς μ ν ἀποβάλλειν, ὅταν εἰς τ σῶμα παραγένηται· τ ς δ προσλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος· ἕως ἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἔχουσι κράσεως ἡμῖν ἢ φύσεως ὁμιλήσῃ, ὡς το ς μ ν ἐκθερμαίνεσθαι το ς δ τοὐναντίον πάσχειν μεθυσκομένουςὔ” “ταῦτ᾿ ”, εἶπεν ὁ Φλῶρος, “ἄντικρυς εἰς τ ν Π ρρωνα δι τοῦ Πρωταγ ρου φ ρει ἡμᾶς· δῆλον γ ρ ὅτι κα περ ἐλα ου κα περ γ λακτος μ λιτ ς τε κα ὁμο ως τῶν ἄλλων διεξι ντες ἀποδρασ μεθα τ λ γειν περ ἑκ στου, ὁποῖον τῇ φ σει ἐστ ν, μ ξεσι ταῖς πρ ς ἄλληλα κα κρ σεσιν ἕκαστον γ νεσθαι φ σκοντεςὔ” (Quaest. conv. – ) ‘ow for wine! should like to know what made you suspect that it is cold.’ replied: ‘o you actually think that this is my own theory’ ‘Who else’s’ lorus said, and answered: ‘ remember coming upon ristotle’s discussion of this question too, not recently but quite a long time ago. nd Epicurus in his Symposium has discussed the matter at great length. The sum of what he has to say, think, is this: he holds that wine is not hot in an absolute sense, but has in it certain atoms productive of heat and others of cold some of these it throws off when it comes into the body and others it attracts out of the body until it adapts itself to us, whatever our constitution and nature may be. ccordingly, some men become thoroughly hot when drinking, others experience the contrary.’ ‘This’, said lorus, ‘carries us via Protagoras straight to Pyrrho for it is clear that we shall go on about oil, about milk and honey, and other things in like manner and shall avoid saying about each what its nature is by defining them in terms of their mixtures and union with each other.’ (trans. offleit, adapted) n spite of its conciseness, the passage is surely interesting, and perhaps also bizarre—for some readers, at least. What is remarkable is the linking of Epicurus to Protagoras and Pyrrho. s a matter of fact, this connection is not uncommon in doxographical reports, which were also known to Plutarch and may have influenced him. Yet, in the passage it is not so much a matter of doxographical genealogy as of philosophical perspective. The link between Epicurus and Pyrrho via Protagoras is not one of chronological descent, but is rather intended to associate Epicurus with Pyrrho, and hence ‘scepticism’ (understood not as a specific philosophical school, but as the questioning or denying of the possibility of knowledge). This reading is no doubt controversial. or it may be objected that there is a sharp distinction to draw on the issue of scepticism between Pyrrho and Protagoras on the one hand and Epicurus on the other. f. lem. Strom. . . Euseb. PE . . [al.] Hist. phil. with . Warren, Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of taraxia (ambridge, ), –, and . onazzi, ‘Protagoras’, in .-. Pradeau (ed.), Les Sophistes, vols. (Paris, ), i. –, – at – n. . Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 275 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics n spite of their divergences, a sceptical stance may be attributed to both Pyrrho and (somewhat controversially) Protagoras. The same, however, does not seem to hold for Epicurus: indeed, as has been rightly remarked, the battle for knowledge played a major role in the development of his philosophy. One of Epicurus’ ‘principal goals’ was to defend atomism from the sceptical conclusions that followers of emocritus such as etrodorus, naxarchus, and ausiphanes (not to mention Pyrrho) drew from the fallibility and conflicting evidence of the senses. oreover, Epicurus and his school also exploited scepticism as a polemical weapon against other (dogmatic) philosophical schools. n interesting example of this polemical attitude might be the above-mentioned Symposium, if Ettore ignone was right to suggest that in this text Epicurus opposes ristotle for the sceptical implications of his natural philosophy. similar line of attack against ristotle is typical of Epicureans, for it also recurs in iogenes of Oenoanda and is further and more generally confirmed by the work of olotes. n his treatise On the Point That Conformity to the Doctrines of Other Philosophers Actually Makes it Impossible to Live, the latter turned against several philosophers the same sceptical argument employed by Epicurus and iogenes against ristotle. y ‘sceptical argument’ mean what is otherwise known as the apraxia argument, viz. the charge of casting doubt upon the plain evidence of sense-perception and thereby providing confusing accounts of sensible objects, as if reality were not properly knowable, with the further consequence of confusing practical life. To deny the truth of impressions is to abolish knowledge, and without knowledge life becomes impossible. gainst this background it emerges that the connection that Plutarch draws between Epicurus and Pyrrho, far from being uncontroversial, is rather part of a polemical attack. ence a preliminary account of Plutarch’s claim is needed in order to reconstruct his views s the discussion at S.E. PH . suffices to show. . . ong and . . Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vols. (ambridge, ), i. . E. ignone, L’Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro, vols. (lorence, ), ii. –. r. . . –. erguson Smith. f. also Polystratus’ On Irrational Contempt, esp. cols. –. or a more detailed account of Epicurean arguments against scepticism see the valuable article by P. Vander Waerdt, ‘olotes and the Epicurean Refutation of Skepticism’ [‘olotes’], Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, (), –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 276 Mauro Bonazzi on Pyrrhonism. or it is clear that Plutarch’s assessment of Epicurus as a virtual sceptic affects his interpretation of what Pyrrhonism amounts to. uckily, on this issue we are better informed than we are regarding Plutarch’s views on Pyrrho. n particular, Plutarch mentions Epicurus’ Symposium elsewhere in his works, most notably in Against Colotes, where at stake is what called the sceptical argument. n analysis of this text will help clarify the meaning of the reference to Pyrrho in Quaest. conv. . . Epicurus’ Symposium is mentioned at the beginning of Against Colotes, in a section devoted to emocritus. olotes had opened his book with two charges against the atomist philosopher ( ). n the first, he had attacked the ou mallon formula (the formula for indifference arguments claiming of an object that it is no more x than y), which had first been introduced by emocritus and had became a distinctive tenet of Pyrrhonism. ence, the silence on Pyrrho (who was probably not considered a sceptic in the Epicurean tradition) does not exclude a reference to scepticism in the abovementioned sense. ndeed olotes’ assault rests on the ‘sceptical’ argument: ‘olotes first charges him [emocritus] with asserting that no object is any more of one description than of another, and thus throwing our life into confusion’ ( - ). olotes had reproached emocritus for providing a confusing account of reality which made knowledge impossible to obtain and, as a consequence, life impossible to live. Unfortunately, Plutarch does not clearly report how olotes argued that the ou mallon formula throws life into confusion, and scholars diverge on the reliability of his testimony. oreover, Plutarch’s response is somewhat complicated by his attitude towards emocritus, whose philosophy he partly defended and partly criticized. Reticence and ambiguity, however, do not obscure the strategy he deploys against olotes and Epicureanism. Plutarch first agrees with the Epicureans on the dangers resulting from this kind of scepticism, which is paradigmatically (and f. also Quaest. conv. and . P. e acy, ‘Οὐ μᾶλλον and the ntecedents of ncient Scepticism’, Phronesis, (), –, and E. Kechagia, Plutarch against Colotes: A Lesson in History of Philosophy [Plutarch] (Oxford, ), –. or the sake of the present argument, it is not necessary to discuss the different senses of the οὐ μᾶλλον formula in emocritus and Pyrrhonism. Vander Waerdt, ‘olotes’, . Translations of Adversum Colotem are from the oeb edition by Einarson and e acy, sometimes slightly modified. Vander Waerdt, ‘olotes’, –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 277 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics remarkably, if one considers the parallel text of the Table Talk) attributed to Protagoras ( ). ut then he argues that it is Epicurus and his adepts who as a matter of fact endorse such a position and therefore deserve to be criticized and dismissed. Plutarch’s attack rests on the claim that the ou mallon formula virtually corresponds to the Epicurean doctrine that ‘all the impressions reaching us through the senses are true’, as shown by the following argument: since people have different sensations, and none of these errs (i.e. the Epicurean doctrine), it necessarily follows that nothing is ‘any more of one description than of another’ ( – ). The same conclusion also emerges from a closer scrutiny of the process of knowing ( –). ccording to the Epicureans, perception depends on the passing into our sense-organs of the seeds which abide in things. Since it is a fact that people will have different perceptions of the same thing, Plutarch would be drawing the unavoidable conclusion that sense-perception is ‘deceptive’ (ψε δεσθαι τ ν αἴσθησιν). ut that is not the case for the Epicureans, who provide an alternative explanation. Since everything is mixed with everything else, it may happen that different people get in touch with different seeds. n any case, and in spite of mutual divergences, to the extent that any sense-perception involves contact with something real, its reliability is warranted. This leads Plutarch to confirm his claim. e concludes that since different perceptions will arise from the same thing, it follows that Epicureanism is nothing but a new version of Protagoras’ philosophy and of the ou mallon theory: τίνες μᾶλλον ἄνθρωποι τ “μ μᾶλλον” ἐπάγουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἢ οἳ πᾶν μ ν τ αἰσθητ ν κρᾶμα παντοδαπῶν ποιοτήτων ἀποφαίνουσι ὔ ὔ ὔ ἔρρειν δ ὁμολογοῦσι το ς κανόνας αὐτοῖς κα παντάπασιν οἴχεσθαι τ κριτήριον, ἔιπερ εἰλικριν ς αἰσθητ ν ὁτιοῦν κα μ πολλ ἕκαστον ἀπέλιπον; (Adv. Col. ) Who are more chargeable with imposing on objects the doctrine that nothing is more this than that, than those who assert that every perceptible object is a blend of qualities of every description . . . and who confess that their standards would go glimmering and the criterion of truth quite disappear if they permitted any sense-object whatsoever to be purely one thing and did not leave every one of them a plurality mmediately after, bringing his argument to a close, Plutarch quotes directly from Epicurus’ Symposium and Reply to Theophrastus, in order to confirm the correctness of his charge through the ipsissima verba of his rival ( - ). The pas- Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 278 Mauro Bonazzi sages from the Symposium are those summarized in the abovementioned section of Table Talk. iven that in the process of sense-perception the atoms stemming from the object and the atomic dispositions of the percipient may vary, it may happen—as it does—that different phenomenal properties and different impressions are produced. ence, it is not correct to generalize that wine is heating or cooling, for both qualities can result from the interaction of its atoms. ut such a conclusion, far from proving Epicurus’ claim that all impressions are true, confirms Plutarch’s conviction that Epicureanism is nothing but a reformulation of the ou mallon formula. nd as hot and cold, so all the rest, to the effect that the Epicureans are doomed by the sceptical arguments they adopted against their rivals. ow accurate is Plutarch’s criticism Some scholars have approved of his arguments, but it is probably safer to side with those who maintain that aversion made Plutarch misinterpret Epicurus, at least in part and perhaps intentionally. e that as it may, leaving f. also . P. owler, ‘Sceptics and Epicureans: iscussion of . igante, Scetticismo e epicureismo’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (), – at –. P. e acy, ‘Plutarch and the cademic Sceptics’, Classical Journal, (), – at , who concludes that ‘there was more than a casual link between the Epicureans and the Sceptics’. Thus, for instance, it may be objected that Plutarch focuses his attack on senseperception without paying due attention to the discriminating power of reasoning, which according to Epicurean epistemology plays an equally important role in our processes of belief formation (. Warren, ‘Plutarch and the yrenaics’ [‘Plutarch’], Aitia, (), forthcoming E. smis, ‘Epicurean Empiricism’, in . Warren (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism (ambridge ), – at –), or that he tacitly assumes what was rather in need of demonstration, viz. the superiority of Platonist dualism between the sensible and the intelligible realms (. snardi Parente, ‘Plutarco contro olote’, in . allo (ed.), Aspetti dello stoicismo e dell’epicureismo in Plutarco (errara, ), – at –, –). nd yet, considering Plutarch’s cademic background, his argument is less superficial than it might appear to be at first sight: for Plutarch is applying the typically anti-Stoic strategy of the cademy to the Epicureans. f sense-perceptions alone are defended as the basis for knowledge, but at the same time taken to provide contrasting reports, then no other criterion can further be inferred from them. n this sense the example of wine in Epicurus’ Symposium is well chosen, and it is not by chance that it occurs in both Table Talk and Against Colotes. f it is true, as Epicurus himself admits, that wine indiscriminately appears both as heating and non-heating under the same conditions and at the same time, this means that we do not have any criterion by which to state whether it is heating or non-heating. nd if this is also the case with all other sense-experiences, then it really follows that no other criterion can be drawn from sense-perception, so that we do not have any possibility of discriminating between true and false perceptions, and knowledge is precluded. The adoption of this cademic strategy prevents the Epicureans from introducing any other criterion to judge Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 279 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics aside the problem of the correctness of Plutarch’s criticism, what it is important to state now is the fact that the parallel helps elucidate Plutarch’s interpretation of Pyrrhonism, and why he was not sympathetic to this philosophy. So far, an analysis of Epicurean epistemology has shown that, for Plutarch, what necessarily results from an empiricist account of reality (i.e. one which assumes the existence of sensible objects and senses merely) is scepticism in the above sense: the impossibility of order and knowledge. ndeed, if reality is reduced to its sensible and phenomenal dimension, it appears devoid of unity and stability, since there are no substances existing per se but only aggregates of qualities which depend on their relative disposition towards other things. The consequence of all this, then, is the impossibility of knowledge: if there were knowledge of anything, it would be knowledge of the sensible world but on the ‘empirical’ account, the sensible world is unknowable therefore there is no knowledge at all. or how can we claim to know a given thing if this lacks any stable property, and always turns into something different, providing conflicting information y merely assuming the existence of sensible objects and the senses, empiricism presents reality as lacking any order at all, as completely crazy (ouch hugies), as Plutarch says elsewhere (Adv. Col. : see n. below). The result can only be radical scepticism. These polemics finally clarify Plutarch’s interpretation of Pyrrhonism: if Pyrrhonism is correctly regarded as a radical form of scepticism and pothe value of perceptions (cf. e.g. the dialectical use of antimarturēsis at , where it is introduced in a way that differs from Epicurean use, with the aim of showing that sense-perceptions differ widely). dmittedly, it may be objected to Plutarch not so much that he underemphasizes the importance of the Epicureans’ more elaborate system of sign-inference (Warren, ‘Plutarch’) as that he overemphasizes the divergences of sense-perception. ut it must be recognized that this results from Plutarch’s adoption of the typically cademic line of attack and not from crass ignorance or blind prejudice on his part. nd as far as Platonic dualism is concerned, it may be observed that while Plutarch takes it for granted, his argument in no way requires it. On Plutarch’s ‘cademic Platonism’ see further below. n fact, it may be observed that Plutarch was adapting the arguments found in the first part of Plato’s Theaetetus to two ellenistic philosophies, as his double reference to Protagoras (in the Quaestiones convivales and at Adv. Col. – ) shows (cf. e.g. the secret doctrine of the expression κρᾶμα παντοδαπῶν ποιοτ των is also interesting in the light of the Theaetetus: Plutarch’s use of κρᾶμα is reminiscent of ἄθροισμα at Theaet. – , and cf. the parallel in De E —note, moreover, that ποι της also occurs in the Theaetetus). t is interesting to remark that some scholars, most notably Richard ett, have recently argued that Pyrrho was influenced by a selective reading of the Theaetetus see further R. ett, Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy (Oxford, ), –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 280 Mauro Bonazzi lemically interpreted as the consequence of Epicureanism, it is on the assumption that both philosophies rest on the same empiricist foundations. or it is because it only sticks to the sensible aspect of things that Pyrrhonism leads to radical scepticism. Strange as it may appear, it is on this assumption that radical scepticism can be presented as the inevitable consequence of Epicureanism and that Plutarch can argue in favour of his ‘empirical’ interpretation of Pyrrhonism. dmittedly, the affinity between the two movements does not imply an equally fierce opposition on the part of Plutarch. or, unlike the Epicureans, Plutarch could at least appreciate Pyrrhonism for being consistent with its premisses: according to Plutarch’s interpretation, Pyrrhonism is not only the necessary outcome of Epicureanism, but a consistent version of it (and of any other empiricist philosophy): for the main difference between the two schools lies in the lack of coherence of Epicureanism. or, even though strict empiricism leads to radical scepticism, the Epicureans, unlike the Pyrrhonists, inconsistently deny such consequences. nd this incoherence further reinforced Plutarch’s negative evaluation of Epicureanism. y contrast, one might acknowledge that the Pyrrhonists consistently (if somewhat crazily) lived in accord with their scepticism. t is not by chance, then, that elsewhere Plutarch presents Pyrrho (if not Pyrrhonists in general) in a more favourable light (Quomodo virt. prof. – ). oreover, once again in opposition to Epicureanism, Plutarch might have remarked that in a way Pyrrhonism too argued against the reliability of the senses, which was a major point in his own philosophy and in his interpretation of the ellenistic cademy. ut in spite of this convergence, the ‘empirical scepticism’ which Plutarch regards as distinctive of Pyrrhonism clearly proves—as we shall now see—its distance from the cademy. . Platonist interpretation of the ellenistic cademy When we turn to the cademy, the situation we find is rather different. Unlike the Pyrrhonists, ellenistic cademics are frequently mentioned in Plutarch’s works and explicitly commended. n the whole corpus it is once again Against Colotes which provides the f. abut, ‘’unité de l’cadémie’, –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 281 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics most interesting evidence for reconstructing Plutarch’s views on the ellenistic cademy as opposed to Pyrrhonism. s a matter of fact, olotes’ On the Point That Conformity to the Doctrines of Other Philosophers Actually Makes it Impossible to Live is an anti-cademic treatise. enerally speaking, olotes’ purpose was to discredit all those philosophers who had cast doubt upon the plain evidence of the senses by showing that if the reliability of the senses is doubted it is impossible to live. Such criticism was not necessarily directed only against the cademics and their presumed predecessors, but it nevertheless applied particularly well to rcesilaus’ famous epochē, as Plutarch himself points out ( ). So while there is no evidence for claiming that all the other philosophers mentioned by olotes were criticized only as part of an attack against rcesilaus, it is fair to assume that the latter was one of olotes’ prime targets. The section devoted to rcesilaus has received varying attention in modern literature. While scholars have rightly acknowledged its importance for reconstructing rcesilaus’ theory of action (in opposition to Stoicism), they have often failed to notice that these chapters are equally relevant for Plutarch’s own interpretation of the ellenistic cademy. s a consequence, great attention has been paid to chapters and , where the apraxia argument is at stake, and less attention than deserved to the second part of the discussion, from the end of chapter to the following chapter . ere Plutarch introduces three Epicurean objections, and by defending rcesilaus also discloses his own view on epochē and the meaning of cademic philosophy. The three objections, and especially the third, mirror the usual strategy adopted by olotes: one cannot reject the evidence of sense-experience, for otherwise life becomes impossible. ot surprisingly, Plutarch’s reply is on the same lines. Only the Epicureans refuse assent to clear evidence, since with their doctrine that all n interesting example is emocritus, who is the first on olotes’ list. s is well known, emocritus stands out among other Presocratics as a source of inspiration for rcesilaus (ic. Acad. . . ). ut important as he might be, he cannot be regarded as the source of inspiration par excellence for rcesilaus, who had to be discussed before all the other thinkers, in open violation of the chronological order. On the contrary, olotes’ choice is best explained as depending upon ‘internal reasons’, namely the Epicureans’ desire to stress the difference between emocritus and Epicurus. t is this polemical background which best explains olotes’ decision to discuss emocritus first. owe this point to uca astagnoli. Vander Waerdt, ‘olotes’, –. Opsomer, In Search of the Truth, . Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 282 Mauro Bonazzi sense-impressions are true they introduce radical scepticism and make life impossible to live. This time Plutarch takes the example of optical illusions and hallucinations: by claiming that illusions exist just like everything else, the Epicureans αὐτο καταβ λλουσιν εἰς ἀφασ αν π ντα πρ γματα. . . . ἡ γ ρ ἱσ της ἣν ὑποτ θενται πᾶσι τῶν νενομισμ νων ἀφ στησι μᾶλλον ἢ προστ θησι τοῖς παραλ γοις τ ν π στιν. ( –) reduce the world to the state where nothing is asserted or denied. . . . or by introducing equality in everything their theory does more to estrange us from established beliefs than to convince us that the grotesques are real. ndeed, the argument basically repeats what has already resulted from the discussion on wine. y making sensation the unique criterion and by claiming that all impressions are true, the Epicureans arrive at paradoxical conclusions, with the effect of destroying the reliability of sensation and making the world something we cannot know at all and hence a place in which it is impossible to live coherently. The problem is once again empiricism, which by assuming the existence only of sensible objects and the senses, cannot discriminate but has to regard reality as indeterminate and lacking any stability, leading to the radical scepticism of the Pyrrhonists. Remarkably, the Epicurean position is again described in Pyrrhonian terms as aphasia, isotēs, and apostasis (just as previously it had been said to slip necessarily into the emocritean–Pyrrhonist ou mallon formula). f scepticism means indeterminacy, then the Epicureans are indeed sceptics. Epochē is introduced as what prevents reaching such sceptical and paradoxical outcomes: εἶτα ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον ἐπισχεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα πιστεύεσθαι δυνατόν ἐστιν; ὔ ὔ ὔ ὅθεν ἴσμεν οὐκ ὀλίγους τῶν φιλοσόφων ἥδιον ἂν θεμ νους τ μηδεμίαν ἢ τ πάσας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τ ς φαντασίας, κα μᾶλλον ἂν οἷς παρ ἐντυγχάνουσι διαπιστήσαντας ἀνθρώποις κα πράγμασι κα λόγοις ἁπλῶς ἅπασιν ἢ μίαν ἐκείνων ἀληθῆ κα ὑπάρχουσαν εἶναι φαντασίαν πεισθέντας ἃς λυττῶντες ἢ κορυβαντιῶντες ἢ κοιμώμενοι λαμβάνουσινὔ ἃ τοίνυν ἔστι μ ν ἀναιρεῖν ἔστι δ᾿ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπέχειν περ αὐτῶν, εἰ μηδ ν ἄλλο, τήν γε διαφωνίαν ταύτην λαβόντας ὔ ὔ ὔ; ( , –) That being the case, is there anything in the world about which it is impossible to suspend judgement, when such things can be accepted as real . . . ence not a few philosophers, we know, would prefer the position that no appearance is true to the position that all are true, and would rather give Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 283 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics up confidence at one sweep in all men, things, and statements encountered in their waking moments than trust as true and real a single one of these appearances that come to us in delirium or ecstasy or sleep. f, then, it is possible to deny appearances, and in a way impossible to do so, is it not possible to suspend judgement about them if for no other reason than because of this conflict of views Epochē, in other words, is a dialectical response to Epicurean epistemology. t is because rcesilaus considers the Epicurean doctrine that all impressions are true as a candidate for truth that he cannot assent to any impression and hence must suspend judgement. The dialectical context confirms that rcesilaus’ prime target is empiricism: εἰ δ περ το των δυνατ ν ἐστιν ἐπ χειν, οὐδ περ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδ νατον, κατ γε ὑμᾶς αἴσθησιν αἰσθ σεως κα φαντασ αν φαντασ ας οὐδ᾿ ὁτιοῦν διαφ ρειν ἡγουμ νους. ( – ) nd if it is possible to withhold judgement about these sensations, it is not impossible to withhold it about others as well, at least on the principles of your school, which set one act or image of sensation on exactly the same footing as another. This is well known. What is less known is that such a dialectical reading of epochē enables Plutarch to present the ellenistic cademy in a different light: as not necessarily committed to scepticism in the above sense. s we have seen, scepticism depends on empiricism, and hence both the Epicureans and the Pyrrhonists may be regarded as sceptics. Even though the Epicureans would have vehemently rejected such a label, for Plutarch it unavoidably results from their materialistic assumptions—the only difference between Epicureanism and Pyrrhonism being the inconsistency of the former. Pyrrhonists consistently accept what follows from their premisses, whereas the Epicureans are forced to put up with these outcomes in spite of their claims in the opposite direction. ut for both philosophies epochē is the unavoidable conclusion—epochē basically corresponding to aphasia, the admission that the world lacks order and that it makes no sense to speak either of knowledge or indeed of reality itself. rcesilaus and the cademy, however, are not committed to f. Adv. Col. : ‘or if men not sodden with drink or confused by strong medicine and out of their right minds, but sober and in perfect health, writing books on truth and norms and standards of judgement, if such men suppose in the presence Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 284 Mauro Bonazzi epochē as the Epicureans are. Suspension of judgement is the weapon against empiricism, but since the cademics argue dialectically, it also follows that they are not obliged to that conclusion. The opposite is rather the case, for the cademics are precisely those who argue against the risk of relying merely on the senses. ndeed, Plutarch envisages a more moderate reading of epochē, which he adapts to the cademy: οὐ μῦθος ο ν . . . ὁ περ τῆς ἐποχῆς λ γος ἐστιν, ὡς οἴεται Κωλ της, ἀλλ ἕξις ἀνδρῶν κα δι θεσις φυλ ττουσα τ ἀδι πτωτον κα μ προϊεμ νη ταῖς διαβεβλημ ναις ο τω κα δυστατο σαις αἰσθ σεσι τ ν κρ σιν μηδ συνεξαπατωμ νη το τοις οἳ τ φαιν μενα τῶν ἀδ λων π στιν ἔχειν φ σκουσιν, ἀπιστ αν τοσα την κα ἀσ φειαν ἐν τοῖς φαινομ νοις ὀρῶντεςὔ (Adv. Col. ) nd so this doctrine of withholding judgements . . . is no idle tale, as olotes thinks it is a settled state and attitude of grown men that preserves from error and refuses to abandon judgement to anything so discredited and incoherent as the senses or to be deluded as these people are deluded who call the seen the evidence of things unseen although they observe that appearances are so untrustworthy and ambiguous. This last remark, which concludes rcesilaus’ section, appears to uphold two claims, one explicit, the other implicit. The explicit claim presents the cademic position as opposed to the Epicurean (and Pyrrhonist) stance for the latter epochē corresponds to aphasia, but for those who are not committed to materialism another possibility is available, and epochē can rather be regarded as what can help us to distrust the evidence of the senses. This moderate reading of epochē enables Plutarch to proceed one step further: in so far as epochē constitutes a warning against the validity of sense-perception, it may be taken to mean, not that it is impossible to know anything at all (as the Pyrrhonists maintain and the Epicureans are forced to admit against their will), but rather that since knowledge cannot be based on the senses alone, one must turn elsewhere to provide a proper account of it. eedless to say, what Plutarch has in mind here is the intelligible dimension. Plutarch’s interpretation, therefore, far from negatively (and definitely) settling the problem of knowledge, paves the way for an alternaof the plainest and most vivid responses and movements of the senses that the nonexistent is true or that the true is false and non-existent, we may well wonder, not that men withhold assent altogether, but that things exist to which they assent at all.’ R. . ones, The Platonism of Plutarch (enasha, Wis., ), . Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 285 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics tive, metaphysical version of scepticism that leads to the notion that reality need not be reduced to its material components only. ndeed, this appears to be Plutarch’s implicit conclusion. dmittedly, this interpretation is not explicitly stated in the treatise. ut some clues may none the less be adduced in its favour, which also help clarify the reasons for Plutarch’s silence. irst of all, it must not be neglected that Plutarch has repeatedly argued for dualism in the preceding sections, from the prologue onwards. With regard to this, the setting of the encounter, carefully described by Plutarch, is extremely important. The treatise is presented as stemming from Plutarch’s exchange with some friends (or, more probably, some pupils), all of whom are committed to a Platonist stance. This provides a first likely explanation of why Plutarch does not feel compelled to express all his views and assumptions: for they would be obvious to his audience. Since the main purpose of the discussion is to mount a counter-attack against olotes, for the sake of clarity and brevity not every implication is developed. ut this does not mean that they were not there. further and most important confirmation that this was Plutarch’s view comes from the very beginning of the section on rcesilaus. ere a dualistic interpretation of rcesilaus, while not explicitly argued for, appears to be historically taken for granted, when Plutarch strategically recalls an ancient charge levelled against rcesilaus by some unnamed ‘sophist’ and also endorsed by olotes: ὁ δ Ἀρκεσ λαος τοσοῦτον ἀπ δει τοῦ καινοτομ ας τιν δ ξαν ἀγαπᾶν κα ὑποποιεῖσθαι τι τῶν παλαιῶν στε ἐγκαλεῖν το ς τ τε σοφιστ ς ὅτι προστρ βεται Σωκρ τει κα Πλ τωνι κα Παρμεν δῃ κα ῾Ηρακλε τῳ τ περ τῆς ἐποχῆς δ γματα κα τῆς ἀκαταληψ ας οὐδ ν δεομ νοις, ἀλλ οἷον ἀναγωγ ν κα βεβα ωσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἄνδρας ἐνδ ξους ποιο μενοςὔ ὑπ ρ μ ν ο ν το του Κωλ τῃ χ ρις κα παντ τῷ τ ν Ἀκαδημαϊκ ν λ γον ἄνωθεν ἥκειν εἰς Ἀρκεσ λαον ἀποφα νοντι. ( – ) ut so far was rcesilaus from cherishing any reputation for novelty or laying claim to any ancient doctrine as his own, that the sophists of his days accused him of foisting his own views about the suspension of judgement or a detailed analysis of the prologue and of its Platonic background see Kechagia, Plutarch, –. f. the presentation of ristodemus of egium ( ): Ἀριστ δημος ὁ Αἰγιε ς (οἶσθα γ ρ τ ν ἄνδρα τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημε ας οὐ ναρθηκοφ ρον ἀλλ ᾿ ἐμμαν στατον ὀργιαστ ν Πλ τωνος) cf. . onazzi, Academici e Platonici: il dibattito antico sullo scetticismo di Platone (ilan, ), . Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 286 Mauro Bonazzi and the impossibility of infallible apprehension on Socrates, Plato, Parmenides, and eraclitus, who had precious little need of such a gloss but rcesilaus wished to certify his views, as it were, by this appeal to highly respected names. So for his sake we are thankful to olotes and to anyone who shows that the cademic reasoning came to rcesilaus from such a higher dimension. learly, if Plutarch is happy to accept this point, it is not only because it enables him to stress the different attitude of cademics and Epicureans towards revered antiquity (as a matter of fact, Epicureanism is virtually reproached for its novelty). ost importantly, Plutarch’s allusion to the four great philosophers provides the proper context for his interpretation of rcesilaus. The previous chapters of the treatise had uncontroversially shown that the unifying factor of their philosophies is dualism, as the case of Parmenides illustrates. Parmenides’ most relevant philosophical merit is to have first introduced the metaphysical dualism that was later to be endorsed by Socrates and brought to perfection by Plato (cf. ). When explaining Parmenides’ doctrine, Plutarch reproaches the Stoics and ristotelians for failing to ‘go higher’ (ἀνωτ ρω δ οὐ προῆλθον, ), viz. to reach the intelligible dimension. Plutarch thanks olotes for showing that the Akademaikos logos came to rcesilaus ‘from a higher dimension’ (ἄνωθεν). The allusion here is not simply to ‘an ancient tradition’, as the oeb editors translate, but also to the ‘higher dimension’ of the intelligible realm. The fact that Plutarch is an artful writer need not be emphasized, as these intertextual references make it all too clear. nd it is this account of Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato to which the reader of Against Colotes is referred, when he encounters these names in the section on rcesilaus. o less remarkable is the fact that the very same list also occurs elsewhere in the treatise, just after the end of the rcesilaus section. ut this time the four great dualist philosophers are linked to remarkable parallel is De E , with the exhortation to aim at the divine realm of pollo: παρακαλῶμεν ἀνωτ ρω προ γειν. The same also applies to eraclitus, whose philosophy is not discussed in this treatise (due to the fact that he had not been attacked by olotes) but is habitually presented as an important representative of the dualist tradition: cf. De Is. et Os. and An. procr. – , with . ansfeld, Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy (eiden, ), –. On the value of these references for recovering the historical rcesilaus, which does not necessarily correspond with Plutarch’s aims, see . rittain and . Palmer, ‘The ew cademy’s ppeals to the Presocratics’, Phronesis, (), –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 287 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics another eminent member of the cademic tradition: not rcesilaus but Xenocrates, whose metaphysical leaning is all too well known ( ). The parallel is eloquent. n short, while dualism is not explicitly mentioned in the rcesilaus section, it serves as the common denominator for Plutarch’s sources of inspiration. The importance of his list is clear: placed at the very beginning of the section and at its end, it strategically offers Platonist readers (such as Plutarch’s friends) the key for a proper contextualization of rcesilaus’ antiempiricist engagement and ‘metaphysical scepticism’. nd this enables Plutarch to uphold the idea of an affinity between rcesilaus and Platonism. or those who have read the treatise in its entirety the pivotal role of such dualism is patent. The polemic against Epicureanism is not limited to a defence of ancient and revered philosophers or the exposure of typically Epicurean pettiness, but also repeatedly offers Plutarch the occasion to vindicate the superiority of his Platonist commitment. or, whereas Epicureanism would condemn us to a crazy world, Platonism furnishes correct doctrines for properly accounting for reality. Overall, the basic argument of the treatise may be presented as follows. ssuming that both philosophies share the view that radical scepticism is a mistaken account of reality, the choice must be: (a) Either Epicureanism or Platonism. (b) Epicureanism leads us to radical Scepticism. (c) So Platonism is right. n other words, to be more precise, Plutarch’s argument appears to rest on the fact that () we do live and know, and () Epicureanism, i.e. empiricism, is not able to account for this: () Empiricism assumes that only sensible things exist and that we can know only via the senses. () Empiricism makes life impossible to live (for it appears that sensible things have no intrinsic existence and that the senses provide conflicting reports). () ut we (viz. empiricists, cademics, and everyone else) do in fact live. () Therefore empiricism is mistaken. () Therefore something else besides sensible things and the senses exists, and knowledge is somehow possible. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 288 Mauro Bonazzi learly, this argument does not only condemn Epicureanism, but also supports positive consequences on an ontological and epistemological level. Reality is more complex than Epicureans and Stoics mistakenly assume. s a matter of fact, Plutarch affirms, reality is not completely crazy (ὑγι ς οὐδ ν, ), but uncertain (ἀσαφ ς, , ). ndeed, it would be completely crazy if the Epicurean account were correct for the mutual conflict of senseimpressions would indicate that the world is reduced to an aggregate of qualities without any unity and stability. ut that is not the case, as the very fact that we are living confirms. Reality is rather uncertain, for it is made up of disorderly and orderly constituents. nd since it has been shown that the disorderly constituents are the sensible ones, it follows that the orderly must be the non-sensible, that is—in Plutarch’s Platonist jargon—the intelligible. This is one of the central themes in Plutarch’s polemics against olotes. The chief merit of the philosophers who in Against Colotes constitute the real core of the Platonist tradition—Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato—lies precisely in having insisted on the importance of dualism ( ). rom this different account of reality there also follows a different epistemology. The asapheia which results from the cademic– Socratic account does not entail, as ‘empirical sceptics’ are forced to admit, that we cannot attain any knowledge at all of reality. iven that our world is also composed of intelligible and orderly constituents, it follows that it is not completely confused consequently, we can make positive assertions about it and we can have some knowledge of it, however provisional, which has practical consequences and enables us to live. What we cannot have—but this is an altogether different matter—is true knowledge of reality, i.e. epistēmē, as Plutarch says in his concluding remark on Socrates, at the end of a discussion which presents remarkable similarities with the defence of rcesilaus: ὁ δ τ ς αἰσθ σεις λ γος ἐπαγ μενος ὡς οὐκ ἀκριβεῖς οὐδ ἀσφαλεῖς πρ ς π στιν ο σας οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τ φα νεσθαι τῶν πραγμ των ἡμῖν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ χρωμ νοις f. Adv. Col. : ‘s that not reason enough to make us regard the world about us with suspicion—not that we actually take it to be completely crazy [ὑγι ς οὐδ ν], but only conclude that there is no end to the doubt [ἀσ φειαν κα ταραχ ν] and confusion that it begets’ f. . oys-Stones, ‘Plutarch on the Probable Principle of old: Epistemology and the De primo frigido’ [‘Principle of old’], Classical Quarterly, (), – at . f. Opsomer, In Search of the Truth, –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 289 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics κατ τ φαιν μενον ἐπ τ ς πρ ξεις ταῖς αἰσθ σεσι τ πιστε ειν ὡς ἀληθ σι π ντῃ κα ἀδιαπτ τοις οὐ δ δωσιν αὐταῖς· τ γ ρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρκεῖ κα χρειῶδες ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν, ὅτι β λτιον ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν· ἣν δ ποθεῖ φιλ σοφος ψυχ λαβεῖν ἐπιστ μην περ ἑκ στου κα γνῶσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι. ( ) The inductive argument by which we conclude that senses are not accurate or trustworthy does not deny that an object presents to us a certain appearance, but forbids us, though we continue to make use of the senses and take the appearance as our guide in what we do, to trust them as entirely and infallibly true. or we ask no more of them than utilitarian service in the unavoidable essentials, since there is nothing better available but they do not provide the perfect knowledge and understanding of a thing that the philosophical soul longs to acquire. parallel to this lies in the chapters on rcesilaus. s we have seen, the idea of epochē takes empiricism to mean that only sensible objects exist and that the senses alone know () moreover, it shows that empiricism leads to radical scepticism, making life impossible to live () it thus reaches the conclusion that empiricism is mistaken (). Unlike what is explicitly stated for Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato, however, Plutarch does not explicitly credit rcesilaus with any positive view on dualism (). ut in spite of this silence, it does not follow that Plutarch distinguishes between Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato on the one hand and rcesilaus on the other as endorsing two different ontologies, for their argument is the same. s we have seen, dualism () depends on () the claim that we somehow know things and hence can live. ow, Plutarch strongly insists that rcesilaus’ epochē too does not prevent us from living ( – ), but raises doubts as to the reliability of the senses and the legitimacy ndeed, it may be objected that the latter (and most important) phrase simply states that the senses do not provide exact knowledge, but not that this knowledge is somehow possible and must be referred to the intelligible. While this is a possible reading, it cannot be the correct one if we consider the above-mentioned phrase from (cf. . Warren, ‘Socratic Scepticism in Plutarch’s Adversus Colotem’, Elenchos, (), – at –). esides, the text is built on the model of the Phaedo, with its opposition between senses and intellect (as correctly pointed out by . Einarson and P. e acy, Plutarch: oralia, xiv (ambridge, ass., ), n. d). ust what epistēmē amounts to for Plutarch is certainly far from clear, and the idea that it is possible to grasp perfectly the intelligible remains controversial. Yet these doubts affect neither Plutarch’s commitment to a dualistic ontology and epistemology nor his conviction that it is the most important view held by Plato, Parmenides, and Socrates. Plutarch’s elusiveness in the phrase also depends on the fact that an open and more detailed reference to dualism in that passage would not have been necessary. inally, we should bear in mind that elusiveness and allusiveness are two distinctive traits of Plutarch’s style. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 290 Mauro Bonazzi of any empiricist account ( ). ndeed, Plutarch’s discussion of the apraxia argument showed that rcesilaus’ epochē does not make life impossible the latter’s aim is rather to eliminate false doxa ( and ), which is the negative correlative of epistēmē: Epicureans and Stoics start by searching for epistēmē but, since they rest on mistaken assumptions, they end up with mistaken doxai, which subvert knowledge and life. On the contrary, rcesilaus’ epochē, in so far as it does not impede life, does not abolish the idea that we have some acquaintance—though not epistemic—with reality. Therefore, given the correspondence between our epistemological possibilities and the ontological status of the world, the fifth point is also accepted. or if we somehow know and hence live, reality encompasses not merely disorder, but also order. nd given that order does not belong to the sensible, it follows that rcesilaus’ epochē also involves an (implicit) recognition of the intelligible dimension. t is in this sense that suggest one should speak of ‘metaphysical scepticism’. Whereas ‘empirical scepticism’ reduces the world to aggregates without any unity or stability and thereby destroys the possibility itself of knowledge and reality, ‘metaphysical scepticism’ attacks this reductionist account and argues for dualism. ccordingly, it further warns against the possibility of acquiring true cognition (epistēmē) of the sensible world but does not deny that we can know something of it. We cannot have epistēmē of the world, for it is impossible to account scientifically for the sensible dimension, which is always different and in flux. Yet such recognition of our weakness does not prevent the philosopher from crediting human beings with some kind of knowledge—however provisional—and presenting the general structure of reality as dualistic. s interpreted by Plutarch, rcesilaus’ scepticism does not lead to Pyrrhonist indeterminacy: it does not merely work as an anti-empiricist weapon, but also paves the way for a different, dualistic account of reality. f this reconstruction is correct, it remains to be explained why Plutarch did not attribute an explicitly dualistic stance to rcesilaus, as he did with Parmenides, Socrates, and Plato. gain, it may be observed that an explicitly dualistic presentation of rcesilaus was not necessary for the philosopher’s criticism of n the footsteps of P. . onini, ‘o scetticismo academico, ristotele e l’unità della tradizione platonica secondo Plutarco’, in . ambiano (ed.), Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica (Turin, ), – at . Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 291 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics olotes. ut the real reason, would argue, lies elsewhere: Plutarch did not explicitly attribute such a stance to rcesilaus because he knew that he could not do so. Plutarch was historically too aware of the fact that there was no explicit claim for metaphysical dualism on the part of rcesilaus this explains his different treatment of rcesilaus compared to Socrates, Parmenides, or Plato. This difference, however, does not invalidate—in Plutarch’s eyes at least—a dualist interpretation of rcesilaus. or rcesilaus’ epochē and critique of the senses imply a conception of reality which, far from being compatible with that of Pyrrhonists and Epicureans, is rather that of explicit dualists such as Parmenides and Plato. To repeat and conclude Plutarch’s basic argument: () () () () Either scepticism (taken in olotes’ sense) or Platonism. ut not scepticism. Then Platonism. ut since rcesilaus and ellenistc cademics are not committed to () scepticism, as Epicureans and Pyrrhonists are, but rather argue against it, () it follows that they are somehow committed to () Platonism. y distinguishing between two alternative kinds of ‘scepticism’, one more empirical, the other more moderate and dualistic, Plutarch can thus defend an interpretation of rcesilaus’ philosophy which endorses a different ontology and (sceptical) epistemology from those of Epicureanism (or Pyrrhonism) and which is compatible with Plato. assume that this was Plutarch’s main thesis in the lost treatise on the difference between the Pyrrhonists and the cademics. . n search of a Platonist identity Plutarch argued brilliantly in defence on his thesis of the unity of the cademy. Within the background of the long history of Platonism, this is a highly original thesis. or after the ‘ntiochus affair’ the majority view, from ntiochus to umenius to Proclus and even later, dismissed the ellenistic cademy as a mistaken parenthesis, or even worse as the ark ges of Platonism. ndeed, only Plutarch and an otherwise unknown commentator on the f. ic. Acad. . on ntiochus umenius, On the Defection of the Academics Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 292 Mauro Bonazzi Theaetetus tried to account for the entire tradition stemming from Plato in its complexity, reserving a place also for rcesilaus and the other ellenistic cademics. ut was Plutarch’s interpretation also accurate reply to this question, am afraid, would condemn Plutarch’s interpretation as implausible. Yet too severe a criticism would prevent a balanced assessment of his merits. Plutarch offers original insight into what we call ‘reek scepticism’, the importance of which it would be wrong to underestimate. or whereas we essentially take scepticism to be an epistemological issue, Plutarch assumes that it involves an ontological dimension too. odern philosophers would probably deny the legitimacy of Plutarch’s view by contesting the theoretical consistency of ‘scepticism’ as it emerges from his account but it is none the less true that Plutarch can lead us to a better understanding of cademic and Pyrrhonian philosophy—at least in so far as he warns against the risk of applying our modern view on scepticism to ancient reece without qualification. n the case of Pyrrhonism it is interesting to observe that recently it has been convincingly argued that enesidemus’ revival of Pyrrhonism in the first century rested on an empiricist recasting of Pyrrho. f that is the case, Plutarch was basically right in insisting on the importance of empiricism as the distinctive feature of Pyrrhonist scepticism. Thus, Plutarch emerges as a brilliant and well-informed witness to the Pyrrhonism of his day, and the parfrom Plato frr. – es Places Procl. Theol. Plat. . non., Prol. in Plat. Phil. . –. Olymp. In Phaed. . Westerink avid [Elias], In Cat. . – usse. Remarkably, that Plato has nothing in common with scepticism was also the view of imperial Pyrrhonists: see . onazzi, ‘ Pyrrhonian Plato gain on Sextus on enesidemus on Plato’, in . achuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism (eiden, ), –. On the anonymous commentator on the Theatetus see . . Sedley, ‘ommentarium in Platonis Theaetetum’, in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, vols. (lorence, ), – at – for a detailed comparison with Plutarch see . rittain, Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics [Philo] (Oxford, ), –, and onazzi, Academici e Platonici, –. t may be objected that ‘empirical scepticism’ is better described as negative dogmatism. s for ‘metaphysical scepticism’, one may doubt whether it in fact constitutes ‘scepticism’ at all. R. Polito, The Sceptical Road: Aenesidemus’ Appropriation of Heraclitus (eiden, ), e.g. –. The treatise On Pyrrho’s Ten Tropes, if authentic, also points in the direction of Plutarch’s acquaintance with enesideman Pyrrhonism more than with Pyrrho directly cf. abut, ‘Scepticisme’, n. . esides, Plutarch is not the only author Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 293 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics allel he draws with Epicurus becomes particularly philosophically stimulating. The case of rcesilaus and his followers is more complex. Surely, one may point out that cademic scepticism, as it emerges from Plutarch’s account, bears similarities to the probabilism championed by Philo of arissa. ut it would certainly be unsafe to ascribe any metaphysical attitude to Philo. t is possible to embrace a rationalist reading of the ellenistic cademy, but hardly a metaphysical interpretation of it. s far as the cademics are concerned, it is then difficult to avoid the conclusion that Plutarch pushes his interpretation too far. Yet, a charge of eclecticism does not necessarily follow from this, as if Plutarch were merely bringing together different, and perhaps incompatible, doctrines without any philosophical understanding. n fact, Plutarch was well aware of the complexity of his philosophical project, and his interpretation is much more subtle than it may appear at first. s we have remarked, in Against Colotes Plutarch presents rcesilaus as explicitly casting doubt on the reliability of sense-perception and only implicitly sharing a dualist perspective. n so doing Plutarch shows himself informed about the technical details of the ellenistic debates. ut the point he wishes to make is that a reading of rcesilaus in terms of his anti-empiricism alone is reductive. nd this is not implausible. Were Plutarch alive today, he would side with those scholars who interpret rcesilaus as endorsing a philosophy in propria persona against those who take him as only dialectically arguing against Stoics and Epicureans but at the same time he would disagree with most scholars who interpret rcesilaus as endorsing a philosophy in propria persona by attributing to him, not radical scepticism, but a metaphysical version of scepticism. We may disagree with Plutarch’s interpretation, but we must concede that the philosopher spotted a highly important issue, to present Pyrrhonism as an empiricist philosophy, as its usual association with medical empiricism shows (cf. e.g. S.E. PH . –). owe this point to Riccardo hiaradonna. f. Schroeter, Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis, – . Tarrant, Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy (ambridge, ), oysStones, ‘Principle of old’, –. esides, the absence of any metaphysical attitude also leads to a different view of the unity of the cademic–Platonic tradition for a detailed comparison between Plutarch’s and Philo’s ‘Unity of the cademy’ theses see rittain, Philo, – and –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 294 Mauro Bonazzi which many modern scholars have failed to address: for Plutarch was aware that alongside the struggle against Stoics and Epicureans there was another and no less substantial issue at stake, namely that of rcesilaus’ stance towards Plato. ndeed, any interpretation of rcesilaus’ philosophy depends on how we view this issue. Plutarch defended the thesis that a united tradition stemmed from Plato in his lost treatise On the Unity of the Academy from the Time of Plato (CL ), as well as in many other passages of his corpus. Obviously, the main obstacle to this claim was rcesilaus’ presumed scepticism: for if one wishes to view rcesilaus as a legitimate heir of the tradition stemming from Plato, one must assess his scepticism as being compatible with Plato’s doctrine. nd this is indeed what Plutarch tried to do. gainst this background the importance of the comparison with the Pyrrhonists becomes clear. s we have seen, Plutarch acutely realized that a merely anti-empiricist interpretation of rcesilaus did not suffice to legitimate his claims about rcesilaus and the ellenistic cademy. dmittedly, if anti-empiricism alone were the trait d’union between rcesilaus and Plato, Plutarch’s claim would be a ‘modest affair’. or all the other philosophers attacked by olotes (even the Pyrrhonists) were likewise somewhat critical of the senses, without thereby being linked to Plato. To pursue his aim fully—to prove rcesilaus’ stricter commitment to Plato—Plutarch needed to take one further step, namely to show that rcesilaus’ anti-empiricist stance necessarily entailed a (Platonist) dualistic ontology. Since Plutarch’s main task in Against Colotes was to defend rcesilaus’ philosophical coherence from Stoic and Epicurean attacks, rather than argue in favour of his ‘Platonism’, this dualistic interpretation was only assumed—it was taken for granted but not argued for in detail, given that the anti-Epicurean argument did not require it. t is rather in the lost treatises on the Pyrrhonists and the unity of the cademy that Plutarch may have argued in detail in favour of this thesis. or, as have attempted to show, the controversy on the difference between the cademy and Pyrrhonism offered him a substantial argument. y adapting radical scepticism to empiricist ontology, Plutarch could construct an alternative form of scepticism for the cademy, compatible with Plato and Platonism in so doing he could legitimate his thesis on the unity of the Platonist tradition. This treatise, therefore, plays a major role in rittain, Philo, . Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 295 Plutarch on Pyrrhonists and Academics Plutarch’s reconstruction of Platonism. s an Opsomer has rightly remarked, it is probably no coincidence that in the Lamprias Catalogue the treatise on the difference between the Pyrrhonists and the cademics followed that On the Unity of the Academy from the Time of Plato, as if the two works constituted a diptych. Plutarch was not interested in Pyrrhonism per se, nor did he write about it with the aim of exhibiting his erudition rather, he clearly understood the tactical importance of an engagement with Pyrrhonism for his attempt to reconstruct the philosophical tradition stemming from Plato. f my reconstruction is correct, a further and most interesting consequence follows. So far have spoken of the cademy as if it were a matter of the ellenistic cademy only. dmittedly, it is most likely that Plutarch focused mainly on rcesilaus and his followers. Yet, given his ‘metaphysical’ interpretation of rcesilaus and his unitary reading of the entire cademic tradition, we must conclude that when Plutarch was arguing for the difference between the cademics and the Pyrrhonists, he was opposing to Pyrrhonism the cademic–Platonist tradition as a whole—from Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates to his own day. Pyrrhonist scepticism he took as a test case to prove the validity of Platonic dualism, for it showed that any form of empiricism could remain consistent only at the expense of patent absurdity (something Epicureans and Stoics attempted to refute in vain). t turns out that Plutarch took a highly original position in the Pyrrhonist/cademic controversy. f this is the case, it also becomes clear why the question whether Plutarch was a sceptic is misleading. s part of the cademic tradition, Plutarch’s philosophy combines positive ontological claims and epistemological caution in a way that hardly meets modern standards. deally, one should speak of ‘cademism’, as opposed to both (dogmatic) Platonism and scepticism. nd even though it may be doubted that such ‘cademism’ is legitimate or possible, we should appreciate the subtlety of Plutarch’s historical-philosophical understanding. n post-ellenistic centuries Platonists had to face a real crisis of self-definition, as several images of Plato were circulat Opsomer, In Search of the Truth, . ndeed, this equiparation had already been hinted at in the prologue, when presenting ristodemus as ‘a man of the cademy, no thyrsus-bearer, but a most frenzied devotee of Plato’ ( ) cf. onazzi, Academici e Platonici, – Kechagia, Plutarch, –. f. . oys-Stones, Post-Hellenistic Philosophy (Oxford, ), –. Created on 16 July 2012 at 11.09 hours page 296 Mauro Bonazzi ing that were hard to reconcile: alongside the cademic Plato there was the Stoic one—as interpreted by Panaetius and Posidonius on the one hand, and ntiochus on the other—and on top of these the Pythagorean Plato of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha. n general, Platonists from ntiochus to umenius and the late eoplatonists opted for a selective reading, thereby losing sight of certain aspects of such a complex tradition. Plutarch sought to take account of the tradition as a whole, finding a place for both the Old cademy and the ellenistic one, for Pythagoreanism, ristotle, and possibly— although this is more controversial—ntiochus as well. t may well be impossible to reconcile the various conflicting trends within the Platonic tradition but it would be a great mistake to undervalue the philosophical relevance of Plutarch’s attempt to bring them together, for this makes him not so much an eclectic figure as one of the most interesting thinkers in the long history of Platonism. Università degli Studi di Milano O RP Y smis, E., ‘Epicurean Empiricism’, in . 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