A soldier carrying a Panzerfaust from the Hermann Göring Panzer Division, Russia, 1944 (Cassowary Colorizations, CC BY 2.0).
The Panzerfaust ("tank fist") was a late-war German hand-held anti-tank weapon. If there's one thing that you can say positive about the Wehrmacht, it was that it always supplied its ground troops with first-class weapons. From pistols to machine guns to grenades to semi-automatics, the German Army had the best in the business. The Panzerfaust was an outstanding addition to the German small arms which had an impact on the final year of the war. The Panzerfaust's main failing was that it did not come sooner, coming into widespread use only after the German armies were so run down that nothing could save them.
A German soldier in South Ukraine aiming a Panzerfaust at a Soviet position, December 1943/January 1944 (Gronefeld, Gerhard, Federal Archive Figure 101I-709-0337A-10A).
What Was the Panzerfaust?
The Panzerfaust was a cheap launching tube from which an individual soldier could fire a high-explosive charge over a moderate distance. It was the forerunner of rocket-propelled grenade launchers such as the Soviet RPG family of grenade launchers (most famously the RPG-2). The Panzerfaust was not the equivalent of the United States Army Bazooka which was developed around the same time. However, it is easy to get the two confused (even the official German Archive does), so let's take a brief look at the Panzerschreck to make the difference plain.
A German soldier aiming a Panzerschreck near Vitebsk, Russia, March 1944. Note that there is no shaped charge at the end of this weapon (Miner, Johannes, Federal Archive Picture 101I-279-0943-22A).
The Germans had their own equivalent to the Bazooka called the Panzerschreck ("Tank scare") which was a completely different weapon. German infantry generally used the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck interchangeably, but the Panzerfaust was much more common (6.7 million Panzerfaust units built as opposed to 289,000 Panzerschrecks). Tests showed that the Panzerfaust also created a bigger entry hole due to its larger warhead and the unique shape of the charge. You were much more likely to be equipped with a Panzerfaust than a Panzerschreck, and the Germans spent much more time developing and refining the Panzerfaust than the Panzerschreck, which at heart was just a cheap copy of the Bazooka. The Panzerfaust in the opinion of many (but not everybody) was simply a better weapon than the Panzerschreck or the Bazooka.
A German soldier in South Ukraine training with a Panzerfaust (Gronefeld, Gerhard, Federal Archive Picture 101I-710-0371-19).
How Was the Panzerfaust Developed?
Contrary to common belief, the Panzerfaust was not a late-war expedient conjured up with little thought. It also did not fire rockets. HASAG Hugo Schneider AG, Werk Schlieben, began work on the concept during the summer of 1942 when things were still going well for the Wehrmacht. Dr. Heinrich Langweiler led a team in Leipzig which came up with the Faustpatrone ("fist cartridge"), which was a recoilless gun. The Faustpatrone was basically just a test of the concept and was considered too small to be very useful in the field, but HASAG delivered 500 of them by August 1943. They were used mostly for training.
A German soldier at the Luftwaffe military officer training center holding a Faustpatrone in 1944. (Hoepner, Federal Archive Picture 101I-672-7634-03).
Virtually concurrently with its development of the Faustpatrone, HASAG began developing another model under the name Panzerfaust. The main difference was simply that the Panzerfaust was bigger. Whereas the Faustpatrone had a metal launch tube with a length of 80 cm (31½ in) and a diameter of 3.3 cm (1.3 in), the Panzerfaust 30 tube was 104.5 centimeters (3.4 ft) and 44 millimeters (1.7 in) in diameter. The Faustpatrone warhead was 400 g (14 oz) of a 50:50 mix of TNT and tri-hexogen, while the Panzerfaust 30 warhead was 2.9 kilograms (6.4 lb) and contained 0.8 kilograms (1.8 lb) of a 50:50 mixture of TNT and hexogen explosives. Obviously, given these differences, the Panzerfaust offered the soldier more firepower. This was critically important because both weapons were only effective at about 30 meters. If you were going to get that close to a tank, you had better make have success with your first shot or you were unlikely to get a chance for a second.
A Panzerfaust being tested. Note the huge arc of the trajectory - these weapons required some practice to use properly.
Development of the Panzerfaust continued until the closing days of the European Theater of Operations. Based on feedback from soldiers, engineers lengthened the weapon and added a crude site to aid with aiming, increased the weapon's range. They also added a shield on later models, but those were more common on Panzerschrecks. All of these enhancements added to the Panzerfaust's effectiveness.
Finnish soldiers aim their Panzerfausts at Soviet armor during the Battle of Tali-lhantala, June 30, 1944.
When Was the Panzerfaust Used?
The Panzerfaust was only produced during World War II. There was some limited use of these weapons after the war. The first production units of the Panzerfaust began arriving in August 1943, virtually at the same time as the Faustpatrone. Initial reports from the field were good. It was light and disposable, with the tube made of cheap steel, so the troops were willing to carry it into battle and fire it. However, there were a couple of complaints. The most important one was that it was difficult to aim (a particular fault of the Faustpatrone). Dr. Langweiler's team solved that by lengthening the tube and adding a sight. The second problem was a little more difficult to solve. Getting to within 30 meters of enemy tanks was not that difficult, but getting away alive was. From this point on, development focused on extending the weapon's range. This was done successfully and efficiently, but the development ate up time that the Wehrmacht no longer had.
There were a few instances of Panzerfausts being used after World War II. The Polish People's Army used captured Panzerfausts beginning in 1949, designating them PG-49. The Poles liked the weapon so much that they made their own knockoff of the Panzerfaust 100 in 1951-52 designated as Pc-100. The Soviets based their famous postwar RPG-2 in part on the Panzerfaust. There were reports of Panzerfausts being used in Afghanistan as late as 2006-2010, and there may still be some in the hands of irregular forces ready to be used.
An experienced German First Lieutenant (note his Tank Destruction Badge) demonstrating the Panzerfaust to an audience in Italy, April/May 1944 (Federal Archive Figure 101I-313-1005-04A).
Who Used the Panzerfaust?
The Panzerfaust was developed by German engineers for use by the German Wehrmacht. However, they were not the only ones that used it. The Reich gave the Panzerfaust to its allies which were also helping to defend the frontier. These included the Italian Social Republic (RSI), Bulgaria, Romania, and the Government of National Unity (Hungary). During mid-1944, Adolf Hitler and General Keitel managed to convince Finland to remain in the war for a couple of months with the promise of aid that included a large batch of Panzerfausts. Thus, the Panzerfaust helped to achieve strategic war aims of the Third Reich, even if the effects were only temporary (Finland defected in September 1944, taking its remaining Panzerfausts with it).
A Finnish soldier with a Panzerfaust. This photo was taken on June 30, 1944 (SA-Kuva).
The Czech resistance used captured Panzerfausts during the Prague uprising of May 1945, which lasted until 9 May 1945.
The Germans gave the Empire of Japan plans and specifications for the Panzerfaust. The Japanese, however, went against the trend and preferred the design of the American Bazooka. The Japanese Type 4 was based on captured Bazookas found at Leyte.
Was the Panzerfaust an Effective Weapon?
The Panzerfaust was very effective, but like all weapons, it was more effective in some situations more than others. Given its limited range, the Panzerfaust was least effective in open settings such as beaches and fields. It was very dangerous to sneak up on an enemy tank in places where there was little cover.
There are two well-documented examples of the Panzerfaust's lesser effectiveness outside of urban areas. First, the Finns, who received a large batch of Panzerfausts and Panzerschrecks in mid-1944, did not particularly like the weapon. This was likely due to the more rural nature of military actions in Finland as opposed to urban combat. Part of the problem may have been lack of training, as Finnish soldiers rightly felt that they had done pretty well with the weapons they already had and did not need to adapt to using a new weapon. The Finns preferred the Panzerschreck and adapted that into their own postwar 55 S 55 weapon.
Finnish soldiers are being taught how to use Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck. This photo was taken in by Military Official J.M Wuorela in Syskyjärvi in July of 1944. (SA-Kuva photo archive, photo number 156315).
Second, the Panzerfaust did not make much impact in the Battle of Normandy, particularly during the lodgement phase on the beaches. However, the Allied troops certainly noticed the danger of Panzerfausts and became very careful about following an all-arms strategy where tanks did not advance without strong infantry support to keep German soldiers away from the tanks.
German soldiers in Budapest armed with sub-machine guns and Panzerfausts as the Red Army approaches in October 1944 (Faupel, Federal Archive Picture 101I-680-8282A-19A).
In urban settings, though, the Panzerfaust was extremely effective. A soldier could fire his Panzerfaust from a second-story window, for instance, and disable a passing tank and then retreat quickly without fear of being captured or shot. This dovetailed nicely with the German situation in late 1944 and 1945 when the Wehrmacht strategy centered around urban strongpoints ("fortresses") and the battlefield changed from eastern forests and fields to built-up areas. German forces held out far longer than they otherwise would have in some cities such as Budapest because they had access to Panzerfausts. In fact, Panzerfausts were considered so critical in Budapest that they continued to be made during the siege itself at the Hungarian Manfred Weiss Steel and Metal Works, located on Csepel Island (much as the defenders of Leningrad continued to make their own tanks during that siege).
A camouflaged German paratrooper carrying his Panzerfaust, France, Jun-Jul 1944 (Thönessen (nn), Federal Archive Bild 101I-586-2221-14).
The Panzerfaust 30 was just the beginning of a family of weapons. Later models of the Panzerfaust increased its effectiveness. Development continued until the end of the war primarily to increase the Panzerfaust's range. The numbers following the name indicate the range of each weapon in meters:
Panzerfaust 30 (Klein) introduced August 1943
Panzerfaust 30 introduced August 1943
Panzerfaust 60 introduced Summer 1944
Panzerfaust 100 introduced November 1944
Panzerfaust 150 introduced in small numbers in March 1945
The last Panzerfaust to make a difference in combat was the Panzerfaust 100, which was finalized in September 1944 and began to reach units that November. The Panzerfaust 60 was the most produced version, reaching production levels of 400,000 by September 1944. Actual useful ranges in combat conditions were likely somewhat shorter than the published ranges. A Panzerfaust 250, which, besides having an extended range would have been reloadable, was in development when the war ended and was not completed.
While this is from a postwar motion picture, it shows how Panzerfausts were used. Note that the soldier is standing in full of the tank crew, which is unrealistic.
In addition, the Panzerfaust was effective because it was readily available. Unlike most other German weapons, there was no scarcity of Panzerfausts. The Reich economy was floundering by mid-1944, but that did not impact Panzerfaust production. The weapon was cheap to make and did not rely on rare materials. Both the firing tube and the warhead could be built by whatever cheap metal was available.
Members of the Grossdeutschland Division, East Prussia, October 1944, carrying their Panzerfausts. In the background is an armored personnel carrier. They are in Memel and advancing to counterattack Soviet troops (Otto, Albrecht Heinrich, Federal Archive Picture 146-1995-081-31A).
German tactical doctrine developed to increase the effectiveness of the Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust. As with every weapon, the Panzerfaust's effectiveness increased when used in certain proven ways. The Wehrmacht directed that separate Panzerfaust teams be sited in staggered trenches within 115 meters of each other. This assured that advancing enemy tanks would coming into their range sometimes from multiple angles but in all cases at a distance no greater than 69 meters. These tactics required some training which often was not given to raw recruits, leading some soldiers to be disappointed by the Panzerfaust.
German soldiers at a training demonstration of the Panzerfaust in France, Spring 1944 (Rogue, Federal Archive Picture 101I-264-1623-30).
There was a problem with the use of the Panzerfaust, but it was unrelated to the weapon itself. The Panzerfaust was a deceptively simple weapon to use - just point and press a lever and you were done. It became a "panacea" weapon late in the war and its capabilities were oversold. When the Reich began raising Volkssturm units late in the war, the new recruits received little training and often went into battle in their street clothes topped off perhaps their old War War I caps.
This photo was taken on 10 March 1945, the day that Berlin was declared a "Defense Area." Note the barricades in the background in front of a railway bridge. In the foreground are three Volkssturm soldiers holding their only weapons - Panzerfausts - and wearing their "uniforms." (Scherl Agency, Federal Archive Figure 183-J31320).
It became almost a joke that these new overage Volkssturm soldiers were issued nothing but a Panzerfaust with a single warhead and told to go destroy an enemy tank. German officials sarcastically commented that once fired, the tube could be used as a club. These patriotic men marching off to war with their Panzerfausts made for good propaganda photos, but firing a Panzerfaust required some training. Their trajectory was like a softball pitch with a huge arc. In addition, getting into a position to use a Panzerfaust effectively required a large dollop of skill, dedication, and bravery. Without these crucial ingredients, the Panzerfaust was virtually worthless. An unenthusiastic recruit could fire his single warhead from too far away or at a worthless target and then his hands were clean - he could walk away without blame or shame. Thus, the Panzerfaust was effective only when given to properly trained and motivated soldiers, which were in increasingly short supply as the calendar moved forward.
A German NCO in France or Belgium holding a Panzerfaust. Note that his uniform sleeve sports a Silver Tank Destruction Badge, indicating that he has personally knocked out an enemy tank (colorized, Ash Bridge, Federal Archive Figure 101I-300-1897-10A).
What did Soldiers Think of the Panzerfaust?
In general, soldiers liked the Panzerfaust and used them gladly. That the soldiers liked the Panzerfaust is more important than you might think - a lot of new weapons fail when the common soldier won't use them. Panzerfausts were easy to aim and fire and could be thrown away once used. One of the most prestigious German military decorations was the Tank Destruction Badge (German: Sonderabzeichen für das Niederkämpfen von Panzerkampfwagen durch Einzelkämpfer). You earned this badge by single-handedly destroying an enemy tank or an armored combat vehicle using a hand-held weapon. Established on 9 March 1942, this badge was prominently displayed on a soldier's uniform sleeve. There were two classes of this badge, a silver class for destroying a single tank and a gold badge (established 18 December 1943) for destroying five tanks. One Wehrmacht soldier, Günther Viezenz, gained renown by destroying 21 enemy tanks, so he wore four gold badges and one silver badge. The Panzerfaust made these highly coveted badges easier to earn.
A US GI of the 2nd Armored Division prepared to use his captured Panzerfaust (colorized).
The best compliment paid to the Panzerfaust, however, was by Allied soldiers. They captured some Panzerfausts during the Sicilian campaign where they were first used and liked them. Other GIs also used the captured Panzerfausts that they came across. General John Gavin of the 82nd Airborne mentioned this in his classic 'On to Berlin" (1978):
I visited [Commander of the 504th PIR Rubin] Tucker to see how he was getting along in his defensive role [at Nijmegen, Holland, during Operation Market Garden]. He and his regiment were in fine form. They had captured a truck load of panzerfausts with training instructions in German which they had translated. They were the best antitank weapons we had for the remainder of the war.
Seriously, that is the best compliment any weapon can receive.
Private William J. Hendrick, Co C 2nd Combat Engineers, 2nd Div, First U.S. Army, shows off a cache of Panzerfausts left by retreating Germans, 16 March 1945, Bad Neuenahr, Germany
As Gavin indicated, GIs often preferred them to the Bazooka and occasionally even went into battle with them (such as British paratroopers during Operation Market Garden in September 1944). The US Army's 82nd Airborne Division used captured Panzerfausts from their first capture in the Sicilian Campaign (Operation Husky) to the end of the war. The Soviet Union did not use them as much, but Marshall Georgiy Zhukov officially recommended their use in a directive published during February 1945.
Two Luftwaffe ground troops with their Panzerfausts in Normandy, September 1944 (Hoess, Federal Archive Picture 101I-680-8254-08A).
Conclusion
The Panzerfaust was an extremely effective weapon in a nation dealing with a struggling economy. It was a cheap weapon to make, proved effective when used properly, and was easy to use. The Panzerfaust proved most useful in the urban settings that characterized the final months of World War II. The Panzerfaust's main drawbacks were that it required training and had a limited range which exposed its user to great danger. Both of these limitations could be addressed, and to some extent were, but the war situation made them impossible for Germany to overcome completely. Overall, the Panzerfaust was a useful weapon, proving its value many times over and well worth the investment.
A female Volkssturm recruit learning to use a Panzerfaust, March 1945 (Federal Archive Picture 146-1973-001-30).
The brief tank battle at Cologne Cathedral is perhaps the single most famous tank duel of all time. To understand what was really going on there, it is necessary to take a look at the strategic situation and Cologne Cathedral itself.
A view from the east side of the river, showing the blown bridges.
The Germans had been chased out of France and had expended their reserves in the Battle of the Bulge aka the Ardennes Offensive aka the Von Rundstedt Offensive. This had led to a delaying action by the Germans along the German border throughout January and February 1945, during which they were slowly pried out of the Rhineland with great difficulty. The British and the Americans then closed up upon the Rhine River. Reaching the Rhine, though, was a lot different than crossing the Rhine.
As can be seen, behind the cathedral is a railroad bridge, which ostensibly needed to be kept out of Allied hands because river lines typically formed German defensive perimeters. However, by the time of the shootout, that bridge had been bombed into ruins as seen in this picture, and its use would have been removed by demolition before the Allies approached.
Cologne goes back to the Roman days and straddles the Rhine, with roughly half on either side. The old part of town was on the western side, crowned by the famous Cologne Cathedral. The cathedral is a Roman Catholic church that was built over an 800-year time frame, with work starting in 1248 and, after a long interruption, work finally was completed only in 1880.
Perhaps the only thing that saved the Cathedral was that it was made of stone, and thus did not burn down, as well as the large clear spaces separating it from buildings that did burn.
The cathedral's completion was an event of national significance, symbolizing as much the unification of Germany out of squabbling individual kingdoms as a work of architecture. It also took place at the summit of German military achievement, coming shortly after the Franco-Prussian war when the Germans unexpectedly defeated arch-enemy France.
Hohenzollern Bridge, Cologne 1945 -- Karl Hugo Schmolz.
Bavarians might not think much of Prussians, and Prussians might not think much of Swabians, but they could all pretty much set aside their differences and take pride in the completion of the Cologne Cathedral.
Cologne, March 1945.
Cologne was a devastated, smoking hell. Being the closest major German city to England, the Allies had bombed it repeatedly during the war. The Allies had launched no less than 262 air raids against it by March 1945, including the first 1000-bomber raid ever assembled against any target on May 31, 1942. Cologne had been paying the price of the war earlier and harder than anywhere else in Germany, and it had lost 95% of its population. In essence, aside from absolutely essential personnel and a few troops, Cologne was nothing but a deserted shell, of no value to anyone except as a place on the map to occupy.
Cologne and the cathedral smoldering after a 1000-bomber raid.
Cologne Cathedral itself had been hit by the bombing, but it remained intact and, from a distance, appeared impervious to the war, like an artificial heart that continues beating after the patient has died. It is difficult to wipe out a building that took almost a thousand years to finish, though hardly impossible. Its survival amidst the devastation was viewed with a mixture of awe and astonishment by the Germans, regardless of whether they were Party members. The spires of the cathedral loomed above a wasteland of rubble and piles of debris, damaged and scarred: but it still stood. Its symbolism only grew - it was the living, beating heart of the true German soul, the one that pre-dated Hitler by centuries. Berlin, which many foreigners consider the heart of Germany, was founded about the same time as construction began on the majestic cathedral. However, Berlin did not have nearly the same sort of significance, being merely the capital of one of many competing German states. Many Germans would refer to Berlin with something approaching disdain, as in "Oh, Berlin is calling again" - but they typically felt genuine affection for the stately church.
A Sherman Tank, crew posed for the camera.
On March 6, 1945, there were as yet no Allied forces across the Rhine - the Remagen Bridge further south would not be taken until the following day. The Germans were fleeing to the far bank of the Rhine about as quickly as they could get there in order to prevent Allied river crossings. There was little point in fighting and dying on the west side of the Rhine when the great river afforded maximum protection and was the new defensive perimeter.
The Panther, protecting an intersection as they always did. The church would be to the left, behind it. The American tank came down the street here parallel to the one the German tank is on and shot on the run. Note the absolute devastation on this random Cologne street.
US 3rd Armor Division entered the city that day after hard fighting to the west. Two medium M4A4 Sherman Tanks were supporting the infantry as they advanced toward the river and the cathedral along the main road, the Komedienstrasse. There was too much rubble in the streets, though, so they stopped just short of the cathedral. At that point, the lead Sherman was hit by a round fired by a German tank, destroying the tank and killing three of the five crew. The GIs quickly discovered that the enemy tank was a medium Panther Ausf. A (an older model - the most recent was Ausf. G) with a command cupola that easily could handle a Sherman tank. That it was an older model is evidenced by the fact that it had Zimmerit anti-magnetic paste on it, which had been discontinued the previous winter due to fire concerns and the fact that it added production time.
Cologne, Germany, March 6, 1945: US tank driver Julian H. Patrick, still sitting in the driver's seat, is dead after suffering the effects of a direct hit from a German Panther during the Battle of Cologne Cathedral. Note the hole in the tank's turret, above Patrick's head, from a direct hit. The tank commander died in the turret, the gunner was seriously wounded but survived, and the assistant driver exited from the escape hatch and survived unharmed.
Therefore the other Sherman, realizing it was no match for a Panther, withdrew, and the soldiers called on a nearby T26E3 (Pershing) for assistance. Then, wisely, they waited.
A US T26E3 Pershing M26 Tank.
The US T26E3, the production version of the T26 series, was a phenomenal tank, and very rare. It was the culmination of US tank development during World War II, which many wrongly think ended with the ubiquitous Sherman. The T26 had a massive 90 mm gun mounted in a new turret and included a front glacis plate with 4 in (10 cm) of armor. The weight of the T26 series was over 40 short tons (36 t), putting it in the heavy tank category but below a panther (about 45 tons). This was a beast to be reckoned with. The designation was changed to M26 shortly after the Cologne battle. There were only 240 T26E3's in existence anywhere in the world, and only 20 of those were in Europe during the war.
As the gunner of the T26E3 in this action said on a website:
"U.S. troops and German civilians were in awe of seeing the M26. Some troops thought it was a captured German tank."
Needless to say, that there was a T26E3 at all in Cologne, much less one only a few streets over, was a phenomenal stroke of luck for the advancing American GIs. The T26E3 was not the world's best tank by far - it had much narrower tread than the King Tiger, for instance, and the armor and gun were not quite as capable - but it was worlds better than the Sherman and could take on any tank in the world on fairly even terms. It was at the very least equal to a Panther, probably a bit better, but not dramatically so.
This aerial shot gives a good idea of the strategic idea behind the battle. The cathedral looks impervious, but it took 70 bomb hits during the war. The German tank would have been just to the left of this photo, with the American tank farther left still. The bridge was blown, so the tank had nothing to defend... or did it?
The crew of the Pershing was: Tank Commander Robert Early, Asst. Driver Homer Davis, Gunner Clarence Smoyer, Driver William McVey, and Asst. Gunner John Deriggi.
One of the 20 Pershings in the ETO. This was their furthest advance in Czechoslovakia.
The Pershing started over and was driving on a parallel street, the Christophstrasse. When it reached the corner Christophstrasse and Marzellenstrasse, it saw the Panther, stopped briefly, and then resumed its movement and opened fire while on the move.
This was the situation, the Pershing in the foreground, Panther in the background.
Let's read what the Pershing tank's gunner, Cpl. Clarence Smoyer observed next:
"We were told to just move into the intersection far enough to fire into the side of the enemy tank, which had its gun facing up the other street (where the Sherman had been destroyed). However, as we entered the intersection, our driver had his periscope turned toward the Panther and saw their gun turning to meet us. When I turned our turret, I was looking into the Panther's gun tube; so instead of stopping and becoming an easy target, our driver kept going through the intersection, so I fired a round and hit the enemy tank. The Panther was dispatched and burned for 3 days after the duel, with 2 of the crew surviving."
So, moving along the street and not stopping for long so as not to present a target, the US tank took a quick pot-shot at the German Panther and scored a direct hit. One can well imagine the feeling of the tank driver seeing the Panther sitting there waiting for him, and the gunner seeing the Panther's gun pointed straight at him, about to fire.
A Panther medium tank.
Why the Panther hesitated and didn't fire in that instant, when it had the split second it needed to wipe out the American tank, we'll never know. It could have been simple confusion - the Pershing was an extremely rare tank, and the Germans may have mistaken it for another German tank, what with all the talk of "secret weapons" and the like. Or, it could have hesitated for any number of other reasons, such as trying to line up the perfect shot, the gun jammed, etc. There is conflicting evidence. American tanks were not known for shooting on the move, that was pretty rare and the German tanker may have been surprised that the US tank fired while on the move.
The Germans fleeing their burning tank.
In the German tank, four got out of the tank and three survived. The Commander was 1st Lt. Wilhelm Bartelborth (sometimes spelled Barthelborth), chief of 2./PzAbt 2106 of Panzerbrigade 106 Feldherrenhalle (2nd company, 2106th Armored Btl., Armored Brigade 106). His brigade was formed on 28 July 1944 from the remnants of Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle at Mielau. Bartelborth survived the battle, along with another man named König. A third man also got out alive but did not last too long after the battle, dying either days or weeks later (records at the time were skimpy and it was an extremely dangerous time to be wearing a German soldier's uniform). At least one man died inside the tank, burned to death. The three survivors were later caught by a group of 30 policemen and men of the Volkssturm. Upon being questioned about the battle, they claimed that they intended to wait for the Pershing to stop before shooting.
This shot gives a good indication of how shot-up the Cathedral was.
Panther commander Bartelborth was no shirker: he was a Holder of the Honor Roll Clasp of the Heer. Bartelborth died before anyone in the media could ask him what happened, but he did talk to his family about the incident. His daughter said in the documentary "Köln 1945 Nahaufnahmen" that her father had told the family that the tank that had appeared in that situation on the street corner, should have been a German tank. Bartelborth probably expected a Sherman tank and the tank was not a Sherman tank, and he had undoubtedly never seen a Pershing before. As Smoyer said in the quote above, the T26E3 was often mistaken for a German tank. A moment of confusion by Bartelborth followed, and he hesitated. He was taken by surprise and did not give the order to fire instantaneously in fear that he would destroy one of his own tanks. That's the difference between life and death in battle.
Jim Bates in 1972.
The action was recorded by Signal Corps cameraman Tec. Sgt Jim Bates:
A Tank Commander named Robert Early from E Company 32nd. Armored Regiment went on foot to investigate. I asked to go along and we went on the mezzanine of a building and saw the tank. He told me to stay there and he would come back in his tank and try to put the German tank out of commission and I could photograph it. He had one of the new M-26 Pershings with a ninety-mm gun. Sgt. Early said he would turn into the square under me, stop and fire at the German tank.
A question seldom asked is why these Germans were sitting in that spot waiting patiently for the Americans. Some cryptically refer to it as a "last stand" sort of deal, common during 1945.
Well, in this author's view at least, it indeed was a sort of the last stand, but not of the type many probably think. It was not the last stand for Hitlerism or anything like that. Cologne Cathedral was the symbol of Germany. It stands outside of politics. It is a source of national pride and, in a very real sense, symbolizes the German soul. These Germans easily could have turned tail and found their way across the river before the last bridges were blown. However, they chose to make a "last stand" in front of the symbol of Germany, a symbol which had absolutely no military value. It made absolutely no military sense, but they were not thinking in military terms. They were fighting for something here, but it wasn't Hitler. Imagine the last group of American soldiers parking their tank in front of the Washington Monument, with Washington D.C. in ruins, and saying "Come and get me you lousy (&)()(*@ we don't care anymore." They wouldn't be upset because of who happened to be in the White House at that moment. You get the idea.
Picture by war correspondent Margaret Bourke-White: some American soldiers attend Mass in March 1945 inside the bombed cathedral of Cologne.
The strange reaction by the American GIs immediately afterward, with their famous "No Sightseers! Keep Out!" sign, is an indication that they, at the time, realized that this spot and incident was unusual and worthy of special respect. They no doubt understood that brave men just like themselves had fought and died there for a worthy purpose, and it wasn't a cause that had anything at all to do with politics or the regime.
This is an extremely rare occasion where there is actual footage of a tank battle. If there are any cases like this, we're not aware of them.
Aftermath
Not to pick on anyone in particular, but the tank battle remnants quickly became a tourist photo op site due to the scenic surroundings. Here, it is Lily Pons and Andre Kostelanetz posing with the shattered tank. This annoyed some of the fighting men, some of whom, it appears, are standing in the background here and taking note of the proceedings.
Sight Seers Keep Out!
There were ordinary people still in the vicinity of the Cologne fighting. Why they stayed... you'd have to ask them. However, running isn't always possible - and where do you go when the fighting is everywhere? Numerous civilians perished during the fighting or simply from being run over during vehicle movements, and usually not in a pleasant way. The bodies very often were left where they fell. Even injured people briefly attended by medics were left lying in the gutter - there was nowhere to take them and trying to move them could expose you to fire from bitter-enders in overlooking buildings. The victims are almost all anonymous. A few gained some notoriety from making the newsreels and later documentaries - but they still died.
All of this affected soldiers on both sides at the time and long after the war. U.S. soldiers were not used to hard fighting in large cities like Cologne, most of it took place in the countryside or along river lines. Seeing victims everywhere was difficult. There were unusual expressions of grief in Cologne Square.
He risks his life 24 hours a day.
Below is a good sequence of combat footage from the war. The Shootout at Cologne Cathedral features at the 3:10 mark.
And finally, some additional footage that was taken by Jim Bates in and around Cologne.
