xiv, 674 pages : 24 cm

I seek to present here a causal explanation of the Vietnam War and to probe its meaning for the modern historical experience. I will examine in considerable depth the Communist Party, the Republic of Vietnam, and the United States. By focusing on how each side was affected by larger military, economic, social, international, and political-ideological structural trends operating simultaneously, I am able to juxtapose forces and factors influencing the outcome of the war and to highlight decisive elements in it. - Preface

Includes bibliographical references (pages 605-652) and index

pt. 1. The Origins of the War to 1960 -- 1. Vietnam's Road to Crisis -- 2. The Communist Party until 1945: From Depression to War -- 3. Vietnam: From the August 1945 Revolution to Protracted War -- 4. The Internal World of Vietnamese Communism: Theory and Practice -- 5. The Communist Party's Consolidation of Power -- 6. America's Confrontation with the Limits of World Power, 1946-1960 -- 7. South Vietnam to 1959: Origins of the Conflict -- 8. The Communist Party's Dilemma in the South, 1954-1959 -- pt. 2. The Crisis in South Vietnam and American Intervention, 1961-1965 -- 9. The U.S. Involvement in Vietnam: From Sponsorship to Air War -- 10. The War and Rural Vietnam -- 11. The Challenge of Defining Military Strategies -- 12. The United States, the Revolution, and the Components of Struggle -- pt. 3. Total War, 1965-1967, and the Transformation of South Vietnam -- 13. Escalation and the Frustration of American Politics -- 14. The Continuing Search for Effective Military Strategies -- 15. The Dilemma of the American Way of War -- 16. War and the Transformation of South Vietnamese Society -- 17. Nguyen Van Thieu and the RVN Power Structure -- 18. The Dilemma of Economic Dependency and the RVN -- 19. The Building of the RVN's Army and the Struggle for Rural South Vietnam -- 20. The Character and Consequences of the Two Vietnamese Armies -- 21. The Communist Party's Responses to Total War -- 22. The Economic Impact of the War on the United States -- 23. The Balance of Forces in the War at the End of 1967 -- pt. 4. The Tet Offensive and the Events of 1968 -- 24. The Tet Offensive -- 25. The Tet Offensive's Impact on Washington -- 26. Assessing the Tet Offensive -- pt. 5. War and Diplomacy, 1969-1972 -- 27. The Nixon Administration's Confrontation with Vietnam and the World -- 28. The Crisis of American Military Power -- 29. The Revolution's Military Policy, 1969-1971 -- 30. The United States and the RVN: Vietnamization's Contradictions -- 31. The Struggle for a Changing Rural South Vietnam -- 32. The Communist Party's International Strategy -- 33. War on Two Fronts: Diplomacy and Battlefields, 1971-1972 -- 34. The Diplomatic Process: Illusions and Realities -- pt. 6. The Crisis of the Republic of Vietnam and the End of the War, 1973-1975 -- 35. The Balance of Forces in South Vietnam, Early 1973, and the Impact of the RVN's Policies -- 36. The Nixon Administration's Dilemmas of Power -- 37. Recovery and Response: The Communist Party's Strategy until Mid-1974 -- 38. The Deepening Crisis of the RVN Social System -- 39. Saigon and Washington, Mid-1974: The Conjunction of Two Crises -- 40. The Revolution's Perceptions and Plans, Late 1974 -- 41. The End of the War

plus-circle Add Review

comment

Reviews