

Presentation by Lieutenant-General Leonid Holopatiuk, Chief of Main Department of Military Cooperation and Verification of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

*950th Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation,
1 July 2020*

Security Dialogue on the Vienna Document 2011

Dear Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Slide № 1

Thank you for the opportunity and pleasure to participate in such a prestigious and representative international event as the "Security Dialogues" of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, which is an important OSCE executive body called upon to make important guiding decisions in the Organization's politico-military dimension. It is doubly so for me to address you today, given the current Chairmanship in this Forum of my country – Ukraine.

Taking into consideration the main topic of our meeting today, rightly chosen by the Ukrainian Chairmanship in the FSC – Vienna Document-2011, I would like to take this opportunity to inform you in detail about the implementation of the Vienna Document by Ukraine and, at the same time, to familiarize you with the conditions in which my country appeared, due to the occupation of a part of its territory, attempts to annex the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as the build-up of foreign armed forces near the eastern border of Ukraine.

I will not reveal any news to you, saying that we live in difficult times. The modern world has run into another period of turbulence, which is characterized by both the presence of traditional, and a number of emerging threats and challenges. The crisis of international security is becoming systemic.

In this context, it is indisputable that the armed conflict in the Donbas launched by the Russian Federation and occupation of a part of Ukraine's territory has resulted in the significant deterioration of the security situation in the OSCE region. Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine has, in essence, become an unprecedented challenge to the current European and global security.

For the first time since the World War II, an attempt has been made to change the long-lasting international order in Europe, including by military assets.

Among the measures taken by the European Community to ensure stability and peace, the issue of maintaining the arms control regime at an appropriate level and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), are of particular relevance.

An important aspect in this context is not only the conscientious and strict implementation of the Vienna Document provisions by all participating States, but also its modernization in order to adapt it to the current conditions, taking into account new challenges to the European security system.

Indeed, in order to alleviate concerns over possible military conflicts and at the same time to rebuild trust, we should do the following:

- Increase transparency and predictability of military activities;
- Strengthen military cooperation and contacts;
- Enhance information sharing on military exercises and activities.
- All that will contribute to building trust and enhancing security.

Being aware of the importance of these processes, Ukraine, as one of 34 OSCE participating states, takes the appropriate steps in this direction. However, we face the reluctance of some participating States to support these changes. We also face blocking, by the Russian Federation, of the modernization of the VD and CSBM adaptation to the current realities.

Moreover, the Russian Federation's activities have already launched a strike on the territorial integrity of Ukraine and led to the creation of the so called "grey zones" on our territory. At the same time, military build-up in close proximity to our state continues to create additional destabilizing factors.

Slide № 2

I'll draw your attention exactly to such "grey zone".

As has been repeatedly noted, the creation of the Russian-occupation task force on the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, consisting of the 1st and the 2nd Army Corps, has brought a large number of weapons and military equipment to the east of our country. By the way, the strength of these formations exceeds that of some European countries.

For reference: the combat composition of the 1st AC includes: 5 brigades (1st, 3rd, 5th dmbde, 100th dmbde, dartbde); 3 detached regiments (11th dmreg, 9th dmreg, detached commandant reg.); 10 detached battalions (divisions).

The combat composition of the 2nd AC includes: 4 brigades (2, 4, 7 dmbde, dartbde); 2 regiments (6 dmreg, detached commandant reg.); 6 detached battalions (artillery battalions).

The strength of the 1st and 2nd ACs is about 35 thousand military personnel and amounts 481 battle tanks, 914 armored combat vehicles, 720 artillery systems, 202 MLRS on the uncontrolled territories of Donbass.

Russian Federation career servicemen occupy command and staff posts, requiring critical skills, in the 1st and 2nd ACs with their total number of about 650 servicemen. In addition, Russia has deployed operational / combat support as well as logistic support units, military advisers and instructors to the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, bringing the Russian military presence up to

2,1 thousand military personnel.

In order to sustain the 1st and 2nd ACs, the Russian Federation continues supplying ammunition and POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) from its territory.

On this slide you can see the extensive data about this task force. The task force that until now has not become the subject to the arms control and CSBM regime.

Slide № 3

Militarization of Crimea remains another destabilizing factor. A peninsula that has become a so-called "ground aircraft carrier."

Today, a powerful joint task force has been created on the territory of Crimea, which includes land, air and maritime components and has the strength of about 32.5 thousand servicemen. In addition, Coastal Defence forces and National Guard units (up to two brigades) as well as the Russian "FSB" Border Guard Service have been deployed.

This indicates an active augmentation of strike capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, which are illegally based on the territory of the peninsula, by increasing the number of troops (forces) and equipping them with new models of weapons and military equipment.

For reference: the basis of the ground component is the 22nd Army Corps, on the basis of which it is planned to create a combined arms army, and 810th detached marine brigade. Currently, 6 battalion tactical groups are ready for employment.

The air component has been reinforced by deployment on the peninsula of bomber, assault, fighter and army aviation. By the way, the aircraft Su-30SM, Su-30M2, Su-34 and helicopters Mi-28, Ka-52, which are deployed on peninsula are absent in the Annual Exchange of Military Information of the Russian Federation.

Belbek and Gvardiyske airfields were reconstructed to accommodate Russian long-range bombers on the peninsula. The infrastructure is being prepared to allow storage of nuclear weapons on the territory of Crimea.

The combat capabilities of the naval component have been increased by adopting the latest warships and submarines – carriers of maritime based cruise missiles of the "Caliber" type (up to 70 warships / gunboats, 6 submarines, a total volley – 84 missiles).

In support of the above mentioned, I would like to draw your attention to this slide, which shows data from the Annual Exchange of Military Information of the Russian Federation according to VD-2011.

Slide № 4

From the comparative table it is easy to see a threefold increase in the number of the Russian Federation weapons and military equipment in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea over the past 6 years.

By the way, we are still missing information about Su-30SM, Su-30M2, Su-34 combat aircrafts as well as Mi-28 and Ka-52 helicopters that have been deployed to the territory of Crimea.

***Quantity of Main Weapons end Equipment Systems
of the RF Armed Forces on the territory of Crimea
according to the VD-11 Annual exchange of military information***

Main Weapons end Equipment Systems	01.01.2014	01.01.2020	Difference
Battle tanks	0	31	+31
Armored combat vehicles	117	305	+188
Armored combat vehicles look-alikes	53	62	+9
Artillery systems	30	128	+98
Combat aircrafts	22	85	+63
Helicopters	0	34	+34
Anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/ integrally mounted on armored vehicles	9	39	+30
TOTAL	231	684	+453

*** The number of MWES increased almost 3 times**

Guided by the provisions of the Global Exchange of Military Information, specifically the paragraph 4.4, which states that a state must provide relevant information on troops (forces) stationed on the territory of another state, Ukraine insists that the Russian Federation has to provide in the Global Exchange of Military Information data on the number of its troops and weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine.

Dear colleagues,

In addition to the situation in the occupied Crimea, the tense security situation in the Azov-Black Sea region also raises concerns.

Slide № 5

This region, given the geopolitical and economic factors, is of particular interest to the Russian Federation. To achieve its own goals in the Azov-Black Sea region, Moscow is implementing a strategy, the main elements of which are:

*[Increasing warship and gunboat composition on the Black and Azov Seas;
Conducting show of force exercises on the Black and Azov Seas with the
creation of access restricted areas;*

*Restriction of freedom of navigation in the Sea of Azov in order to cause
economic damage to our state;*

*As well as blocking passage of Ukrainian Navy ships and boats through the
Kerch Strait.]*

Under the guise of fighting the so-called terrorist threats, Russia amplifies control over navigation in the Sea of Azov and demonstrates the ability to blockade our state.

In fact, the airspace and waters of the Sea of Azov are patrolled on a regular basis by maritime aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet. The practice of closing areas in the Sea of Azov is being introduced, ostensibly under the pretext of conducting combat training activities. Under the pretext of anti-terrorist measures, Ukrainian and foreign civilian vessels bound for / from Ukrainian ports are detained / searched by the “FSB” Coastal Defence Forces.

Slide № 6

Dear colleagues!

The Russian Federation continues military build-up along the state border of Ukraine. In particular, the active creation of brand-new military units and reorganization of existing military formations in order to enhance their combat potential. Currently, 28 battalion tactical groups are deployed along the state border of Ukraine.

Today, the creation of three new formations is being completed – two Armies and an Army Corps, which plan to reach full operational capability in 2020-2021.

In the **ground component** in the Western strategic area, 20th combined arms Army consisting of 3rd motorized division and 144th motorized division has been created.

448th Missile Brigade of the 20th Army, equipped with mobile short-range ballistic missile system “Iskander”.

In the South-Western strategic area, the 8th Combined Arms Army consisting of 150th motorized division, 20th separate motorized rifle brigade, as well as operationally subordinated 1st and 2nd ACs have been created.

The “Iskander” missile brigades will be established within the military district and the Army. In general, the strength of the land task force of the Russian Armed Forces along the border of Ukraine amounts about 87 thousand military personnel, up to 1,100 tanks; up to 2600 armored fighting vehicles; up to 1100 artillery systems; up to 360 MLRS, 18 mobile short-range ballistic missile systems.

The **air component** continues to be re-equipped with modern and upgraded models of aircraft (Su-30SM, Su-35S, Su-34, Su-25SM3, MiG-31K with hypersonic "Kinzhal" system as well as helicopters of various modifications). In total, about 330 combat aircraft and 230 helicopters are deployed at base airfields near the Ukrainian state border.

The formation of mobilization deployment support centers continues, which can allow for the establishment of up to 4 combined arms divisions (Boguchar, Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Novoozerne / temporary occupied territory of AR Crimea).

Thus, as of today, three joint task forces have already been created in the vicinity of Ukrainian state border, which are capable of carrying out sudden offensive operations on the territory of our state with limited goals without announcing mobilization and with minimal preparatory measures.

Slide № 7

There is another security aspect of great concern that is noteworthy.

Over the past 6 years, we have continued to see an increase in the intensity and scale of operational and combat training of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which does not provide additional security guarantees to neighboring states.

Special attention should be paid to such issues as unforeseen military activities, which include snap (undeclared) exercises and exercises below the threshold levels.

It is not excluded that during such exercises, Russia hides the actual number of personnel and weapons involved, including the number of sorties of aircraft and helicopters, as well as using so-called fragmentation.

The non-transparent nature of unscheduled (snap) exercises increases distrust and military-political tensions in the OSCE area of responsibility.

Dear colleagues!

Now I would like to inform you of Ukraine's fulfillment of its international obligations in the field of conventional arms control.

I believe, no one will argue that the honest implementation of agreed confidence- and security-building measures depends entirely on the political will of the participating States.

Despite the fact that our state is forced to fight, repelling armed aggression, it strictly adheres to the requirements of international treaties and agreements, and fulfills all its international obligations, while showing high degree of openness and transparency.

Today, Ukraine is one of the most active member states in the implementation of VD-2011. To support this thesis, I will give you only some statistics.

Slide № 8

Thus, the significant part of all inspections and evaluations under the VD-11 and bilateral agreements, which were conducted in the OSCE area in 2019, fall within our state.

In particular, out of 199 activities carried out by the participating States, Ukraine conducted 29 activities on the territory of the participating States (19 inspections and 10 evaluations), which is 15%, and hosted 18 events (12 inspections and 6 evaluations) on its territory, which respectively is almost 10% of all activities.

Additionally, in order to strengthen confidence and security at the regional level, Ukraine is steadily fulfilling its obligations under bilateral agreements with neighboring countries (Hungary, Slovak Republic, Republics of Poland, Belarus and Romania) which were established under Chapter X "Regional Measures" of the Vienna Document.

Slide № 9

I would like to emphasize that reciprocal inspections with these countries bring closer our positions on European security and provide an opportunity to implement new initiatives regarding the implementation of the provisions of the VD-11.

For reference: during the implementation of bilateral agreements the following additional confidence and security-building measures were achieved:

Military activities at tactical level are subject to observation within the area of application of the above agreements;

Ban on conducting battalion-sized exercises within 10-20 km area adjacent to the national borders;

Transparency of military activity of other law enforcement agencies in the immediate vicinity of the borders is provided;

Opportunity to extend the inspection for one day is provided;

Opportunity to conduct evaluation visits at the battalion level units etc.

I will give an example that convincingly demonstrates openness of Ukraine and fulfilling of its international obligations. It is a unique experience of our country in using the opportunities of the Vienna Document, which were not used before. These include verification activities in the area of the Joint Forces Operation in eastern Ukraine, even in the combat areas.

In order to dispel any concerns and misunderstandings about our military activities, as well as striving for maximum openness and transparency, Ukraine has provided an opportunity for the OSCE participating States to conduct additional inspections in our territory in the areas of concern.

In total, over the past 6 years we have hosted 36 over-quota inspections in the eastern part of our state.

Dear colleagues,

Slide № 10

In summary, I would like to emphasize the following.

Click

Firstly, I would like to assure you that Ukraine is consistent in its course regarding strict compliance with its obligations under the provisions of international treaties and agreements in the field of conventional arms control.

Click

Secondly, Ukraine will continue its cooperation in the process of the VD-11 modernization on confidence- and security-building measures and other instruments of OSCE influence that will promote military stability, transparency and predictability for all participating States, and calls on all participating States to join this process.

Click

And finally, I would like to draw your attention to the need to develop effective mechanisms of international control over the military activities of the Russian-occupying forces deployed to the temporary occupied territory in the eastern part of our state and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

In conclusion of my briefing I would like to say the following.

My country is forced to pay an enormous price when protecting its independence and territorial integrity while withstanding Russian aggression.

As a result of the conflict launched by Russia more than 3094 defenders of Ukraine are killed in action and almost 12000 wounded.

The war has already claimed more than 3353 civilian lives. More than 7000 thousands of our citizens have been wounded and crippled, almost 1.8 millions of Ukrainians have been forced to leave their homes.

And all this happens not in the remote regions of the world or during the dark medieval times but in the center of Europe and at the beginning of the XXI century. This presents a daunting challenge to the European community, but at the same time gives us a joint mission of an utmost importance – to steer the European security system out of the crisis for the sake of peace and stability in the region.

Slide № 11

Thank you for attention.

ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE




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 Armed Forces of Ukraine
 Lieutenant General Leonid HOLOPATIUK



Russian occupation forces in the east of Ukraine


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Deployment of the Russian forces in Crimea

3



Combat units as of 01 Jan 2014
810 th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade
7058 th Aviation base
Combat units as of 01 Jan 2020
22 nd Army Corps
810 th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade
126 th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade
8 th Artillery Regiment
68 th Separate Naval Engineering Regiment
27 th Composite Aviation Division
37 th Composite Aviation Regiment
38 th Fighter Aviation Regiment
39 th Helicopter Regiment
43 rd Separate Naval Assault Aviation Regiment

3



Russian MWES in Crimea according to VD-11 AEMI

4

Main Weapons and Equipment Systems	01.01.2014	01.01.2020	Difference
Battle tanks	0	31	+31
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
The number of MWES increased almost 3 times

4



Training intensity of the Russian forces


- **2019** – SCPX on strategic directions /SD/:
 - “Centre-2019” (Centre-Asian SD)
 - “Union Shield-2019” (Western SD)
 - “Ocean Shield-2019” (Arctic SD)
 - “Grom-2019”
 - CPX with LIVEX phase involving troops of Southern Military District (South-Western SD)
- **2020** – Strategic CPX “Caucasus-2020”: assessment of the operational readiness of Southern Military District on conduct of a strategic operation



Demonstration of the Russia's readiness to defend its interests by military forces



VD-11 Activities of participating States in 2019



IPRM/BA: Inspections pursuant to regional measures / bilateral agreements
 EVPRM/BA: Evaluation visits pursuant to regional measures / bilateral agreements

**Ukraine conducted almost 15% of all VD-11 activities
 hosted almost 10% of all VD-11 activities**



Conclusions



How to improve security situation

1. Fulfillment of obligations
2. Modernization of VD-2011
3. Development of effective arms control mechanisms



Thank you for your attention!