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ABSTRACT
What were Russia’s objectives in Eastern Ukraine, and why was it seemingly unable to achieve a successful or decisive outcome? In contrast to Russia’s seizure of Crimea, the uprising in Eastern Ukraine was marked by disorganization and chaos. Using proxy and surrogate actors, along with military exercises and the injection of Russian troops, Russia sought to institutionalize a political entity inside Ukraine to influence its domestic politics. In this article, I analyze the mechanisms by which Russia attempted to implement, and later salvage, its strategy. The article contributes to clearer theoretical and practical understanding of limited force in coercive diplomacy, signaling, and a more rigorous treatment of the role and uses of proxy actors.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Mark Galeotti, Robert Ross, Jennifer Erickson, Jan E. Angstrom, Oscar Jonsson, and Ruslan Pukhov along with the participants at the 2017 NEPSA and 2017 ISSS-ISAC conferences for their advice and contributions to the research of this paper. Additionally, the author thanks the Editors of the Journal of Strategic Studies and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful advice.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 There is a large and wide-ranging debate over the sources of Russian conduct in Ukraine. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,’ Foreign Affairs 93/5 (October 2014), 77–89; Michael McFaul, ‘Moscow’s Choice,’ Foreign Affairs, 93/6 (December 2014), 167–71; Mark Galeotti and Andrew S. Bowen, ‘Putin’s Empire of the Mind,’ Foreign Policy (April 2014); Roy Allison, ‘Russian ‘Deniable Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules,’ International Affairs 60/6 (2014), 1255–297; Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Last Stand: The Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy,’ Post-Soviet Affairs 31/4 (2015), 279–303; Charap, Samuel, and Timothy J. Colton, Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia(NY: Routledge 2016); Elias Gotz, ‘Putin, the State, and War: The Causes of Russia’s Near Abroad Assertion Revisited,’ International Studies Review 19/2 (2017), 228–53.
2 Major General I.N. Vorobyov and Colonel V.A. Kiselev, ‘Land Forces Brigade Structure as a Step Toward Improving Their Mobility’, Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), 19/1 (2010), 74–81; Alexei Gayday, ‘Reform of the Russian Army,’ in Mikhail Barabanov (ed.), Russia’s New Army (Moscow: CAST 2011), 9–32; Alexander Golts, ‘Reform: The End of the First Phase – Will There Be a Second?’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27/1 (2014), 131–46.
3 The conflict in Ukraine has also been marked by terms such as hybrid or nonlinear war. I have avoided such loaded concepts – which can also include grey zone conflicts – in order to focus on Russia’s decisions and choices in the conflict. V.A. Kiselyov and I.N. Vorobyov, ‘Hybrid Operations: A New Type of Warfare’, Military Thought 24/2 (2015), 28–36; Dima Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy’, Proliferation Papers, No. 54 Security Studies Center (IFRI) 2015; Alexander Lanoszka, ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Euope’, International Affairs 92/1 (2016), 175–96; Michael Kofman, ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts,’ War on the Rocks, 11 March 2016; Mark Galeotti, Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Getting Russia’s Non-Liner Military Challenge Right (Prague: Mayak Intelligence 2016); Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, (eds.), Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Heidi Reisinger and Alexander Golts, ‘Russia’s Hybrid Warfare: Waging War Below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defense,’ NATO Research Paper No. 105 (2014).
4 James D. Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41/1 (1997), 68–90; Brian Lai, ‘The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48/2 (2004), 211–29; Branislav L. Slantchev, Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
5 Emmanuel Karagiannis, ‘The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals’, Contemporary Security Policy 35/3 (2014), 400–20.
6 Charles King, ‘Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States’, World Politics, 53/4 (2001), 538–40.
7 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Ukraine and the Art of Limited War’, Survival. 56/6 (2014/15), 7–38.
8 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion (Cambridge UK: Cambridge UP, 2002), 31.
9 Mark Galeotti, ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and non-linear? How New is Russia’s “New Way of War”?’ Small Wars and Insurgencies 27/2 (2016), 282–301.
10 Pal Kolsto, ‘Crimea vs. Donbas: How Putin Won Russian Nationalist Support – and Lost it Again’, Slavic Review 75/3 (2016), 702–25.
11 Illicit NSA are primarily motivated by economic, greed, than political, grievance, factors. Thus, organized crime groups fall in this category.
12 Paul Gordon Lauren, ‘Coercive Diplomacy and Ultimata: Theory and Practice in History,’ in Alexander George and William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder CO: Westview Press 1994), 29.
13 Robert Art, 'Introduction', in Robert Art and Patrick M. Cronin, (eds.) The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 2003), 10; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory’, International Studies Perspectives 12/1 (2011), 158–59.
14 Ibid., 154.
15 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale: Yale UP, 1966), 99, 105–07; Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP, 1996).
16 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 107.
17 Alexander George, 'Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics' in Alexander George and William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder CO: Westview Press 1994), 8.
18 Ibid., 7.
19 David Baldwin, ‘Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends and Old Tendencies’, World Politics, 31/1 (1979), 188.
20 George ‘Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics’, 10.
21 Slantchev, Military Threats, 5, 75–77, 255–56; Lai, ‘The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization’,
22 Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, 8; Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 18.
23 Jakobsen, ‘Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,’ 163, 165.
24 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press), 71.
25 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 137; Wallace J. Thies, When Worlds Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968 (Berkeley CA: University of California Press 1980), 3.
26 Scott Sagan and Jeremi Suri, ‘The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969’, International Security 27/4 (2003), 150–83.
27 James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes’, American Political Science Review 88/3 (1994), 577–92; Kenneth A. Schultz, ‘Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises’, American Political Science Review 92/4 (1998), 829–44.
28 Shuhei Kurizaki, ‘Efficient Secrecy: Public Versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy,’ American Political Science Review 101/3 (2007), 543–58; Keren Yarhi-Milo, ‘Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret Reassurance’, Security Studies, 22/3 (2016), 405–35; Austin Carson, ‘Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War,’ International Organization 70/1 (2016), 103–31.
29 Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, ‘Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret’, Security Studies 26/1 (2017), 124–56.
30 Ibid., 132–35.
31 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1976), 187; Robert Jervis, ‘Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inference and Projecting Images’, in K. R. Monroe (ed.), Political Psychology (Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 2002), 298, 308.
32 Dima Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 1 (2017), 21–22.
33 Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder CO: Westview Press 1980), 73.
34 Mike Bourne, ‘Controlling the Shadow Trade’, Contemporary Security Policy. 32/1 (2011), 224–28; Peter Andreas, ‘Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons,’ Political Science Quarterly, 126/3 (2011), 415–18.
35 Kimberly Marten, Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States. (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP, 2012), 3; Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State Sponsored Militias (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
36 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz, ‘Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes,’ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52/4 (2008), 479–506.
37 Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 117.
38 Navin A. Bapat, ‘Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups’, British Journal of Political Science, 42/1 (2011), 3.
39 Idean Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54/3 (2010), 496.
40 Diane E. Davies, ‘Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern World’, Contemporary Security Policy 30/2 (2009), 222–23.
41 Svante E. Cornell and Michael Jonsson, (eds.) Conflict, Crime, and the State in Postcommunist Eurasia. (Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); Christoph Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus (NY: New York University Press, 2007), 3, 8–9, 60–63.
42 Klaas Vob, ‘Plausibly Deniable: Mercenaries in US Covert Interventions During the Cold War, 1964–1987,’ Cold War History 16/1 (2016).
43 Mark Galeotti, ‘Crime and Crimea: Criminals as Allies and Agents’, RFE/RL. 15 August 2016 http://www.rferl.org/content/crimea-crime-criminals-as-agents-allies/26671923.html.
44 Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 119.
45 Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations’, 505.
46 Daniel Byman and Sara E. Kreps. ‘Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism’, International Studies Perspectives 11/1 (2010), 1–18.
47 James Ron, ‘Territoriality and Plausible Deniability: Serbian Paramilitaries in the Bosnian War’, in Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (eds.), Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder With Deniability (New Yok: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 292.
48 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2005); Slater, Dan and Daniel Ziblatt. ‘The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison,’ Comparative Political Studies 46/10 (2013), 1301–327.
49 Russia’s strategy of influence and coercive diplomacy also included other measures such as cyber-attacks, economic, and energy politics. However, the threat of invasion and actual insurgency presented the most immediate dangers.
50 Some scholars argue for internal explanations. See Serhiy Kudelia, ‘Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency’, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 351 (September 2014). While there was a base level of discontent, domestic arguments are insufficient to explain the extent and continued nature of the insurgency. See Andrew Wilson, ‘The Donbas in 2014: Explaining Civil Conflict Perhaps, but not Civil War’, Europe-Asia Studies 68/4 (2016), 631–52.
51 Lukas I Alpert and Jay Solomon. ‘Russia Orders Military Drill, Stoking Tensions’, Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304709904579406310892324006.
52 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia. Statement ‘Regarding the Aggravation of the Situation in the South-Eastern Regions of Ukraine’, 13 April 2014 http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/25a25347e9ab1fec44257cbb005aff4e!OpenDocument.
53 Shaun Walker and Harriet Salem. The Guardian, ‘Russian Parliament Approves Troop Deployment in Ukraine’, 1 March 2014 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/russia-parliament-approves-military-ukraine-vladimir-putin.
54 Phil Stewart and Mark Hosenball. Reuters, ‘Russia’s Buildup Near Ukraine May Reach 40,000 Troops: U.S. Sources’, 28 March 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-military-idUSBREA2R1U720140328; Reisisinger and Golts, ‘Russia’s Hybrid Warfare,’ 3.
55 Leo Cendrowicz, Luke Harding and Alec Luhn. The Guardian, ‘Satellite Images Reveal Russian Military Buildup on Ukraine’s Border’, 10 April 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/10/satellite-images-russian-military-ukraine-border; http://www.mk.ru/politics/russia/article/2014/03/11/996737-quotdesanturaquot-gotovitsya-k-vooruzhennomu-konfliktu.html.
56 Anton Lavrov and Alexey Nikolsky. ‘Neglect and Rot: Degradation of Ukraine’s Military in the Interim Period’, in Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov (eds.), Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (Minneapolis: East View Press, 2014), 57–73; Alexei Nikolsky, Vedemosti, ‘Ukraina Ne Boyets’, 13 March 2014. http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2014/03/12/ukraina-ne-boec.
57 Igor Sutyagin and Michael Clarke, ‘Ukraine Military Dispositions: The Military Ticks Up While the Clock Ticks Down’, RUSI Briefing Paper, Apr. 2014.
58 Andrew S. Bowen, ‘Chicken Kiev’, Foreign Policy, 15 Mar. 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/15/chicken-kiev/.
59 Reisisinger and Golts, ‘Russia’s Hybrid Warfare,’ 8.
60 Spencer Ackerman, ‘Hagel Assured by Russian Minister Moscow Will Not Push Beyond Crimea’, The Guardian, 20 Mar. 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/hagel-assured-russian-minister-moscow-push-crimea.
61 Alissa de Cardonnel, ‘Russia Says East Ukraine Must Have Say in Preparing Referendum’, Reuters, 14 Apr. 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-idUSBREA3D0G920140414.
62 President of Russia. ‘Telephone Conversation with Federal Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel’, 31 March 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20670.
63 White House. ‘Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden at a Meeting with Ukrainian Legislators’, 22 Apr. 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/22/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-meeting-ukrainian-legislators.
64 RT interview with Russian FM Lavrov. https://www.rt.com/shows/sophieco/154364-lavrov-ukraine-standoff-sophieco/.
65 President of Russia. ‘Media Forum of Independent Local and Regional Media’, 24 Apr. 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20858.
66 Neil MacFarquhar, ‘Putin Announces Pullback From Ukraine Border’, New York Times, 7 May 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/europe/Putin-Russia-Ukraine.html.
67 President of Russia. ‘Russia Appeals for an Immediate End to Use of Force in Southeast Ukraine’, 19 May 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21035.
68 This includes nationalist and far right parties such as Svoboda and Right Sector, which, in addition to having strong militias that played large roles in the fighting (others include outfits like the Azov Battalion), obtained powerful positions within the government. Including positions of deputy National Security Chair (Right Sector) and Svoboda co-founder Andriy Parubiy as secretary of the Security and National Defense Committee. Svoboda members also gained positions as vice minister and heads agriculture and environment, and for a brief time the Minister of Defense. Andrew Foxall and Oren Kessler. ‘Yes, There Are Bad Guys in the Ukrainian Government’, Foreign Policy, 18 Mar. 2014 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/18/yes-there-are-bad-guys-in-the-ukrainian-government/.
69 Author interview with Ruslan Pukhov of CAST, Moscow summer 2014.
70 Maxim Solopov, RBC, ‘Rassledovaniye RBK: Otkuda na Ukraine Rossiyskiye Soldaty’, 2 Oct. 2014 http://www.rbc.ru/politics/02/10/2014/542c0dcfcbb20f5d06c1d87a; Igor Sutyagin, "Russian Forces in Ukraine" RUSI Briefing Paper, March 2015, 6-9 ; The most complete list was cited by Delegation of Ukraine to OSCE 9 September 2015, although unverified, is https://en.informnapalm.org/RussianPresence/.
71 Russian Foreign Ministry, 'Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding another provocation of Ukraine against the territory of the Russian Federation', 12 Jul. 2014.
72 Keith Darden, Foreign Affairs, ‘How to Save Ukraine: Why Russia is Not the Real Problem’, 14 April 2014; Yuri Zhulov, ‘Trading Hard Hats for Combat Helmets: The Economics of Rebellion in Eastern Ukraine’, Journal of Comparative Economics 44/1 (2016), 1–15.
73 International Crisis Group. ‘Ukraine: Running Out of Time’, Europe Report Number 231, 14 May 2014, 7–8.
74 Circumstantial evidence points to Vladislav Surkov’s responsibility for managing Ukraine. Evidence includes purported hacked emails from Surkov’s account, ‘Surkov leaks’, Also, see International Crisis Group. ‘Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine’, Europe and Central Asia Briefing No. 79 (2016), 12.
75 Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands (London: I.B. Taurus 2016), 148–53.
76 Opinion surveys demonstrated support for separatists and projects emphasizing a separate identity from Ukraine – such as Novorossiya – was minimal outside of Donetsk. John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal and Vladimir Kolosov, “The Rise and Fall of ‘Novorossiya: Examining Support for Separatist Geopolitcal Imaginary in Southeast Ukraine’, Post-Soviet Affairs. 33/2 (2017), 133, 136, 139–41.
77 Kimberly Marten, ‘Ukraine and the Problem of Local Warlords’, Washington Post: Monkey Cage. 5 May 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/05/ukraine-and-the-problem-of-local-warlords/; Marlene Laruelle, ‘Is Anyone in Charge of Russian Nationalists Fighting in Ukraine?’ Washington Post: Monkey Cage. 26 June 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/26/is-anyone-in-charge-of-russian-nationalists-fighting-in-ukraine/.
78 Mark Galeotti, ‘Moscow’s War in Ukraine Relies on Local Assets’, The Moscow Times. 23 Apr. 2014. https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/moscows-war-in-ukraine-relies-on-local-assets-34596.
79 Girkin eventually admitted to being a former FSB officer, but Kiev and EU sanctions identify him as a GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) officer.
80 Andrew Higgins, Michael R. Gordon and Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Photos Link Masked Men in East Ukraine to Russia’, The New York Times. 20 Apr. 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html?_r=1; Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, ‘Kerry: U.S. Taped Moscow’s Calls to Its Ukraine Spies,’ The Daily Beast. 29 Apr. 2014. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/29/kerry-u-s-taped-moscow-s-calls-to-its-ukraine-spies.html.
81 Michael Comyn and Andrey Shcherbak. ‘Novyye Otverzhennyye Kto Stanovitsya Dvizhushchey Siloy Revolyutsiy v SNG,’ Carnegie Moscow Center. 9 Sept. 2016. http://carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/06/09/ru-63776/j1oe; Makarenko, Victoria. ‘Fermy Dlya “Dikikh Gusey,”’ Novaya Gazeta. 11 June 2014. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/63990.html.
82 The ATO was referred to as a ‘punitive operation [karatelnaya operatsiya],’ which refers to Nazi atrocities during World War II.”
83 Tass. ‘Demonstrators in Donetsk Plan to Create “People’s Army”’, 10 Apr. 2014. http://tass.ru/en/world/727352.
84 Rosaria Puglisi, ‘Heroes or Villains? Volunteer Battalions in Post-Maidan Ukraine’, Instituto Affari Internazioinali. Working Paper 15, 8 Mar. 2015; Kimberly Marten, ‘The Security Costs and Benefits of Non-State Militias: The Example of Eastern Ukraine’, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 91 (Oct. 2015).
85 See note 67.
86 C.J. Chivers and Noah Snider. The New York Times, ‘Behind the Masks in Ukraine, Many Faces of Rebellion’, 3 May 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/world/europe/behind-the-masks-in-ukraine-many-faces-of-rebellion.html?_r=1&referrer=.
87 Matt Robinson and Alessandra Prentice. Reuters, ‘Rebels Declare Victory in East Ukraine Vote on Self-Rule’, 11 May 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSBREA400LI20140511.
88 Marlene Laruelle, ‘The Three Colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32/1 (2016), 55–74.
89 Both Strelkov and Borodai have admitted to working in Crimea during the Russian annexation, and were asked to ‘help’ the situation in East Ukraine.
90 Victoria Makarenko, Paul Kanygin and Sergei Kanev. Novaya Gazeta, ‘Gruz 200: Prodolzheniye’, 4 June 2014. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/63873.html.
91 Claire Bigg, RFE/RL, ‘Vostok Battalion, a Powerful New Player in Eastern Ukraine’, 30 May 2014. http://www.rferl.org/content/vostok-battalion-a-powerful-new-player-in-eastern-ukraine/25404785.html; Andrew Roth, The New York Times, ‘A Separatist Militia in Ukraine With Russian Fighters Holds a Key’, 4 June 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/world/europe/in-ukraine-separatist-militia-with-russian-fighters-holds-a-key.html; Alec Luhn, The Guardian, ‘Volunteers or Paid Fighters? The Vostok Battalion Looms Large in War with Kiev’, 6 June 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/06/the-vostok-battalion-shaping-the-eastern-ukraine-conflict.
92 President of Russia. ‘Telephone Conversation with President of the United States Barack Obama’, 23 June 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46037.
93 This was announced after Borodai was called to Moscow for consultations in the wake of the retreat from Slavyansk. 10.07.2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08KdvFpz-84; Gabriela Bacxynska and Aleksandar Vasovic. Reuters, ‘Pushing Locals Aside, Russians Take Top Rebel Posts in East Ukraine’, 27 Jul. 2014; Andrew E. Kramer, The New York Times, ‘Separatist Cadre Hopes for a Reprise in Ukraine’, 3 Aug. 2014.
94 Anton Zverev, Reuters, ‘Ukraine Rebel Commander Acknowledges Fighter Had BUK Missile’, 23 July 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-commander-exclusive-idUSKBN0FS1V920140723.
95 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia. ‘FM Lavrov Interview with Life News’, 28 Oct. 2014 http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/EF40A589BC597EE9C3257D7F00386A2C; Stepan Kravchenko, Bloomberg, ‘Putin Tightens Reigns on Ukraine Rebels, Putting Conflict on Ice’, 17 Sept. 2015. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-18/putin-tightens-reins-on-ukraine-rebels-putting-conflict-on-ice; Alec Luhn, The Guardian, ‘Ukraine’s Rebel People’s Republics Begin Work of Building New States’, 6 Nov. 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/ukraine-rebel-peoples-republic-states; Valery Shiyaev, Novaya Gazeta, ‘To – Voyna’, 8 Aug. 2016 http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/74105.html.
96 Oliver Carroll, ‘Welcome to the Cossack People’s Republic of Stakhanov’, Politico Magazine. 2 Nov. 2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/11/welcome-to-the-cossack-peoples-republic-of-stakhanov-112420; Andrew Kramer, ‘Cossacks Face Grim Reprisals From Onetime Allies in Eastern Ukraine’, The New York Times. 4 Aug. 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/world/europe/cossacks-face-reprisals-as-rebel-groups-clash-in-eastern-ukraine.html?_r=1.
97 Oliver Carroll, The Independent, ‘Separatist Rebel Commander Mozgovoi Says He is “Ready for More Deaths”-And Ceasefire With Kiev Won’t Hold’, 18 May 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-separatist-rebel-commander-aleksey-mozgovoi-says-he-is-ready-for-more-deaths-and-10259509.html; Jack Losh, Vice News, ‘Paranoia and Purges: The Dark and Dirty Battle for Power Inside Rebel Held Ukraine’, 10 Feb. 2016 https://news.vice.com/article/paranoia-and-purges-the-dark-and-dirty-battle-for-power-in-rebel-held-ukraine; Jack Losh, Vice News, ‘How Ukraine’s War Became Big Business for the Underworld’, 22 Feb. 2016. https://news.vice.com/article/how-ukraines-war-became-big-business-for-the-underworld.
98 Novorossiya News Agency. ‘DNR i LNR pristupili k sozdaniyu Armii Novorossii’, 16 Sept. 2014. http://novorossia.su/ru/node/6688.
99 Ukraine alleged that Russia had 15 battalion and six company level tactical groups inside Ukraine with another 39 battalion and 14 company level tactical groups on the border. Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 795th FSC Plenary Meeting (OSCE), 9 Sept. 2015.
100 The Telegraph. ‘Serving Russian soldiers on leave fighting Ukrainian troops alongside rebels, pro-Russian separatist leader says’, 28 Aug. 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/angela-merkel/11060559/Serving-Russian-soldiers-on-leave-fighting-Ukrainian-troops-alongside-rebels-pro-Russian-separatist-leader-says.html.
101 Andrew Roth, The New York Times, ‘Putin Tells European Official That He Could ‘Take Kiev in Two Weeks’, 2 Sept. 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/world/europe/ukraine-crisis.html.
102 Natalia Zinets and Gabriela Baczynska. Reuters, ‘Ukraine Rules out Direct Talks With Separatists’, 19 Nov. 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-idUSKCN0J30T920141119.
103 Sputnik. ‘Russia Needs Guarantees Ukraine Will not Join NATO’, 19 Nov. 2014. http://sputniknews.com/politics/20141119/1014912664.html.
104 113th Congress. S. 2828-Ukaine Freedom Support Act of 2014. https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2828.
105 Yelena Kostyuchenko, Novaya Gazeta, ‘My vse znali, na chto idem i chto mozhet byt’, 2 Mar. 2015. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/67490.html.
106 Novaya Gazeta identified Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lentsov, since 2013 the deputy commander of Russian Ground forces, in Debaltseve. Irek Murtazin, Novaya Gazeta, ‘Pod Debal’tsevom ob’yavilsya «Yustas»’, 18 Feb. 2015. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/67337.html; Ilya Barabanov, Kommersant, ‘V pampasakh Donbassa’, 19 Feb. 2015. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2671088.
107 Ian Traynor, The Guardian, ‘Putin Tried to Delay Ukraine Ceasefire Deal, EU Summit Told’, 13 Feb. 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/ukraine-service-personnel-killed-minsk-ceasefire?CMP=share_btn_tw.
108 President of Russia. ‘Press Statements and Answers to Questions from Journalists Following Russian-Hungarian Talks’, 17 Feb. 2015. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/47706.
109 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,’ International Security 34/4 (2010), 91; Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 2014), 285–86; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, ‘Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion’, International Security 40/4 (2016), 7–44.
110 Todd S. Sechser, ‘Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power’, International Organization 64/4 (2010), 627–60.
111 Thies, When Worlds Collide, 346–47.
112 Carson and Yarhi-Milo, Covert Communication, 126, 137–38.
113 Galeotti, ‘Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-Linear?’ 292–96.
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Andrew S. Bowen
Andrew S. Bowen is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Boston College and an Associate at the Initiative for the Study of Emerging Threats (ISET) at NYU.