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Foreign
Relations
of the
United
States



1946

Volume VII

THE NEAR EAST
AND AFRICA

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Department of State
Washington

Philip E. Mosely -

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of the
United States
1946

Volume VII

The Near East and Africa



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PREFACE

This volume was compiled and edited under the direct supervision of S. Everett Gleason, Chief of the Foreign Relations Division, assisted by Rogers P. Churchill.

The documentation on Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Yemen was compiled by Herbert A. Fine. Mr. Fine also compiled the documentation reflecting United States policy toward the Near East as a region.

John G. Reid was responsible for the documentation of American relations with Turkey and John P. Glennon for the documentation on Morocco and North Africa.

The Publication and Reproduction Services Division (Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief) was responsible for the technical editing of this volume.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
*Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs*

OCTOBER 15, 1969

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United

States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

- a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

- ACC**, Allied Control Commission
AGRI, Department of Agriculture
AIOC, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
Amdel, American Delegation (at the Council of Foreign Ministers or at the United Nations)
Amfoqe, Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections
Amfoqe II, Allied Mission to Observe the Revision of Greek Electoral Lists
AmLeg, American Legation
AP, Associated Press
ARAMCO, Arabian American Oil Company
BMA, British Military Authority
CCP, Cabinet Committee on Palestine
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
cirtel, circular telegram
COMC, Department of Commerce
ComGenUSFA, Commanding General, United States Forces in Austria
ComGenUSFET, Commanding General, United States Forces in the European Theater
DelAm, American Delegation (at the Council of Foreign Ministers)
Delsec, Indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, or the Paris Peace Conference, at times headed by the Secretary of State
DelUN, indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the London meetings of the United Nations
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DP, Displaced persons
- EA**, *Ethniki Allengyi* (National Solidarity), the EAM relief organization in Greece
EAM, *Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon* (National Liberation Front), a resistance group controlled by the Communist Party of Greece
eco, economic
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council (UN)
EE, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
ELAS, *Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos* (National People's Liberation Army), the military arm of EAM in Greece
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EUR, Office of European Affairs, Department of State
Eximbank, Export-Import Bank of Washington
FLC, (Office of the) Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State
FO, Foreign Office
FonAff, Foreign Affairs
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
ForMin, Foreign Minister
GA, General Assembly (UN)
IARA, Inter-Allied Reparation Agency
Int Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Interbank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IO, Reference and Documents Section, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IPC, Iraq Petroleum Company

- JA**, Jewish Agency for Palestine
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
KKE, *Kommunistikon Komma Ellados*, the Communist Party of Greece
kms, kilometers
Le, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
MA, Military Attaché
ME, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of State; or Middle East
MEI, Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs, Department of State
MESC, Middle East Supply Center
MID, Military Intelligence Division (War Department)
mytel, my telegram
NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems
NE, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
NEA, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State
Niact, Communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NOF, *Narodnoosloboditelniot front* (National Liberation Front) successor to SNOF in 1946
OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
OFLC, Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State
OSS, Office of Strategic Services
ourtel, our telegram
PAL, Palestine
PED, Petroleum Division, Department of State
PPA, *Parti du Peuple Algerien* (Algerian People's Party)
PriMin, Prime Minister
RAF, Royal Air Force (British)
SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SC, Security Council (UN)
SE, Division of South European Affairs, Department of State
Seedel, indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, or the Paris Peace Conference, at times headed by the Secretary of State
SNOF, *Slavomakedonski narodnoosloboditelniot front* (Slav-Macedonian National Liberation Front), a pro-Yugoslav partisan movement operating in Greek Macedonia
SPA, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State
SSU, Strategic Services Unit, War Department
SWN, State-War-Navy (Departments)
SWNCC, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
SYG, Secretary-General (UN)
TWA, Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.
UNdel, indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the London meetings of the United Nations; refers also to the Delegation
Under Sec, Under Secretary of State
UNO, United Nations Organization
UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UP, United Press
ur, your
urtel, your telegram
USdel, United States Delegation
USFET, United States Forces in the European Theater
USG, United States Government
X (*Xites*), Royalist terrorist organizations in Greece
USPolAd, United States Political Adviser for Germany, at Berlin
ZOA, Zionist Organization of America

ASPECTS OF THINKING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES OF
THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE
EAST ¹

890.00/12-2845

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and
African Affairs (Henderson)*²

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST—A DANGER TO
WORLD PEACE

At the present time the Near East, which for the purpose of this memorandum may be considered to include Turkey, the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Islands, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Egypt (including the Suez Canal), Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf area, and Afghanistan, is a breeding ground for international misunderstandings. The national objectives of two Great Powers, namely the Soviet Union and Great Britain, collide head-on in this region. [The most important interest of the United States in the Near East is not based, as a fairly large section of the American public appears to believe, upon American participation in petroleum extraction or in profits to be derived from trade, but upon preventing developments from taking place in that area which might make a mockery of the principles on which the United Nations Organization rests, which might lead to the impairment, if not the wrecking, of that organization, and which might eventually give birth to a third World War.]

Behind the curtain of protestations of a desire for international cooperation, of devotion to the principles of democracy, and of loyalty to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, etc., four of the world's Great Powers are carrying on four different, opposing policies in the Near East:

¹ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 33 ff.

² Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs (Dunn), and the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson). In his covering memorandum of December 28, 1945, Mr. Henderson stated: "I wish to stress the fact that the suggestions contained in this memorandum are of an extremely tentative nature. We are advancing them now with the idea that they might be useful for discussion within the Department. If any of them are considered useful they might be passed on to the Secretary." (890.00/2-2845)

(a) Great Britain is endeavoring to use the Near Eastern area as a great dam which serves both to hold back the flow of Russia towards the south and to maintain an avenue of communications with India and other British possessions in the Indian and Southeast Pacific Oceans. The British strive, by maintaining a certain control over the natural resources, industry, means of communication, and commerce of this great causeway, to make it pay its own way so far as possible.

(b) France, largely because of national pride and of a desire at least to appear to continue to play the role of a great empire, is determined to maintain a paramount position for itself in Syria and Lebanon.³ In view of the influence which French culture had exercised for a great many years in this area, France received a mandate from the League of Nations covering Syria and Lebanon following the last war; France continues to maintain troops in the area against the will of the local governments. It seems clear that France will insist that it be permitted to maintain a military base in Lebanon for an indefinite period of time and that it hopes, with the aid of Great Britain, to obtain the approval of the United Nations Organization for this project.

(c) The Soviet Union seems to be determined to break down the structure which Great Britain has maintained so that Russian power and influence can sweep unimpeded across Turkey and through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, and across Iran and through the Persian Gulf into the Indian Ocean. During the last five years, two great barriers to Russian expansion have disappeared, namely, Germany in the West and Japan in the East. Judging from recent events in the Near East, Russia now appears to be concentrating upon the removal of a third barrier in the south.

(d) The United States has been pursuing a policy of the open door in the Near East. It has taken the position that the independent countries of the Near East which are members of the United Nations should be treated with the same consideration as other members of this organization; that they should not be considered as lying within the sphere of influence of any Great Power; that the idea of any single Great Power maintaining a paramount position in any of these countries by special treaty provisions is outmoded and dangerous to peace. The United States, furthermore, has taken the attitude that the Great Powers, for the future world peace as well as for their own benefit should, in dealing with the countries of the Near East, give full consideration to the welfare of the peoples of these countries and should follow policies which would tend to raise living standards, educational and cultural levels and to qualify these peoples to play a role in world affairs appropriate to their number and talents.

Great Britain is encountering difficulty in maintaining its Near Eastern ramparts in its present weakened condition and in the face of a series of unilateral acts which Russia has committed or appears to be about to commit with the aim of breaking through to the Mediterranean and to the Indian Ocean. There is undoubtedly a tendency among certain circles in Great Britain to enter into a series of con-

³ For documentation on the French role in Syria and Lebanon, see pp. 751 ff.

promises with the Russians in the hope that the Soviet Union may be satisfied by obtaining the control of certain territory now belonging to third powers and of achieving strategic defensive positions at the expense of other members of the United Nations. If the British Government should actually embark upon such a policy, it would appear that the United Nations Organization would either disappear as a force in world affairs or would tend to become merely an instrument for the use of the Great Powers in carving up the world into respective spheres of influence. It is, furthermore, clear that the struggle between Great Britain and Russia would not be eliminated by such concessions. The Russians, once in possession of the new positions conceded to them by the British, would undoubtedly begin preparations for further attacks upon such barriers to their emergence into the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean as might remain.

French policy in the Near East is of so cynical a nature that it is impossible to believe that French officials responsible for its formulation have any confidence whatsoever in a collective approach towards the maintenance of world peace or any interest in the maintenance of the principles upon which the United Nations Organization is based. France, by exploiting its nuisance value, appears to have been successful in prevailing upon the British to agree to support France's claim to a special position in the Levant and possibly to the maintenance by France of a military base in Lebanon. There does not seem to be any likelihood that France in the near future is destined to play any constructive role in the Near East.

The Soviet Union appears to be achieving certain successes in its efforts to break through the barriers which are restraining it in the south and southwest. Although Soviet activities in northern Persia⁴ appear to have been in violation of commitments made by the Soviet Union both to Great Britain and the United States as well as contrary to the general principles of the United Nations Organization, no serious effort has as yet been made by the other Great Powers jointly responsible for the maintenance of world peace to cause the Soviet Union to cease such activities. It would seem that the Soviet Union is also preparing trouble of some kind for Turkey with the purpose of gaining control of all territory touching upon the Black Sea as well as of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.⁵ Although the situation in this respect is quite clear, no single Great Power has thus far made any real effort to prevent the Russians from carrying out what seems to be their purpose. If the Soviet Union does succeed by force or threat of force in obtaining control of Turkey or of Turkish territory, the United Nations Organization is likely to be placed in a position equivalent to that in which the League of Nations found itself

⁴ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 289 ff.

⁵ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 801 ff.

when its own members engaged in acts of aggression. It is important to spare UNO this supreme test at the very outset of its existence, for it might not survive such a test.

The United States has of late made little progress in the direction of carrying out its own policies in the Near East. It is obvious that the United States does not intend to enforce its policies in that area with the use of force or the threat of force. Furthermore, the United States has thus far made no effort worthy of note to back up its policies with the employment of American economic power. The countries of the Near East which have suffered severe economic blows as a result of the war have repeatedly begged for financial, economic and technical assistance from the United States.) Little has been done, however, to aid them. In reply to requests for credits which would enable them to satisfy their most urgent consumption and industrial needs and to carry out certain programs for industrial and agricultural reconstruction, the United States has in general taken the attitude that any help from it must be limited to projects which can produce dollars or goods with which to repay. The impression is being created in the Near East that the United States is prepared to advance huge credits to Great Powers such as Great Britain and the Soviet Union in order to enable them to become even stronger and greater, but that it is unwilling to take any investment risks in order to enable small and backward peoples to improve their lot. The special interest of the United States in Palestine⁶ has also created the impression that the United States is not only willing to aid people of Jewish blood in a manner in which it would not be ready to assist other peoples of the Near East, but that it is prepared to back a political program in Palestine which is opposed by two-thirds of the people of that country, and by the neighboring countries. This impression serves to handicap the efforts of the representatives of the United States in the Near East in carrying out the policies of the American Government.

Since the conflict of policies and interests in the Near East, if permitted to continue unchecked, may eventually lead to a third World War, it is believed that the time has come for this Government carefully to consider whether it should endeavor to find some means of alleviating the situation or whether it should allow the matter to drift. (If steps are to be taken, it would seem that they should be taken at once before the Soviet Union goes so far in Iran and Turkey that it cannot retreat, and before its activities have assumed a character which would hopelessly compromise the United Nations Organization.) What steps, if any, might be taken? It is believed that the various problems of the Near East are so closely connected and that the policies

⁶ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 576 ff.

of the various Great Powers are so interwoven into these problems that it will be impossible to solve them piece-meal or to alleviate the general situation by agreements reached between any two or three of the interested Powers. It is suggested, therefore, that perhaps the most promising way to obtain a settlement in the Near East which might result in at least a considerable postponement of a breakdown in the world peace structure and which would contribute to the strengthening of the United Nations Organization would be for Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and the United States to reach a comprehensive agreement on Near Eastern matters which would be in harmony with the spirit of the United Nations Organization. It is believed that the holding of a conference on Near Eastern matters by these four Powers would be the most promising method for them to reach an agreement of this kind. Such a conference might be announced now, but would be held in about six months. It could not, of course, without violating the spirit of the United Nations Organization, undertake to decide what the future of the Near East is to be. Its purpose would be to find whether or not the four Powers who would attend it could determine upon a common policy with regard to the Near East. It would be clearly understood that any policy which might be worked out at the conference must be one which not only would eliminate friction between the Great Powers, but which would also be to the benefit of the peoples of the Near East and would in no sense be in contravention of the spirit of the United Nations Organization. In case the four Powers should be successful in reaching unanimity, they could present their findings to the various countries of the Near East. Possibly every country in the Near East would have an objection to one or more of the findings which might be reached. Nevertheless, if the findings were of such a nature that there could be no doubt as to their basic justice and fairness, and if they would include plans for raising living and cultural levels and for modernizing and reconstructing the agriculture, industry and transportation of the Near East, it is possible that all of the countries of the Near East would eventually adopt them as their own.

It is realized that it would be extremely difficult for a conference such as that proposed to be a success. In the first place, Great Britain might greet with suspicion a suggestion that it be held for fear that it would become a means for depriving the British Empire of its present position in the Near East. Furthermore, the Soviet Union might regard it as an expedient for preventing it from making the most of the present situation in order to continue its drive towards the south and southwest. France, on the other hand, would probably welcome inclusion in a conference of this kind. Elements in the United States might take the attitude that the conference was merely another ruse for extracting from the United States funds and

materials for the benefit of other Great Powers. In spite of the complications and difficulties which can be foreseen, it is recommended that the Department give immediate consideration to the advisability of suggesting informally to Great Britain, France and Russia that such a conference be held. If such a suggestion should be made to Russia, it might simultaneously be pointed out that if the Soviet Union really desires the maintenance of world peace, it should at least for the time being abandon its present unilateral approach towards Near East problems.

The agenda for such a conference would be lengthy and complex. Many of the problems which it must solve if a real understanding is to be reached would be difficult. Nevertheless, the situation in the Near East is fraught with so much danger that nothing which might offer some hope of alleviation should be left undone. Even if the conference should conclude without an agreement being reached, it should serve the purpose of bringing the issues involved into the court of world opinion.

890.00/1-446

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Merriam)*⁷

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1946.

Here are a few comments on the British memo which Engert⁸ brought back from London.⁹

1. As far as Soviet Russia is concerned, the memo is "dated." It visualizes the possibility, as well as the desirability, of bringing Soviet Russia into the Middle Eastern picture on a cooperative basis. We were thinking along somewhat the same line a year ago. However, the development of Soviet Russia policy and methods in the Middle East, it seems to me, makes the passages relating to Soviet Russian participation sound over-simplified and over-optimistic.

2. There is quite a divergence between the way the British contemplate cooperation between the great Powers in the Middle East and the way in which we contemplate it. Presumably the Russians also have ideas of their own. The British have in mind cooperation

⁷ Addressed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), the Deputy Director of that Office (Allen), and the Assistant Chiefs of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones and Satterthwaite).

⁸ Cornelius Van H. Engert of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁹ On December 7, 1945, Mr. Engert sent to Mr. Henderson his undated "Draft Memorandum on Britain and the Middle East". He noted that the paper was based on notes loaned to him at London in October 1945 by a friend in the British Foreign Office and undoubtedly reflected the views of several members of the Foreign Office even though it was not an official expression of the wishes and hopes of the British Government. (890.00/12-745)

on a basis in which they would lead and guide. Our own ideas, as I understand them, are along the line of free competition in trade and communications matters, complete liberty on the part of the independent countries of the Middle East to select advisers and experts, and, in general, a friendly vying among the Powers in the course of which each will put its best foot forward to help the Middle Eastern countries get ahead on a basis of complete respect for their independence and sovereignty.

G[ORDON] P M[ERRIAM]

[On March 21, 1946, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 202/2 dealing with "Policy Concerning Provision of United States Government Military Supplies for Post-War Armed Forces of Foreign Nations". The section on the Near and Middle East reads as follows: "In accordance with the United States' firm political policy of aiding the countries of the Near and Middle East to maintain their independence and develop sufficient strength to preserve law and order within their boundaries, it is consistent with United States policy to make available additional military supplies, in reasonable quantities, to those countries." For full text of the paper, including further discussion of the Near and Middle East, as well as of Afghanistan, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon, and Turkey, see volume I.]

890.51/6-446

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1946.

Subject: Export-Import Bank Loans for the Near East

I would be derelict if I did not point out to you that we are *not* bringing to bear upon Near Eastern problems one of the most important political weapons employed by this Government in Europe, the Far East, and South America. Without a strong army backed by compulsory military training the weapons with which the Department of State is supposed to conduct a forward-looking foreign policy dedicated to keeping the peace are feeble enough. What we have left are diplomatic representations backed by such prestige as remains from our erstwhile military strength, support of the principles and procedures of United Nations and, last and not least, loans by the Export-Import Bank.

The United States' position in the Near East area is in some ways worse than in Europe and the Far East. American troops are still present in the latter areas, and, moreover, plans are under way to give European and Far Eastern countries Eximbank or other loans on a basis which would further our policies in those areas. Eximbank loans are also made frequently to South American countries.

NEA believes that Eximbank loans also can and should be employed as an instrument of American foreign policy in the Near East, but approaches to the Bank have led to the information that this Government has no facilities for political loans. In general statements are made along the following lines:

- (a) the Eximbank is governed by banking rules;
- (b) the Eximbank is not designed to serve political purposes;
- (c) the Eximbank, in any case, does not have funds to lend to Near Eastern countries, because of loans earmarked for devastated Europe, the Far East, and South America.

In contrast to this, however, NEA has observed sizable loans either authorized or in negotiation to Poland (\$40,000,000), Czechoslovakia (\$50,000,000), China (\$500,000,000), Netherlands (\$50,000,000), France (\$650,000,000), Italy (\$100,000,000), and the Philippines (\$50,000,000).

NEA feels that it is in the interest of the defense of the United States that the Department take the responsibility and see to it that if the Eximbank has any funds over and beyond the most pressing and urgent needs of Europe and Asia, these should be earmarked to the extent of at least \$120,000,000 for construction and development loans to Near Eastern countries without demanding excessive assurances that every cent loaned will be repaid in dollars. The financial risk involved in such loans in the Near East would certainly be no greater than the risk involved in loans to some of the countries listed above.

I regret that I cannot say that loans in the Near East will be enough to revive our waning prestige: I do say, however, that judicious loans will go far to bolster our deplorable position in the Near East area. I fail to see how we can justify our *failure to employ such loans*, particularly in the face of the disturbing fact that the Near East is now a major political battleground.

It would be most helpful if we could interest in this matter the Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury, the other members of the National Advisory Council, as well as the President, whose words in his Army Day speech on April 5 [6] have a bearing on the matter:

"If peace is to be preserved and strengthened in this important section of the world, however, we cannot be content merely to assure self-government and independence. The people of the Near and

Middle East want to develop their resources, widen their educational opportunities and raise their standards of living. *The U.S. will do its part in helping to bring this about.*"¹⁰

An extension of my views on this important matter appears in the enclosed copy of a memorandum addressed by me to Mr. Luthringer of FN [OFD]; Subject: "Political Justification for a \$120,000,000 Export-Import Bank Line of Credit to Near Eastern Countries."¹¹

[Mr. Henderson's memorandum of June 4, 1946, to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy called for a tentative credit ceiling of \$25,000,000 each for Turkey, Egypt and Palestine; \$10,000,000 each for Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia; \$5,000,000 each for Syria and Lebanon; \$3,000,000 for Ethiopia; and \$2,000,000 for Yemen. The memorandum also stated: "NEA does not wish to argue at this time for a political fund to be administered by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, which would be used to assure peace so far as possible in backward areas. The British Foreign Office has such a fund and has demonstrated its utility, but the American system of government does not lend itself to such a program. NEA urges, however, the Export-Import Bank to adopt with regard to the Near East the same flexibility of attitude which has enabled this Government to employ the power of its resources in diplomatic negotiations" with China, France, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Poland and Italy. "NEA believes that it should not be denied at this crucial time the important diplomatic weapon of loans which have so far been used only in other areas. . . . NEA is convinced that under certain conditions NEA could gain important U.S. diplomatic objectives through the judicious use of credits to countries deserving the good will and support of the U.S. and of the U.N. Some of these loans might not be repaid in full in dollars, but the greater part of them probably would be repaid: the risks in the Near East are no greater than the risks in China, Poland, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.

¹⁰ For full text of President Truman's speech, including his additional observations on the Near and Middle East, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 14, 1946, p. 622.

¹¹ Not printed, but see bracketed note *infra*. Mr. Acheson inquired of Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Clayton whether the Export-Import Bank under its forthcoming appropriation would have \$120,000,000 available for credits to Near Eastern Countries. Mr. Luthringer, in a memorandum of June 14 to Mr. Clayton, stated that: "the Bank would have this amount of money available for such a purpose if it wished to put itself in a completely loaned up position and if it wished to utilize nearly one half of the \$250 million remaining after \$1 billion is set aside for the USSR. The Bank would of course find it necessary somewhat arbitrarily to disregard the possible claims of other geographic areas and of American exporters requesting export credits." (890.51/6-1446) This memorandum was sent to Mr. Acheson. For information on failure to supply such credit to the Soviet Union, see bracketed note, vol. VI, p. 839.

Such losses as might occur would have to be charged up to the cost of a positive and forward-looking American foreign policy in the Near East dedicated to the cause of peace and the implementation of the Four Freedoms, of which the Second Freedom clearly calls for economic and financial aid to help the recipient countries banish the spectre of want. The expenditure of a few millions of dollars to help secure the stability of backward countries by raising the standard of living would be a sound investment for the American taxpayer who would thus be buying in the Near East the same form of anti-war insurance which he is purchasing in Europe and the Far East. . . . What NEA would like to do is to attempt to stem at once the rising tide of distrust for the U.S. in its area by giving concrete evidence of U.S. confidence and faith in the future of the Arab countries. This can be done by conveying to Arab governments informally, as suitable opportunities arise, the fact that in principle the U.S. is willing to aid them with prompt loans on projects which meet the Bank's standards." (890.51/6-446)]

890.51/6-2046

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Luthringer) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*¹²

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1946.

Subject: Your Memorandum of June 4¹³ on \$120 Million Eximbank Line of Credit for Near Eastern Countries.

This office has reviewed carefully your memorandum, and heartily agrees with your desire to further economic development in the Middle East and to strengthen American prestige there through appropriate economic measures. We would support Export-Import Bank credits in moderate amounts to finance specific and fairly urgent development projects in Near Eastern countries to the extent consistent with the Bank's limited resources and with other high priority claims upon them. We feel, however, that for the Export-Import Bank to set aside \$120 million in the form that you suggest, and for the Department to use this lending power in discussions with Near Eastern diplomatic representatives in the manner suggested in your memorandum, is undesirable, and that the proper agency for the longer range development of Near Eastern countries is the International Bank. These conclusions are based on two main grounds.

¹² Approved by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) on June 24.

¹³ Not printed, but see bracketed note, *supra*.

In the first place, your proposal calls for a loan procedure in the Middle East that is different than has been followed in Latin America and in other areas, and different from the Export-Import Bank policy that is now contemplated for the post-war period. It also involves a unilateral approach to economic development which, I believe, is not in line with the economic foreign policy that this Government has been supporting to further economic reconstruction and development in the post-war period.

I am giving below in more detail the reasons why this office feels that your suggested approach to economic development in the Middle East is not feasible within the existing authority of the Export-Import Bank, or within the existing foreign economic policy of this country.

1. The earmarking that you request for the Near Eastern countries would be an abnormal procedure that has no precedent in operations in other areas. I fear that in the discussion in Mr. Collado's¹⁴ office on May 9, to which you refer, you received a misleading impression as to the nature of the provision of Export-Import Bank funds for credits to the American Republics. This figure simply indicated a rough estimate by the Bank of the total credits for Latin America, if the other responsibilities of the Bank, the nature of the loan proposals presented, and the general financial situations in the individual country, justified the extension of a credit. There was no idea of an assignment as between individual Latin American countries and there was no idea that the State Department would tell individual Latin American countries that so much in the way of loans had been reserved for them.

2. In several places in your memorandum you state or suggest that loans to Middle Eastern countries should be made without too exacting requirements as to the probabilities of repayment. I realize that the question as to what risks the Export-Import Bank may appropriately make involves drawing a fine line, that may shift from country to country and from time to time depending upon economic and political considerations, but in view of the plain intent of Congress as expressed in the Export-Import Bank legislation, neither the Export-Import Bank, nor the Department of State as a member of the Bank Board, could justify to Congress a general policy of loans to Middle Eastern countries that did not conform to the Congressional mandate of offering "reasonable assurances of repayment" (section 2(b) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945).

3. You refer to the use of Export-Import Bank credit in connection with diplomatic negotiations with France, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, China and other countries, and suggest these loans are a

¹⁴ Emilio G. Collado, Deputy on Financial Affairs to Mr. Clayton.

precedent for your suggested loan policy in the Middle East. I feel, however, that there is a very important distinction between the political aspect of these credits, and the type of political lending in the Middle East suggested by your memorandum, in which you state that "NEA could gain important diplomatic objectives through the judicious use of credits to countries deserving the goodwill and support of the U.S. and of the U.N." The countries you mention suffered great physical destruction during the war, and in most cases their present holdings of gold and foreign assets are far below what they were in 1939. To raise economic activity within the next couple of years to anywhere near the level of 1939 requires substantial outside assistance, which pending the establishment of the International Bank, has had to come in large part from the Export-Import Bank. This was explained in detail to Congress in the summer of 1945 when the request was made for an increase of \$2-¾ billion in the Bank's lending power. Without this Export-Import Bank assistance there seemed little hope for the early economic reconstruction or the attainment of political stability. Our objective was not to buy the support of these countries, but to restore economic activity in those countries in the belief that only by the restoration of normal economic conditions could Democratic governments of western or neutral orientation be expected to survive, or could there be an early realization of the American program of restoring international trade on a multilateral basis. My feeling is that your memorandum tends to exaggerate and over-emphasize the immediate diplomatic and psychological impact of an Eximbank loan in the borrowing country, which is, in any case, of a largely transitory nature and would certainly not have justified credits of the magnitude which we have been making. Our policy in making the reconstruction loans to which you refer has rather been based on the assumption that long-term political benefits would accrue to the United States from the economic recovery and political stabilization which would result from the loan.

4. It has been the announced policy of this Government for some time past that the reconstruction loans of the Export-Import Bank were in large part to be of an interim nature to meet the most urgent needs up to the time when the International Bank had begun operations. This Government played a leading part in the establishment of the International Bank, and the operations of this Bank are an integral part of our foreign economic policy.

In a report of the NAC submitted to President Truman on February 21, 1946, and transmitted to Congress by the President on March 1, 1946, with his endorsement, the following statements were made:

"The International Bank will be the principal agency to make foreign loans for reconstruction and development which private

capital cannot furnish on reasonable terms. It provides a means by which the risks as well as the benefits from international lending will be shared by all of its members. It is expected that the International Bank will begin lending operations in the latter half of 1946 and that during the calendar year 1947 the International Bank will assume the primary responsibility for meeting the world's international capital requirements that cannot be met by private investors on their own account and risk."

"It is the established policy of the United States Government carefully to scrutinize each loan application to determine that the need is urgent and that the funds can be obtained from no other source than the Export-Import Bank."

In line with this policy it has been the position of this office, which is supported by Assistant Secretary Clayton, that the Export-Import Bank should get out of the field of long-term developmental credits as soon as possible, leaving that business to the International Bank, and should make the larger part of its loans in the form of exporters credits which presumably would run in most cases not over ten years, and generally would be for a shorter period.

5. This office questions whether the unilateral approach of your memorandum to economic development in the Middle East is in accord with the policy of this Government of seeking world economic development through international action. Statements on page 7 of your memorandum suggest that Export-Import Bank loans should be used as political weapons to compete with both Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East. It is of course possible that the U.S. may ultimately be forced to such an approach to Middle Eastern problems, particularly as regards the U.S.S.R., but as long as the present policy of this Government is maintained of seeking international action, to offer credits to the Middle East with the idea of competing with British and Soviet influence appears to this office to be out of accord with our foreign policy. Until we have come to the conclusion that that policy is not workable, it would seem to this office that it would be quite inappropriate to adopt a loan policy along the lines that you suggest. Even if the international approach with Soviet cooperation proves unsuccessful, it is our belief the most appropriate means of stimulating economic development in the Middle East, of strengthening the economies of those countries, and of improving the ties between them and the western world, would also be through the International Bank, in which Great Britain and this country are the principal contributors, rather than through a unilateral approach.

6. We recommend that in discussions with Middle Eastern countries Department officials explain the limited lending authority of the Export-Import Bank, and the primary responsibility of the Bank for meeting the urgent reconstruction needs of devastated countries and of countries that have had serious losses of gold and foreign exchange

in recent years. We should also point out that the International Bank was established in large part through American initiative, that most of the lending power of the Bank will probably come from the U.S., and that through that Bank the major part of the development capital of the world, not available from private sources, is to be sought. Such an approach will indicate the interest of the U.S. in economic development in the Middle East, will make clear the economic power of this country to finance such development, and at the same time will make clear that our approach to world economic problems is on an international basis involving collaboration with other great powers.

GEORGE LUTHRINGER

[Mr. Henderson set forth various observations on the Near and Middle East in an address delivered at Los Angeles on September 19; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 29, 1946, pages 590, 593.]

Committee Secretariat Staff Files: Lot 122

*Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Near East Economic Policy*¹⁵

CONFIDENTIAL
CITAS D-7

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1946.

At the CITAS meeting of October 14, an Ad Hoc Subcommittee consisting of representatives of NEA and the economic offices was asked to examine the document "American Economic Policy in the Middle East" (ECEFP D-71/45)¹⁶ with a view to (1) determining whether the economic policies set forth therein are still valid; (2) preparing recommendations for revision, if necessary; and (3) preparing recommendations for the implementation of policies in that document or its revision.

Messrs. Gay—CP, Shaw—CP, Ansara—FN, Lincoln—ED, and Rountree—NEA have acted upon the instruction of the Committee and submit the following report:

(1) The broad economic policies set forth in ECEFP D-71/45 are still valid, although this document recently has been supplemented by a statement which has been included by NEA in the over-all policy statement in relation to the area.¹⁷ The Subcommittee believes that

¹⁵ To the Committee on Iran, Turkey, and the Arab States (CITAS). The report was submitted to the Committee on December 4, 1946.

¹⁶ See report by the Coordinating Committee of the Department of State, May 2, 1945, and footnote 5, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 34.

¹⁷ Not found in Department files.

the revised document should be considered the present statement of United States policy.

(2) It is not considered necessary that the long-range policy objectives of the United States toward the area be revised. It is recognized that some of the objectives cannot be accomplished within a short period; for example, development of a mechanism for international cooperation in the economic work of the area will require careful planning and will probably be achieved only after considerable time. However, it is felt that the objective itself is sound and should remain a long-range policy of this Government.

(3) The Subcommittee feels that the main problems have been the limitations upon our ability to implement the United States economic policy toward the area. It is recognized that the present strained economic, financial, technical and personnel resources of the United States are limiting factors upon the extent of our assistance to the several countries. Within these limitations, however, the Subcommittee feels that we are making progress in implementing our policies. Economic development of certain countries of the area is being assisted through the extension of loans and credits and by other means. We are cooperating in the development of an international trade organization, designed for the widest possible participation, which looks toward increased world trade and production and which will remove forms of discriminatory treatment which would hamper the movement of goods to and out of the several countries. Exchange difficulties are being solved as rapidly as possible. CP is proceeding with commercial treaty work as rapidly as practicable. Although the field personnel problem remains acute, we have been successful in providing field offices with junior officers to assist with their economic work. While every effort is being made to meet the large number of requests by NEA countries for economic and technical advisers, that problem also remains acute. Under two of the long-range objectives set forth in the memorandum, however, little or no progress has been made. These are:

(a) To encourage the creation and the efficient operation of a regional institution which should be initiated, supported and operated by the local Middle East Governments for the purpose of improving the standards of agriculture, transportation, communications, public health and related matters. (An organization of this type has been created within the framework of the Arab League, but the extent of United States efforts to promote the efficient operation of this body has been very limited.)

(b) Little or no progress has been made in developing mutual coordination between outside powers interested in the area, particularly, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and France.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Committee consider the following specific suggestions as to steps, in addition to the Department's current efforts, which should be taken toward the implementation of the stated policies of this Government:

(a) It has been proposed that a meeting of principal economic officers in the area be held in the near future at a convenient capital in the area. The purpose of such a meeting would be to discuss economic affairs common to the area, to consider issues in which the interests of major powers conflict, and to bring all economic personnel up-to-date on this country's trade and financial programs. Such a meeting has been proposed on several previous occasions, but for reasons existing at the particular times it has never developed. It also has been suggested that a survey of the resources of the area be undertaken with a view to enlarging the line of products which economically can be marketed abroad. This would include not only finding additional products with export possibilities, but improving the marketability of current exports to the United States. Memoranda from Mr. Shaw expanding upon these suggestions are attached. (See Enclosure 3 [*Enclosures 2 and 3*])¹⁸

(b) One of the current difficulties in effectively implementing American policies in the area is the shortage of qualified economic personnel in several State Department offices. It is suggested that the Committee consider this problem with a view to assisting with whatever means are at its disposal in the assignment of qualified officers, including the establishment of adequate budgets for this purpose.

(c) It is suggested that the Committee continue to study the problem of international cooperation in the area, with a view to increasing international economic coordination, both by outside powers interested in the area and by the local government offices. Specifically, the Subcommittee recommends:

1. That the Committee continue consideration of the proposal outlined in D-6¹⁹ for the establishment of a mechanism for international cooperation of the powers, with the view of proceeding with some such plan at the appropriate time.

2. That the Committee support the proposal (Ref. CITAS M-4)²⁰ that the United States Government recommend to ECOSOC that the Subcommittee on Economic Development undertake a survey of the economic conditions and problems of the area.

¹⁸ Memoranda by Mr. Shaw to Mr. Gay, dated October 24 and November 8, 1946. Both memoranda were entitled "Implementing United States Economic Policy for the Near East"; neither printed.

¹⁹ CITAS D-6, October 8, 1946, not printed; it recommended that "The United States with other major powers and in collaboration with the Near East countries establish a regional economic organization for the Near East under the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The Organization should have no coercive or executive powers but should function wholly on the basis of discussion, study, report and recommendation"; also "The organization should help coordinate and implement for the Near East the postwar economic objectives and programs of the major powers and the Near East countries, help to reconcile their economic interests and policies, attempt to restrain unilateral action, mediate conflicting interests and lay a solid basis for a peaceful, efficient and integrated economic development of the Near East." (Lot 122)

²⁰ Minutes of meeting of October 14 not printed.

3. That the Committee consider the position of the United States in regard to economic activities of the Arab League with a view to determining the attitude of the United States with regard to this form of cooperation among the several countries, and what action, if any, the United States should take in respect to this activity.

4. That the Committee consider despatch 2198, dated October 22, 1946, from London, setting forth the desire of the British for American participation in the advisory program of the British Middle East Office in Cairo. A copy of this despatch is attached. (See Enclosure 4)²¹

²¹ Not printed.

PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF THE NEAR EAST ¹

8901.6363/2-546

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Petroleum Division (Loftus)*²

[WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1946.

I am forwarding herewith a summation of the facts and issues involved in the current negotiations for pipeline and refinery concessions in the Near East being conducted by the Arabian American Oil Company.

At a meeting in your office on January 29 there was substantial agreement among those present on the following propositions.

1. It would not be in the long-run interest either of the stability of Aramco rights in the Near East or of the prestige and position of the United States Government in that area for Aramco to adhere rigidly to the pattern of provisions established by the earlier IPC concession contracts for transit rights through Trans-Jordan and for transit and refinery rights in Palestine.³

2. It would be equitable for any oil company operating a pipeline through a country (as for instance Trans-Jordan) to pay to the Government of that country some annual monetary compensation which, however small it might be, would be something over and above the direct costs incurred by the local government for policing of the line and other services.

¹ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 49 ff.

² Addressed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) and the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam).

³ A convention governing the construction and operation of pipelines and refineries in Palestine was signed by the High Commissioner for Palestine and William J. Lenahan of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company, an Aramco subsidiary, on January 7, 1946. A copy of the convention was transmitted to the Department in despatch 2377, January 11, from Jerusalem (867N.6363/1-1146). In a memorandum of February 4 to Mr. Henderson, Mr. Loftus and Walter J. Levy of the Office of Research and Intelligence noted that the convention followed closely the pipeline agreements signed between Palestine and the IPC and between Palestine and the AIOC in the 1930's in that it provided for security fees for the protection of company facilities rather than transit fees. The memorandum noted further that the Emir of Trans-Jordan had requested payment of transit fees for the right to build a pipeline through his country, a departure from previous concession practices in the Near East in that direct compensation would be paid for right of transit and not merely as compensation for special expenses. (890F.6363/2-446)

3. A *prima facie* case could be made that the equitable form of such compensation should be some fee related to and based upon the tonnage of oil moved through the pipeline.

4. Over and above any such transit fees additional compensation ought equitably to be paid to the Government of a country (e.g., Palestine or Lebanon) in which a concession for refinery operations is obtained; and this compensation ought both equitably and economically to be related to and based upon the tonnage of throughput.

5. The company ought to assume a contractual obligation to provide those countries in which either transit or refinery rights are obtained with ample supplies of oil at reasonable prices. Definitive agreement was not, as I recall it, reached on the exact form of such a contractual undertaking; it was suggested, however, that one possibility might be to assume an obligation to sell up to some predetermined quantity annually at a price 25% (or such other percent as might be appropriate) below the lowest delivered price prevailing in Mediterranean terminal markets (with appropriate safeguards against re-exportation).

6. Whatever more advantageous terms might be offered to local governments by the Arabian American Oil Company should not be such as to prejudice the competitive position of Arabian oil vis-à-vis oil from Iraq or elsewhere.

On the basis of this area of agreement discussion was held on January 31 with Messrs. Duce, Lenahan, and Miller of the Arabian American Oil Company. It was made clear to these gentlemen that a general problem was being discussed and that while the Department was agreed upon certain principles and considerations, no formal opinion was being conveyed to the company at this time.

The representatives of the company were in complete agreement that some compensation should be accorded to the local government in the case of Trans-Jordan for transit rights. They did not feel, however, that it was desirable at this juncture to pre-judge the question of the contractual form which such compensation might take; and they wished to reserve for further consideration certain alternative possibilities, such as either a fixed or a variable annual contribution to the local government unrelated to tonnage moved through the line or a transit tax paid upon the length of the line rather than the tonnage moved through it. Representatives of the Department urged that while the absolute amount of the compensation might work out to the same figure under various alternatives, there was a *prima facie* and evident equity in payment based upon tonnage, making it clear however that the Department was not insisting upon any particular form of contract.

Due to the lack of time the question of guaranteeing cheap fuel supplies was not adequately explored with the company's representatives. They indicated concurrence in the objective being sought but felt that cheap fuel would be a natural economic result of the initiation of refinery operations. It was pointed out to them that this "natural economic result" did not occur when the Consolidated Refinery went on stream at Haifa and in fact prices rose. Further discussion of this matter was deferred to some subsequent meeting.

The company officials made a considerable point of their anxiety not to be placed at a competitive disadvantage by virtue of any contractual provisions designed to assure economic benefits to countries of transit and/or terminus. It was pointed out to them that (a) there would not in fact be more than a short term competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other Middle Eastern oil moving to the Eastern Mediterranean since the terms of the IPC concession contract would undoubtedly have to be revised upward to meet the Aramco levels, and (b) the monetary magnitudes that would probably be involved would be infinitesimal in relation to the f.o.b. refinery prices that could be expected for petroleum products, so that the competitive differential, even if there were one, would be of no real significance. They did not seriously dissent from this reasoning and presumably agreed to it.

The areas of disagreement or incomplete agreement that emerged from the discussion are as follows:

1. The company did not agree that the principle of compensation for transit rights was applicable to countries in which refinery and port rights were obtained as well as transit rights. It was argued specifically, for instance, that in the case of Palestine the economic benefits (in the form of employment, industrialization, etc.) resultant from refining and shipping operations would adequately compensate the government of Palestine for privileges granted, whereas in Trans-Jordan where only transit rights are obtained a special compensation ought to be accorded. It was argued by the Department that in such a country as Palestine three separate sets of privileges are obtained by the company—transit rights, refinery rights, and port rights; and that compensation for transit rights in such a case should be on the same basis as in the case of a country in which only transit rights are obtained. It did not appear that the company was willing to accept this reasoning.

2. While agreeing with the Department's ultimate objectives in respect of compensation for transit rights the company wished, so far as immediate tactics are concerned, to pursue a course exactly opposite. Specifically in the case of Trans-Jordan they stated that

the British Colonial Office was unalterably opposed to any provision in the pipeline concession that would establish a transit tax or transit fee;⁴ and that opposition to the Colonial Office in this matter would result in an extinction of the company's present limited access to the Emir of Trans-Jordan for negotiating purposes. Accordingly the company wanted to defer to the wishes of the Colonial Office and therefore to negotiate with the Emir a contract substantially identical with the previous IPC contract, intending at some subsequent date and after Trans-Jordan has been granted its independence to modify the contract by granting more favorable terms. It was pointed out by the Department that the Embassy at London could approach the Colonial Office and state strongly that it was the view of the United States Government that the Arabian American Oil Company should have complete freedom to grant any terms it desired (provided they were not more favorable to the company than the provisions of the IPC contract) and that the terms which the company would discuss with the Emir might or might not include payment of a transit tax. If the Embassy took this position the outcome might be either (a) a modification of the attitude of the Colonial Office, or (b) a breakdown of the negotiations between the company and the Emir. The company felt that the risk of the latter outcome was sufficiently great to outweigh any possible advantages.

3. The company felt that it would be preferable for any revision of concession terms in the Near East to be made by both Aramco and IPC simultaneously and for IPC to appear to take the lead, since it was the established company. In this view Mr. Merriam concurred⁵ and earlier Mr. Pinkerton at Jerusalem⁶ had concurred. I argued and still believe that the benefits in goodwill and prestige of any concession arrangements designed to accord greater economic benefits to the countries of the Middle East should accrue primarily to the American company and the United States Government.

With respect to point 1 immediately preceding, this is a matter upon which the Department's position is clear and what is needed is further discussion with the company and a more effective effort to alter the company's view.

⁴ The memorandum of February 4, 1946, by Messrs. Loftus and Levy stated that the British authorities were perturbed about the repercussions that the granting of such fees might have on Anglo-Iranian and IPC pipeline and refining rights in the Near East.

⁵ Marginal notation by Mr. Merriam: "Yes. I feel we might be seriously criticized for urging or even permitting Aramco to accept a less favorable arrangement than IPC. Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that IPC would lift its terms to conform. IPC and the British might just sit back and laugh. GPM"

⁶ Lowell C. Pinkerton, Consul General at Jerusalem.

With respect to point 2, I do not share the company's opinion that the Colonial Office would resist a perfectly reasonable request of the American Government to the point of precipitating a breakdown of the negotiations. I should appreciate your judgment, however, on whether we ought to proceed with instructions to the American Embassy against the expressed wishes of the company.

With respect to point 3 the decision will depend upon what course is pursued with respect to point 2. If we proceed with instructions to the Embassy at London I think it will follow naturally that the prestige benefits will accrue to Aramco and the United States Government. If, however, we defer to the company's wishes and permit the improvement in concession terms to come at some later date the step will in practice probably be taken by both companies concurrently and the British will get the greater share of the credit.

Incidentally, with reference to the company's program for modifying the concession terms at a later date I do not know of any oil concession anywhere in the world the terms of which have been voluntarily liberalized by an oil company.

In summary, the security of our oil investments in the Near East, the protection against hostile internal and external forces and the goodwill of our American companies will be much enhanced if the various countries in that area participate directly in the economic benefits resulting from the development of local oil resources. The granting of such terms would be an important step in establishing an independent and enlightened U.S. policy in that area. It is likely that British pressure on the local governments and on the Aramco will prevent us from following such a course if no action is taken by the Department to assure freedom of action for Aramco and the Near Eastern countries.⁸

⁸ In a conversation on February 15, officers of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs informed Aramco officials in the following sense: "If Aramco is obliged to include a transit tax provision as a condition to obtaining the pipeline concession, a clear case would apparently arise under the 1924 treaty requiring IPC to sign a supplementary agreement including a similar provision. This would perhaps be the ideal way to handle the matter. On the other hand, if Aramco should on its own initiative, for reasons which it considered good, offer to include a transit tax provision, it seemed unlikely that our treaty rights would be affected, although we might wish to transmit an official notice to that effect to the British Government. It seemed to us that a treaty provision conferring the right of non-discriminatory treatment to American interests would not operate to prevent an American interest from voluntarily offering a non-generalized benefit to Trans-Jordan." (Memorandum by Mr. Merriam, 867N.6363/2-1546). William W. Bishop, Jr., Assistant to the Legal Adviser, when consulted by Mr. Merriam on the legal question involved in these views, concurred in the position taken by officers of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (penned comment, February 25).

The 1924 treaty referred to is the convention between the United States and Great Britain relating to rights in Palestine, signed at London, December 3, 1924; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. II, p. 212.

867N.6363/3-1146 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1946—2 p. m.

2352. Arabian American Oil Company has informed Dept they are willing to pay reasonable transit tax to Transjordan Govt in consideration of granting of pipeline concession, amount of tax to be negotiated directly between company and Emir. Dept endorses this desire of company and requests you to discuss matter with Colonial Office (which is opposed to payment of such a tax and which is reported so to have advised Emir) in the following sense:

1. US Govt feels that whatever may be historical precedents, Transjordan is entitled to receive determinate and proportionate compensation for transit privileges granted to company in any pipeline concession. Accordingly US Govt strongly supports desire of Aramco to offer payment of transit tax as consideration for obtaining pipeline concession.

2. US Govt therefore assumes that Colonial Office will facilitate free discussion between company and Emir with respect to such arrangements and that Aramco will enjoy full freedom to accord in a commercial contract any non-generalized benefit to Transjordan Govt which it voluntarily chooses to accord without reference to terms and provisions of previous or other comparable contracts.

3. US Govt further feels that existing and future pipeline and refinery concessions in Near and Middle Eastern countries should reflect full recognition of principle that countries which contribute in any way to development and commercialization of petroleum resources should receive fair and reasonable compensation for such contribution. Accordingly, US Govt is requesting the American interests in IPC to bring this matter to attention of IPC management and to urge modification of existing contracts which do not conform to above stated principle.

4. This Govt might not consider that a contract provision for a benefit to Transjordan, in this instance a transit tax, would be in derogation of American rights under Palestine Convention of 1924, even though not generalized by corresponding amendment in IPC contract, if said provision resulted from voluntary offer by Aramco. Nevertheless strong criticism might arise if, because of a technicality, Aramco alone should contract to provide fair and reasonable contribution to country of transit and thereby be competitively disadvantaged.

Dept further requests you inform Emir of Transjordan while he is in London⁹ that:

1. US Govt endorses desire of company to pay reasonable transit tax.

⁹ Emir Abdullah was then in London to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the British recognizing the independence of Trans-Jordan; for documentation on this subject, see pp. 794 ff.

2. US Govt however does not thereby waive any of its rights under Palestine Convention of 1924 which, of course, remains in force until direct negotiations between US Govt and Transjordan Govt result in reciprocal acceptance of some alternative basis for determining the rights of nationals of each Govt in the country of the other. Aramco offer to pay transit tax is purely voluntary and without derogation of American rights to most-favored-nation treatment in Transjordan.

3. US Govt assumes that negotiations between Emir and Aramco will be predicated on recognition of need for reasonableness in determining level of compensation payable to Transjordan Govt and upon recognition of need for safeguarding competitive position of Aramco oil vis-à-vis oil from other Middle Eastern sources.

BYRNES

867N.6363/3-1846 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, March 18, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received March 18—4:07 p. m.]

3105. Reference Deptel 2352, Mar. 16. Since Department's instruction re payment of transit tax to Transjordan Govt in consideration of pipeline concession crossed our No. 3087 of same date¹⁰ reporting that Lenahan had been authorized to drop transit tax in favor of payment for security and since Lenahan tells us that he is still working under those instructions and that our intervention at this point in favor of transit tax would only muddy waters we are holding up action and would suggest Dept's clearing matter with Aramco with view to coordinating instructions to Embassy and Lenahan.

It may be pointed out, however, that altho matter of payment is important factor question which first needs to be clarified is legal right of company to concession and British obligations in that connection under provision 1924 treaty. After sending our No. 3087 we had another long conversation with representatives of American and Eastern Depts of Foreign Office who expressed personal and informal view that considerations of mutual interest aside British Govt probably under legal obligation to assist company but they felt it necessary to obtain ruling from Legal Dept of Foreign Office and said they would endeavor to do so without delay. It would be helpful therefore to have Depts views as soon as possible in order to assist us in pressing for early decision which would enable Lenahan to pursue his negotiations. As matter stands he feels it undesirable to proceed until it is clearly established where responsibility actually rests.

¹⁰ Not printed.

Incidentally we understand that British treaty with Transjordan will include clause providing for Emir's assuming responsibility for obligations incurred in his behalf by British Govt and it seems probable that 1924 convention would fall into category of such agreements.

GALLMAN

867N.6363/3-2146 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

LONDON, March 21, 1946.

[Received March 21—7:40 a. m.]

3229. Following is essential portion of text of letter dated March 20 received by Embassy from FonOff setting forth British Government's position in respect of negotiation of Transjordan pipeline:

"The position as we see it is that after detailed and prolonged discussions with the company's representative, the High Commissioner for Transjordan¹¹ has transmitted to the Transjordan Government the draft of a convention setting out the conditions which are to govern the construction and eventual operation of the pipeline.

"It is our view that the convention should be signed on behalf of Transjordan by the Transjordan Government and not by His Majesty's Government. We consider that this would have been the correct procedure even if Transjordan were not on the point of becoming an independent state and it was in fact the procedure followed in the case of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline convention with Transjordan. As the Transjordan Government are to be signatories of the convention, it is clear that their wishes must be given the fullest consideration and we therefore consider that the next step is for the company to approach the Transjordan Government direct with the object of negotiating with them any points which may still be in doubt. This, however, should not be taken to mean that we are no longer interested in the negotiations. We are interested both on our own account because we wish to see the negotiations brought to an early and successful conclusion and because we consider that we are still bound in respect of Transjordan by the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 whereby the rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals are extended to include the United States Government and its nationals. These rights and benefits include, of course, the right to no discrimination mentioned in article 18 of the mandate. We are informing the Transjordan Government of our views, and we are recommending the matter to their favorable attention."

Lenahan has been informed. Suggest Department advise Aramco.

GALLMAN

¹¹ Alec S. Kirkbride.

867N.6363/3-2146 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

2624. Conference Dept with Duce, Aramco, indicates Lenahan's instructions to drop transit tax in favor of flat payment for security (first para Urtel 3105 Mar 18) were predicated on assumption pipeline convention impossible of negotiation with transit tax included and did not anticipate strong US Govt intervention such as proposed in Deptel 2352.¹² Accordingly, Dept understands that Lenahan's principal's still favor payment of transit tax if Brit Govt can be persuaded through diplomatic representations to agree. If Lenahan's principals confirm this point to him you may proceed along lines of Deptel 2352 as modified by additional considerations in following paras of this message.

Dept assumes from Urtel 3229¹³ that Brit Govt's attitude and procedure are based on its present status as Mandatory and that discussions between Aramco and Transjordan Govt will relate solely to relatively unimportant details. If this is so, Dept feels strongly that an American company should not in declining days of mandate be party to abuse of mandatory power which would be involved if Brit influence were used to compel payment to Transjordan Govt lower in amount and less equitable in character than company willing to pay.

In direct answer to your question Dept is of opinion that unless Brit Govt wishes to waive its rights as Mandatory it is obligated to assist Aramco to obtain concession on terms not less favorable to Aramco than IPC terms if such are the terms which Aramco wants. This, however, would not preclude Aramco voluntarily offering non-generalized benefit to Transjordan in excess of IPC terms and/or in different form; and British Govt would not be justified in using its mandatory position to prevent the offering and acceptance of such more beneficial terms.

Emb should discuss foregoing points and sense of Deptel 2352 with Foreign Office and Colonial Office informally but at sufficiently high level and should endeavor to press on appropriate officials that US Govt feels very strongly the importance of liberalizing concession arrangements such as this in Middle Eastern area in order to stabilize and secure American oil position there. US Govt believes Brit Govt would be wise to follow same course but in any case would view with concern any Brit effort to prevent implementation this American policy.

¹² March 16, p. 23.

¹³ *Supra.*

In view complexity of payments problem Dept would appreciate opportunity to review any definite payment agreement contemplated in view of advice already given Transjordan by Colonial Office and in view observations on IPC contracts adopted by Permanent Mandates Commission in 1931.¹⁴

ACHESON

867N.6363/3-2746 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1946—7 p. m.

2858. Dept approves approach to FonOff in sense of numbered para 5 urtel 3470 Mar 27.¹⁵ Aramco has been advised that in opinion of

¹⁴ An undated "Review by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the 1931 Pipeline Concessions of the Iraq Petroleum Company in Palestine, Syria, and the Lebanon: Summary" was prepared, presumably in the Department of State, and was attached to the Loftus-Levy memorandum of February 4 to Mr. Henderson (see footnote 3, p 18). The Review noted that the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations had considered at its 20th session from June 9 to June 27, 1931, whether the IPC agreements with the British Government on January 5, 1931, and with the Lebanese and Syrian Governments on March 25, 1931, were compatible with article 18 of the Mandate for Palestine and article 2 of the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. "These articles specified that the mandatory Powers should not discriminate against the nationals of member states of the League of Nations as compared with the nationals of the mandatory Power or any foreign state with regard to matters of taxation, commerce, navigation, etc., and that they should take all necessary steps to promote the development of the natural resources of the mandated territories and to safeguard the interests of the population. Following detailed study of the agreements and the Mandates, consideration of testimony from representatives of the Powers concerned and prolonged discussion before the Commission, the Commission concluded that there was nothing in the Mandates which prevented the granting of the advantages and privileges conferred by the concessions but that it appeared doubtful whether proper balance between benefits granted to the company and those which would accrue to the territories had been kept. A note containing the conclusions of the Commission and mentioning the 'doubts' of certain of the members was sent to the Council of the League of Nations, following vote as to whether such a notification was justified. While reaching final agreement on the form of the note to be submitted to the Council, the Commission was equally divided on a question or [of] whether or not censure of the mandatory Powers of Palestine, Syria, and the Lebanon was also called for. The note which was sent did not indicate the extent of the objections of the dissenting members of the Commission, and it is not known what action, if any, was taken by the mandatory Powers after the Council of the League forwarded to them the observations of the Commission." (890F.6363/2-446) For text of Part B (Special Question) of the Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission submitted to the Council of the League of Nations on September 4, 1931, see League of Nations, *Official Journal*, September 1931, p. 2177.

¹⁵ Not printed; this paragraph stated: "Finally, regarding Lenahan's suggestion that Dept ask FonOff to issue detailed instructions to Kirkbride, it would seem that, while Lenahan's anxiety to attain maximum clarification and support may be understandable, situation might adequately be met by less peremptory approach taking cognizance of progress made here and expressing hope that matter will be of continuing concern to British authorities now that scene of negotiation being transferred to Amman. (867N.6363/3-2746)

Emb and Dept prospects are good for mutually satisfactory completion of negotiations at Amman. Dept commends Emb and Hare for skillful handling this negotiation during Emir's visit London.¹⁶

ACHESON

[Mr. Loftus gave an address on "Oil in United States Foreign Policy" at the University of Pittsburgh on July 30. He cited various activities of the United States with respect to foreign oil operations prior to World War II, as follows:

1. Insistence upon nondiscriminatory commercial treatment of American oil marketers operating in foreign countries.

2. Insistence upon the 'open door' principle of equal commercial opportunity (most-favored-nation treatment) with respect to the granting of rights to explore for and develop oil reserves.

3. Insistence on the principle of just and adequate compensation in circumstances where a foreign government exercises its sovereign right to nationalize the oil industry.

4. Diplomatic assistance to and support of American oil companies in their various dealings with foreign governments, when requested, such assistance and support being more or less routine, depending on the circumstances."

Mr. Loftus also set forth two goals of United States foreign policy, as they affected Middle East oil: "To promote the development of oil potentialities in the Eastern Hemisphere, particularly in the oil-rich areas of the Middle East—so that the expanding requirements of Europe and Asia for petroleum products can be met from Eastern Hemisphere production without that drain upon Western Hemisphere reserves which has characterized the pattern of world trade in the past", and "To facilitate and encourage within reason the participation of American capital and enterprise in the development of Eastern Hemisphere resources."

Excerpts of Mr. Loftus' address are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 11, 1946, page 276.]

¹⁶ In accordance with Department's telegram 2858, Mr. Gallman discussed the pipeline question with Sir Robert G. Howe, Superintending Under-Secretary for the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office, on April 8. It was Sir Robert's understanding that appropriate instructions had been sent to Amman to ensure that negotiations would not bog down again, but if such instructions had not gone forward, they would be sent without delay. Sir Robert was said to be "unequivocal in reiterating that British Govt regarded pipeline project as of direct interest and definitely wished to cooperate in bringing negotiations to successful termination." (Telegram 3926, April 9, 9 p. m., from London, 867N.-6363/4-946)

890E.6363/7-3046: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT, July 30, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received 5:14 p. m.]

388. Aramco representative Lenahan arrived Beirut July 26 to negotiate pipeline conventions with Lebanon and Syria. I have presented him to Foreign Ministers Beirut and Damascus and arranged that technical discussions with appropriate Ministers begin this week.

He has full powers of attorney and proposes endeavor conclude agreement with each country generally along lines of his Trans-Jordan draft, with articles VI and VII of IPC Syrian-Lebanon conventions added.

For transit rights and security services in Syria he is prepared to pay up to pounds 50,000 per annum which is figure informally agreed upon with King Abdullah. For terminus and port facilities he will suggest to each country payment at same rate now paid by IPC. He understands such rate to be two pence per ton loaded aboard tankers Tripoli. This would involve annual payment pounds 150,000 were whole of expected on [*sic*] 5,000,000 tons annual throughput tons loaded at one port.

I gather from Lenahan that, while trend of Aramco thinking in US tends to favor establishing terminus at Port Fouad (with possible bifurcation to Palestine or Levant Port) he himself is keenly appreciative of advantages offered by port in Lebanon. In addition to those discussed during my last visit to Dept is presumption that Lebanon is least likely of Arab states to manifest xenophobic tendencies in treatment of foreign capital investment.

Copies to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

[A pipeline convention was entered into at Amman by the Government of Transjordan and the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company on August 8, 1946. Article IV provided for a payment of 60,000 Palestinian pounds as transit fee for each year that oil passed through the Company's pipeline across Transjordan. A copy of the convention was transmitted to the Department in despatch 1306, August 20, from Beirut (890E.6363/8-2046).

On August 10 the Company signed a pipeline convention at Beirut with the Government of Lebanon. Article IV called for payment of 1.5/1000 of one pound sterling per ton of oil passing across Lebanese

territory through the Company pipeline, with a minimum annual payment of 20,000 pounds sterling. A copy of the convention was transmitted to the Department in despatch 1310, August 22, from Beirut (890E.6363/8-2246). In a separate letter of August 10 to Saadi Mounla, the Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr. Lenahan made formal notification that should the Company select a port on the Lebanese coast for the terminus of its pipeline, it would conclude an agreement with the Lebanese Government whereby it would pay two pence on every ton of oil exported in lieu of all dues, taxes, and charges, except lighthouse dues (890B.6363/11-1446).

Mr. Lenahan also attempted to negotiate a pipeline agreement with the Government of Syria. He informed officers of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on November 21 that these negotiations had broken down completely (memorandum of conversation by Richard H. Sanger, 891.6363/11-2146).]

891.6363/8-2346 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1946—7 p. m.

709. By informal notes and discussions¹⁸ in Dept, Ala¹⁹ has proposed establishment international corp under aegis UN to pool and control all oil resources of Iran including AIOC concession. Plan presupposes participation by British, Soviet, Iranian, American, and possibly other interests, preferably by private companies. Ala strongly feels creation such Co would provide solution oil problem in Iran and alleviate political pressures from North and South on central govt. Ala feels exclusive British oil interest in South is causative factor in recent sequence of events involving British military moves in Iraq,²⁰ Soviet concentration near Azerbaijan, and probable renewed Soviet pressure on central govt.

Dept explained that recent public utterances²¹ referred to by Ala relate to creation international oil body under UN for advisory

¹⁸ Informal notes of July 19 and 22 not printed; discussion took place on August 21 with officers of the Petroleum Division and the Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs.

¹⁹ Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador.

²⁰ A general strike of workers in Abadan took place in July 1946. The British viewed the strike essentially as an attempt to advance Soviet interests and not primarily as a labor dispute and despatched 15,000 troops to nearby Iraqi waters (Basra) from India.

²¹ Reference is to Mr. Loftus' address of July 30 (see p. 28) and to the participation by Mr. Loftus and Charles B. Rayner, Adviser on Petroleum Policy, in a broadcast on "Oil and International Relations" over the National Broadcasting Company on August 17, 1946.

rather than regulatory purposes. Consequently, US Govt unable sponsor at this time creation international oil organization before UN. Furthermore, Dept unable support inclusion AIOC concession in proposed organization since it is morally bound observe provisions Anglo-American Oil Agreement²² providing for respect of existing concession and lawfully-acquired rights even though such agreement not yet ratified by Senate.

Summarizing Dept's views expressed Ala, (1) Dept concurs in principle with objectives implicit in Amb's suggestions that oil situation be treated protect Iranian sovereignty; (2) Dept must study proposal establishment joint Co suggested by Amb vis-à-vis merit of concessions being held by several private Cos before further comment on proposal; and (3) Dept would consider, at appropriate level, question approaching British authorities to ascertain views re proposal.

Copies Dept's public utterances re oil, informal note Iranian Amb, and memo conversation being forwarded air mail.

Sent Tehran, repeated London and Moscow.

ACHESON

890G.6363/8-2746

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George C. McGhee, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1946.

Participants: Standard Oil Company of New Jersey—Mr. Hardin
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company —Mr. Sheets
UE —Mr. Clayton
AP & Mr. McGhee
—Mr. Rayner²³

Problem:

Representatives of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum Oil Company called to advise the Department that British Counsel had rendered to them the opinion that the so-called "Red Line Agreement"²⁴ entered into in connection with the formation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd., was no longer valid, and to request advice from the Department as to policy to pursue jointly in renegotiating a new agreement with their foreign partners.

²² For text of agreement, signed at London, September 24, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 30, 1945, p. 481; for information on this unperfected agreement, see bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. vi, p. 244.

²³ Charles B. Rayner, Adviser on Petroleum Policy.

²⁴ For text of the Group (Red Line) Agreement entered into by private American and European oil interests on July 31, 1928, see *Current Antitrust Problems: Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary*, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, pp. 1004 ff.; for information on the agreement, and events leading to the agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 944, footnote 42.

Discussion:

Mr. Hardin and Mr. Sheets, representing the two United States oil companies participating in Iraq Petroleum Company, first gave a brief history of the formation of the IPC, after the first World War, to operate in the area of the old Turkish Empire. They reviewed the part played by the Department of State in securing participation of United States oil companies in this joint venture and described events which finally resulted in the Near-East Development Company, which is owned equally by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, owning 23.75% of Iraq Petroleum Company. Remainder of the interest in IPC is French government 23.75%, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 23.75%, Shell Oil Company 23.75%, and Mr. Gulbenkian, a naturalized UK citizen of Armenian origin, 5%.

The oil companies' representatives stated that a basic condition of the original agreement was that each of the participating companies received its share of the oil produced at cost. In the Agreement, each of the companies, in addition, surrendered all operating rights in the area surrounded by the "Red Line", which included the old Turkish Empire. This part of the Agreement can be construed as excluding purchasing of concessions of crude petroleum from other producers in this area, although Standard of New Jersey counsel has interpreted it as not excluding purchase of products from petroleum produced in this area.

During the War a number of the participating companies, including the American and French companies, were not in position to take delivery of their production. All except the French, however, will be allowed to make up their production.

The oil companies' representatives stated that their present problem arose from their having been advised by three independent British Counsels, all of whom reached identical conclusions without knowledge of the others investigating the problem, that the Red Line Agreement, under the British law, ceased to be in effect in June 1940 when France became a technical enemy of Great Britain, wherein the IPC is domiciled. The three barristers are the leading English authorities on this subject, one being Sir Ballantine Holmes. The British Counsel held that the rights of the participating companies, in the absence of a new Agreement, will revert to their rights pursuant to the articles of incorporation of the IPC. This would entitle the companies only to a share of the profits of the British company. Under British law there is no provision whereby the original Agreement can be resumed, now that the condition causing its dissolution has been overcome. A new agreement must be negotiated from scratch. Each of the four major groups participating in the original agreement have two directors on the IPC Board, Mr. Gulbenkian has one. A unanimous vote

of all directors is required for a new Agreement, which means that any one country or Mr. Gulbenkian could block the new Agreement.

The oil companies' representatives stated that they are faced with two problems:

1. Negotiating a new Agreement which would reaffirm their right to their share of the oil produced by IPC at cost.

2. Avoiding, at the same time, restrictions as to their activities which they had accepted in the original "Red Line Agreement" and for which they have been criticized by the U.S. Department of Justice.

With regard to the first problem, both companies affirm their desire to obtain their share of the oil in kind at cost and asked whether or not the Department would support them if they encountered any difficulty in reaching such an agreement with their other partners. It was brought out that profits which they might receive from the British company would be subject to British taxes.

The Department representatives replied that the original participation of the American companies was at the intercession of the United States Government, and it was clearly the original intent and in the interest of this Government for the US companies to control their share of the crude oil produced, rather than to receive profits to be derived from the sale of oil under control of a British company. It was pointed out that the French government should have the same interest as the United States in seeking to obtain their share of the oil in kind. Mr. Clayton stated that if the companies encountered difficulty in securing Agreement to receipt of their share of the oil produced by the IPC, the Department would support them.

With respect to the restrictions to which the companies had subjected themselves in the "Red Line Agreement", Mr. Hardin stated that the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey would like complete freedom of action; in fact their Counsel did not believe that they could subject themselves to any limitations in a new Agreement. Mr. Sheets said that Socony-Vacuum was willing, if necessary, to agree not to take any additional concessions in the original area of the Agreement, particularly in the light of advice by their geologists that all of the good concessions were taken. They would, however, like complete freedom of action in other matters, such as buying interests on existing concessions, purchasing oil from other producers, refining, marketing, etc.

Mr. Rayner stated that although there was agreement that most if not all of the good concessions were taken, he did not believe the Department of Justice would agree to any limitation on the companies' activities in a new agreement.

It was pointed out that the French would probably press for this limitation, since they were not in a good position to take new conces-

sions for themselves independently and would feel that the other companies would be competing with IPC to their advantage. It was brought out that the recent increase in production from the IPC fields should help to alleviate the French fears. It was also observed that the British might profit more from freedom of action than the American companies, since they were in a good strategic position to obtain valuable concessions, particularly that south of Kuwait.

Action:

If necessary the Department will support the position of the US oil companies participating in IPC, in seeking a new Agreement, that they receive their share of the production in kind. The companies in turn will not agree to limitation of their activities in the area of the old "Red Line Agreement".

891.6363/8-2946 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1946—4 p. m.

723. Following point by point expressions Dept views re many important Emb observations outlined Urtel 1050 July 31²⁵ designed provide fullest possible clarification.

First Dept concurs your view we must defer permitting US companies send reps to Iran to express interest in or undertake negotiations for oil concessions until appropriate future date when conditions warrant but not before restrictions based on following points removed:

1. US Govt support Iranian case in Security Council²⁶ not motivated by selfish interest; Govt has accordingly requested US companies refrain from initiating oil negotiations in Iran. This position holds while Iranian case remains on agenda.
2. Prevailing Iranian Law forbids concession negotiations by Iranian officials with foreign nationals. Not clear here whether recent Sov negotiations constitute law violation, however, no risk of law infringement by US nationals should be taken.

²⁵ Not printed; it reported that on July 30, the Shah made a strong plea for an American oil concession in Iran, stating that it was impossible for Iran to give an oil concession to the Soviet Union in northern Iran without offsetting it by an American concession in southern Iran. Ambassador Allen replied to the Shah that his point of view was understandable. He also advised the Department that it was his opinion that the United States should wait for an oil concession because of internal and external political considerations but that it was not too early to make plans. (891.6363/7-3146) For subsequent discussion on oil with the Iranian Prime Minister, see telegram 1192, September 6, from Tehran, p. 514.

²⁶ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 289 ff.

Second Dept concurs your view US Govt cannot enter oil business. This precludes possibility creating Govt corp to acquire concessions ownership wholly or jointly with Iranian interests. Criticism US industry, Congress, and press against wartime proposal Govt ownership Arabian pipeline²⁷ is case in point. Furthermore, it would be contrary to traditional US pattern open door competitive bidding, equal opportunity, and ownership of petroleum resources and facilities by private enterprise.

Third While Dept may not be able sponsor creation private US corp patterned after IPC (with interested US companies participating) there is no reason preclude voluntary establishment in industry of new corp (composed of interested Cos) patterned after Arabian American Oil Co (composed of California Standard and Texas Co).

In obtaining concessions and marketing oil therefrom Dept feels principal issue is whether maximum competitive opportunities are provided to private enterprise and secondary issue is whether negotiations are conducted by joint Co or number of individual Cos.

Fourth In event more than one Co seeks concessions, Dept could undertake at appropriate later date minimize possibility free for all concession hunt by preliminary discussions here with Co reps emphasizing need for orderly negotiations and for restricting submission of bids to Emb channels if considered necessary. In latter case you could be authorized devise procedure locally for handling bids and negotiations in such manner eliminate undesirable consequences free for all concession hunt. Dept believes number interested Cos limited to few including Jersey Standard and Sinclair because unstable local conditions and huge investment required for developing concession and constructing attendant facilities; therefore problem re concession seekers may be limited.

Fifth Iranian Govt may find solution for problem arising from demands of concession seekers, including Sovs, by

1. Adopting standard concession contract form applicable all parties seeking future concessions or equivalent privileges in Iran, and
2. Limiting privileges under such standard contract to commercial exploitation and omitting privileges which may be used for political penetration.

Before offering assistance to any Co in acquiring concession, Dept would acquaint Co with necessity adherence to US economic foreign policy.

ACHESON

²⁷ For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 17-34, *passim*.

891.6363/8-3046 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1946—7 p. m.

729. Resuming conversation reported Deptel 709 Aug 23, Dept officials informed representative Iranian Emb Aug 29 that preliminary study joint petroleum Co under aegis UN (point 2, penultimate para reftel) leads Dept to conclusion that proposed international approach to Iranian oil problem is not desirable at this time. Principal controlling factor was stated to be US commitment under Anglo-American oil agreement (1) to respect existing concessions and lawfully acquired rights, (2) to use that instrument as springboard for multi-lateral accord. (For your info Dept has addressed exploratory note to UK re latter point). Secondary consideration was practical wisdom keeping Iranian oil question out UN while Iranian case remains on SC agenda.

Iranian Emb reference to model petroleum laws other countries prompted Dept to discuss possible desirability enactment petroleum law applying to all future oil concessions in Iran (Item Fifth, Deptel 723, Aug 29), possibly on occasion repeal 1944 restrictive statute. Iranian Emb representative felt such law might provide formula relieve political pressures arising from conflicting foreign oil interests.

Dept officials indicated that question of approaching British authorities re Iranian Emb proposal had been considered at appropriate level of Dept (point 3, penultimate para reftel) with decision that Anglo-American Agreement bound US not to raise question impinging upon existing oil concessions. (In this connection it was learned that Iranian Emb London may approach UK authorities on subject joint Co proposal).

Sent Tehran, repeated London, Moscow.

ACHESON

800.6363/11-646

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Petroleum Division (Loftus)

[WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1946.

Participants: Mr. E. E. Jones, Petroleum Attaché, British Embassy
 Mr. Thomas E. Bromley, British Embassy
 Mr. George H. Middleton, British Embassy
 Mr. Henderson—NEA
 Mr. Minor—ME²⁸
 Mr. Freeman—Le²⁹

²⁸ Harold B. Minor, Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs.

²⁹ Alwyn V. Freeman, Assistant to the Legal Adviser.

Mr. Loftus—PED

Mr. Robertson—PED³⁰

The representatives of the British Embassy called at their request to have a preliminary discussion jointly with NEA, PED, and Le of a problem which had been presented to them by London. It has to do with the disposition of the sub-sea oil resources of the "Continental Shelf" of the Persian Gulf. It appears that the entire Persian Gulf has at all points a depth not exceeding 100 fathoms; so that by the concept of the Continental Shelf, adopted by the United States Government in its proclamation,³¹ the entire expanse of the Persian Gulf would be underlain by a shelf.

The British Government feels that it has at least a three-fold concern with this matter:

(1) The rights in this territory of the various "protected States" on the northern and western shores of the Gulf are a responsibility of the British Government,

(2) The present contractual rights of British oil companies may be involved,

(3) Because of the importance of Middle East oil the British Government has a keen interest in the basis for allocation of rights to explore and develop such oil resources as may exist under the waters of the Persian Gulf.

It appears that the authorities in London had instructed the Embassy here to confer preliminarily with the Department, pointing out that there appeared to be three alternative courses of action the British Government might pursue.

(1) Unilaterally to instruct the British-protected shaikhdoms of the Persian Gulf littoral what rights they should assert in the waters of the Gulf,

(2) To expound to those shaikhdoms the British concept (when it had been developed) of an appropriate basis for the disposition of rights in the Gulf, and to advise the shaikhdoms after consultation with other "riparian" states to assert their respective rights in accordance with the advisory opinion of the British Government,

(3) Before taking any action vis-à-vis the shaikhdoms, to have an exchange of views with the United States Government on the technical, political, and economic aspects of the problem, and to proceed after some common agreement had been reached between the two governments as to the most equitable basis for allocation of rights in the waters of the Gulf.

³⁰ David A. Robertson, Assistant Chief of the Petroleum Division.

³¹ For documentation on the formulation of United States policy on the Continental Shelf from 1943 to 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 1481 ff. Actually, President Truman issued two proclamations on September 28, 1945, asserting the jurisdiction of the United States over the natural resources of the Continental Shelf under the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States and its territories, and providing for the establishment of conservation zones for the protection of fisheries in certain areas of the high seas contiguous to the United States; for texts, see 10 Federal Register 12303, 12304.

Of the three alternatives the British Government much preferred the third; and specifically it was hoped that the State Department would agree that the forthcoming oil conversations in London³² would be an appropriate occasion for a preliminary exchange of views on this subject. Such exchange of views would be entirely without commitment and on *ad referendum* basis. The British experts would be speaking without prior consultation with the Cabinet—without, therefore, any authority to take a firm position. It was assumed that the U.S. experts would be similarly situated.

It was pointed out to the British representatives that the United States Government, of course, did not have a direct political interest in the settlement of this problem, although it did share with the British Government a general concern over the basis upon which oil rights in the Gulf might ultimately be allocated when and if petroleum development operations became commercially attractive. It was also pointed out that the United States Government probably would not *a priori* favor a disposition of the problem which would assert the extension of presently established oil rights but would rather favor the determination of some orderly and equitable basis for the acquisition of new rights.

After further discussion of some of the more technical aspects of the problem it was agreed that, subject to confirmation, there appeared to be no reason why it would not be appropriate and useful for Messrs. Loftus and Rayner to discuss this problem with the British Government in London this month, provided the discussions were as had been previously stated entirely non-committal and *ad referendum*.

124.416/10-1446

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 598

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1946.

The Secretary of State acknowledges with appreciation the receipt of the Embassy's despatch number 2052 dated October 14, 1946³³ regarding petroleum reporting and recent oil developments in the United Kingdom.

[Here follows a paragraph dealing with publication of oil statistics.]

³² For extracts of the record of informal Anglo-American talks on oil questions, from November 19 to November 30, 1946, see p. 44.

³³ Not printed; it reported that an important group of oil executives representing Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil and Socony-Vacuum conferred in London during the first 10 days of October. Among the problems discussed was that "of the future status of the agreement arising out of the Iraq Petroleum Company concession. It is felt that the conference agreement should now be regarded as abrogated on the ground that during the war the Compagnie Française des Pétroles and the Gulbenkian interests in IPC were under enemy control. It is therefore argued that the agreement should now be rewritten in the light of the postwar situation. (124.416/10-1446)

The Department has reviewed with considerable interest the Embassy's comment concerning the Red Line Convention. There is enclosed for the Embassy's information a copy of a memorandum of a conversation ^{33a} held in Mr. Clayton's office with executives of two American participants in the Iraq Petroleum Company which indicates the nature of the official discussion of this subject. It should be noted that the Department agreed to support the position of the United States companies participating in IPC with respect to the preservation of the basic conception of the inter-company agreement, viz., that the IPC is a consortium based upon shares of oil rather than upon shares in the pecuniary profits of a jointly-owned company. Furthermore, the Department hopes that the American element in IPC will be successful in a renegotiation of the inter-company agreement designed to eliminate its restrictive provisions. The United States Government has officially indicated its view that the Red Line Agreement in so far as it restricts the commercial liberties of the parties to it is a kind of private commercial understanding incompatible with the United States' views on restrictive business practices. Paragraph 3 of Article II of the Anglo-American Oil Agreement is clearly directed against such arrangements and the Red Line Agreement was explicitly mentioned in the Anglo-American oil talks as being one of the arrangements falling under the indictment of this paragraph.

The Department, however, does not feel that it is competent to or could appropriately enter into a discussion of whether or not the inter-company agreement is *de facto* void at the present time by virtue of the legal status during the war of Compagnie Française des Petroles and Mr. Gulbenkian. This is a matter on which the private parties at interest must be guided by the opinion of competent counsel. If, however, it is the case that the old agreement is void, the Department concurs with the American companies in the desirability of negotiating a substitute agreement which would preserve the concept of shares in oil; and its unfavorable attitude toward the restrictive clauses of the 1928 Convention is a matter of record.

In this connection it will interest the Embassy to know that this problem was the subject of discussion in Paris between Mr. Sheets of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company and Mr. Loftus of the Department. Since the concurrence of the French element in IPC is necessary for the successful renegotiation of the inter-company agreement and since the management of CFP is not free to proceed without the advice and consent of the interested French Government entities, Mr. Loftus undertook to explore the problem informally with representatives of various agencies of the French Government as well as with officers of Compagnie Française des Petroles and Compagnie

^{33a} August 27, p. 31.

Française de Raffinage. These conversations were protracted and oblique. They indicated quite clearly, however, that the French were not convinced that the commercial liberty CFP would obtain in consequence of the elimination of the restrictive clauses would be a net gain if by obtaining it CFP simultaneously lost the right to prevent its partners in the IPC from improving their supply or production position. It was also evident that the French desire more time in which to appraise this calculus of gain and loss.

Accordingly, Mr. Loftus advised Mr. Sheets that unless there were considerations of urgency unknown to the Department it appeared advisable for the American element not to deliver an ultimatum to the IPC partners at the expiration of the two-week period which had been mentioned during the first IPC meetings in London and if possible to allow the French element a period of six to eight weeks in which to weigh carefully the economic and political considerations.

It is understood that subsequently this recommendation was discussed as between the Socony-Vacuum and Jersey offices. It was the opinion of counsel of the Jersey Company that any protracted lapse of time might cause the former inter-company convention to re-enter into force by virtue of consecutive performance under it. Accordingly, since the recommendation was qualified, the two American companies decided to accept it to the extent of extending the original two-week ultimatum to probably four weeks. It is not believed, however, that the negotiations on this subject will drag on over a long period. Apparently the legal principle which the Jersey counsel anticipated may become operative is a sufficiently practical consideration to make it imperative that the matter be resolved one way or the other in the very near future.

[Here follow last three paragraphs of this instruction, dealing with oil questions other than the Red Line agreement.]

890G.6363/12-346

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George C. McGhee, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Harden —Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey
Mr. Clayton (in part) —UE
Mr. McGhee —UE
Mr. Henderson (in part)—NEA
Mr. Merriam (in part) —NE
[Mr. Russell ³⁴]

³⁴ Donald S. Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration.

Discussion

Mr. Harden stated that he and Mr. Holman of his company had recently called on the Department with respect to a proposed pipe line from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. They were received by Mr. Donald Russell, in Mr. Clayton's absence, and advised Mr. Russell of a proposed joint purchase by Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Socony Vacuum Oil Company of 35, possibly 40 per cent stock interest in Aramco, a company owned 50 per cent by Standard Oil Company of California and 50 per cent by the Texas Company. Aramco included in its assets all oil concessions and physical properties owned by these two companies in Saudi Arabia. In the event a 35 per cent interest was acquired, 25 per cent would belong to Standard and 10 per cent to Socony. In the event 40 per cent could be acquired, Standard would get 30 per cent and Socony 10 per cent. In the event this deal was consummated, it was planned that Aramco would build a 24-inch to 30-inch pipe line from the oil fields in Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean going through Trans Jordan and with the outlet possibly in Lebanon. This pipe line would be capable of carrying up to 500,000 barrels a day, although operations in excess of 300,000 barrels a day are not now contemplated.

Mr. Harden explained that his Company's desire to acquire an interest in Aramco and build the pipe line was part of a long range plan to obtain all the oil for their European and other Eastern Hemisphere markets from the Middle East, retaining Western Hemisphere oil exclusively for their Western Hemisphere markets. He stated that even with their Iraq production, the proposed interest in Aramco was not adequate to supply the needs for their European market and that they had entered into discussions with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company regarding the purchase of a specified amount of oil at a specified price over a period of 20 years. Standard proposed to transport this oil to the Mediterranean through another pipe line which it would build on a 50-50 basis with Anglo-Iranian. Standard's interest in the oil and line would be shared with Socony on an 80-20 basis.

This oil would be delivered by Anglo-Iranian at Abadan, in Iran, and would be transported to the pipe line terminus across the river in Iraq. The line would pass just north of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia into Trans Jordan and Palestine, with an outlet possibly at Haifa. The line would be similar to that described above from Saudi Arabia and would cost an estimated \$100 million to \$120 million. The British would use half of the capacity of the pipe line for transporting their own oil and provision could be made for carrying any production which Gulf might wish to transport.

Mr. Harden requested the approval of the Department in principle to the oil purchase and the construction of the pipe line in partnership with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. He asked whether the

Department had strong views as to whether or not the company which would build and operate the pipe line for the partnership should be domiciled in the U.S. or the U.K. Mr. Clayton replied that he saw no objection to the proposal, and that he had no strong views as to whether or not the pipe line company should be American or British. He said, however, that the Department would look into the matter further and advise Mr. Harden if there were any objections.

Subsequently Mr. Harden presented the question of the Iraq pipe line to Mr. Henderson, NEA, and Mr. Merriam, NE, both of whom were familiar with the proposed Saudi Arabian pipe line. Mr. Henderson advised that the Iraq pipe line raised no new political issues and that he saw no reason why the Department should object to the proposed deal with Anglo-Iranian and the construction of the pipe line.

As to the question of whether the pipe line company should be domiciled in the U.S. or the U.K., Mr. Henderson stated a strong preference for the company being a U.S. company. He said that British control might result in restrictions on participation of American personnel and in other ways. He urged that Standard attempt to obtain an agreement from the British on this point if there were no commercial considerations to Standard to the contrary.

Mr. Harden replied that he did not know to what extent Standard would be able to enforce their wishes in this matter since he assumed Anglo-Iranian would have to obtain approval from the British Foreign Office. In the event there are no commercial considerations to the contrary, Standard would make every attempt to get agreement on the company being a U.S. company and Standard would consult the Department before agreeing to operation of the pipe line by a British company. He stated that the British had indicated that a British company might secure the pipe line right-of-way more easily, since right-of-way had already been secured for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company along the same route.

Conclusion

The Department advised Mr. Harden tentatively that it raised no objection to the proposed oil purchase from Anglo-Iranian Oil Company^{34a} and the pipe line from Iraq to the Mediterranean which Standard proposed to construct in partnership with Anglo-Iranian, and agreed to advise Standard if it saw any difficulties after further con-

^{34a} Mr. Henderson informed Mr. Loftus on the morning of December 11 that a simple purchase and sale arrangement for crude oil from Iran, such as that proposed between Standard of New Jersey and Anglo-Iranian, "would not be in conflict with the Department's policy of not seeking oil rights for American nationals in Persia at the present time and of not permitting American nationals to seek such rights themselves." (Memorandum of December 11 by Mr. Loftus to Mr. Henderson, 891.6363/12-1146)

sideration. Mr. Harden agreed that if commercial considerations to the contrary were not overriding that Standard would press for construction and operation of the pipe line by an American company, and that Standard would not agree to operation by a British company without consulting the Department.

891.6363/12-446 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1946—7 p. m.

U.S. URGENT

8023. For Loftus and Rayner.³⁵ Harden discussed proposed Standard NJ-Socony-AIOC pipeline from Persian Gulf to Mediterranean with Clayton and Henderson yesterday who tentatively told Harden Dept perceived no objection to project. Henderson felt domicile of pipeline company should be US unless there are commercial considerations to contrary and Harden promised not to agree to domicile elsewhere without further consultation with Dept. Line would have capacity 15 million tons annually. Percentage participation would be Standard 40, Socony 10, and AIOC 50. According to Druitt,³⁶ Am companies would purchase 134 million tons crude oil over 20-year period to be supplied by AIOC from Iran and/or Kuwait for delivery Mediterranean terminus proposed pipeline. Line would also be available as common carrier for Gulf Kuwait production to extent free capacity.

Brit informed PED yesterday that Brit Govt had informed AIOC it had no objection to project subject to further clearance of route, terminus, and currency problems, and provided American companies have cleared with State Dept. Your views urgently desired. Particularly, do you think that to prevent any possible future misunderstanding Standard should confirm discussion with Clayton and put matter up to Dept in letter for written reply.

Brit also inquired whether Gulf-Shell proposed marketing agreement had been taken up with Dept. Their approval this project also contingent upon Dept clearance. Gulf has not consulted Dept and we are inclined simply to inform Brit to this effect leaving matter to be raised with Dept by Gulf. Proposed agreement is for 10 years with quantities involved starting at 1 million tons annually and rising

³⁵ Messrs. Loftus and Rayner were in London for informal discussions on oil questions of mutual interest to the British and American Governments.

³⁶ Charles E. H. Druitt, Assistant Petroleum Attaché of the British Embassy.

probably to 10 million. All costs would be pooled and profits divided equally. Shell would undertake to transport, refine and market in Eastern Hemisphere oil supplied by Gulf from Kuwait.

Your views also desired proposed handling this case.³⁷

ACHESON

841.6363/12-646

Record of Informal Anglo-American Oil Talks, November 1946 ³⁸

[Extracts]

SECRET

[LONDON, undated.]

A series of informal discussions on oil questions of mutual interest to the British and American Governments took place in London from 19th to the 30th November, 1946, between representatives of the U.S. State Department and officials of the interested U.K. Government Departments.

MIDDLE EAST

12. *I.P.C. and Koweit Inter-Company Agreements.*

(a) The U.S. representatives, after reviewing the present status of the I.P.C. and Koweit intercompany Agreements, and the legal issues involved, expressed the U.S. Government view that

(i) the clauses of the I.P.C. Agreement prohibiting the partners from separately obtaining concessions and separately purchasing oil in the Red Line area contravened the spirit of the Anglo-American Oil Agreement;

(ii) paragraph 7 of the Koweit inter-company Agreement was also contrary to the spirit of the Anglo-American Oil Agreement;

(iii) even apart from the Oil Agreement, these clauses in the I.P.C. and Koweit Agreements appeared to be incompatible with the preservation of competition in the international oil trade, in view of the growing importance of Middle East supplies;

(iv) the U.S. Government were, therefore, advising the American partners in the I.P.C. that if the I.P.C. Group Agreement needed to be reaffirmed, the restrictive clauses mentioned in (i) should be reconsidered;

³⁷ On December 6, Messrs. Rayner and Loftus advised the Department that they had informally told the British they saw no objection to the proposed pipeline but would have to await their return to Washington for complete details and Department clearance before giving approval. They also stated that the Gulf-Shell transaction was apparently not an urgent matter and could await their return for detailed discussion (telegram 9948 from London, 891.6363/12-646).

³⁸ Copy transmitted to the Embassy in the United Kingdom on December 6 by K. L. Stock, Assistant Secretary of the Petroleum Division in the British Ministry of Fuel and Power. Mr. Rayner, who left London December 6, transmitted the document to Mr. Clayton and other high economic officers of the Department with a memorandum of January 29, 1947, in which he indicated that British approval of the document had just been received.

(v) the British and American Governments should urge their respective nationals to cancel paragraph 7 of the Koweit intercompany Agreement.

(b) The U.K. representatives replied that the view of the British Government was that the "restrictive" clauses referred to in the I.P.C. and Koweit intercompany Agreements were of a type which might impede the achievement of the objectives stated in the Anglo-American Oil Agreement. These company Agreements were, however, freely entered into by the contracting parties. The rights of all interests in the I.P.C. Agreement would have to be considered. The British Government was not in a position to express a view as to the legal validity of the I.P.C. Group Agreement and hoped that the parties to the Agreement would be able to work out a satisfactory solution on their own. The British companies concerned in the I.P.C. were, however, well aware of the British Government's general views on these clauses. In the case of Koweit, developments appeared to be such as to render paragraphs 7 and 8 inoperative and the British Government did not therefore feel that it would be appropriate for it to intervene at this stage.

13. *Pipeline and Refinery Concessions.*

The U.S. representatives explained the position of their Government with reference to transit pipelines and refinery concessions, as evidenced in the recent diplomatic exchange over the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company's concession in Trans-Jordan. They considered that the country giving such facilities was equitably entitled to payment for them. The U.K. representatives reserved their position on this question but considered that an annual lump sum payment for transit rights in respect of a pipeline was more appropriate than payment based on the amount of oil put through the pipeline.

14. *Iraq.*

It was agreed that the U.K. Government would advise the Iraq Petroleum Company of the interest displayed by the Iraqi Government in the early development of the Basrah concession and that the U.S. Government would take a suitable opportunity of advising the Iraqi representatives in the U.S.A. of intended developments.

15. *Bahrein.*

The U.K. representatives advised that H.M.G. considered the claim of Iran to sovereignty over Bahrein was untenable.³⁹

³⁹ For previous documentation on Iranian claims to sovereignty in Bahrein, see *Foreign Relations*, 1934, vol. II, pp. 890 ff. For related documentation on the reservation of American rights against Iran's attempts to extend its exclusive jurisdiction over coastal waters beyond the three-mile limit, see *ibid.*, 1935, vol. I, pp. 916 ff.

16. *Qatar/Saudi Arabia.*

It appeared that no settlement had ever been reached about the Qatar/Saudi Arabia boundary. It was agreed that the two Governments should consult their respective nationals with a view to ascertaining whether operations by either I.P.C. or Aramco were likely in the disputed territory.

17. *Iran.*

The petroleum situation in Iran was discussed. It was noted that, for the time being, no further concessions could be granted by the Iranian Government under existing legislation. Discussion on the labour situation is covered in paragraph 2.⁴⁰

18. *Continental Shelf.*

(a) The U.K. representatives stated that action was contemplated by the British Government in respect of the Continental Shelf in the Jamaica and Bahamas area on lines similar to that taken by the U.S.G. under President Truman's Proclamation of 1945.

(b) The U.K. representatives also drew attention to the possibility that oil companies might wish, in the fairly near future, to undertake submarine oil development in the Persian Gulf, and to the political difficulties which might arise in any attempt to apportion the sea bed of the Persian Gulf. In a limited sphere, this problem had already arisen owing to the desire of the Bahrein Petroleum Company to drill on small islands and reefs in the waters separating the main Bahrein Island from the Qatar Peninsula; the apportionment of the sea bed between Qatar and Bahrein on an equitable basis was under consideration by the British authorities responsible.

(c) The U.S. representatives stated that the U.S. Proclamation on the continental shelf was issued after prior notice to the directly interested Governments and that it included provisions for reconciling conflicting interests of various countries by negotiation.

(d) It was agreed that the issue of any general declaration about the division of the sea bed in the Persian Gulf would be undesirable. It was further agreed that a suitable opportunity would be taken by both Governments to indicate to the companies concerned that if they contemplated drilling in the sea bed, they should inform their respective Governments before doing so, and that the latter should consult together, as appropriate, on an *ad hoc* basis.

⁴⁰ This paragraph not printed.

890D.6363/12-1346: Circular airmgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers ⁴¹

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 13, 1946—9: 25 a. m.

Discussions in Department and with Aramco including Lenahan regarding Trans-Arabian pipeline route indicate (1) intention of Aramco to exclude Syria from proposed pipeline survey and (2) wisdom of refraining from pressing for treaty rights to obtain pipeline concession from Syria under prevailing circumstances.

Confidential sources indicate survey may determine feasibility and economics of route from Saudi Arabia through Trans-Jordan and northern tip Palestine to Mediterranean terminus in Lebanon. Department offered to assist Aramco in providing access its personnel to Syria for survey purposes but Company declined preferring to bypass Syria at present time in view of that Government's refusal to consider reasonable pipeline convention.

Department feels invocation treaty rights for purpose obtaining pipeline concession without Aramco obligation to construct through Syria following on heels of Aramco inability to negotiate on voluntary basis would meet with stiff resistance, jeopardize future chances to obtain concession, and create undesirable friction in US-Syrian relations. Aramco agrees undesirability invoking treaty rights at present time.

ACHESON

890G.6363/12-2846

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moose)

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 561

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1946.

The Secretary of State refers to conversations which took place in the Department on May 29, 1945 ⁴² between Nuri Pasha and various officers of the Department, in which Nuri Pasha stated, *inter alia*, that he considered it highly desirable that the extraction of petroleum in Iraq be increased and that he hoped American interests would take steps to bring about the opening of the Basra and Mosul oil fields.

⁴¹ Sent to Damascus, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, Jidda, and London.

⁴² *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 49; see also footnote 10, *ibid.*, p. 51. Nuri Pasha was at that time a former Prime Minister of Iraq. He became Prime Minister again on November 21, 1946.

The Officer in Charge may inform Nuri Pasha, unless objection is perceived, that the American Government and American elements in the Iraq Petroleum Company have consistently favored the development of these areas and that, in line with this policy, it is now understood that the Iraq Petroleum Company has secured priorities for the export of drilling materials and has firm plans for commencing drilling operations in the Basra Petroleum Company Ltd. concession in the near future. It is also understood that the Iraq Petroleum Company has firm plans for the commencement of operations in the British Oil Development Company Ltd. concession area in northern Iraq.

891.6363/12-2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

TEHRAN, December 29, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received December 30—11:35 a. m.]

1636. Dept's 1061, December 26.⁴⁴ Proposed oil purchase and pipeline agreement which was described briefly to me by a visiting oil man some weeks ago and which was subject of telegram British Ambassador subsequently received from London, seems a good arrangement in principal as far as American interests here are concerned. It will provide a large westward outlet Iranian oil and consequently contribute to the economic stability of Iran for which we are working.

Arrangement of the magnitude contemplated will inevitably give US an increased interest in AIOC affairs and Iranian public will probably attach some responsibility to US for AIOC operations in future, no matter how much we insist that arrangement is a private commercial one without political significance. Many Iranians who would welcome American participation in Iran petrol development either through separate operation or through participation in British concession, will regard agreement as step in latter direction. I gather from remarks British Ambassador has made that certain, especially Empire-minded, directors of AIOC, were hesitant about agreement for this very reason.

I hope Department will be able to insist on American domicile for pipeline company. British insistence on British domicile for various oil companies operating in Persian Gulf area has placed American interests in Bahrein, Kuwait and Iraq at disadvantage. American domicile for new corporation would tend to even score somewhat. AIOC has generally been difficult to deal with. It refuses at present,

⁴⁴Not printed; it repeated telegram 8023, December 4, to London, p. 43.

for instance, to discuss with FLC the question of large amounts of US Lend Lease supplies which company is still using without having paid any rent or principal, on specious argument that company is responsible only to British Army although latter has approved direct discussions. AIOC record does not encourage one to rely on its generosity towards US.

Repeated London 192.

ALLEN

891.6363/12-3146 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1947—7 p. m.

US URGENT

13. Embtel 1638 Dec. 31.⁴⁵ While detailed provisions of AIOC-AM Cos agreement not fully known to Dept and many points may still be under negotiation among parties involved, quick analysis known developments indicate arrangement is strictly private transaction whereby one commercial firm, AIOC, agrees to sell and two other commercial firms, Standard New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum, agree to buy 134 million tons petroleum produced from Iran and/or Kuwait for delivery over period 20 years with not more than half total deliverable in first 10 years. Motivation appears to be that AIOC has vast ME holdings and large potential surplus oil production in Iran, Kuwait and Iraq, and AM Cos have large market outlets and relatively smaller crude reserves in ME area.

Other developments in ME area indicate Iran will not necessarily be principal source supply for AIOC-AM Cos agreement. For your confidential information Gulf recently negotiated to supply Shell with crude from Gulf's share Kuwait oil, amounts ranging from approx 1 million tons in 1947 to 10 million tons in each of last 2 years of 10 year period. Gulf undoubtedly will have other commitments which with Shell transaction entail huge development program for Kuwait concession. Undoubtedly AIOC will take as its share Kuwait oil amount equal to Gulf's production. Ready market to AIOC for such enormous quantities appears likely through arrangement being negotiated with Jersey Standard and Socony.

Possibility that AIOC may provide portion oil to Jersey and Socony under subject agreement from AIOC share Iraq oil should not be overlooked. IPC, in which AIOC participates, plans new development Mosul and Basra concessions in Iraq in 1947. With already

⁴⁵ Not printed.

available sufficient production in Iran to meet current market demands AIOC may turn to Jersey-Socony deal for market outlet. Dept knows no prohibition on use Iraq oil in fulfillment of contract.

It may therefore be observed that, while Kuwait and/or Iraq oil may be used in substantial quantities thus lessening extent to which Iranian oil will be needed, foregoing observations are based on broad outlines of transactions revealed to Dept by Am Cos and final contracts may contain specific provisions differing in some respects.

BYRNES

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTH AFRICA

881.00/7-1146

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Rabat (Pasquet)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1946.

The Acting Secretary of State requests that, starting immediately upon the receipt of this instruction, the Consular Officer in Charge submit a fortnightly airgram on Communist activities in Morocco and on the Communist, or Communist-inspired, press and other forms of propaganda in that area. Similar instructions are being sent to the Consulate General at Tunis, the Consulate General at Casablanca, and the Consulate General at Algiers; and the Embassies at Paris and Moscow and the Legations at Tangier and Cairo are being informed.¹ Copies of the Consulate's airgrams should be sent to all of these offices.

When possible, and for purposes of consistency, the first part of the airgram should be devoted to Communist propaganda, tracing the line which is being followed and emphasizing such changes in the line as may be noted from time to time. The second part should contain a description of activities other than propaganda, showing in particular any trend which the activities may indicate and how they do or do not conform to the propaganda line. Special mention should be made of attempts, successful or otherwise, to recruit Moslems into the Communist or Communist-inspired parties or groups. The airgrams should be headed "Communist Activities—North Africa".

For the secret background information of the Officer in Charge and for the guidance of the reporting officer in preparing the required airgrams, there is outlined below a brief analysis of the extent, intensity, and possible future direction of Communist activities in North Africa. Any comments which the Officer in Charge wishes to make on this analysis will be appreciated.

In general, it may be stated that the Communists have not as yet undertaken activities on an intensive scale in French North Africa, nor have the Communist parties in that area met with outstanding success in recruiting Moslems. Theoretically, it would seem that such a wide ideological gap exists between Communism and Mohammedanism that no basic community of interests could be established between

¹ The Legation at Cairo was requested to bring this subject to the attention of its Attaché who acted as an observer in Libya for his guidance in reporting on similar activities in that area (851S.00/7-1146).

the two groups which would stand the test of time. In this connection, however, attention is drawn to the fact that there are substantial Moslem communities in the USSR, that these Moslems are permitted to practice their religious rites, and that, as a result of the improved conditions which these Moslems enjoy under Communist domination as compared with their lot during the reign of the Czars, there are no indications of serious unrest among these peoples. Furthermore, it is possible that the Nationalist groups in North Africa might conceivably come to feel that there is something to be gained by a temporary alliance with the Communists, especially if the impression grows on them that they can expect nothing from France, and little more from the Western Powers. Regardless of the apparent logic which might motivate such a policy, the dangers to the Nationalists of attempting such an alliance cannot be over-emphasized as such alliances almost invariably result in advantages for the Communists at the expense of the other party.

Information in the Department's possession indicates that at the present time the Communists still have hopes of gaining control in France and for that reason do not wish to endanger their future position by an open campaign seeking to stir up discontent or to raise hopes for independence among the natives of French North Africa. If the Communists were to gain control in France, however, it is probable that a full scale program would immediately be launched in North Africa to gain the support of the native inhabitants for Communism by means of granting certain reforms and nominal autonomy, which would be accompanied by intense propaganda to the effect that these reforms came to the Arabs solely as the result of the interest shown in them and the efforts made in their behalf by a *Communist* France. If such a program were successful, the ultimate strategic results would be the control of North Africa by Moscow.

On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that if the Communists once become convinced that they will be unable to gain control of France by peaceful means in the foreseeable future, they may, for that reason also, begin an intensive campaign of propaganda among the Moslems, the difference being that in this case the "line" would emphasize that the Arabs can expect nothing but oppression and the continued deprivation of all liberty so long as they are under the control of the French and that the Arabs should therefore strive for independence by agitation or by violent means, violence to be employed only as a last resort or under favorable circumstances. The object, of course, would be to weaken a France which would, in Communist eyes at least, have turned to the "western bloc".

In view of reports that there exists in North Africa a group of French Army officers who plan a military *coup d'etat* in the event that Communist activity or control becomes too great in either France or North Africa, continued reports on this group are requested.

It is, of course, quite possible that neither of the above patterns will actually take definite form in the near future, but the Department feels that it is important to watch closely any signs which may indicate a trend in any specific direction, and consequently particular care and thought should be given to the airgrams requested by this instruction. It is hoped that this will not prove too great an additional burden on your staff.

881.00/7-1946 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TANGIER, July 19, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received July 19—1 : 14 p. m.]

281. Last evening I discussed with Leon Marchal, French Delegate at Rabat, who happened be Tangier, general question raised Deptel 232, July 16 re uprisings French Morocco.² He spoke very frankly saying Residence [*Residency?*] expected no trouble immediate future but no one could say there might not be troubles some time ahead. Marchal said the Resident General³ proposed follow increasingly liberal policy and cited recent repatriation three Nationalist leaders who had been exiled for several years. He added that Resident General would make an important announcement July 22. Marchal appeared believe that there was more danger from Communist inspired activities than from Nationalist agitation. He pointed out Communist movement among French residents was quite important in protectorate adding that he was not sure whether activities were inspired from Paris or from further afield.

He stated Resident General believed, as he himself did, in educating Moors for greater responsibilities, in developing protectorates' mineral resources and in starting certain industries to raise standard of living. In this program Resident General has full support and confidence of Sultan.⁴ I gathered that through such policies Resident General hoped avoid any clash with Nationalists.

² Not printed; it transmitted certain information on the possibility of a revolt in Morocco, requested that an investigation be made, and asked for an evaluation of the situation (881.00/7-146).

³ Eirik Labonne.

⁴ Sidi Mohammed.

I have great confidence in Marchal's opinions and am inclined to give them full credence.

Am visiting Casablanca this week-end and will make further investigations there and report.⁵

ALLING

851R.00/7-2646

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

No. 5749

PARIS, July 26, 1946.

[Received August 5.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's instruction No. 2234 of July 11, 1946,⁶ informing this Embassy that the American Consulate General at Algiers had been requested to prepare fortnightly airgrams on the subject of Communist propaganda and activities in Algeria and that identical instructions had been sent to the consular offices at Tunis, Casablanca and Rabat. It is felt these periodical reports will be most timely and interesting, and the Embassy would appreciate receiving copies thereof.

Instruction No. 2234 also made reference to the Embassy's despatch No. 5336 of June 5, 1946,⁶ pertaining to an interview with Ferhat Abbas, a prominent Algerian native leader. The Department referred in particular to the statement contained in the closing paragraph: "For the purpose of developing autonomy of these areas and of weakening their ties with France, they (the Communists) do not hesitate to pose as the friends 'of these oppressed native populations.' This policy of course fits in with the Soviet general interest in the whole Mediterranean area and more particularly with their desire to weaken the control of other Mediterranean powers over the outlets of this Sea." The Department's instruction expresses the opinion that "so long as the Soviets still have hopes of gaining control of France by peaceful means, their policy can only be one of establishing friendly relations between the Arab nationalist leaders of North Africa and the Communist party, rather than 'actually weakening their ties with France'; and that not until the Communists are convinced that they have little or no chance of gaining control of France

⁵ Mr. Alling's report is contained in telegram 286, July 22, 1946, from Tangier, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: "Over week-end, discussed subject Deptel 232, July 16, with Military and Naval Attachés and Consular officers at Casablanca and Rabat. All are in agreement that (Legtel 281, July 19) outbreaks are unlikely in foreseeable future; that with good crops and improving economic conditions, Moroccans are unlikely revolt; that Resident General, whom I saw yesterday with Ambassador Caffery, is following line which is pleasing to nationalists. At same time, all agree that in view developments Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Egypt and Libya, unless French make real effort assist bringing about self-government Morocco within few years, troubles will occur. We all agree Moroccans require training and education before they are competent self-government." (881.00/7-2246)

⁶ Not printed.

and with it, French Africa, will their program be aimed at breaking the North African communities away from the mother country."

The Embassy agrees fully that the Soviets would prefer if possible to influence and control French North Africa through gaining "legal" control of France, thanks to the Communist party. It would seem, however, that for some time and more especially since the Referendum of June 2 [*May 5?*], 1946,⁷ the Soviets may have had their hopes dampened for a speedy accession to power of the French Communist party through legal means.

The Embassy agrees with the Department's statement that Soviet policy until now has preeminently been one of establishing friendly relations between the Arab nationalist leaders of North Africa and the leaders of the Communist party. In this connection, however, the Embassy would like to express its belief that it is extremely difficult in such relatively backward countries as Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, to distinguish between Communists, autonomists and those natives advocating all out independence. It would seem, on the contrary, that these various movements, which should in theory be quite separate and distinct, are on the contrary confused and interwoven at the base, with a few leaders at the top giving the appearance of separate and distinct movements. Furthermore, while the Communist party has posed as a patriotic party since 1941 and has refrained from using separatist slogans openly, the Embassy believes that behind the scenes the Communists' organizations in French North Africa have, ever since the Allied landings of November 8, 1942, fostered, aided and abetted nationalist or independent movements in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

While true Marxist Communist doctrine would appear difficult to reconcile with the form of Moslem life which has slowly evolved in North Africa in the course of centuries, it is not believed that the contradictions in doctrine would provide a major obstacle to extensive Communist penetration of the Moslem masses. While the consular offices in North Africa are more qualified to give an authoritative opinion on the subject, the Embassy, viewing the situation from Paris, believes that Communist doctrine in North Africa is purposely kept exceedingly fluid, ill-defined, and that according to Leninist-Stalinist theory it has been tailored to adapt itself to the loose and as yet uncrystallized nationalist aspirations of these areas and towards the exploitation of the misery and subnormal standards of living which for several years have prevailed in North Africa, due to a series of dry years and to the war.

⁷ In the May 5 referendum the new French draft constitution, the adoption of which was advocated by the French Communists, was rejected. In elections held on June 2 the Mouvement Républicain Populaire replaced the Communists as the largest party in France.

In many ways, it would appear that Communism wears a cloak of nationalism and local autonomy in North Africa and perhaps more especially in Algeria. Thus, while it can be said that the Communists as such have not succeeded in developing (or perhaps have not attempted to develop) an extensive following under their own banner in Algeria, one must not forget the potential allies they have in the followers of Ferhat Abbas and of Messali Hadj. Ferhat Abbas's sweeping victory at the polls in June is an indirect Communist success. (In the Constitutional Committee of the Assembly, Ferhat Abbas first voted with the Communists and Socialists when they voted together on an issue. In case of disagreement he abstained. On two occasions, however, during the recent past, he modified this policy and voted with the Communists against the Socialists.)

The Communist official party newspaper *Humanité* has granted extensive support to the native autonomist elements in French North Africa ever since that area came painfully into the news with the Constantine uprisings of May 1945. The autonomist nationalist leaders, Messali and Ferhat Abbas, have been defended from the start. (It may be of some interest that Messali Hadj when arrested in November 1934 was defended by the "Secours Rouge International" or Red International Legal Aid. The movement which he then headed, the "North African Star" was not only nationalist but also professed Marxist doctrines.) The *Humanité* waged a campaign in favor of the pardon of all natives implicated in the Constantine uprisings.

The *Humanité* of June 23, 1946 gives a certain prominence to the meeting in Algiers of the Central Committee of the Algerian Communist party. As a sub-title, *Humanité* declares "it demands the immediate release of Messali." It is assumed the Consulate General at Algiers has reported on the text of the resolutions adopted. However, in connection with the subject of this despatch, special attention is drawn to that part of the plan adopted by the Algerian Communists calling for the establishment of an Algerian Democratic Republic. True enough, such a Republic would be "tied to the people of France by federal bonds, freely decided upon, as well as to the other peoples federated into the French Union", but the trend would appear to be clearly indicated.

Thus it would seem that in many ways the Communist party has in fact since the liberation of France contributed materially to the development of North African nationalist movements (more especially the Algerian one), and thereby has already contributed somewhat to weakening the ties which bind North Africa to France.

Respectfully yours,

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

851R.00/8-756 : Airgram

The Consul at Rabat (Pasquet) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

RABAT, August 7, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received September 4—1: 01 p. m.]

A-39. Reference Department's Secret instruction A.F. of July 11, 1946 (File No. 851R.00). While there is no doubt that the Communist Party in Morocco is endeavoring to increase its following, within the last few months propaganda has been decreasing largely as a result of the party's set back in recent French and Moroccan elections. The "line" used has been against the trusts, be they foreign or French, and against exploitation of native farmers. It might be more properly stated that Communist dominated "Confederation Generale du Travail" has been spreading this line and Communist Party giving it lip service which served its purpose.

Influence of Communists on natives has been extremely limited, almost negligible, and Nationalists have always maintained that gap separating the Islamic and Communist conceptions of life is too great to be bridged. Recent reliable rumors that Nationalists and Communists were uniting for political reasons seem to have some basis but reliable sources state that negotiations were definitely broken off by Nationalists. Chief of Security for Morocco claims, as confirmed by two other reliable sources that there are no more than 2500 convinced Communists in Casablanca (of whom possibly 1000 French and remainder Spaniards) and 200 in Rabat the latter being found principally in the lower echelon of French civil servants.

There is no doubt that any widespread gain of Communism either in France or Morocco (which seems unlikely at present) would find strong opposition not only in the local French Army group but among the *colons* (French landed farmers) and the Nationalists as well [as the] Sultan and his government. Any spread of Communism would undermine the position of these classes, and they will simply not tolerate it. It should not be forgotten that there are many retired Colonels, Generals, and a smattering of naval officers who are convinced that France cannot live without her colonies and protectorates. This group is furthermore convinced of the coming conflict between the USSR on the one side and the Anglo-American bloc and Western Europe on the other, some going so far as to say that France will again be occupied, with part of Germany joining each camp. They maintain therefore that French North Africa must be kept open for future defense of Western Europe.

PASQUET

851R.00/8-1746: Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Finley) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ALGIERS, August 17, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received 1:55 p. m.]

503. I put the question raised in urtel 4083 to Paris⁸ to Governor General Chataigneau⁹ this morning. He considers that a serious and important change has recently (since the visit here of Marty) occurred in the Algerian picture. He confirmed that with Soviet inspiration the Communists are now offering the Algerian Nationalists an alliance which he doubts can be averted. He pointed out the great advantages which the Nationalists would find in this association both because of the strength of the Communists in the Parliament and because of the powerful press which would then be put at the Nationalists' disposal. He stated that his latest information was that the Communists would probably run no candidates in Algeria at the October elections but would support the Nationalist candidates.

Chataigneau said that the present government was prepared to grant Algeria an assembly and a greater degree of local self-government but it could not consent to relinquish its sovereignty over the country which is what the Communist Nationalists want. He characterized the attitude of the Communists in this respect as little short of treason.

The Governor General recalled that the Communists were also supporting the Nationalists in Tunis and he feared that we could look for the Soviets to play with the Arab League (asking me at the same time if I could give him or get for him any information along this line). He felt confident that previous rifts between the manifest¹⁰ and the PPA would disappear; that he was going to Paris probably tomorrow to see what he could learn about Messali and to discuss this whole situation which is obviously giving him great concern.

Finally the Governor General recalled the interest which both the United States and Great Britain had in forestalling the extension of Soviet influence to this part of the Mediterranean; that he was glad to learn that we had more ships here; and that he hoped that we might

⁸ Not printed; this telegram, dated August 14, 1946, requested information concerning whether recent overtures from the Communists to the Algerian Nationalists for the formation of a united front constituted primarily a tactical maneuver in order to gain votes in the coming Assembly elections in October. These overtures had apparently been made by André Marty, Secretary of the French Communist Party, in a recent visit to Algeria and were reported in telegrams 484 and 492, August 12, 1946, from Algiers, repeated to Paris as telegrams 98 and 99. (851R.00/8-1246)

⁹ Yves Chataigneau, Governor General of Algeria.

¹⁰ Reference is to the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifest (Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien) founded by Ferhat Abbas.

some day soon send a ship into Philippeville and Bone. He asked me to keep in touch with him and intimated that we might have another talk when he returned from Paris.

Sent to Department as 503; repeated to Paris as 102.

FINLEY

851R.00/8-1746: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1946—10 a. m.

U.S. URGENT

4279. Urtels 4074¹¹ and Algiers 98 and 99.¹² View recent Communist maneuvers North African Arabs and presence Carrier *FDR* in Med Dept considering requesting Navy Dept have carrier visit Algiers and possibly Bone between Sept. 4 and 17. *FDR* already scheduled visit Tangier 18th. Casablanca later possibility. Navy Dept not unfavorable principle but desires earliest notice. Cable immediately your views political desirability and recommendation.¹³

ACHESON

881.00/8-1246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Rabat (Pasquet)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1946—4 p. m.

20. Your A-40 Aug 12.¹⁴ Can you confirm your report that although door to future collaboration with communists not closed leaders Moroccan Nationalist Party refused align themselves with Moroccan communists. If so do you attribute refusal to belief on part of Nationalists that satisfactory reforms will be forthcoming from French without necessity joining forces with communists. Your despatch

¹¹ Dated August 17, 1946. The text reads in part as follows: "It seems clear that Communist policies reported in Algiers' 98 and 99 (reference Dept's 4083, August 14, 4 p. m.) are being carried out in accordance with high strategy orchestrated in case of French colonies in general and in case of French North Africa in particular by Colonial Section of Central Committee of French Communist Party under Soviet influence. While immediate political advantages in present Constituent Assembly and incoming elections are obviously factors favoring the new tactics, these are not the fundamental issues involved. . . . Essentially, Embassy believes that North African Communists are seeking to use for tactical purposes the nationalist aspirations of native populations as means of weakening French 'imperialism.'" (851R.00/8-1746)

¹² Concerning telegrams 98 and 99, see footnote 8, p. 58.

¹³ Mr. Caffery replied in telegram 4207, August 24, 1946, from Paris, as follows: "I recommend visit carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt* to Algiers and Bone (Dept's 4279, August 22 and 4334, August 23).

"The Governor of Algeria who arrived here last night recommends this also. He says that in view of recent Communist activities he is extremely apprehensive about the situation in Algiers. He has come here to consult with the govt in regard thereto." (851R.00/8-2446) Telegram 4334 is not printed.

¹⁴ Not printed.

40 Jan 29 ^{14a} indicated Moroccan Nationalist leaders hoped communists would take up problem Morocco and that meetings had occurred between the two groups. Is there any indication Residency contemplates giving Moroccans same right public assembly as communists?

Sent Rabat as 20, repeated Tangier as 280, Paris as 4504.¹⁵

ACHESON

811.3381/9-1546 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Alling)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1946—4 p. m.

296. Original purpose naval visits French North African ports was to remind Arabs of US interest in that part of world at time when they are being tempted join forces with communists. French refusal of permission for air shows was result of fear of communists' counter demonstrations in North Africa on one hand and violent objections of French air minister on the other.

In view of urtel 358 ¹⁶ however Dept suggesting to Navy that decision regarding air show Tangier be left to your and Admiral Cassady's ¹⁷ discretion. Considering recent disturbances Tangier Arabs we would consider air show inadvisable if likelihood that Arabs would interpret it as answer to their recent demonstrations. You are best position to judge what local Arab reaction might be.

Recent Navy Dept order authorizes air shows only when request initiated by government of country to be visited. We are informing Navy that in case of Tangier your request is sufficient provided no other member of Administration objects.¹⁸

Sent Tangier as No. 296, repeated Paris as no. 4849.

CLAYTON

^{14a} Not printed.

¹⁵ In reply, telegram 4393, September 2, 1946, from Paris stated: "The absence of any agreement as yet between Moroccan Nationalists and Communists would seem to be confirmed by fact that Communist *Humanité* has completely ignored press conference held in Paris August 30 by newly arrived delegates of Istiqlal Party. . . ." (881.00/9-246) The pertinent portion of telegram 25, September 2, 1946, from Rabat reads: "Refusal [of Nationalists] to align themselves so far not due to belief in immediate reforms but for fear of losing their identity if merger effected with Communists, however, some reforms are anticipated. No indications at present Right Public Assembly to be granted Nationalists." (881.00/9-246)

¹⁶ Presumably, reference is to telegram 348, September 14, 1946, from Tangier reporting on the unlikelihood of further native demonstrations similar to those which had recently taken place (881.00/9-1446).

¹⁷ Rear Adm. John H. Cassady, Commander, Carrier Division, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

¹⁸ In telegram 353, September 21, 1946, from Tangier, Mr. Alling reported that he and Admiral Cassady had informed the local authorities that in view of the warm reception given the U.S.S. *Franklin D. Roosevelt* on its visit to Tangier they hoped to reciprocate by having routine air exercises in appreciation. The local officials expressed pleasure, and the demonstration was scheduled for September 23. (811.3381/9-2146)

851R.00/10-446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, October 4, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received October 4—1:09 p. m.]

4974. Deptel 5199, October 1.¹⁹ Recent playing down of Communist support for independence of French colonies as reported by Algiers has also been noted in French Communist press. It is believed main reason for this is internal political situation in France.

Recent change in Communist tactics towards open support for autonomy and even independence of colonies and cooperation with local Nationalist movements met with sharp reaction in non-Communist French circles, particularly since it coincided with trend in center and moderate parties away from ultra-Liberal colonial policy. (Many voices have been raised, including General de Gaulle,²⁰ warning of dangers of too great relaxation of central controls over overseas territories.)

New Communist colonial policy was given increased and dangerous (for Communists) publicity through series of close votes in Constituent Assembly where balance of power was exercised by Algerian Manifest Party led by Ferhat-Abbas, which consistently voted with Communists. In addition, public indignation was aroused by reports of ambushes, assassinations and massacres by Viet Nam adherents in Indochina at time when French Communist Party was vigorously supporting Ho Chi-Minh²¹ and blaming French Government for refusing to meet his demands.

It would thus appear French Communist Party faced with highly important elections in few weeks decided new tactics in colonies were dangerous and must be put back on shelf at least for time being since they would furnish too valuable ammunition to their opponents in political campaign. Also likely relative lack of success of efforts to form united front with nationalist movement in Tunis and even less progress made in approaches to Istiqlal Party in Morocco have had some influence in persuading French Communist leaders that return to classic Marxist colonial tactics should again be postponed at least until after elections.

Department please repeat to Tunis as unnumbered, to Algiers as 58, to Tangier as 26, to Rabat as unnumbered, to Casablanca as unnumbered, to Moscow as 369.

CAFFERY

¹⁹ Not printed; it requested comment from the Embassy in Paris on such reports from Algiers (851R.00/9-1846).

²⁰ Gen. Charles de Gaulle had resigned as President of the French Provisional Government in January 1946.

²¹ President of the Republic of Viet Nam.

8518.00/12-1946

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harry H. Schwartz of the
Division of African Affairs*

[Extract]

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1946.

Participants: Habib Bourghiba, Leader of the Nationalist Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia.

Mr. Hourani, The Arab Office.

Mr. Andrew G. Lynch, AF.

Mr. Edwin M. Wright, NEA.

Mr. Schwartz, AF.

I. SUMMARY

In an hour and a half's talk, Mr. Bourghiba presented the case for the independence of Tunisia. He stated the demands which his countrymen insisted that France meet and outlined the future plans of his Party for pressing these demands and attaining Tunisian independence.

His thesis is that both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of the Protectorate have been abrogated by France; that, rather than permit Tunisia to develop politically and evolve gradually from more and more autonomy to independence, the French have attempted and are still attempting to assimilate Tunisia into the Metropole. As a result of this policy the Tunisians are, and have long been, deprived of all liberties and all rights and Tunisia has been enduring a "state of siege" since 1881.

Bourghiba demands that France grant Tunisia her independence under her legal sovereign (Moncef Pasha Bey, who is in exile in France). Once the Treaty of the Protectorate is dissolved and Tunisia has her own government, another treaty can be made with France and in that treaty Tunisia will be willing to guarantee the rights of French economic interests as well as of all other foreign interests in Tunisia. Tunisia will also be willing to give France strategic bases. Frenchmen and other foreign nationals will enjoy there the same treatment as Tunisians. Bourghiba hopes that Tunisia could continue to employ French functionaries. He emphasized that he was speaking for Morocco as well as Tunisia, adding that Algeria was a different and certainly more difficult problem because of the extent to which it has already been absorbed into metropolitan France.

Bourghiba says that he long ago determined to explore and exhaust every possible peaceful method of attaining these ends for Tunisia. Only when he and his Party are convinced that no other means is possible and that no help is coming from any outside source (and he will neither seek nor accept assistance from communists) will they

then attempt armed revolt, a course which will mean death but quite possibly also it will draw the attention of the world to Tunisia's plight and might even bring about the intervention of the Security Council. In the meantime, Bourghiba has been meeting in New York twice a week with the delegates to the United Nations of the Arab states and he says that those delegates have resolved that the Tunisian case should be presented at the next meeting of the General Assembly.

Bourghiba emphasized that he has no desire to embarrass the policy of the United States whether he enlists our support or not, but he pointed out that regardless of any policy that the United States may have toward France it is to our interest to see that the situation in Tunisia and French North Africa does not degenerate into a problem comparable to the one now existing in Indo-China, particularly as French North Africa is strategically more important to the United States than is Indo-China.²²

Bourghiba is planning to return to Cairo in January and hopes to go via England where he plans to speak to various people in the Foreign Office. He has not yet received a British visa but expects that it will be forthcoming as he thinks that the British preferred to let the United States take the lead in this matter. Bourghiba was asked if he had encountered any difficulty in obtaining a passport from the French Legation in Cairo. He replied in the negative, explaining that as he had been able to travel all over the Near East without a passport, the French Legation felt that they might as well give him one.

At one point in his talk Mr. Bourghiba said that the United States had shown sympathy for Tunisia by allowing him to enter and speak his mind. He was told, however, that he should not necessarily draw that conclusion from the fact that he had been granted an American visa because it had long been an American tradition to permit anyone whose presence in the United States does not constitute a danger to the national interest to come to this country and enjoy freedom of speech.

At the conclusion of the conversation he asked Mr. Lynch to give him some word of hope that Tunisia might some day be free. Mr. Lynch replied that he was not in a position to make a statement of the kind desired by Mr. Bourghiba.²³

²² For documentation on the interest of the United States in Nationalist opposition to restoration of French rule in Indochina, see volume VIII.

²³ A brief, undated note from Mr. Henderson to Mr. Acheson, transmitting this memorandum of conversation, reads as follows: "I hope that you can find the time to read Bourghiba on Tunis. This is a situation which I do not like. The French policy in Tunis is opposed to modern ideas of self-government, etc. Nevertheless the international situation imposes apparently an attitude of silence on our part." (851S.00/12-1946)

AGRICULTURAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES TO VARIOUS NEAR EASTERN COUNTRIES

[On January 18, 1946, the Department notified Baghdad that in compliance with requests from several Near Eastern governments and private institutions and in line with the American policy of cultural and technical collaboration with foreign countries, it was sending an agricultural mission to interested Near Eastern countries in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture. The primary purpose of the mission was to survey the agricultural situation in these countries in order to indicate the possibilities of long-term developmental projects to be undertaken by the Near Eastern governments independently or in collaboration with the United States. The secondary purpose was to share American agricultural experience with governmental and private organizations and to extend advice when requested. (Telegram 27, 890B.61A/1-1846). The official announcement of the mission was made on February 19; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 3, 1946, page 348.

The mission left the United States in February of 1946 for detailed study of the agricultural scene in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. It completed its field work in June by investigating agricultural conditions in Greece, together with British and French experts, under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The Department of Agriculture, in 1947 and 1948, released reports of the mission regarding its activities in Syria and Lebanon (International Agricultural Collaboration Series, Nos. 4 and 7). The Food and Agriculture Organization published the preliminary summary of findings and recommendations of its Greek mission on October 31, 1946, and the mission's full report the following March.]

POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE ARAB PRINCIPALITIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE GULF OF OMAN

790.00/4-946

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1946.

[Extracts]

POLICY AND INFORMATION STATEMENT ON ARAB PRINCIPALITIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE GULF OF OMAN

I. Current US Policy Toward the Arab Principalities of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman

A. *General Political.* (1) While we recognize the special position of Great Britain in the Sheikdoms of Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial Coast, our policy toward this area is based upon insistence that Britain's special position in those principalities should not result in injury to US interests or those of the local peoples and governments. (2) Our policy toward the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman is based upon one of our oldest treaties still in force, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of September 21, 1833.

Special treaties and agreements, dating from the 19th Century, bind all the Sheikhs of the Persian Gulf Principalities to Great Britain. At first (in 1820) these Sheikhs were "bound" to assist the British in eliminating piracy and in putting an end to the traffic in arms and slaves. By a series of subsequent exclusive agreements the Sheikhs guaranteed the British monopolistic rights in their lands, in return for British protection. . . . Between 1913 and 1923 the Persian Gulf Sheikhs further bound themselves not to grant any concessions for oil within their territories without the approval or consent of the British Government (Kuwait in 1913; Bahrein in 1914; Qatar, for a blanket monopoly, oil not specified in 1916; the six Trucial Sheikhs in 1922). The Sultan of Muscat and Oman agreed, in 1923, to "consult" the Political Agent and the Government of India before exploiting oil in his Sultanate. The Sheikdoms are protected by the British Government; they are not British Protectorates. The British have consistently maintained that these Sheikhs are "independent rulers in special treaty relationship with His Majesty's Government." The position of the rulers of the Persian Gulf might be thought of as that of independence regulated, supervised, and defined by HMG.

. . . Fourteen years later¹ Iran revived its historical claim to sovereignty over the Bahrein Islands. The Iranian Government protested against Article 6 of the Treaty of May 20, 1927, between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, in which reference was made to the special position of the British in the Gulf Sheikdoms. The Iranian claim was categorically rejected by the British Government on historic and other grounds. Again, in May and December, 1934, Iran made various representations and protests—on the subject of the oil concession obtained in Bahrein by the Standard Oil Company of California—to the United States Government² and the Standard Oil Company of California, in an effort to invalidate any concession granted in Bahrein that took no account of Iran's claim to sovereignty over the Islands. These Iranian protests were ignored by the United States Government at the time; and the League of Nations, though notified of the dispute, took no action. At no time has the United States, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia or any other Near Eastern State shown any disposition to recognize that Iran has a valid claim to sovereignty over the Bahrein Islands. It is of some significance, however, that the Soviet press has recently carried articles which have pointed out Iran's long-standing claim.

By our Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, the United States is accorded extraterritorial rights in the dominions of the Sultan. This is, therefore, the one Gulf Principality in which the United States has a position entirely independent of Great Britain and the Political Agents of the Government of India. However, American missionaries of the Reformed Church in America (Dutch) have been active in various parts of the Persian Gulf since 1889, and have established schools and hospitals at Bahrein and at Kuwait as well as at Muscat. Other than medical and missionary work, the only additional US interests in the Persian Gulf area are oil and communications.

Following the failure of British interests to exploit the petroleum concession which they had been granted by the Sheikh of Bahrein in December 1925, and after several years of complicated negotiations, British consent was eventually obtained for the grant of an oil concession by the Sheikh to the Bahrein Petroleum Company Ltd., a registered British (originally Canadian) company, whose shares are owned wholly by the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company. The first concession, covering the exploitation of 100,000 acres on Bahrein Island, was assigned to the Bahrein Petro-

¹ In 1927.

² For documentation on Persian claims to sovereignty over Bahrein, see *Foreign Relations*, 1934, vol. II, pp. 890 ff.

leum Company on August 1, 1930, and the Sheikh of Bahrein granted the company a Mining Lease for a 55-year period from January 1, 1935. Oil was discovered in 1932. An "Additional Area" concession was granted by the Sheikh on June 19, 1940. A special Political Agreement was thereupon signed by the Bahrein Petroleum Company with the British Government on June 29, 1940. Under the terms of this Political Agreement the Company is obligated to pay "due deference" to the advice of the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agent at Bahrein. It is also important to note that in the event of national emergency or war, the British Government has reserved the right to take over all of the Bahrein crude oil and the products thereof. Furthermore, the India Office proved unwilling to permit the US interests to enter into negotiations for oil concessions with the Sheikh of Qatar or with the six Sheikhs of Trucial Oman.

Oil interests on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf are divided as follows: The Kuwait Oil Company holds the concession for the whole of Kuwait; the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British controlled) and the Gulf Exploration Company (US owned and controlled) share equally in the ownership of the Kuwait Oil Company. The Arabian American Oil Company, wholly American, holds the concession for about $\frac{3}{4}$ of Saudi Arabia. The easternmost part of this concession covers the Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia, between Kuwait and Qatar. The Bahrein Petroleum Company, Ltd. is US-owned, but registered as a British company. The Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company jointly own both the Bahrein Petroleum and the Arabian American Oil Companies. Petroleum Development Ltd. (a subsidiary of the British controlled Iraq Petroleum Company) holds current concessions for all of Qatar and the Trucial Coast. There were indications as recently as 1941, that Petroleum Development Ltd. still held a concession for the exploitation of oil in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.

Since 1936 the Bahrein Petroleum Company, employing British and Bahreini as well as US labor, has built modern oil installations, pipe lines, and oil refinery and loading wharves, and an up-to-date camp with recreational facilities at Awali on the main island. US influence in the Bahrein Islands grows in proportion to the expansion of this US colony.

In view of our existing oil interests in the Bahrein Islands, our great oil interests on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia adjacent to these islands, and our somewhat lesser though important oil interests in neighboring Kuwait; and in consideration of the special position of Great Britain throughout the Persian Gulf Area; it is our present

policy: (1) to give all possible diplomatic support to US commercial interests, both present and potential, vis-à-vis the British and local Governments; (2) to cooperate harmoniously with Great Britain and British officials in the Gulf Area, with a view to expanding our existing business interests wherever practicable; (3) to encourage and support US missionaries in the Persian Gulf in their medical and educational work.

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EGYPT

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND EGYPT FOR REVISION OF THE ANGLO- EGYPTIAN TREATY OF AUGUST 26, 1936

[The Egyptian Government, in a note of December 20, 1945, requested the British Government to undertake negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The note emphasized that the presence of foreign forces on Egyptian soil during peacetime was wounding to national dignity and also raised the matter of the status of the Sudan. The reply of January 25, 1946, declared the willingness of the British Government to review existing treaty arrangements with the Egyptian Government and expressed the British desire to place Anglo-Egyptian relations on a footing of full and free partnership, as between equals, with full respect for the independence and sovereignty of Egypt (despatch 28082, February 1, 1946, from London, 741.83/2-146).

Ismail Sidky Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, and Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, were designated to head their respective delegations (telegrams 443, March 9, from Cairo, and 3693, April 3, from London, 741.83/3-946, 4-346).]

741.83/4-2046

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1946.

Lord Halifax¹ called at his request. He stated that the purpose of his call was to inform the State Department of the attitude of the British Government toward the negotiations with Egypt which were to begin in earnest next week. He stated that the ultimate objective was the organization of the defense of the Middle East on a collective basis within the structure of the United Nations. He stated that the British preference would be for Anglo-Egyptian collaboration on the basis of separate contributions to a defense system rather than on the basis of a bilateral agreement based on the defense of the Suez Canal area. However, it was the understanding of the British Government

¹The British Ambassador, the Earl of Halifax.

that the Egyptians preferred a bilateral agreement. The British Government hopes to get, as a result of these negotiations, the renewal of the same provisions and facilities in case of war or emergency as are provided by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. In this connection Lord Halifax called attention to Article 16 of the 1936 Treaty, which he stated in specific terms provided for the renewal of these arrangements and facilities.

So far as peacetime is concerned, Great Britain wishes to station minimum land and air forces in the Suez Canal zone and also to establish an administrative base and headquarters in that zone which could serve as a nucleus of expansion in case of trouble.

Lord Halifax stated that the Egyptian drive for evacuation is strong and that the British Government would be willing to agree to the withdrawal of all combat troops by stages except air fighter squadrons. They might agree to withdraw the air fighter squadrons later on when Egyptian fighter squadrons were trained and ready to assume responsibility.

If, as and when the Sudan comes up in the discussions, Great Britain will want both parties to make the principal objective of their negotiations the welfare of the Sudanese.

So far as United Nations considerations are concerned, the Ambassador pointed out that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty has, under its provisions, ten years to run. Great Britain however is willing to modify this treaty as the Ambassador has stated above, and in doing so will safeguard the overriding authority of the United Nations. The Ambassador pointed to Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter as sanctioning a continuing Anglo-Egyptian alliance.

Broadly speaking, the Ambassador said, the Middle East is of immense strategic importance to Great Britain, and the defense interests of Great Britain in Middle Eastern countries and Egypt are the same but, he added, Egypt must "come clean" in these negotiations. By that, he explained, he meant that Egypt wishes now to achieve inconsistent ends. It wishes all the advantages of the security which would come from an adequate defense in which the British participated without the inconvenience of making any provision upon which British participation can rest. He said that at some stage of the negotiations the British might have to ask for our support but that they would see how the negotiations go.

He added that Sir Ronald Campbell, as British Ambassador to Egypt, would carry on the negotiations for the British Government.²

² The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bevin, announced to the House of Commons on April 2 that he would be unable to be present at the earlier stages of the negotiations at Cairo and that the Secretary of State for Air, Lord Stansgate, and the British Ambassador to Egypt would conduct them on his behalf; see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 421, col. 1110.

The Ambassador did not ask for or expect any reply from me. I thanked him for this information and he assured me that the British Government would keep the Department informed.

DEAN ACHESON

741.83/5-746

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1946.

Mr. Balfour³ called at his request. He said that the Ambassador wished to have him inform us of a change in the British attitude regarding the negotiations with Egypt. This information had already been conveyed to Mr. Byrnes in Paris⁴ and to our Embassy in London. Sir Ronald Campbell had advised the Foreign Office that to insist upon the maintenance of an administrative base and British forces in the Canal Zone would cause very considerable disorders in Egypt, probably resulting in invocation of the powers of the Security Council, et cetera. As a result of this warning by the Ambassador the British Government has now informed the Egyptian Government that it is prepared to abandon the idea of a base in the Canal Zone and to evacuate all British troops from Egypt and from the Canal Zone over a period of five years. They are willing to work out the stages of this evacuation starting with Cairo and Alexandria. The Foreign Office had expected that some announcement would have been made but probably they are still wrangling in Cairo over the five-year period.⁵

The British proposals also contemplate the establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian Joint Defense Board.

Sir Ronald Campbell is also to inform the Egyptian Government that this evacuation may impair British ability to carry out its treaty obligations regarding the defense of Egypt and therefore His Majesty's Government will have to insist that the new treaty provide that all provisions of the treaty may be reviewed at the time the evacuation is completed in the light of all the circumstances then existing. Mr. Balfour was of the opinion that this meant that the British Government might not be willing to continue after the date of the evacuation provisions guaranteeing the defense of Egypt.

³ John Balfour, the British Minister.

⁴ Mr. Byrnes was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which met at Paris from April 25 to May 15, 1946.

⁵ In telegram 746, April 30, 1946, 1 p. m., from Cairo, Minister Tuck reported: "Campbell asked me if I had any opinion to offer. I replied frankly that I felt that when the Egyptians learned that the total evacuation of their country would take a period of five years it would come as a bitter blow. I reminded the Ambassador that general speculation locally as to the period of evacuation had varied from six months to a year and that I felt that it would be extremely difficult for the Sidky Govt in the face of strong Wafdist opposition to accept an evacuation proposal covering five years." (741.83/4-3046)

Mr. Balfour also said that Mr. Bevin had said to the Secretary that the British had hoped that they were going to receive the trusteeship for Cyrenaica and if this could have happened the evacuation of Egypt would not have impaired British ability to play the role of protector in the Middle East.⁶ I thanked Mr. Balfour for this information.

DEAN ACHESON

741.83/5-2446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, May 24, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received May 24—3:06 p. m.]

5434. Top secret and personal for the Secretary. Bevin called me over to the House of Commons during the midday recess today to explain the difficulty he was having in Egypt. As you know the British are meeting resistance from the Egyptians on their latest proposals in connection with the withdrawal of their troops and military establishments from Egypt over a period of 5 years. In the wave of nationalistic feeling Sidky is insisting that the withdrawal should be at once. According to Bevin, Sidky has stated that his "friends" believe that the retirement should and can be immediate. Bevin's impression is that his "friends" include American representatives in Egypt possibly American officers. He is however not at all sure of this and wants it to be understood that he is in no sense critical of any

⁶ In his record of a discussion between Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin on the Italian colonies and Egypt, H. Freeman Matthews, Political Adviser to the United States delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers, wrote on April 27:

"4. *Italian Colonies and Egypt.* Mr. Bevin then discussed the British position with regard to the Italian Colonies and his firm intention not to permit the Soviet Union to have a trusteeship in Tripolitania. The Secretary stated that he felt equally strongly on this question. Mr. Bevin then said in strict confidence that probably within the next 24 or 48 hours he was going to have to agree to the Egyptian Government's insistent request that all British forces be withdrawn from Egypt. This would mean the abandonment of the Naval Base at Alexandria and withdrawal of British forces now stationed for the protection of the Suez Canal. This, he thought, would be a serious blow to the whole British position in the Near East with its vitally important oil resources. He said that in view of the Egyptian request he did not feel he could refuse, for most certainly the question would be brought before the Security Council and Great Britain would then be in the reverse position to that taken on Iran. The Secretary inquired whether they would be able to maintain the airfields in Egypt and Mr. Bevin replied in the negative. He said that possibly something might be worked out on this score, but the Egyptians were declining to discuss anything of the sort prior to British agreement to withdraw their forces from the country. He continued that this was the reason why he had hoped to obtain some strategic base rights in Cyrenaica, for otherwise he did not know what could be done to replace Alexandria in the protection of the Eastern Mediterranean. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the American proposal with respect to Italian Colonies at least kept the Russians out of that area, to which Mr. Bevin agreed, but he seemed obviously unhappy about this latest development." (740.00119 Council/4-2746)

of our people. He went on to explain that at the meeting of Arab leaders on Tuesday, May 28, to discuss the Palestine problem⁷ they will also discuss secretly, according to his information, the whole problem of mutual defense. Underlying is the grave fear of Russia's intentions in the Middle East.

Bevin requests if you find it consistent with American policy that you request our Minister in Cairo to have a most informal talk with King Farouk indicating our interest in the whole question of the defense of the Middle East. Bevin suggests that before this talk it would be well for our Minister to see Lord Stansgate in order to get the full details of the situation from the British viewpoint. It may be that the King will suggest that Tuck see Sidky Pasha as well but it is not clear whether this would be desirable.

Bevin further explained it is his conviction that the Egyptians will be able to develop a reasonably good military establishment if the British sincerely assist them. He contends that previous governments have offered to help the Egyptians but failed in fact to do so. He is anxious if possible to work out some sort of an arrangement which would give the British some military rights in Egypt for quick use of advance bases in cooperation with the Egyptians in the defense of the Canal Zone along the lines of our arrangements with Canada,⁸ or else perhaps a lease of bases similar to that the British granted us in Bermuda, West Indies,⁹ etc. He is not discouraged and still hopes something can be worked out because he feels that the British Government is for the first time sincere in its objective to respect and assist full Egyptian sovereignty. He told me that he intended to indicate to Parliament today that the first British move should be to help the Egyptians solve their problem of debilitating diseases coming from the infected water supply. In this connection he hopes that he can get the assistance of American experts such as the Rockefeller Institute who have had such great experience in combatting disease on a large scale. He believes realistically that the reduction of disease in Egypt is the first stage in the advancement of that country.

Bevin feels that if you are willing to indicate in the most general way our interest in the security of the Arab World to King Farouk without of course any commitment or participation it will materially assist him in bringing his negotiations out of the emotional stage it is now in to a realistic discussion. He realizes time is very short but

⁷ A meeting of the Arab League on Palestine was held at Inchass, Egypt, on May 28 and 29, 1946.

⁸ For documentation on the agreement between the United States and Canada concerning the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 144 ff.

⁹ For documentation on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 49 ff.

still hopes that you can ask our Minister in Cairo to take some action prior to the May 28th meeting.

Bevin points out incidentally that if he can work out something reasonable with the Egyptians it may relieve necessity of his pressing for bases in Cyrenaica.

I would greatly appreciate being informed of your decision in this matter as I would like to be able to explain it to Bevin. Bevin is on a hot spot over Egypt because of the House debate and Churchill's¹⁰ attack in the middle of the negotiations.

I am impressed with Bevin's sincerity in attempting to forward the moral issue of full respect for Egypt's sovereignty in the withdrawal of British troops and at the same time realistically dealing with the security needs of the Canal and the Middle East.¹¹

HARRIMAN

741.83/5-2446 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

TOP SECRET
U.S. URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1946—3 p. m.

959. Personal for Tuck. Text of top secret telegram no. 5434 of May 24 from Harriman to me reads as follows:

[Here follows text of No. 5434, printed *supra*.]

Unless you perceive some objection please discuss situation at once with Stansgate and thereafter request audience with King. You might inform King that in view of its friendship for Egypt and Great Britain and its deep interest in welfare of all peoples of Middle East, your Govt has instructed you to discuss with him progress of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.

After inquiring whether in his opinion it is still possible for negotiations to terminate in such manner as to give Egypt satisfactory guarantees of full sovereignty without running risk of undermining security of Middle East or of weakening defenses of area against

¹⁰ Winston S. Churchill, leader of the Conservatives, the opposition party in the House of Commons.

¹¹ On May 9, 1946, Mr. Bevin had sent a memorandum to Mr. Byrnes at Paris which read: "Now that the British statement regarding the ultimate evacuation of British forces from Egypt has been issued, the British Government would be glad if the United States Government could emphasise to the Egyptian Government their interest in the security of the Middle East. It is suggested that the United States Government might urge upon the Egyptian Government the importance of providing and maintaining the necessary military facilities in their territory." The memorandum was transmitted to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) on May 20 with the notation: "So far as I know there was no discussion between the two with regard to its content." (890.20/5-946)

possible aggression you might express hope that negotiations will have such a successful termination. You should make it clear that the United States considers the security of the entire Middle East of fundamental importance to its own security. It would be helpful if during course of conversation you could find opportunity to let King know that your Govt appreciates historical basis of suspicions existing in Egyptian circles with regard to intentions of Brit Govt but that your Govt believes present Brit Govt is fully aware of mistakes that have been made in past; and that your Govt is convinced that Great Britain is really sincere in its desire to find a solution of the Middle East security problem which would make it possible for countries in that area to enjoy their unrestricted independence but which would not at same time create a situation likely to encourage aggression from without.

You may use your discretion in deciding whether it would be advisable also to discuss this matter with Sidky Pasha or other Egyptian officials.¹²

Sent Cairo, repeated London for Harriman.

BYRNES

741.83/6-1146 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, June 11, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received June 11—5 : 45 p. m.]

1035. Personal for Secretary. I saw the Prime Minister this morning, who delivered to me in the form of a *note verbale* in French a reply to the secret and personal letter which I had left with him on May 27 (remy 927 May 27¹³). Following is careful translation of *note verbale*:

¹² Unable to see King Farouk because of the imminence of the Monarch's departure to Inchass, Mr. Tuck conveyed to the Egyptian Prime Minister the purport of the final paragraphs of this telegram and left with him "a carefully worded secret and personal letter", dated May 27, 1946, embodying the principal points of the telegram. A copy of the letter was transmitted to the Department in despatch 2136, January 11, 1947, from Cairo (741.83/1-1147). The Prime Minister promised to deliver the letter personally to the King. Mr. Tuck reported that "Sidky Pasha appeared very much interested particularly in the importance which we attach to security in the Middle East. He said he would confidentially inform the members of his delegation of our views which he added 'were almost those of the Turks.'" Mr. Tuck also advised that he had acquainted Lord Stansgate with the contents of the Department's telegram and that the chief British negotiator had expressed sincere appreciation of Mr. Byrnes' desire to be of help. Lord Stansgate was interested to learn that Mr. Tuck "had sent the PriMin some weeks ago at the latter's request a copy of the joint statement issued by President Roosevelt and the Canadian PriMin setting up a permanent joint board on defense." (Telegram 927, May 27, 3 p. m., 741.83/5-2746). For the joint statement, released on August 18, 1940, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, p. 146.

¹³ Not printed; but see footnote 12, above.

"The communication delivered by His Excellency the Minister of the US to His Excellency The Prime Minister on May 27, 1946 to be communicated to His Majesty the King has had the full attention of His Majesty and His Government.

The interest which this letter provokes is not only due to the fact that it is connected with negotiations of vital importance to Egypt but also because it constitutes an intervention by the US of America, a country on which Egypt has always based great hopes owing to its known disinterestedness and the high aims of its foreign policy.

This interest calls for a reply inspired by a loyal and objective presentation of facts and it is Egypt's concern that it should reassure the American Government as quickly as possible with regard to its real intention.

As a Middle Eastern country Egypt shares the preoccupations manifested by the US with regard to security in this region.

But Egypt desires to point out that the concern for such security is connected, insofar as Egypt is concerned, with the necessity for recovering all her liberties.

Egypt realizes perfectly well that the guarantees derived from the treaty of 1936 with Great Britain should not be lost to view, but she wishes emphatically to state that these guarantees would only be strengthened if the new alliance to be concluded with Great Britain is on a basis of friendship and confidence which can only be achieved if the independence of Egypt is respected.

It is only on this condition, which moreover stands out in the clauses of the United Nation's Charter—to which Egypt was one of the first adherents—that Egypt will be able to bring serious collaboration to world peace. She will do so, thanks to her own resources and thanks to the profound consciousness of new duties incumbent upon her as an independent country.

The ignoring of this situation and delays consequent to its settlement create a spirit of uneasiness, not to say the tension which may jeopardize the aim in view which is to create a spirit of harmony and mutual comprehension necessary to the definite establishment of peace in the Middle East.

Egypt welcomes with satisfaction the occasion thus offered to request the Government of the US to unite its powerful efforts to all efforts now being exerted to create such a spirit of harmony."

In delivering this *note verbale* to me Prime Minister stated that it was the firm intention of Egyptian Government to strengthen its military establishment. The Egyptian Army would be raised from its present strength of 40,000 to 150,000 men and conscription would be introduced. Furthermore, as a result of close military collaboration with the British, it is hoped that the Egyptian General Staff would not only benefit thereby but would also have at its disposal the use and experience of modern implements of war.

As regards the proposed treaty, the Prime Minister said that the difficulty at present lay in the agreement on texts. The British wished to include in the terms of the treaty military clauses which the Egyptians consider would commit them in the future. The Egyptians

desired a treaty couched in much more general terms and had asked the British to accord them full trust and confidence in future collaboration.

Please repeat to London.

TUCK

[When discussions at Cairo did not result in agreement, Prime Minister Sidky and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Abdul Hadi departed for London, where between October 17 and 25, they held five meetings with Mr. Bevin. Three draft documents were initialed on October 25: an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, a Sudan Protocol, and an Evacuation Protocol calling for complete withdrawal of British forces from Egypt by September 1, 1949. It was agreed that these documents were prepared *ad referendum* but that if they were put forth officially and unaltered by the Egyptian Government, Mr. Bevin would recommend them to the British Government; for the texts of the three documents, see British Cmd. 7179, Egypt No. 2 (1947): *Papers Regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936*, pages 2-4.

Seven of the twelve members of the Egyptian delegation rejected the Bevin-Sidky proposals on November 25 and on the following day, the delegation was dissolved by royal decree (telegram 1862, November 26, 1946, 1 p. m., from Cairo, 741.83/11-2646).

The Egyptian Government thereupon officially informed the British Foreign Office of its readiness to sign the Bevin-Sidky proposals. A British Foreign Office spokesman notified Chargé Gallman that the stumbling block to full agreement was the differing British and Egyptian interpretations of the Sudan Protocol, the Egyptians wishing to restrict Sudanese right of self-determination to be within the framework of the Egyptian Crown, whereas the British wished the right to be unrestricted (telegram 9885, December 3, 1946, 7 p. m., from London, 741.83/12-346).]

741.83/12-1646 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck)*¹⁴

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1946.

2016. Inquiries received by Dept re press accounts attributing to Makram Ebeid¹⁵ statement that US Govt had sent note to Sidki advising him to reach agreement with British. In reply Dept spokesman said Dec 16 that last May we had in fact expressed to both

¹⁴ Mr. Tuck became Ambassador in Egypt on September 19, 1946.

¹⁵ Formerly a member of the Egyptian delegation negotiating with the British for revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936.

Egyptian and Brit Govts our hope that treaty negotiations might terminate in such manner as to give satisfactory guarantees to Egypt of full sovereignty without at same time running risk of undermining security of Middle East. Spokesman added we still hope satisfactory settlement can be reached along these lines.

Sent Cairo rptd London.

BYRNES

ELEVATION OF THE AMERICAN LEGATION IN EGYPT TO THE STATUS OF AN EMBASSY¹⁶

124.83/8-2746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1946—5 p. m.

1458. Officially notify FonOff President has signified his desire American Mission Cairo be raised to rank of Embassy and he would welcome arrangement for exchange of Ambassadors between Egypt and USA.¹⁷ Such arrangement of course would be predicated on the understanding that American Amb upon being duly accredited would have status of complete equality with other foreign diplomatic representatives in Egypt of similar rank and question of his precedence would be regulated in accordance with accepted diplomatic procedure.

You may stress (1) the traditional cordiality of Egyptian-American relations which in recent years have become greatly intensified and strengthened, (2) Egypt's importance as one of most progressive and influential of Arab states, (3) whatever other expressions of courtesy you may deem appropriate.

In conclusion, you may inform FonOff that if foregoing proposal is agreeable to Egyptian Govt, President desires to appoint as American Ambassador to Egypt Honorable S. Pinkney Tuck, and would welcome Egyptian *agrément*.

¹⁶ For documentation on the consideration given by the Department of State in 1945 to elevating Legations of the United States in Egypt and other Near Eastern countries to the status of Embassies, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 19 ff.

¹⁷ In a memorandum of August 16, 1946, to President Truman, Acting Secretary of State Acheson stated: "Since 1876, when we established diplomatic relations with Egypt, our mission there has not had a higher rank than that of a Legation. In view of Egypt's strategic position and its importance as one of the most advanced and influential states of the Arab world, the Department has desired to raise the Legation to an Embassy. It has refrained from attempting to do so, however, since in an exchange of notes between the Egyptian and British Governments subsequent to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, it was agreed that the British Ambassador should have precedence over all other foreign diplomats. Recently, however, the British have informed the Department that they are prepared, in case the Egyptian Government desires, to arrange with the Egyptians for the abandonment of the claim of the British Ambassador to take precedence." The memorandum concluded with a request for the President's concurrence to take the necessary steps to elevate the American Legation at Cairo and the Egyptian Legation at Washington to Embassies. The President gave his approval in a marginal notation on August 16. (124.83/8-1646)

For background you are informed that Brit authorities have informally given us to understand that Brit Govt would be prepared, if approached by Egyptian Govt to abandon any claim to precedence of Brit Amb over Am Amb other than that which is customarily accorded on basis of seniority.¹⁸

ACHESON

124.83/9-446 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1946—6 p. m.

1510. Brit Emb Washington assured us end July that London would have no objection to our raising question at this time with Egypt of elevating AmLeg Cairo to Embassy. We were also assured that Brit would not insist on retention special precedence for Brit Amb if approached by Egyptian Govt. Consequently Dept is unable comprehend Bowker's position urtel 1498 Sept. 4.¹⁹ If you perceive no objection please urge upon him that his view is at variance with understanding London and Washington adding that we deem it essential that exchange Egyptian and American Ambassadors and elimination special precedence proceed forthwith regardless present state Anglo Egyptian treaty negotiations.

You may also inform Egyptian FonOff that we are sending request for Hassan's²⁰ new *agrément* to President but will withhold actual recognition until simultaneous announcement can be made in Cairo and Washington following assurance by Egyptian Govt that our Amb will be on footing of complete equality.

Sent to Cairo, rptd to London.

CLAYTON

[Mr. Bowker informed the Chargé in Egypt on September 14, 1946, of receipt of instructions from the British Foreign Office giving unconditional assent to the proposition that the appointed American Ambassador to Egypt should have vis-à-vis the British Ambassador

¹⁸ On August 31, 1946, the Chargé in Egypt, Patterson, sent note 1787 to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which incorporated the substance of telegram 1458 (despatch 1874, September 20, from Cairo, 124.83/9-2046).

¹⁹ Not printed; it stated that Reginald J. Bowker, Counselor of the British Embassy in Egypt, had informed Mr. Tuck "that British no longer insisted on diplomatic primacy in Egypt. However, he suggested that question of timely change in status possesses some importance and recommended that definitive action be deferred until conclusion of current Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations since new treaty would automatically terminate 1936 Treaty and annex whereby British Ambassador to Egypt received precedence over all other diplomatic representatives accredited to this country." (124.83/9-446) For documentation on the interest of the United States in the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Egypt for revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 26, 1936, see pp. 69 ff.

²⁰ Mahmoud Hassan, the Egyptian Minister.

the usual diplomatic precedence based on seniority. Mr. Bowker advised that the British Ambassador would give oral assurances on this matter to the Egyptian Government. The renunciation of precedence given to the British Ambassador was to be applicable only to the American Ambassador since the United States Government alone had raised the issue (telegram 1552, September 14, 1 p. m., from Cairo, 124.83/9-1446).

In note 249 B, September 15, 1946, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs gave his Government's assent to the raising of the American diplomatic mission in Egypt to the status of Embassy and the *agrément* of the King of Egypt to the nomination of Mr. Tuck to the rank of Ambassador (despatch 1874, September 20, from Cairo, 124.83/9-2046).

For statements made by the Department on the agreement of the Governments of the United States and Egypt to exchange Ambassadors and on the presentation of credentials by the newly appointed Ambassador of Egypt to President Truman on October 10, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 20, 1946, page 727.]

AGREEMENTS ON CIVIL AND MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT AND SURPLUS PROPERTY ENTERED INTO BY THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT

711.8327/4-1646: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT

659. For the Minister. Unless you deem inappropriate, please seek early audience with King²¹ and tell him President Truman has asked you take up following matters which this Govt regards highly important.

A. For past year negotiations have been carried on between our two Govts for conclusion of bilateral civil air transport agreement. It appears we are in agreement on virtually all points except for Egyptian insistence that no traffic is to be carried by US air service between Cairo and Lydda. We have concluded bilateral agreements with virtually all countries of Europe and in none of these is there any specific restriction on this so-called Fifth Freedom traffic. While long-range character of US international services will undoubtedly make few if any seats available for this short haul traffic, this Govt would be loath to include such a restriction in the bilateral agreement because it would create undesirable precedent and encourage other countries to ask for similar restrictions. This in turn would

²¹ King Farouk of Egypt.

create such a series of restrictions that it would be economically impossible for US trunk lines to operate and to offer services which will contribute greatly to the development of international understanding and commerce. The only alternative would be to connect Palestine with US on a second route by-passing Cairo. This would not only divert from Cairo this US-Palestine traffic, and incidentally deprive MISR of opportunity to carry some of this Cairo-Lydda traffic originating in or destined for US, but would also increase materially operating costs and problems of TWA, which hopes to have major maintenance base at Cairo for servicing its international planes. (In this connection it is hoped that TWA may be granted all reasonable facilities at Cairo, and preferably at Payne Field, which may be required for its efficient operations.)

This Govt has already agreed to include in draft agreement with Egypt a principle which provides that capacity shall be related to the "traffic requirements of the area through which airline passes after taking account of local and regional services" and we feel this should provide adequate protection for MISR in its Cairo-Lydda operations.

This Govt feels that inclusion of Cairo on US international route already proposed will strengthen economic and cultural bonds between our two countries, and any restriction which would prejudice the economic operation of the proposed route would lessen these benefits. It is therefore earnestly hoped that the bilateral agreement can be concluded in form now proposed, and with the route pattern desired by this Govt.

B. You are also requested to discuss matter of military rights referred to in pgh A, Deptel 550, Mar 30.²² In mentioning our desire for assurances re interim military rights, it is suggested you emphasize:

(1) That such rights are requested because they are essential to maintain communications between US and its occupation forces as well as between those forces, which is in turn essential to the effective execution of a responsibility imposed on this Govt as a result of the war which it gladly accepts as a part of its share in protecting the victory which has been won.

(2) That this Govt confidently expects that Egypt, whose resources were such a vital contribution to the winning of the war, will be no less ready to share them for the equally important work of protection and readjustment.

(3) This Govt earnestly and sincerely desires to appreciate the Egyptian Govt's problems in meeting this responsibility and to make every effort to reduce the difficulties involved to a minimum. The US is anxious to repatriate its military forces, and their complete removal from Egypt can be greatly expedited by working out necessary technical servicing arrangements for our service aircraft and conclu-

²² Not printed.

sion of surplus disposal negotiations in which the US is prepared to offer generous terms. As indicated in Deptel 550, granting by the Egyptian Govt of these restricted military rights does not necessitate retention in Egypt of US military personnel.

C. In summarizing, you are authorized to say that in the President's opinion the successful conclusion of the pending set of agreements relating to the air is a matter of the utmost importance to the US and to the close and friendly relations which he wishes to see developed between Egypt and this country. The President, therefore, hopes that His Majesty will see fit to do what he considers appropriate to remove these last-remaining obstacles to a comprehensive and mutually beneficial agreement.

BYRNES

711.8827/4-2246 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

CAIRO, April 22, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received 6 : 30 p. m.]

689. Reference Dept's secret 659, April 16, 3 p. m. and my secret 659, April 17, 10 p. m.²⁴

The following is text of letter dated April 16 which I addressed to the Prime Minister presenting our proposals for his consideration :

"In the interest of effecting an early conclusion of our negotiations looking towards the acquisition by the Govt of Egypt of all property declared surplus to the needs of the Army and Navy of the US, Mr. Fred W. Ramsey, Central Field Commissioner for the Foreign Liquidation Commission joins with me in presenting the following proposals for your consideration :

"The FLC Commissioner at Cairo is prepared, with the approval of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commission at Washington to offer all of the property declared surplus to the needs of the US Army and Navy lying within the borders of Egypt and remaining unsold exclusive of certain railway rolling stock of Lend-Lease origin now available for sale under separate contract to the Egyptian state railways and excepting the fixed installations and equipment on Payne Field at a discount of 60% applied to the cost to the US in Egypt of said property.

"It is estimated that the inventory involved in the above proffer, when fully disclosed and verified, will represent a total value of not less than £E ²⁵ 7,500,000. On the basis of a value of £E 7,500,000 the

²⁴ Latter not printed ; Mr. Tuck reported that after an unsatisfactory conference with the Under Secretary of the Egyptian Foreign Office, he had stressed to King Farouk on April 17 the great importance which President Truman and the United States Government attached to prompt signature of the bilateral civil air transport agreement and an agreement for military air rights. The Minister noted the King's statement that he would give President Truman's message the attention it merited. (711.8237/4-1746)

²⁵ Egyptian pounds.

amount to be paid by the Egyptian Govt for all of the property would be £E 3,000,000 or 40% of the cost to the US in Egypt. If the total value of the property is found to be less or more, appropriate adjustment would be made on the basis of 40% of value.

"Upon the acceptance of this proffer and assuming the consummation of satisfactory arrangements covering certain mutual interests of the Govts of Egypt and of the US in Payne Field the FLC is prepared to recommend to its principals in the US that title to all of the fixed installations and equipment on Payne Field be transferred to the Egyptian Govt without charge.

"In addition, upon acceptance of these proposals, the FLC will transfer to the Govt of Egypt, without charge, title to all non-flyable aircraft remaining unsold in Egypt and all aircraft parts not required for ATC or for return to the US.

"During the war my Govt, in concert with the Govt of Egypt, has developed air navigation, air communications and weather facilities of great value to our Govts and of most significant importance to the program of development and expansion of aviation in times of peace in which our Govts have a profound and a mutual interest. To serve this interest, I think we both recognize that the facilities provided on Payne Field should be maintained and continued in effective operation.

"In view of the international obligations assumed by the US which require for their fulfillment free channels of air communication across the world and, in particular as related to airways passing through this area, my Govt has a special concern for retained rights in Payne Field where it has a very large investment.

"Payne Field provides the only link for the US in its chain of air communications in this area. Other govts are more happily circumstanced in that other links are available for them in their chains of communication in this area.

"My Govt is most desirous that Payne Field, as with other facilities in other parts of the world where the US has an associated interest, be transferred to and be operated by, the Govts concerned as part of an integrated world-wide system following the highest accepted standards.

"It is proposed that our Govts conclude the bilateral air transport agreement as proffered by the US Govt to the Egyptian Govt under date of February 11, 1945.²⁶ In view of the provisions made in this agreement for periodic review and amendment and in the interest of conformity with the agreement already reached with Govts associated in the International Civil Aviation Conference, my Govt requests that the agreement be accepted without modification.

"Recognizing that upon the transfer of the property of the US on Payne Field to the Egyptian Govt, it will be necessary in avoidance of a break in the technical services of the field to continue for a period the present experienced personnel of the US to supervise the operations and to instruct Egyptian personnel in the operation and servicing of the airport facilities and navigational aids, and in the interest of maintaining the services of Payne Field on a high level of safety and effectiveness, my Govt is pleased to proffer the assistance of such

²⁶ For documentation regarding the unsuccessful efforts of the United States in 1945 to enter into bilateral civil air transport agreements with Egypt and other governments in the Near and Middle East, see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VIII, pp. 64 ff.

trained technical US personnel remaining on the field for such aid to operations as may be required and for the purpose of training Egyptian personnel in the maintenance and operation of the field.

"My Govt requests that the air navigation, communication, weather and other facilities now installed in Payne Field and the supporting installations adjacent thereto, be retained and continued for safe and effective operations.

"It is proposed that the Egyptian Govt designate and maintain Payne Field as a civil airport with rights secured for the US civil airlines on a non-discriminatory basis. Detailed arrangements desired under this head are disclosed in Annex A, which is a verbatim setting forth of the specifications desired by my Govt.

"My Govt regards it essential that the US continue to enjoy the present rights as applied to Payne Field for US military aircraft and to continue to use the facilities at Payne Field as required for our operations as long as necessary to return US personnel from or through Far East or Near and Middle East and to serve US occupation forces in the Far East. These rights are set forth in Annex B. It is desired that US personnel be retained at Payne Field for the purpose of serving this traffic but with the understanding that my Govt would withdraw all uniformed personnel at the end of six months.

"The representatives of my Govt have been in continuous consultation with the representatives of the Egyptian Govt over a long period of time and it is my belief that the proposals we are making will be found to represent a mutually acceptable position.

"If the above arrangements prove acceptable to Your Excellency's Govt, Mr. Ramsey and I will join in submitting them to our Govt in Washington for final approval."

There were two enclosures to this letter :

1. Annex A was entitled "Proposed Agreement between the Govts of the US and Egypt relating to the Designation and Operation of Payne Field as a Civil Airport." This proposed agreement was based upon the Dept's telegram 489, March 22.²⁷

2. Annex B was entitled "Proposed Agreement Relating to Rights Desired by the US Govt for United States Military Aircraft."

The text of Annex B follows :

"Upon the transfer of Payne Field to the Egyptian Govt the US is to continue to enjoy the present rights and facilities of said field for its military aircraft. These rights comprise the following :

"a. The free transit and servicing of US military aircraft, including the landing and taking-off at airport, the transporting of personnel, material and mail for as long a period as necessary to return US personnel from, or through, the Far East or Near and Middle East and to serve US occupation forces in the Far East ;

"b. Emergency landing for US military aircraft on other Egyptian fields ;

"c. Stationing of US personnel necessary to the operation of US Army requirements with the understanding that the US will withdraw all uniformed personnel at the end of six months ;

²⁷ Not printed.

"d. Use of installations and the operation of necessary weather and communication air navigation aids in the service and maintenance of facilities as may be required;

"e. Use and security of necessary code;

"f. Administrative and operational control of US military aircraft by US personnel;

"g. Military personnel, crew and other military operating personnel to wear the uniform of US Army;

"h. US Army personnel to remain undisturbed save in a grave emergency, American military personnel to remain neutral under any circumstances and to take no armed action other than in defense of their own person or property and US Army to control and discipline its own personnel;

"i. Procurement and transportation of all necessary supplies and equipment including overland supplies all of which to be exempt from Egyptian customs, imposts, duties, tariffs and taxes;

"j. Ingress and egress to, and over, the airbase as necessary to US Army operating requirements.

"The turnover to the Egyptian Govt is to be made after all the items at the installation sold by the FLC to other buyers have been removed.

"The Egyptian Govt is to take possession of the installation building by building upon a joint inventory to be made by the representatives of the US Army and the Egyptian Govt. The order in which the buildings are to be handed over to the Egyptian Govt and the rate of progress are to be set by the US Army."

[The remaining two paragraphs deal with discussions with Egyptian officials.]

TUCK

[Four agreements were entered into at Cairo by the United States and Egyptian Governments on June 15, 1946:

I. Civil Air Transport Agreement: for text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1727, or 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3825.

II. Agreement covering bulk sale of United States surplus property in Egypt, effected through an exchange of notes by Mr. Ramsey and Ahmed Loutfy el-Sayed Pasha, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The cost to the United States of the property transferred to the Egyptian Government was estimated at \$28,983,000, for which the latter was to pay 30% of the cost. The Egyptian Government agreed that payment up to one-half of the total amount due to the United States would be made within two years in real estate for the use of American diplomatic and consular representatives in Egypt. Payment of balances due after the two-year period would be made immediately in Egyptian pounds freely usable for expenses of the United States in Egypt, for cotton and for such other purposes as the two governments would find mutually satisfactory. Among the properties transferred were the fixed installations and improvements at Payne Field.

III. Agreement on the utilization of Payne Field, effected through an exchange of letters by the American Minister and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Under its terms, the Egyptian Government agreed to maintain Payne Field on a non-discriminatory basis for international civil air traffic.

IV. Agreement on the use of Payne Field by United States military aircraft effected through an exchange of letters by the American Minister and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Under its terms, American military aircraft were granted permission to use Payne Field for a period of six months, renewable if necessary by mutual consent.

The texts of these agreements were transmitted to the Department in despatch 1635, June 19, from Cairo (883.7962/6-1946).

Renewal of agreement numbered IV for a six-month period was requested in Embassy note of October 25, 1946, and was granted in Egyptian Foreign Office note of December 8, 1946 (despatch 2083, December 24, from Cairo, 883.7962/12-2446).]

ETHIOPIA

[For documentation relating to Ethiopian territorial and reparations claims against Italy, see *Foreign Relations*, volumes II and III covering the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference.]

GREECE

PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE ALLIED MISSION TO OBSERVE THE GREEK ELECTIONS AND IN THE ALLIED MISSION TO OBSERVE THE REVISION OF GREEK ELECTORAL LISTS; DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE; GREEK TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE FRONTIERS OF GREECE BY ALBANIA, BULGARIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA¹

800.00 Summaries/1-846 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1946—8 p. m.

24. Tsouderos memorandum² received by Emb London declares Greek financial reconstruction plan prior necessity to stable currency program while British view vice versa. Memo asserts Greece must go beyond its means in providing for restoring economy and since hope for adequate reparations from Paris Conference³ has failed, must obtain funds either from taxation, which would jeopardize expanding production, or outside loans in credit or cash. Financial help is thus prerequisite to stable currency and sound economy, and would have steadying psychological effect on Greek population. Memo apparently expects some outside control of Greek economy as condition of financial help. Tsouderos also asks improvement of distribution and increased amount of UNRRA supplies. Finally, balancing of budget depends on sound functioning of Greek economy and currency stability. Memo concludes with summary of prospective extraordinary expenditures and reasons for impossibility of greatly increasing revenue to meet them.

ACHESON

¹ For previous documentation on these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 98 ff., 193 ff., and 300 ff.

² Memorandum by Emanuel J. Tsouderos, Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Coordination, presented to the British Government on January 2, 1946.

³ The Paris Conference on Reparation met from November 9 to December 21, 1945; for documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. III, pp. 1357-1506, *passim*.

868.51/1-946: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1946—11 p.m.

309. For Hawkins and Taylor.⁴ Following is proposed draft on Greek Currency Committee proposal submitted to but not yet cleared by Sec Vinson.⁵ Do not consider this draft as approved or act on instructions contained herein until you receive telephone confirmation by State Department approximately Friday noon Wash time. Any changes in draft will be communicated to you at that time.⁶

Dept and Treas have given most careful consideration to Brit views on Greek situation set forth in urtels 273, Jan 9 and 119, Jan 4⁷ (repeated to Athens as 8 and 4 respectively) to views of Emb contained in Athens' 1497, Jan 1⁸ (repeated to you as Deptel 128 Jan 5) and in Athens despatch 2002, Dec 15,⁹ and to Greek views reported in urtel 173, Jan 7¹⁰ (apparently not repeated to Athens). As result of this consideration following views have been developed.

1. We are convinced that monetary measures alone cannot solve Greek problem but agree that comprehensive program of economic and administrative rehabilitation cannot be successfully implemented without some degree of currency stability.

2. We believe that proposed Currency Committee has serious shortcomings but recognize that it may have stabilizing effect which may assist initiation of comprehensive program mentioned above. We believe this is matter of judgment which in last analysis Greek Government must decide. Apart from matter of its technical effectiveness Currency Committee proposal is open to serious question from US viewpoint because: (1) US representation on Committee would result in degree of US participation in internal affairs of friendly foreign nation far in excess of that to which US Govt has heretofore been willing to agree, (2) There is danger that an American, even if appointed in private capacity, may be regarded by Greeks as representing US Govt, (3) possibility that Committee will fail in effectively sta-

⁴ Harry C. Hawkins, Counselor for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom, and William H. Taylor, Treasury Representative in the United Kingdom, who were American participants in British-Greek discussions on the Greek economic and financial situation; see telegram 11089, December 27, 1945, to London, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 297.

⁵ Fred M. Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury.

⁶ In telegram 339, January 11, 1946, 8 p. m., the Department informed London that President Truman, at discussions the same afternoon with Messrs. Acheson and Vinson, had expressed grave concern as to the possibility of success of the committee device and the extent of United States involvement through participation by an American on the Committee. Nevertheless he had approved proceeding on the basis set forth in telegram 309. (868.51/1-746)

⁷ Neither printed.

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 298.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

¹⁰ Not printed.

bilizing Greek currency can not be overlooked in which event US Govt might share onus of such failure and become subject to attack in Greek politics. Despite these misgivings we are prepared to agree to participation of an American in proposed Currency Committee if Greek Govt proposes its establishment and if Greek Govt clearly understands that U. S. Govt assumes no responsibility for operations of currency committee or for determination of exchange rates and is in no way committed to additional financial support on account either of decisions made by currency committee or participation of American individual therein. This decision is made because we believe that present situation justifies adoption of extraordinary measures, particularly since they appear to constitute only feasible immediate remedy.

3. This Govt notes possibility that Brit Govt may be willing to pay into proposed Greek currency reserve account sum not exceeding £ 5 million which should contribute to flexibility necessary to successful operation of scheme. U. S. Govt cannot commit itself at this time to pay equal sum into currency reserve account. Such proposal can only be considered on its merits when need for funds arises.

4. Final approval was given Jan 9 to \$25 million Eximbank loan to Greece. Greek Ambassador will be informed late afternoon Jan 11. Note to Greeks will be released in press Jan 12.¹¹ In view of fact that Greeks here were already aware consideration of loan had reached final stages it was not deemed appropriate to postpone announcement further.

5. Any U. S. Govt expert advisors who may be requested by Greeks to aid in formulation of economic rehabilitation program will act in exclusively advisory capacity under terms of reference which will clearly indicate that such advisors will have no authority to commit U. S. in any way with respect to additional loans to Greece.

6. We are not completely clear as to procedure for implementing Currency Committee proposal and manner in which decisions respecting such matters as exchange rate, amount of note issue and of currency reserve, etc., will be made. We presume these questions will be determined later and we will be given advance opportunity to examine proposals.

7. You are requested to inform Brit at earliest opportunity of U.S. position as outlined above so necessary steps can be taken to ascertain Greek reaction to Currency Committee proposal and implement project. Copies of this telegram have been provided to Brit Emb and Treas Delegation, Washington. For your info Dept informally advised Brit Emb here Jan 7 of Dept's initial reaction on Eximbank loan and Currency Committee, indicating Dept felt there would be difficulty in postponing announcement of loan but Dept would not advance objection to appointment of American on Currency Committee on understanding U.S. and Brit members were not appointed as representatives of their respective Govts.

ACHESON

¹¹ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 20, 1946, p. 78.

868.00/1-1146: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*¹²

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, January 11, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received January 13—1:17 a. m.]

64. With reference to mytel to Dept No. 50, January 11¹³ repeated to London as No. 4, January 11 the immediately following paragraphs contain a joint message which my British colleague¹⁴ and I would respectfully submit to you and Mr. Bevin.¹⁵ The gravity of the present situation in Greece, the importance to us (ultimately) as well as to the British of finding a successful solution promptly, and the striking unanimity of opinion on the part of our respective technical advisers, have all united to make me associate myself with this message drafted by my colleague, to which I earnestly hope you will have time and opportunity to give your appropriate consideration.

1. We are deeply disturbed by position now reached in discussions with Greek Ministers in London. Bad as currency position is, the usual remedies might be applied were the Greek problem today purely financial. Unfortunately the financial problem is gravely affected and aggravated by nervousness resulting from political instability and the growth of a well organized revolutionary Communist movement.

2. Under such conditions it is our firm and considered opinion which is supported by the advisers of both Embassies that the financial and economic proposals shortly to be put formally to the Greek Ministers in London do not sufficiently meet the realities of the Greek situation.

3. We have to deal with a public in a highly nervous condition convinced that it cannot find economic recovery without long term financial aid from outside. Whether this is true or not (and we ourselves believe it to be true on all the evidence available to us) the belief is so widely and strongly held that it has become a fact which dictates the policy of any Greek Government. No Greek Government could survive which failed to secure satisfaction in this respect.

4. Rightly or wrongly the Greeks believe that they put up a finer resistance against the enemy in 1940 than any other small country and that the magnitude of their sufferings during the war has not been understood. This sense of being insufficiently appreciated as allies

¹² Mr. Byrnes was at this time attending the sessions of the United Nations at London. He left the British capital on January 25.

¹³ Not printed; it stressed that the urgency and seriousness of the situation in Greece was such as to require tangible and not merely verbal assurance of Allied intentions to maintain Greece as a sovereign state. The most effective, because the most tangible, form of assurance was said to be direct and adequate financial assistance from the British and American Governments with accompanying implications of political support. (868.51/1-1146)

¹⁴ Sir Reginald W. A. Leeper, British Ambassador in Greece.

¹⁵ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

is very widespread and is only aggravated by admonitions to them to do more for themselves. On the other hand it can be eradicated by a generous long term policy on the part of our two Governments.

5. If we fail to deal with the Greek problem with imagination and understanding at this moment it is our view that the present democratic government will certainly fall and probably be succeeded by a regime of the extreme right which in turn could scarcely fail to produce in due course a Communist dictatorship. We are faced with a highly inflammable situation where there are still bitter memories of the civil war a year ago and where fear for the future grips the whole public.

6. We believe that our Governments have an opportunity right at this moment to give hope and encouragement to this people, to put them on their feet again and get them to work by a broad generous and statesmanlike approach, by wiping out debts which cannot and will not be paid and by giving a definite guarantee that whatever material or financial assistance is in fact found to be necessary will be made available. The response to such a policy would be immediate and would produce more practical results than anything else. What Greece needs is a plan (1) which gives her the reassurance of continued economic existence after the present year; and (2) which prevents the Greek vices of extravagance and incompetence from wrecking the plan.

7. The moment is extremely critical. If we permit detailed discussions to hold up broad lines of positive action we may find that the economic structure here has collapsed before we have finished the argument. We suggest therefore, with all due respect to the British and American Secretaries of State to whom we address ourselves, that they should lift the discussions with the Greek Ministers onto a higher plane, giving them the necessary assurances that their people will be enabled to live and work and that necessary financial assistance will be provided for the stabilization of the currency though guarantees of sound financial administration will be required at the same time. We suggest as time presses here that a statement incorporating these assurances should be coupled with announcement that the discussions in London are at an end and that any British and American experts and advisers who are to assist Greece should immediately be sent to Athens to work out details.

8. We consider that this is a matter of extreme urgency and that if our advice is accepted the situation can almost certainly be saved and that relief and gratitude will give an immediate impetus to work and hope. Otherwise we feel it is our duty to warn you that Greece will not only be a source of grave political trouble for some time to come, but will also in all probability be condemned to bloodshed and famine.

Sent London as 5; repeated Department as 57 [64].¹⁶

MACVEAGH

¹⁶ No evidence of a reply to telegram 64 by the Department has been found. A summary of the communication was incorporated in a memorandum of January 15, 1946, by Mr. Hawkins to the Secretary of State. The summary noted that Mr. Bevin had approved the proposed British measures for assisting Greece despite their inadequacy in terms of the MacVeagh-Leeper recommendations. (868.00/1-1546)

868.00/1-1446

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, January 14, 1946

In fulfillment of the responsibilities undertaken by this Government at Yalta, and in response to the invitation of the Greek Government for Allied observation of Greek elections, the President appointed Henry F. Grady as his representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to head the American group to observe those elections in collaboration with representatives of Great Britain and France.* In November Ambassador Grady visited London for preliminary consultations with the British and French representatives, who subsequently accompanied him to Athens for conferences with the Greek authorities. During this visit the Greek Government reiterated its desire for Allied observation and fixed the date of March 31, 1946, for the elections.

The President has now announced the appointment of the following as members of the United States Mission, with the personal rank of Minister †

Harry J. Malony, Major General, U.S.A.

Joseph Coy Green, Adviser to the Secretary of State.

Walter H. Mallory, Executive Director, Council on Foreign Relations.

James Grafton Rogers, lawyer and educator, former Assistant Secretary of State.

William W. Waymack, Editor of the Des Moines *Register and Tribune*.

Herman B. Wells, President of Indiana University.

The members of the Mission are now assembled in Washington for the Mission's initial meetings, scheduled for January 14 and 15, 1946.

The Mission will be assisted in carrying out the observation by a civilian secretariat and advisory staff of approximately 80 persons and by a military staff numbering about 500 persons.

Appointments to the principal positions on the civilian staff include:

[Here follows a list of persons filling principal civilian positions, with their responsibilities.]

By direction of the President ‡ the State and War Departments are collaborating closely in the organization of the Mission and are receiving the assistance of the Navy Department and other executive

*Department of State Press Release No. 787, October 20, 1945. [Footnote in the original. Richard T. Windle and Brig. Gen. Arnaud Laparra were Chiefs of the British and French groups, respectively.]

†White House Press Release, January 11, 1946. [Footnote in the original.]

‡Executive Order No. 9657 of November 16, 1945, released to press by White House November 17, 1945; published in *Federal Register*, Vol. 10, No. 227, November 20, 1945. [Footnote in the original.]

branches of the Government. General Malony, as principal representative of the War Department, will be in charge of the military personnel constituting the observation teams and handling the physical arrangements of the Mission, which will be largely self-sufficient as regards supply, transportation, and communications. The following are the assignments to the principal positions on the military staff:

[Here follows a list of persons filling principal military positions, with their responsibilities.]

It has been agreed among the participating Governments that the three national groups will be organized into an Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections¹⁷ and that the observation will be conducted as a combined Allied operation. The United States and British Governments will each furnish 100 and the French about 40 mobile observation teams, each consisting of a military officer and enlisted man and a Greek interpreter equipped with a jeep and trailer. During a period of three weeks prior to election day these teams will inspect and report on the status of the electoral registers and of the provisions made for the election. On election day the teams will be sent to a sufficient number of representative polling places throughout Greece to give a valid sample of the effectiveness and integrity of the polling.

The pattern of observation will be worked out by a staff of Sampling and Statistical Experts.

The operation will be carried out through a Combined Central Office in Athens and Combined District Offices in Athens, Salonika, Patras, Tripolis and Herakleion, all headed by members of the three Allied Missions. Specific areas will not be assigned to the representatives of the three different nations, but American, British and French teams will be interspersed, one team to each selected polling place.

Mission personnel will observe the election process and will not interfere in any way. In the event of disturbances, observers will avoid becoming involved and will simply report the facts to the appropriate officers of the Mission. Military personnel will in no sense be in Greece for military purposes. All Allied staff members will wear distinctive personal identification in the form of shoulder patches for military personnel and brassards for civilians.

A group of members of the Interpreters Section of the United States Mission headed by Mr. Seeley is now en route to Greece to join with British colleagues in selecting the 200 or more Greek-English interpreters to be employed by the Mission. Another group from the civilian and military staffs, headed by Mr. Keeley,¹⁸ is now in London

¹⁷ The Mission was commonly referred to as "Amfoge", an abbreviation that came into use during early planning stages when it was unofficially designated "Allied Mission for Observing Greek Elections".

¹⁸ James Hugh Keeley, Foreign Service Officer, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Mission.

consulting with British and French representatives and elaborating the plans for the combined observation operation. Other groups, particularly the Technical Advisers and Central and District Office Staffs, will proceed to Greece in the near future to undertake the necessary advance studies and plans and to make advance arrangements for officers and quarters and for supplies.

Personnel of the three Allied contingents will be assembled in the Naples area of Italy in mid-February for a period of indoctrination and training before proceeding to Greece to begin the observation early in March.

868.00/1-1546

*The Secretary of State to the Greek Deputy Prime Minister
(Tsouderos)*

MEMORANDUM

1. The economic situation and needs of Greece as described by the representatives of the Greek Government in their memorandum of January 2, 1946,¹⁹ and in the recent discussions, have been carefully and sympathetically considered by the Government of the United States which is anxious to assist in the solution of these problems in every feasible and practicable way. The recent extension of a \$25 million Export-Import Bank loan and the United States participation in the current operations of UNRRA in Greece are demonstrative of the earnestness of the Government of the United States in assisting Greece on the road toward economic recovery.

2. Fully aware of the grave difficulties which beset Greece, the Government of the United States is nevertheless convinced that monetary measures alone cannot solve the Greek problem but is in agreement with the view that without some measure of currency stability, no comprehensive program of economic and administrative rehabilitation can be successfully implemented.

3. It is understood that the Government of Greece now has under consideration the creation of a currency committee; that this committee would be composed of appropriate officials of the Greek Government; that persons of American and British nationality would be invited by the Greek Government to serve as members of the committee; and that new issues of currency would only be made with unanimous approval of the committee.

4. If the Government of Greece should decide to establish such a committee, the Government of the United States is prepared to agree

¹⁹ For substance, see telegram 24, January 8, to Athens, and footnote 2, p. 88.

to the participation of an American national, appointed in a private capacity provided the Government of Greece clearly understands that the Government of the United States is in no way committed to additional financial support through decisions made by the currency committee or through the participation of an American national thereon.

5. It is necessary to point out that in assenting to the participation of an American national, the Government of the United States has serious misgivings that the presence of an American on the currency committee even though appointed in a private capacity, might be construed as representing a participation by the Government of the United States in the internal affairs of a friendly foreign nation to a degree far in excess of that to which the Government of the United States has heretofore been willing to agree. There is also the possibility that if the committee did not succeed in effectively stabilizing Greek currency, the Government of the United States might in some degree be held responsible for such failure and become the subject of attack in Greek politics. In view of these considerations the Government of the United States desires to emphasize the nature of American participation in the proposed currency committee, as set forth in the preceding paragraph, to ensure that it will be clearly understood.

6. The Government of the United States is prepared to consider sympathetically requests which may be made by the Greek Government for expert American advisers to aid in the formulation of an economic rehabilitation program. Any such advisers would act exclusively in an advisory capacity under terms of reference which will clearly indicate that they would have no authority to commit the Government of the United States in any way.

7. The Government of the United States cannot commit itself at this time to any proposal regarding a future commitment to provide funds for a currency reserve account. Such a proposal can only be considered on its merits when the actual need for funds may arise. In this regard the Government of the United States would like to refer to the note delivered to the Government of Greece on January 12, 1946 ^{19a} advising the Government of Greece that a \$25 million Export-Import Bank loan would be afforded to assist toward reconstruction in Greece and that the extension of possible further financial assistance to Greece would necessarily be influenced by the effectiveness with which the Government of Greece deals with the stabilization policy in Greece.

LONDON, January 15, 1946.

^{19a} Not printed.

868.00/1-1546 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1946—8 p. m.

49. Brit desire for Three Power approach urging Greek Govt to make public statement concerning method of election and reiteration March 31 firm date has been transmitted to Dept. Dept has replied to Brit Emb that it perceives no objection to such approach if clearly understood that Allies are expressing no preference on election system whether proportional or majority but that advanced stage of preparation plan makes it seem advisable for some firm statement of Greek Govts intention to be made available to Greek public. Such statement would of course include reiteration that elections would be held March 31. You are authorized to concert with your Brit and French colleagues in making such an approach to Greek Govt.

Sent Athens as no. 49; repeated Paris as no. 219 and London as no. 454.

ACHESON

868.00/1-1946

♦

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, January 19, 1946.

No. 2100

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a report²⁰ recently submitted to the War Department by the Assistant Military Attaché of this Embassy, Captain William H. McNeill, which I believe merits the Department's attention and a place in its files. The report is described as an "annual estimate of the stability of Government in Greece" but is in reality a very sound analysis of the whole political situation in this Country at the present time. It is written with remarkable lucidity and based on a very wide range of information. In particular, one of the ideas presented in conclusion, namely that certain factors in the Greek political situation are such as to favor a recurrence of dictatorship in this Country, after elections have been held and the British troops withdrawn, seems to be especially worth keeping in mind.

The report, oddly enough, but apparently as desired by the War Department for the sake of convenience, begins with a summary and conclusion. It then discusses factors making for stability of govern-

²⁰ Undated report not printed.

ment in Greece at the present time; viz: the presence of British troops in the Country; the British trained and supervised *Gendarmerie* and Police Force, described as being "more impartial in politics and less brutal against the public" than before the British Police Mission took over; the National Guard, now incorporated in the Greek Army; and the Greek Army itself "in which so far, there has been no overt expression of excitement [*incitement?*] or any breach of discipline," despite Communist infiltration and the nationalist sentiment of both "the overwhelming majority of the officers now on duty" and "at least 60% of the enlisted men".

Factors promoting instability are next considered: the serious economic paralysis and monetary inflation; the prevailing "psychological climate" of discouragement; the resulting political confusion, with extremes of left and right (each possessing a criminal fringe) facing each other across a weakly organized and emotionally unappealing center; the inefficiency and corruption of the government bureaucracy; the confusion of the legal system; the frequent changes of key administrative personnel; and the uncertainties of an unrealistic foreign policy based on a national feeling of insecurity due to past experience and fear of "Slavic inundation and Communist imperialism".

In a final section the above factors making for stability are weighed against those making for instability and found wanting. It is also pointed out in this section that Greece's economic and political problems must be tackled concurrently and that in the long run her salvation as an independent country depends on a balance being achieved between the Near Eastern policies of Great Britain and Soviet Russia.

Though the report ends at this point, its last word and main interest would appear to lie in the implications of the "conclusion" prefixed, as mentioned above, to the whole discussion. It is indeed always possible for Greece to find a kind of temporary "stability" in what Captain McNeill describes as an "authoritarian" government, "enjoying the support of a violent police and a pliant army". Such a thing has occurred many times before in Greece throughout her very long history, and the present report indicates convincingly that all the essential conditions may now be present for its occurring again once the British forces leave. However, in the present state of world opinion, and particularly of British politics, such an authoritarian government, if issuing from the right, could hardly maintain itself, and therefore the most likely eventuality in case the new government to be produced by the forthcoming elections should prove unviable in the face of a Parliament closely divided between leftist and rightist elements (thus repeating the situation which only a few years ago produced the fascist dictatorship of Metaxas²¹) would seem to be the eventual

²¹ Gen. John Metaxas, Greek Prime Minister, 1936 to 1941.

emergence of a dictatorship of the left, which in turn would infallibly place Greece, like all the other Balkan Countries at the present time, under the predominating influence of Russia. Persons interested in world politics and the future maintenance of world peace might do well to consider what such an eventuality would mean, having regard to the critical position of this small Country at the oldest historical cross-roads of empire.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

[On January 21, 1946, Ambassador Gromyko, Acting Representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations, sent a letter to the President of the Security Council transmitting the allegation of the Soviet Union that the presence of British troops in Greece represented foreign interference in the internal affairs of that nation and was fraught with grave consequences for the maintenance of peace and security. The communication requested the Security Council to discuss the matter and put an end to the situation; for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, page 73.*]

868.00/1-2246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, January 22, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received January 23—9:46 a. m.]

108. For Grady Mission. Regent²² signed decree January 19 providing for elections March 31 for revisionary parliament to be convoked May 13. Prime Minister²³ has also been actively consulting party leaders with view to early final decision whether elections to be held by majority or proportional system. Accordingly British Embassy feels (and I concur) that three power approach mentioned urtel 49, January 15 might be limited to expression welcoming these steps and stressing importance of early decision election system and of utmost efficiency and despatch in administrative arrangements to meet timetable.

Law on revision electoral lists which also signed January 19 causing British observers some anxiety latter connection. Law provides for extension registration period some districts till January 30 following which during 20-day period lists will be thoroughly checked by local committees with participation representatives Liberal, Populist, Communist Parties. During a further unspecified period voters

²² Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens and Primate of Greece.

²³ Themistocles Sophoulis.

eliminated from lists by revisionary process may appeal. This process can scarcely be completed before March 1 allowing just the required legal lapse of 30 days between final establishment of lists and elections and possibly precluding completion of printing of final lists in time.

MACVEAGH

868.51/1-2246: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, January 22, 1946—10 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

[Received January 23—12: 28 a. m.]

793. Urgent for Secretaries of State and Treasury from Hawkins and Taylor. British officials state that detailed report of proposed agreement between British and Greek representatives substantially accurate in all respects appeared in Athens press this morning. Accordingly the British and Greek representatives decided this evening that publication of letters to be exchanged between the British Govt and Greek Govt covering agreement reached during current conversations in London cannot be longer delayed. They propose to release for publication in Athens Wednesday afternoon January 23, on [or?] Thursday, January 24, an exchange of letters following the paraphrase of the draft letter in part II of this cable. Tentative plans are that the British Foreign Secretary will make a statement along these lines either Wednesday or Thursday. It is planned that draft letter will be approved at meeting in British FonOff tomorrow at noon with Greek representatives at which we will be present.

2. At previous conversation with us the British and Greek representatives inquired as to the procedure whereby the member of US nationality to participate in Currency Committee would be selected. In accordance with urtel No. 309 of January 10 we replied tentatively that member of US nationality was to be appointed by the Greek Govt but that the US Govt, if requested to do so, may be willing to suggest informally to the Greek Govt a list of persons of US nationality who would be qualified for this position. We indicated that we would not be able to give definite reply in absence of definition of functions and responsibilities of the Currency Committee.

3. From the discussions it would appear that the Greek representatives feel that the functions of the Currency Committee should be limited strictly to the management of the note issue, and that the Bank of Greece and appropriate Greek Ministries would have clear authority over and responsibility for foreign exchange transactions, stabilization measures and administration of Greek economy gener-

ally. The British representatives commented to us informally that the functions of the Currency Committee might well be limited officially to the issuance of new currency, but that in practice it would be in a position to issue policy directives on a broad basis to the Bank of Greece and to the Greek Ministries in initiating and carrying through desired program for economic stabilization. British are now reviewing scope of functions and responsibilities to be given to Currency Committee. We have indicated that the US would take an advance opportunity to comment upon the implementation of the Currency Committee and the formulation of its functions.

4. Greek representatives hope that they will be able to announce rate of exchange in conjunction with publication of agreement. Tentative British views favor rate between 16,000 and 20,000 drachmae to the pound. Greek representatives have mentioned 18,000 drachmae to pound.

5. The exchange of letters will not refer to any possible support by the British Govt of proposals by the Greek Govt for assistance to the Reconstruction Bank or other international bodies. See paragraph 8 of ourtel 542, January 2 [16]²⁴. It was agreed that such commitment would be ill advised from the viewpoint of the role of the Reconstruction Bank as an independent agency.

6. British and Greek representatives agree that currency conversion program should be a straight conversion at rate to be agreed upon. Tentative views are that there will be no blocking or tax measures, or any registration which would permit currency program to be used as a measure for discovering and combating black market operations. Greek and British representatives comment that currency is not held by hoarders or dealers in black market and that change in rate of exchange hits holders of currency hard enough. Exchange of letters will also commit Greek Govt to appropriate adjustments in wages and prices.

7. Settlement of outstanding 1945 financial claims between the two countries will be settled by a separate exchange of letters. We understand that exchange of letters on this matter will not be published.

8. British representatives are urging Greeks to send purchasing missions to UK immediately. They point out that Greeks should turn Greek foreign exchange assets into supplies and capital equipment which can be used by Greeks in restoring her economy as soon as possible.

9. Tentative plans are that Tsouderos and Kartalis²⁵ will not return immediately to Greece but will remain here until a definite list of supplies and equipment which can be shipped immediately to Greece

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ George Kartalis, Greek Minister of Supply.

is agreed upon. Greek representatives commented to British that unless they can take actual goods and schedule of agreed subsequent deliveries back with them "agreement is so much hot air".

Part II. Paraphrase of draft letter from Mr. McNeil²⁶ to M. Tsouderos for discussion and signing if possible on Wednesday 23rd January²⁷ is quoted below. Our comments are in parentheses.

"It pleases me to record the agreement which has been reached between the British Govt and the Greek Govt concerning the decision of the Greek Govt to put into force a detailed and comprehensive programme to reestablish confidence, to restore industrial and agricultural production and to make it possible to take progressive steps to reduce the deficit on the Greek budget; and also the financial and economic assistance which the British Govt have, as part of this programme, decided to give to Greece.

It is my honour to confirm that the financial and economic assistance which the British Govt have decided to give to Greece as part of this comprehensive plan will be the following:

(a) The British Govt will ask Parliament to approve a credit of 10 million pounds for the stabilization of the Greek currency which as described below will have a definite and specific cover of 25 million pounds in all. This cover will be held in a special account of the Bank of Greece at the Bank of England and will be invested in agreement with the Bank of England.

(b) The British Govt will waive repayment of the sum of 46 million pounds loaned to Greece in 1940/41. This will enable the reserves of the Bank of Greece to be available free of all charges or encumbrances as additional cover for the Greek currency and for the purchase of essential imports.

(c) (This section is to be drafted. It will refer to release of property held under custodian arrangements.)

(d) The British Govt will make available immediately for sale to the Greek Govt consumer goods at a cost price of 500,000 pounds. These goods which will be provided in spite of the acute shortage in the UK will comprise clothing and certain household utensils.

(e) The British Govt will make available for service in Greek waters additional coastal shipping and dredgers in order to restore the Greek coastal trade and to ensure that both UNRRA supplies and local agricultural and industrial produce are rapidly and efficiently distributed. (Types of shipping are to be further discussed.)

(f) The British Govt will release from British military stocks for sale to the Greek Govt at disposal prices, material for the reconstruction of Greek land communications. The British Govt have particularly in mind the provision of Bailey Bridges for the repair of the road system. (Greeks have asked to pay in drachma for all supplies in (d) (e) and (f) but British have so far given categorical "no".)

(g) The British Govt will endeavor in consultation with the Govt

²⁶ Hector McNeil, British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

²⁷ The letters were actually exchanged by Messrs. Bevin and Tsouderos on January 24; for texts, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 413, cols. 451-454.

of the US and UNRRA to make available without delay the necessary spare parts and tires to enable the 4,000 lorries imported into Greece by the military authorities and by UNRRA to be kept on the roads. In addition, the British Govt will endeavor to provide materials for sale to the Greek Govt to overcome certain other shortages which may be holding up the immediate reconstruction programme. The British Govt have particularly in mind the rebuilding of houses, the repair of industrial plants and the restoration of road, rail and sea communications and of port facilities.

(h) The British Govt will provide to the Greek Govt technical assistance over a wide field. A highly qualified consultative mission on financial, economic and industrial matters has been formed under Lieutenant General Clark, CB, MC. In addition on the invitation of the Greek Govt British advisers will be appointed to work in certain Greek Ministries and be responsible to the Greek Ministers concerned. (Clark Mission may be limited to 2 years.)

(i) The Greek Govt have stressed the need for a longer term reconstruction plan covering a period of say 5 years and it estimates that to carry through such a plan Greece will need foreign financial assistance on a large scale. The Greek [*British*] Govt do not dispute this need and they suggest that the Greek Govt should submit proposals to the Bretton Woods Reconstruction Bank to cover the period when UNRRA supplies will have ceased. (British say Greek representatives felt that it was desirable to refer to the Reconstruction Bank but agreed to eliminate any statement that British Govt would support any approach Greeks might make to Bank.)

(j) (Greeks have been pressing strongly for food supplies. British have not been able to indicate what will be made available but may agree to make some reference to it.)

The Greek Govt for their part will take the following measures:

(1) The Greek authorities will make an early announcement fixing a new rate of exchange between Greek currency on the one hand and sterling, US dollars and other foreign currencies on the other hand.

(2) The Greek Govt will deposit as cover for the currency in the special account referred to above 15 million pounds from the foreign exchange resources of the Bank of Greece in addition to the 10 million pounds to be contributed by the British Govt.

(3) As a further measure to establish confidence in the currency, the Greek Govt will by Greek law set up a Currency Committee which will have statutory management of the note issue. The Committee will consist of the Greek Minister for Coordination as President, the Greek Minister of Finance, the Governor of the Bank of Greece, a member of UK nationality and a member of US nationality, whom the Greek Govt will invite to act as members of the Committee.²⁸ New issues of currency will only be made with the unanimous approval of the Committee.

(4) There will continue to be offered for sale to the Bank of Greece foreign exchange received from exports and in respect of remittances.

(5) The Bank of Greece will freely convert Greek currency into foreign exchange for imports and for other approved purposes.

²⁸ Sir John Nixon, retired official of the Government of India, and Gardner Patterson, formerly with the United States Treasury Department, were designated British and American members of the Currency Committee by the Greek Government in early February and early April, respectively.

(6) A programme will be framed by the Greek Govt for progressively reducing and as soon as possible eliminating the budget deficit by increasing the proceeds of taxation and reducing expenditure. Monthly statements showing the progress made in carrying out this programme will be published by the Greek Govt.

(7) Wages will be readjusted in the light of the new rate of exchange and will be kept stable.

(8) A system of price control over rationed items and allocated materials will be established.

(9) The Greek Govt will work out in agreement with UNRRA plans for increasing the price of UNRRA goods and reducing the number of indigents who receive free rations. So far as possible the Greek Govt will require indigents to work in exchange for their UNRRA rations.

(10) All possible measures will be taken to restore industrial and agricultural production, so that the standard of living may be improved and a basis may be afforded for adequate taxation.

It is suggested that an agreement between our two Govts is constituted by this letter and Your Excellency's reply thereto."²⁹

[Hawkins and Taylor]
WINANT

501.BB/2-246 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, February 2, 1946—noon.
[Received February 2—11:05 a. m.]

1275. For the President and the Secretary. At the Security Council meeting this [*yesterday*] afternoon, Vyshinsky³⁰ made a series of charges against the British relative to the Greek situation. He emphasized that there were no legitimate reasons for the presence of British troops in Greece and ended by urging that the Council ask the British to withdraw these troops immediately.

Bevin answered in very forthright terms and I hope you will read

²⁹ In a memorandum of January 26, 1946, to Mr. Acheson, Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, stated that the "British have been more generous than might have been expected in offering financial and economic assistance; the Greek Government, for its part, has agreed to undertake a stringent stabilization program." He noted also the urgent request of Mr. Tsouderos for the United States to issue a public statement approving the agreement and appended a proposed statement. (868.51/1-2646) The statement was issued by the Secretary of State the following day; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 3, 1946, p. 155.

³⁰ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations.

his statement. He emphasized that British troops were in Greece at the request of the Greek Govt. Also that it was British policy to maintain security in Greece until the Greeks could work out their own political problems in their own way and in particular to make it possible to hold fair elections. He stated that British troops would be removed at the earliest possible moment.

Bevin made quite a point of the internal fight between Communists backed by Russian official propaganda and the other Greek parties and complained of the lack of friendship which the Russians were showing by their anti-British Communist propaganda all over the world. He indicated his belief that the Soviets had deeper motives in bringing the case before the Council than merely to protest against British action in Greece. He ended by asking the Council whether what the British had done endangered the peace and security of the world and insisted that he was entitled to a definite yes or no answer. He asked for a clean bill of health from the Council. (For fuller report see DelUN 202.³¹)

The Greek representative stated that the British troops were present in Greece with the full consent and approval of the Greek Government.³²

I feel that this frank exchange of views cleared the air and sets a good precedent for future Council hearings. In view of Bevin's strong statement and the position taken by the Greeks, it is possible that the Soviets may not press for an investigation or other action. If so, I am inclined, if Bevin agrees, to close the matter without pressing for a formal resolution dismissing the case on its merits. I think the same objective could be attained by a simple statement from the chairman approved by the Council without vote. This would give Bevin in substance his clean bill without publicly chastising the Soviet Govt. I do not believe Russians have made a sufficient case to justify investigation and will only vote for investigation if British feel it essential for their vindication. I intend to oppose any other action by the Council along the lines suggested by the Soviets as set forth above.³³

I would welcome any views you may have.

STETTINIUS

³¹ Telegram 1266, February 1, 1946, midnight, from London, not printed.

³² The President of the Security Council had invited the representative of Greece to participate, without vote, in the discussions. For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on February 1, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, No. 1*, pp. 72-90.

³³ In telegram 1171 (UNdel 163), February 2, 1946, 4 p. m., the Secretary of State set forth his agreement with the views outlined in this paragraph (501-BB/2-246).

501.BC/1-146

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations (Bohlen)

SECRET

LONDON, February 3, 1946.

USSC 46/13 (Conv. 2)

Participants: Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Pastorev
Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Stettinius said he was sorry to disturb Mr. Vyshinsky on a Sunday night,³⁴ but since the Greek question would be coming before the Council again on Monday, he had wished to have a private conversation with Mr. Vyshinsky in order to explore various possibilities. He inquired what Mr. Vyshinsky's views were as to the best way out of the difficulty.

Mr. Vyshinsky said that he had already stated the Soviet position and that he had no other course than to maintain that position. The Soviet Government was acting on a genuine conviction that the situation in Greece was dangerous. In this connection he wished to draw Mr. Stettinius' attention to the fact that he had not accused Mr. Bevin of the sins which the latter had accused the Soviet Government of. Mr. Bevin's attitude on the Soviet view was reminiscent of Lord Curzon and Mr. Chamberlain's toward the Soviet Union.

Mr. Stettinius said that he must state frankly that in our opinion, nothing had been presented at the Council to justify the belief that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted a threat to the peace. He personally could not see any serious justification for this charge.

Mr. Vyshinsky said that their point of view was different. The presence of British troops was being utilized by right-wing and Fascist elements in Greece to continue disorders and to promote a state of affairs which could only lead to trouble later on. He felt sure that if the British withdrew, the situation in Greece would quiet down in a very short time. The British troops had been in Greece for a long time, but no order had resulted. As to the threat to the peace, the Soviet Government considered that the situation in Greece contained the seeds of such a threat. For example, a Greek judge in the trial of a Greek Lacedaemonian patriot had openly stated that the Greeks would not shrink from extirpating all Slavs on their territory. An atmosphere of conditions which permitted of such incidents could not but create the possibility of trouble with the neighbors of Greece and eventually a threat to the peace. The British were supporting the Royalists, and among the Royalists were "strong-arm men" who

³⁴ The conversation began at 10:30 p. m. at the Soviet Embassy.

dreamed of a greater Greece. He pointed out that these were not only his sentiments but those of many people in the world, including some of the Labor members of Parliament. He went on to say that Mr. Stettinius would recall that at Yalta³⁵ Marshal Stalin had approved the presence of British troops in Greece because at that time they were there in connection with the prosecution of the war and the driving out of the German invaders. Since that time, however, the war had ended and the Soviet Government could not see any reason why British troops remained in Greece.

Mr. Stettinius said that he believed that if either Mr. Vyshinsky's motion or Mr. Bevin's motion were to be put to a vote, there was a strong likelihood that neither would pass. He said that it would be much better to avoid a vote and to find some formula or statement which would dispose of the matter. For example, there was Mr. Bevin's statement and that of the Greek Government to the effect that the British troops would be withdrawn as soon as order was restored.

Mr. Vyshinsky replied that every vote could not be successful, but that he must say that if the Council dismissed the matter the Greek question would, before long, come before it again, inasmuch as the logic of the situation and future developments in Greece would make this necessary. He said that the Soviet Government had not created this danger and had no direct interest in Greece. Despite Mr. Bevin's statement that little Greece could not menace, allegedly, herself or her neighbors, the Soviet Government felt that the existence of chauvinistic sentiments in Greece could lead to future trouble involving a threat to the Greek Government. He pointed out that history shows us that if small matters are not treated in their infancy, they grow to big ones.

Mr. Stettinius repeated that the United States frankly could not see that there were sufficient grounds to justify a determination of a threat to the peace in this situation, which, under the Charter, would have to be the first consideration of the Council. He again expressed doubt as to whether Mr. Vyshinsky's resolution would be supported by the Council.

Mr. Vyshinsky replied that they had grounds for believing otherwise, but in any event, it was up to the Council to decide.

Mr. Stettinius said that although he had talked with the British since the last Council meeting, there had been no conversations with any other delegations.

Mr. Vyshinsky said that he, personally, could see no other way out than to put the matter to a vote.

³⁵ For documentation on the meeting at Yalta from February 4 to 11, 1945, of President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*.

After a short discussion of the status of the work of the Assembly in which Mr. Vyshinsky said it would be necessary to agree on a panel of judges, Mr. Stettinius left.

501.BC/1-146

*Report by the United States Representative at the United Nations
(Stettinius)*

USSC 46/9 (Report 13)

[LONDON, undated.]

RECORD OF SECRET SESSION WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE MEETING OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1946, FROM 9 : 10 P. M.
UNTIL 11 P. M.

Present: Messrs. Stettinius, Bevin, Cadogan,³⁶ Lie,³⁷ Jebb,³⁸ Makin,³⁹
Bailey, Vyshinsky and Interpreter, Modzelewski⁴⁰ and
Interpreter, Dr. Koo⁴¹ and Bidault.⁴²

The Security Council recessed at about 9 : 10 p. m. at the suggestion of the Chairman, Mr. Makin of Australia, who did not consult others, as it was obvious to him that there was to be no quick agreement on the Greek situation.

Makin opened the meeting by saying he was perfectly sure that the great powers could work this matter out and he thought a private discussion of this kind would be useful. He turned to Vyshinsky and said he understood that Vyshinsky had a proposal to make which he thought would be acceptable to Bevin.

Vyshinsky spoke for approximately five minutes and his proposal was that he would not insist on a statement relative to the removal of troops if Bevin would not insist on saying the Council had not found that a threat to the peace resulted from the presence of British troops in Greece.

Bevin answered him immediately with great force and talked for about ten minutes. He referred to Grymyko's original letter, saying this had been an attack on the British people and it would have to be withdrawn. He then asked whether Vyshinsky would be willing to withdraw the Gromyko letter. Vyshinsky said he would like to see the letter and Bevin handed it to him. It was discussed back and forth and finally Vyshinsky stated again, "I cannot withdraw the letter, but I wish to make it very clear to everyone that we did

³⁶ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Representative at the United Nations.

³⁷ Trygve H. Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations.

³⁸ Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb, Executive Secretary of the United Nations.

³⁹ Norman J. O. Makin, Australian Representative at the United Nations; at this time, also President of the Security Council.

⁴⁰ Zygmunt Modzelewski, Polish Representative at the United Nations.

⁴¹ V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Representative at the United Nations.

⁴² Georges Bidault, French Representative at the United Nations.

not say that the British troops in Greece were a threat to the peace, but we did say that the situation created by the presence of British troops was causing a threat to the peace." Vyshinsky made quite a distinction on this point.

At about this time Dr. Koo appeared with Bidault.

Vyshinsky all of a sudden stated, "Well, Mr. Bevin, if we can't agree on this matter, let's send a commission to Greece to investigate the situation and whatever the commission says we will abide by, and we will even withdraw our letter." Bevin said, "I will have no commission of any kind go to Greece. I am either a decent citizen, and my people are decent citizens, or we aren't."

Vyshinsky then stated, "I resented very much what you said the other day, Mr. Bevin, relative to the fact that you could not sit with me any longer if this matter was not solved immediately." Bevin made an unsatisfactory explanation of this matter, in which he did not clarify exactly what was said. I broke into the conversation and said, "Gentlemen, I remember exactly what Bevin said and it was if these charges are correct he wasn't fit to sit with any member of the Security Council. It did not relate at all his sitting with the USSR." My explanation was concurred in by all present.

Vyshinsky went on to say that it was a great pity that such a discussion had to take place. He said they could not have won the war alone, and Britain could not have won the war alone—they needed each other then as they needed each other now. He then said, "We want to stay friendly with you and we must find a way." Bevin said something pleasant about his great desire to stay friendly.

Bevin then said, "I am willing to accept any kind of language to settle this. I am willing to say the presence of the troops in Greece *do not constitute* a breach of the peace, and also, if it would be helpful, I am willing to say it doesn't violate the Charter. I must have this attack withdrawn—the fact that the presence of our troops there are a threat to international peace."

Vyshinsky then replied that the British troops lead to complications which are a threat to the peace. He said, "*That* is what I am talking about."

Bevin then stated, "Would you mean that the British troops do not endanger the situation?" Vyshinsky did not answer.

Vyshinsky then stated that he would be willing to have the matter settled by the Chairman in an oral statement saying that everybody had been heard, but that he would not withdraw the letter. Bevin replied, "You have raised this matter in Potsdam,⁴³ in London and

⁴³ For documentation on the meeting at Potsdam from July 17 to August 2, 1945, of President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill (succeeded during the meeting by Clement R. Attlee), and Marshal Stalin, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, 2 vols.

in Moscow.⁴⁴ It must be settled here once and for all, or I shall not go on with these discussions.”

Vyshinsky then stated that the elections in Greece could never be free with the British troops there. Bevin referred to the fact that the United States Government did not feel that the elections were going to be free in Bulgaria,⁴⁵ and that could be discussed pro and con, but of course he could never admit that the presence of British troops would not guarantee a fair election.

Vyshinsky then lost his temper and spoke for five or six minutes, not even pausing for the interpreter. He said this was not propaganda and that he had a deep conviction that the validity of his case was evident. It was very distressing to him that Bevin could not see the situation in the way we [*he?*] saw it.

Then the Pole spoke up, red in the face, and said some rather unpleasant things relative to lack of understanding among the big powers, etc.

I then became quite aroused for we had gone on for an hour and forty-five minutes already and I felt that a great mistake had been made for Makin to adjourn for five minutes and allow us to be out for almost two hours, and I made a three- or four-minute statement.

I said that the eyes of the world were on us at this meeting. None of us were other than average men, but that the world had supreme hopes for the success of the United Nations and more than that the success of the five permanent members learning to work in harmony and understanding. The exchanges which had taken place this evening had been very disturbing. Civilization as we knew it depended upon not only the success of the United Nations but specifically the success of the five countries here represented finding a solution to their problems. I was convinced that with good will, understanding and tolerance we could find a solution, and I appealed to Vyshinsky and Bevin to look at this situation in a broad way.

I then stated that I felt personally that they should both be satisfied with having the Chairman make a statement something along the following lines—that we should take note of the declarations of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Greece, and we should also take note of the views expressed by France, China, the United States of America, (and anyone else who talked, in order that their statements may be in the official record) with regard to the situation in Greece which had come about as a result of the presence of British troops, and all of these declarations and statements should be published in the official records and that the matter should be

⁴⁴ The Council of Foreign Ministers met at London from September 11 to October 2, 1945, and at Moscow from December 16 to 26, 1945; for documentation on these meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. II, pp. 99 ff., and 560 ff.

⁴⁵ For documentation regarding the political situation in Bulgaria, see vol. VI, pp. 46 ff.

closed. I said something of that kind certainly should satisfy the situation particularly in view of the fact that the day before yesterday we had a vote ⁴⁶ and the vote was nine to two stating that a threat to the peace did not exist.

I then said that I now wished to make very clear to Mr. Vyshinsky in making this proposal that I link what I said to the declaration of the United States made the day before yesterday in which I stated it was the position of the United States that we did not believe a threat to the peace existed as a result of the presence of British troops in Greece, and moreover I placed great emphasis on the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Council had already publicly so stated.

Vyshinsky spoke up and said, "This is very interesting but I must consult my Government." Bevin stated, "I will have to discuss this with the Cabinet."

I then stated that we had kept the Council, the press and the public waiting for almost two hours, and had recessed for five minutes, and I said it was going to make a very bad impression and I felt we must adjourn and continue it in public or decide to meet tomorrow. Makin said he thought we should meet tomorrow. Vyshinsky suggested ten p. m. tomorrow night. Somebody said that was too late and we should meet at eight. We agreed to meet at nine.

After Vyshinsky had asked me for the text of what I said, Jebb came up along side of me and wrote it up in long hand. He did not get it correctly and I re-stated it slowly. Vyshinsky took it down in Russian and Bailey took it down in English. (Copy attached)

We then walked back to the Council meeting. Bevin was uncertain as to the whole situation. He said he thought that serious charges had been made and that the United Kingdom had been charged by Russia of this serious situation and he was not at all sure he could accept any compromise of any kind other than a clear vote regardless of what the circumstances were—even to wrecking the UNO—to clear the charges made by the USSR against the United Kingdom.

I then went back to the Council, and Makin said he would adjourn until tomorrow night at 9 and meet at 10:30 a. m. to elect the judges.

[Annex]

TEXT OF STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY THE CHAIRMAN, WHICH MR. STETTINIUS PROPOSED AT PRIVATE MEETING IN MR. LIE'S OFFICE DURING SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 5TH

"I feel we should take note of the declaration made before the Security Council by the Representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Greece and also of the views expressed by the

⁴⁶ The vote actually took place on February 4.

Representatives of the following members of the Security Council—the United States, France, China, Australia, Poland, Egypt and The Netherlands—in regard to the question of the presence of British troops in Greece, as recorded in the proceedings of the Council, and consider the matter closed.”

868.00/2-546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1946—7 p. m.

147. For Grady Mission. Brit Elections Mission on preliminary visit to Greece noted absence any provision in Greek law corresponding to Brit Ballot Act enforcing oath of secrecy on all officials engaged conducting elections. Brit wish to draw attention Greek officials to desirability publishing some such law prior to elections and Brit Emb here asked whether US willing to make similar recommendation. Same inquiry being made of French Govt by Brit Amb in Paris.

Dr. Grady recommends following Brit suggestion, and you are authorized to proceed.

BYRNES

501.BB/2-646 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, February 6, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 11 : 11 p. m.]

1465. Delun 249. I will attempt to give below an analysis of the developments in regard to the Greek question now before the Council. This account will not include, except for purposes of convenience, a report of proceedings of the Council itself, which have been reported in the press and in our telegrams Embassy's No. 1279, DelUN 234, and DelUN 246.⁴⁷ After the initial meeting on Friday February 1 at which the Soviet charge and the British and Greek answer were heard, the principal question over the week end was whether or not the Soviet Government was determined to press its case in the face of the generally insubstantial nature of the charge and its obvious failure to convince the Council that any threat to the peace existed.

It was our view that since in essence the statements of Great Britain and Greece had effectively cleared England of the Soviet charge there

⁴⁷None printed. No. 1279 was dated February 2, 1946; DelUN 234 and 246, which also carried Embassy Nos. 1401 and 1451, were dated February 5 and 6, respectively.

would be no advantage to anyone concerned to have the matter brought to a formal vote or resolution which could only exacerbate the situation.

In order to ascertain the British reaction to this position I saw Bevin on Sunday night. He said he would not demand a formal resolution or vote under the circumstances but would be quite satisfied with some statement from the Chair expressing the sense of the Council that no threat to the peace had been caused by the presence of British troops in Greece or any other informal indication of the Council's view to that effect. He made it clear, however, that while not pressing for a formal vote he must, in view of the charges levelled against Great Britain, obtain some indication, no matter how informal, of the Council's opinion exonerating Great Britain from these charges. He said his Government could not accept any solution which would pass over in silence this vital point.

[Here follows a summary of the discussion with Mr. Vyshinsky as recorded in Mr. Bohlen's memorandum of February 3, page 106.]

I subsequently saw Mr. Bevin and outlined to him the Soviet position as I had understood it. Mr. Bevin repeated that while he would not press for a formal resolution he would insist upon some expression of the Council's opinion exonerating Great Britain from these serious charges. He was most vehement on this point. He was quite willing, however, to have me make a statement and appeal to the Council not to take any formal action but to dismiss the case on the grounds of my statement.

The next morning the statement which I subsequently made at the Council was drawn up. During the proceedings of the Council meeting on Monday it became apparent that Mr. Vyshinsky had firm instructions from the Soviet Government consisting of 2 main points: (1). That the Council should adopt or informally accept some statement as close to the original Soviet proposal for the quick and unconditional withdrawal of British troops as is possible. (2). To block any ruling or resolution by the Council exonerating Great Britain of the charge that the situation resulting from the presence of British troops constituted a danger to international peace.

This was demonstrated by the resolution which he himself introduced concerning the withdrawal of British troops (later withdrawn in favor of the Polish resolution to the same effect) and by his emphatic objection to the inclusion in the Egyptian proposal of a reference to the absence of any danger to the peace, even carrying his objection to the point of threatening to exercise the veto power.

Mr. Bevin on the other hand was quite prepared to accept the Egyptian proposal including the reference therein to the withdrawal

of British troops but could not accept the elimination of the sentence exonerating Great Britain.

As a result of Monday's meeting the issue had narrowed down to the question whether or not the Council should give some indication that British action in Greece did not constitute a threat to the peace. On this point 8 members of the Council had spoken expressing the opinion that the British action did not constitute a threat to the peace but it was obvious that no motion to that effect could be carried in view of Mr. Vyshinsky's announcement that he would exercise the veto power to block it.

Prior to the meeting last night Mr. Wellington Koo made several attempts with the Russians and British to find a formula which would reconcile this issue but without any success. As a result when the meeting convened last night there was no basis for agreement and the Chairman had not worked out any procedure for handling the matter. In this connection I am obliged to state that in our opinion and that of other delegations had the Chairman been more decisive and experienced this troublesome and dangerous controversy could have been terminated by an appropriate ruling from the Chair. When it became apparent that no basis for agreement on disposing of the question was present the Chairman suggested a short adjournment and Mr. Bevin and Mr. Lie retired to a private room where, on their own invitation, Vyshinsky, the Pole and I joined them. . . .

[Here follows a summary of the discussion at the secret session of February 5 as recorded in Mr. Stettinius' undated memorandum, page 108.]

Mr. Bevin phoned me early this morning to say that he was going to suggest to the Prime Minister within a few minutes that my proposed statement with slight alterations was a satisfactory basis for agreement. He said he thought he had perhaps gone too far in urging his point. He later advised me that the Prime Minister hesitated to accept my proposal and wanted Britain cleared. A Cabinet meeting is being held later today to obtain a final decision.

Mr. Makin also reported that his Government had given him strict instructions not to agree to anything which did not clear Britain fully. He said that if the British did not agree to my proposal he would make a statement at tonight's meeting that since 8 countries had stated the British troops were not endangering international peace he declared the matter closed. The representative of Brazil has also advised me that he proposes to state before the meeting is closed that Brazil does not believe that the presence of British troops in Greece has endangered peace.

If Great Britain and the Soviet Union adopt my suggestion I believe the matter will have been closed in the best possible manner under the circumstances.⁴⁸

STETTINIUS

868.00/2-2746 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 27, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received 10:55 p. m.]

2391. This morning's *Daily Herald* stated that Greek elections might not be held on March 31 as Sophoulis Cabinet is now unanimously in favor of postponement.

We asked Foreign Office today for their comments. Foreign Office official said:

There is indeed strong pressure for postponement of elections, and now not only Center and Leftist parties wish this but also there are indications that Rightist party are also for postponement as they fear that British troops will be withdrawn from Greece immediately after elections. (In this connection, Foreign Office official stated that there was little likelihood that British troops would be pulled out before autumn.)

Center and Leftist parties' desire for postponement is based on plea that there are large numbers of bandits and terrorist gangs on the loose in Greece and that they would interfere with free elections. However, British Embassy in Athens has reported that although there were number of incidents involving gangs prior to UNO discussions on Greece, they became less frequent during UNO discussions and have now considerably decreased. It has to be decided just how much can be said to Greek Govt on question of postponement. Certainly Allied Mission for Observation of Elections cannot discuss security angle as it does not fall within its province, but Mission could very well say that electoral rolls are entirely satisfactory (as Windle has reported) and that on this count elections could be held at any time.

⁴⁸ The Security Council discussed the Soviet complaint concerning the continued presence of British troops in Greece at its meetings on February 1, 4, 5, and 6. It disposed of the case on February 6 when agreement was reached on a summary statement read by the President of the Council which very closely paralleled the statement offered by Mr. Stettinius (see annex to the undated report by the United States Representative, p. 111.). For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council at the four meetings, see SC, *1st yr., 1st series, No. 1*, pp. 72 ff., 91 ff., 132 ff., and 165 ff. The statement by the President of the Council is printed *ibid.*, p. 171. The United Nations has published an account of the Council's deliberations in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47*, pp. 336-338.

Two members of General Clark's economic mission have just returned from Greece and categorically state that it is essential to hold elections on date fixed as Greece cannot "go ahead" until elections are finished. Any attempts to get administrative decisions, they say, are brushed aside with remark that such decisions must await termination of elections.

Foreign Office feels very strongly that these elections should be held on March 31.

Sent Dept as 2391; repeated to Paris as 160, to Athens as 39.

GALLMAN

868.00/2-2846: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, February 28, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received March 1—11:25 a. m.]

277. Mytel 248, February 21.⁴⁹ Pursuant receipt message from Bevin refusing endorse majority system as requested, Regent yesterday signed law No. 1021 providing for reapplication 1936 legislation in forthcoming elections (proportional system) but lifting restrictions on number of seats (300) and voting of military personnel. He also signed decree fixing electoral districts and representation on basis one seat per 20,000 population 1940 censuses (total 354 seats) and stipulating balloting between sunrise and sundown, March 31.

Though they have thus obtained proportional system for which they asked, reluctance to face balloting March 31 is becoming increasingly evident among anti-Royalist groups with threat of abstention spreading to Center.

[Here follows an account of comment by Greek newspapers and official reaction thereto.]

British Embassy feels possibility abstention Left and even Center parties from elections is very real. Leeper told me privately his efforts to build up Center have completely failed and hazarded guess Right might win absolute majority even if Center and Left did participate. He expects a 2 weeks' delay in election date for "technical" reasons in any case. Soviet Ambassador⁵⁰ recently expressed to me opinion that disorders inevitable if elections held March 31 and asked my views. Replied I foresaw no danger serious disturbances unless instigated by orders of some large organization.

RANKIN

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Rear Adm. Konstantin Konstantinovich Rodionov.

868.00/2-2746 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)*⁵¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

252. If agreeable to Ambassador Grady please inform Greek Foreign Minister that the U. S. Government hopes report that Greek Government may be considering postponement of elections beyond March 31 is not correct, since U. S. Government believes that work of rehabilitation in Greece, in which this Government is deeply interested, will be hampered as long as uncertainties regarding elections continue. Moreover, American Election Commission was appointed on the understanding that the elections would be held as announced by Greek Government, and it will be difficult to assure American participation in observing elections if there is any further postponement.

Sent to Athens. Repeated to London and Paris for information British and French Governments.

BYRNES

868.00/3-1246

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER,
DATED MARCH 7TH, 1946⁵²

I have received through the Greek Embassy your message of March 2nd on the subject of the elections.

I have noted with regret the decision of Left Wing elements in Greece to abstain from the elections. Abstention from the elections

⁵¹ In a memorandum of March 12, 1946, George L. Jones and Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs explained the background of this telegram as follows: "When on March 2 the Department authorized expression of the hope to the Greek Government that the elections would not be postponed, account was taken of recent political reports received from the Embassy at Athens. One of the results of terrorist excesses of leftist EAM in the Greek civil war was the virtual wiping out of the Center as a political entity; fearing for their lives and property, the moderates in Greece moved to the Right. There are still Center parties in Greece, and the present Government is a Center, or slightly left-of-Center, affair, but reports from some observers indicate that the popular support of the Center is negligible.

"It has been estimated that the most of [*sic*] the Left might hope to win in a fair election is one-third of the 354 seats in the Greek Constituent Assembly. It thus seems fair to assume that if the Left and the 'Center' politicians should combine in efforts to postpone the elections, the majority of the people of Greece would still prefer to see the elections take place as scheduled . . ." (868.00/3-1246)

⁵² Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador (Halifax) in a letter of March 12, 1946. The message was sent to Mr. Byrnes at the request of Mr. Bevin, with an expression of regret that he had been obliged to dispatch it to the Greek Prime Minister without prior consultation with Mr. Byrnes.

in these circumstances can only imply a belief by the Parties concerned that they do not enjoy popular support, and I do not think that such an abstention can be any reason for refusing to the people of Greece a chance of electing their Government in accordance with their own free will. Until elections have been held there can be no possibility of knowing what the real sentiments of the Greek people are, and it is for this reason that His Majesty's Government for their part have always advised that elections should be held as soon as possible. I am much surprised by your statement that the armed X organisations⁵³ will be reinforced by almost the whole of the police and *gendarmérie*. Such a statement is not borne out by reports which I have received, and I feel sure that you as Minister of Public Security can, with the help of Sir Charles Wickham,⁵⁴ see that no such cooperation between the organs under your control and illegal armed bands takes place. In any case I cannot see how the X organisations can compel the electors in the countryside to vote in a manner contrary to their convictions provided a reasonably secret ballot is secured. It seems to me that the right course for Greece would have been that all Parties should participate in the elections in a peaceful manner, so that the Greek people on March 31st may be assured of the opportunity of expressing its will in conditions of tranquillity and order. If Greece is to win respect of her Allies and particularly United States and public opinion here, it is essential for the Greek Government to show determination to deal with this matter effectively. It will establish her in the credit of her friends more than anything else.

868.00/3-846 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, March 8, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received March 8—11:20 a. m.]

317. From Grady Mission for Henderson from Grady. Three Chiefs of Mission paid courtesy call on Regent March 7. Although speculation had appeared in press that hour long visit of Sophoulis to Regent on March 6 was for purpose of discussing an election postponement and that Regent might be convinced that some delay was necessary we found Regent firmly determined that elections shall take place as scheduled.

A campaign was started by Leftists on our arrival to shake our purpose to proceed alleging dire consequences if elections were held

⁵³ Royalist terrorist groups in Greece; known also as Xites.

⁵⁴ Sir Charles Wickham, Head of the British Police and Prisons Mission in Greece.

on date planned. Sophoulis has stood firm on date but has regularly given as a reason his promise to the Allies. Perhaps 75% of present Govt wants postponement but several Ministers have or will be dropped because of public statements favoring delay. Regent and we both believe Leftist campaign for delay is ordered from abroad in order to sabotage the elections, gain time to build up Leftist strength and when ready seize power. Center party as represented by present Govt wishes postponement to gain time not to do the things they have failed to accomplish during the past 3 months and which they could not in any case accomplish with a month or 6 weeks' extension but to salvage something for their party and themselves by political trading with EAM. Communists are today showing evidence of desire to trade and are proposing 50-50 coalition with the Center if the elections are postponed for 2 months. I anticipate further proposals as they become convinced they cannot force a postponement. I feel certain that elections will be held as scheduled and I think there is a chance that in the end the Communists will vote. We are standing pat and have refused to be drawn into political discussions or postponement agitation. Mission has made no public statements involving policy since press conference February 27. Factual bulletins regarding mission's organization and personnel are being released to local newspapers every few days. [Grady.]

RANKIN

868.014/3-946

The Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State

No. 958

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1946.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In the course of a conversation recently held between the Greek Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Athens, the latter brought up the subject of the possibilities of increased trade relations between the U.S.S.R. and Greece and indicated that his country could supply large quantities of goods to Greece.

After making it clear that the following represented his personal opinion only and that he was not authorized to speak for his Government, Admiral Rodionov further stated that the transport of Russian exports to Greece would be greatly facilitated if the Greek Government agreed to cede to Russia a port in a small island of the Dodecanese as a base of repairs for the Soviet merchant ships.

Mr. Sophoulis replied that the Greek Government would only be too happy to see the resumption and expansion of Greek-Russian commercial relations and assured the Soviet Ambassador that the Greek

ports afforded ample facilities for the handling of merchandise, as well as for repairs of ships, and that all such facilities would also be offered to Soviet shipping. Consequently he did not see any need for ceding to the U.S.S.R. any particular port.

When Admiral Rodionov remarked that, in his opinion, the cession of a Greek port to Russia would somehow facilitate the shipment of Russian goods to Greece, the Prime Minister pointed out that he saw no possibility of effecting such cession, and declared that despite the Greek Government's earnest desire to see commercial exchanges between the two countries resumed and expanded, in the event the U.S.S.R. insisted upon such a demand, it would be utterly impossible to satisfy it and Greece would regretfully be forced to forego Russian imports.

Following this statement by Mr. Sophoulis the Soviet Ambassador dropped his proposal after reassuring the Prime Minister once again that it represented but his own personal opinion and carried no endorsement from his government.

Although in subsequent meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Ambassador made no further hint about his proposal, the Greek Government takes a very serious view of the matter. Considered in the light of the whole Russian attitude on the Dodecanesian problem, the sounding made by Admiral Rodionov leaves no doubt as to the U.S.S.R. intention of seeking a base in the Dodecanese islands.

The Greek Ambassador has been directed to draw the attention of the Department of State to the gravity of the above Russian *démarche* and to inform it that the Greek Government is placing all its hope and confidence for the preservation of its rights to the Dodecanese Islands in the unfailing support of the United States, Great Britain and France.

868.00/3-1146 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, March 11, 1946—9 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

[Received March 12—11 a. m.]

333. Deptel 252, March 2. Grady and I agree that direct representations to Greek Government at this time might merely reinforce contention of Left that Government is being forced by Allies to hold elections prematurely before security and other conditions propitious.

We believe it would be helpful if Secretary were to emphasize in response to query at press conference extensive organizational preparations for observing elections on March 31 and difficulty as well as expense of maintaining mission organization in existence should elec-

tions be postponed (Deptel 2157, March 10, to London ⁵⁵). Press query might ask whether observer mission would be withdrawn if elections postponed as urged by Leftist parties.

As deadline for registration of candidacies nears, the statement should be made immediately in hope that dissidents will participate if satisfied that tactics for delay unavailing.

Secretary might continue his remarks by saying that as prospects for economic recovery of Greece rest upon establishment of elected government it is our hope that Greek people will avail themselves of presence of Allied observers to exercise right to ballot without fear in same courageous manner they defended their homeland against invaders.

For Department's information, Secretary's statement is desired for local effect both in discouraging postponement and in influencing as large participation as possible in elections.⁵⁶

In my opinion, state of public order is such that under Allied observation elections can be held on March 31 with reasonable expectation of fairness and I believe further postponement unlikely produce any improvement while deliberate violence by organized subversive groups always possible irrespective of election date.

RANKIN

868.00/3-1946 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1946.

333. For Grady Mission. I made the following statement at my press conference this morning:

"As friends of the Greek people, we are interested in seeing them elect a representative Government. We believe that only when the Greek people have freely expressed their will at the polls, and the Government of their choice has taken office, can the work of reconstruction, which is so vital to the welfare of Greece, go forward satisfactorily. Accordingly, this Government would like to see fair and free elections held in Greece at the earliest practicable date. The timing of the elections is, of course, a matter for the Greek Government alone to decide.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ In telegram 316, March 14, 1946, 8 p. m. (868.00/3-1446), the Department informed Athens of its doubt concerning the wisdom of issuing a statement along the lines suggested in telegram 333, so close to Mr. Bevin's letter of March 7 to the Greek Prime Minister, p. 117. In telegram 337, March 19, 1946, 6 p. m. (868.00/3-1646), Athens was notified that the Department was preparing a statement on the elections for release to the press. The Embassy was directed not to approach the Greek Government with the statement authorized in Department's telegram 252, March 2, p. 117, unless specifically instructed. For statement made by Mr. Byrnes, see telegram 333 to Athens, *infra*.

The American Mission to observe the Greek Elections has completed its preparations, and, together with its British and French counterparts, will be at posts throughout Greece ready to discharge its observation function on March 31, the date which the Greek Government has set for the elections. This Government has absolutely no partisan interest in Greek affairs. It sincerely desires that the Greek elections be carried out by the free suffrage of the entire electorate."

BYRNES

868.00/3-1946 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 19, 1946.

[Received March 19—3 : 30 p. m.]

867. Summary follows of unsigned major article on forthcoming Greek elections published *Red Fleet* March 19 :

General elections scheduled for March 31 have greatly aggravated internal political situation. Overwhelming majority of population is protesting against election date upon which British Govt insists so strongly. At first only Leftist parties insisted upon postponement but this movement now includes remaining parties except for reactionary Rightists. Ten Ministers resigned out of unwillingness to bear responsibility for elections. Greek Govt thereupon decided to request British Govt to agree to postponement. But this did not succeed for British Ambassador in Athens remained adamant. Then Sophoulis asked Bevin for "advice" in letter to which Bevin replied by insisting categorically upon scheduled date. At end of his letter Bevin advised Sophoulis to turn for support to Chief of British Police in Athens. This "advice" is superfluous for it is presence of British troops and police in Greece that encourages activity of Monarchist-Fascist groups as British papers *Manchester Guardian* and *Times* point out. British Govt motivates its decisions by assertion that 1,200 foreign observers cannot remain indefinitely in Greece and that it is in interests of Greeks themselves to hold elections as soon as possible as British troops will be removed thereafter. Such arguments will hardly convince anyone.

On March 15 democratic parties and organizations in Greece requested Govts of Britain, USA, USSR and France to avert election parody and facilitate restoration of democracy in Greece. This message emphasized that recently intensified terrorism is obstructing all activity of democrats in provinces and paralyzing it to considerable degree in towns. Foreign observers cannot prevent mass falsification of lists which has reached such proportions that Greek authorities have already received 45,000 written protests on this score. All re-

ports from Greece refer to fact that Monarchist-Fascist terror has sharply increased. Political terror is aggravated by severe economic situation.

It is plain to all honest and impartial observers that elections now being prepared are an attempt to provoke Monarchist-Fascist *coup d'état* under mask of "legality" and thereby deceive world public opinion. As *Eleutheria* stated, Greek people will hardly accept authority imposed upon it without resistance.

Sent Dept 867, repeated Athens 17, London 149, and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

868.00/3-2046 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, March 20, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received March 20—3 : 20 p. m.]

370. From Grady Mission for Henderson from Grady. I have assumed that operationally it would be unfeasible to maintain our mission in Greece indefinitely, not only because of expense involved but because of time limitation on War Dept's commitments. For example, more than 100 officers and men of our military personnel are scheduled for demobilization in April and many of our civilians are otherwise committed.

Suggestion in Embtel 333, March 11, repeated in Embtel 355, March 16,⁵⁷ was based upon my conviction that our Mission's work here has tended to bolster confidence in fairness of elections; that they should be held as scheduled and that even if disposed to let the Greeks play politics it would be impracticable to hold our organization here if elections were postponed. Believing that so to inform the Greek Govt directly in advance might be interpreted as undue pressure, my suggestion for press statement by the Secretary was designed indirectly to strengthen the Prime Minister's hand in adhering to his announced intention of holding elections on March 31st and also to influence participation by those who perhaps counting on our support are trying to obtain postponement by threatening to abstain if elections are held as scheduled.

The Secretary's statements of March 19⁵⁸ as reported in radio bulletin can scarcely be expected to serve either of these purposes. On contrary, statement has been interpreted by Greek newspapers as indicating that American Govt is not unsympathetic to postponement.

In the circumstances, it would seem prudent now to decide what

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ See telegram 333 to Athens, p. 121.

we shall do in event we are faced with postponement. General Malony and I are in agreement that it does not seem feasible to maintain our organization here for any prolonged period.

Moreover our observation leads us to believe that what Greek Govt has been unable to accomplish in past 4 months is unlikely to be accomplished within any period of delay that we could accept from an operational standpoint. If Dept contemplates trying to maintain the mission in Greece beyond about April 10th, which is target date for departure if elections come off as planned March 31st, War Dept's concurrence would of course be necessary and appropriate alterations made in plans, schedules, supplies, personnel, etc. I should be grateful if Dept would instruct me in the premises.

Deptel 337, March 19⁵⁹ just received. [Grady.]

RANKIN

868.00/3-2046

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Reference is invited to the letter which His Majesty's Ambassador wrote to Mr. Byrnes on March 12th,⁵⁹ on instructions from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, enclosing a copy of the reply which Mr. Bevin had written to the Greek Prime Minister's message on the subject of the forthcoming Greek elections. As the Department of State will recall, the hope was expressed in the Ambassador's letter that Mr. Byrnes might feel able to send a similar message to the Greek Prime Minister.

In this connection Mr. Bevin had in mind the following considerations. Elections in which the Left-wing do not participate would certainly not be satisfactory, and if as a result a Right-wing Government should come to power, political and economic problems in Greece would be far from being solved. On the other hand, the disadvantages of holding elections under such circumstances would, in Mr. Bevin's view, be far outweighed by the consequences which would almost certainly follow on a postponement. From the political point of view, a postponement would result in a deterioration in the state of law and order and it might even lead to civil war if the Right attempted to take action. It can safely be assumed that a delay of two months would increase rather than diminish the tension between the extreme Right and the extreme Left which is the cause of the present state of insecurity.

⁵⁹ Not printed, but see footnote 56, p. 121.

⁶⁰ Not printed; but see footnote 52, p. 117.

On the financial and economic side, a postponement would almost certainly lead to disaster. The Greek Government have done very little to put their house in order since the agreement of last January,⁶¹ and no marked progress can be expected until there is an elected Government. Even if elections are held on March 31st, there is bound to be a delay of several weeks before a new government has been formed and is in a position to take strong action. It will be difficult enough to get through this period without a further inflation, and, in Mr. Bevin's view, the situation could certainly not be held for a further two months. A new financial collapse would produce far worse conditions for holding elections in two months' time than those which exist now. There are some indications that some of the Left-wing parties other than the Communists may be reconsidering their decision not to take part in the elections. Thus a declaration by the United States Government in favour of elections on March 31st might well tilt the scale and once there was a break, the whole of the Opposition Front might cave in with the result that the Communists would be the only party who would in fact abstain.

Mr. Bevin is most grateful for the Department of State's courtesy in imparting to His Majesty's Embassy the substance of the statement which Mr. Byrnes proposed to make and which was released yesterday, March 19th. Mr. Bevin hopes, however, that in view of the importance, from the economic as well as the political point of view, of holding elections in Greece at the earliest practicable date, the United States Government will see their way clear to supplement the statement of March 19th by instructing the United States Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to approach the Greek Government and urge them to adhere to the date of March 31st which they have already fixed for the elections. His Majesty's Embassy understand that instructions in this sense were in fact sent to the United States Chargé d'Affaires at Athens on March 2nd, but were not put into operation and that the United States Chargé d'Affaires is at present holding them in abeyance pending receipt of further instructions. Mr. Bevin very much hopes that Mr. Byrnes will agree with him on the disadvantages of a further postponement and will feel able to authorise the United States Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to carry out these instructions of March 2nd in order to strengthen the Greek Government in their intentions of holding elections on March 31st.⁶²

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1946.

⁶¹ The agreement of January 24; see telegram 793, January 22, from London, p. 100, and footnote 27, p. 102.

⁶² An announcement on the elections in Greece was issued by the British Foreign Office on the night of March 20. The text of the announcement as printed in the *London Times* the following day was transmitted to the Department in despatch 28917, March 21, 1946, from London.

S68.00/3-2046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

352. If you and Ambassador Grady perceive no objection, it is suggested that you convey to PriMin my statement to the press of Mar 19. In doing so you may point out orally that although this Govt takes view that timing of Greek elections is a matter for decision by Greek Govt alone, it nevertheless hopes that Greek Govt will not find it necessary again to postpone the elections and that they will be held on Mar 31 as planned (Embs 370 Mar 20).

You may inform PriMin that this Govt is of opinion that any postponement would have a deteriorating influence upon the Greek economy, which as Greek Govt knows is already in an alarming state, and would seriously retard the vital work of rehabilitation in Greece, in which this Govt is deeply interested. You may add that this Govt believes that it is extremely important to the future of Greece and to the welfare of Greek people as a whole that in so far as is possible the entire Greek electorate participate in the elections. It would be unfortunate if upon the first occasion after 10 years that the citizens of Greece are given an opportunity freely to choose their own Govt at the polls, the outcome of the elections should be prejudiced by abstention from voting by parties or groups.

You may say that in our view it is inevitable that after the democratic system has been so long set aside the first elections should be fraught with difficulties. However, Allied observation missions are on hand ready to fulfill function which Greek Govt has invited them to perform and the full public reports which they will render after elections will resolve in one way or the other doubts now being so freely expressed.

Greek people by patriotically going to the polls on Mar 31 and casting their votes for the parties of their choice will justify faith of American people in imperishability of Greek democratic tradition.

Report action taken.

Foregoing supersedes Depts 252 Mar 2.

Sent Athens. Repeated London and Paris.

BYRNES

S68.00/3-2046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1946—6 p. m.

365. Embtel 370 Mar 20. Personal and strictly confidential for Ambassador Grady only. Dept hopes statements authorized in Dep-

tel 352 Mar 21 will strengthen PriMin in efforts to have elections held Mar 31 and to influence wide participation Greek electorate. However, if elections should be postponed Dept intends take to highest authority question of maintaining American Mission in Greece until June 1 at latest, if Brit and French Govts agree. This intention not being discussed at present outside Dept and is conveyed to you for your personal and strictly confidential information only. Knowledge of this intention might strengthen position of those elements desiring postponement.

BYRNES

868.00/3-2346 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, March 23, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received March 24—6:15 a. m.]

383. From Grady Mission for Henderson from Grady. It is now generally conceded that agitation for postponement of election has failed and election will undoubtedly be held March 31st. Plan of observation respecting conditions of registration and state of public order preceding election will be completed by March 28. On polling day mission will deploy 240 teams to cover maximum number of polling places. Some will remain at fixed stations and others will visit a number of polling booths during the day. In order to get a full picture of conditions on polling day teams will visit polling places for 3 days after election to question officials respecting conduct of polling. Final reports from observers will reach central office in Athens by evening of April 4. Final report of the mission will be signed on April 10th. A summary of report will be telegraphed to London, Washington and Paris on night of April 10th where it should be released to press by three respective Govts on April 11th, at same time text is delivered to Greek Govt and released to press in Athens provided no objection is taken by the three Govts. This summary is expected to be approximately 1,500 words in length suitable for publication in its entirety by newspapers. The final official report much of which is already prepared will contain a full account of the history, organization and operation the mission together with its observations and a statement of its considered opinion of the freedom, fairness and validity of the elections. The text will be accompanied by a voluminous appendix of relevant documents.

As any statement issued by mission following March 31st would be regarded by world press as final judgment of mission on fairness of elections it is of vital importance that our first pronouncement contain no views which will have to be retracted. It is realized that a lag of some days following elections would give chance for considerable

press conjecture if it were not known in advance that missions' report would not be forthcoming for 10 days. Consequently a press release is planned for April 1st indicating that mission will not express its views until all reports have been analyzed and that report will be signed by three Mission Chiefs on night of April 10th. Text of this press release will be telegraphed to London, Washington and Paris for release on April 1 at same time as Athens press is informed. Dept's views are urgently requested.⁶³

Similar message being sent by other Chiefs of Mission to their Govts.

Sent Washington as 383; repeated Paris as 17; London as 2. [Grady.]

RANKIN

868.00/4-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 2, 1946.

[Received April 2—12: 50 p. m.]

1017. Soviet press April 2 prominently displays Tass despatches headed "‘Elections’ in Greece" according to which "elections" took place under conditions of excessive terror with entire police and national guard mobilized to ensure order. "Elections" were extensively boycotted. Over 30 percent of Athenian voters refrained from voting. In certain localities no more than 10 to 15 percent of voters participated. Boycotters run risk not only loss of livelihood but in certain cases of life at hands of Monarchists. Arrests occurred and police broke up mass demonstration of EAM adherents by opening fire on crowd resulting in one dead, several wounded and hundreds injured. It is not surprising that under these "elections" Monarchists will secure majority in Parliament.

Sent Department 1017, repeated Athens 18, London 176 and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

868.00/4-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, April 2, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received April 3—7: 25 p. m.]

446. As election returns come in, intensive political activity has been centering around questions of (a) formation new govt (b) future of regency (c) date of plebiscite.

⁶³ In telegram 380, March 26, 1946, 7 p. m., the Department informed Ambassador Grady of its full agreement with this plan of action (868.00/3-2346). The press release was transmitted to the Department in telegram 419, March 29, 1946, and released on March 31; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 7, 1946, p. 582.

(a) Regent April 1 accepted Sophoulis resignation with request he remain office till new govt formed and April 2 entrusted this mandate to Executive Committee Populist Party. Latter apparently reluctant assume sole governmental responsibility in difficult days ahead and desiring present picture of liberalism has approached centrist, and non-political leaders with regard assumption premiership. Voulgaris, Papandreou and Sophoulis have refused collaborate, latter preferring lead opposition and press for new elections while Canalopoulos and Venizelos are hesitant. King reported urging selection Gonatas. There is strong possibility premiership will finally be entrusted to non-political personality most likely Panayotis Poulitsas, President Council of State, pending election Populist leader at forthcoming party congress or convening of assembly. British Embassy is distressed at lack of talent among available candidates for premiership and would prefer coalition govt under Papandreou whom they consider best man in sight. British faced with new situation where they are no longer undisputed arbiters Greek situation apparently propose seek more positive US support their policies. This connection British Minister Counselor Lascelles said he would appreciate my endorsement idea of coalition govt if asked for advice by politicians.

[b?] Regent has announced intention resign in accordance previous declarations but Lascelles feels certain he can be persuaded remain if Allies so request. Says Bevin strongly favors retention Damaskinos (contrary previous position) and that British FonOff is asking King's assent this connection. Some divergence views within Populist Party on question Damaskinos. Mavromichalis at least is known to favor his retaining post but others insist Greek people "detest" Regent and he must go. ReDeptel 404, March 29.⁶⁴ Apparently neither British Embassy nor FonOff has seriously faced problems Damaskinos successor but both according Lascelles would oppose Papagos. Lascelles hopes Embassy will use influence induce Regent withdraw resignation and thinks statement by Secretary this connection would be helpful. (c) Despite Republican majority elections, (national bloc being considered as Republican and uncertain factor political abstention included) Populist leaders are convinced time is "now or never" for plebiscite which they accordingly desire almost immediately June being mentioned. They believe apparently that many inclined towards republic would nevertheless refuse vote on same side as Communists and realize moreover that inevitable "mistakes" Rightist govt will weaken Royalist cause as time goes by. Lascelles feels some definite date should be fixed for plebiscite (and asked our support this point) but is undecided as to exact timing and uncertain British FonOff views; while I feel immediate raising issue with attendant political agitation should be avoided (my despatch 2448 March 28).⁶⁴ It is

⁶⁴ Not printed.

possible this end might, in fact, best be served as Lascelles suggests by fixing definite date plebiscite. Fall of 1946 after harvest completed with attendant improvement economic situation or spring 1947 would seem reasonable compromises between Populist demand and position previously adopted. Damaskinos and British FonOff calling for postponement till 1948.

Dept's views and instructions urgently requested re points raised final parts above three paragraphs.

RANKIN

868.00/4-346 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, April 3, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 2:08 p. m.]

449. Embtel 433, April 8 [1]⁶⁵ last paragraph. Sir Charles Wickham head British Police Mission informs me that investigation established Communist character of a band which perpetrated outrage at Katerini. Some of band arrested and on questioning said they understood similar attacks taking place throughout country. Wickham interprets this to mean Communists were prepared start widespread trouble which he says also evidenced by recent movements of arms from point to point. One man apprehended with 17 tommyguns.

Above agrees in essentials with other reports that Communist organization have been on alert since January either to combat Rightist Putsch or start trouble on own account when so ordered. Band which attacked Katerini may have misinterpreted or failed to receive instructions issued to such groups in general.

RANKIN

868.00/4-546 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, April 5, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 6:30 p. m.]

455. Mytel 454, Apr 5.⁶⁶ New Cabinet will remain office only until election Populist leader at party congress 2 weeks hence.

In private conversation last night Brit Amb Norton⁶⁷ confirmed various points made by Lascelles (mytel 446 April 2). Populist leaders told him April 2 question of Damaskinos resignation (which

⁶⁵ Not printed; it reported that the only serious clash during the elections took place when a *gendarmerie* patrol near Katerini was attacked by an armed band of 100, and 10 gendarmes were killed (868.00/4-146).

⁶⁶ Not printed; it stated that the Poulitsas Cabinet had been sworn in the preceding day (868.00/4-546).

⁶⁷ Sir Clifford V. Norton became British Ambassador to Greece in March of 1946.

now in King's hands) is for King to decide. Norton understands King is being pressed by Bevin to retain Damaskinos but is proving "sticky". Participation National Bloc leaders was obtained by vague formula on plebiscite according which matter will be "considered" after Assembly convenes. Tsaldaris told Norton Populists would yield on question immediate plebiscite if Bevin so requested on grounds "international situation" and Bevin has informed Norton his willingness make such request.

RANKIN

868.00/4-546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

438. Brit Emb has informally made available to Dept copy of Bevin's message April 1 to Norton instructing him approach Greek political leaders and state Bevin's opinion that Govt which will be set up as result elections should be broad coalition and that it is in best interests Greece that Regent carry on, by agreement of King and of parties represented in new Govt. Norton was instructed inform Regent of Bevin's views and assure him that Bevin is ready make public statement his desire see Damaskinos retain his position once King, new Govt and Regent himself have given assurances this acceptable. Brit Emb advises that when Brit Govt advised King against early plebiscite, King adopted intransigent attitude, stating he must await information from his Ministers. King declared he was informed from Greece that none of the Greek political leaders wished Damaskinos to continue as Regent, and that he was determined to observe strict letter of constitution, which provides that in absence of King, his functions must be exercised by Crown Prince or by Govt of the day.

Brit Emb has stated on instructions that Bevin hopes US Govt will make similar representations to Greek political leaders re nature of future Govt and also be prepared issue public statement expressing hope that Damaskinos will not resign.

Brit Emb has been informed that we feel that before deciding our course of action in this respect we should have more information regarding elections and Greek political situation resulting therefrom. (Urtel 446, Apr 2). In particular, we should have some indication re attitude of Observation Mission Chiefs re validity of elections.

Following are Dept's comments and instructions on points raised in lettered paragraphs urtel 446 Apr 2:

a. Dept believes that in order that Greek Govt may be able to take strongest measures for solution of pressing economic problems now

facing country and forcefully be represented in international gatherings, Govt should be as representative a coalition as possible. If asked for advice by political leaders, you are authorized to state this Govt's belief that establishment of a broad coalition Govt would be in best interests of Greek people.

b. Because the precipitate return of the King would arouse passions and might retard rehabilitation, Dept believes an early plebiscite would be unfortunate and that Damaskinos should continue as Regent. If in your opinion such action would assist in inducing Regent to remain in office you are authorized to express to Damaskinos this Govt's hope that, after having so capably steered Greece through the troubled times prior to the elections, he will not leave his office at a time when Greece is greatly in need of the firm and experienced leadership which he is uniquely qualified to give.

c. Dept very interested in your reasoning re majority in elections favoring a republic. In any event, for reasons stated in *a* above, Dept believes that an early plebiscite on the King's return would be most undesirable. Dept would prefer to see plebiscite take place when economic situation has improved, and believes that it should not take place earlier than the spring of 1947. In your discretion, you may communicate this position to Brit Emb and to Greek political leaders who may ask our views on subject, adding of course that date of plebiscite is matter for decision by Greek Govt alone.

Dept would appreciate your early comment on above, as well as further estimate of type Govt likely to be set up and course of action likely to be pursued by Regent.

BYRNES

768.75/4-446 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative in
Albania (Jacobs)*

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1946—8 p. m.

60. Greek Emb under instructions has presented note dated Apr 4⁶⁸ stating Greek Govt "reliably informed that new wave terrorism raging in Northern Epirus, and Greek residents of district being arrested, deported, and otherwise persecuted." Note claims "two Greek priests and four laymen" arrested Feb 10 in Premeti and imprisoned Argyrocastro; 42 persons alleged arrested Feb 23 in Premeti, Argyrocastro, Delvino and Himarra. Note states following arrested persons face summary execution and requests Dept's intervention their behalf: Soterios Louis, Athanasios Pantos, Papachristos, Spelios Louis, Evangelos Tachos, George Liakos and Vasilios Partalis.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

Dept would appreciate your comments re this reported mistreatment Greek residents Northern Epirus and situation seven persons mentioned above.⁶⁹

Sent Tirana, repeated to Athens.

BYRNES

868.00/4-1046 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, April 10, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received April 10—2:50 p. m.]

485. Prime Minister, British Ambassador and I called on Regent in succession yesterday in effort dissuade him from making his resignation effective immediately. He insisted on interpreting King's telegram as dismissal since it accepted resignation "in principle" and only asked him remain in office until Govt "completed". Regent considers Govt already completed but I pointed out to him that it lacks sanction of Parliament. I informed him of US Govt's position as stated in paragraph b of Deptel 438, April 5, mentioning also that while most anxious not interfere Greek affairs I felt our interest in and responsibility for Greek economic reconstruction and better international relations made it duty call his attention importance US attaches to continuity of leadership only he can provide. Regent seemingly determined on resignation but on taking leave I urged that his reply to King, which he planned telegraph today, should not close the door.

Immediately afterwards I saw British Ambassador in hope he might suggest Foreign Office try induce King go step further in persuading Regent remain. Ambassador was pessimistic.

Last night I saw Sophocles Venizelos, Minister without Portfolio, and informed him of Dept's views on Regency. He fully agreed and said he was hopeful further action today in inducing Regent change mind. He said he thought Papandreu, Cannellopoulos and himself would withdraw from Govt unless Regent stayed and he suggested I talk with Minister Foreign Affairs Tsaldaris. Latter assured me he wanted Regent remain and agreed with my interpretation of King's

⁶⁹ In telegram 213, April 12, 1946, Mr. Jacobs set forth his belief that it was inadvisable to approach the Albanian authorities in specific cases of the kind raised by the Greek Government. He pointed out that the Albanian authorities had inaugurated a Sovietization process and that those under arrest might have been detained, not because they were Greeks, but because they were under suspicion of being non-conformists or oppositionists. For text of No. 213, see vol. VI, p. 17.

In telegram 80, May 15, 1946, 5 p. m., the Department informed Tirana of a further note of May 10 from the Greek Embassy and stated: "Although US intervention requested by Greek note not feasible (urtel 213 Apr 12, 1946), Dept would appreciate any available information." (768.75/5-1046)

message that latter would have made no mention of Archbishop "remaining" unless he meant just that.

Tsaldaris, however, indicated he was thinking in terms of early plebiscite and I conveyed Dept's opinion earliest desirable date as spring 1947. He seemed greatly disappointed this position and expressed belief his Govt could not keep situation in hand during such long delay in view election promises. Tsaldaris mentioned June or July but I added economic situation alone could hardly justify plebiscite until harvest completed at very earliest. I also expressed personal opinion that holding Greek plebiscite during peace conference⁷⁰ unlikely contribute to improved international relations.

RANKIN

868.00/4-1046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, April 10, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received April 10—4: 17 p. m.]

3985. FonOff official today made following comments to us on Greek political situation:

1. Regency question is obscured by uncertainty as to King of Greece's objectives. In his weekend message to Damaskinos King accepted Regent's resignation "in principle" but asked him to stay on until, as he put it ambiguously, the necessary machinery for Regency had been formulated. Damaskinos finds this unacceptable as he wishes a clear-cut acceptance of his resignation or request from King to continue in office.

The King has all along maintained that Regency in its present form is unconstitutional because in his absence from Greece it is provided by constitution that Crown Prince exercise the royal prerogatives or else they be vested in Greek Govt. Certainly there is no question of Crown Prince returning and therefore it is possible that King wishes regency to be vested in Govt.

In connection with plebiscite, King has indicated to Britain that, in his belief, plebiscite should be held in September, for it would be impossible to hold it later this year and he feels that economic rehabilitation of Greece will never make headway until this complicated question is settled. FonOff official thinks it may be possible that King is trying to get his date for plebiscite accepted in return for his requesting Archbishop in clear language to remain as Regent.⁷¹

FonOff is puzzled by desire of Rightists, including King, for an early plebiscite because on figures shown by recent elections, Repub-

⁷⁰ Held at Paris from July 29 to October 15, 1946.

⁷¹ The Regent did remain in office.

licans would win with addition of Leftist groups which did not participate in elections.

2. Statement made by Greek King to *Manchester Guardian* (see Embstel No. 3953 April 9⁷²) expresses known views of King who, if he returns to Greece, would in all likelihood endeavor to steer a moderate course but it is questionable whether he would be permitted to follow such policy.

3. It is unlikely that Poulitsas will remain as P[ri]me M[in]ister because that position will probably be filled by one of big four Populists. However, these four leaders have not been able to agree on one of their members for premiership. FonOff believes that Stephanopoulos is best of four. When new government is formed, members of present Government with exception of Poulitsas, will probably remain in office and total membership of Government largely increased.

4. The economic rehabilitation of Greece cannot but continue to be matter of concern as there are strong indications that food situation will deteriorate in mid-summer and Bank of Greece is still selling gold at rate of about 10,000 pounds sterling a day—this, however, is reduction from peak figure of 25,000 pounds sterling a day. The only hope is that industrial production will increase at substantial rate and that this, plus importations from abroad, will result in more goods being available in country, thus reducing dangers of further inflation.

Sent Dept as 3985, repeated Athens as 63.

WINANT

[The signing of the unanimous report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections took place at Athens on April 10, 1946. The following day, the Department of State released a statement by the mission which noted that the "Greek elections of March 31 were conducted under conditions that warranted holding them on the date selected. They were on the whole free and fair, and the results represent a true and valid verdict of the Greek people". The text of the statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 21, 1946, page 671.]

768.75/4-446

Memorandum by the Acting Department of State Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Matthews) to the Full Committee

SECRET

WASHINGTON, [April 11, 1946.]

The Department of State is urgently engaged in studying the Greek claims for an adjustment of the Greek Albanian frontier which in-

⁷² Not printed.

volves the area popularly known as Northern Epirus or Southern Albania. The Department is in receipt of a note from the Greek Embassy in Washington, dated April 6 [8], 1946, and referring to the Peace Treaty presently to be negotiated. This note reads in part as follows:

“The Greek Government considers further postponement of this question as highly detrimental to the interests of Greece and hopes that the assurances given by both the United States and British Governments at the time of the recognition of Hoxha’s regime⁷³ by their respective countries, to the effect that such recognition would not prejudice Greece’s territorial demands against Albania, will prompt them to see to it that the Albanian question will come up for consideration at an early date and that a settlement thereof involving the cession of Northern Epirus to Greece will be reached soon.”⁷⁴

The Greek Government is attempting to secure all of Northern Epirus (Southern Albania) on a basis of ethnic and strategic considerations. The Department of State is obviously not qualified to assess the validity of any claims which the Greeks have made relate to the latter. The Albanians, on the other hand, wish the frontier to remain as it was in 1939.

The Secretary of State is to attend a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on April 25, 1946. It is essential that he be provided with adequate information to enable him to formulate a position on the question in time to meet the deadline.

In view of the importance and the time element involved in this matter, the Department of State would greatly appreciate receiving an estimate of the strategic value to Greece and/or Albania of the disputed region as a matter of high priority.

If further information on this subject is desired in connection with this estimate, Mr. Harry Howard, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, is available for consultation and may be reached on State extension 2928.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

⁷³ The United States and British Governments had not recognized the Albanian regime but had expressed, in 1945, a readiness to establish diplomatic relations. For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁴ Quoted from Greek Embassy memorandum 1556: it informed the Department that on February 15, 1946, the then Greek Foreign Minister, Constantine Rendis, had directed a letter to the Council of Foreign Ministers at London proposing that the Council prepare a draft treaty of peace between Greece and Albania for submission to the forthcoming Peace Conference. The memorandum stated that the Council had replied on March 2 that the Deputies to the Foreign Ministers had no authority to discuss the Greek request. (768.75/4-846) The Deputies were then sitting in London to prepare draft peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary. For the decision of the Deputies not to discuss the Greek proposal, see telegram 2609, March 5, from London, vol. II, p. 21.

868.00/4-1546 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, April 15, 1946.

[Received April 16—9:16 p. m.]

512. Formal note Greek Government refers to Amfoge recommendation that Greek registration lists be completely recompiled before opinion Greek people again sought on matters of national import. Note says Greek Government proposes examine this question soonest and requests US Government permit one member of its observer mission to stay on in Greece "so as to be able to certify before world opinion the complete objectivity with which the necessary measures will be taken".

Identical notes were addressed to British and French Embassies.

Note was received this Embassy after departure American members of mission.⁷⁵

RANKIN

868.00/5-346

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁷⁶PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO HIS MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR AT ATHENS DATED APRIL 15, 1946

I have been considering the next step in our policy towards Greece and particularly our attitude towards the question of the plebiscite. If I were asked for my advice on the method and timing of settling the constitutional issue, giving full regard to all relevant facts including the recent elections, I still would have nothing to add to the advice I gave in November of last year i.e. that the plebiscite should be postponed until March 1948.

Nevertheless I do fully appreciate the position and the wishes of the recently elected government for, as I have repeatedly made plain, I am anxious that the Greek Government should increasingly, and as quickly as possible accept full responsibility for the government of their country and I have therefore given further study to the emerging position. There are arguments in favour of an early settlement of

⁷⁵ In telegram 514, April 19, 1946, 6 p. m., to Athens, the Department noted Ambassador Grady's view that a new census would be needed before the registration lists might properly be revised. It stated that an observer could not remain in Greece until completion of the census but that the United States Government would give every consideration to a new Greek request after the census had been taken. (868.00/4-1546)

⁷⁶ Received in the Department on May 3.

this contentious issue. So long as this question remains unsettled Greek political life, it may be argued, cannot be expected to settle down nor is the Greek Government likely to give its full attention to economic and financial reconstruction. Moreover it is becoming increasingly clear that we shall have the greatest difficulty with the King and the constitutionally elected government if we seek a postponement until next year. Nevertheless I am impressed by the passage in the report of the International Observers Mission recommending that all registration lists in Greece should be completely recompiled before the opinion of the Greek people is again sought on a matter of national import, so as to remove all possible justification for charges of fraud based on inaccurate registers in the future.

If the plebiscite were to be held with our acquiescence before the electoral rolls have been revised both we and the Greek Government would lay ourselves open to strong and justifiable criticism not only from the left-wing in Greece, the Soviet Government and their communist friends in all other countries but also from otherwise friendly quarters.

In these circumstances I am considering the desirability of an approach to the Greek Government on the following lines: we understand their anxiety to settle the constitutional question once and for all but for the reasons referred to above an immediate plebiscite held without any adequate revision of the electoral rolls would not only damage the interests of Greece but make it necessary for His Majesty's Government to reconsider their attitude towards the regime. We should therefore suggest that if they consider they must set aside our advice previously given the Greek Government should make immediate arrangements for the revision of the electoral rolls; and that they should invite the powers whose representatives participated in the International Observers Mission to supervise and check the arrangements made by the Greek Government for the revision of the electoral rolls.

I propose to discuss my suggestion with Mr. Windle on his return, but shall be glad of your views meanwhile. If the Greek Government agreed to proceed on these lines and subject to what is said below concerning economic reconstruction His Majesty's Government would consider the holding of the plebiscite at any time after the revision of the electoral rolls was complete.

In this case there would of course be a danger that during the period of I suppose about six months before holding the plebiscite, the Greek Government might neglect reconstruction measures. In return therefore for the help in revision offered, His Majesty's Government would have to require the Greek Government to bind themselves fully to implement the economic and financial plan agreed last January.

I shall be glad of your very early comments. On their receipt I propose to discuss the matter with the United States Government.

868.00/4-1346 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1946—7 p. m.

494. Embtel 500 Apr 13.⁷⁷ The following exchange of questions and answers took place at my press conference today:

“Q. I understand that Ambassador Grady has returned to this country. Would you care to give us any information he may have brought you beyond that contained in the summary of his report to the President?”

A. Ambassador Grady's comments to the Dept are that after having been deprived of the privilege of voting for ten years the Greek people in general displayed a very keen desire to participate in the election and he states that on the whole, conditions of order and calm prevailed on election day.

Q. Did the Ambassador bring any additional information on the question of when the plebiscite on the return of the King is to be held?

A. No, the report of the Allied Mission recommends that before the opinion of the Greek people is again sought on matters of national import a new census should be taken and a complete revision of the registration lists made. I said in my last press conference, in response to a question, that I considered the question of the timing of the plebiscite one for decision by the Greek Government. I have nothing to add to it. I think that it is a problem which is so serious it should be approached without any undue haste and only when steps have been taken to make some progress in the restoration of Greek economy. Of course that is a matter which the government of Greece must determine.”

BYRNES

868.014/4-1846

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, April 18, 1946.

No. 2531

[Received April 29.]

SIR: I have the honor to invite the attention of the Department to a report No. 68-46 of March 26, 1946, submitted to the War Department by the Military Attaché to this Embassy, which incorporates the text of a lengthy memorandum on Greece's northern frontiers prepared by the Greek General Staff. The memorandum itself is too voluminous to copy for transmission to the Department without

⁷⁷ Not printed.

considerable delay, and will be available in the files of the War Department in any event. However, a transcript of comments⁷⁸ by the Assistant Military Attaché, Captain William H. McNeill, and a map⁷⁹ showing the various proposals for boundary changes, are enclosed herewith. Reference is made to the Embassy's confidential despatch No. 1487 of September 4, 1945,⁷⁸ on the same general subject.

The memorandum of the General Staff may form the basis of Greek claims at the coming Peace Conference. It contains little if anything that is new, the memorandum being chiefly remarkable for the total extent of the territorial claims put forth. The northernmost blue line on the map represents the maximum sought by the General Staff, with various alternative lines in green or yellow, while the present frontiers are shown in brick red.

Supplementing the Military Attaché's comments it may be stated that, however adjusted, Greece's northern frontier would remain indefensible against a powerful aggressor by any forces which this country or its probable allies could muster in time. The Greco-Italian campaign was no exception when considered, as it should be in a military sense, simply as a part of a much larger conflict. Greece was overrun in a matter of three weeks when the Axis chose to shift sufficient forces to this area. The northern frontier is of strategic importance only against a weak adversary, and it may be hoped that at the very least the UNO will be able to prevent such a conflict. A further practical consideration is that the maintenance of a modern army of 50,000 men is already well beyond Greek financial resources and that several times that number, all well equipped, would be required to make even a pretense of defending the northern frontier as a whole.

A further point that cannot be too strongly emphasized is that frontier adjustments at the expense of Bulgaria or Yugoslavia are not at present within the realm of practical politics. Only a profound change in Russia's attitude, which seems improbable by the time the Balkan frontiers come up for discussion at the Peace Conference, would permit consideration to be given to Greece's claims, and to obtain any serious hearing such claims would have to be much more modest than those of the Greek General Staff. A very small shift in the Yugoslav frontier, however, would give both countries some of the defensive advantages of the Vardar Pass (see magenta line on map) while no minor change in the Bulgarian border would be of particular benefit except possibly in the southwestern corner of that country. An adjustment at this point presumably would be feasible only if Greece were obtaining substantial territory from Yugoslavia as well.

⁷⁸ Not printed.

⁷⁹ Not reproduced.

The frontier at the southeastern corner of Bulgaria is admittedly artificial but does not readily lend itself to improvement in favor of Greece.

The Greco-Albanian border belongs in a somewhat different category from those just mentioned. There is little need to repeat here historic, ethnic, geographic and moral considerations, already familiar to the Department, which argue in favor of a revision of this frontier in Greece's favor. However, there appears to be a very real danger of underestimating political consequences of a negative attitude toward this not unreasonable Greek claim. Sentiment in Greece for the acquisition of "Northern Epirus", however that area may be defined, is exceedingly strong and all but universal. Moreover, the Greeks believe that they have shown exemplary forbearance and confidently expect that justice will be rendered to their cause at the Peace Conference. Should, therefore, a negative verdict be returned on that occasion, or the question shelved on grounds of expediency, one consequence would certainly be a very profound revulsion of feeling in Greece against the Western Powers, coupled with a decided strengthening of the Greek Left and of the prestige of the Soviet Union posing as the champion of alternative Greek claims in Eastern Thrace. Nor would the issue of Northern Epirus be dropped, for no Greek Government in prospect could afford to do so. Admittedly, the issue is inconvenient and embarrassing from the viewpoint of the Western Allies for the same reasons as in the case of the Bulgar and Yugoslav frontiers, and for the additional reason that they are committed to the maintenance of a sovereign Albanian State, which would certainly not be feasible if that already diminutive country were even further reduced in size. Nevertheless, the issue must be faced.

Geographically the Albanian frontier is as logical as any other in the same general region, but there is still an appreciable Greek minority on the Albanian side (despite Albanian efforts to reduce, disperse or absorb Greek elements) and there is also the very real question whether Albania can exist as a truly sovereign state in view of its small size, lack of resources and general backwardness. Certainly there would seem to be strong arguments in favor of leaving no minorities at the mercy of a primitive majority in a country such as Albania. Except for the possibility of giving the town of Korce (Kercha or Koritza) and immediate vicinity to Greece (see magenta line on map), there is no natural frontier to the west and north of the present border short of one which would turn over to Greece something like half of Albania. The yellow line running from Lin on Lake Ohrid (Ochrida) in a southwesterly direction to the coast south of Valona, which is an alternative suggested by the Greek General

Staff, would cross most of the rivers and valleys at right angles, leaving the upper reaches to Greece and producing a highly artificial situation.

The United States is pledged to support Albanian independence, but the country may nevertheless cease to exist as a sovereign power as a result of Communist techniques. In a purely practical sense this may be just as well. Albania has as strong a moral case for independence as Macedonia, and one perhaps almost as good as that of Montenegro, but the fact remains that there is no prospect of this little country's being able to stand on its own feet. If, therefore, as a result of the initiative of Russia or Yugoslavia, Albania should "ask" to become a "federated" state of a Slav "union", the United States Government might well insist upon the reconsideration of the whole Albanian question. A partition of the country would transform the present Moslem majority, which occupies the central portion, into a minority within some larger national state. This would have undesirable aspects, but the existence of a few hundred thousand people of one race and religion in a given area is not in itself sufficient practical justification for setting up a sovereign state. Albania was brought into existence in 1912 not out of consideration for its people but primarily to prevent Serbia from obtaining an outlet to the Adriatic. Neither Greece nor Yugoslavia has sound ethnic claims on the central part of the country, but in the event of its partition there is certainly no more reason for giving Moslem-inhabited areas to Yugoslavia than to Greece.

The Greek General Staff's maximum claims against Albania extend to the Skumbin River plus a corner to the north of that river near the present Albanian-Yugoslav frontier (see blue line on map). This corner would not come into consideration unless Yugoslavia were also making very substantial concessions of territory to Greece. Curiously enough, the General Staff appears to have overlooked the fact that the natural frontier between northern and southern Albania lies a few miles *north* of the Skumbin River. The latter is a comparatively small stream, and is neither an important defensive barrier nor a logical economic frontier. The watershed immediately to the north (see magenta line on map), extending from Lake Ohrid in a north-westerly direction along the present Albanian-Yugoslav frontier to elevation 2257 meters, and thence in a general westerly direction to Cape Laghi (Kep i Lagit) would appear to furnish the most logical basis for Albania's partition and would not necessitate changes in the present frontier between Greece and Yugoslavia.

It should be possible to find some solution to the vexing problem of the Greco-Albanian frontier which would be reasonably satisfactory

to all of the peoples and nations involved, including the Russians. Certainly the effort must be made. If no solution can be found, then American and British diplomacy should, at the very least, so conduct the case as to place responsibility for failure squarely and obviously at the door of Soviet intransigence.

Respectfully yours,

K. L. RANKIN

868.00/4-1846 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, April 18, 1946—noon.
[Received April 19—1:11 p. m.]

531. Embtel 485, April 10. In private conversation last night MinFonOff Tsaldaris repeated to me fears of extremists his party and minor Royalist groups forcing immediate plebiscite. Believe he must have definite program to present new Parliament April 29, and mentioned September 8 as possible date for plebiscite. He asked me repeatedly, "What shall I tell them?"

Tsaldaris professed surprise at action Papandreou, Cannellopoulis and Venizelos in withdrawing (Embtel 523, April 17⁸⁰) while conversations proceeding normally, adding they were to see him again this noon for further discussions. I asked if he thought other reasons influenced their action besides those announced and Tsaldaris replied he believed they wanted portfolio of Foreign Affairs. This, he said, was unacceptable, since it must be held by member majority party in view impending Peace Conference. Secretary's remarks at press conference April 16 quoted in all papers, each stressing phrases best suited its politics. However, his statement re "undue haste" in holding plebiscite appears have had sobering effect on Right.

Discussed foregoing with British Ambassador. He inclines toward view that plebiscite cannot be postponed beyond September and believes Bevin coming around to same opinion. As situation appears today I feel that date in September constitutes best compromise in sight. (Embtel 485). What Tsaldaris seems to want is indication from US and Britain that we would not object if he should announce plebiscite for September 8 or similar date as part of his program. Department's instructions requested.

Sent to Department as 531; repeated London as 32.

RANKIN

⁸⁰ Not printed; it reported that the three Greek political leaders had refused to participate in the new government (868.00/4-1846).

768.75/4-1846 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn),
at London* ⁸¹

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1946—7 p. m.

3336. For Dunn. Greek Emb has presented note ⁸² that in view of response of deputies to Greek request that CFM draft peace treaty between Greece and Albania Greek Chargé in London was instructed to deposit with Secretary General CFM on Apr 11 on behalf Greek Govt a formal petition that there be placed on agenda Paris meeting of CFM the question of Northern Epirus as a territorial dispute between Greece and Albania.⁸³ Note transmits copy of memorandum ⁸⁴ which accompanied petition, giving past history this question, and states Greek Govt hopes that US member will be instructed to support this request and that American delegation will uphold Greek point of view when subject is discussed in Paris.

Please comment, including preliminary British reaction.

BYRNES

868.00/4-1946 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1946—7 p. m.

516. Prior to returning to Athens Apr 24 for consultation Greek Amb called on Under Sec Apr 18 to take leave and to deliver message from FonMin ⁸⁵ expressing appreciation to me for my statement at press conference Apr 16 on question of plebiscite. Greek Amb stated that Greek Govt felt that no real progress could be made in economic rehabilitation of Greece until question of plebiscite settled. Under Sec informed Amb that while matter of timing of plebiscite was for Greek Govt to decide, this Govt considered solution of economic problems facing Greece much more important than solution of constitutional question at present time and would be deeply disappointed if Greek Govt undertook arrangements for plebiscite in near future.

⁸¹ Mr. Dunn served as Deputy to the Secretary of State at the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Paris from April 25 to May 15 and from June 15 to July 12, 1946.

⁸² No. 1835, April 16, 1946, from the Greek Ambassador to Mr. Henderson, not printed. In note 1981, April 22, to Mr. Henderson, the Ambassador transmitted the view of his Government that the question of Northern Epirus should be considered by the Council as a "Territorial question outstanding on the termination of the war." (740.00119 E.W./4-2246) The communication was handed to an officer of the Department on April 23.

⁸³ See telegram 4357, April 19, from London, vol. II, p. 80.

⁸⁴ Undated memorandum not printed.

⁸⁵ Dated April 17, not printed.

Under Sec informed Greek Amb that it was view of US Govt that plebiscite should not take place before spring of 1947 at earliest. Greek Amb said he would immediately cable these views to FonMin.

BYRNES

768.75/4-2246

Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 22 April, 1946.

SWN 4173

In response to a request by the Acting State Member, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, dated 11 April 1946, for an estimate of the strategic value to Greece and Albania of the Northern Epirus area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:

"a. The Northern Epirus area is mountainous. In this area are the most important passes and terrain barriers between the northern plains of Albania and the Greek frontier. The zone includes no ports or airfields of importance. It has some mineral wealth and the meager surplus food production of the area is of considerable importance to Albania, which as a whole is deficient in food production.

"b. In all probability Greece can successfully defend her present frontier against Albania attacking alone. Acquisition of Northern Epirus by Greece would strengthen her defensive capabilities but not to the extent of guaranteeing successful defense against any coalition or combination of nations including Albania.

"c. Unless preparations to re-enforce Greece have been made in advance of attack, it is improbable that acquisition of Northern Epirus would strengthen her sufficiently to prevent a breakthrough by a coalition or combination of nations before outside support could become effective.

"d. The loss of Northern Epirus by Albania would deprive that nation of her only natural defensive positions against attack from the south. The converse is not true with respect to Greece, since her present boundary gives her control of terrain (along the Albanian frontier) well suited to defense.

"e. Albania is now dependent upon import of some food from Yugoslavia. Loss of Northern Epirus, considered by Albania to be a part of her territory, coupled with loss of the food products of that area, would inevitably force even closer economic and military cooperation with Yugoslavia and possibly might result in Albania joining as a part of the Yugoslav confederation.

"f. Cession of this territory to Greece is likely to be followed by guerrilla warfare, which could endanger peace in the Balkans."

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

JOHN D. HICKERSON
Acting Chairman

711.6827/4-646: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1946—7 p. m.

536. Urtel 531, April 18, rptd London as 32. Possibility that Brit Govt may be agreeable to Sept date for plebiscite favored by Tsaldaris unknown to Dept or Brit Emb here. Brit Emb seeking clarification from London and will inform Dept if any compelling reason has developed making desirable earlier date for plebiscite than previously suggested by Brit. Dept believes Greek Govt would be well advised to concentrate all energies for present on solution economic problems and to postpone constitutional issue at least until spring 1947. Populist majority in recent election not sufficient to constitute clear mandate for immediate attempt to bring back King. Precipitate action on plebiscite, preoccupation with political manoeuvres or extreme repressive measures against abstaining Leftists on part of elected Govt would be shortsighted playing into hands of dissident propagandists who claim election was a monarcho-fascist coup. Such developments would also impugn good faith of Allies who participated in Election Mission.

Complete text Amfoge report which will be published about May 1⁸⁷ (urtel 545, April 21, rptd London as 33⁸⁸) includes in last paragraph Chapt VIII under section entitled "Registration Lists" following statement: "The Mission recommends that in order to remove all possible justification for such charges (falsification of lists) in the future a new census should be taken and a complete revision of the registration lists made before the opinion of the Greek people is again sought on matters of national import."

Sent to Athens, repeated to London.

ACHESON

⁸⁷ The report was released by the White House on May 10; for announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 19, 1946, p. 865. The text of the report was published by the Department of State as publication No. 2522 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946). The Secretary of State, in a note to the Soviet Chargé on May 27, 1946, expressed the regret of the United States that the Soviet Government had been unable to see its way clear to participate in the Mission and transmitted ten copies of the report in accordance with the United States' "announced intention of informing the Soviet Government concerning the activities of the Mission". (868.00/5-2746)

⁸⁸ Not printed.

868.00/4-2446

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs.*

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1946.

About a week ago Mr. Pares⁸⁹ inquired of an officer of the Department "for his own personal information" concerning the attitude of this Government on the continued presence of British troops in Greece. Mr. Pares called today at my request to discuss this matter. I told him that the United States Government would not be embarrassed by the retention for a time of British troops in Greece if the British Government should be of the opinion that their presence for a while longer in Greece would be conducive to the maintenance of peace in the Near East and if the Greek Government should invite the British troops to remain. If the situation in Greece should develop in such a way that the United States Government would be likely to be embarrassed by the continued stay of British troops there, the Department will informally let the British Government know its feelings in the matter.

768.75/4-2546 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, April 25, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received April 26—6:39 a. m.]

4472. FonOff today made following observations to US regarding Greek territorial claims. FonOff has all along advised Greek Govt not to present editorial [*territorial*] claims because Albanians and Bulgarians would doubtless present counter claims. Situation has now changed because Greeks have put forth their claims.

FonOff believes that Council of Foreign Ministers might appoint a sub-committee or commission to give a hearing to Greek claims. FonOff having arrived at conclusion that Greek claims in any case would not be satisfied because Bulgarians and Albanians would be supported by Soviets. A result of this would be that Greeks would be turned down and the chief blame, from Greek point of view, would be thrown on Soviet Union.

⁸⁹ Peter Pares, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

All shades of opinion in Greece from extreme Right to extreme Left support these claims. Sympathetic consideration should be given to the Greeks because of depredations made on Greek editors [*territories?*] by both Bulgarians and Albanians.

Mr. Bevin will apparently bring this up with Mr. Byrnes in Paris. Sent Dept as 4472; repeated to Paris as 303.

GALLMAN

868.50/4-2646: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, April 26, 1946—10 a. m.
[Received April 27—11:35 a. m.]

563. Letter dated April 25 from Minister Coordination Stephanopoulos approves sending three experts suggested Deptel 480, April 12⁹⁰ and expresses gratitude US action.

Request Dept telegraph names when selected and clarify points raised Embtel 539, April 21,⁹¹ second paragraph, to avoid possible misunderstanding.

RANKIN

740.00119 Council/4-2746

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. Freeman Matthews*⁹²

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] April 27, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Bevin, accompanied by Mr. Robert Dixon
The Secretary
Mr. Matthews

[Here follow introductory paragraph and paragraphs numbered 1 on food and 2 on Palestine. For introductory paragraph and paragraph on Palestine, see page 587.]

3. *Greece.* Mr Bevin said that he had urged upon the King and upon the Greek Government that holding of a plebiscite to determine the form of Greek Government should be postponed until 1948 and that he understood we had similarly urged postponement until next year. He was not so sure now, however, that this was a wise course. The plebiscite, if it is to be held earlier, must take place either this coming September or not until March, largely because of weather conditions. He feels that he must get British troops out of Greece

⁹⁰ Not printed; it expressed the Department's belief that the Greek request for the sending of American economic experts should be confirmed by the new Greek Government (868.50/3-646).

⁹¹ Not printed.

⁹² Political Adviser to the United States delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers.

this autumn, one reason being that as long as British troops are there he is sure that Russian troops will not be withdrawn from Bulgaria. He is told that if the plebiscite is held after the withdrawal of British troops it will be probably largely fraudulent, along the lines of recent Yugoslav and Bulgarian elections. In this case with a victory for the Monarchists, the Left would probably start a Civil War which might have most serious consequences. He is therefore coming to the view that it might be better to hold the plebiscite this September. Prior to that time he believes that the electoral registers should be brought up to date. He had been told that Mr. Grady and his British colleague had done an excellent job in assuring the fairness of the recent Greek elections and that the degree of abstention had been far less than anticipated. He thought that these American and British teams of observers could be utilized to bring the electoral registers up to date prior to the plebiscite. The Secretary indicated that he thought that Mr. Bevin's reasons had a certain logic and that he would give the matter consideration. Mr. Bevin said that when he had finally made up his mind, he would send the Secretary a memorandum on the subject.⁹³

[Here follows an account of the Byrnes-Bevin conversations on the Italian colonies and Egypt (paragraph 4) and on bases in the Pacific (paragraph 5). For the section on the Italian Colonies and Egypt, see footnote 6, page 72.]

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

740.00119 E.W./4-2246

Memorandum by the Acting Department of State Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Hickerson) to the Secretary of the Full Committee

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1946.

On April 22, the Department of State received a memorandum from the Greek Embassy reading in part as follows:

"It should be pointed out that the rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier demanded by Greece has a double object: (1) to

⁹³The British delegation at Paris telegraphed an account of the Byrnes-Bevin conversation on Greece, said to have taken place on April 26, to the British Foreign Office the same day. A paraphrase of the telegram was sent to the Department by the British Embassy on May 3. The British and American accounts of the conversation were broadly parallel. The British version, however, cited Mr. Byrnes as stating that the British were in a better position than the United States to assess the situation and that if the British thought that September 1946 was the right date, the United States was prepared to accept it. The British version also indicated Mr. Bevin's view that a bare majority for the King would be unfortunate, and noted his query as to whether a majority of "say 60%" should not be required for the King's return. (868.00/5-346)

strengthen Greece's territorial defense by obtaining a new stronger line or frontier than the existing one; and (2) as a logical consequence of the above, to give the Greek frontier populations that indisputable feeling of security today lacking after all they have suffered as the result of repeated Bulgarian inroads, so that in the future they may devote themselves, free from all anxiety, to their peaceful occupations."

Despite the development of new military weapons, the Greek Government—

" . . . insists absolutely that the moving of the present frontier inside Bulgarian territory and further away from the sea from which it is at present distant, at the narrowest point of the territory in question, only some 30 kilometers, will most certainly strengthen Greece's defense against the Bulgarian danger and so avert the possibility of a *fait accompli* in the future. For notwithstanding all recent discoveries in the art of war, it remains an indisputable fact that the possession of a naturally strong line contributes in no small measure to an army's effective defense of the national territory against an aggressor. It does, in fact, permit of a delaying action and makes it possible in the meanwhile, in the event of the aggressor getting the upper hand, to effect a tactical retreat of regrouping of the main forces and the preparation of new defensive positions. The experience of the late war, as of previous wars, fully bears this out."⁹⁴

In view of the fact that the Greek Government has already approached the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris in an attempt to secure their backing for the rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier as indicated above, the Department of State would very much appreciate receiving from the Joint Chiefs of Staff a study evaluating the strategic elements which are involved in the Greek request as indicated in their memorandum under reference.

In view of the fact that the problem has already been presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers, expedition on the part of the Joint Chiefs of a reply to this memorandum would be greatly appreciated.

If further information on this subject is desired in connection with this request, Mr. Harry Howard, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, is available for consultation and may be reached on State extension 2928.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

⁹⁴ Quoted from an undated memorandum transmitted on April 10 by the Greek Chargé in the United Kingdom (Mostras) to the Secretary General of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London. A copy was sent to the Department on April 23 by the Greek Embassy with note 1980, April 22.

The memorandum set forth the views of the Greek Government on the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria: see also bracketed note and Greek Embassy *pro memoria* note 1985, April 23, vol. II, pp. 50 and 84, respectively.

868.00/4-2946

*The King of the Hellenes (George II) to the Secretary of State*⁹⁵

LONDON, 29 April, 1946.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: The stabilization of the political situation in Greece is, I am sure you will agree, of wider interest from the point of view of the diplomatic situation in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, and from this respect it is very likely to occupy the attention of the Foreign Ministers of the four Allied Powers now meeting in Paris.

In my desire that you should be fully informed as regards the latest phase of the Greek internal problem and the possibilities of a speedy and satisfactory solution to it, I am sending you the enclosed *Aide-Mémoire* summarising my views on this subject.

It would be a source of much satisfaction to me if you would consider the views expressed therein with the same interest which I know you reserve to all that concerns my country, whose position in the Mediterranean renders her worthy of especial attention.

Very sincerely,

GEORGE II

[Enclosure]

The King of the Hellenes (George II) to the Secretary of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In his capacity as Head of State, the King of the Hellenes carried out all negotiations with the Allies before and during the war, supervised the military re-organisation of his country, and led it with unshaken steadfastness throughout all the phases of the struggle against the Axis.

Yet when Greece was about to be liberated, the principal Allied Governments advised the King of the Hellenes not to return to his country forthwith; and shortly afterwards, at the end of December 1944, it was insistently demanded of the King that he should appoint a Regent "for the period of emergency" and that he should remain abroad until the "free expression of the national will".

The King acceded to the pressing advice of his Allies and agreed to this course, issuing his Proclamation of the 29th December 1944.

After repeated postponements during the second half of 1945 and

⁹⁵ Transmitted on April 30 by Mr. Gallman to James Clement Dunn at Paris for forwarding to the Secretary of State. Mr. Byrnes was attending the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris.

the beginning of 1946, the Greek people were finally called upon to express their will; and in the elections of March 31st 1946 the people returned the Royalist parties by an overwhelming majority. Those parties which went to the people with a clear monarchist programme polled about twice as many votes as all the other parties added together, and among these other parties there were some that did not define their position clearly as regards the regime question. Furthermore, these elections, which were held under the supervision of Allied Observers, were "free and fair" according to the Observers' report, and the volume of abstention, estimated at 9% by the Observers, "could not have altered considerably the result of the election".

2. It is therefore not possible to dispute on any reasonable grounds that the free expression of the national will has in fact taken place in Greece and that its implications furnish the King of the Hellenes with the right and the duty to resume the exercise of his constitutional functions in Greece.

Nevertheless, in his desire to take into consideration the friendly counsel offered him, and in his concern that the question of the regime should be kept completely above party, the King has announced his decision to await the holding of a plebiscite to confirm yet again the expression of the popular will in his favour. It is, of course, understood that this plebiscite should be held as soon as possible. Any delay would amount to a frustration of the popular will which has been so recently and so categorically expressed; it would be quite contrary to the principles of self-determination of peoples, so often proclaimed during this war; it would embitter without reason the majority of the Greek people; and finally it would constitute most unfair treatment towards a Sovereign who has been at the forefront of the Allied struggle from first to last and who would now be obliged, against his people's will, to remain abroad for a long time, when the Sovereigns of enemy States like Italy and Japan have not been meted such treatment.

3. In addition to reasons of a moral nature which do not permit a lengthy postponement of the plebiscite, there are also arguments of political advisability which militate for its being held quickly.

The experience of the last few months has shown that the constitutional problem which has completely absorbed public opinion in Greece cannot be solved simply by being shelved. Around this question are bound up all the main differences which have divided the Greek people for many years; the continuation of the uncertainty over this question therefore prolongs an explosive atmosphere, which is being suitably exploited by both extremes so as to confuse the situation even more. After the liberation of Greece, Allied policy has

been based on the hope that with the passage of time and with the economic reconstruction of the country, spirits would calm down and the solution of the regime question would become easier. Time, however, has shown that on the contrary, it was the prolongation of the institutional anomaly that has impeded economic reconstruction. Reviewing the year's work of UNRRA in Greece Mr. Maben, head of the UNRRA Mission in that country, stated on the 2nd April 1946 that "work has been hindered by the repeated changes of government", and spoke of "the disastrous influence of unstable political conditions on the country's economy". The situation was in no way easier at the beginning of 1946 than in the middle of 1945, and this is the main reason why the British Government arrived at the conclusion that no further delay of the elections was justified and insisted on their being held by the end of March.

4. The elections have fully justified the hopes based on them from the viewpoint of stabilising the situation in Greece. The recourse to the popular verdict has been marked by a substantial easing of the atmosphere from the stifling tension of the last few months. This is precisely the most suitable moment, during the relative calm that has followed the elections, to settle the fundamental question of the regime, which will poison the atmosphere anew if it is left in abeyance. The majority in the newly-elected Parliament has been returned with a specific pledge to the people for the holding of a plebiscite by May; not to hold the plebiscite speedily would therefore place this majority in complete contradiction to itself. Many Ministers in the Greek Government have announced their intention to resign both from office and from Parliament should the plebiscite be postponed as a result of Allied pressure. The leaders of the extremist right will find fertile ground for bringing pressure on the Government, while at the same time the extreme left, which following its defeat at the elections has now diverted all its energies towards averting a plebiscite, will find considerable encouragement in the uncertainty entailed in any postponement. What it would accept to-day without too much difficulty following the still fresh expression of popular sovereignty, would actually become the object of intensive exploitation in a few months and would obviously be linked with a demand for the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of fresh elections. Instead of being eased the situation would thus proceed to fresh complications.

5. It is imperative that Greece should find herself completely settled internally during the next few months. The vivid example of other countries has demonstrated how difficult is international assistance in a country where the internal situation permits its resistance to be

sapped from within. Having now entered the road of stability through the elections, Greece must not find herself in such a position in a few months. Once the Greek people have expressed their preference for the nationalist parties, these must not be put, as a consequence of the objections of the Allies to satisfy the clear wishes of the Greek people on the question of the King, in an impossible position politically, from which will inevitably arise many complications weakening Greece's international position.

On the other hand the solution of the question of the regime at a time when this is a relatively easy matter, would remove the main obstacle which has so far impeded collaboration between the Monarchist and the other non-communist parties, and as a consequence would render a normal political life in Greece much easier.

LONDON, April 1946.

740.00119 Council/5-246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1946—8 p. m.

2074. Secdel [Unnumbered]. Brit Emb handed Dept today following paraphrase of FonOff tel dated April 26 to Brit Emb.

"We are proposing that when the Greek territorial claims, both against Albania and against Bulgaria, come to be considered either by the Council of Foreign Ministers or by the Peace Conference, the British representative should say that His Majesty's Government have not made up their minds about the Greek proposals but that Greece has good claims on the sympathies of the United Nations in view of her services to the common cause and of her sufferings from the Bulgarian and Albanian invasion and occupation. His Majesty's Government therefore think that the Greek claims should be fully investigated either by the hearing of witnesses before the Council of Foreign Ministers, by the appointment of a Special Commission or by other appropriate procedure.

The claims against Bulgaria will, of course, have to be considered in relation to the Bulgarian Peace Treaty. The claim to Northern Epirus falls to be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers under the first section of the Potsdam protocol, where it is said that "as its immediate important task the Council shall be authorised to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding at the termination of the war in Europe.

Please inform the State Department of the above and say that the United Kingdom delegation in Paris will be discussing the matter with the United States delegation. We do not propose to say anything to the Greeks for the present, until we know what the American attitude is likely to be."

ACHESON

868.00/5-446 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1946—6 p. m.

571. After consultation with Secretary in Paris Bevin has informed Brit Emb here⁹⁶ that he favors a "relatively early" plebiscite in Greece provided (1) satisfactory revision of electoral rolls is made and (2) Greek Govt agrees to carry out financial and economic agreement signed in London Jan 1946. Brit wish to accept Greek Govts invitation to extend assistance in connection with revision of voting registers and hope for participation of US and French Govts. Urgency of obtaining some decision on this matter dictated by Greek Govts desire to make definite announcement concerning plebiscite when Parliament meets May 13.

Dept is in principle favorable to participation with Brit and French in assisting in connection with registration revision and plebiscite procedure as (1) effective guarantee against large-scale falsifications, (2) possibility of refuting charges such falsifications by Greek opposition and world opinion and (3) moral effect on Greek people of continuing, through critical period of decision on constitutional questions, kind of assistance recently tendered for elections.

Such projected mission would be on much smaller scale than Amfoge. Dept is consulting members Amfoge technical staff for opinion on numbers of personnel and length of time required. Possibility also being explored that unexpended Amfoge funds could be used for this purpose and that this additional mission would not require new authorization but could be included in Amfoge terms of reference.

Please inform Dept urgently your views as to (1) desirability US participation in such project, (2) size of personnel required, (3) length of time needed for satisfactory revision of voting lists, (4) latest possible date in autumn 1946 on which plebiscite could be held without danger of unfavorable weather conditions.⁹⁷

Sent to Athens as 571. Repeated to London and Paris for Secdel.

ACHESON

⁹⁶ A paraphrase of the telegram of May 1 from the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Greece was transmitted informally to the Department by the British Embassy on May 3.

⁹⁷ In telegram Secdel 203 (No. 2111 to Paris), May 4, 1946, 6 p. m., Mr. Acheson requested Mr. Byrnes' views on telegram 571 to Athens before discussing the matter with the White House (868.00/5-446).

Mr. Byrnes, in telegram Delsec 466 (No. 2180 from Paris), May 6, 1946, midnight, replied: "I think that if we are formally invited by the Greek Govt, we should participate with the British and French in assisting in recompiling the electoral registers. Subject to change in the light of info which may be forthcoming, my view is that Sept 15 is latest possible date this year for plebiscite." (740.00119 Council/5-646)

868.00/5-646

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James E. Doyle*⁹⁸

SECRET

[PARIS,] May 6, 1946.

Present: Mr. Dragoumis, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Greece
 Greek Ambassador to the US, Mr. Diamantopoulos
 Director General of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Foreign Office⁹⁹
 Secretary Byrnes
 Mr. Doyle

Mr. Dragoumis spoke first about the borders between Greece and Albania and between Greece and Bulgaria. He stated that the people who evacuated these border areas during the war are afraid to return even to admittedly Greek territory because of the unsettled conditions. He said, with respect to the Albanian border, that the existing border gives great strategic advantage to Albania, and that this was demonstrated by the Italian invasion of Greece through Albania. He regards a rectification of the border with Albania as particularly important because Albania is subject to influence of other larger powers. Moreover, because of Albania's strategic location on the Adriatic, it may be in the interests of countries other than Greece to restrict its power.

Mr. Dragoumis referred particularly to the island of Saseno, which was ceded by Greece to Albania in 1913. Italy seized the island from the Albanians and fortified it. Its location near the narrow entrance to the Adriatic lends it strategic importance. Greece is anxious that the island be returned to her now.

The Secretary expressed the view that neither the security of Greece nor that of any other country in that part of the world could be achieved by boundary rectifications. The hope for security resides in UN and if UN fails no additions of territory to Greece will make her secure. He explained that the questions which Mr. Dragoumis had mentioned had not been discussed by the Council, with the exception of the Dodecanese. He said that the Council members were agreed in principle that the Dodecanese should go to Greece, but that the Soviet has refused to come to a firm agreement on the matter and had in fact refused once more at the morning's meeting. The Secretary said that starting tomorrow the Council planned to turn to the Balkan treaties.

Mr. Dragoumis remarked that it would be most difficult for any Greek government to sign any treaties which do not correct the

⁹⁸ Assistant to Benjamin V. Cohen who was Counselor to the United States delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers.

⁹⁹ Presumably Leonidas Melas.

boundary injustices in Northern Epirus and in Thrace. The Secretary observed that the Italians and the Yugoslavs and other governments said the same thing about treaties which might be unfavorable to them. Mr. Dragoumis remarked that Greece, unlike Italy, had fought on the side of the Allies throughout. The Secretary said he appreciated the significance of this fact and expressed his admiration for the way in which the Greeks had fought.

Mr. Dragoumis then turned to the matter of shipping. He referred to the shipping losses Greece had suffered, stressed the importance of shipping to Greece, and requested the assistance of the United States in obtaining some merchant ships for Greece either from Italy or elsewhere. The Secretary explained that the only discussion in the Council to date in connection with Greece and ships was the discussion about the Italian cruiser to replace the Greek cruiser sunk by the Italians. He added that when the Council comes to discuss the Italian merchant fleet, he will remember the interest of the Greek Government in the matter.

In response to a question by the Secretary, Mr. Dragoumis explained the importance of the Dodecanese to Greece because of their value for fishing and sponges.

Mr. Dragoumis thanked the Secretary for the United States observers of the recent elections and stated that the presence of these observers had helped a great deal. The Secretary said that he had talked to Mr. Grady about the elections and that Mr. Grady had complimented the Greek Government and people on the manner in which the elections were conducted. Mr. Dragoumis suggested the possibility that the United States might participate in the preparations for a plebiscite in the fairly near future. The Secretary stated that the United States would of course participate only upon the request of the Greek Government, but that if a request were forthcoming he thought that some such arrangement might add to the world's confidence in the fairness of the plebiscite.

868.00/5-746

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1946.

Subject: Allied Assistance in Preparations for Greek Plebiscite.

The recently formed Greek Government, wishing to announce definite plans for a plebiscite at the first meeting of Parliament on May 13, desires an indication from the Allies who participated in observing the Greek elections that the date for the plebiscite will be agreeable to them and that they will assist in observing the revision of electoral rolls, thus offering some guarantee of validity for the vote.

On May 6, in Paris, Mr. Bevin addressed a note to the Secretary expressing the hope that the United States Government would be willing to send a small group of technical advisers to Greece to assist in this revision, which could probably be accomplished in three or four months. The Secretary believes that, unless further contradictory information is forthcoming, the latest possible date for holding the Greek plebiscite this year would be September 15. With your approval, he wishes to reply favorably on May 8 to Mr. Bevin's note.

It is considered desirable that the United States should participate on a small scale with France and Great Britain in observing preparations for the Greek plebiscite, and you may wish to authorize for this purpose the use of some of the unexpended funds from the budget set up for the Greek election mission, which was carried out at much less expense than anticipated.

If you approve, I shall inform the Secretary that this Government is prepared to accept an invitation from the Greek Government to participate with the British and French in assisting to recompile the Greek electoral registers.¹

DEAN ACHESON

868.00/5-846: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, May 8, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

[Received 7:05 p. m.]

619. Following views expressed in response numbered questions last paragraph Deptel 571, May 4 after consideration various aspects situation including Paris telegrams 2179, and 2180, May 6.²

1. US cannot well refuse finish job if Greek Govt desires. But it should be done well or not at all. Participation must not be so superficial as to prevent accurate and comprehensive appraisal. Sufficient time must be allowed for correction any irregularities brought to light and for observers verification that correction has in fact been made. Moreover acceptance of task should be on clear understanding Greek Govt will promptly in good faith correct irregularities reported to it by observers.

To accomplish purposes set forth in Deptel 571, May 4 it would

¹ President Truman's approval was given in a marginal notation on May 7. The Secretary of State was notified of the President's action in telegram Secdel 210 (No. 2158 to Paris) the same day (868.00/5-646). Mr. Byrnes thereupon, in a note on May 8 informed Mr. Bevin that the Government of the United States was prepared to accept a formal invitation from the Greek Government to provide the necessary observers and that the Government of the United States considered the autumn of 1946 as a satisfactory time for holding the plebiscite (telegram Delsec 478 (No. 2252 from Paris), May 9, 4 p. m., 740.00119 Council/5-946).

² Neither printed. No. 2179 (Delsec 467) gave the text of Mr. Bevin's note of May 6 to Mr. Byrnes; for quotation from No. 2180, see footnote 97, p. 155.

seem necessary observe actual plebiscite as well as revision registers since otherwise certification of registers would be construed by interested parties as authenticating whatever results plebiscite might yield, though correct revision obviously no guarantee they will be properly voted. Deptel 571, May 4 appears contemplate such plebiscite supervision while Paris telegrams 2179 and 2180, May 6 give no indication Secretary and Bevin envisage that possibility. Suggest this point be clarified and consideration given to opinion of samplers as to ability effectively observe plebiscite with whatever personnel is considered adequate for observing revision registers.

[Here follow replies to remaining Department queries: the minimum requirement would be sixty Allied observers as well as drivers, interpreters, and a headquarters staff of ten; at least three months would be required to revise the electoral lists; and October 27 was the latest date in 1946 that the plebiscite could be held.]

Sent Dept as No. 619; repeated to London as 35 and Paris as 32.

RANKIN

868.00/5-1046 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, May 10, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received May 11—12: 23 p. m.]

633. See mytel 613, May 6.³ Increase Partisan violence since mid-March is serious but not exclusively of Rightist origin as indicated *Pravda* nor so critical as depicted lurid report London *Times* May 7 which said "wave of crime and terrorist activity sweeping Greek mainland from northern boundaries to Matapan and from Ionian Islands to Aegean Coast". (Deptel 575 May 6.⁴)

British police mission reports total of 14 verified homicides related to politics May 1 to 5 inclusive. In 8 cases victims were Rightists and perpetrators Leftists. In 5 cases victims were Leftists and perpetrators Rightists. Remaining case was innocent bystander killed by stray bullet of *gendarmerie* dispersing crowd. During March, according same source, homicides related politics were 46 committed by Leftists, 46 committed by Rightists and by 16 unknown persons, or total of 108 as compared with 41 in February. April totals unavailable but probably higher than March.

These homicides result from (1) vendetta assaults on specific individuals, (2) raids by armed bands, (3) free use of weapons in street

³ Not printed.

⁴ Not printed; the Department had requested Athens' comment on alleged political murders and increasing Monarchist terror (868.00/5-346).

brawls. First category characteristic in Peloponnesos where Rightists usually instigators, second category most common central and western Macedonia where Communist and Autonomist bands active, third category Athens where responsibility perhaps evenly divided.

Increased disorder may be attributed to (1) deliberate Communist policy (mytel 449, April 3), (2) boldness of Right extremists following elections, (3) release of Leftists under prison decongestion law (see below) and consequent vendetta killings, (4) reluctance *gendarmerie* and police to curb Rightists due to their own anti-Communist bias and uncertainty as to Govt attitude. Inefficiency of *gendarmerie* and police judged by western standards, despite recent progress, and traditional Greek complacency towards vendetta and carrying and use of weapons also relevant factors.

During 10 years 1928 to 1937 homicides in Greece recorded maximum 492 in 1928 and averaged 380 annually or .58 per thousand inhabitants. Present situation should be viewed against this background and not in light grossly exaggerated or invented reports launched by Greek Leftist and Center Opposition press and echoed by Moscow for obvious reasons. Average citizen is unmolested and would be unaware disturbances except for press. Dramatized accounts like that London *Times* must be attributed to gullibility *Times* correspondent or to desire build case backing editorial policy favoring postponement plebiscite.

Responsibility present Royalist Govt for Rightist excesses is unclear since marked increase began mid-March and until very recently rather in nature of reluctance or inability take decisive action. Tsaldaris personally, whatever his shortcomings, has good record adherence constitutional procedures. There is no evidence he condones or contemplates use of force, though eventual suppression Communist Party as in Switzerland and other democracies seems likely particularly if King returns. Govt security measures to date include increased penalties for carrying firearms, proposed reestablishment committees public safety and "closing" offices of EAM and Xite auxiliary organizations without interference party activities (mytel 613, May 6). In practice latter measure amounts only to posting pickets outside party offices where auxiliary agencies carry on as usual. Meanwhile Govt is proceeding with releases under prison decongestion law (despatches 2245, Feb. 14 and 2059, Dec. 28⁵) which totaled 7471 by 1st May, 745 having been released since April 1. Present prison population all categories offenders is about 13,000 as compared with 17,000 late December 1945 and 8,000 in 1940.

Sent Dept as 633; repeated Moscow.

RANKIN

⁵ Neither printed.

740.00119 EW/5-1146

Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1946.

SWN 4279

In response to a request by the Acting State Member, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, dated 29 April 1946, for a study evaluating the strategic elements which are involved in the Greek request for rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:

a. Greece desires to advance her Bulgarian frontier an average of about thirty-six miles northward to include the general areas of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed, approximately doubling the present width of her territory between Bulgaria and the Aegean Sea. This would require transfer of a strip of more than 6500 square miles of Bulgarian territory along the full length of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier with a population of about 400,000, the majority of whom are Moslem Pomaks or Turks. There are no known important military establishments in the area.

b. In all probability Greece could not successfully defend her present frontier against Bulgaria attacking alone. Greek forces in western Thrace can easily be cut off by penetration to the sea through her present narrow east-west corridor in this area. Acquisition of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed area would materially widen this corridor and strengthen Greek defensive capabilities, possibly to such a degree that she might withstand Bulgarian offensive efforts. However, Greece would not be strengthened to the extent to guaranteeing successful defense against Bulgaria or any coalition or combination of nations.

c. Unless preparations to re-enforce Greece have been made in advance of attack, it is improbable that acquisition of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed would strengthen her sufficiently to prevent a break-through by a coalition or combination of nations before outside support could become effective.

d. Advancing the Greek boundary at the expense of Bulgaria, as proposed, would not strengthen the Greek position sufficiently for her to participate effectively with Turkey in defense of the Dardanelles. On the other hand, in the unlikely event that neutrality is permitted to Greece, her possession of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed would be of some advantage to Turkey in a defense of the Dardanelles. This might, however, influence Turkey to accept the extreme hazard of defending her territory in Europe.

e. Transfer of this territory from Bulgaria to Greece would likely be followed by violent resentment and partisan activities. The peace of the Balkans would thereby be endangered without decisive strategic gain."

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

JOHN D. HICKERSON
Acting Chairman

868.24/5-1446 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, May 14, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received May 15—10:18 a. m.]

650. Mytel 646, May 13.⁶ Use of phrase "plebiscite for the return of His Majesty the King" in Regent's throne speech has provoked sharp opposition protest, Papandreou, Venizelos, Cannellopoulos and Sophoulis all insisting people must vote on straight monarchy versus republic issue and not merely on whether King George is to return. Queried by journalists Tsaldaris advanced argument "all official acts" since Lebanon⁷ have envisaged only referendum "on King's return" and pointed out present Assembly has only revisionary not fundamental constituent powers. Said "existing regime is Monarchy" and Populist Party's mandate is "to bring back King quickly". Added subject plebiscite not discussed with Allies.

Apart from dubious nature Tsaldaris argument, controversy would appear academic since it is hardly conceivable Monarchy could survive negative vote on question George's return.⁸ Moreover such negative vote seems improbable. Real issue of plebiscite in minds most voters, carefully encouraged by Rightist propaganda, will be Nationalism versus Communism. Campaign opened in editorial Royalist *Kathimerini* May 12 which said "republic is the antechamber to Communist dictatorship". Importance this issue plus natural trend toward winning bandwagon might well result Royalist majority in honest plebiscite exceeding 60 percent suggested mytel 558, April 25.⁶

RANKIN

868.00/5-1146 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1946—7 p. m.

620. Urtel 637, May 11.⁹ You may inform Greek FonOff that in response to Greek request US is prepared to send observers to Greece to collaborate with Brit and French representatives in connection with recompilation of electoral lists in preparation for plebiscite. Dept prefers postponing formal written acceptance until certain points are clarified by further discussion with Brit, French and Greek Govts.

⁶ Not printed.⁷ For documentation on the conference in Lebanon of Greek political parties in May 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 106-112.⁸ In telegram 727, June 3, 1946, noon, Mr. Rankin reported the view of the Greek Prime Minister that a negative vote against the King would mean the end of the monarchy in Greece (868.00/6-346).⁹ Not printed; it advised that the official request by the Greek Government for Allied observers was embodied in a Foreign Office note of May 10 (868.00/5-1146).

Although US has informed Brit that autumn 1946 will be "satisfactory date" for plebiscite, Dept still feels Greek Govt would have done well to put solution of pressing economic problems above political considerations involved in monarchy question. Dept feels announced date of Sept 1 should not be thought irrevocably fixed if observers agree on spot that some postponement would be advisable in order to complete recompilation of lists.

Dept also believes Greek Govt should give assurances that it will immediately correct any irregularities brought to its attention by observers during preparation period and that some form public statement should be made on clear majority necessary for return of King. In order to obviate any doubts concerning results, Dept believes Bevin's suggestion of 60 percent should be considered.

US sampling experts already consulted informally considered total US mission of 30 to 40 could in conjunction with Brit and French groups complete job of observing recompilation of lists in about 12 weeks and could at same time take fairly satisfactory sample census. Both Greek Govt and UNRRA might find census helpful. It would serve as check on total electorate and would also meet to some extent recommendation in Amfoge report.

Possibility that projected mission might assist in observation of actual voting in plebiscite if requested by Greek Govt needs to be explored in consultation with participating groups and competent experts. (Urtel 619, May 8).

Foregoing questions discussed here with Brit Emb, which is forwarding them to Brit FonOff. Your comments and suggestions requested.

[Here follows discussion of an administrative matter.]

Sent to Athens; repeated to London, Paris, Moscow.

ACHESON

868.00/5-1646: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1946—7 p. m.

2381. Deptel 2380 May 16 to Paris, Athens 620, London 4072, Moscow 911. US decision to participate in projected Allied Mission to observe preparations for Greek plebiscite based on assumption that French will accept Greek invitation. Absence of French would allow adverse criticism and give credence to false charges that Greece being used by US and UK as element in Anglo-American bloc.

Please approach FonOff expressing strong hope of US Govt that France will be willing to cooperate in this further aid to Greek people, which can be considered a logical continuation of Amfoge task. You

may wish to refer to our extreme satisfaction at atmosphere of friendliest and frankest cooperation between national groups which characterized Amfoge and our appreciation of French contribution to outcome of Mission. Matter of such importance that if Secy is still in Paris and has opportunity he may think it desirable to discuss with Bidault.¹⁰

Report French views urgently to Dept, repeating to London, Athens, Moscow.

Sent to Paris; rptd to Athens, London, Moscow.

ACHESON

868.00/5-2146 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, May 21, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received May 22—5:05 p. m.]

685. In separate conversations today with PriMin and British Ambassador, I raised points mentioned Deptel 620, May 17 [16]. Telegram received today by FonOff from Greek Ambassador Paris states French have not yet refused collaborate in observing revision electoral lists but British reports are not hopeful this score. Possible Canadian participation favored both by PriMin and British Ambassador although no positive steps yet taken. Dept may wish explore this suggestion in Ottawa particularly if French refuse. Swedish or Swiss collaboration also would be welcomed by PriMin although he realizes difficulty obtaining prompt decision.

PriMin insists he selected Sept 1 as plebiscite date primarily for convenience Allied observers who he believed would have completed investigation electoral registers by that time and could then observe actual voting plebiscite without undue waiting. He would have no objection reasonable postponement after Sept 1 if developments warrant. British FonOff and British Ambassador do not agree Bevins's suggestion specifying percentage majority necessary for King's return and Ambassador opposes public statement this connection as unnecessary advance commitment. Under circumstances, I did not mention this point to PriMin particularly since US impartiality might be questioned if we thus fixed target which seemed commit us to guaranteeing return of King if he received 60 percent and to preventing his return if 59 percent. I suggested British Ambassador request British FonOff sound out King on percentage he now considers would justify his return. With plebiscite based on person of George II rather than monarchy as such, a 51 percent vote for King might of course simply

¹⁰ Georges Bidault, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

result his abdication in favor brother or nephew. Indication Greek Govt's attitude on percentage is given PriMin's recent reply to correspondent who asked what would happen if King received 51 percent. PriMin retorted "What will Republicans do if they get 51 percent?"

Harakas, acting representative Greek War Relief, promises full cooperation in making surplus jeeps and other equipment available. Inventory now being taken and would appreciate information regarding items and quantities desired.

Sent Dept 685; repeated London 40; Paris 43.

RANKIN

740.00119 EW/5-1846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1946—8 p. m.

645. Urtel 665, May 18.¹² Greeks were told by Dept several months ago that loans could not be made against reparations.¹³ In connection rumors of request for 200 million dollar Eximbank loan you should take every opportunity informally to call attention of Greek Govt officials to fact that none of 25 million dollar Eximbank loan has been utilized by Greece during more than four months since it was granted Jan 12.

BYRNES

868.00/5-2546: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1946—2 p. m.

661. Difficulties of mounting and sending into field an operation similar in character to Amfoqe even though on smaller scale have led Dept to following conclusions, which are being transmitted to Brit Emb here for forwarding to Brit FonOff. Please discuss with appropriate Brit officials in Athens, reporting to Dept their views and comments as well as your own. AmEmb London is requested to follow up with Brit FonOff.

1. Desirable to keep revision mission small and unambitious as possible without jeopardizing accomplishment of purposes. Dept prefers to have no US military personnel included and to play down necessary participation of Brit military personnel, even though it is

¹² Not printed; it summarized a *note verbale* of May 10 from the Greek Foreign Office which outlined the "alleged dire economic plight" of Greece because of astronomical war losses and expressed the conviction that Greece should be accorded priority rights to reparations payments similar to those granted to Belgium after World War I (740.0011EW/5-1846).

¹³ For a quotation from the relevant memorandum of January 11, 1946, to the Greek Embassy, see footnote 43a, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 284.

recognized they must be used as observers in field and close cooperation with Brit military and Police Mission necessary for successful operations.

2. Dept believes the most practicable assistance it can render will be on technical samplers level and civilian personnel to staff and administer central office. For your information, it is felt US took lead and bore largest share responsibility and expense in Amfoge operations. Since decision to accede to Greek request for early plebiscite mainly due to Brit initiative, it would appear Brit should assume responsibility for heavier share in this operation. Furthermore, it seems logical that Brit, in spite of manpower shortage, are in better position to furnish personnel and services in Greece than US, which has no men and equipment on spot. US willing to assume its share financial responsibility along with Brit and Greek Govts.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3, 4, and 5 which analyze the number and type of civilian personnel to be made available, problems dealing with transportation within Greece, and questions relating to sampling.]

Dept would appreciate your early comments and suggestions.

Sent to Athens 661, rptd London 4287, Paris 2533.

BYRNES

868.00/5-2746

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation by Mr. William O. Baxter of
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1946.

Mr. Pares telephoned today to report the information contained in a telegram just received from the Foreign Office. Mr. Tsaldaris, Prime Minister of Greece, recently asked the British Ambassador to Greece for the views of the British Government on the form of the forthcoming plebiscite; that is, whether it should be merely on the return of King George II or whether it should be a referendum on the form of government,—monarchy vs. republic. The British Ambassador said that he would refer the matter to London but that in his personal view he felt that a referendum on the monarchy question alone would be inconclusive, as another referendum would be necessary in order to apply the principle.

The Foreign Office has now indicated its approval of the British Ambassador's attitude, pointing out that, although the question to be decided by a plebiscite is the concern of the Greek Government, it had always been the understanding of the British Government that the Greek people were to be consulted as to whether the King should return and were not to be asked to decide upon a form of government.

[On May 31, 1946, two reports on Greek frontier problems were prepared by Mr. Harry N. Howard of the Division of International Organization Affairs and were given control numbers PIO-563 and PIO-564. The former was entitled "The Problem of the Greek-Bulgarian Frontier"; the latter, "The Greek Claim to Northern Epirus". Both reports were in the nature of historical reviews of the problems covered and analyses thereof.

PIO-563 recommended:

"1. The United States should reject any Bulgarian claims to Western Thrace.

2. In view of the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States should likewise not support the strategic claim of the Greek Government to rectification along the Greco-Bulgarian frontier.

3. The United States should, therefore, support retention of the pre-1941 frontier between Greece and Turkey.

4. In order to facilitate Bulgarian economic access to the Aegean Sea the United States might encourage the Greek Government in a friendly manner in the re-establishment of the Greek Free Zone at Salonica. . . ."

PIO-564 recommended:

"The United States should not commit itself at this time to any specific position as to the questions at issue in the Greek territorial claims in Northern Epirus. Nevertheless, it is felt, on the basis of studies made in the Department, that while the Greeks may have some title historically to the territory in question, there is at the present time, because of shifts in population and new methods of warfare, little justification on either ethnic or strategic grounds for anything more than a minor adjustment in behalf of Greece in the Southwestern corner of the disputed area opposite the island of Corfu.

As regards placing this question on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the American Representative should not sponsor it . . . but he should not oppose its inclusion if the Greeks insist.

If the Council accepts the Greek claim as an item on the agenda, the American Representative, without taking the lead, should support a thorough-going investigation of the Greek-Albanian frontier problem.

The Greek government did not seek the advice of the United States Government in connection with its petition to the Council. If the advice of this government is sought with respect to the matter, the Greek government might well be asked whether it had considered fully the various complex political issues which might be raised at this time and the chain of events which might be started as a result of this action."

The Secretary of State transmitted copies of the two reports to Athens, for the information of the Officer-in-Charge, in instruction 924, July 24 (868.014/7-2446).]

868.00/5-2846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1946—7 p. m.

696. Paris 2604 May 29¹⁴ rptd as infotel Athens 677, London 4365.

1. In view French decision against participation mission for revision Greek electoral lists please request further info of Greek Govt re PriMins suggestion of Canadian, Swedish or Swiss participation. For your info Dept would be glad for other participation if only token in order to counteract probable criticism that US-UK coalition is exerting undue influence on Greek internal affairs.

2. Dept agrees advisability exchange of identical US-UK notes with Greek Govt suggested para 5 urtel 712 May 28.¹⁵ In addition to points you mention it might be advisable to indicate that we would welcome participation of other national groups if Greek Govt makes appropriate overtures.

3. To avoid later confusion official name of mission should be decided upon. In view possibility that only US and UK may participate it seems preferable not to use word "Allied". Dept therefore suggests "Mission to Observe Revision of Greek Electoral Lists" which could be referred to briefly as "Greek Electoral Mission".

4. In spite of Depts willingness to cooperate to fullest practicable extent it was thought impossible to recruit and send to Greece in time to be of assistance any civilian observers. Attempt being made to include in total of eight samplers and six statistical assistants as many men as possible who could make trips to field with observer teams. In light suggestions para 1 your 712 (delayed in transmission by garble) Dept now recruiting approximately 25 carefully screened university or graduate students particularly interested in international affairs to act as civilian observers.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 5 and 6 dealing with personnel matters.]

Sent to Athens 696, rptd to London 4466, Paris 2670.

BYRNES

¹⁴ Not printed.

¹⁵ Not printed; it was a reply to telegram 661, May 25, to Athens, p. 165. Paragraph 5 reads: "Since mission (at least British contingent) will in effect be functioning June 3, suggest advisability early tying down Greek Govt commitments as proposed Dept's telegram 621 [620], May 16 by formal acceptances Greek request for observers in identical British and US Embassy notes, specifying as condition understanding Greek Govt will loyally undertake give effect observers recommendations by such administrative or legislative action as may be indicated including eventual prolongation various steps in list revision process and reasonable postponement plebiscite if necessary. Greek Govt reply would constitute binding agreement." (868.00/5-2846) No. 620 is printed on p. 162.

868.00/6-846: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

ATHENS, June 8, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received 6:50 p. m.]

755. Parallel communications being sent to Greek Government by British Embassy and US accepting invitation to observe revision electoral registers on understanding Greek Government will undertake loyally to give effect to any mission recommendations to end that referendum when held shall conform to terms and spirit of Yalta Declaration and be so accepted by unprejudiced opinion in Greece and abroad. Without specific mention possible Swedish or Swiss participation which would be infeasible at this late date, note expresses pleasure that other nations have been invited among which UK, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are understood already to have accepted. Communication notes Greek Government's promise pay expenses and assumes that free entry and other privileges granted Amfoge will be extended Amfoge II.¹⁶ (Deptel 696, June 4, 7 p. m.).

If invitation observe plebiscite should be forthcoming we might then raise possibility of Swedish and/or Swiss participation should we decide to accept.

Acting on Department's earlier suggestion (Deptel 571, May 4) that current mission might be considered extension of Amfoge British early adopted designation "Amfoge II" which has already been extensively used in military orders and otherwise in connection with operations already under way in Greece. Windle feels moreover and Embassy agrees that widespread confidence built up by Amfoge should not be jettisoned. As five Allies have already agreed participate use of term "Allied" seems entirely appropriate and desirable.¹⁷

[Here follows discussion of administrative and technical matters.]

RANKIN

868.00/6-1346: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1946—7 p. m.

730. Urtel 764; June 11, noon.¹⁸ Although no rooted objection to

¹⁶ In telegram 786, June 17, 1946, 5 p. m., Mr. Rankin reported receipt of a note dated June 15 from the Greek Prime Minister which conveyed the agreement of the Greek Government with the terms of the Embassy's note (868.00/6-1746).

¹⁷ Leland B. Morris was appointed Chief of the United States Section of the Allied Mission To Observe the Revision of the Greek Electoral Lists (telegram 729, June 13, 2 p. m., to Athens, 868.00/6-1346); see also text of Department press release of June 18, Department of State *Bulletin*, June 30, 1946, p. 1128.

¹⁸ Not printed; it advised that Mr. Tsaldaris expected to proceed to Paris shortly for a meeting with Messrs. Byrnes and Bevin, and that subject to their advice, he hoped to make a 2-week trip to London and Washington (868.00/6-1146).

July visit to Washington by PriMin and/or MinFonOff²⁰ Dept inclined to believe in principle that American public will wonder how Greece can spare such important Mins at time when Greece's domestic problems are so critical. It would be unfortunate if idea became current that Mins were on junket.

Knowledge of topics Mins desire to discuss would assist both Secretary and Dept in weighing pros, cons and timeliness of suggested visit.

ACHESON

868.51/6-1446 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1946—5 p. m.

739. Dept disturbed by reported Greek attitude that additional financial aid can be expected regardless of Greek inertia in meeting own problems and non-use of funds available from Eximbank loan. Dept suggests Emb take up with new Greek Govt desirability of active work on most needed reconstruction projects, with suggestion that additional financial assistance likely to be affected by use made of assistance available. Services Am engineering firms probably useful such projects as restoration harbors drainage work. After specific projects selected, Am firms could expedite getting work underway and aid, if necessary, in preparing specifications for purchase equipment.

Dept understands UNRRA in consultation with Greek Govt is preparing analysis capital requirements. Dept suggests you (a) express our great interest in early completion this analysis which should be very useful to U. S. advisory mission (b) discreetly urge Greek Govt to keep study realistic and avoid substituting grandiose plans for prompt action.

ACHESON

868.00/6-1846 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, June 18, 1946—9 a. m.

IMMEDIATE

[Received 1 : 48 p. m.]

790. Mytel 764, June 11; ²¹ Deptel 730, June 14 [13]. British Ambassador transmitted message to Prime Minister this morning from Bevin that he would be "glad" to see Tsaldaris in Paris and in London. I conveyed substance of Deptel verbally to Prime Minister who informed me he wishes discuss primarily economic questions which will

²⁰ Mr. Tsaldaris was both Greek Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

²¹ Not printed; but see footnote 18, p. 169.

arise from withdrawal UNRRA December 31 and is considering taking Finance Minister Helmis with him to Paris, London, Washington for trip totaling perhaps 3 weeks beginning about June 26. Prime Minister also told me he intends consult French Ambassador today and Soviet Ambassador later if trip decided upon. He plans simply inform Soviet Ambassador of trip and expresses hope he will be able see Molotov²² whom Dragoumis so far unable approach.

While urgency economic questions probably basic and adequate reason for purposed trip Prime Minister evidently anxious convince US and British Govts by personal contact that members his Govt do not have horns and tails and that his guiding principle in foreign affairs is maintenance intimate friendly relations with western Allies. I believe him to be entirely sincere in this; also that he and his Govt would benefit greatly from his meeting the Secretary and Dept officials and getting their viewpoint on Greek and international questions at first hand. British Ambassador favors London trip for same reasons believing Tsaldaris proposal worthy hospitable response.

Prime Minister indicated he would not decide on Washington visit without further clarification Dept's attitude in light first paragraph above.

Request urgent reply.

Sent Dept as 790, repeated Paris as 47.

RANKIN

868.00/6-1846: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1946—2 p. m.

786. Urtel 790 Jun 18 rptd Paris 47. Dept hopes that you will find it possible, without giving appearance of inhospitality on part of US Govt, to discourage any plans for visit of Greek PriMin Tsaldaris and FinanMin Helmis to US at this time. You may in your discretion indicate Dept's feeling that a visit during summer will be ill-advised. Many ranking officials will not be in Washington. Furthermore Congress will either be adjourned or making hurried preparations for summer recess because of Congressmen's preoccupation with coming election campaign.

We would be glad later to receive visit from head of Greek Govt. Such a visit should be made however after plebiscite has been held and the character and policies of the future Greek Govt have been more clearly outlined as well as more definite plans made by Greek Govt with regard to economic reconstruction. Greek Govt has itself put

²² Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, a participant in the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

much stress on fact that it could not make much headway toward permanent solution of urgent problems until plebiscite is held. At later date US will also have more definite information on economic questions, as plans for post-UNRRA period are now under discussion but not yet fully formulated or approved.

Dept believes Tsaldaris might realize most of his objectives by talks with Secy and/or Counselor who are likely to be in Paris at time of his visit. In this connection Dept is telegraphing Secy to inquire as to his willingness to see Tsaldaris in Paris.²³

Sent Athens. Rptd to London and to Paris for Secretary.

ACHESON

868.002/6-2546 : Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Rankin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, June 25, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received June 26—10 a. m.]

825. Called on PriMin this afternoon after receipt Paris Delsec 613, June 24²⁴ and informed him of substance Deptel 786, June 22. He expressed keen disappointment at necessity postponement Washington visit for following reasons: (1) He will be blamed locally for apparent failure to take timely steps toward negotiating for US economic aid in post UNRRA period, a matter which predecessor Govts bungled; (2) he planned visit Washington as well as London to evidence Greece's position as sovereign state and not simply British satellite whose Ministers must run to London periodically for instructions; (3) he fears that Dept's discouragement Washington trip indicates lack sympathy his Govt and its policies.

To offset in part second point above, PriMin indicated he would like very much meet Secretary and Bevin together, preferably before seeing either separately. He would endeavor persuade them Greek Govt has no secrets from either western ally and seeks only their continued good will and guidance. Tsaldaris also is not unmindful of favorable effect in Greece of such meeting. He is currently under heavy pressure from extreme Right which condemns his comparative leniency toward Left terrorists whose activities currently increasing in northern Greece perhaps on orders from abroad. Meanwhile Center opposition rebuffed Tsaldaris' conciliatory gesture June 20 of inviting their participation in Govt during preparations for plebiscite, for which gesture extreme Right roundly condemned him. He still controls solid majority but

²³ In telegram Secdel 325 (No. 3019 to Paris), June 22, 1946, 2 p. m., not printed. In telegram Delsec 613 (No. 3067 from Paris), June 24, noon, Mr. Byrnes notified the Department that he would be glad to see the Greek Prime Minister at Paris and that the latter's proposed visit to the United States should not be encouraged (740.00119 Council/6-2446).

²⁴ Not printed; but see footnote 23, above.

naturally seeks any evidence US support which would strengthen his position. If opponents able play-up absence US sympathy effectively extreme elements might get upper hand.

Tsaldaris informed me he might send Under-Secretary Coordination Ailianos and Sophocles Venizelos, the latter as representative of opposition, to visit US at early date for economic discussions since he and Finance Minister unwelcome. However he may be expected upon seeing Secretary to raise again question of visiting Washington on present trip.

PriMin intends fly to Paris Friday accompanied by party of about 10. Sent Dept as 825, repeated Paris as 50.

RANKIN

868.014/6-2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, June 29, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received June 30—3:11 p. m.]

838. News of award of Dodecanese to Greece²⁵ has been greeted here with notable enthusiasm on part of Government, Parliament and press and last night's Parliament session was largely devoted to this event. PriMin expressed gratitude of whole Greek people toward Paris Conference and Parliament addressed messages to latter and to people of Dodecanese. However, party leaders and other Deputies generally followed PriMin's lead in expressing hope event foreshadows satisfaction of other Greek claims.

[Here follows an account of press reaction.]

Contrasting with officialdom and the party press, general public has shown little enthusiasm, possibly because man in street has long regarded Dodecanese as Greek and its cession as only simple justice. In this connection stronger popular feeling may be involved in case of Northern Epirus but even in this matter as also in regard to Greek claim to a more favorable strategic boundary with Bulgaria, popular interest would appear somewhat apathetic compared with persistent propaganda of political leaders.

MACVEAGH

²⁵ By the Council of Foreign Ministers; see vol. II, p. 661. In telegram 841, July 9, 1946, 6 p. m., to Athens, the Department stated: "Turkey satisfied with Foreign Ministers decision return Dodecanese Greece, but would be pleased if Greece returned to Turkey two or three islands near Turkish Coast. Turks feel their claim as good as Greek, since Italy forcibly took islands from Turkey. Turk Govt has no intentions discussing matter with Greek Govt to avoid misunderstanding with Greece." (800.00 Summaries/7-946) On July 15, Ankara reported information that Mr. Bevin had told the Turks it was inadvisable to seek Castellorizo and Simi because this action would encourage the Soviets to renew pressure on the Turks regarding the Straits. The Dodecanese should be treated as a whole and not split up, and the demilitarization of the islands should remove any menace to Turkey (telegram 755, 740.00119 Council/7-1546).

868.00/7-146

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers

[PARIS,] July 1, 1946.

Participants: M. Tsaldaris, Greek Prime Minister
M. Dragoumis
Ambassador Diamantopoulos
The Secretary
Mr. Matthews

The Prime Minister began with a general expression of gratitude of the Greek people and Government for the understanding and sympathy shown them by the American people and Government, for **American assistance in connection with the observance of the elections, and now in a revision of the election registers, and for the stand which Mr. Byrnes took with regard to the Dodecanese Islands.** He said that there were several additional matters to which the Greek Government attached much importance, namely, the questions of reparation and the country's economic rehabilitation. He also said that moral support for the Greek position vis-à-vis her neighbors, particularly in the light of Bulgarian territorial pretensions, was most important. He said he did not wish to take up the Secretary's time this morning but he would like to have an hour with him again before leaving Paris.

The Secretary said he was delighted to meet the Prime Minister and explained why he had felt it would be better to see him here than for the Prime Minister to visit Washington at this time. The Secretary said that he expected to be in Paris for some weeks, that a number of high Department officials are here, and that with the situation existing in Washington, many important problems still pending before Congress and Congress getting ready for adjournment, all of which kept the President extremely busy as well as other high officers of our Government, he felt it would be better to see the Prime Minister here. The Secretary then spoke of the deep affection which the American people have for Greece, the admiration for Greek heroism during the war and the great interest and sympathy with which Greece's problems are viewed in the United States. He then described his 10 months' endeavor to obtain Russian approval for the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece which culminated with Mr. Molotov's sudden acceptance of the American proposal last Friday. He said that he would be happy to see the Prime Minister again before his departure from Paris. The Secretary then asked a number of questions with regard to conditions in the Dodecanese and was told that the population before the war totaled about 130,000 and that the principal means of livelihood for the inhabitants was sponge fishing.

The Prime Minister expressed his interest in sending into the Islands as soon as possible a number of Greek civil officials in order to survey the political situation and needs of the Islands. He also spoke of the dangers of the extreme Communists to Greece's internal situation and the importance of offsetting these dangers through a program of economic rehabilitation and general political stabilization within Greece.

868.51/7-546

Memorandum by Mr. Leonard Unger, Economic Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers, to the Secretary of State

[PARIS,] July 5, 1946.

It was the desire of the Greek Premier Tsaldaris that for your Friday morning conversation with him you be acquainted with the following problems and requests of the Greek Government in connection with the present difficult economic situation in Greece.

1. Last winter Greece was granted a line of credit to the limit of \$10 million with which to buy U.S. surplus property,²⁶ under which the Greek Government has submitted to the OFLC requests for about \$4 million worth of surplus property. The Greek representatives report having been informed that practically none of this property is available to them, since most of it is either reserved for France or has been taken by other countries, including ex-enemies. It was promised that this question will be taken up both with Mr. Virden of OFLC in Paris and with the Department in Washington to assure that Greece is given fair and friendly treatment in the matter. In answer to the Greek request that the \$10 million loan be increased, it was indicated that the Department would be hesitant to discuss this matter until it was clear that the loan already extended was in sight of being exhausted.

2. The major request being pressed by the Greek representatives is for recognition of their urgent requirement for very substantial financial assistance for the country's reconstruction. These requirements, according to the representatives, have not previously been submitted to the United States Government in such concrete, comprehensive form and they are the main burden of Mr. Tsaldaris' mission on the economic side. With the help of these loans it was claimed that at the end of 5 years Greece could again be self-supporting, and would be free from the necessity of applying continually for small loans, no one

²⁶ The terms of this line of credit were embodied in an agreement signed in Washington by Thomas B. McCabe, the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, and Paul Economou-Gouras, the Greek Chargé, on May 16, 1946 (868.51/5-1646).

of which could have a permanent effect in rebuilding the Greek economy. The loans requested are divided into the following categories:

(a) A loan of \$5 billion (present dollar value) for the reconstruction of material damage; the loan to be extended over an unspecified period.

(b) A loan of \$600 million to cover shipments over 5 years, in decreasing amounts, of consumer goods, industrial products and raw materials. This loan appears to be essentially a continuation of the aid supplied by UNRRA; it is to meet the balance of payments deficit which these essential imports would incur.

(c) A loan of \$440 million to cover internal budget deficits for a five-year period.

(d) An unspecified loan looking toward development over and above the pre-war level of the Greek economy.²⁷

Because of the continuing economic difficulties of Greece, these loan requests may require considerable careful study by the Department, even though the figures no doubt far exceed any possibility of being met. Moreover, certain inconsistencies and errors are to be observed in the text submitted.

The first three loans requested, (a), (b), and (c), are for immediately pressing needs, and it is doubtful that assistance of this nature would be forthcoming from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development or any other agency except possibly the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom. The Greek representatives indicated that the Export-Import Bank had mentioned the possibility of its granting a loan for similar purposes to those outlined in point (b) above, although undoubtedly for a much smaller amount. Mr. Ailianos, Greek Deputy Minister for Economic Coordination, is ready to go to Washington to discuss these matters and, if it should be your decision to encourage this, he could be reached in London.

In relation to point (d) above, regarding future development, it would not appear worthwhile to hold discussions at the present time, and, in any event, such loans might well be within the province of private interests and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

Mr. Ailianos is going to London with the Premier to discuss these same loans with the British Government. The British and American Governments, he thinks, will ultimately wish to consult with each other in order to coordinate their assistance to the Greek economy and to determine which country would be prepared to supply aid in which fields. He suggested the dispatch to Greece of a commission of American and British technicians to study the Greek reconstruction needs

²⁷ Undated memoranda dealing with United States financial assistance to Greece and surplus property were presented to American officials at Paris by Greek officials on July 3 (868.51/7-1746).

and advise their respective Governments in order to assure that any money which is advanced will serve a useful purpose and that the projects undertaken offer a good promise of repayment.

868.51/7-546

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers

[PARIS,] July 5, 1946.

Participants: The Greek Prime Minister, M. Tsaldaris
The Greek Ambassador to Washington,
M. Diamantopoulos
The Secretary
Mr. Matthews

The Greek Prime Minister called, at his own request, on the Secretary this morning. He referred to the financial conversations which the Greek Deputy Minister for Economic Coordination, Mr. Ailianos, had had with Mr. Unger and asked if the Secretary was familiar with the substance of the talks. The Secretary said that his time had been so extremely occupied with the work of the Conference that he had not yet had time to go into the matter. The Prime Minister then explained that Mr. Unger had seemed to think the Greek line of approach to their rehabilitation needs was reasonable and it was suggested that further talks should be held in London, particularly with a view to ascertaining whether Mr. Ailianos should proceed to Washington for conversations with the Ex-Im Bank. Mr. Matthews suggested that the Secretary might wish to inform the Department of the talks here,²⁸ and have the Department communicate its reactions to our Embassy in London which in turn would convey them to the Prime Minister's party there. The Department would probably wish to suggest further procedure with particular reference to possible Ex-Im Bank conversations. The Secretary agreed that this was the best procedure. He said that after possible talks had taken place with the Ex-Im Bank he would be glad to go into the whole question of Greece's financial and economic needs and see what could be done. Mr. Matthews pointed out that the Greeks were requesting financial assistance to the extent of some six billion dollars and that perhaps the Secretary would feel

²⁸ The substance of the two memoranda of conversations of July 5 were cabled to the Department in telegram Delsec 670 (No. 3327 from Paris), July 8, 1946, 11 a. m. Mr. Byrnes concluded the telegram as follows: "I request therefore that Dept examine question of additional Ex-Im Bank aid to Greece and that if Dept finds it desirable, it should request through London Embassy that Ailianos visit Washington to discuss matter. . . ." (740.00119 Council/7-846)

that such a figure was not within the realm of possibilities. The Secretary so informed the Prime Minister, pointing out that the remaining available capital in the Ex-Im Bank is now rather reduced and that it may be a little while before Congress appropriates new funds. Both the Prime Minister and the Ambassador hastened to assure the Secretary that the figures mentioned to Mr. Unger were purely tentative and represented only what Greece would need for her long-term rehabilitation over a period of five to ten years. In this connection Mr. Tsaldaris spoke of attracting foreign capital, of Greece's record for debt payments, and of the importance of the stability of the drachma. He said that small, piecemeal help was not sufficient really to put the country back on its feet.

Mr. Tsaldaris then said he wanted to go into another question, namely, Greece's territorial claims. Greece has claims against Bulgaria which affect the security of Salonika, and claims against Albania to the Northern Epirus. Out of respect to her Yugoslav ally, Greece had hitherto advanced no claims against that country but he had just had a telegram from the Greek Embassy in London reporting that Yugoslavia and Albania had just signed a treaty of mutual support. He therefore no longer felt inhibited from advancing claims against Yugoslavia in the interest of Greek security and he thought the Allies might wish to consider the new situation presented by Yugoslavia's support for Albania, a country with which Greece is still at war. He said he had followed with interest the solution of the Trieste problem which thus "neutralized" the northern end of the Adriatic. He then launched into a plea that a similar procedure be taken to "neutralize" Valona by setting up a Free Territory of Valona and giving Greece the hinterland just as Yugoslavia had been given the hinterland of Trieste. In the course of this presentation he said he had heard a British suggestion that "Albania be placed under the United Nations" but he did not see how this would solve the problem. The Secretary in reply said that he did not see that the question of the Greek-Albanian frontier would come up at the Peace Conference which is specifically called to negotiate the five peace treaties. The same was true of course of any Greek territorial claims against Yugoslavia.

Mr. Tsaldaris then spoke of the Greek reparations from Germany and the decisions of IARA and asked whether this question would come up at the Peace Conference. The Secretary informed him that it would not. The Prime Minister asked several further questions concerning the possible duration of the Peace Conference and the possible postponement of the General Assembly meeting to which the Secretary replied first that it was difficult to estimate the Peace Conference duration—it might last about three to four weeks—and (2) while there might be some delay in the meeting of the Assembly and

Secretary General Lie had raised the question, the United States Government would not ask for any postponement.

The Prime Minister said he was leaving for London tomorrow and expressed his appreciation of the Secretary's kindness.

768.75/7-846

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Gouras,³¹ Greek Chargé d'Affaires
Mr. Henderson (NEA)
Mr. Baxter (NE)

Mr. Gouras, Chargé of the Greek Embassy, called at his request to inform the Department, on instructions from the Greek Government, that on the night of July 7 a considerable force of Albanians had seized the Greek frontier post no. 13, wounding the commander and apparently abducting two of the garrison soldiers. During the time of the attack Greek frontier posts nos. 12 and 14 were under fire. A division of the Greek Army has been ordered to recapture the posts and drive the Albanians off Greek territory.

Mr. Gouras stressed the serious nature of this incident, pointing out that, though there have been slight disturbances on the Greek-Albanian frontier during the past few months, this is the first instance of Albanian penetration of Greek territory. Mr. Gouras expressed the hope that the Department would take the necessary steps with the Albanian Government in order to avert further developments of this nature.

Mr. Henderson assured Mr. Gouras that the Department would immediately forward this information to the American missions at Athens and Tirana with the request that they urgently report all pertinent information and that the substance of the Greek memorandum would be telegraphed at once to Paris for the attention of the Secretary.³²

768.75/7-1246

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 12, 1946.

Mr. Gouras, Chargé of the Greek Embassy, called today at his request to ask if the Department had any further information on de-

³¹ Paul Economou-Gouras.

³² In telegram 119, July 9, 1946, to Tirana, repeated to Athens as No. 838, to Paris as Secdel 427 (No. 3316), and to Belgrade and Moscow.

velopments to report on the Greek-Albanian frontier incident of July 7.

I told Mr. Gouras that our Embassy at Athens had reported direct to the Department the same details which the Greek Embassy had transmitted in its memorandum of July 10.³⁴ I explained to Mr. Gouras that at the present time we are having some difficulty in cable communications with Tirana and that to date we have had no reply to our request for information from Mr. Jacobs.

Mr. Gouras asked if we had instructed our mission in Albania to make representations to the Albanian Government. I told him that we had not done so but had merely asked for comment, at the same time explaining the anomalous situation of our mission there, which is not in official diplomatic relations with the Albanian Government.³⁵ I mentioned, however, that our Embassy at Athens had transmitted press reports from Greece indicating that the Greek Government intended to request the four Allies to take this matter up with the Albanian Government, but that to date we had received no formal request from the Greek Government to intervene.³⁶

868.51/7-1246: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, July 12, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received July 12—6:25 p. m.]

6674. This afternoon, the Greek Prime Minister, M. Tsaldaris, accompanied by the Greek Ambassador in London, called on me at the Embassy. We had a very friendly talk during which the Prime Minister spoke at length about problems of reconstruction in Greece and the country's need for financial assistance.

Tsaldaris said he was very glad of the opportunity he had in Paris to see Secretary Byrnes, from whom he gained an impression of friendliness towards Greece and of the willingness of the United States to do what it could to assist Greece with her difficult postwar economic problems. The Prime Minister said he spoke to Mr. Byrnes about the possibility of Greece obtaining further financial aid from the Export-Import Bank and also about the possibility of sending a small mission

³⁴ Not printed.

³⁵ Tirana, on July 12, reported information from the Albanian official press of July 9 that a clash with Greek forces had taken place on Albanian territory and that the various frontier incidents were attempts by the neo-Fascist Greeks to violate the border and pillage Albania (telegram 380, 768.75/7-1246). This information was given informally to the Greek Chargé by Mr. Baxter on July 15.

³⁶ The formal request was made by the Greek Foreign Office in a note dated July 12 but received by the American Embassy 3 days later. The note was transmitted to the Department in telegram 903, July 15, 5 p. m., from Athens, and received in the Department the following day at 3:26 p. m. (768.75/7-1546).

of Greek experts to Washington straightaway to discuss this matter in an exploratory way with the appropriate American authorities. The Prime Minister is most anxious to know now whether a visit of a mission of this kind would be agreeable to the United States Government.

The Prime Minister said the proposed mission would consist of M. Venizelos, M. Bacalbassis and M. Ailianos, with perhaps one or two secretaries. M. Ailianos is Under-Secretary for Coordination in the present Greek Government, while the other two members belong to the opposition Liberal Party. All three are now in London with the Prime Minister and, if their visit is approved, would go on to Washington from here.

Tsaldaris also told me that on the day he left Greece, June 29, a telegram from the Greek Ambassador in Washington was delivered to him as he was entering his plane at the airport. This message stated that a high official of the Export-Import Bank had informed the Greek Ambassador that the Export-Import Bank was willing to consider now an application for additional financial aid from Greece and had suggested to him that estimates should be submitted covering the country's immediate needs without awaiting for the presentation of longer range program. The Prime Minister said that particularly in view of the receipt of this message he was anxious for the mission of Greek experts to proceed to Washington without delay. Tsaldaris added that if for any reason, it should not be possible to make arrangements with the Export-Import Bank for immediate assistance, he thought the mission should go to the US anyway in order to supply general information on Greece's economic needs preparatory to the more formal visit of the Prime Minister himself in September. Tsaldaris is scheduled to leave London on next Tuesday for Paris en route Athens and said he hoped very much he could get the Department's views on the foregoing matters before he departed from here. I told him I would take the matter up urgently with the Department and request an answer by Monday.

Sent Dept as 6674, repeated to Paris as 524, to Athens as 95.

HARRIMAN

868.51/7-1346 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)*³⁷

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

5358. Urtel 6674 July 12. Appropriate American authorities have informed Dept there is very little possibility in foreseeable future that

³⁷ Repeated to Paris as No. 3440 and to Athens as No. 863.

additional Eximbank loans will be made available to Greece for following reasons: (1) Despite Bank's, Dept's and Athens Embassy's frequent reminders, Greeks have not used any of 25 million dollar credit granted in December 1945 and have to date shown little ability to make effective use of funds; (2) Bank's uncommitted funds are very low; (3) number of loan requests are under consideration from other needy countries which have received no Eximbank assistance to date; (4) by end of year, International Bank may be in position to make small loans. Neither Dept nor Eximbank therefore in position to discuss question of loan with proposed mission. Eximbank feels that recent discussion with Greeks was misrepresented in telegram to which Tsladaris referred. Bank had merely stated that it would examine any further requests presented by Greek Govt but gave no encouragement that further loans could be made.

However, if Tsaldaris wishes send three men mentioned discuss with appropriate US officials general Greek economic and financial problems and Greek plans for purchase and supply following UNRRA period but not to discuss further Eximbank loan, Dept would be glad to see them. Dept would like clear understanding in advance from Greek Govt that Greek public and press will not be given impression this group is coming to US to request further loans or other financial aid either from Eximbank or other US Govt sources.

Embassy might suggest to Greeks that value of mission both to US and Greece will depend in part on mission being equipped to discuss details of Greek import needs, export possibilities, and balance of payments position for 1947.

ACHESON

768.75/7-1346

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South European Affairs (Barbour) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1946.

NE has handed SE the attached correspondence from the Greek Embassy, the British Embassy and our Embassy Athens³⁸ concerning a formal Greek request to the British and ourselves that we transmit to the Albanian Government a Greek protest concerning recent Greek-Albanian border incidents. You will note that the British Embassy states³⁹ that in the absence of British relations with Albania the British are not in a position to comply with this Greek request but they hope that the US will be able to do so. It is NE's feeling that we should instruct Jacobs as the Greeks and British suggest.

³⁸ Not printed.

³⁹ In an informal letter of July 16 to Mr. Baxter from Mr. Pares, not printed.

Subject to your approval, I propose to take the following line with NE:

In pointing out that our Mission in Tirana is only informal and that we in fact have no diplomatic relations with the Albanian Government, I will indicate that Eur is disinclined to take the matter up as requested. It seems to me that in the absence of impartial corroboration of the Greek allegations, of which we have none, we are in a weak position to transmit a protest on behalf of one of the contestants when it is obvious that such action will result in countercharges by the Albanians supported by their Yugoslav and Soviet friends which will only serve to further acerbate the situation. While there has undoubtedly been shooting on this frontier it seems to me that on the face of it, in the absence of exact information, it might be assumed that the Greeks have more cause to initiate such incidents than the Albanians. The Greeks are the ones claiming frontier rectification and might therefore wish to keep the frontier disturbed. In addition, the Greeks admit the presence of Greek fugitives from justice in the area (presumably Elasitas) who have been carrying on guerrilla warfare in Greece ever since liberation.

The Greek Chargé indicated in a conversation with NE that it was Greece's intention to request the Four Allies to take this matter up with the Albanian Government. If Greece does so, i.e. raise it with the Soviets and French in addition to their present approach to us and the British, I think we should be prepared to consult with the USSR, Britain and France as to the possibility of concerted action. Similarly, we should be prepared to give appropriate consideration if Greece should see fit to present the matter to the Security Council. In the absence of Greek action along one or the other of the above lines, I do not believe we should take any steps in the matter.⁴⁰

WALWORTH BARBOUR

868.50/7-1846 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

LONDON, July 18, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received 8:05 p. m.]

6804. Embtel No. 6798.⁴¹ Hayter Head of Southern Department in Foreign Office has now given us orally the following additional information about the talks the Prime Minister and his Mission had in London.

⁴⁰ In a note dated August 22, 1946, the Acting Secretary of State informed the Greek Ambassador that "in the absence of official relations between the United States Government and the Albanian Government, the informal American Mission at Tirana is not in a position to act in accordance with the request of the Greek Government." (768.75/7-1346)

⁴¹ Dated July 18, not printed.

Economic Matters

The British Government welcomed visit of Prime Minister and his party but British had not expected to engage in very detailed discussions with Mission or to receive any specific requests from Greeks for aid. Foreign Office was therefore somewhat surprised when in visit Prime Minister indicated he wanted to present a memo to British on subject of Greek economic reconstruction. Memo turned out to be "a most formidable document" and Greeks asked for a quick reply.

Briefly the memorandum copies of which being forwarded Department via airmail shows aim of the 5-year Greek reconstruction program to be twofold:

(a) The restoration of Greek economy to its pre-war level and; (b) its further development through the exploitation of new resources.

To accomplish first aim memorandum says something over 6 billion dollars are required to be used as follows:

1. Replacement of capital 5 billion dollars.
2. Deficit of balance of payments for 5 years 600 million dollars.
3. Deficits of budgets for 5 years 440 million dollars.

Achievement of second aim memo states presents an opportunity for financial investment in Greece by the western allies.

Immediate British reaction to Greek request to cover material damage was that this figure was far too high and that it was too much to hope that Greek economy could be straightaway restored to its prewar level. This view was explained to Greeks as well as fact that most countries of world had been weakened by the war and that it would hardly be possible to restore the economies of any of them to their prewar level immediately. The Greeks were given to understand that certainly nothing like the sum of 6 billion dollars would be available from Britain for use in Greece. It was, however, suggested to the Mission that Greeks themselves should work out a practicable plan for economic rehabilitation of their country with statement of their needs in way of external financial assistance and that they might then present this to some international financial agency. (Hayter mentioned specifically International Bank of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.) Greeks agreed to follow this suggestion.

British told Prime Minister they would undertake to purchase surplus stocks of tobacco presently held in Greece as well as this year's crop. Most of this tobacco will probably be used in British zone in Germany though some will be brought to Great Britain.

Greeks were told that British would be glad to assist them in arranging transfer of flags on any old merchant vessels Greeks might purchase. Greeks have considerable money in London representing insurance on Greek ships sunk during war.

Political Matters

Greek Prime Minister is much disturbed about infiltrations and clashes occurring on Albanian-Greek frontier. These incidents were discussed with British and Prime Minister advanced suggestion situation might be called to attention Security Council. British advised Greeks not to do this and suggested instead that Greeks endeavor to solve these frontier troubles through negotiations with Albanians. Greeks were willing to try this but asked for British help in approaching Albanians. British explained they were unable to assist as they do not recognize Albanian Government. Greeks then said they would probably follow British suggestion that they enlist support of US representative in Tirana.

In a general and preliminary way British discussed with Greeks plans for turning over administration of Dodecanese Islands to Greek authorities after Italian Peace Treaty becomes effective. British indicated that in meantime they will probably permit some Greek liaison officers to be attached to British Military Government in the island. British are now drawing up detailed plans for turning over administration of islands but these plans will be presented to Greeks later.

Without giving any indication of support in Greek territorial claims on Albania and Bulgaria British told Greeks that they would do all possible to see that these claims received a full hearing either at Peace Conference or Council of Foreign Ministers or both.

[Here follows discussion of internal Greek political affairs and of civil aviation in Greece.]

Sent Department as 6804; repeated to Athens as 99.

HARRIMAN

501.AA/7-2646

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Paul Economou-Gouras, Greek Chargé d'Affaires
Mr. Henderson (NEA)
Mr. Baxter (NE)

Mr. Economou-Gouras, Greek Chargé d'Affaires, called this afternoon at his request and presented Mr. Henderson with a note⁴² expressing the strong opposition of the Greek Government to the admission of Albania to the United Nations at this time.

One of the main arguments advanced by Mr. Gouras for this stand was the fact that Greece still considers itself at war with Albania.

⁴² No. 3807, July 25, not printed.

Mr. Henderson pointed out that, though the United States had not yet recognized the present Albanian regime, nor established diplomatic relations with it, our attitude throughout the war was that Albania was a puppet of Italy and therefore not to be held responsible for its hostile declarations against various Allied nations.⁴³

In connection with the statement, contained in the Greek note, that Greece had declared war on Albania by a Royal decree on November 10, 1940, Mr. Henderson remarked that as far as he knew the Department had no record of this declaration of war nor had it, to his knowledge, been referred to any earlier Greek notes concerning Albania, particularly a request about a year ago that Albania be declared an enemy State. He requested Mr. Gouras to supply the Department with a photostat copy of this decree.

Mr. Henderson assured Mr. Gouras that the views of the Greek Government concerning Albania membership in the United Nations would receive sympathetic consideration and be immediately made available to the appropriate US officials.

868.00/8-346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, August 3, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received August 4—2:37 p. m.]

1008. See mytel 955, of July 24.⁴⁴ Lieutenant General Crawford, commanding British Land Forces Greece, confirmed to me last night that serious fighting in progress last 24 hours in Olympus region north of Larissa with Greek troops attempting roundup opposing bands said to be about 4,000 strong. General said "undoubtedly" some members of these bands have come across border and expressed opinion majority likely elude capture by dispersing in mountains. Added "will be good thing if troops get them on the run since this will cause Communists lose face". British Staff information given Military Attaché this morning is that Government now using three battalions ground forces Thessaly and some air forces. Much seems to depend on early success of these forces if conditions of "civil war" repeatedly mentioned in Communist propaganda (mytel 983, July 23⁴⁴) are not to develop.

In this connection, recent word from usually dependable source Greek General Staff indicates Government now embarked on all out policy root out Communism and preparing shortly declare Communist Party illegal, which considered reason for present overt policy of "reconciliation" adopted by Communist chiefs. At same time, source

⁴³ For attitude of Department officials on this matter, see footnote 26, vol. III, p. 257.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

agreed with other less dependable informants in stating that Communists have been secretly planning widespread intensification of armed band activities between the 10th and 20th this month, which now being forestalled by stepping up of Government measures.

Meanwhile, though strong measures insure law and order undoubtedly carries appeal to large part of population, Government may be making as many enemies as friends on account of growing official tendency (1) to consider all persons Communists unless Royalists, (2) to protect former Metaxists and collaborators and (3) to accept armed assistance from disreputable elements professing royalism. Increasing exasperation of members of all parliamentary opposition groups apparent in this connection, and strengthening rather than weakening of anti-King and even pro-Communist sentiment throughout country not impossible as result of present extremist policy of governing authorities.

MACVEAGH

868.51/8-746

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1946.

Subject: Greek Economic Mission

1. In January 1946 the Export-Import Bank signed an agreement with Greece for a \$25 million loan. At the same time the American Ambassador in Athens delivered to the Greek Government a note that had been approved by you, pointing out the urgent need for the Greek Government to take immediate and energetic measures to solve its economic difficulties.

2. Up to the present time the Greek Government has not used any of the \$25 million credit made available to it nearly eight months ago. The information available to the Department indicates that the Greeks have not taken effective measures to deal with their internal financial difficulties, or to make the most effective use of the foreign assets already available to the country.

3. Early in July the Greek Prime Minister indicated to our Ambassador in London that he would like to send a mission to this country to discuss an additional Export-Import Bank loan. The Department, after consultation with the Export-Import Bank, replied that the time was not opportune to discuss a further loan, but that a mission to discuss the general Greek economic and financial situation would be welcomed. Our Ambassador in London conveyed this information to the Greek Prime Minister, and made clear that under present conditions there was no prospect of a new Export-Import Bank loan at this time.

4. The mission, however, in its early conferences with the Department has requested a new Export-Import Bank loan of \$175 million,

and urged the necessity of such a loan to prevent economic and political collapse.

5. UNRRA to July 31, 1946, provided \$293 million of free assistance to Greece, and this assistance by the end of 1946 will total approximately \$358 million. The Department, after a careful survey of the Greek economic situation, concluded that Greece could meet essential import needs in 1947 if it used effectively the resources at its command, including the \$25 million Export-Import loan. The Department did not feel that it was practicable to ask Congress to appropriate additional relief funds for Greece, either through UNRRA or a new organization. This decision has not yet been communicated to the Greek Government, but it is probable that Mr. Clayton⁴⁵ will explain our position to Greek representatives at the current UNRRA meeting in Geneva.

6. It is the feeling of the Department that it would be unwise for this Government to commit itself to extend any additional Export-Import Bank credits to Greece until the Greek Government has shown that it is taking the measures within its own power to deal with its economic problems. If Greece does that, an Export-Import Bank loan should be an effective means of furthering reconstruction in Greece, but in the absence of such action I feel that a new loan would do little, if anything, to solve the basic economic or political difficulties of Greece, and would ultimately add to its financial problems.

7. For your information, there is attached a copy of the note of January 12.⁴⁶

DEAN ACHESON

868.51/8-1246

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 3013

ATHENS, August 12, 1946.

[Received August 30.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a Memorandum,⁴⁷ prepared by Mr. Gardner Patterson, U.S. Member of the Greek Currency Committee, on the financial situation in Greece as of mid-July,

⁴⁵ William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

⁴⁶ Not printed. President Truman received the Greek Ambassador and the Greek Economic Mission on August 7. In a memorandum of the same date to Mr. Henderson, Mr. Baxter noted that the "President pointed out that any economic aid to be effective must be accompanied by measures undertaken by the Greek Government to restore normal internal economic conditions and that any credit extended through the Export-Import Bank is a two-way proposition with agreements to be worked out on both sides of the table. . . . The President once again assured the Mission of his desire to see Greece restored to economic health and stated that he would discuss the matter with the Secretary. It was understood, of course, that no decision of any sort could be reached until the Greek program had been thoroughly studied and discussed by Government officials who would, he was certain, be as sympathetic towards Greece as he himself." (868.50/8-746)

⁴⁷ Dated July 22, not printed.

1946. This Memorandum was very kindly drawn up by Mr. Patterson at my suggestion, to inform me of the condition and progress of his work with the Greek Government, and is wholly ex-curricular and unofficial. The Department may find it, as I have, of real interest in connection with the general problems of Greek finance and economy, and it may even provide officials of the Department and the Treasury with some useful background in their dealings with members of the Greek Economic Mission now in the United States, or with the Export-Import Bank and the Greek Embassy on the question of further American loans to Greece (see especially Department's telegram no. 883 of July 17, 1946⁴⁸); but the greatest care should be observed not to refer to it explicitly in any way, in order to safeguard Mr. Patterson's position, which is that of a paid employee of the Greek State.

Mr. Patterson describes the Greek financial situation as "gratifyingly quiet" and more satisfactory than at any time since September 1945. Inflation has been arrested for the moment, but the danger has not passed and continued improvement will depend on the handling by the Government of its problems. Mr. Patterson ventures to predict that "with appropriate policy the financial and economic situation can continue to improve gradually." On the other hand, a few serious errors could put Greece's economy "back into the chaos of last fall and winter."

Gold purchases by the Bank of Greece, the declining rate of increase in currency circulation, the increase in tax receipts, and the holding of the wage rates are mentioned as favorable factors. Serious problems remain, among them the heavily unbalanced budget, the expenses of the wheat collection scheme, the financing of imports following the cessation of UNRRA assistance, a necessary further depreciation of the drachma* to expand exports, and labor's demands for higher wages.

In conclusion, Mr. Patterson states that with the exception of Mr. Varvaressos'⁴⁹ efforts last summer, no one of the post-liberation governments can show that its policies were basically responsible for improving the financial situation; all tended to rely for assistance on what they conceived to be the strategic military and political interest of the United Kingdom and the United States, whereas Greece, which "needs a great deal of foreign aid", also "needs to do a great deal more for herself".

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

⁴⁸ Not printed.

*A separate memorandum on this subject is being prepared by Mr. Patterson, and will be transmitted as soon as possible. [Footnote in the original. The memorandum, dated August 12, was transmitted to the Department in despatch 3020, August 19, neither printed.]

⁴⁹ Kyriakos Varvaressos, Greek Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Supply from June 2 to September 1, 1945; for documentation on his economic program, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 222-236, *passim*.

868.00/8-1246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

4082. Secdel 666. For the Secretary. Greek Govt has requested Allied Mission observe Greek Electoral Lists remain in Greece to observe voting plebiscite scheduled September 1. Dept feels late date invitation and impossibility adequate observation with present staff make advisability negative reply to Greek invitation. Please advise Dept your decision urgently as Mission now in Athens recommends reply be made to Greece before publication its report on condition electoral lists now expected ready for release to press Saturday Aug 17.⁵⁰ Or you may wish to communicate direct with Tsaldaris and Brit in Paris.

Sent Paris 4082; rptd London 6028, Athens 1001.

ACHESON

868.51/8-1446 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1946—6 p. m.

1002. Since arrival Aug 1 Greek Economic Mission consisting Venizelos,⁵¹ Ailianos, Bakalbassis and Karamanlis has had frequent meetings with officials Dept, Treas, Comc, Agri, UNRRA and Eximbank. Despite Dept's indication US officials did not wish discuss further loans to Greece at this time, which was clearly explained to Mission by letter from Harriman before Mission left London, Venizelos and Ailianos insist conditions so serious Greek Govt felt necessary request loan this time despite US advice. Venizelos stresses political importance immediate further credits in order bring hope Greek people and expresses fear Greek internal social order will collapse if early aid not forthcoming.

Greek memo presented Eximbank and Dept Aug 7⁵² mentions additional loan \$175 million, of which approximately \$25 million would be used for purchase consumers goods in US in order Greek Govt by their sale could secure drachmas for local expenses in connection reconstruction and rehabilitation. Both Bank and Dept officials con-

⁵⁰ The Secretary of State, in telegram Delsec 824 (No. 4054) from Paris, August 16, 1946, 1 p. m., replied as follows: "Unless you feel that it is entirely impracticable to accept Greek invitation to observe voting on plebiscite, I should like to comply with request." (740,00119 Council/8-1646)

⁵¹ Sophocles Venizelos, the head of the Greek Economic Mission, sent a letter to Mr. Acheson on August 6 which presented in general terms Greece's dire need for immediate economic assistance (868.50/8-646).

⁵² Not found in Department files.

sider this memo poorly conceived and inadequate, containing many inconsistencies and estimates at great variance with those prepared by US Govt sources as well as surprising statement increased taxation would produce inflation. Attitude US officials also influenced by Greek slowness and inefficiency in connection utilization existing 25 million credit. Almost all US officials including President have mentioned necessity Greek Govt showing firm intention to institute economic, financial and tax reforms to put its own house in order.

Greek Mission approach on subject further credits widely divergent from Bank's. Greeks think obvious need for reconstruction and rehabilitation should justify blanket extension large credit with specific uses worked out later in conjunction with Bank. On other hand Bank now prefers to operate on basis submission individual projects with adequately supporting data and accurate estimate sums necessary for carrying out each project. Bank would then make individual decision each project rather than blanket line credit. Greek Mission will be encouraged not to submit formal request for \$175 million as such formal presentation would require official Bank decision which would be negative.

Dept feels Mission visit has been profitable as opportunity for exchange of views and will have good effect if returning Mission can convince Greek Govt that sympathetic consideration any future US assistance will be greatly facilitated by demonstration Greeks' ability to help themselves. Ineffective use existing Eximbank credit and \$10 million surplus property credit due dilatory Greek tactics and not to any obstacles raised by US officials.

Before departure Greek Mission, now scheduled Aug 22, Dept intends issue press release⁵³ emphasizing profitable two-way discussion on Greek economic and reconstruction problems. It is hoped some specific and encouraging items can be included such as improved coal and additional textile allocations; establishment better contacts for sale Greek tobacco to US; possibility early Lend-Lease settlement and defrosting Greek assets in US.

Sent Athens 1002; rptd London 6041, Paris 4091.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/8-1646 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1946—8 p. m.

4175. Secdel 692. For the Secretary. Urtel 4054, Delsec 824.⁵⁴ In view inadequate size present Greek Electoral List Mission to assume

⁵³ For text of press release issued on August 22, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1946, p. 426.

⁵⁴ Not printed; but see footnote 50, p. 190.

much larger task observing plebiscite and impossibility procuring necessary additional personnel, transportation, etc. between now and Sept 1. Dept considers it entirely impracticable accede to Greek request.

Brit Emb has informed Dept similar FonOff negative decision this subject and suggestion direct to Brit Delegation Paris that after consultation with you Greek Prime Minister Tsaldaris should be informed negative decision and public statement made at once if there is time to do so before release present Mission's report scheduled Saturday Aug 17. Brit FonOff suggests if this timing impossible announcement refusal observe plebiscite might be delayed few days so reply to Greek invitation would not be interpreted to be consequence observers report.

No public statement re US inability observe plebiscite will be released until you inform Dept of developments in Paris.

Sent Paris; rptd London 6114, Athens 1015.

ACHESON

[On August 19, 1946, the Department of State released a summary of the Report of the Allied Mission To Observe the Revision of Greek Electoral Lists. Leland Morris and Richard T. Windle were Chiefs of the American and British Sections of the Mission, respectively. The Mission expressed itself as "satisfied that the revision and recombinations of the electoral lists as observed by it attain a degree of fairness and accuracy which justifies their use in seeking the opinion of the Greek people in matters of national import." The full text of the release is published in the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1946, page 424.]

740.00119 Council/8-2046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

PARIS, August 20, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received August 20—5 : 03 p. m.]

4122. This is Delsec 834 from the Secretary. Tsaldaris called on me yesterday and again urged American and British observation of the forthcoming Greek plebiscite. After consultation with Bevin I have agreed that we should undertake together with the British informal observation of the Greek plebiscite. It is our thought that these observers should not in view of their limited numbers and the impossibility of full coverage of the polling places submit any formal report to the two governments. We feel, however, that their presence may serve as a deterrent to possible violence or fraud during or before the elections and that they would be able to convey to their two governments certain definite impressions as to the fairness of the plebiscite.

The British and American Governments could upon receipt of these impressions be guided thereby in their estimate of the results and could if desired make public their views. In view of the probability that elements of EAM and other groups may challenge the validity of the results of the plebiscite I believe that this is a useful course.

I am told that there are some 46 prefectures in Greece and that it would be feasible to have say, one British and one American observer in each who would visit by car such polling places in their respective areas as might be practicable during the course of the election. The British have some 50 observers still in Greece and I understand we have 25. I hope the Department will make every effort to obtain an additional 25 Americans in order if possible to participate on an equal basis with the British. The Department should inform the Greek Government of the foregoing, stating that we have reversed our previous decision on the basis of a further appeal for limited participation above described.

Sent Dept as 4122; repeated to Athens as 42 and London as 625.

[BYRNES]

868.00/8-2146: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1946—6 p. m.

1035. Paris 42 Aug 20 to Athens.⁵⁵ For Amfoge II and Embassy. In accordance Secretary's wish US personnel remain Greece for informal observation plebiscite Dept hopes you and staff will be willing to remain and in consultation with Amb MacVeagh and your Brit colleagues be able to work out plan of observation as satisfactory as limited facilities allow.⁵⁶

After consultation and agreement between you and Amb MacVeagh latter should inform Greek Govt that as result further Greek request for limited observation US has reversed earlier decision and is now willing keep observers in Greece for plebiscite. It should be clearly explained to Greek Govt that observers will make no formal report to Greek Govt but are remaining in order to transmit to their respective governments as much information as possible on conditions under which plebiscite is carried out. Also make clear to Greek Govt that it is our understanding that our observers are to have complete freedom of movement and complete cooperation of Greek officials. You may add that we are somewhat disturbed by recent reports of growing

⁵⁵ Same as telegram 4122, *supra*.

⁵⁶ For statement by the Department on observing the Greek plebiscite, released August 24, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1946, p. 425.

tendency on part of various factions to bring pressure for the apparent purpose of influencing plebiscite results. Greek Govt should be told that our observers will of course be obligated to report any acts of violence, intimidation, unfair pressure or fraud which may be brought to their attention and that we shall take into consideration these observer reports in arriving at our decision with regard to fairness of plebiscite.

Dept has discussed with War possibility of detaching on urgent basis from European Theater 25 officers to be assigned to you as additional observers, recommending Lt. Col. William H. Patterson, formerly with Amfoge I and now in Germany, to be in charge this group. Dept has indicated that if such group military personnel could be made available it should reach Athens by Sunday or Monday Aug 25 or Aug 26 and that its duties in Greece would last only about 8 days. Decision of War on this request will be transmitted to you soon as possible.

Dept will explore possibilities at this end of return transportation and will appreciate any suggestions you can make. Suitable arrangements will be made for those observers scheduled to take Foreign Service exams Sept 30.

Sent Athens 1035, rptd London 6184, Paris 4264 for Secretary.

ACHESON

[On August 24, 1946, Dmitry Zakharovich Manuilsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, telegraphed the complaint of his Government against Greece before the Security Council, then meeting in New York City, under article 34 of the United Nations Charter. The complaint alleged that irresponsible Greek policy had resulted in a situation in the Balkans which represented a grave danger to the peace and security of that area. It called attention to the numerous border incidents on the Greek-Albanian frontier provoked by Greek armed units; the repeated public statements by Greek Government spokesmen about the existence of an alleged state of war between Greece and Albania; the persecution of minorities in Macedonia, Thrace, and Cyprus by the Greek Government; and the unbridled propaganda of Greek monarchist extremists who demanded Albanian territories. The principal factor said to be conducive to the situation was the presence of British troops in Greece which intervened directly in the internal affairs of Greece on behalf of aggressive monarchist elements. For text of the Ukrainian complaint, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 5*, page 149.]

501.BC/8-2746

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Director of the
Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1946.

Subject: Attitude Toward the Ukrainian Complaint Against Greece

Mr. Johnson⁵⁷ talked to me several times on the telephone on the above subject expressing considerable anxiety lest the Ukrainian complaint redound to the discredit of the Security Council. He said that he considered the complaint intellectually dishonest and frivolous. He hoped that we could oppose its being considered on those grounds. I pointed out that the position the Secretary had taken consistently had been that the Council was to be open to access by all states and that in our discussions heretofore in the Department about this matter we had simply assumed that the usual procedure would be followed of letting the Ukrainians supplement their complaint in an oral statement following which the Greek representative would be permitted to have his say. Mr. Johnson felt that this procedure would fail to avoid the dangers he foresaw. He said that he had some doubt as to whether the United States should take the lead in attacking the complaint and he thought it might be better tactics to have the Egyptian or perhaps the Brazilian take the lead. Although he had initially suggested that the Ukrainian's present complaint should be dropped as frivolous with a ruling by the Council that it would not consider the matter further unless a *written* statement was submitted establishing a *prima facie* case for the file, in the course of our discussions Mr. Johnson took the position that perhaps the charge of frivolity should be made after the Ukrainians had been permitted to make an oral statement in support of their present written complaint.

I said that I thought this latter suggestion of Mr. Johnson merited careful consideration and that I was inclined to agree that many of the points made in the complaint presented no case for Council action. I said, however, that I thought the allegation of border incidents between Albania and Greece could not be dismissed as fabricated in view of the fact that the Greek memorandum⁵⁸ against Albania's application for membership had itself alleged a number of border incidents. Both Mr. Johnson and I recognized in this connection that it appeared strange for the Ukrainians to be pleading Albania's case unless it could state reasons why Albania was itself not in a position to do so.

⁵⁷ Herschel Johnson, Acting United States Representative at the United Nations.

⁵⁸ No. 3807, July 25, not printed.

This might offer a ground for the Council refusing to consider the Greek-Albanian border clashes at the present time.

Mr. Johnson urged me to see that this matter was considered carefully by the Department, saying that he thought the Ukrainian case would damage the Council's prestige even more than the Spanish case had.

Mr. Johnson called me again on this subject to say that Dr. Van Kleffens⁵⁹ also feels strongly about the dangers to the Council's prestige inherent in the Ukrainian complaint and feels that the Council must protect itself from being made a forum for political propaganda. Dr. Van Kleffens said that he would oppose the complaint being placed on the agenda, pointing out that it took only five votes to block that action whereas it would require seven votes including all the permanent members to drop a case from the agenda once discussion had started. Dr. Van Kleffens had also said that he thought Mr. Johnson's proposal would not meet the situation since it would be impossible to prevent lengthy acrimonious discussion in the Council about the merits of the case once the matter was permitted to appear on the agenda. I told Mr. Johnson that in view of the Department's position that all states should have free access to the Council I did not see how we could support any attempt by Dr. Van Kleffens to prevent the matter going on the agenda. I pointed out that the Secretary, in the Iranian case, had stressed the fact that placing a matter on the agenda in no way represented any predetermination by the Council on the merits of the case and that the only way to determine whether a complaint was frivolous was to permit its presentation, and I also pointed out that the Russians had themselves admitted in the Spanish case that only a procedural vote would be required to drop a matter from the agenda. Mr. Johnson said that he would talk further to Dr. Van Kleffens. I suggested that Dr. Van Kleffens might wish to express his doubts as to the propriety of the Council's considering the case without actually formally opposing its appearing on the agenda.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Elco Van Kleffens, Netherlands Representative at the United Nations.

⁶⁰ In telegram 523, August 28, 10:20 p. m., New York reported that at the morning session that day, the Netherlands spokesman, supported by Sir Alexander Cadogan, opposed inclusion of the Ukrainian complaint on the Security Council agenda until the complaint was better documented. Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Representative at the United Nations, argued in favor of including the complaint on the agenda. It was decided to hold the question in abeyance. (501.BC/8-2846) For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on the morning of August 28, see SC, *1st yr., 2nd series, No. 4*, pp. 33-39.

501.BC/8-2846 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Acting
Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1946—3 p. m.

174. For Herschel Johnson. We have received information that Greece may urge postponement of SC consideration of Ukrainian communication of August 20 and will request US support of their position.

Our view is that, as a general rule, SC should permit adequate time for a nation complained against before SC to prepare its case and to transport its representatives to participate in SC discussion. This general rule would be subject to Council consideration of representations by complaining member urging prompt treatment. In Iranian case in March 1946 Secretary took strong position that Council should not decide to postpone consideration of case until it had had opportunity to hear Iran as complaining nation state its views on advisability of postponement. We do not wish to take position on Ukrainian complaint inconsistent with that taken in Iranian case.

Accordingly, our position on postponement of Greek case should be that we have no objection to granting their request for postponement for reasonable time if Ukrainian representative himself offers no objection but that we will not support postponement if Ukrainian objects until Council has had opportunity to hear his views on postponement issue.⁶¹

ACHESON

501.BC/9-546 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Acting
Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

179. With respect to specific charges made in Ukrainian note we have following comments: (1) Allegation that Greeks have perpe-

⁶¹The United Kingdom considered it important that the Ukrainian case not be considered until after September 1, the date of the plebiscite (telegram 7796, August 27, 1946, 4 p. m., from London, 868.00/8-2746). Mr. Acheson directed that Mr. Johnson be informed of the British position and of the United States view that it would be helpful if the case were not considered until the following week. An assistant of Mr. Johnson was so informed by Mr. Hiss on August 28 (memorandum of conversation, 501.BC/8-2746). Later the same day, the Department received instructions from Mr. Byrnes to support British efforts to postpone discussion of the case (telegram 4303, August 28, 5 p. m., from Paris, 868.00/8-2846). The Security Council, at its fifty-ninth session on September 3, admitted the Ukrainian complaint to its agenda by a vote of 7 to 2, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands opposing and Australia and Brazil abstaining.

trated border incidents presents but part of picture. As you know Greek Govt has made similar allegations against Albanians. Whether one side or other is primarily responsible for these incidents could only be determined following consideration by Council of evidence of conclusive nature which may be submitted by interested parties or result from an investigation if such were deemed necessary. Ideological differences between present Greek and Albanian regimes and Greek claims to Northern Epirus are among basic causes for friction which has developed. Accordingly an examination by Council of available evidence would seem to be only procedure by which essential facts regarding this situation could be ascertained.

(2) We have in past sought informally and orally to dissuade Greek Govt from pressing claim that state of war exists between Greece and Albania. We consider claim of doubtful validity. However, Greek Govt would now find graceful retreat from this position extremely difficult. Although we do not regard reference to this subject in Ukrainian note as a major point and feel that it is significant in relation to UN Charter only because it is manifestation that friction exists between Greece and Albania, we believe that the question of whether a state of war exists might be referred by Council to [International] Court for advisory opinion under Article 96 par. 1. Such a solution might be palatable to Greece even though an adverse opinion were handed down by Court since Greece would be positively demonstrating her good faith in Charter. Of course, Ukrainian complaint on this aspect Albanian-Greek relations would be groundless if state of war were found to exist.

(3) Ukrainian allegation that there has been persecution by Greek Govt of national minorities in Greece requires further elucidation. It is known that Albania has alleged 25,000 Albanians were driven from Greece. On the other hand Greece has complained of persecution of Greeks in Albania. At this moment obtaining a completely accurate picture on this controversial question would appear virtually impossible. Treatment accorded to national minorities by state in which they dwell would generally be matter essentially within domestic jurisdiction of state. We feel however certain practices with regard to national minorities, such as forceful expulsion, may have international implications of concern to UN.

Balkan minority problem is obviously friction laden and present phase is simply continuation of desperate situation in which those minorities have existed during modern history. If, as result of preliminary discussion, Security Council finds there are sufficient indications to warrant belief that Greece may have engaged in practices with regard to its national minorities which are of legitimate concern to UN, we would be prepared to support establishment of subcommit-

tee of Council, one of whose duties would be to study material available in New York. Following report to Council of subcommittee consideration could be given to possibility and advisability of on the spot investigation to include interviewing of minorities who have allegedly gone into adjacent countries.

(4) Ukrainian reference to "unbridled propaganda" of Greek monarchist extremists as serving to convert Balkan peninsula into center of conflict is somewhat vague. Not only monarchist but center and left press in Greece is demanding that certain territory be ceded to Greece. Greece is not alone in its desire obtain certain territories. Press in Bulgaria, former enemy state, has been demanding cession of Western Thrace by Greece. We feel this demand equally as disturbing to Balkan situation as Greek demands. In any event we do not regard charge against Greek monarchist propaganda as being relevant to a complaint alleging a situation under Article 34 of the Charter.

(5) Charge against presence of British forces in Greece revives similar charge made by USSR against United Kingdom in January. We do not believe that any new facts have been presented to substantiate charge that presence of British troops is cause of a situation which endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. As you know USSR was originally invited to participate in observance of Greek election but declined to do so. So far as US knows conduct of British forces in Greece has been excellent. For your information US military and Dept believe that their continued presence is stabilizing factor and we hope that UK will not commence an early withdrawal following plebiscite which we have understood is their intention.

U.S. cannot divest itself of certain responsibility for the welfare of the Greek people and could not appropriately urge the Council to treat superficially charges about the situation there.

(6) We do not believe that we should at this stage support dismissal Ukrainian complaint regardless of motivation. In our opinion our policy should henceforth be as follows:

(a) Support of principle of full discussion of Ukrainian complaint by Council and of right of Ukrainian and Greek Representatives to participate in such discussion if they so desire.

(b) Support submission of question of whether state of war exists between Albania and Greece to Court for advisory opinion in event Council discussion does not solve question.

(c) Since Dept is at present pessimistic about results to be obtained from Council discussion of matter, we should be prepared to support or recommend establishment of subcommittee, similar to that set up for Spanish question, (1) to examine evidence in New York and report to Council, and (2) subsequently to conduct on the spot investigation

if Council deems such necessary. Terms of reference of committee must be carefully drawn up so that investigation will be sufficiently broad to determine what countries are responsible and to what degree for unstable situation.

Repeated to Paris as Secdel.⁶²

CLAYTON

868.00/9-546

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Gouras, Greek Chargé
Mr. Henderson (NEA)
Mr. Baxter (NE)

Mr. Gouras, Greek Chargé, who called today at his request to discuss several Greek matters, asked if the Department had any views on the recent plebiscite which he might transmit to his Government. Mr. Henderson said that we had as yet received very little information from Athens beyond the official figures on the voting released by the Greek Government and the information that the plebiscite had passed off generally in an atmosphere of calm.

Mr. Henderson remarked that the outcome of the plebiscite had not been much of a surprise to anyone, he thought. He hoped, however, that the policy of the Government would be a moderate one, aimed at consolidating the varied political views of the great majority of the Greek people. Although any government is justified in taking the necessary measures to preserve law and order, the US Government would find it very difficult, in the face of adverse opinion from the American public, as well as the rest of the world, to look with favor on a Greek government which would follow the plebiscite with terroristic or unnecessarily repressive steps to get rid of all Greek political elements unfriendly to the government.

Mr. Henderson assured Mr. Gouras that we had no indication that the Greek Government intended to move in that direction, but he did feel it necessary to point out that in the present international situation when Greece is the object of so many unfriendly attacks from the outside, it was particularly necessary for it to follow a course of prudent moderation.

⁶² This telegram was repeated as Secdel 823 (No. 4603 to Paris). In telegram Secdel 822 (No. 4602 to Paris), September 5, 1946, 4 p. m., Mr. Clayton informed the Secretary of State that had time permitted, Secdel 823 would have been sent to him for approval because of its importance. Mr. Clayton noted that the Department had tried carefully to follow Mr. Byrnes' policy. (740.00119 Council/9-546)

868.50/9-746 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1946—3 p. m.

1112. Discussions with Greek Economic Mission followed general tone outlined Deptel 1002 Aug 14 to Athens, London 6041, Paris 4091. During informal conversations⁶³ just before Mission's departure, while stressing US friendliness to Greece and fact US Govt had no intention interfering Greek internal affairs, I said frankly that US can do little toward long-term aid to Greece if Greek Govt unwilling or unable to take measures in order conserve Greek resources and lay basis for immediate economic reconstruction. Feeling in US Govt circles that Greece has not taken all steps to conserve or make best use of gold and foreign currency resources in Greece or of resources Greek Govt and citizens outside Greece; that sterner measures could have been taken during postwar period to prevent profiteering and to tax profiteers from occupation period. Also question whether Greek tax structure corresponds to present needs.

Although no commitments made, it was informally agreed that possibility sending small top flight economic and financial commission to Greece in near future if requested by Greek Govt would be presented to National Advisory Commission.

I reiterated general policy US Govt that International Bank should be principal medium for flotation loans for reconstruction or development. Also indicated Int. Bank expected to be able extend credits within few months and was already receiving loan applications.

It was agreed that any specific suggestions or advice as to methods whereby Greece could improve economic conditions would be embodied in memorandum transmitted through Greek Emb to Athens and not in Dept's press release. Copy of memorandum when prepared will be transmitted to you by Dept.

You may use this info as background for discussions with Greek officials whenever appropriate.

For your info only real effort was made by both Dept and Treas to make Mission aware that basic long term policy of US aimed at elimination foreign exchange restrictions and controls does not mean that US fails to recognize desirability use effective control measures during next few years by countries like Greece which should husband all available gold and foreign exchange resources for essential reconstruction purposes. In this connection it was intimated to Mission

⁶³ On August 23.

that US failed to comprehend wisdom present Greek monetary policies such as gold sales, and unrestricted monthly remittances up to £100, which dissipate vital Greek foreign exchange resources.

Conversations members Mission indicated possibilities substantial export tobacco also currants, strengthened OFD view that if Greek Govt marshalls Greek resources it is possible for Greece to meet needs for current consumption from home production plus proceeds exports, remittances etc. Conversations mentioned ineffectiveness Greek Govt organizing reconstruction work.

Sent Athens 1112, rptd Paris as 4672 for Sec Del 844, London 6502.

CLAYTON

501.BC/9-746 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Acting
Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1946—10 p. m.

US URGENT

183. For Herschel Johnson. In light of SC proceedings on Ukrainian complaint against Greece thus far we believe that US should pursue following course for the present :

1. Support request of Albania to appear before Council. (Re Deptel 180 Sept 5⁶⁴) Whether or not Art 32 of Charter forms basis of participation you may in your discretion support laying down of reasonable conditions in accordance with spirit of last sentence that Art.

2. At appropriate stage of debate, following statement of Albanian Representative, we suggest you should make general statement of US position along following lines :

US Govt has during past 2 weeks given careful study to charges contained in Ukrainian letter of Aug 24 concerning situation in Greece. My Govt has been surprised at manner in which Ukrainian Govt has dealt with these grave charges against two Members of UN. US feels that any Member of UN which is concerned about situation should at least make effort to call it to attention of Govts directly involved prior to submitting such case to SC. As matters stood on Aug 24 Ukrainian Govt had, so far as my Govt is aware, made no effort whatsoever to call to attention of either Greek or British Govts situation of which it now complains or to obtain from them any information regarding matter.

We have now heard remarks of Representatives of Ukrainian S.S.R.,

⁶⁴ Not printed; it set forth the Department's view that "under Article 32 of Charter Albania can appropriately be invited as a 'party to a dispute under consideration' by SC. Furthermore, even if this broad interpretation of phrase 'party to a dispute' is not accepted by Council, we believe that SC could under its general powers invite Albania to participate without vote in discussion of Greek question." (501.BC/9-546)

Greece, UK, USSR (and Albania). In general it may be said that there are three major questions about which there seem to be conflicting allegations and opposing views. First of these is question of border incidents along Greek-Albanian border, second is treatment accorded to national minorities and third relates to presence and activities of British troops in Greece.

My Govt regards Ukrainian charges concerning (a) monarchist propaganda, (b) Greek claim that state of war exists with Albania and (c) Greek elections and referendum, of minor importance to the SC. All shades of opinion have been expressed in Greece and, if I might add, in rather strong terms. Whether state of war exists or not Greece apparently makes this claim in good faith. The fact that she has already made it to Peace Conference in Paris would indicate that it is made without aggressive intent. With respect to elections held last March, I should like to call attention of Ukrainian Representative to the "Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections", copies of which have been distributed to each member of Council today. Since My Government participated in Allied Mission to observe Greek elections and was, with Governments of France and Great Britain, signatory to this report, it feels that casual manner in which Ukrainian Delegate has cast doubt upon way in which Greek elections were conducted is totally uncalled for and can only stem from willful disregard of facts set forth in this report, available to anybody who will take slightest trouble to read it. It may be recalled that Govt of USSR, of which Ukrainian SSR is one, was among those govts invited to observe elections.

US has received only preliminary reports concerning referendum. These reports do not contain any evidence to warrant belief that the manner in which referendum was conducted was a danger to international peace.

Turning now to allegations regarding border incidents and persecution of minorities, I should like first of all to state that while Council cannot dismiss these allegations lightly we believe they must be looked at as symptoms of disturbed situation in whole Balkan area.

As regards border incidents, Ukrainian (and Albanian) Reps. allege that Greece has perpetrated such incidents while Greece contends attacks have been made on her. We do not feel that evidence thus far presented proves either that Greece is alone responsible for these incidents or that her conduct with respect to them creates a situation of concern to the Council.

Under normal circumstances the problem of national minorities within a state is one of domestic concern to that state. It is well known, however, that the problem of national minorities in an area may cause serious friction between states. This is particularly true in Balkan area. Yet I do not think that Council could conclude from facts thus far presented to it that friction asserted in this instance is endangering international peace.

Ukrainian and Soviet Representatives have been most critical of presence of British troops in Greece and have stated that their continued presence is endangering peace and security. My Govt does not share this opinion. On contrary we believe that presence of Brit-

ish forces has been a stabilizing factor. This matter was thoroughly discussed in London at open meetings of SC. At that time US Representative said, and this is still position of my Govt:

"The Government of the United States is satisfied after thorough consideration, that there is no reasonable ground for a belief that the presence of British troops in Greece under the admittedly unhappy circumstances described by the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Greece, can be regarded as constituting a situation which is likely to endanger international peace and security."

My Govt, therefore, does not see that any useful purpose is served by going into this matter again.⁶⁵

3. You are authorized in your discretion to support establishment of subcommittee to examine facts in New York, provided terms of reference are satisfactory, (re final para. Deptel 179, Sept. 5) but should not agree to any proposal for on-the-spot investigation without further authorization.

Repeat to Paris as #4675, Secdel 847. Sent to Amdel N. Y. as 183.

CLAYTON

868.00/9-746

*Report by Messrs. Richard T. Windle and Leland Morris, Chiefs of the Allied Mission To Observe the Greek Elections*⁶⁶

REPORT ON THE OBSERVATION OF THE GREEK PLEBISCITE

ATHENS, 7 September, 1946.

At the request of the British and American Governments, the Allied Mission appointed to observe the recompilation of the Greek Electoral Lists remained to observe the Plebiscite on the return of King George of the Hellenes held on 1st September.

The Mission had to be reorganized at short notice and its strength was increased from sixty-four to ninety-five observer teams, each consisting of an observer, driver, and a Greek interpreter. Twenty-five of the additional teams were supplied by the American element and the remainder by Land Forces Greece.

Observers were allocated to centres from which they could radiate to observe a number of polling places on polling day, and on the two days before polling day they visited villages and precincts where polling was to take place, to ensure that adequate preparations were made for the casting of ballots.

The selection of Centres of operation had regard to—

- (a) An adequate coverage of the country.
- (b) Districts to which earlier reports indicated attention would be desirable.

⁶⁵ For text of statement made by Mr. Johnson before the Security Council on September 9, see SC, *1st yr., 2nd series*, p. 273.

⁶⁶ Sent to the Secretary of State at Paris by Mr. Morris on September 7.

With minor exceptions, all observers reached Athens on 25th August. They were briefed on the following day and dispersed to their districts, the journey in many cases taking two or three days.

The number of places visited on the two days preceding the election was 1096. The number of polling places visited on polling day was 625.

The total number of electors on the rolls was approximately 1,813,730. At the time of writing this report 1,691,802 votes had been cast, and it is estimated that approximately 15,000 votes will be cast at the polling places where the polling takes place on 8th September. The votes cast will therefore be approximately 94% of the total electorate.

In 34 polling places polling did not take place owing, it is stated by the Greek Government, to the inability of the legal representative of the Government to reach the polling place. Polling will take place on 8th September at these places.

The total votes cast to date is:—

King George	1, 166, 665
Blank	346, 913
Democratic	174, 411
Invalid	3, 813
Total:—	<u>1, 691, 802</u>

This shows a majority of 69% of votes cast in favour of the King.

Conditions in Polling Stations.

We are satisfied that the Government took adequate steps to provide the necessary personnel and material for the conduct of the plebiscite, and made provisions for the parties to be represented. In most cases the conditions established for polling stations appeared to have been carried out satisfactorily, but there were a number of polling stations in which there were irregularities which gave advantage to the supporters of the Government.

In some cases the elector was allowed to take only one ballot paper, and the way he voted would therefore be known. At a number of polling stations the representation of political parties was inadequate, and there is an indication that influence was used by the supporters of the Government to prevent representatives of the opposition from functioning. In Larissa and Thrace military operations are proceeding between government forces and armed bands; this on polling day created a state of tension which may have had the effect of preventing people attending the polling places.

Of polling places visited 463 are reported by the observers to have been orderly and well conducted, and in 162 there were varying degrees of dissatisfaction expressed. The counting of the votes ap-

peared to have been conducted satisfactorily. Adequate arrangements for the counting had been made, and in the polling stations observed there were no complaints of importance.

Influence with Electors.

Many complaints have been made of interference with the electors. This takes many forms and is not confined to interference in and around polling places. While it was carried out by both sides, we feel from the information received that the supporters of the government were responsible for by far the largest amount of this form of activity. Owing to military operations in some districts even the roads were mined by anti-government elements, making the passage of electors dangerous.

Civil Service and Military Personnel.

Special arrangements were made for civil servants and military personnel to vote at stations other than those at which they were registered. We understood this to have been for the purpose of providing for absent voters. We fear, however, that voting facilities were given to service personnel who were not on the electoral lists, though qualified to be registered. This will increase the number of people who voted beyond that which would have been the case had it been confined to registered electors.

The special facilities for civil servants appear to have worked better as they had to hand in their electoral booklets in order to obtain these special facilities.

CONCLUSIONS

The state of public order is far from satisfactory. Well organized armed bands are operating in Larissa, Thrace and other parts of the country. The main towns are not affected by this, and the Government appear to be taking steps to deal with it. While this is a governmental matter, it had effect on the free movement of persons desiring to vote.

There is no doubt in our minds that the party representing the government view exercised undue influence in securing votes in support of the return of the King, but without that influence we are satisfied that a majority of votes for the King's return could have been obtained.

The vote which shows 94% voting we regard as unreal and does not agree with the percentage of votes cast in the polling stations that were covered by our observers. The fact that the Mission remained to observe the plebiscite undoubtedly stimulated the government and its local election officers in making adequate preparations for and the carrying through of the polling.

A supplementary report devoted to detail respecting the conduct of the plebiscite and containing statistical and other appendices, including extracts from the observers' reports, will be presented later.⁶⁷

R. T. WINDLE
LELAND MORRIS
Chiefs of Mission

501.BC/9-746

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1946.

Mr. Johnson called me last night to say that he thought the Department's telegram (183 of September 7) of suggestions for a statement he might make at this stage of proceedings in the Ukrainian case against Greece is very good. He said that he liked our approach of taking the issues up one by one and in effect eliminating as unimportant all but the allegations relating to border incidents.

He went on to say that he had just been talking to Sir Alexander Cadogan and that Cadogan said that sending a commission to consider the question of Greek frontier incidents would be dangerous. He thought the sending of such a commission would provoke both sides to bring about incidents which they could allege were caused by the other side. Sir Alexander plans to talk to Mr. Hasluck (Australia) and apparently will try to dissuade Mr. Hasluck from proposing the sending out of any such commission. Cadogan also said that he had received a special telegram from Bevin thanking him for the statement he had made before the Council. Cadogan said that Bevin is seriously disturbed by the Ukrainian charges as he believes the case is ruining the Council's reputation and believes, therefore, that the Council must terminate consideration of the case. Mr. Johnson believes that Cadogan is instructed to try to get the case dropped in its entirety on the ground that a *prima facie* case has not been made.

Mr. Johnson said that Van Kleffens is also very worried about the damage being done to the Council's prestige. He feels that it is weakened of the Council to allow cases of this kind to remain before it. In this connection, however, Mr. Johnson told me that he himself is convinced of the correctness of our position with respect to the proposal made by the British and the Dutch that the case not even be placed on the agenda. Mr. Johnson said that he has had many favorable comments about our position in this matter.

⁶⁷ The "Supplement to Report on the Observation of the Greek Plebiscite"; dated September 13, 1946, and its eight enclosures, were transmitted to the Department by Ambassador Morris in his despatch 5, September 13, none printed.

Mr. Johnson made clear that he too was still seriously preoccupied about the problem of the Council's prestige if the Ukrainian case is not dropped from the agenda. He also said that he is convinced that the major Soviet purpose in sponsoring the Ukrainian move is to "break" Greece and to try to bring about a situation in Greece comparable to the situations in Rumania and Bulgaria. However, he anticipates that there will very likely be a movement within the Council for the appointment of a committee of the Council to receive further information. We agreed that if such a movement develops it would be unwise for this government to oppose it. In fact Mr. Johnson went so far as to say that the situation might develop in such a way that we should take the initiative in proposing the establishment of such a committee. In any event our support for a committee would, presumably, on the basis of present developments, be limited to a committee to consider only the frontier issue but its terms of reference should include incidents on all of Greece's borders. In particular, Mr. Johnson agreed that if Australia, France, Mexico and Egypt, or some of this group, urge the appointment of a committee it would be unwise for this government to oppose it even though we might want to say in agreeing to it that we ourselves were not convinced that a *prima facie* case of a threat to the peace had been made out. We would, in such case, defer to the views of a substantial number of members of the Council that the matter warranted further investigation. Mr. Johnson said that he thought if the situation developed in this way it would be most unwise for the British themselves to oppose the appointment of a committee and that he would want to speak to Cadogan in an attempt to persuade the latter not to oppose a committee. Mr. Johnson agreed that his initial statement would be along the lines of preliminary comments as to the information thus far put before the Council without any indication of the ultimate views of the United States as to action the Council should take in disposing of the case. He will, meanwhile, attempt to ascertain the views of other representatives on the Council and will keep the Department informed of developments.

868.00/9-1146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, September 11, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received 8:15 p. m.]

1206. Recent announcements of British military withdrawal from Greece have been in keeping with long-standing official attitude that such withdrawal would follow completion of plebiscite. However, Lt. General Crawford, commanding British Land Forces Greece has told me privately that in his opinion British troops will stay here till

Russians withdraw from Bulgaria and possibly longer since by time Russians withdraw they will have completed the formation of strong Communist armies in all Balkan puppet states constituting continued threat to Greek northern provinces. Hazarded guess of at least another year of British occupation. Meanwhile some troops are due to leave Greece in accordance with announcements but Military Attaché reports from British staff sources that combat strength in north will not be lowered appreciably. Withdrawals which will total about 4,000 out of approximately 28,500 now in country will be made chiefly from Patras and Athens areas. In addition RAF planning to depart before end of year leaving here only small advisory and training mission.

MACVEAGH

711.68/9-1246

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter dated August 28, 1946 from the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War, to which is attached a memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated August 23, 1946,^{67a} entitled "Military Implications of the Current Turkish Situation." You will observe that the JCS memorandum contains certain suggestions for improving the military situation of Turkey, including the granting of permission for Turkey to purchase from the United States certain arms and military equipment as outlined in SWNCC 202/2^{67b} and the giving of consideration to the advisability of supplying selected United States technicians including officers for the purpose of assisting the Turks.

This communication brings us face to face with a problem which we appear to have been approaching for some time. That problem is whether in view of the policy which the Soviet Union appears to be pursuing of endeavoring to undermine the stability and to obtain control of the countries in the Near and Middle East such as Greece, Turkey and Iran, we should make certain changes in our general policies, including those relating to the sale of combat equipment, to an extent which might enable us to strengthen the will and ability of the various Near and Middle Eastern countries under Soviet pressure to resist that pressure.

You will recall that on February 5, 1946, the Staff Committee recommended that certain restrictions be imposed upon the sale of

^{67a} For these papers, see pp. 856, 857, respectively.

^{67b} Dated February 11, included in the documentation on United States National Security Policy, printed in volume I.

military-type surplus equipment to foreign countries. A copy of the Summary of Action of the Committee^{67c} on that date is attached hereto for your convenience (Enclosure 2). You will observe that this recommendation excludes the sale of such equipment to any countries of the Near and Middle East. Insofar as can be ascertained, no formal blanket decision at a high level has been made with regard to the sale abroad of military-type equipment other than surplus equipment, and the Department has consequently pursued no fixed policy regarding the matter, but has handled each request on an *ad hoc* basis. Sales to the Near and Middle East by private American suppliers have been limited to commercial aircraft, sporting equipment or small arms for personal protection.

You will also recall that on February 5, 1946 Mr. Acheson, in testifying before the Mead Committee, explained why the Department had decided to sell certain quantities of military-type surplus equipment to a number of selected countries and that the members of that Committee were inclined to be critical of our action in that respect. Although Mr. Acheson made no pledges to the Committee with regard to the future policies of the Department of State with respect to the sale to foreign countries of military-type surplus equipment, he made it clear that we had no intention of selling this type of equipment to countries other than those contained in the list, which did not include any Near or Middle Eastern countries. Mr. Acheson did not discuss with the Mead Committee what our policies might be with regard to new non-surplus military-type equipment. The Mead Committee has no jurisdiction over transactions involving sale of equipment which is not Government-owned. Shortly after the hearings in which Mr. Acheson participated, a sale of surplus airplanes was made inadvertently to Sweden by an FLC Representative and the matter was explained to the Mead Committee. The members of that Committee, while accepting the explanation, indicated that they reserved the right to criticize the transaction.

Mr. Acheson, however, did not consider that his action in offering an explanation of the Swedish sale to the Mead Committee established a precedent which would require consultation with the Committee on each subsequent proposal to sell military equipment. His explanation was given for the purpose of making it clear to the Mead Committee that he had acted in good faith in explaining our policy to that Committee on February 5 and that he did not know at that time that a sale to Sweden was under contemplation.

^{67c} No. SC/R-184, included in documentation on United States National Security Policy, in volume I.

On March 21 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee made a decision ^{67d} (SWNCC 202/2) in which it was suggested that "In accordance with the United States' firm political policy of aiding the countries of the Near and Middle East to maintain their independence and develop sufficient strength to preserve law and order within their boundaries, it is consistent with United States policy to make available additional military supplies, in reasonable quantities, to those countries." This decision also applied only to surplus and Lend-Lease equipment. It will be noted that it is not on all fours with the State Department Staff recommendations. At least one of these documents, therefore, must be changed.

During the period of more than six months which has elapsed since the formulation of the policies outlined above, there have been certain profound changes in the world situation. The Soviet Union has shown itself determined to continue to adhere to, and to pursue unswervingly, its policies of endeavoring to create instability in certain of the Near and Middle East countries contiguous to it or to its satellites and to endeavor to obtain hegemony over these countries.

In northern Iran the Soviet Union has equipped and trained a puppet Azerbaijan army said to number more than 20,000 men and is continuing to endeavor through this army and by other means to weaken and eventually gain control of the Central Iranian Government. It has made formal demands upon Turkey which, if accepted by the Turkish Government, would inevitably result in Turkey becoming a Soviet puppet.

It has aided its satellites, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, in creating strong armed forces and is using these forces as a means of pressure upon Greece. Soviet agents are undoubtedly responsible for the smuggling of arms to, and for the strengthening of, groups in Greece which are endeavoring by force to set up in Greece a government which would be subservient to the Soviet Union.

This Government, as you are aware, has already decided that the establishment of a Soviet puppet government in Turkey would constitute a serious threat to the security of the United States and that we should endeavor to strengthen the will and ability of Turkey to defend Turkish independence and territorial integrity.

On a number of occasions we have informed both Greece and Iran of our deep interest in the maintenance of Greek and Iranian independence.

The Central Government of Iran has sent to the United States a Military Purchasing Commission to buy certain military-type equipment for the purpose of improving the quality of the Iranian army

^{67d} See footnote 67b, p. 209, and footnote 63 to reference there cited.

and strengthening the ability of the Iranian Government to maintain its authority throughout the whole country.

The Turkish Government has already indicated its desire to buy certain military-type equipment from us in order to strengthen its defenses.

Although Greece apparently has not approached us with a request to buy military-type equipment it is reasonable to expect, in view of the situation in which that country finds itself, that the Greek Government will eventually seek to make some military purchases in this country.

If we should categorically refuse to sell to these countries any military-type equipment, even though it be clearly demonstrated that such equipment is urgently needed in order to preserve internal order or to protect frontiers, the governments and people of these countries may well obtain the impression that our interest in the maintenance of their independence is not deep and they cannot expect any concrete support from us in their efforts to preserve their independence. If such an impression should be created there is a danger that the governments and people of these countries will gradually become discouraged and that their will to resist Soviet pressure will be greatly weakened.

All of us working on the problem, including General Hilldring, believe, in the light of the Dardanelles decision (See Department's telegram to Paris 4122 of August 15.^{67e}) that the time has now come for us to review existing policies with regard to the sale abroad of military-type equipment, both surplus and non-surplus. We believe it is clear that this review will demonstrate the necessity that changes be made in the recommendations of the Staff Committee of February 5, 1946 (SC/R-184). These changes could be effected in one of two ways. You may issue a statement of policy which would supplant the Staff Committee policy (SC/R-184) or, if you wish, the Staff Committee could issue a new statement in accordance with suggestions made by you. The advantage of the changes being effected by you personally would be that they would be known to a smaller circle in the Department and that the danger of a leak would be correspondingly reduced. It seems to us that in any event the new statement of policy should be broader than that set forth in SC/R-184, which covers only surplus property. It should cover the transfer or sale of all military-type equipment of United States origin, regardless of whether Government-owned or privately owned.

We are preparing a draft of a statement of a type which in our opinion will enable us to meet the situation which has developed since last spring and we are planning to send it to you under cover of another letter. We are couching this statement in most general terms in

^{67e} *Post*, p. 840.

order that it will permit of a considerable degree of flexibility in application.

You will, of course, understand that it is not our idea that we should begin to sell military-type equipment immediately in large quantities to various countries subject to external pressure. We feel, however, that the new policy should enable us, with the discretion and restraint required by the circumstances, to supply military-type equipment to countries such as those in the Near and Middle East, the maintenance and integrity of which are considered to be of important interest to the United States.

In view of the national importance of this matter, you may care to discuss it informally with the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate who are with you in Paris. You will, of course, desire that a new policy, in case you approve it, should receive the approval of the President before it is put into force.

We have grave doubt that it would be advisable at the present time for the United States to send a military mission to Turkey. We understand that Turkey has not as yet asked for such a mission. We believe that it might be preferable not to endeavor to make a decision with regard to this matter at the present time. In case, at a later date, Turkey should request some kind of American military mission, we could make our decision at that time after taking into consideration the type of mission desired, the world situation and other factors involved.

Insofar as we are aware, no action has been taken so far as the Soviet is concerned, to implement that section of the memorandum contained in our telegram 4122 of August 15 to Paris which reads: "The implementation of this policy * * * will require in the first instance frank discussions with the principal nations involved." We have assumed that you will probably care to talk this over with Molotov at such time, and in such manner, as you may consider appropriate. Although we consider the maintenance of integrity and independence of Iran and Greece also to be extremely important to the United States, we have not undertaken the preparation of a memorandum relating to them similar to that regarding Turkey since the Soviet Union has made no formal demands upon them as it has upon Turkey. It seems to us important, however, that in emphasizing to the Soviet Union our interest in the maintenance of Turkish independence and integrity the impression should not be left with the Soviet Union that we are not also interested in the independence and territorial integrity of Greece and Iran.

I have read this letter to the Secretary of War and to the Under Secretary of Navy and both of them have given it their full approval.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. CLAYTON

501.BC/9-1246 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Acting
Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1946—9 p. m.

US URGENT

188. For Herschel Johnson. 1. There is set forth below a draft statement which you may wish to use at tomorrow's meeting of SC or at some later time before SC completes its consideration of Greek case:

The complaint of the Ukrainian Govt was brought to the attention of the Security Council on August 24. Since that time we have had an opportunity to hear the representatives of the nations which are particularly concerned with the question. We have heard an elaboration by Mr. Manuilsky of the charges contained in his original communication, and we have heard the replies of Greece and the United Kingdom. The representative of Albania has had an opportunity to make a statement to the Council on behalf of his Govt. There have been rebuttals and surrebuttals.

As I have already made clear, my Govt believes that certain of the Ukrainian charges require no further consideration by the Council. However the issue of the frontier incidents warrants special notice. Frankly the statements thus far heard in the Council with respect to these incidents have on the whole lacked the evidentiary quality that would have been required in a court of law.

Rather the statements we have heard have been accusations and counter-accusations which contribute little to a dispassionate and fair determination of the case or, for that matter to the prestige of the Council.

The prestige of the Security Council itself has been the subject of debate in this case. It has been said that to hear the case at all would tend to undermine the dignity of the Council. On the other hand, it has been said that for the Security Council to fail to take direct action in support of the Ukrainian charges would weaken it in the eyes of the world as a powerless organ which has failed to achieve the high hopes of its creators.

Let us see the issue clearly. The issue is not the Council's prestige; it is its obligation to live up to its primary responsibility to further the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. If the Council fulfills its obligation, we need not worry about the influence and the power and the prestige of the Council.

There are 40 other nations not represented here who look to the Council. We are acting on their behalf not merely as a matter of theoretic principle but constitutionally under the Charter. We are entrusted with that responsibility and are in a very real sense the trustees for this purpose of all the United Nations.

It seems to my Government, therefore, that in this case the question we must ask ourselves is what steps we should take to fulfill our responsibility.

My Government feels that all the evidence at its disposal shows there is unquestionably along the northern frontier of Greece an unsettled and disquieting situation. There have been incidents along these borders which are clearly a source of friction.

These incidents are in the view of my Government, a renewed manifestation, a further symptom of the unsettled situation in this part of the Balkans. The allegations made by the representatives of the Ukraine, of Greece, and of Albania make it apparent that the situation embraces the relations between Greece and its three northern neighbors, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

As I have already stated, it is not the view of my Government that Greece has been primarily responsible for the troublesome situation along its frontier. My Government is, however, deeply concerned with the disquieting relations between the nations in the area, and we would give favorable consideration to a proposal for further examination by the Council of the border difficulties between Greece and her neighbors, not overlooking the problem of national minorities in that area in so far as that latter problem affects international peace and security.

My Government is not now proposing the establishment of a subcommittee to inquire further into this case. As I have said, however, my Government would look favorably on such a proposal if in the considered judgment of the members of the Council that course would be an appropriate method of finding a solution. Accordingly, it is as a suggestion rather than as a formal proposal that my Government offers this course, with a view towards hearing further discussion in the Council as to whether it would help in achieving our objectives and as to the terms of reference of such a subcommittee of inquiry.⁶⁸

2. The terms of reference of the committee might be:

a. To examine statements already submitted to Council, and to ask for and receive from governments directly involved other information, relating to friction along the borders between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria on the other, with particular reference to frontier incidents.

b. To submit to Council as soon as possible a report on the facts together with committee's conclusion as to whether these facts indicate existence of a situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and security.

3. In case report you telephoned Hiss afternoon September 12, regarding nature of possible Gromyko proposal proves correct, you should endeavor alter terms of reference along lines indicated above.

4. We feel a proposal establish commission investigate matter on the spot is premature although, for your own information, we do not foreclose possibility of such a commission should report of subcommittee indicate it is warranted.

CLAYTON

⁶⁸ For text of statement made by Mr. Johnson before the Security Council on September 18, see SC, *1st yr., 2nd series*, p. 366.

501.BC/9-1346

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] September 13, 1946.

Subject: Ukrainian Complaint Against Greece

Participants: Mr. Herschel Johnson (New York)
Mr. Charles Noyes⁶⁹ (New York)
Mr. Alger Hiss

During the course of several conversations on this subject yesterday Mr. Johnson informed me that Parodi⁷⁰ (France) is planning to propose a small committee of the Security Council to study in New York information relating to the Albanian-Greek frontier and to suggest possible action to the Council. Parodi's idea is that this committee would require only a few days for its sessions.

After discussing this matter with Mr. Loy Henderson and with representatives of EUR I said that it was the general feeling in the Department that if such a motion is made we should attempt to have the subcommittee's jurisdiction extended to include incidents occurring on the Greek-Yugoslav and the Greek-Bulgarian frontiers. However, we recognized that Mr. Johnson would probably not have very much specific evidence which he could offer in support of his suggestion and that in any event his proposal might not be accepted. In that event we feel that it would largely depend upon the circumstances in the Council at the moment and the attitude of the other representatives as to whether we should oppose or go along with the Parodi proposal. I said that the desk officers most directly concerned feel that it is to our interests to prevent the case being dropped from the agenda and that I thought this should be taken into account but that the discretion as to whether to vote for or against the Parodi proposal would have to be left to Mr. Johnson. There was complete agreement that in any event the issue would be a procedural one and not subject to veto and that we should make our position on this point plain.

Mr. Johnson told me that Van Kleffens (Netherlands), who was scheduled to be the first speaker this afternoon, had told him that he would suggest that the Secretary General be directed to write to the "parties concerned" asking them to refrain from all border incidents and also to the "great powers" asking them to exercise their influence to bring about moderation of the "parties concerned". Mr. Johnson said that he felt confident that Mr. Lie would have to interpret the phrase "parties concerned" as limited to Greece and Albania and that

⁶⁹ Adviser on Security Council matters to the United States Delegation at the United Nations.

⁷⁰ Alexandre Parodi, French Representative at the United Nations.

Van Kleffens had that interpretation in mind. After discussing the matter with others in the Department, including Mr. Loy Henderson, I said that we felt that Dr. Van Kleffens should be persuaded to drop any reference to the "great powers" and to substitute for that phrase "permanent members of the Security Council", otherwise it might appear as though the Council regarded the smaller states as puppets of particular great powers. The general feeling in the Department was that Dr. Van Kleffens' proposal had a good deal to commend it and that we should not oppose it.

I sent word to New York this morning that if the question of choosing between the Parodi and the Van Kleffens' proposal came up I did not think the Department had any particular choice and that I thought Mr. Johnson should be guided by the general sentiment in the Council. I suggested, however, that it might be feasible for the Council to do both things and pointed out that establishment of the committee would continue to keep the matter on the agenda.

In the course of conversations yesterday we were in agreement that if neither the Parodi nor the Van Kleffens' proposals are adopted by the Council nothing remains but for us to support a move to drop the case from the agenda and to insist that such motion is procedural and not subject to veto.

501.BC/9-1346 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Acting
Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1946—3 p. m.

193. Reference your 562.⁷¹ 1. We have not intended to give you the impression that we prefer the Van Kleffens proposal rather than Parodi's. We had meant to indicate that we thought you were warranted in indicating sympathy for and even supporting either or both depending upon circumstances. Recent developments have made us prefer a small factfinding committee and consequently we now prefer the Parodi proposal. However, we would like to have its authority limited to factfinding without authority to make recommendations (see paragraph 3 following).

2. For your information Maclean of the British Embassy called upon us this morning and read from Cadogan telegram of September 12 to London and from London reply. The British are opposed both to Van Kleffens proposal and to the establishment of a small factfinding committee. However, it appeared to us on the basis of excerpts read to us and Maclean expressly stated it was his own conclusion that London is more vigorously opposed to Van Kleffens proposal than to the

⁷¹ September 13, 1946, 5:05 p. m., not printed.

committee. The British are particularly anxious to avoid any appearance of Council adopting any of the Ukrainian charges. They apparently feel that an admonition by the Council to Greece as proposed by Van Kleffens is bound to have implication that the Council thinks perhaps Greece has been at fault. For similar reasons they are opposed to committee as its creation would be inconsistent with flat dropping of the case by the Council thus throwing out Ukrainian charges. However, Maclean recognized that examination of limited issue of the fact of frontier incidents need not involve passing on merits of Greek position and hence believed less objectionable than Van Kleffens proposal.

3. Reference your paragraph 2. We do not see how you could very effectively urge extension of Van Kleffens proposal to cover entire northern boundary inasmuch as it is proposed as an exhortation to parties before the Council. We do not wish to urge at this stage that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria be themselves brought before the Council. In urging factfinding committee have included in its term of reference the other two frontiers you would not be charging incidents but asking that the Council seek information about a situation as to which allegations have been made before the Council.

4. Reference your paragraph 7. We had not intended to suggest that the subcommittee formulate recommendations for Council action. We had, however, thought it appropriate for committee to attempt to reach a conclusion as to whether facts found by them constitute a situation endangering the peace. We do not feel strongly about this latter point and would not object to the committee being limited to fact-finding.

5. With respect to continuing British desire that Ukrainian complaint be dismissed in its entirety we feel that in addition to considerations with which you are already familiar and which have lead us to our position on Van Kleffens and Parodi proposals the filing of the Albanian complaint⁷² yesterday makes proposal to drop case in its entirety academic. We pointed this out to Maclean in discussion with him today.

Repeated to Paris as 4842, Secdel 906.

CLAYTON

⁷² The complaint was in the form of a telegram, dated September 11, 1946, from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Albania to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The message drew the attention of the Security Council to the situation created on the Graeco-Albanian frontier by continual Greek provocations. The Greeks were said to be responsible for 59 incidents in 1945 and 57 incidents in the first 8 months of 1946, which denoted their aggressive intentions and constituted a direct threat to peace in the Balkans. The Security Council released the text of the telegram in S/158.

501.BC/9-1846

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Director of the
Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1946.

In telephone calls from Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Noyes, late yesterday afternoon, last night, and this morning the following was developed:

Cadogan and Van Kleffens continue to be opposed to a subcommittee of the Council meeting in New York to consider the facts relating to the border incidents. They have indicated to Mr. Johnson that they would prefer an investigating commission of experts being sent out to investigate these border incidents. However, Mr. Johnson believes that their first preference continues to be for a mere dropping of the case. It was agreed that Mr. Johnson, on the basis of his estimate of general support for a commission, would decide whether to amend his proposed remarks to include willingness to support a commission as well as a subcommittee.

Mr. Johnson told me in confidence and asked that the Department take pains to treat the matter as strictly confidential that Mr. Lie, after yesterday's session of the Council, had expressed his fear that Gromyko would attempt to veto a proposal for a subcommittee. As Gromyko himself will be in the chair and as the prior ruling in the Spanish case is available for him as a precedent, Gromyko could rule that the motion had been vetoed which would leave the motion in the same state of impasse as occurred in the Spanish case. Mr. Lie said that if this occurred he would be prepared on his own initiative and under his own authority as Secretary General to send out a group of three of his own Secretariat officials to investigate the facts of the border incidents, provided he was assured that this would have the support of the United States. Mr. Lie said that he would plan to send an American, a Chinese (Mr. Kuo) and his Norwegian Military Adviser.

After discussing this matter with Mr. Hickerson I called Mr. Johnson this morning and said that I had not yet had an opportunity to present the question to Mr. Clayton but that the present thinking of EUR and SPA is that Mr. Lie should be told that of course he must make his own decision as to whether he is authorized and whether he should act in the manner he is suggesting, and that in our opinion he would be authorized to take such action and the action would be desirable. Moreover, if any question is raised about his action we would support it. However, in view of the fact that a commission may be proposed and vetoed, Mr. Johnson should emphasize the distinction between a commission and a committee, pointing out that

under the present development of the Council's procedure there is legal authority to veto a proposed commission. We would not think it appropriate for the Secretary General on his own initiative to send a group of members of his own staff to investigate a subject which the Council had considered and rejected because of the lawful use of the veto.

Mr. Johnson expressed himself as fully in agreement with these views and said that he would tell Mr. Lie the exact present status including the fact that no top ruling has been made on the Department's position but that the foregoing represents the present trend of thinking within the Department.⁷³

501.BC/9-1946 : Telegram

*The United States Acting Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, September 19, 1946—6:45 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received September 19—6 p. m.]

584. In a frank discussion with Gromyko today he stated that he would veto our proposal for a commission. He said that under the Ukrainian complaint there was no basis for including the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian frontiers within the scope of the commission's investigation. He said further that if the scope of the investigation were

⁷³ In a memorandum of conversation, September 20, Mr. Hiss reported "I called Mr. Johnson this morning on this subject and pointed out that now that he has definitely decided to propose only the establishment of a commission (as opposed to a subcommittee which would sit only in New York) Mr. Lie's proposal becomes academic, in view of the fact that no one in the Department has thought it would be appropriate to take such action in the event of a veto of a commission (this being recognized as a substantive issue in which the use of the veto would not be improper). I said that in view of the fact that the question proposed by Mr. Lie's inquiry will not arise I did not wish to present the matter to Mr. Clayton at all since I did not think he should be asked to rule on a purely hypothetical matter when the issues involved were so important. I said that I also wanted Mr. Johnson to understand that doubts had been expressed by officers of EE, SE and NEA. They feel that no useful purpose is likely to be served by such action since the members of the Secretariat would probably not be permitted to enter Albania, Yugoslavia or Bulgaria and the Secretariat group could, therefore, not conduct a real inquiry. This prospect of the inability of the Secretariat group to accomplish anything makes it, in the opinion of the officers mentioned, unwise to run the serious risks of impairing Lie's effectiveness in his relations with the Russians and of perhaps adversely affecting the Russian relationship to the United Nations as a whole.

"It was agreed that Mr. Johnson would tell Mr. Lie that in as much as the situation in the Council envisaged by Lie would not now arise we had not felt warranted in asking Mr. Clayton to pass on the question. Mr. Johnson said he would also indicate to Mr. Lie that some of the officers of the Department had doubts about the merits of the proposal in any event. Mr. Johnson thought this would satisfactorily dispose of the issue." (501.BC/9-2046.)

limited to the Albanian frontier he would still veto the proposal on the ground that it attached unwarranted blame on Albania and omitted the fundamental point that it was the presence of British troops in Greece which was the aggravating source of the situation.

He said further that he would vote against the Australian motion and argue that it is a substantive motion and therefore his negative vote amounts to a veto. He indicated, however, that a straightforward motion to drop the Ukrainian complaint from the matters of which the Council is seized would be procedural.

He asked me if I would support a resolution keeping the Council seized of the Ukrainian complaint. I told him for bargaining purposes that the US would not support it on the ground that such a decision would leave on the Council's agenda the accusations against Greece and UK which we reject.

JOHNSON

[The Security Council considered the Ukrainian complaint against Greece at fourteen meetings from August 28 to September 20. Various proposals and resolutions were submitted to the Council. The United States on September 20 called on the Council to appoint a three-man commission which would investigate the facts relating to the incidents along the Greek frontiers with Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and would submit to the Council as soon as practicable a report on the facts disclosed by its investigation. The resolution received eight affirmative votes. The Soviet Union and Poland voted in the negative and Australia abstained. The resolution was vetoed as a result of the negative vote of the Soviet Union.

The representative of Australia stated that a formal decision by the Council was necessary in order to remove the item from its agenda and pressed for a vote on his resolution calling for the Council to pass to the next item on the agenda. Mr. Gromyko, as President of the Council, ruled that there was no need to vote on the Australian resolution, declaring that the Council was ready to pass on to the next item on the agenda. The Secretary General gave his opinion that if the Council followed the ruling of the President, the Council would no longer be seized with the case and it would automatically be taken off the agenda. The ruling was not challenged.

For Council discussion of the Ukrainian complaint, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, Second Series, Nos. 4-16*, pages 33-422, *passim*. The text of the United States resolution is printed *ibid.*, page 396. The United Nations has published an account of the Council's discussions in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47*, pages 351-360.]

768.75/9-2146: Telegram

The United States Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TIRANA, September 21, 1946—1 p. m.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

[Received October 4—3:37 p. m.]

487. Following is attempt evaluate motives behind Albanian agitation⁷⁴ and mobilization against Greece. All public announcements, editorials and speeches of officials indicate purpose is defense against attack by, or award of Albanian territory to Greece by Peace Conference or UN. Other evidences in support this purpose are: (1) Albanian Army, numbering anywhere from sixty to one hundred thousand hastily mobilized during past 6 months, consists largely of inexperienced men and officers and not well equipped for modern warfare; so doubtful whether capable by itself attacking Greece; (2) Even if adequately trained and equipped Albanian Army could not hope, without outside aid, wage successful war against Greece; (3) Strong opposition to present regime and its internal policies lends color to thesis that authorities are using Greek bogey to keep army fully mobilized for purpose of indoctrination and controlling dissident elements.

On other hand, following factors lend color thesis present Albanian military activities for aggressive purposes against Greece: (1) This military activity going on for 6 months and constitutes heavy drain on Albania's meagre resources which may not be possible continue without action; (2) large number Soviet and Yugoslav military advisers and equipment already in Albania, with more coming, seems indicate coordination Albanian preparations with those Soviet, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which points aggression against Greece rather than defense, or at least agitation that motive for other purposes (war of nerves); and (3) Hoxha,⁷⁵ in recent (since return from Paris) talk with Albanian Army chiefs, reliably reported have said: "We must attack Greece".

Deciding factor is what Soviets want done.

Sent Department 487; repeated Caserta 196, Paris 62 for Secdel.

JACOBS

⁷⁴ In telegram 484, September 18, 1946, 10 a. m., Tirana advised that during the past few days the official press had played up four border incidents with Greece, Greek terrorization and liquidation of the Slavic population of eastern Macedonia, and other aspects of the Albanian-Greek problem (768.75/9-1846).

⁷⁵ Enver Hoxha, Secretary General of the Albanian Communist Party and concurrently Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

740.00119 Council/9-2446: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, September 24, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received September 24—4: 50 p. m.]

4787. Delsec 986. For Clayton from the Secretary. I feel that you should have a full realization within the Dept of the importance of world developments in recent months and their effect upon such earlier plans as may have been under consideration with regard to economic assistance in different forms to various countries in Europe and the Near East. It was natural that consideration of such assistance should some months ago have been determined largely on the basis of need, capacity to repay, and general attitude of the recipient country towards our important aims and methods of expanding world trade. The situation has so hardened that the time has now come, I am convinced, in the light of the attitude of the Soviet Govt and the neighboring states which it dominates in varying degrees, when the implementation of our general policies requires the closest coordination. In a word we must help our friends in every way and refrain from assisting those who either through helplessness or for other reasons are opposing the principles for which we stand.⁷⁶

I have in mind particularly two countries which it is of the highest importance for us to assist, Turkey and Greece. I hope you have carefully read the top secret memorandum addressed to me approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS 1704/1 on August 24⁷⁷ (a copy of which I have just received through military channels). I am in full accord with the reasoning contained in that document and with its conclusions. I discussed the question of Turkey with Bevin on Saturday and suggested that Britain, in view of her alliance with Turkey, might wish to furnish direct military equipment while the US would

⁷⁶ In a memorandum of September 28 to Mr. Acheson, Mr. Hickerson in the capacity of Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs stated that Mr. Byrnes' telegram was of fundamental importance and that the first practical application of the principles set forth in that communication "has been in our relations with Czechoslovakia. . . . We are considering carefully this telegram from the Secretary in connection with our economic relations with all of the countries of Europe." (740.00119 Council/9-2446) For documentation on United States economic assistance to Czechoslovakia and the reversal of policy of assistance to those "opposing the principles for which we stand" in connection with that country, see vol. VI, pp. 178 ff.

⁷⁷ Not printed; but for JCS 1704, dated August 23, see p. 857. JCS 1704/1 contains the same substantive text, with minor changes, as JCS 1704; its cover sheet states that on August 23 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered No. 1704 and agreed to forward a copy to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy (SWNCC files, SWNCC 091—Russia Miscellaneous).

render all feasible economic assistance through sale of surplus, credits, etc. If the Turks should request a few selected US technicians I should favor granting the request.

The political situation in Greece is of course far less satisfactory than that in Turkey. On the other hand the strategic importance of Greece is equally great as set forth in the draft paper on Greece which I understand is now pending in the Near and Middle East Subcommittee of SWNCC. I therefore hope that every effort will be made to extend such economic help to Greece as we reasonably can and that you will emphasize the importance of such measures with regard to both countries in the NAC and in your discussions with the Export-Import Bank. The world is watching the support or lack thereof which we furnish our friends at this critical time and the future policies of many countries will be determined by their estimate of the seriousness or lack thereof with which the US upholds its principles and supports those of like mind.⁷⁹

[BYRNES]

868.00/9-2446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, September 24, 1946—9 p. m.
[Received September 25—2:07 p. m.]

1284. In conversation with me last night Prime Minister stated:

- (1) Believes resignation of Govt uncalled for at this time since no constitutional change involved as result of plebiscite.
- (2) Considers broadening of Govt to include elements all parties except extreme Left possible only if chiefs agree to continued leadership of Populist;
- (3) Is personally unable consider surrendering leadership to coalition or "ecumenic" Govt as this would mean betrayal of mandate given in March election;
- (4) Finds other party leaders taking different attitude and general agreement of "political world" unlikely before King's return.⁸⁰

MACVEAGH

⁷⁹ In telegram Secdel 990 (No. 5083 to Paris), September 25, 1946, 6 p. m., Mr. Clayton informed Mr. Byrnes as follows: "Concur completely views on Turkey and Greece set forth urtel delsec 986, Sep 24. We have been thinking on same lines here." (740.00119 Council/9-2446)

⁸⁰ The King returned to Athens on September 28. The Government resigned the same evening and Mr. Tsaldaris was requested by the King to form a new cabinet. Negotiations ensued between Mr. Tsaldaris and the opposition leaders in order to broaden the Government but they were unsuccessful. A new Tsaldaris Cabinet was sworn in on October 2 with no changes from the previous one.

711.68/9-2546

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris*TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On September 12 I wrote you a personal, top secret letter enclosing a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum on the Turkish situation.⁸¹ In that letter I suggested a partial reorientation of our thinking with regard to the Near and Middle East and, specifically, a change in our policy toward supplying arms to countries, such as Turkey, which are under Soviet pressure.

We have now had a further indication of War Department concern over the Greek as well as the Turkish situation and have come to the conclusion that it is desirable to draw up, in written form, new outlines of policy on Turkey, Greece and Iran, the three Near and Middle Eastern nations we consider most seriously affected by present developments.⁸² We propose to go beyond the field covered by the JCS memorandum on Turkey and to include political and economic considerations as well as those related primarily to military assistance.

I enclose, for your consideration, a draft outline of policy toward Greece.⁸³ We believe the position of Greece closely parallels that of Turkey, and, as you will see, the enclosure follows out and develops the thoughts set forth in my letter of September 12. The draft has received the approval of the proper officers of the Department.

Similar papers on Turkey and Iran are in process of preparation.

⁸¹ JCS 1704 dated August 23, p. 857.

⁸² Possibly a reference to an undated memorandum entitled "U.S. Security Interests in Greece". This paper was prepared on September 5 by Col. James McCormack, Jr., of the Plans and Operations Division of the War Department General Staff. The following day, Colonel McCormack sent the paper to Col. Alexander D. Reid of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee with the requests that it be published as a draft memorandum to the Secretary of State and be considered by the SWNCC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East. The paper concluded as follows: "It is in the interest of U.S. security that Greece be supported. The most important assistance which can be given immediately is active political support in the international field—in the United Nations, at the Paris Conference, and wherever else it can be useful. In addition to political support, there should be economic assistance in the form of liberal and unfettered credits, and direct relief to supplant UNRRA assistance. The United States should make it clear to the world that our desire to see Greece remain independent and in charge of her own affairs is no less firm than our position on Turkey. In Greece, as in Turkey, similar U.S. and British interests assure strong British support and assistance to such policy on the part of the U.S." (Colonel McCormack's memoranda, both dated September 6, to Colonel Bonesteel at Paris and to Colonel Reid, Lot M-88, Box 2099, Bonesteel Correspondence.)

⁸³ Entitled "Memorandum regarding Greece", dated September 25, not printed; for revised version of October 21, see p. 240.

If you approve the Greek outline, I propose to transmit it to the Secretaries of War and the Navy and, after obtaining their concurrence, to submit it to the President.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. CLAYTON

868.00/9-3046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

ATHENS, September 30, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received October 1—12:40 a. m.]

1307. In reply to Department's request for my views contained in its telegram 1232 of September 27,⁸⁴ I would say that in my belief, while deteriorating situation along northern Greek frontier may be regarded as due to basic racial antagonisms and conflicting territorial aspirations of longstanding [character?] with mutual recriminations merely case of pot calling kettle black, such view is only superficial. Greek policy since liberation has consistently been to avoid conflict with northern neighbors despite expansionist agitation of extreme Right if only because of hopelessness of Greek armed forces opposing ten times their number. Policy has even been to observe almost humiliating caution and restraint (see mytel 1100 of August 22⁸⁵) while placing hopes for satisfaction of claims in Peace Conference and UNO. On other hand, no such pacific and conciliatory attitude evidenced by Soviet puppets. Though alleged proofs of their official complicity in border incidents may still be held inconclusive, presence of overwhelming forces facing Greek frontier and widespread activity of NOF agents in Greek Macedonia are established facts. Furthermore, incidents themselves, as reported by Greek, British and United States military and other sources, appear almost uniformly as provocations from across border, possibly aimed at exciting such reaction as would tend to support Soviet claim that Greece is menace to peace. Add con-

⁸⁴ Not printed; this telegram, sent also to Belgrade, Tirana, and Sofia, requested all available information and documents regarding incidents along the northern Greek frontier, including views as to responsibility for the continued strife. The telegram was repeated to New York, Paris (for the Secretary of State), London, Moscow, and Ankara. (868.00/9-2746) Mr. Byrnes, directed, in telegram 4882, September 29, 1946, 1 p. m., from Paris, that the replies of Athens, Belgrade, Tirana, and Sofia be repeated to him in view of the general importance of the present difficulties in Greece and their bearing on the over-all European situation (868.00/9-2946).

⁸⁵ Not printed; it advised of receipt by the Greek Foreign Office of a very violent note from the Yugoslav Legation, claiming that a Yugoslav vessel had been intentionally damaged by Greek gunfire and demanding instant investigation. The telegram noted also that the Yugoslav Minister had been recalled because of the incident and continuing Greek statements and press attacks on Yugoslav leaders. A Greek Foreign Office spokesman was reported as having expressed regret to the Minister about his departure, emphasizing that there had not been sufficient time to investigate the vessel incident and that his Government had done everything consistent with freedom of the press concerning attacks on Yugoslav leaders. (760H.68/8-2246)

tinued anti-Greek Moscow propaganda and secret Soviet control of Greek Communist party (See my despatch No. 3044 of August 27⁸⁶) which now developing increased subversive activity especially in north and last, but not least, Soviet veto of UNO investigation for which Greeks only too anxious and conclusion seems inevitable that Soviet Government in final analysis must be "assigned responsibility for continued strife".

Soviet aims in this connection can be better estimated by Department than by an observer in Greece. However, it appears here that Russia, now in control of Adriatic entrance through her domination of Albania, aims at similar control of North Aegean by backing Yugoslav and Bulgarian puppets in their claims to territory on that sea. World wide propaganda on the part of Soviet and fellow travelers to get rid of inconvenience of British troops (see *Manchester Guardian's* editorial quoted in London's telegram 8470 of September 27,⁸⁶ repeated Athens as 120) may perhaps be interpreted as preparatory in this connection as also the propaganda directed against Greek Government as menacing, monarcho-Fascist, and collaborationist, and the attempted subversion of all law and order in this country, particularly in north. On the basis of present indications, I see no reason to change view expressed during my recent consultations in Washington with many officials of Department (see also conclusion to my despatch No. 2880 of July 5, 1946⁸⁷) that British withdrawal will not long precede an invitation from "persecuted democrats" of Macedonia to their Yugoslav and Bulgarian brethren to "come over into Macedonia and help us". My Turkish colleague expressed similar view the other day when he said that if British withdraw, a Yugoslav Army Corps will be in Salonika "within 24 hours". What can best be done to prevent such an eventuality would seem to be to give full publicity to any evidence of preparation for it and I feel that no opposition from whatever source should be allowed to stand in the way of impartial investigation and complete revelation of facts.

MACVEAGH

[Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Matthews conversed with Mr. Dragoumis as Acting Head of the Greek delegation and with Ambassador Diamantopoulos on October 1 at Paris on a number of subjects. That part of the discussion dealing with the economic situation in Greece was summarized in Mr. Matthews' memorandum as follows: "In conclusion the Greeks discussed the seriousness from the economic point of view of the situation in Greece as set forth in the recent message from Prime Minister Tsaldaris which had been

⁸⁶ Not printed.

⁸⁷ Not printed; the subject of the despatch was internationally sponsored violence on the Yugoslav border of Greece (760H.68/7-546).

sent to the Secretary. They said that the rural population in the north is so convinced that Greece is about to be invaded by Albania and Yugoslavia that the farmers are leaving their fields when they should be preparing for the next crop and there is a great rush of population to the cities. This is being accompanied by a flight from the drachma and a great demand for gold pounds. The Greek Government is very seriously concerned lest all the economic progress made in recent months will be lost. The Secretary said he was aware of the seriousness of the situation and expressed his deep regret over these developments." For the rest of the memorandum, see volume III, page 614. The Prime Minister's message of September 16 is printed in volume IV, page 862.]

868.014/10-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, October 2, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received October 3—3 : 50 p. m.]

1324. Mytel 1323, October 2,⁸⁸ repeated Paris as 80. Leon Melas Director General of Foreign Office emphasized to Keeley⁸⁹ this afternoon at conclusion of interview on another subject that Greeks very depressed over defeat of proposal for strategic adjustment Bulgarian frontier and particularly distressed that US voted against Greece and that British abstained. Characterizing as extraordinary decision of Military Commission that it not competent make recommendations on strategic aspect since problem involved also political, economic and national elements Melas said Commission should have rendered decision on military aspects leaving to those competent to decide weight to be given other factors. Defeat of Greek amendment indicates either that Greece's friends are ignorant of danger inherent in decision taken or do not intend to support those measures necessary to secure the peace; resulting feeling of insecurity in Greece will result in widespread emigration, said Melas. In response to suggestion that perhaps decision was motivated by larger issues and with thought that protection Greece from possible aggression from whatever source is primary responsibility of UN, Melas said that UN had yet to show itself capable of controlling such a threat as faces Greece on her northern frontier.

Sent Department as 1324; repeated Paris for Secretary as 81.

MACVEAGH

⁸⁸ Not printed.

⁸⁹ James H. Keeley, Jr., Counselor of Embassy in Greece.

768.75/10-546 : Telegram

*The United States Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

TIRANA, October 5, 1946—noon.
[Received October 14—6 p. m.]

508. In response Deptel September 27⁹⁰ following rounds out my evaluation Greek Albania border situation first submitted mytel 487, September 2 [21] sent Secdel as 62:

Notwithstanding extraneous factors indicated herein as now impinging on this situation root of problem inescapably lies in unfounded Greek claims to southern Albania which have been pressed with increasing aggressiveness for more than two years in Greek press and radio by Greek propagandists sent to Washington and London and by appeal to Paris Conference. Claims are unfounded as borne out by fact that present boundary was fixed by international agreement quarter century ago on as fair basis as could be devised since during that period comparative peace reigned on both sides of border until Greece stirred up question again and by facts set forth in document entitled "Greek Claim to Northern Epirus" dated June 3, 1946⁹¹ in which Department stated it was opposed to United States supporting Greek claim.

Virulence Greek propaganda in support its claims has been due in part to British incitement and tacit support (various British officers here have told me as much) and also in part failure United States effectively to disabuse Greek claims at final showdown at Peace Conference or elsewhere.

For 4 or 5 months Albania disregarded Greek propaganda claims but later began counter propaganda in self defense thus creating war of nerves which inevitably led to border disturbances culminating in present grave situation.

When Peace Conference convened Albania felt neither British nor United States (thanks in part to Senate's adoption of Pepper resolution) could be counted on to buttress Albania's defense against one of two anticipated alternatives, either Northern Epirus being awarded to Greece or Greece attempting seize region if not awarded.

To this underlying international motive for virtual national mobilization and deployment troops along southern border must be added: maneuvering for domestic ends; using foreign threat to distract Albania from domestic problems; and using mobilization to tighten Communists' grip in international affairs under guise of national emergency.

⁹⁰ Same as telegram 1232 to Athens; see footnote 84, p. 226.

⁹¹ This may refer to report PIO-563, May 31; see bracketed note, p. 167.

In addition to purely Albanian factors mentioned situation redounds to advantage of Soviet and Yugoslavs because Albania is forced to rely increasingly on those two countries which in turn enables them consolidate their hold over Albania and eastern shore Adriatic.

With USSR assuming key role in picture it becomes increasingly imperative that Greco-Albanian border question be eliminated from list of urgent international problems facing world today. Withdrawal of claims Paris Conference 2 weeks ago should facilitate achievement this end. Danger still exists however that Albania with Russian and Yugoslav prodding will continue present military situation in spite of removal of official grounds for it. In fact, continuing military preparation by Albania and Albania's support Chamerian refugees' petition of Sept 26 to UN Assembly for return to homes in Greece indicates that such may be the case. This development might be made difficult or impossible if United States could find occasion soonest to 1, state publicly withdrawal Greek claims should remove friction which has engendered present situation and thus allow both Albania and Greece devote to reconstruction energies which have been sapped by crisis endangering peace of Balkans and 2, informally along with British if possible to influence Greek Government abstain from further agitation over border question and at same time persuade Soviet take similar action vis-à-vis Albania. Some such moves by United States would have several important advantages:

(1) Further military preparations by Albania, Yugoslav, Soviet against Greece would be revealed to world in true light and could be denounced accordingly through UN or directly.

(2) We would regain some of our lost prestige in Albania and rest of Balkans.

(3) Serious threat to peace in Balkans might be allayed.

[Here follows an analysis of the frontier incidents, said to be deliberately created by Albanian and Greek authorities and EAM guerrillas, and those caused by Albanian frontier forces or as a result of border feuds.]

Sent Department 508; repeated Paris for Secdel 65; Moscow 49; London 48; Athens 22 and to Caserta by courier 205.

JACOBS

868.00/10-746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, October 7, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received October 8—12:17 p. m.]

1351. Deptel 1232, September 28 [27].⁹² In connection with deterioration situation on Greek northern frontier following are Assist-

⁹² Not printed; but see footnote 84, p. 226.

ant Military Attaché Miller's conclusions on basis of personal field survey of northern provinces terminated September 29. Lt. Col. Miller is serious, painstaking and reliable officer whose findings so far as they go (see my top secret telegram 1307 of September 30) I have no hesitation in endorsing:

"1. Communist policy as applied to Greece has an immediate objective of portraying the nation in a state of anarchy. In application of this policy all forces within the international Communist organization have been coordinated. A great deal of aid is secured by advertising their cause as 'democracy' opposed to 'Fascist reaction'. Dissident elements within Greece have been mobilized by the Communists and are directed in furtherance of the over-all plan. Lawlessness of all types whether it be purely for personal revenge or monetary gain, finds sympathy and aid from the well organized and militant party.

2. The rough mountain ranges running south from the Lake Prespa region of the Yugoslav and Albanian frontiers afford a convenient avenue for movement of personnel and supplies between Thessaly and Greece's northern neighbors. I talked to the natives of this district, to British and Greeks exercising a variety of official functions and to Americans engaged in consular business, educational, relief, health and religious pursuits. All had knowledge of the outlaw bands and it was quite easy to trace the progressive movement of individual groups on their international journeys.

3. Movement of Left Wing bands across the frontier is given the tacit approval of Yugoslav and Albanian authorities. Local demonstrations and minor attacks are made west of the Struma River at frequent intervals. These incidents act as diversions. They effectively tie up two-thirds of the Greek Army in northern Greece and cover the simultaneous crossing of the frontier by bands.

4. At present the main areas affected by Left Wing terrorism are Thessaly and western Macedonia. In these areas armed bands have resorted to practically every form of violence to induce intimidation of the population and to cut communications. Reinforcements are brought in from the Athens-Piraeus area and from Left Wing Greeks who crossed the northern frontier following the Varkiza agreement of February 1945.⁹³ (NOTE: The American Military Attaché in Belgrade estimates that there are 7,000 troops of this type in southern Yugoslavia).

5. All of the violence in Greece is by no means attributable to the Left. Royalist extremists, known as X-ists, operate throughout the country and there are other brigades representing many other diverse interests. But none of these groups are coordinated nor do they receive aid from any national regime or major political party. These groups often take the role of local 'minute men'. They often operate in conjunction with the local peace officers or Army garrison. Their methods are crude and their justice is questionable. Their operations certainly play into the hands of the Communists.

6. Left-wing bands operating in northern Greece find support from not over 15 percent of the population. They are supplied and financed

⁹³ Between the Greek Government and the EAM, signed at Athens on February 12, 1945; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 100.

through the party organization. When not 'in the field' Communist-supported terrorist groups base north of the Greek frontiers or are protected by local Greek Communists. The leaders are usually former ELAS (Communists' military organization for Greece) with considerable knowledge of army and explosives. The bands are composed of two categories, the 'regulars' built around ELAS as a nucleus and supported by Serb-Macedonians; and the 'sympathizers' who appear to be law-abiding citizens by day but who actively give aid at night.

7. Orders are passed and control is maintained by utilizing the existing party cell system on both sides of the frontier. This is known as 'the National Freedom Front' (translated into Greek and abbreviated as EAM; translated into Serbian and abbreviated as NOF⁹⁴).

8. With the advent of winter band activity will most probably diminish throughout Greece. This will probably be only temporary. It is difficult to see how any Greek Government can appreciably better the situation without a fundamental revision in the policy pursued by her northern neighbors."

Repeated Paris for Secretary as 93.

MACVEAGH

868.24/8-3046

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Greek Chargé
(Economou-Gouras)*

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Greece and has the pleasure to reply to his note No. 4589 of August 30, 1946⁹⁵ requesting credit for the Greek Government for the purchase of United States surplus property.

On September 20, 1946 an additional credit of \$10,000,000 was granted the Greek Government to enable it to bid on \$12,000,000 of maritime equipment; and on September 27, 1946 an additional credit of \$25,000,000 was extended to the Greek Government for the purchase of surplus property located in Italy, Belgium and Germany.⁹⁶

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1946.

⁹⁴ The EAM, composed of Greeks controlled by the Communist Party of Greece, operated throughout Greece. The NOF (shortened from SNOF in 1946) was the parallel Communist organization operating in Greek Macedonia. It was composed of local Macedonian Slavs and was oriented toward the Yugoslav Communist Party.

⁹⁵ Not printed; it advised that the \$10,000,000 credit granted to the Greek Government on May 16 would shortly be exhausted and requested an additional credit, as extensive as possible, to enable the Greek Government to make further purchases of surplus property (868.24/8-3046).

⁹⁶ The agreements embodying these additional credits were signed by Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, successor to Mr. McCabe as Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, and Mr. Economou-Gouras on September 25 and October 4, 1946, respectively (868.51/10-2446).

868.00/10-1046 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 10, 1946.

[Received October 10—1:08 p. m.]

3802. *Trud* October 6 major article by M. Lazarov, "Greece after 'plebiscite'", cites alarm caused among Greek reactionaries and their "Anglo American trustees" by outbreak Partisan fighting in North in response to Monarchist punitive expeditions against National Liberation Movement. Greek Govt circles are circulating provocative rumors that Albanians, Yugoslavs and Bulgars are allegedly participating in struggle on Partisans side. These rumors have secret aim of justifying inability of Greek Monarchists to deal with National Liberation Movement so as to secure intervention by British troops "on wider scale" in Partisan struggle. British papers have no doubt such British assistance will be given.

American diplomacy, article emphasizes, fully supports British policy in Greece. According to AP, Byrnes and Bevin agreed in Paris to remain "absolutely firm in regard to Greece". Anglo-American stand, article concludes, signifies further support by Britain and United States of Fascist Monarchist regime, further coercion of Greek people and kindling of civil war, and continuation of policy to transform Greece into springboard for British and American imperialist forces in Eastern Mediterranean.

Pouched London and Paris. Repeated AmEmb Athens 33.

DURBROW

868.00/10-1146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

ATHENS, October 11, 1946—11 p. m.

[Received October 12—11:35 p. m.]

1384. In a long conversation with the King this afternoon I was able to make the following suggestions on the purely personal and informal basis which he seems to invite and appreciate:

(1) That the King should insist on the political leaders getting together to form a broadly representative govt and that the possibility of his personally advising the public of any opposition to his appeal might be enough to bring recalcitrants into line; (2) that unity among all nationally minded Greeks is as important now as collaboration among the politicians and that in the country's present dearth of statesmen, only the crown's leadership can bring this about; (3) that

the only practicable curative program for this country after what it has gone through is one of widespread tolerance, justice and mercy similar to the program of Lincoln after the American Civil War; (4) that in pursuance of such a program all people who have "gone into the mountains" except those subject to definite charges under the Greek code should be allowed to return freely to their homes; (5) that wives and children of fugitives should no longer be imprisoned and exiled as hostages; (6) that in general every Greek should be allowed his or her political opinions and no one be prosecuted except for definite commission of crime. I emphasized my belief that if such program were put into effect at least 70% of the existing banditry in Greece would disappear. I spoke of my belief that certain policies of the present Defense Minister, Mavromichalis, may be "tending toward Fascism" which I felt could not be tolerated again after the Allied Nations have fought a war for its eradication; and I added that whether or not the policy I suggested is the right solution for the present problems I felt sure that in following it the King would have the satisfaction of the approval of his own conscience.

Somewhat to my surprise the King expressed thorough agreement with each one of the above points. In regard to (1) he said he has already sounded out the politicians and found all of them agreeable to the idea of collaboration in a broadened govt except Sophoulis who holds out for being Premier. He said he had approved of the politicians going to Paris because they might learn there some things to convince them of the necessity of getting together as well as of the fact that Greek "national claims" must be considered as part of the whole great problem of world peace. Regarding (2) he accepted the idea and showed no tendency to shirk the responsibility of the Crown and in respect to (3) and (4) indicated that he had already thought of attempting to follow the Lincoln example. As to (5) he was emphatic in stating his belief that the present policy only tends to increase bitterness by the addition of resentment and in connection with (6) assented warmly and fully as to this being the general need of the hour. In addition he was impressed by my estimate of the number of non-criminal elements in the band [*land?*] and said of Mr. Mavromichalis that "He is an old playmate of my youth but I think him stupid." Fascism he agreed is no longer a possible solution adding "Dictatorship never agreed with my ideas and I made a mistake to fall in with it."

In comment I would point out that the King spoke as I did purely personally, that he is a lonely and distracted figure and that his happily good intentions are not likely to find much support from the local influences surrounding him (see mytel 1304 of September 28⁹⁷).

⁹⁷ Not printed.

I therefore intend to communicate the substance of my conversation to my British colleague who in his first audience received only the formal assurance that the King "will act constitutionally" and the impression that he is resentful toward the British for having kept him out of Greece these past 2 years. This last is probably true but the British can afford to ignore it and I believe that if they will only make full use now of their position here to strengthen the King's hand in an all-out effort to liberalize the Govt and unify behind the regime all but the criminal and subversive elements in the country, there is a chance to reduce greatly the dangers of Slavic infiltration and Communist activity and consequently to favor the economic reconstruction now so greatly hampered by widespread dissension and fear. However the time to make use of the King's possibilities as a unifying and constructive agent is now while he still retains some adventitious popularity as a result of his return by the plebiscite. After he has been seen for a while to do nothing or is felt to be falling under the influence of some local group it will be too late.

The Department will appreciate the highly confidential character of this message.⁹⁸

Sent to Department as 1384; repeated Paris for Secretary as 99.

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-1546: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1946—1 p. m.

1336. Serious concern both War and Dept over worsening internal conditions in Greece and increasing tension along northern Greek frontiers have led to recent reevaluation US policy towards Greece. Document⁹⁹ stating background present situation and suggesting specific steps to implement active US interest in Greece has been approved in principle by Secretary in Paris.¹ When redrafted in final form and concurred in by War, Navy and State it will be submitted to President for approval.

Dept feels that strained international relations focusing on Greece may result in early major crisis which may be a deciding factor in

⁹⁸ In telegram 1350, October 16, 1946, 5 p. m., Mr. Acheson replied to Ambassador MacVeagh as follows: "I wish to commend you highly for your approach to King. Your ideas expressed to him show profound understanding complicated Greek situation and represent finest kind US advice to head friendly Allied state whose future is of extreme concern this Govt. You should seek early opportunity inform King that you have reported substance your conversation your Govt which is in full agreement with ideas expressed and gratified learn King's attitude towards specific problems discussed." (868.00/10-1146)

⁹⁹ Entitled "Memorandum regarding Greece", dated September 25, not printed; for revised version dated October 21, see p. 240.

¹ In a letter of October 1 from Paris, not printed.

future orientation of Near and Middle Eastern countries. It is of importance to US security that Greece remain independent and in charge of her own affairs, and we are prepared to take suitable measures to support territorial and political integrity Greece.

Specific policies, some of which have been in effect for some time, are set forth as follows:

1. Make clear to world by diplomatic conversations, public statements, or other appropriate means that US strongly supports Greek independence and territorial integrity and actively encourages development in Greece of democracy and peaceable and reasonable policy on part of Greek Govt.

2. Direct US advice to Greek Govt that policy of moderation in internal political affairs should be followed now that regime question has been voted on.

3. Clear statement by US to Greek Govt of view that Greek frontiers should remain those of 1939 in interest of justice, peace and stability.

4. Active support of Greece in UN and Security Council when occasion arises.

5. Question of sale to Greece and by what country of sufficient arms for maintaining internal order and defending territorial integrity until UN military forces are prepared to undertake guarantee against aggression has been discussed in general with Secretary but final decision on policy awaits his return in near future.²

6. Recommendation to Eximbank and International Bank concerning economic assistance to Greece provided credits are expended on sound projects which will strengthen Greek economy.

7. Relief assistance following cessation of UNRRA activities. Methods of implementation now under urgent consideration by Dept.

8. Additional credits and if necessary priority treatment for purchase by Greece of US surplus property both in US and abroad.

9. Make available to Greece appropriate US financial and economic advice through advisers and technicians or through dispatch of US economic mission.

10. Appropriate US action when necessary to assist Greece in finding export markets and in acquiring essential goods in US market.

11. Appropriate action to relieve Greek shipping crisis through sale or charter of vessels.

12. Active attempts to inform American public through press and foreign policy associations of nature of US policy towards Greece and reasons for it. *End of Summary.*

Dept intends in near future to transmit to you letter for King George from the President. Although this letter will be couched in general terms you may use your discretion in expanding certain

² In telegram Secdel 1108 (No. 5484 to Paris), October 11, 1946, 7 p. m., Mr. Acheson informed Mr. Byrnes that the reference in the memo of September 25 "did not mean that any such sales are now envisaged but was intended to provide for future eventuality in case situation develops in which Brit cannot provide minimum Greek requirements. It is Dept's feeling, as it is yours, that US assistance should be primarily economic." (740.00119 Council/10-1146)

points orally. It should be made clear to King and key Greek officials that active US support of Greek independence and territorial integrity is based on assumption that Greek Govt will strive for policy of moderation in connection with divergent Greek political factions the basic loyalty of which to Greece is not subject to question, as well as in its relations with neighboring countries.

It is particularly important that Greek Govt distinguish sharply in its attitude towards opposition between those essentially loyal groups which differ with regard to the kind of govt Greece should have and those groups which are intent on depriving Greece eventually of its independence. Repression of former groups will tend to force them into camp of latter groups and will thus strengthen hands of those seeking to destroy Greek sovereignty. US would find it difficult to support strongly any govt by means of which Extreme Right would resort to excessive measures against political opposition expressed through legal and peaceful means or to repression of civil liberties except in conditions of emergency to maintain internal order and authority of Govt. Proper Greek authorities should be made to understand Dept's view that measures for internal order have not been impartially applied in recent months but have instead encouraged lawlessness of Extreme Right groups. It is further the view of the Dept that although the vote in the plebiscite represents the will of the Greek people the percentage in favor of King was increased by falsification and unfair practices of Govt in power. Also, although Tsaldaris may be legally correct in stating that March elections gave Populist Party clear mandate to form Govt it would appear that this is not a time for narrow legalistic argumentation but for an enlightened and patriotic attempt to bring together all decent democratic elements in Greece in a unity equally important now for the continued existence of Greek nation as it was during the war. It is not to be expected under existing circumstances that Extreme Left could be included in such Govt. At the same time certain notoriously reactionary Rightists are almost equally to blame for objectionable features of present Govt policy and should be removed from power for the good of the Greek people as a whole.

We have suggested informally to Brit that they consider similar letter and oral advice.

Your comments and suggestions by urgent cable would be appreciated.³

Sent Athens 1336; rptd Paris 5539, London 7175.

ACHESON

³ Ambassador MacVeagh replied in telegram 1407, October 17, 1946, 4 p. m., as follows: "Cannot concur too strongly in revaluated general policy re Greece." (868.00/10-1746)

868.00/10-1446 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1946—5 p. m.

1351. Dept in full agreement conclusions urtel 1390, Oct 14,⁴ London 73, Paris 100 for Secretary. You should immediately take occasion express appropriate officials Greek Govt our concern over widespread unofficial arming civilians and rumored proposals that Greek Govt seeking to give official sanction to this practice and requesting additional arms and ammunition from Brit for that purpose. We do not believe that in country where political hatreds were encouraged by enemy occupation authorities and where arms were widely distributed for underground activities against enemy, a permanent solution internal order can be reached by further distribution arms which in our opinion would aggravate and not ameliorate present distressing conditions. Dept also hopes Brit colleague will see fit make similar strong representations Greek Govt.

Sent Athens 1351, rptd London 7201, Paris 5574.

ACHESON

868.00/10-1946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

ATHENS, October 19, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received October 20—8:25 p. m.]

1426. Mytel 1424, October 19.⁵ Prior to Premier's return and in view of approaching political discussions of critical nature, I asked the King to my house yesterday afternoon and confidentially acquainted him with contents of Deptel 1336 of October 15, feeling that full knowledge of our thought at this time could not fail to encourage him as well as give him guidance. We went over every point together and the King thanked me warmly for my confidence, which he promised to observe. He thoroughly agreed that widespread arming of civilians against bandits is undesirable in country where too many people are already armed, though he thought villagers might be enlisted by Govt in connection with special defense missions, for which arms could be issued and withdrawn after completion. He was outspoken in condemnation of lawlessness in the administration of public

⁴Not printed; the Ambassador concluded that the Greek plan to mobilize and arm civilians in sections of the country menaced by Communist bands would be ineffective in bandit warfare and highly dangerous politically (868.00/10-1446).

⁵Not printed.

order and said he is trying, against great difficulties, to determine the individuals responsible. He showed great interest in our findings as regards the plebiscite. I described these to him briefly, but I believe it would be a good thing if I were authorized to let him see the report of Amfoge II. He will be glad to receive the President's letter and "listen to my exposition of certain points orally."⁶ He welcomed the idea of our attempting to strengthen Greek economy through the selection and realization of sound limited projects, saying this is in line with his own thoughts. He made no criticism of Britain during the entire conversation and showed his realization of solidarity of Allied policy by saying: "This is just the way Bevin talks to me." Regarding Dept's advice that certain notorious reactionary extremists in the Govt should be gotten rid of, he accepted this to mean Mr. Mavromichalis in particular, whom he said he does not intend to support.

I believe the Dept may be assured that the King will strive, insofar as in him lies, to secure such a moderate govt as will justify US support. To help him he has the essential moderation of Tsaldaris and the apparent willingness of some minor opposition leaders to approach the problem of cooperation in constitutional fashion. Most unfavorable, however, is the attitude of the Sophoulis branch of the Liberal Party, which not only continues to refuse to meet the Populists on any other terms than its own, but has for a long time pursued a policy of flirting with the Communists, its paper, the *Vima*, even going so far recently as to propose Russia as Greece's logical protector (see mytel No. 1424 of October 19.⁷). Mr. Sophoulis regards such dangerous opportunism as smart politics (see my despatch No. 1699 of October 13, 1945⁷). But Porphyrogenis, the Greek Communist leader, told the King recently, among other things (see my despatch No. 3204 of October 15⁷) that, "in our advance to power here we shall use old Mr. Sophoulis as a front." With both the British and ourselves pressing for moderation, I believe the extreme Right must inevitably move toward the Center, but what can induce the Liberals to take a more constructive national attitude while under the leadership of Sophoulis and the anti-British editor of *Vima* (Lambrakis, whom the British imprisoned in Syria during the war), is another question and perhaps the most difficult one facing the King at the present juncture.

MACVEAGH

⁶ In telegram 1430, November 6, 1946, 7 p. m., the Department notified Ambassador MacVeagh that it considered it unnecessary for the President to send a formal letter to the Greek monarch since the Ambassador had clearly and fully informed him of the United States Government's views. The letter, the Department explained, was intended to lend weight to the Ambassador's advice but the receptive attitude of the King indicated that such reinforcement was not needed. (868.00/11-646)

⁷ Not printed.

868.00/10-2146

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁹

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1946.

The attached memorandum on Greece,¹⁰ originally submitted to you under cover of a letter of September 25 from Mr. Clayton, has been revised in the light of suggestions which you made in your letter of October 1 from Paris.¹¹ It is evident that the critical Greek situation will require very close attention and active U.S. interest during the ensuing months, and for that reason it seems advisable to have a comprehensive statement of U.S. policy towards Greece as a basis for day-to-day operations on all levels in the Department and for dealing with other Government agencies.

In connection with the possibility of making arms available to Greece if necessitated by changing events, an urgent request was received last week from the British for permission to lend 2,000 Thompson machine guns and suitable quantities of ammunition to the Greek Government for use by the Greek *gendarmerie*. The Greek Government has also recently expressed an interest in purchasing from the U.S. 25 AT-6 fighter-trainer aircraft, and an unspecified number of motor torpedo boats.

On the basis of your general approval of this memorandum a summary was telegraphed to Ambassador MacVeagh, who has replied by expressing his strongest concurrence in this reevaluation of our policy towards Greece.

If you approve the Greek policy statement in its present form, you may wish to seek the concurrence of the Secretaries of War and Navy in order that the paper will represent an agreed version of our policy towards Greece.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

868.00/10-2146

*Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs*¹²

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1946.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING GREECE

1. Many signs indicate that Greece is becoming a focal point in strained international relations and that its fate during the next few

⁹ Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary (Acheson).¹⁰ *Infra*.¹¹ Not printed.¹² Marginal notations indicate the memorandum was approved by the Secretary of State approximately November 1.

months may be a deciding factor in the future orientation of the Near and Middle East. The importance of Greece and the desirability of supporting her have clearly emerged in Paris at the Peace Conference. Evidence to the above effect includes the following: the Ukrainian and Albanian complaints against Greece in the Security Council; increasing reports of incidents along the Greek frontier with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania; reports of large troop concentrations in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria facing the Greek frontier; unceasing and virulent attacks by the Soviet and Soviet-dominated press against the "illegal" Greek Government and the "fake" plebiscite; statements of Greek leaders of the Extreme Left that the present government would have to be overthrown before Greek "democrats" would be prepared to defend Greek soil against aggression; outspoken Soviet protests against British and U.S. "interference" in Greek internal affairs.

If the present trend continues and a major crisis arises, Greece will be found in a weakened internal condition. Its economy is still shattered as a result of enemy occupation, and public order is at a low ebb as a result of hatreds engendered by partisan cruelties and strife. Those hatreds are now being kept alive by the harsh *intransigence* of certain Extreme Right members in the Government and by the activities of an apparently well-organized and armed Communist-dominated minority supported by the U.S.S.R. and Soviet satellites. Although the Greek elections of March 1946 were considered fair by Western democratic standards (in spite of Extreme Left abstention), the resultant government is strongly royalist and is not averse to playing on the fears of the Greek public in order to brand all opposition as Communistic and foreign-inspired, with the hope of justifying strong measures to stamp out Left factions and to render impotent any real Center republicanism.

The relations of Greece with its northern neighbors are strained, in part, because of long-standing and vociferously expressed Greek claims for territorial adjustments at the expense of Albania and Bulgaria. Left elements in Greece minimize these particular claims and concentrate on demands for Eastern Thrace and Cyprus, thereby seeking to embarrass Great Britain and Turkey. On the other hand, Greece is historically justified in her fears that both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have designs on Macedonia, though the only official claim advanced at this time by either of these two countries is Bulgaria's recent bid for Western Thrace as a territorial outlet to the Aegean.²³

2. It is to the strategic advantage of the U.S. that the world should not be divided into mutually exclusive spheres of influence, but it is

²³ In a statement made by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister on August 14, 1946, in presenting to the Paris Peace Conference his Government's views on the draft peace treaty with Bulgaria; see Verbatim Record of the Sixteenth Plenary Meeting, vol. III, p. 200.

apparent that the U.S.S.R. is aggressively attempting to bring under its control an ever-increasing number of nations. The strategic importance of Greece to U.S. security lies in the fact that it is the only country of the Balkans which has not yet fallen under Soviet hegemony. Greece and Turkey form the sole obstacle to Soviet domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, which is an economic and strategic area of vital importance. If the Greek mainland and the Greek islands were allowed to come under Soviet influence, the Soviet Union would be in a position to exert irresistible pressure upon Turkey. We cannot afford to stand idly by in the face of maneuvers and machinations which evidence an intention on the part of the Soviet Union to expand its power by subjecting Greece to its will, and then using Greece as an important stepping-stone for a further expansion of Soviet power. In the broader political sense, but with important military implications, it may also be pointed out that:

a. It has become clear and indisputable that the national security of the U.S. rests, to a degree which can hardly be overemphasized, on the maintenance of the principles of the United Nations and on maintaining the confidence of other nations that these principles will in fact become the effective guide lines of international conduct. This requires that those key nations not already under the control of the U.S.S.R. should be confirmed in their faith that the U.S. will give complete support to the UN principles so far as the nations in question are concerned. The moral strength imparted by high principles and the conviction that the U.S. is defending not only its cause but that of all free nations is a tremendous factor in world affairs and would contribute greatly to our strength should matters ever come to a military test. We must not, therefore, endanger our moral standing nor allow it to appear that the situation has degenerated into an ideological duel solely between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. or between the U.S. and British on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other.

b. Greece was an early and courageous opponent of Fascist and Nazi aggression. The fact that she resisted to the end of her strength is widely known along the Soviet perimeter from Finland to Turkey. Likewise, it is recognized that Soviet hostility to Greece is not inspired by a sincere concern that the Greek people might be crushed by an undemocratic government, but that Soviet policy towards Greece is dictated by the clear intention of making it impossible for any country in the geographic position of Greece to remain friendly to the Western Allies and to Western ideals of democracy. If Greece were to be allowed to fall victim to Soviet aggression, which aggression would doubtless be delegated to Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the Soviet-inspired Left Movement in Greece, there could not fail to be most unfavorable repercussions in all of those areas where political sympathies are balanced precariously in favor of the West and against Soviet communism.

3. If, in the process of trying to straighten out her own affairs, Greece falls into open civil war, there will certainly be outside intervention on the side of the Communist-dominated Extreme Left, al-

though this intervention will probably be cleverly disguised to conceal its outside character. Such a situation would face the Western Powers, particularly Great Britain, but also the U.S. with difficult decisions as to what support could be given the established government involved in open internal hostilities. Decisions of this nature have been difficult in China, and may become more so; they were impossible in the Spanish civil war. It is vastly to the interest of the U.S. that the recognized government be assisted in becoming strong enough *before the fact* to handle its internal problems without requiring a sudden increase in assistance *during* a state of actual or near civil war.

4. Withdrawal of British forces from Greece, as it progresses, will leave the Greek government with the complex problem of maintaining internal order and protecting her borders under conditions where none of her Soviet-inspired neighbors wish to see her succeed. The stability of the Greek Government in such circumstances must be regarded as questionable unless given vigorous external support, including support by the U.S. If the fall of the Greek Government should result in the emergence of a dictatorship of the Left minority subservient to Moscow, Soviet encirclement of Turkey will have gone a long way towards completion, and we will have allowed to go unchecked another step of Soviet aggression aimed at exclusive domination of the Eastern Mediterranean.

5. There can be no question that the U.S.S.R. is providing military assistance to elements seeking to cause the fall of the Greek Government. An important part of this assistance is the maintenance of large armed forces by the Soviet Union and her satellites in countries contiguous to Greece. Many armed bands operating in Greek territory are based in Yugoslavia and Albania and supplied from sources within these two countries. Such military threat against stability in Greece makes it urgent that the U.S. increase and intensify its political and economic assistance promptly, lest it come too late.

6. The U.S. should make it clear to the world that we are determined that Greece remain independent and in charge of her own affairs and that we are prepared to take suitable measures to support the territorial and political integrity of Greece as important to U.S. security. Our action in this regard should include, among others, the following steps, which will be taken only after consultation in appropriate cases with other Powers having interests similar to our own :

a. Clarification to the world, by diplomatic conversations, by the issuance of public statements from time to time, and in other appropriate ways, that this Government strongly supports the independence and territorial integrity of Greece and encourages the development of democracy in Greece and a peaceable and reasonable policy on the part of the Greek Government.

b. Exertion of all possible U.S. influence to counsel the Greek Government, following the return of the King, towards a policy of moder-

ation in connection with divergent Greek political factions the basic loyalty of which to Greece is not subject to question, as well as in its relations with neighboring countries. It should be pointed out that the U.S. would find it very difficult to support strongly any government by means of which the Extreme Right would resort to excessive measures against political opposition which is expressed through legal and peaceful means or to repression of civil liberties, except in conditions of emergency, to maintain internal order and the authority of the Government.

c. Continued clarification by the U.S. to the Greek Government that we believe the interests of peace and stability require that Greek claims to territories beyond the frontiers of 1939 should be dropped. (We should make clear, of course, that we equally oppose any claims by other countries for territory on the Greek side of these frontiers.) If confidential efforts are unsuccessful in convincing Greece that she should abandon or leave in abeyance her territorial claims, we should be prepared to make a public statement of our position.¹⁴ In any case, we should work in the Council of Foreign Ministers and elsewhere to see that the 1939 frontiers are accepted by all parties.

d. Active political support of Greece in the United Nations and the Security Council when occasion warrants.

e. Although it is recognized that Great Britain has primary responsibility in furnishing military equipment to Greece, the U.S. should be prepared, in case of British inability, to sell to Greece sufficient arms for the maintenance of internal order and for the defense of Greek territorial integrity until such time as military forces of the UN are prepared to undertake guarantees against aggression. Such sales would of course be made only after consultation and coordination with other countries from which Greece may seek to acquire arms.

f. Recommendations to the Export-Import Bank, as in the past, and to the International Bank for the grants of economic assistance to Greece, provided that such credits are expended on sound projects which will strengthen Greek national economy.

g. The immediate dispatch to Greece of an American economic mission, as requested by the Greek Government, with favorable consideration at a later date of the possibility of making available to Greece appropriate American financial and economic advice through advisers and technicians.

h. Appropriate action by the U.S. Government, if and when necessary, to assist Greece in finding export markets and in acquiring essential goods in the American markets.

i. Appropriate action by U.S. Government to relieve the Greek shipping shortage through the sale or charter of vessels, and in other ways.

¹⁴ Mr. Henderson transmitted a copy of the "Memorandum Regarding Greece" to Ambassador MacVeagh on November 14 and noted, in connection with section 6c, that Secretary Byrnes did not think it advisable at that time to make a special public announcement of our position toward Greek territorial claims (861.-24/11-1446).

j. Informing the American public through the press, American foreign policy associations, and the like, of the nature of our policy towards Greece and the reasons for it.¹⁵

868.00/10-2346 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1946—7 p. m.

1385. Urtel 1441 Oct 23.¹⁶ Although your excellent clarification US views to Tsaldaris included reference to Greek territorial claims you may take opportunity further to stress this aspect Greek problem with Tsaldaris or other Govt officials or King if you think advisable in connection declared Greek intention present territorial claims to CFM in New York. US vote against Bulgarian frontier revision in Bulgarian Territorial Commission and Peace Conference¹⁷ makes clear our position on that question. In fairness Greek Govt should realize in advance that US can not support Greek desire for revision Albanian frontier. Although US has sympathetic understanding Greek arguments for territorial adjustments and realizes failure to achieve national claims is bitter pill, indeed, we feel that in interest more important long-range aim of Balkan peace and stability US must favor retention 1939 boundaries. However, we would strongly support Greece in event any effort made to change those boundaries.

It would appear to be to eventual advantage of Greece to accept territorial integrity of its neighbors several of which are now exploit-

¹⁵ On September 30, Secretary Byrnes advised Mr. Clayton: "I approve the revision of SC/R-184 enclosed with your personal letter of September 25 and agree that it should go to the President." (Telegram 4906 from Paris, 740.00119 Council/9-3046) Presumably, the revision referred to section 6e of the draft memorandum sent with Mr. Clayton's letter of September 25. This section read: "Sale to Greece of sufficient arms for the maintenance of internal order and for the defense of Greek territorial integrity until such time as the military forces of the U.N. are prepared to undertake guarantees against aggression. Such sales would, of course, be made only after consultation and coordination with other countries from which Greece may seek to acquire arms."

In telegram Delsec 1032 (5007 from Paris), October 5, 1946, 7 p. m., Secretary Byrnes informed Mr. Acheson: "As to three countries mentioned, my friend agreed with me some weeks ago it was his primary duty as to direct military equipment. If he fails to act then we can." (740.00119 Council/10-546) Greece, Turkey, and Iran were the three countries; "my friend" was Mr. Bevin.

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ See the United States Delegation Journal account of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Political and Territorial Commission for Bulgaria, October 1, and the Verbatim Record of the Forty-Second Plenary Meeting, October 11, vol. III, pp. 610 and 796.

ing against Greece what they characterize as increasingly aggressive attitude of Greek Govt in its endeavors to enlarge territory at their expense.

Although it has always been US belief that international differences should be given fullest hearing in appropriate international bodies Greek Govt must certainly be aware that continued attempts to advance these claims in and out of season can only create difficulties for Greece and for those nations who want to assist her in present dangerous situation. If in spite unfavorable atmosphere and likelihood frontier claims being rejected Greek Govt still feels it must present these claims to CFM, US Govt strongly hopes Greek officials and politicians are prepared to accept in good faith and goodwill any decision on her territorial claims even though it may be unfavorable to Greece and that they should be further prepared to exert all possible influence within their country to have such decision accepted with a minimum of dissatisfaction and rancor towards other nations.

Foregoing views being expressed to Greek Amb here.¹⁸

Sent Athens 1385. Rptd London 7347, Paris 5714, Moscow 1888, Sofia 348, Tirana 195.

ACHESON

768.75/10-2746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, October 27, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received October 28—1 p. m.]

1468. On October 20 Assistant Military Attaché Miller accompanied by Lt. Glenn A. Rounsevell of Military Attaché's staff completed week's thorough reconnaissance of Greece's frontier with Albania. They covered 300 miles by jeep, visited actual border at 12 points between Pirsoyianni and Capestilo, talked with soldiers, British liaison officers, clergy and civilians and interrogated captured bandit leaders.

On basis survey they are convinced that 30 to 40 attacks on Greek frontier outposts were launched by Albanian Armed Forces during first half 1946. Heavy attack on Greek's Kipi outpost July 7¹⁹ was followed by period of quiet (presumably timed to coincide with Security Council discussion and Paris Conference) but four new Albanian attacks have occurred during past 2 weeks.

No one to whom they talked had any knowledge of Greek attacks on Albanian outposts and they do not believe that more than 1 or 2 such incidents can have occurred during past year. Same Greek units have been on frontier for 18 months and check at numerous frontier posts of standing orders showed latter to be purely defensive.

¹⁸ On October 25 (memorandum of conversation not printed).

¹⁹ See Mr. Baxter's memorandum of July 8, p. 179.

Interrogation of Fotios Kontopanos (alias Anniba or Hannibal), bandit leader captured October 11, revealed him to be ex-ELAS officer who entered Yugoslavia after Varkiza. Kontopanos said that in fall 1945 all Greeks in Soviet Balkans sphere were placed in concentration camps, Greek Macedonians being sent to Skoplje and others to Boulkes north of Belgrade.

In these camps they were trained for future armed action within Greece by officials of Yugoslav and Soviet governments and KKE. Kontopanos group was addressed by Yugoslav Minister Education for Bukovina at Belgrade and by Zachariades Greek Communist leader, at Boulkes March 25, 1946. Beginning April 1946 Kontopanos continued, armed bands of these dissident Greeks were despatched into Greece with assistance Yugoslav and Albanian Governments, UNRRA supplies and equipment being used. Plan was to seize initially strip of mountainous territory within Greece extending from Albanian frontier near Nestorian to Mt. Olympus. (From personal observation and recent withdrawal 25 Greek *gendarmerie* posts, the two US observers consider this objective already practically accomplished.) Second phase of plan calls for reformation of old ELAS regiments, and for this purpose bands of dissident Greek officers, armed and provided with names of local KKE contacts, are infiltrated into Greece.

Miller and Rounsevell found no conclusive evidence that Albanian or Yugoslavian nationals are being despatched into Greece for partisan activity. Fully documented report including signed statements of persons interrogated, photographs, etc. is being forwarded.

From Greek sources local press has obtained and published some of the results of this survey which has caused Communist *Rizospastis* to comment angrily "It is unheard of that an officer of a foreign country should examine the frontier posts of an independent state or cross-examine Greeks in their own land." The US officers concerned have not revealed any details of their mission to unauthorized persons.

Repeat to MID War Department. Sent Department as 1468 repeated Tirana and Belgrade.

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-2946

Memorandum by Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1946.

After his return from Paris Mr. Matthews sent you a memorandum, with several attachments, concerning the discussions of Greek questions which had taken place in Paris during the period of the Peace

Conference. I have extracted from these documents the following points which may be helpful in current discussions on Greek matters.

GENERAL

1. The Secretary told the Greek leaders that he and his delegation had given more time to the Greek than to any other question with the exception of Trieste. He made it a matter of principle to support the Greek delegation whenever possible and to help them over rough spots when their projects were rejected.

3. The British delegation did less to help the Greeks, both at the table and in the lobbies, than did the US. This was probably because of the discussion concerning Greek "reaction and monarchical fascism" which came up whenever a Greek matter was mentioned. The British were therefore happy to stay out of all such discussions and allow the US to take the lead.

BULGARIAN FRONTIER

1. The US delegation tried to soften the Bulgarian frontier blow by proposing a demilitarized zone,²⁰ a proposal based on one of the Greek amendments. To everyone's great astonishment, the Greek military technicians repudiated this suggestion in the Military Commission.²¹

2. In a letter of October 8 Mr. Dragoumis indicates the Greek intention of bringing the matter of Bulgarian frontier to the attention of the Council of Foreign Ministers and hopes that it may be raised jointly by the American and British representatives.

ALBANIAN FRONTIER

1. On Albania, Secretary Byrnes "went so far as to make a special speech for them (the Greeks) in a plenary session, though we really felt the subject did not belong in this conference."

2. In a conversation with Greek Opposition leaders the Secretary mentioned Albania and explained the situation under the Potsdam protocol and repeated assurances given to Mr. Tsaldaris, that when the matter came before the Council of Foreign Ministers as a proper and normal item of discussion he would do his best to have the topic kept before the Council for discussion.

3. In another interview concerning the subject of the Albanian

²⁰ See the United States Delegation Journal account of the Ninth Meeting of the Political and Territorial Commission for Bulgaria, September 11, vol. III, p. 422.

²¹ See the United States Delegation Journal account of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Military Commission, September 28, *ibid.*, p. 586.

frontier Mr. Dragounis asked the Secretary—and said he intended to ask the British also—merely to leave the matter open on the Council of Foreign Ministers agenda and neither raise it in the near future nor agree to its definite exclusion. The Secretary stated that he thought this would be easy to do and that he would comply with the Greek request.

ECONOMIC

1. The Secretary told certain members of the Greek delegation that, if they were disturbed as to methods of collecting Italian reparations out of current industrial production, they could inform the Greek Government that financial assistance would be forthcoming from the US in the form of a credit to purchase in advance the necessary raw materials. The Secretary spoke in rather general terms but indicated that if the reparations totalled one hundred million dollars, perhaps something around forty million dollars would be needed for the purchase of raw materials.

2. In discussing the different forms of assistance for Greece the Secretary spoke particularly of surplus, saying that he had in mind particularly ships, road machinery and railway equipment “even though some of the goods which he hoped could be made available to Greece might have to be taken away from other countries for whom it had already been earmarked[”].

3. In explaining the functions of the International Bank as a medium for reconstruction loans, the Secretary said that it had occurred to him that a good way to approach the problem would be to have three experts sent to Greece to make a technical survey.²² This suggestion, made to Mr. Tsaldaris, resulted in a letter from him to the Secretary, dated October 12,²³ in which he acknowledges the US intention of sending an economic mission to Greece. This letter is hardly the “invitation” from the Greeks which we had in mind, but it may have to serve the purpose.

4. The Secretary warned the Greek delegation that it would be inadvisable for them to attempt to have reparations increased during the final steps of the treaty preparations in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

²² In telegram 1355, October 16, 1946, 7 p. m., the Department informed Athens that a United States mission to analyze the Greek situation was now being selected. The mission would recommend steps to improve conditions and achieve economic stability and study the extent of foreign aid needed for reconstruction. (868.50/10-1046)

²³ Text of this letter was transmitted to the Department by the Secretary of State in telegram Delsec 1065 (No. 5165 from Paris), October 14, 4 p. m. (740.00119 Council/10-1446)

868.50/8-646

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*²⁴

From information available to this Government it appears that tremendous efforts have been made in some segments of the Greek economy toward recovery from the devastation of war. The notable gains in agricultural production, both in crops which provide for the needs of the Greek people and in crops grown mainly or in part for export, bear witness to the degree to which the hard and sustained work of the farmers has overcome handicaps in lack of draft power, etc. However, many other steps must be taken to restore economic stability. There is a feeling in United States Government circles that Greece is not likely to have economic order and prosperity, at least for a long time to come, unless the Greek Government and the Greek people are prepared to take heroic measures of an economic nature which would compare with the heroic measures which Greece took in the military field when Greece was the victim of aggression. It appears necessary for the merchants and industrialists to make greater efforts and to direct these efforts toward production and distribution of goods essential to the Greek people. As there may be greater profit in the production of luxuries, it may be necessary, in these difficult years, for the Greek Government to pass and enforce measures which will direct production toward meeting the basic needs of the Greek economy. Finally, the Greek Government must take much more active responsibility for reconstruction; the apparent belief that foreign assistance can be effective without a much more vigorous internal policy is itself a major obstacle to recovery.

In order to expedite Greek recovery it appears most important that steps should be taken:

- (A) to stimulate exports;
- (B) to maximize domestic production of essential commodities;
- (C) to reduce non-productive government expenditure in order to make funds available for reconstruction, and effect reforms in government administration and in taxation;
- (D) to obtain control of and utilize effectively foreign exchange earned by the national economy; and
- (E) to prepare a reconstruction program which puts first things first and is within the means of the Greek economy, and to carry out reconstruction up to the limits of the means available.

²⁴ This memorandum was enclosed in a letter of October 29 from Mr. Acheson to Mr. Venizelos (in care of the Greek Embassy) in reply to the latter's communication of August 6 (see footnote 51, p. 190). The letter of October 29 stated in part: "At the request of your Mission, a memorandum has been prepared outlining steps which it is thought are essential before Greece can accomplish any degree of economic stability. This memorandum is enclosed for your consideration and for transmittal to the appropriate quarters of the Greek Government. The recommendations contained therein are necessarily stated in general terms; the methods by which the objectives should be accomplished must be decided largely by the Greek Government itself." (868.50/8-646)

More specifically it appears that the Greek Government should address itself energetically toward carrying through a program such as the following:

(A) To stimulate exports:

1. Steps should be taken to bring export prices and domestic prices more into line with one another.

(a) The wide disparity, as compared with corresponding pre-war figures, between foreign exchange rates on the one hand and internal prices and living costs on the other suggests the possible need for a revision of the foreign exchange rate.

(b) Measures should be taken to lower internal prices. Measures would include the expansion of production in Greece, increased imports of consumer goods, reduction in cost of distribution, and tax reform. These measures are also related to other aspects of the Greek economy and are listed under appropriate headings.

2. Essential goods should be made more easily available to all consumers under a system which would discourage the hoarding of export commodities. To accomplish this, there should be:

(a) distribution of goods now in warehouses;

(b) vigorous government action to effect expansion of production in domestic manufacturing plants and sale without excessive increases in price;

(c) preference, in use of such foreign exchange as is available for consumer goods, for purchase of goods essential to farmers and lower income groups in the community;

(d) where necessary, direct stimulation of exports to countries still exercising full control over their foreign trade by the negotiation of trade agreements under which needed imports could be obtained.

3. There should be energetic, far-reaching, and persistent efforts to reduce the cost of internal transport.

(a) Temporary program should be developed to effect immediate repair of the highways with minimum drain on the government budget. Such a program will require the concerted efforts of practically all able-bodied male citizens. (Note: Immediate road repair is extremely urgent: bad roads increase the cost of marketing of foodstuff and result in losses through spoilage; they increase the cost of distribution of consumer goods; they shorten the life of tires and trucks, and cause heavy expense in truck maintenance.)

(b) Reconstruction of key elements in vital railway lines and of port works should be initiated at once. The Export-Import loan and material obtained under the United States Surplus Property Credits could be utilized in carrying out the most important projects.

(c) Vessels recently purchased through a United States Surplus Property Credit should be utilized to provide coastal and inter-island transportation at moderate rates.

4. Taxes on the production, sale, movement or export of export commodities should be reduced or removed, at least for a period sufficient for a substantial amount of exports to be made and to permit revision of the system of taxation.

5. Assistance, including financial assistance if necessary to stimulate trade, should be given to processors and packers of export products.

6. Opportunities to develop exports should be sought persistently in pre-war markets and also in markets where few or no Greek products were sold before the war. The loss of pre-war markets in Central Europe makes this the more important.

(B) As foreign exchange is an extremely critical factor in the Greek economic position, the Government should endeavor to maximize the earnings in foreign exchange of the Greek economy. It should adopt drastic measures to obtain control of as much as possible of its foreign exchange and to use such exchange effectively. Measures to increase exports have been discussed; increased amounts of foreign exchange should be available from them. The earnings of merchant vessels under Greek ownership or control should be another substantial source of foreign exchange. In this connection, it may be noted that estimates by UNRRA of 1947 foreign exchange earnings of the Italian fleet (comparable very roughly in size to the 1947 Greek fleet) are \$80 million. While this is merely an estimate, it suggests that energetic government action could substantially increase the \$7 million estimated by the Mission as the 1947 foreign exchange earnings of the Greek Merchant Marine, and greatly improve the Greek balance of international payments. An obvious opportunity to save foreign exchange for the Greek economy would be in greater use of "freight aboard ship" terms in the purchase of imports combined with shipment in Greek vessels.

For effective utilization of foreign exchange it appears that the Government should adopt and enforce regulations to limit the use of exchange to the purchase of essential commodities or the payment for essential services. The Government should change its present regulations permitting the transfer of funds abroad, and limit transfers to those of advantage to the Greek economy, such as expenses of diplomatic representatives or of sales organizations. Provision should be made, of course, for those cases where denial would work a definite hardship.

Sales of gold constitute a wasteful, inefficient use of foreign exchange, but their continuance as a temporary expedient may be desirable until the economy has begun to function in more normal fashion.

(C) Realistic fiscal policy and reforms in taxation and government administration are essential.

Without discussing in detail reforms in government administration and in taxation, and speaking generally, it appears that the number of government employees should be cut to a minimum and that every effort should be made to re-establish pre-war civil service standards. It appears obvious that heavier taxation is necessary if the Greek Government is to be in a sound financial position, and that a system of taxation should be developed so that the burden of taxation is proportionately greater on the segments of the community best able to bear it—particularly the merchants and manufacturers. It would appear that such a system should include a graduated income tax, a revenue tariff on certain imports, and increased excise taxes on luxury and non-essential products. In spite of the need for greater tax revenue, it appears that the taxes on the transportation of commodities within the country should be abolished with a view toward lowering internal costs and prices and facilitating the distribution of goods.

It appears essential that the Government devote a substantially greater proportion of its efforts to reconstruction. Emergency measures for immediate highway improvement have been outlined. They are a temporary expedient. It is imperative that the direction of reconstruction by the government be carried out in an energetic and well organized manner. An essential element will be the programming of government and private reconstruction projects and expenditures with priorities for necessary materials. If the recently established reconstruction organization is given authority and continued support, it would appear to be such an agency as is needed to deal with these problems.

(D) Reconstruction should be pushed to the limits of the means available.

From information available it appears that there has been substantial restoration of agricultural production through tremendous efforts of individual Greek farmers using whatever aid was available. Similar utilization of available resources in reconstruction is necessary. The restoration of the highways has already been mentioned; it deserves further emphasis. In addition, reconstruction work should be prosecuted on the railways, irrigation and municipal water works, electric power plants, port works, and where necessary, industrial plants. To achieve this there should be effective utilization of all equipment and material which Greece has received or can obtain from abroad. This would include the following:

1. The materials brought in by UNRRA for industrial rehabilitation.

The amount scheduled under the industrial rehabilitation program aggregated \$40.9 million. About half of this appears to consist of

equipment, which should continue to provide the means for much reconstruction after the termination of UNRRA activities. Its importance can be realized by reviewing the more significant items of one category of supplies. The category selected is "General Reconstruction Equipment", the principal items of which are as follows:

<i>Number</i>	<i>Article</i>	<i>Value</i>
46	Road rollers	\$170, 110
71	Rock crushing and screening plant	317, 116
59	Concrete mixers	50, 211
49	Air compressors	281, 248
30	Tractors with dozers	251, 779
48	Power shovels and cranes	505, 084
12	Truck shovels	128, 806
	Bridging material	2, 230, 000
	Miscellaneous	524, 319
	Reserve	131, 327
	Total	<u>\$4, 590, 000</u>

While the bridging material has probably been used up, it is obvious that much highway and other reconstruction and maintenance work can be carried out with the remaining two and one-half million dollars worth of equipment.

2. Material to be obtained under FLC credits:

As many of the items selected under FLC credits will be obtained at a low percentage of their cost to the U. S. Government, the amount of supplies obtained thereunder will be substantially greater than the sums involved.

3. The Export-Import Bank loan of \$25 million agreed upon January 11, 1946.

The effective use of the tremendous amount of materials obtainable under (1) and (2) above will require well thought out plans and coordinated engineering work. It appears possible to use part of the proceeds of the Export-Import loan for contracting services in connection with the material obtained under (1) and (2) and in planning this work of reconstruction. It appears essential that this be done.

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1946.

[Mr. Venizelos, at Athens, replied to Mr. Acheson on November 23. He set forth the Greek people's full appreciation of and gratitude for Mr. Acheson's kind words and American assistance already given to Greece, and then stated:

"I quite appreciate that, in order to achieve economic order and prosperity the Government and the people of Greece will have to devote themselves with the unrelentless task to develop all their resources and to take heroic measures in facing the present situation.

"However, you will admit that the extent of actual destruction is such and the available means of reconstruction are so meager that in spite of their best efforts, the Greek people will be bound to depend

on foreign assistance and guidance in order to achieve economic recovery and social stability.

"Therefore, although I am quite convinced that the most earnest consideration will be given to the suggestions contained in the Memorandum enclosed in your letter, the Government and the people of Greece are looking forward to the early arrival in Greece of the small economic mission which Mr. Byrnes promised to send, upon request of the Greek Government."

Mr. Venizelos' letter was transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the Greek Chargé on December 31, 1946. (868.50/12-3146)]

711.00/10-2946

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1946.

In the conference yesterday afternoon attended by the Secretary, Under Secretary, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Matthews²⁵ and General Hilldring, with respect to changes in the Armaments Policy, it was decided:

That with respect to Turkey and Greece, arms should be furnished by the United Kingdom. In the event that the United Kingdom required arms for this purpose which were not in its possession, the arms would be furnished to the United Kingdom by the United States.

With respect to Iran a limited amount of armament not to exceed \$10,000,000 in value would be sold to Iran. In the event that credits were necessary in order to furnish these arms, the United States would give favorable consideration to such a credit.

That no further exception to the existing arms policy would be authorized at this time.

That language would be added to the existing Arms and Armament Policy which would make it possible for the Secretary of State to depart from the existing policy when it was clearly in the interest of the United States to do so. Language to make such exceptions possible, for inclusion in the present arms policy, would be prepared by General Hilldring and submitted to the Secretary for approval.

868.00/10-3046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

ATHENS, October 30, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received November 1—10:23 a. m.]

1491. During visit received this morning from Under Minister Foreign Office I read him Dept's 1385 of October 24 and at his request am

²⁵ H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

supplying Foreign Office with memorandum covering the ideas therein expressed. He advised me by all means to communicate same to King and was outspokenly critical of Prime Minister whom he accused of seeing Foreign Affairs wholly in light of local politics and of having been afraid in Paris to tell Greek public the truth about national claims. He said that "impossibility" of these being satisfied under existing conditions was made perfectly understandable to Greek delegation but that Prime Minister personally prevented facts from being communicated to Greek press and persisted in encouraging idea that Greece could still urge claims with some hope of success. Dragoumis himself since his recent return from Paris has publicly attempted to counteract the damage done (see paragraph 5, mytel 1482, October 30²⁶).

Though King already acquainted with problem through my discussion with him of Embtel 1336 of October 15 [3]²⁶ and both he and his political adviser Pipinelis personally see matter of Greek claims in proper perspective (mytels 1384 of October 11 and 1344 of October 4²⁷) I shall not fail to use earliest opportunity to communicate to Palace also the substance of Deptel 1385 of October 24.

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-2546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1946—8 p. m.

1403. Unless you perceive some reason for not doing so please seek occasion to make it clear that although this Govt would of course welcome visit by Tsaldaris to US it feels it would be unfortunate for him leave Greece this critical time in order present the national claims at CFM. It seems to us task of broadening govt and endeavoring to strengthen Greece internally is most important one that can face a Greek PriMin at present time.

Brit Emb has informed Dept that similar UK views have been expressed to Greeks by your Brit colleague.

Sent Athens; rptd London.

BYRNES

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ Latter not printed.

868.50/10-2146 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1946—8 p. m.

1409. Urtel 1428, Oct 21.²⁸ One principal purpose Mission will be study Greek economy and recommend Greek Govt steps for effective utilization Greek resources improve internal conditions. Some recommendations will relate to measures to be carried out by Greek Govt alone without outside assistance as well as measures dealing with problems where assistance will be needed. Dept shortly transmitting Venizelos via Emb Washington preliminary memorandum²⁹ outlining program deemed essential for economic recovery, including steps to: (a) stimulate exports; (b) maximize domestic production essential commodities; (c) reduce non-productive govt expenditures in order make funds available for reconstruction, and effect reforms govt administration and taxation; (d) obtain control and utilize effectively foreign exchange earned by Greek national economy; and (e) prepare and implement realistic reconstruction program.

Another principal purpose Mission will be to study extent foreign assistance needed. In this connection Dept agrees with your view that Mission should not encourage Greek Govt to expect more credit than it is likely to receive. However, Mission should feel free to examine whatever it believes desirable. To limit Mission to projects of character likely to come before Eximbank or International Bank would be tantamount to assuring Greeks of US support in financing such projects. Greek Govt should understand that study of different segments Greek economy or particular projects does not carry implication of loan. You should, when occasion arises, discourage extravagant hopes in Greek Govt quarters.

Sent Athens; rptd London 7473.

BYRNES

²⁸ Not printed; it noted that the Greek conception of minimum financial needs for reconstruction far exceeded what the United States was prepared to finance through the Export-Import Bank. Ambassador MacVeagh suggested that the projected mission should limit its investigations and recommendations to projects that might be seriously considered for financing by the Export-Import Bank or the International Bank. (868.50/10-2146)

²⁹ Presumably memorandum of October 29, p. 250.

868.014/11-446

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Acheson
Mr. Baxter (NE)
Greek Ambassador

The Greek Ambassador called today to ask for clarification of two points relating to Greek territorial claims which he had discussed last week with officers of the Department. In connection with recent instructions to Ambassador MacVeagh to inform the Greek Government that in the interest of peaceful settlements in the Balkans the US Government would be unable to support the Greek claim for Northern Epirus, the Ambassador wished to know whether this represented any change in the attitude of the Secretary, who, in Paris, according to the Ambassador's understanding, had assured the Greek Prime Minister that he would see to it that a lack of unanimity among the Council of Foreign Ministers would prevent any final rejection of the Greek claim to Northern Epirus. The Ambassador also wished to know whether the vote on Article One of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty in the plenary session of the Peace Conference would modify in any way the US attitude on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier question.

Discussing the second question, Mr. Acheson said our position in the Council of Foreign Ministers will be the same as in Paris—in other words, this Government will vote in favor of Article One of the Bulgarian Treaty, which provides for no rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier.

On the matter of the Albanian frontier, Mr. Acheson read to the Ambassador an excerpt from a memorandum of conversation³⁰ in Paris in which Mr. Dragoumis, after the Greek claim against Albania had been voluntarily withdrawn by the Greek delegation from the agenda of the Peace Conference, asked the Secretary "merely to leave the matter open on the Council of Foreign Ministers agenda and neither raise it in the near future nor agree to its definite exclusion." Mr. Acheson explained that he thought the Secretary had meant by this simply that, since the Albanian question had been presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers as long ago as last April, the Greeks wished him to take no initiative in having the matter discussed now, when the atmosphere is unfavorable, but that at the same time he would prevent anyone else from trying to remove the matter from the agenda. Mr. Acheson explained that, though he could not state definitely what the Secretary had in mind, it seemed to him that

³⁰ Incorporated in Mr. Baxter's memorandum of November 1 to Mr. Henderson, not printed.

the Secretary was making no promises about the indefinite future but was referring to his attitude in the near future. Furthermore, if agitation for a discussion of this was continued by the Greeks and they desired it to be discussed soon, as indicated by a recent communication addressed to the Council of Foreign Ministers,³¹ he did not consider that the Secretary had given any assurances of what his attitude might be under these new circumstances.

The Ambassador said that he had clearly understood from the Secretary that the matter of Northern Epirus would not be discussed for some months, as it needed to await the German and Austrian settlements. However, he reiterated his belief that the Secretary had given assurances that when the question is eventually discussed, he will see to it that Greek claims are not unanimously rejected but the way left open for future decision. He therefore hoped that Mr. Acheson would discuss this matter with the Secretary and inform him of his attitude.

In conclusion the Ambassador said that officers of the Department had recently assured him, in discussing the US attitude towards Greek territorial claims, that the territorial integrity of Greece is of great importance to the US. He wished to know just what that would mean in the event of any possible outside attempt to cut off a part of northern Greece to form a so-called "democratic" unit. Mr. Acheson said that we are pledged to resist strongly any aggressive actions against the territorial integrity of any of the United Nations. There are prescribed methods and procedures of taking action under the United Nations Charter in the case of any such actions and he thought that the immediate steps which we had taken in the case of Azerbaijan,³² and were continuing to take, made clear our attitude on this question.

868.51/11-446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

ATHENS, November 4, 1946—9 p. m.

[Received November 4—11 a. m.]

1501. Embtel 1500, November 2.³³ Text of Prime Minister's note follows:

"I wish to draw Your Excellency's attention to the extremely critical foreign exchange position of Greece.

³¹ By the Greek Ambassador in memorandum 5833, October 30, not printed, but see footnote 22, vol. II, p. 956.

³² For documentation on the situation in Iran, see pp. 289 ff. In telegram 9681, November 22, 1946, noon, London reported that the British Foreign Office took a very serious view of the situation along Greece's northern frontier, fearing particularly a joining of ELAS contingents with Greek and Yugoslav Macedonian bands to form an "Azerbaijan area" (868.014/11-2246).

³³ Not printed; it stated that the Greek Prime Minister presented urgent notes addressed to Mr. Bevin and to Ambassador MacVeagh requesting extension of immediate financial assistance to Greece to avert a foreign exchange crisis (868.00/11-246).

The position with regard to our dollar assets is especially acute. Today we have only 10 million dollars in freely expendable exchange and these dollars represent a recent loan from the New York Federal Reserve Bank against our gold stock. At the end of September dollar holding of the Bank of Greece totaled \$25,000,000. However against these assets there were outstanding \$18,000,000 in confirmed credits and \$4,000,000 has been set aside in our currency cover account. In early October we opened confirmed credits to the amount of \$3,000,000 for the import of fertilizers, overcoats and blankets thus using up all our then available dollars.

Our sterling position is somewhat better but it is also very critical with our freely expendable sterling totaling only 3.5 million pounds. At the end of September we had 24 million pounds (including a 10 million pound loan from the UK) in our currency cover amount. In addition we had a balance of 6.8 million pounds but there were outstanding against this amount confirmed credits of approximately 3.3 million pounds leaving freely expendable sterling assets of only 3.5 million pounds. These figures exclude 4.7 million pounds due on BMA notes purchased by the Bank of Greece and 11.1 million pounds representing drachmae advances to the British forces. These assets are not at this time freely expendable for financing imports into Greece.

Our gold stock totals approximately \$22,000,000 of which \$10,000,000 has been pledged against the recent dollar advance from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York mentioned above.

In view of this situation we have in recent months been forced to impose severe restrictions on the import of many urgently needed consumer goods. Our concerted efforts to expand Greek exports are yielding increasing amounts of foreign exchange but it is clear these proceeds will not be sufficient to meet current needs during the next few months.

In the past several months we have made much progress in solving our purely internal financial problems but this tremendously difficult task will become impossible unless we can be assured of the continued import from abroad of the most essential consumers' as well as capital goods.

I bring this very serious problem to Your Excellency's attention in order to express the urgent hope that measures may be quickly found whereby the US Government may come to our aid in meeting our current foreign exchange needs.

On this occasion I would like to remind the promise given by Secretary Byrnes as to the early sending to Greece of financial experts in order that they should investigate into the country's requirements."³⁴

Comment follows in next telegram.³⁵

MACVEAGH

³⁴ A parallel note was sent to the Department by the Greek Embassy on November 7 (868.5151/11-746).

³⁵ No. 1502, November 4, 1946, 1 p. m., not printed; it stated that the Embassy's information substantially confirmed the seriousness of the free dollar-sterling exchange position as outlined by the Prime Minister (868.51/11-446).

868.00/11-546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, November 5, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

1522. Deptel 1392, Oct 26.³⁶ 2532 persons in exile on Oct 1 according British Police Mission (which has only reliable figures available) with unknown number in transit camps en route exile or detained pending sentence.

Embassy has also received numerous protests concerning wholesale exile of political hostages and inhumane conditions at places of exile mainly from EA (EAM relief agency; see mytel 1484, Oct 31³⁷).

UNRRA has investigated conditions at several camps concerning which EA has protested and found latter's figures invariably exaggerated but conditions at places of exile and concentration points fully as deplorable (by western standards) as claimed. In general adequate housing, clothing and food unsupplied and unavailable and medical facilities totally lacking. However, despite contrary Balkan tradition most exiles do receive drachma allowance from Govt which though inadequate for subsistence (10 cents at legal rate) is no more unrealistic than low rate of Civil Service pay which Govt unable better at this time for budgetary reasons. Findings of British Police Mission and British Embassy confirm UNRRA description of conditions.

Though figures from Leftist sources must be accepted with extreme reserve correspondence between following figures just furnished Embassy by EA and those of British may indicate former not far out of line. According EA "about 2500" persons were in exile on Oct 1 which number had increased to 3991 by Nov 1. Latter from following areas: Macedonia 1693; Thessaly 1092, Epirus 222, Central Greece 441, Peloponnesus 416, Islands 127. EA states that in Larissa and from which 683 persons in exile on Nov 1 there were 1230 persons detained in transit camps and claims numbers so detained in other areas in proportion. Also claims approximately 10 to 12 percent of all persons exiled or detained are women or children.

As to political orientation of deportees, absence of specific protests from non-Communist sources (though Center has condemned general policy) would indicate that for most part only Communists and their families have suffered exile to date.

³⁶ Not printed; it requested information on press reports and letters of protest alleging that thousands of "democratic" Greeks had been deported to Greek islands and that thousands, including women and children, were being held as hostages in jails (868.00/10-2546).

³⁷ Not printed.

I have urged to King that wives and children of fugitives should no longer be imprisoned and exiled as hostages and he replied that he regards present policy in this connection as only tending to increase bitterness with resentment (mytel 1384, Oct 11). I have also urged Prime Minister to amnesty all persons not guilty of actual crimes (mytel 1441, Oct 23³⁹) and he later made statement of policy which included such an amnesty with a certain time limit and other conditions (mytel 1446 [1466], Oct. 27³⁹) but did not refer specifically to exiles.

Meanwhile UNRRA has taken strong position that exiles are entitled regular UNRRA rations and is endeavoring induce Govt provide shelter and clothing from unused Govt stocks.

MACVEAGH

868.24/11-846

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1946.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Since the return of the Secretary,⁴⁰ there have been a number of conferences with regard to the policy which we should pursue concerning the question of providing such arms and military supplies to Greece as might be necessary to maintain law and order and to preserve the territorial integrity of that country.

On the one hand, we do not wish the Greeks to obtain the impression that our interest in the maintenance of Greek territorial integrity and independence is not sufficiently deep to cause us to run the risk of internal or international criticism arising from the supply of arms and military equipment to Greece. On the other hand, we have concern lest in case we supply arms and military equipment to Greece the impression be obtained that we are carrying on a provocative policy with regard to the Soviet Union and its Balkan puppets and are encouraging the outbreak of open warfare in the Balkans.

The decision has finally been made that since British troops are in Greece and since in the past Great Britain has been supplying Greece with arms and military equipment, it would be preferable for the Greeks to continue to obtain such supplies from Great Britain rather than from the United States. The Secretary discussed this matter with Mr. Bevin while in Paris and the Foreign Minister agreed that it might be wise at this juncture for Greece to look to Great Britain rather than to the United States for arms and military equipment.

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ From the Paris Peace Conference.

The Secretary, on his part, informed Mr. Bevin that we would try to aid Greece in other ways; that, in particular, we would endeavor to strengthen the economic position of Greece.

We are hoping, therefore, that you will find it possible to discourage the Greeks from asking us for arms and military equipment and to let them know that it would be preferable for them to address requests of this kind to the British Government. You might also pass the word along to the military and naval attachés of the Embassy so that they will adopt the same attitude when approached by the Greeks on the subject.

In case the Greeks should ask the British for arms and military equipment which the latter are not able to furnish but which we are in a position to provide, we might be prepared to furnish such supplies to Great Britain for delivery to Greece. It might even be possible, if this method of indirect furnishing of arms and military equipment should not in certain circumstances be feasible, to consider furnishing certain supplies direct.

We feel sure that in the various discussions which may arise in this connection with appropriate Greek officials, you will be able to make it clear that our reluctance to furnish military equipment direct is not due to any unwillingness on our part openly to support Greece in its efforts to retain its independence and territorial integrity but rather to our feeling that in the world situation the wiser course would be for the Greeks to look to Great Britain.

Any suggestions which you may care to offer with regard to our decision in this important matter would be appreciated.

With kindest personal regards,

DEAN ACHESON

868.00/11-1446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, November 14, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 11:51 a. m.]

1569. See mytel 1499, November 2.⁴¹ PriMin in talk with me last evening brought up question of his visiting US and I read him essential parts of Deptel 1403 of October 30. He replied that after seeing how events develop here in near future and before making final decision he will again talk with me. However, he feels at present that since solution of Greece's main problems both as regards security and reconstruction depend principally on decisions to be made in New York⁴² and Washington he would risk important loss of prestige here

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² The Third Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers met at New York City from November 4 to December 12, 1946.

where politics are so largely personal if he failed to go to US at least for brief period at this critical juncture.

MACVEAGH

868.51/11-1846

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jernegan)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1946.

Mr. Maclean ^{42a} referred to the notes recently delivered by the Greek Government to the American and British representatives in Athens requesting urgent assistance in connection with the critical Greek position in foreign exchange. He remarked that at the same time Prime Minister Tsaldaris had sent a personal communication to Mr. Bevin on the same subject.

The British Foreign Office, Mr. Maclean said, intended to consult the Department before sending a reply to the formal note. Meanwhile, however, it had been trying to draft something encouraging in response to the personal message to Mr. Bevin. At first, the Foreign Office had been disposed to minimize the seriousness of the situation, believing that the Greeks had overlooked some of the assets they could draw upon. When this attitude was communicated to the British Ambassador at Athens, he had demurred and had insisted that the position was in fact extremely grave. As an immediate palliative step, he had suggested that it would be helpful if the United States would make early public announcement of its intention to send an economic mission to Greece. This suggestion had been relayed to Mr. Bevin in New York, and he had instructed the Embassy to pass it on to the Department.

I told Mr. Maclean that the Greeks had made a similar request to us,⁴³ that Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Clayton were informed of it, and that the Department planned to make an announcement as soon as it could be sure of a man to head the mission. We thought it would be awkward to say anything publicly before that. I understood that a selection had been made tentatively, but I did not know whether the man in question had yet accepted the designation. Mr. Maclean said that he understood the situation and would duly report it.

When leaving, Mr. Maclean reiterated his remark that the Embassy would consult with the Department in due course regarding the answer to be made to the formal Greek note on the exchange situation. He seemed to want to make sure that this was understood.

^{42a} D. D. Maclean, First Secretary, British Embassy.

⁴³ In a telegram from the Greek Prime Minister to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Greek Embassy in note 6179, November 12, not printed.

868.014/11-1846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, November 18, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received November 19—9:41 a. m.]

1604. PriMin called me to FonOff this morning and handed me copy of memorandum which he said Greek Delegation to UN Assembly has been instructed to forward to Secretary and Bevin. Memorandum recites incidents occurring during past 2 months in vicinity of Northern Greek frontier which "clearly prove the close cooperation and support afforded by foreign elements outside Greek border to anarchical bands inside Greece".

PriMin stated that Greek Delegation has also been instructed to ascertain views of Secretary and Bevin as to whether it might in accordance with article 14 of UN Charter lay situation before General Assembly with view to examination and action. He showed me "reliably informed" telegram just received from Greek Minister Belgrade to effect that General Petko Davchevich, till now commander of Fourth Army in North Yugoslavia, has been shifted to Greek frontier to "take charge of all bandit groups operation in Greek territory".

Foreign complicity of [*in?*] fomenting Greek internal disorders now clearly and increasingly indicated by MA reports to War (see also mytel 1468, October 27 and despatch 3282 of November 8⁴⁴), and Greece's difficulties in maintaining order and security necessary for rehabilitation northern provinces likely soon prove insuperable. Possibility also exists that growing anarchy may result in Communist move to split North Greece from rest of country thereby endangering general peace. Situation unchanged except for worse since mytel 1307, September 30, the conclusion as well as substance of which I would respectfully but emphatically repeat.

MACVEAGH

868.51/11-446 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1946—5 p. m.

1488. Reurtel 1501 and 1502, Nov 4.⁴⁵ 1. Dept exploring possibility extension US credit against subsequent delivery strategic materials and commodities. Difficulties may be insurmountable and no optimis-

⁴⁴ Latter not printed.⁴⁵ Latter not printed, but see footnote 35, p. 260.

tic report can be given at present. In view seriousness Greek foreign exchange position Dept endeavoring every way expedite departure Mission.

2. Reurtel 1529, Nov 6.⁴⁶ As stated Deptel 1409, Oct 31, Mission will study extent foreign aid needed. Findings will have considerable bearing further US economic assistance. You therefore need not fear terms of reference will preclude idea of practical assistance.

3. Deptel 1414, Nov 2.⁴⁶ National Advisory Council approved Nov 6 credit for purchase 109 vessels. Amount credit needed 45 million dollars rather than 57 million indicated Deptel.

ACHESON

501.BC Greece/11-2146

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Hiss) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1946.

Subject: Proposed Security Council Commission to Investigate Greek
Border Clashes

In talking to Mr. Cohen ⁴⁷ on the above subject you may want to suggest to him that in the event Big Five commission along the lines we discussed at the meeting in your office this morning proves impossible, an alternative might be to have the Council charge the Secretary General with having members of his staff make such an investigation on behalf of the Council. You will recall that during the Ukrainian case against Greece Lie let it be known that he would be prepared on his own initiative under Article 99 to send such a group out to investigate the situation.⁴⁸ Consequently the proposal would not be a novel one and presumably would be agreeable to Lie himself. Like the proposed Big Five commission it also avoids protracted delay in selection of personnel (if an independent expert commission of the kind we have considered heretofore were to be appointed) or the selection of countries to be represented (if a commission of government representatives made up of members in addition to or other than the Big Five were to be considered). There may also be some advantage to establishing the precedent of impartial Secretariat investigations which do not involve the likelihood of political controversies within the commission itself and likely conflicting statements for propoganda purposes being made by members of the commission. It would also avoid the Big Five domination aspect which the Secretary has in the past

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department.

⁴⁸ For discussion of Mr. Lie's proposal, see Mr. Hiss' memorandum of September 18, p. 219.

wanted to minimize. A commission selected by the Secretary General could include as advisers military officers now on the staffs of the respective representatives to the Military Staff Committee. This would give the Secretariat commission technical military competence.

868.00/11-2246 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1946—7 p. m.

1503. There follows summary developments to date re possible Greek complaint to UN on frontier disturbances :

On Nov 18 Greek Ambassador asked Secretary ⁴⁹ whether he thought Greece should bring matter before UN and if so whether it had best be done before GA, invoking Art 14 or some other art, or by getting Sec Gen Lie to present question to SC under Art 99. (Lie reported to have indicated willingness to suggest despatch of investigating commission.) As third alternative Amb said Greeks might merely ask Sec Gen to circulate statement of case among GA members with Greek Govt reserving right to request specific action later if difficulties continued. Further suggested possibility of Big Four committee of inquiry outside framework of UN.

Amb was informed Nov 21 that before bringing matter to attention UN we felt Greeks should be quite sure they had good case well prepared. If they decided to go ahead they would be well advised to present case to SC and request appointment of commission to conduct on-the-spot investigation. It was pointed out to them that present discussions of veto question in UN ⁵⁰ would make Soviet veto more difficult than had been case when Ukrainian complaint was before Council. Moreover Sov opposition in former case was based on argument that commission to investigate Albania as well as Greece would indicate Albania was at fault, whereas complaint was brought against Greece not Albania. If Greece were complainant and investigation broadened to include Yugo, this argument would be less applicable.

On Nov 21 Brit Emb told us ⁵¹ Bevin had received request for advice whether Tsaldaris should come personally to US to present case. He was replying that this was for Greek Govt decide and he could not attempt influence them one way or another.⁵²

⁴⁹ Actually, the Greek Ambassador had sought the views of the Secretary of State in a letter of November 18 to Mr. Reber, Acting Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (501.BC Greece/11-1846).

⁵⁰ For documentation on this subject, see volume I.

⁵¹ In *aide-mémoire* 292/248/46, not printed.

⁵² The Greek Prime Minister departed for the United States on December 1.

Greeks have not put this question to us but we have told Brit that if we are asked we shall make same reply as Bevin.

Rptd to CFM, Amdel, New York, for Secretary.

ACHESON

868.00/11-2346

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, November 23, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received November 23—11:38 a. m.]

1628. Mytel 1622, November 22.⁵³ Transformation of bandit forces in north Greece into self-declared "army" represents no change in military situation since coordination as well as excellent training and equipment these forces has been evident for some time. Change, however, may have considerable propaganda importance as tending to place bandit activity on "civil war" level while name "Republican Army" recalling the Irish Republican Army seems well calculated to appeal to anti-British sentiment particularly in US. Furthermore, now that bandits can be called by more respectable name Department should perhaps be prepared for same type of foreign press "information" in their regard as concealed so long and so effectively the Communist control and motivation of EAM.

[Here follows an account of bandit activities.]

Repeated Belgrade.

MACVEAGH

501.BC/11-2546

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jernegan)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1946.

Participants: The Greek Ambassador
Mr. Henderson, NEA
Mr. Jernegan, NE

The Ambassador said that his Government had agreed to be guided by the Secretary's suggestion that any Greek complaint to the UN regarding the troubles in northern Greece should be brought before the Security Council. His Government now would like the further advice of the Department as to whether the case should be brought up under Article 33 or Article 34 of the Charter.

Mr. Henderson said that the American Govt. did not want to urge any course of action upon Greece. However, we in the Department considered that Article 34, which provides that the Security Council

⁵³ Not printed.

"may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction", was the logical basis for presentation of the Greek case. He pointed out that Article 33 assumed the existence of a "dispute", which had not yet been established in the present instance. Article 34 was broader in its scope. Furthermore, if it asked action under Article 33, Greece might be placed in an awkward position because it had not made any determined effort on its own account to enter into negotiations with its northern neighbors.

The Ambassador agreed with these remarks and said he would inform his Government that the Department thought it better to invoke Article 34 in the present instance.

Mr. Henderson emphasized the necessity for Greece to have a thoroughly prepared case before coming to the Security Council. The Ambassador expressed agreement but remarked that it would be difficult to prove many of the incidents which are the cause of the complaint. It was suggested to him that the official reports by the Greek functionaries concerned in each case, even though they might not constitute legal proof, would at least be very useful to the Council in its deliberations.

768.70/11-2646 : Telegram

*The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

SOFIA, November 26, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received November 28—12: 05 p. m.]

932. Neither Bulgarian Govt nor Bulgarian press has given any info on state of affairs along frontiers Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria with Greece except that press has published dispatches from Athens, Tirana and Belgrade on charges and counter charges of Greek, Albanian and Yugoslavian Govts.

So far as Bulgaria may be involved in situation reported from Athens defense is being left to Russia. Russia's project of defense by offensive action is revealed in text of so-called ACC letter to Greek liaison officer Sofia, text of which is contained in my next following telegram 933.⁵⁴

So far as I can ascertain, and our military authorities here are in general agreement on this point, Bulgaria is not as yet really involved in unfortunate state of affairs obtaining in Greek Macedonian territory. This does not mean that Bulgaria will not become actively engaged in that situation in event she is able to sign treaty of peace. It

⁵⁴ Dated November 26, 1946, not printed; it denounced strange movements of large groups of Greek soldiers near the Bulgarian frontier and the firing of arms by Greek forces into Bulgarian territory and warned that these activities might cause incidents with undesirable consequences (868.014/11-2646).

is my own belief and many other foreign observers here agree with me that it is only because Bulgaria is not yet at peace with Western Democracies that she is not actually involved with Yugoslavia and Albania in fomenting strife in Greece's northern and western provinces.

Peace will free Bulgaria to prosecute policy in this regard that will best suit Russia and her own national interests. In this connection Bulgarian's Russian supported campaign for return of Western Thrace takes on pressing significance. As seen from this vantage point problem in northern and western provinces of Greece may well present itself by spring as follows:

1. Greek sovereignty will no longer be effective in so-called Greek-Macedonia.
2. Local population this area will set up provisional regime and request union with Yugoslavia-Macedonia.
3. Bulgaria will express willingness to transfer its Macedonian territory in Pirin area to United Macedonia within "Federative Yugoslavia".
4. Obliteration of Greek sovereignty in Greek Macedonia will isolate Western Thrace from Greece.
5. Local population Western Thrace will establish provisional regime and request union with Bulgaria.
6. By this outflanking movement problem of Dardanelles will be "softened".

As I have pointed out in recent telegrams leadership of Bulgarian Communists is not sufficiently anxious for treaty of peace to make concessions to western views with respect to domestic political situation. I do believe, however, that this leadership, backed by Russian designs, is anxious for reestablishment of peace to facilitate developments as forecast above.

Sent Dept, repeated Moscow 371, London 214, Paris 304, Ankara 27, Athens 16, Belgrade 31.

BARNES

868.00/11-2846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, November 28, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received November 28—12: 05 p. m.]

1642. Deptel 1503, November 24 [22]. I asked King's political adviser Pipinelis to my house last evening and told him that I personally feel (1) that if Prime Minister goes New York in connection frontier disturbances before a government of national unity has been formed, he should be accompanied by opposition leaders to make clear that Greek case has full and not only majority parliamentary support and

(2) that formation of broadest possible coalition government is still matter of urgent necessity particularly in connection with desired US assistance.

In regard to (1) Pipinelis replied that though King and he do not "feel very happy" over idea of Prime Minister's trip, he could assure me that desirability of presenting a national front at New York is understood and that Tsaldaris is seriously attempting to assemble broad delegation. He added, however, that Sophoulis is against being represented and that Venizelos is "terrorized" by Sophoulis while Papandreou and Canellopoulos follow Venizelos' lead. In regard to (2), he also assured me that King is continuing his efforts but added that Sophoulis is again the stumbling block. On other hand, he expressed hopes of being able eventually to persuade other opposition chiefs to come in even if Sophoulis is still out though he said matter will take time and will depend somewhat on present Government showing itself strong enough to carry on if necessary without opposition assistance. In this connection, he said that such outside expressions of opinion as *Times* editorial quoted in London's clear telegram of November 26 are positively harmful here since they tend to confirm opposition leaders in idea that present Government is doomed if it has to stand alone and to cause the UN [*opposition Chiefs?*] raise their price for joining it. I told Pipinelis that it seems to be felt in US and Britain that time has come for King to impose his leadership on politicians and he replied that while King can require concessions from Government and can get them from Tsaldaris, he lacks power to command opposition which, however, must also make some concessions if viable coalition is to be achieved. When I pointed out that King could certainly call publicly on opposition to help save nation and that refusal on its part to respond loyally would put it in bad position, he said that basis of agreement which all parties could reasonably be expected to accept must first be found. He said he hoped this could be done and that then King might launch appeal. Pending such time he stressed that conversations must be kept private and not aired publicly lest this lead to "hardening" of views on part of some or all concerned.

Pipinelis then said that what Greece now chiefly needs is assistance in increasing her armed forces to wage "war" on frontier and against "fifth column" and I replied that her chances of getting such assistance would be greater if she had a broad national government. In conclusion, I again stressed my feeling that Government should show united front in New York while earliest possible achievement of coalition of nationally-minded elements here in Greece is of utmost importance.

MACVEAGH

868.014/12-346 : Telegram

The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SOFIA, December 3, 1946—6 p. m.

URGENT

[Received December 4—10:09 a. m.]

942. See mytel 936, November 27 [29].⁵⁵ Not only has Bulgarian PriMin categorically denied Bulgarian involvement in border incidents with Greece but during past week official Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency has issued denials and countercharges based on contents ACC letter to Greek liaison officer reported my 933, November 26.⁵⁶ Text of second ACC letter on subject this time with reference to alleged infringement Bulgarian sovereignty by Greek airplanes reported by next following telegram 943.⁵⁷ Contents of this letter already used by Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency for semi-official statement. Government press claims Greece making allegations against Bulgaria similar to those already made against Yugoslavia and Albania in order to support her claims for reparations against Bulgaria and revision Bulgarian frontier. It is my own belief supported by our military personnel here and also by British military personnel that we are approaching period when conditions Bulgarian Greek frontier will become similar to those obtaining along Yugoslav and Albanian side of frontiers with Greece. I am also thoroughly convinced that if steps suggest[ed] penultimate paragraph mytel 937, November 30,⁵⁵ not taken early future by US and UK, creation enlarged Macedonia within "federated" Yugoslavia will become *fait accompli*.

Repeated Moscow and London.

BARNES

501.BB/12-446 : Telegram

The United States Acting Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, December 4, 1946—7:30 p. m.

URGENT

[Received 8:02 p. m.]

921. The following letter of the Greek delegation was received by the Secretary-General last night: ⁵⁸

"3 December, 1946.

Mr. Secretary-General,

Under instructions from my government, I have the honour to request you, in virtue of Article 34 and of Article 35, paragraph 1, of

⁵⁵ Not printed.⁵⁶ Not printed; but see footnote 54, p. 269.⁵⁷ Dated December 3, not printed.⁵⁸ For the official text, see SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, Suppl. No. 10, p. 169.

the Charter, to be so good as to submit to the Security Council, for early consideration, a situation which is leading to friction between Greece and her neighbors, by reason of the fact that the latter are lending their support to the violent guerrilla warfare now being waged in northern Greece against public order and the territorial integrity of my country. This situation, if not promptly remedied, is, in the opinion of my government, likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

In particular, the Greek Government desires to draw the attention of the Security Council to the urgent necessity for an investigation to be undertaken on the spot, in order that the causes of this situation may be brought to light. They are confident that in this way the charges brought by them may be confirmed authoritatively, and means provided for the settlement of the question.

A detailed memorandum in support of this request is submitted herewith, duly substantiating the Greek Government's complaint, but I should like to refer at present to the meetings of the Security Council at which Albania's application for admission to the United Nations and the Ukrainian complaint against Greece and the United Kingdom were considered, as also to the various communications subsequently addressed to the Secretary-General by the permanent Greek delegation, for the purpose of informing him of developments in the situation.

Information which has reached the Greek Government, and which has been carefully verified in every particular, shows that the position is as follows:

(a) The guerrilla warfare now being vigorously conducted in western Macedonia, and particularly in the mountainous regions of Kaimakchalan and Paikon, is supported by the seditious organization N.O.F., which is recruiting volunteers and supplying arms. The organization is under foreign leadership and has its headquarters at Skoplje.

(b) At the camp of Bulkes, in the Voivodina district of Yugoslavia, there is operating a military establishment at which picked men are undergoing training for guerrilla activities in Greece. These men have been chosen from those members of ELAS to the number of 2,500-3,000, who, following the Varkiza Agreement, sought refuge in Yugoslavia; they include many persons whose arrest had been ordered for offenses under the common law.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the Belgrade newspaper *Politika*, in its issue of 1st October, 1946, stated that the camp at Bulkes had recently received a contingent of "Aegean Macedonians," i.e. Slav-speaking inhabitants of Greek Macedonia, who have become the tools of those directing subversive activities from Skoplje.

It has been ascertained that the inmates of this camp make frequent incursions into Greek territory by way of Albania and Bulgaria.

(c) The battalions which for long existed in Yugoslav Macedonia and comprised Slav-speaking Greeks who similarly had sought refuge in Yugoslavia, following the Varkiza agreement, in order to escape prosecution in the Greek courts, were disbanded

and the men attached, in small groups, to various units of the Yugoslav Army. Men from the battalions in question, which had been commanded by Elias Demakis (known under the assumed name of Gochev), are permitted to enroll on a voluntary basis in the armed bands operating in northern Greece.

There is conclusive evidence that the whole guerrilla movement against Greece is receiving substantial support from the countries adjacent to Greece's northern boundaries, and particularly from Yugoslavia, and that this support takes the following forms:

(a) Groups of men are being trained and organized in foreign territory; they are then sent into Greece, together with consignments of war material;

(b) Armed bands or isolated members of such bands are crossing the boundary-line in both directions under the protection and guidance of the frontier authorities of the neighbouring countries;

(c) Greek fugitives from justice and anarchists are being received and cared for in foreign territory, and are being incited by propaganda to carry on subversive activities in Greece.

It is to be noted that Bulgaria and Albania bear a similar responsibility for the activities of the hostile bands operating on Greece's northern frontiers.

The permanent Greek delegation has already drawn your attention to the inimical attitude towards Greece of the official Yugoslav press, as also to the statements made in August last at the first congress of the "Popular Front of Macedonia" by MM. Dimitri Vlachov, Vice-President of the Yugoslav National Assembly, Kulichevsky, Prime Minister of the "popular Macedonian Republic" and other official spokesmen, in which statements the union of the three sections of Macedonia was demanded.

It may be added that statements of a similar tenor were also made at the Paris Peace Conference by MM. Dimitri Vlachov and Pijade, and that various Yugoslav representatives have since expressed themselves in a like sense.

The evidence thus afforded confirms the view of the Greek Government that the guerrilla warfare that is being conducted on the northern boundaries of Greece enjoys official Yugoslav support.

The situation to which the events referred to have given rise is seriously hampering the Greek Government's efforts to promote the economic rehabilitation of the country, and is tending to create causes of friction with neighbouring countries with which Greece desires, and is firmly decided, to live in peace and in a spirit of sincere collaboration.

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to you, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(sgd) Th. Agnides

*Acting Chairman of the Greek Delegation to
the General Assembly."*

Attached to this letter was a long memorandum a copy of which we have not yet obtained.⁵⁹ In addition to these two documents, the Greek delegation submitted certain photographs.⁶⁰

The Secretary-General informs us he is making the above letter and memorandum public either tonight or tomorrow morning, as soon as copies have been forwarded to the members of the Security Council. The photographs are being copied but will not be available for 3 or 4 days.

JOHNSON

868.014/12-546

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
No. 3389

ATHENS, December 5, 1946.
[Received December 31.]

SIR: [Here follows analysis by Ambassador MacVeagh of Greek territorial claims against Albania and Bulgaria.]

Summary and conclusion:

As I understand our Near Eastern policy, it includes supporting the independence and integrity of Greece and helping her reestablish her economy. It also includes similar support for Turkey, the purpose being the maintenance of a defensive line against Soviet advance on both sides of the Dardanelles. However, Slavic and Communist pressures, reaching down across Greece's frontiers, are today menacing her territorial integrity and, more distantly, her independence, and are largely responsible for preventing the reestablishment of her normal economic life. Furthermore, these pressures have already achieved virtual control of the exit of the Adriatic, and are obviously equally aimed at issuance on the Northern Aegean. The full accomplishment of both of these aims would effectively deprive Greece of any value as a bastion of democracy and cut off Turkey from the West. But Greece's frontier with Albania and Bulgaria, and to a certain extent with Yugoslavia also, are strategic liabilities rather than assets for the Western Powers. The first named cries aloud for adjustment, at least along the coast, if Italy and the central Mediterranean are to be spared the same threat which now hangs over the eastern portion of that sea, and the other two can perhaps only be maintained effectively

⁵⁹ For text of memorandum, dated at Athens on November 25, 1946, see SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, Suppl. No. 10, p. 172.

⁶⁰ Photostatic exhibits, including photographs, submitted in connection with the memorandum of November 25, are reproduced, *ibid.*, as Suppls. 10A and 12A.

by the presently problematic intervention and assistance of the United Nations. Therefore, to consider a fixation of these borders, which were adequate enough in 1939, as anything more than a momentary resource, or as likely to contribute anything but ever increasing trouble for our policy as above outlined, would seem, under present conditions, to be unwise in the extreme. To attempt to protect Western Democracy behind this line is to concede such immense advantages to the other side that it can only be hoped that when and if opportunities arise for altering it, even in the slightest, they may be immediately and strongly taken.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

501.BC/12-946

Memorandum by Mr. Harry N. Howard of the Division of Research for Near East and Africa

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, December 9, 1946.]

INCIDENTS ON THE NORTHERN GREEK FRONTIERS:

A SUMMARY STATEMENT ⁶¹

The Department of State has accumulated a vast body of evidence with respect to numerous incidents along the northern Greek frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the period of 1945-1946. This evidence comes from Albanian, Greek, Yugoslav and Bulgarian sources, reports from United States Missions in Athens, Tirana and Belgrade, reports from military attachés, AP and UP dispatches and correspondents of the *New York Times* and other responsible newspapers. There were also charges and counter-charges concerning the situation along the northern Greek frontiers during the recent consideration of the Greek case before the United Nations Security Council. Despite general agreement in the Security Council that a disturbing situation existed along the Greek frontiers which might well constitute a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council, on September 20, 1946 rejected the recommendation of the United States for an on-the-spot investigating commission in the frontier area because of the veto of the Soviet delegate.

Both Greece and Albania have submitted numerous lists of in-

⁶¹ In telegram 1546, December 7, 1946, 1 p. m., to Athens, the Department summarized developments concerning the northern Greek frontiers. It cited the Soviet veto at the Security Council in September of the United States proposal for an on-the-spot investigation and stated that its research clearly indicated there was more reason for such an investigation now than there was in September. (868.014/12-746)

cidents alleged to have occurred on the Greek-Albanian frontier, and there have been charges on the part of Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as to developments along the Greek-Yugoslav and Greek-Bulgarian sectors of the frontier area. While it is not possible to attest each alleged incident which appears to have taken place, the cumulative impression is that an extremely grave situation exists in the frontier area. This has been particularly true in recent weeks along the Greek-Yugoslav section of the frontier.

The evidence regarding the incidents, which has been thoroughly examined within the Department, points toward an over-all pattern, with indications that the USSR and its satellites, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria may be seeking 1) to embarrass the Greek Government, 2) to cut off Greek Macedonia from Greece and bring it into the Yugoslav Federation, 3) to obtain Western Thrace for Bulgaria in order to give that country and the Soviet Union an outlet on the Aegean Sea, and 4) to place the Soviet Union in a more strategic advantage on the Aegean side of the Turkish Straits.

Partly through its own blunders, but even more because of its geographic position, Greece has been placed in this dangerous situation. The pattern of encroachment has gradually emerged until there seems little doubt of Soviet intentions. Since the end of the war Greece has been unceasingly attacked by the Soviet press and radio, along with British and American policy toward that country. Moreover, it may be pointed out that Soviet policy with respect to Bulgaria and its claims on Greece dates at least from the "Big Bulgaria" policy of 1878. In November 1940 the Soviet Government offered both Western and Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria if it would sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, which would also withdraw any objections against Bulgarian entrance into the Axis. Soviet policy toward the Turkish Straits is long established. In the past, Yugoslav governments have looked in the direction of Salonika, which was promised by the Germans on March 25, 1941 when the Yugoslav Government signed the Axis Pact. Despite official denials, there are indications that Marshal Tito has not given up the dream of Salonika.

If these developments continue without some action on the part of the United Nations, the situation in Greece and the eastern Mediterranean can only deteriorate. Whatever the interpretation to be placed on these incidents, and wherever the ultimate responsibility for them may lie, it seems clear that the situation in this frontier area calls for an impartial investigation on the part of the United Nations in the interest of Greece and its neighbors, of the welfare of all the peoples of the region, and of international peace and security.

868.50/12-1246: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1946—9 a. m.

1569. Paul A. Porter has accepted appointment as head Economic Mission. Following press release issued by Dept Dec 11:

"The appointment of Paul Porter as Chief of an American Economic Mission to Greece was announced by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson today. Mr. Porter until recently headed the Office of Price Administration. The Mission will leave for Greece during January and, because of the urgency of the situation, has been asked to complete its work by the end of April 1947. It is being sent in response to a request made by Greek Prime Minister Tsaldaris to Secretary of State Byrnes. In addition to Mr. Porter the Mission will consist of a small group of economic, financial and engineering experts. The Mission will examine economic conditions in Greece as they bear upon the reconstruction and development of the economy of that country. It will consider the extent to which the Greek Government can carry out reconstruction and development through effective use of Greek resources, and the extent to which foreign assistance may be required.

[Here follows remainder of press release; for full text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 22, 1946, page 1151.]

Sent to Athens repeated London as Dept. No. 8138.

ACHESON

868.24/12-1046: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1946—7 p. m.

1583. In tel of Dec 7 ⁶² Wackwitz ⁶³ informed War that RAF considers very important Greek air force receive eight C-47s to fly supplies to troops fighting armed bands. Wackwitz concurs this view but says RAF cannot provide these planes and asks whether US policy permits supply.

Although as pointed out my letter Nov 8 we prefer as far as practical arms for Greece come from Brit, in view importance this matter and fact planes not combat types Dept has decided make available planes desired. FLC is directing FLC Cairo earmark eight best C-47s on hand there for delivery as soon as request received from Greek Govt.

⁶² No. MID 353-46, not printed, it stated that the critical situation in Greece and the possibility of all-out revolution in the spring of 1947 made immediate aid to the Greek Armed Forces imperative. It noted also that the British planned to issue sufficient additional equipment to the Greek Army to bring its strength from 98,200 to 115,000 men. (868.24/12-1046)

⁶³ Col. Donald N. Wackwitz, Military Attaché and Military Air Attaché of the Embassy in Greece.

Cost can be covered under credit already extended for surplus purchases. FLC says planes at Cairo are recaptured from RAF and while not new should be good flying condition. If sale made, RAF will be asked fly them Athens according terms Lend-Lease agreement requiring Brit deliver recaptured items at points we designate.

Request Embassy inform RAF and other appropriate Brit officials suggesting that if Greeks desire these planes, Greeks make immediate request either through you or through Dept here.

War is informing Wackwitz that his query being answered by this tel.

ACHESON

501.BC/12-1346 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Acting
Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)*

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1946—7 p. m.

320. For Herschel Johnson.

1. In view of the resolution adopted by SC on Dec 10⁶⁴ it seems likely that question will be raised again as to whether Albania and Bulgaria should be invited to participate without vote in SC discussion. Dept thinks it would be inadvisable for SC to conclude that it is a necessary prerequisite to a Council invitation to participate that SC make a formal determination that a dispute exists between Greece on one hand and Albania and Bulgaria on the other.

2. The reasons for this position which Dept has consistently taken (see NY Tel 27, 180, 194⁶⁵) are: First, that although Dept would prefer to broaden meaning of word dispute to include situation tantamount to a dispute and thus use Art 32 as basis for invitation, whether or not the invitation is made under Art 32 the SC under its general powers has authority to invite non-members to participate in order to assist SC proceedings. Secondly, to hold otherwise might constitute an unfortunate precedent with respect to the application of Charter injunction on abstention from voting under Article 27. Thirdly, it might vitiate the proposition that an invitation by the Council to a member or non-member of UN to participate under Art 32 is governed by procedural vote because a strong argument might

⁶⁴ For text, see SC, *1st yr., 2nd series, No. 24*, p. 558. Under the terms of the Netherlands resolution, the representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia were invited to participate in the discussion without vote and those of Albania and Bulgaria were invited to enable the Security Council to hear any declarations they wished to make. The resolution also provided that should the Council find at a later stage that the matter under consideration was a dispute, the representatives of Albania and Bulgaria would be invited to participate in the discussion without vote. The United States position was set forth by Herschel V. Johnson, who was at this time President of the Security Council; see *ibid.*, pp. 530-559, *passim*.

⁶⁵ Dated April 3, September 5, and September 14, respectively; none printed.

be made that the question whether a case technically constitutes a situation or a dispute would be governed by a substantive vote.

3. It is suggested that if following informal consultation with the other members of the Council you obtain support for such a course you make a statement along the following lines after the Council has heard the statements to be made by the representatives of Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria.

In the light of the statements of the four governments it seems clear that the circumstances before the Council whether or not technically labeled a dispute or a situation are of a nature tantamount to a dispute thus making it appropriate for the Council to invite them to participate without vote in the discussion relating to the case. The principle set forth in Article 32 of the Charter is clear. Namely, that when non-members of the UN are directly involved in a case before the Council equity and sound practice require that they be invited to participate without vote in the Council discussion. Whether or not the invitation is issued under Article 32 it is clear that the Council has general authority to invite non-members of UN to participate in its proceedings in order to assist its work. At the same time as Albania and Bulgaria are not members of the United Nations it would be appropriate for the Council in accordance with the spirit of Article 32 of the Charter to lay down such conditions as it deems just for their participation. One such condition could appropriately be that they accept in advance for the purposes of the case the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter.

Accordingly, it is proposed that without a determination as to whether a technical dispute exists the Council adopt a resolution inviting Albania and Bulgaria to participate without vote in the discussion relating to the case provided that they accept in advance for the purposes of the case the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

4. We do not of course wish to provoke a protracted discussion in the SC on this question. However from US point of view it is believed that it would be helpful to SC consideration of the case to have Albania and Bulgaria participate on same basis as Yugoslavia.

5. If Albania and Bulgaria are unwilling to accept the condition that they accept obligations of pacific settlement, it is Dept's view that invitation to participate should not be extended.

6. It is recognized that the provisional rules of procedure of the SC, particularly Rules 37 and 38, do not cover invitations to non-members of UN or their right to submit proposals and draft resolutions. Rules on this subject were deferred by Committee of Experts. See S/57⁶⁶

⁶⁶ For text of this Security Council document entitled "Report of the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on the Work of the Committee", dated May 13, 1946, see SC, *1st yr., 1st series, Suppl. No. 2*, p. 20.

page 4. Even without such rule it is clearly within authority of Council to invite non-members and we believe they should be permitted to submit proposals and draft resolutions in accordance with principle of Rule 38.

ACHESON

868.014/12-1446: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, December 14, 1946—9 a. m.
[Received December 16—12: 53 p. m.]

1719. Acting Minister Foreign Affairs Stephanopoulos handed me yesterday first person note⁶⁷ protesting with "vigor" and "deep bitterness" CFM decision fixing Bulgarian Greek frontier and contrasting "flagrant injustice" towards Greece, a faithful ally, with "compensation of Bulgaria for its disloyal policy during war".

Note recalls Tsaldaris letter of October to CFM⁶⁸ reducing Greek claim against Bulgaria to area of 875 Kms with 45,000 inhabitants. This it says while constituting "only very limited satisfaction of Greece's legitimate security demands against Bulgaria would have involved only unimportant sacrifices for latter amply compensated moreover by acquisition of Southern Dobrudja—with 7500 sq Kms and 365,000 inhabitants".

Note maintains that decision far from bringing desired Balkan appeasement exasperates Greek people and will encourage Bulgarian aggressive policy as proved already by Dimitrov's⁶⁹ maintenance of "inadmissible demand" for western Thrace and recrudescence activity bandits based in Bulgaria. "Iniquitous decision" rendered still more painful note continues because Greeks not heard again by CFM despite expressed demand and "new and serious aspects" of situation arising from bandit infiltration.

Note finally says partial demilitarization Bulgarian side frontier will constitute "no appreciable guarantee of Greek security in absence effective supervision" and concludes with requests that protest be urgently transmitted by me to US Government and that CFM again examine question and hear Greek Government representative. Full text of note being forwarded by despatch.

Stephanopoulos delivered similar notes to British and French Embassies and Russian Chargé. In conversation with me he voluntarily expressed his awareness that protest can now have little practical effect but called it necessary for the record.

He requests MID be informed.

MACVEAGH

⁶⁷ Dated December 12, not printed.

⁶⁸ Reference is to note 5834, October 30, from Ambassador Diamantopoulos to the Secretary General of the Council of Foreign Ministers, vol. II, p. 956.

⁶⁹ Georgi Mihailov Dimitrov, Bulgarian Prime Minister.

868.51/12-1446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, December 14, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received December 15—3:06 p. m.]

1718. Embassy's telegrams 1501 and 1502, November 4.⁷⁰ Greek Government foreign exchange position becoming daily more acute and already has reached point foreshadowing financial breakdown unless adequate assistance provided within few weeks.

[Here follow details of the exchange position.]

In view of "strained international relations focussing on Greece" (Department's telegram 1336 of November [October] 15) and inescapable consequences of new economic collapse this country, I agree with all competent United States and British opinion here that financial assistance should be provided soonest. Suggest this should be both in kind and in cash, the former to follow termination of UNRRA supplies while cash grant (probably better than loan) should be made available immediately without awaiting results of economic mission survey now scheduled to leave United States early in January and impossible of completion till next spring. Gregory (recently replacing Nixon as British Treasury representative on Currency Committee) expresses personal opinion that British Treasury might be persuaded to make cash grant of 4 or 5 million pounds. He expresses no opinion regarding possible settlement basis for above mentioned Greek claim of 16,900,000 pounds.

MACVEAGH

868.00/12-1646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ATHENS, December 16, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received December 16—3:20 p. m.]

1721. For Loy Henderson, NEA. I agree thoroughly with instructions Acheson's letter ⁷¹ enclosed in yours of November 12 ⁷² and all appropriate authorities have been informed. However I feel impossible exaggerate importance of adequately equipping Greek Army at earliest possible date. Since Montgomery's visit (mytel 1668, De-

⁷⁰ Latter not printed, but see footnote 35, p. 260.

⁷¹ Presumably Mr. Acheson's letter of November 8, p. 262.

⁷² Not found in Department files.

cember 3⁷³) local British Military including Rawlins seem no longer complacent or suspicious of Greek motives this connection as reported London's telegram 9910, December 5 [4]⁷⁴ but danger may lie in British tendency toward "too little and too late". Have therefore secured [list?] of Greek equipment requirements for spring operations[.] [List?] is [to be?] forwarded London soonest with suggestion that US military authorities there be promptly contacted with regard to items British unable supply. I also feel direct query to London by US military authorities Washington might help produce much needed promptness. Time presses if Greek Government is to be sufficiently strengthened "before the fact" as advocated in admirable NEA memo⁷⁵ enclosed your letter November 14.⁷⁶

I also fear delays on our part in regard to prompt adequate economic and particularly financial assistance which equally necessary with military. Position Greek finances reaching catastrophic stage (mytel 1718, December 14) and problem facing economic mission of [at?] eventual arrival likely to be less one of long term rehabilitation than of immediate correction if possible of impending if not actual collapse.

Meanwhile since psychological factor of definite and growing importance in above situation believe much good could be done by forthright public statement of new policy at this time.⁷⁷

MACVEAGH

⁷³ Not printed; in it Ambassador MacVeagh reported a conversation with British Field Marshal Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial Staff, the previous evening in which the latter informed him of his strong advice to the Greek Government and the Greek military to devote the coming winter to converting the Greek Army into specially trained and equipped forces for fighting the bandits and to take the field in the spring and totally eradicate banditry. This program, the Field Marshal stated, could be carried out; if it were not done, Greece was lost. He concluded that there was no sense in building up a mechanized army since it would not be adequate to withstand large-scale attack. (868.00/12-346)

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ The memorandum regarding Greece, of October 21, p. 240.

⁷⁶ Not printed; but see footnote 14, p. 244.

⁷⁷ Mr. Byrnes replied in telegram 1598, December 19, 1946, 1 p. m., as follows: "Dept entirely concurs your feeling adequate equipment for Greek Army is urgent. Please forward Washington immediately (with copy to Emb London) full list requirements so we may be studying items and determine in advance what US Govt could supply if Brit unable.

Your 1721 being rptd London as 8235 except first sentence and final para." (868.00/12-1646)

No. 8235, sent on December 19, concluded with the following paragraph: "Please inform appropriate Brit official informally and confidentially we are anxious know as soon as possible extent to which Brit will be able to supply Greece with arms considered necessary for maintenance Greek independence and territorial integrity. It has been agreed with Bevin that Brit have primary responsibility furnish combat arms. In view of dangers inherent in situation we feel essential Greek needs for arms should be met. It would be particularly helpful for us to know (1) What specific items Brit Govt considers essential, (2) Which of these items Brit unable to furnish." (868.00/12-1646)

501.BC/12-1846 : Telegram

*The United States Acting Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

US ROUTINE

NEW YORK, December 19, 1946—8:50 p. m.

[Received December 19—7:45 a. m.]

983. Security Council (85th Meeting). A U.S. proposal for a seven-member Commission to investigate on-the-spot the alleged violations along the Greek frontier with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, was placed before the SC December 18 by Chairman Johnson.

Prior to submitting his proposal, Chairman Johnson expressed the U. S. Government's deep concern at the friction between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the other. He pointed out that all the involved nations had accepted SC jurisdiction in this case, which he described as exactly the type of case for the SC.

Mr. Johnson reviewed the situation as thus far presented by the four nations, emphasizing that the border violations alleged during the course of the debate could not be ignored by the SC. Information currently available was not a reliable basis for an SC decision and for this reason he urged the SC to suspend judgment and set up a Commission of Investigation, composed of Poland and Brazil in addition to the U.K., U.S.S.R., China, France and U. S. The group should proceed to the troubled area not later than January 15, 1947, and report on its findings at the earliest possible date.

Characterizing this on-the-spot inquiry as a "first essential step" Johnson declared it was with "a sincere desire to see constructive action and evenhanded justice result in a pacific solution of this case" that he had submitted his proposal.⁷⁸

The Resolution embodying the U. S. proposal allows the Commission to: make preliminary reports; have authority to conduct its investigation in the area including such territory in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia as it deemed necessary, and call upon the Governments and officials of these countries, as well as other sources, for all relevant information. The SYG would make arrangements with appropriate authorities in the four countries to facilitate the investigation and would provide necessary staff.

[Here follow a further discussion of the Greek complaint and a summary of a meeting of the Committee on Postal Experts.]

[JOHNSON]

⁷⁸ For text of Mr. Johnson's statement, see SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, No. 27, p. 629.

[By unanimous vote on December 19, the Security Council established a fact-finding Commission of Investigation to make on-the-spot inquiries in northern Greece and anywhere else in Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia it deemed necessary. The Soviet delegate twice abstained from voting on provisions he had opposed, thereby making possible their passage. The British delegate similarly abstained to permit passage of a provision he had opposed. The Council's decision was based on the United States resolution, with amendments proposed by other members of the Council (telegram 985, December 19, 1946, 11 p. m., from New York, 501.BC/12-1946).

For Council discussion of the Greek complaint, which took place at successive sessions from December 10 to December 19, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, Second Series, Nos. 24-28*, pages 529-701, *passim*. The text of the resolution establishing the Commission is printed *ibid.*, No. 28, pages 700-701.]

868.48/12-2346 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1946—1 p. m.

1610. We have agreed with British that they and we will suggest to Greek Govt that latter approach Swedish and Swiss Govts indicating they have need for financial assistance for essential imports following termination UNRRA program and are appealing to various countries for help and requesting sympathetic consideration by Swiss and Swedes for assistance in 1947. You should also advise Greek Govt US will approach Swedes and Swiss following Greek appeal on basis that we are considering assistance for Greece in 1947, that we understand Greeks have also appealed to Swiss and Swedes for help and that we hope they will give sympathetic consideration to these appeals. Greeks should not inform Swiss and Swedes their appeal is being made upon our initiative. Understand Brit Amb being sent similar instructions. Please report further developments.⁷⁹

BYRNES

868.51/12-1446 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1946—11 a. m.

1627. After full consideration urtel 1718, Dec 14, Dept regrets only immediate measures which might be taken by U.S. to alleviate critical

⁷⁹ In telegram 1777, December 28, 1946, 4 p. m., Ambassador MacVeagh reported he had made suggestion as instructed in telegram 1610 to Acting Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos who promised to consider the matter but doubted whether the proposed appeal would succeed (868.48/12-2846).

exchange position consists possible release uncommitted balance of present Eximbank credit for free use, probably to cover portion outstanding confirmed letters of credit of Bank of Greece. Previous suggestion advances be made on future deliveries commodities and strategic materials impracticable for immediate financial aid.

American relief grant can be provided only pursuant new Congressional action. For your confidential info program under preparation in Dept contemplates such aid, but minimum 2 or 3 months required for Congressional consideration and appropriation this purpose.

Dept pleased at possibility that British Treasury will make 4 or 5 million pounds available. Urtel 1718 as well as this reply being repeated London ⁸⁰ with request that Emb discuss with British Govt to ascertain assistance which might be immediately forthcoming to alleviate situation.

ACHESON

868.00/1-347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1947—8 p. m.

8. During recent visit as guest of US Govt ⁸¹ Tsaldaris received usual official courtesies and in addition to seeing President once had talks with most top Dept officials as well as SecTreas and Eximbank officers. Tsaldaris' main purpose appeared to be to exact firm commitment that US would extend immediate financial assistance to Greece. Tsaldaris was vague on exact sum desired but mentioned 50 to 60 million dollars for urgent needs during first 3 months 1947.⁸² Also suggested that perhaps with US Govt guarantee some banking firm could "discount" reparations in order to advance ready cash to Greece at this time. Further suggested possibility that Eximbank could advance cash against proposed grant to be asked of Congress soon after it convenes. He also indicated that Greece "accepted" report of Ecosoc Subcommittee on Devastated Areas which mentions 5-year program of reconstruction and development totaling 1,246,000,000 dollars and requested US Govt to make this sum available by most appropriate means. In short, although several matters such as territorial claims, immigration quotas and the Greek desire to obtain Saturnia and Vulcania were mentioned, Tsaldaris emphasized his

⁸⁰ In telegram 8326, December 28, 1946, 11 a. m., not printed.

⁸¹ From December 19 to 23.

⁸² In a letter to the Secretary of State, dated December 23, 1946, the Greek Prime Minister estimated the deficit in his country's foreign exchange for the immediate future at about \$15,000,000 a month and requested American assistance in meeting it (868.51/12-2346).

belief that US must offer immediate financial assistance to Greece if that country is to maintain its territorial and political integrity and not fall prey to "anarchists".

Tsaldaris was clearly given to understand that US is unsympathetic to Greek insistence on territorial adjustments. In economic field importance of Porter mission was stressed and Tsaldaris was informed that we intend to request funds for relief to Greece from Congress and will discuss with Eximbank possibility small additional loan in near future to bridge gap. No assurance was given that such loan could actually be made.

Although US officials are friendly to Greece and are exploring all possible means of effective aid to Greek economy, they were unfavorably impressed by Tsaldaris' lack of precision and by complete absence of any well-prepared data to substantiate exaggerated demands.

It would be unfortunate if Tsaldaris should attempt to distort US promises to "explore urgently possibilities of immediate as well as long-term assistance" to make it appear that he personally has been able to obtain commitments of a nature which US had been heretofore unwilling to make and to exploit his success in order to perpetuate his uneasy position in Greek political world.

Although US recognizes importance to its own security as well as to international security of maintenance of Greek independence and territorial integrity, our views on desirable character and policies of Greek Govt have not changed since you were instructed to transmit them to King and political leaders at time of King's return. In short, it appears to us that in this critical time, when existence of Greece is threatened by unfriendly neighbors as well as civil strife and economic collapse, all loyal political parties and leaders should unite to form most broadly based govt possible dedicated to moderation, all feasible conciliation to loyal opposition and sincere determination to institute economic and fiscal reforms even though drastic in their nature.

Recent SC action in establishing Investigating Commission may appear to Greece as complete vindication of Greek complaint and policies of Greek Govt. However, it is our belief that Commission is obligated to ascertain pertinent facts and causes relating to "border violations" no matter which side of frontier is involved and that long-range aim of final SC action should be an attempt to achieve stable conditions in that part of world. We are not sure that Greek Govt has been above reproach in manner of instituting and applying recent security measures. Imminence of arrival of SC Commission with consequent focusing of world opinion on conditions in Greece should make leaders of all Greek political parties realize that now is the time to subordinate unessential differences and cooperate in policies that will remove,

as far as possible, legitimate criticism of Greek Govt and causes of internal dissension.

You are authorized in your discretion to express foregoing views to King and responsible Greek leaders both in and out of present Govt.⁸³
Sent Athens 8; rptd London 41.

BYRNES

**CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND GREECE**

[For text of the agreement, signed at Athens on March 27, 1946, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1626, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2937.]

⁸³ For the Department's statement on the conversations with the Greek Prime Minister, released to the press December 23, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1947, p. 29.

IRAN

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE REMOVAL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM IRAN;¹ WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES AFTER SOVIET-IRANIAN AGREEMENT

501 BB/12-2745

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry N. Howard of the Division of International Organization Affairs, and Mr. W. Clyde Dunn of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs*²

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1945.

USGA/Gen/24

SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS

I. *The Problem of Iran*

If the Delegate of Iran should bring the problem of Soviet-Iranian relations before the General Assembly of the United Nations, under Articles 10 and 11,³ on the ground that the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran were impaired, in violation of the Charter, by Soviet-inspired developments in Azerbaijan province, what should be the attitude of the Delegate of the United States?

II. *Proposed Position of the United States*

If this problem arises, the United States Delegate should point out the seriousness of the allegations made by Iran and should state that the problem should be dealt with at once. The Delegate should also point out that the United States is particularly interested since it is a signatory to the Declaration regarding Iran of December 1, 1943⁴

¹ For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 359 ff.

² The Office of European Affairs recommended that this memorandum be held for review in the light of possible developments at the meeting of Foreign Ministers, held at Moscow December 16-26, 1945, and that final conclusions should await return of the U.S. delegation. For a summary of discussions concerning Iran at Moscow, see telegram 4311, December 28, 1945, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 517.

³ Of the United Nations Charter, adopted at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, Department of State Treaty Series 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

⁴ Made at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. IV, p. 413.

and that it has already endeavored to bring about a satisfactory solution of the problem by conferring with the other signatories to that Declaration. He should add that, since no solution satisfactory to Iran has been worked out, it is only fair to Iran that the matter be considered at the earliest possible moment by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Postponement of the consideration of allegations of this character by a member of the United Nations at the very time when the United Nations Organization is taking form would impair the confidence of member nations in the ability of the United Nations Organization to preserve a peace based upon principles embodied in the Charter of that Organization. Among the purposes and principles of the United Nations Organization it is particularly pertinent to note that all members of the United Nations "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

The Delegate should explain that the issue which appears to be joined is whether Soviet troops stationed in Northern Iran have aided and abetted a change in the form of government in the area of Azerbaijan over the protest and against the will of the government which is recognized by the Soviet Government and other members of the United Nations as the Government of Iran. If Soviet troops have engaged in such activity, with the approval of the Soviet Government, it would seem clear that the Soviet Government had violated the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It, therefore, may be the duty of the United Nations to determine the facts in the case. The United States Delegate should, in such instance, suggest a fact-finding commission to be appointed by the appropriate organ of the United Nations to ascertain the facts and to report its findings to the United Nations for appropriate action.

[Here follows Section III, "Essential Facts Concerning the Present Status of Soviet-Iranian Relations".]

891.00/1-146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, January 1, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received January 3—2:32 a. m.]

1. Deptel 759, December 29,⁵ received December 31. I conveyed to Prime Minister ⁶ this morning and to Shah ⁷ this afternoon infor-

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 521.

⁶ Ibrahim Hakimi.

⁷ Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

mation regarding Moscow conversations on Iran and in particular regarding proposal to form Anglo-American-Soviet Commission to⁸ [advise and assist Iran govt in reestablishing satisfactory relations with provinces.

Prime Minister seemed entirely receptive to proposal and promised to bring it at once before Council of Ministers and to inform me of decision as soon as possible.

Hakimi expressed indignation at repeated references by Stalin to "hostile" government of Iran and observed that apparently only government that is entirely subservient to Soviet demands would be regarded by them as "friendly". Prime Minister then referred to his repeated but rebuffed offers to discuss with Soviets anywhere and any time matters of mutual interest to two countries and added that if it would be helpful to his country in present situation, he would gladly resign. (In] later conversation with British Ambassador⁹ a few minutes after his return to Tehran he remarked rather gloomily that he "supposed there would have to be change of govt".)

In audience with Shah he informed me of likelihood that Hakimi Govt would soon fall owing to withdrawal of support by a number of deputies in majority group (presumed to be under British influence) some of whom now accuse Hakimi of inability to deal with Russians and others of whom believe he has been too conciliatory.

Shah discussed with great frankness, as has been his wont in recent months, the distressing position in which his country now finds itself by reason of British interference in south and Soviet interference in north. He realizes fully that, while British interference doubtless has no such sinister motives as appear to inspire Soviet activities, the Soviets regard British activities with suspicion and may feel counter measures on their part justified.

With regard to proposed Anglo-American-Soviet Commission, Shah said he personally was inclined to view it with favor for particular reason that it would assure friendly and unbiased assistance of US. In view however of Molotov's¹⁰ position that Soviet Govt could not deal with "hostile" Hakimi Govt, he said he wondered whether Soviet tactics would not be to insist in first instance on setting up of "friendly" govt (i.e. one that would meet all Soviet demands) whereafter Soviets would declare that they did not wish to participate in such commission that proposed to "interfere in internal affairs of Iran".

⁸ The following bracketed portion was taken from the copy in the Tehran Embassy files because of garbling in the message as received in the Department.

⁹ Sir Reader W. Bullard.

¹⁰ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

In reply to Shah's misgivings, I stated that while, of course, there were risks of failure in any proposal of this kind, I was convinced that it was in Iran's vital interest for govt to espouse the proposal thereby demonstrating govt's willingness to resort to every reasonable remedy in order to relieve present strain in its relations with Soviets. Even if such measures fail, Iran would have given evidence of her good faith and have strengthened her case in world public opinion.

I added in conclusion that, as His Majesty was well aware, I have strongly urged since my return to Iran that govt here endeavor by every reasonable means to establish personal contacts with Soviet Govt through suitable emissaries if necessary and that in any case I earnestly hoped that if Hakimi is to resign due consideration will be given in selecting his successor to the great importance of his being competent to deal effectively with Soviets without, of course, sacrificing vital interests of the country.

MURRAY

891.00/1-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN, January 2, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received January 3—11:36 a. m.]

10. Rossow ¹¹ in Tabriz confirms fall of Rezaieh and end of Iran Govt resistance in Azerbaijan. He states that Kurds aided Democrat forces not Iranian Army as local press had reported.

Sent Dept as 10, repeated Moscow 5.

MURRAY

891.00/1-246 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1946—9 p. m.

4. The Iranian Ambassador ¹² has informed the Department that the Iranian Government, in considering whether to bring Iran's case before the General Assembly of the United Nations during the meeting this month in London, desired to have assurance in advance that the United States and Great Britain would support the Iranian position. In the absence of such assurance, the Iranian Government would hesitate to take a step which would further widen the breach between Iran and the Soviet Union without accomplishing any constructive results.

The Ambassador has been informed that while the American Government has in no way changed its policy as regards Iran, which is

¹¹ Robert Rossow, Jr., Vice Consul at Tabriz.

¹² Hussein Ala.

based firmly on the Declaration regarding Iran and on the United Nations Charter, the American Government could not undertake to give advance assurances of the position it would take in any case of this kind to be brought before UNO. The United States has friendly relations with both the Soviet Union and with Iran, and for us to give advance commitments to either side would not be in harmony either with those friendly relations or with the spirit of the United Nations. The Ambassador was authorized, however, to assure his Government that the United States intends to carry out the commitments which it made when it signed the Charter of the United Nations, and that it intends fully to support the principles of the Charter in any matters which may be presented to the UNO.

As regards press reports which have recently appeared from London to the effect that the United States and Great Britain are discussing the Iranian question in an effort to prevent its being brought before the UNO, you may inform the Iranian Government that the United States is of the view that any member of UNO should be entirely free to present its case to that organization.

BYRNES

891.00/1-346

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) ¹³

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1946.

Lord Halifax ¹⁴ came in to see me today at his request, in the Secretary's absence. He said that he had a cable from Mr. Bevin ¹⁵ informing him that the Iranian Ambassador in London ¹⁶ had stated that his Government wanted to have the Azerbaijan matter put down on the agenda of the United Nations meeting. January 4 is the last date on which items could be added to the Agenda. Lord Halifax said his Government wanted this Government to instruct Ambassador Murray to join with the British in urging the Iranian Government not to do this.¹⁷ The only reason that the British had for urging this joint action was that the possibility of the Soviets' joining the proposed Tripartite Commission on Iran would be defeated by the proposed Iranian action.

I told the Ambassador that I felt that the Secretary would not feel that we could justify any such action on our part, but that I would

¹³ The substance of this memorandum was sent to Tehran in telegram 5, January 4, 1946, 1 p. m. The telegram was repeated to London, Moscow, and Ankara.

¹⁴ The British Ambassador.

¹⁵ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁶ Seyid Hassan Taqizadeh.

¹⁷ Formal British views on this matter were set forth by the British Embassy in an *aide-mémoire* of January 7, 1946, not printed (761.91/1-746).

discuss the matter with the Secretary and call him back again this evening.

I called the Secretary at home and told him of the Ambassador's proposal and that Mr. Henderson ¹⁸ and I felt we should not join with the British in this matter. I also said that last night we had sent a cable to Murray denying press reports that the British and United States Governments were holding conversations looking toward recommendations to Iran not to take this matter up in the United Nations meeting. The Secretary replied that we could not possibly urge Iran not to bring the matter up if they wished to do so. In view of the lapse of over a week since the Secretary's departure from Moscow and in the absence of any statement from Molotov that the matter was being reconsidered, the Secretary felt that we had no basis to believe that the Soviets would join the proposed Commission.

Subsequently I called Lord Halifax and told him that I had talked with the Secretary, who instructed me that we should not make the representation to Iran, and that to do so would be to take on a responsibility which we should not assume. He also felt that if the Soviets were going to join in the proposed Tripartite Commission they would have done it before this.

Lord Halifax said that he had thought that this would be our reaction and that he would inform London of our decision.

DEAN ACHESON

891.00/1-446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 4, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received January 5—8:53 a. m.]

17. Embtel 13, January 3.¹⁹ British Ambassador Bullard under instructions from London succeeded in persuading PriMin to send urgent instructions to Ambassador Taqizadeh in London to withdraw from UNO agenda previous request for discussion of Iranian question. Iran Govt had instructed Taqizadeh previously to place on agenda questions of (1) withdrawal of foreign troops and (2) "interference in internal Iranian affairs".

When I asked him if he thought chances for eventual formation of Three Power Commission suggested in Moscow talks were good (this being reason for urging Iranians to drop UNO proposal) he replied

¹⁸ Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

¹⁹ Not printed; Mr. Murray reported that the British Ambassador had discouraged the Iranians from presenting their case to the United Nations, that the British had not consulted with him before taking this line, and that he found it difficult to reconcile this point of view with the United Nations Charter (891.00/1-346).

gloomily that he feared not. He admitted that Iranians might be left by his Government's action without hopes of either three power commission or investigation and settlement by General Assembly of UNO. Bullard said urgency of matter had prevented his consulting me in advance but that he assumed British FonOff was taking up matter with Dept. I informed him that I had no instructions from Dept and that I certainly had no intention of approaching Iran Govt along same lines as he had. I told him further that I consider his action ill-advised especially since he himself felt chances of creation of commission were slight and that his action had now left Iranians with no recourse in sight. Bullard countered by suggesting that Iranians might be able to raise question with Security Council at later date after that body is formed and functioning. Difficulty here, of course, is that by time Security Council is formed Iranian crisis may be settled in totally unsatisfactory manner.

I have been handicapped in this matter by total lack of instructions from Dept and I do not intend to mention matter to Iranians until I have some indication of Dept's wishes.²⁰ I can not, however, see any objection to Iranians raising issue in UNO meeting in London next week unless chances of setting up of Tripartite Commission are more favorable than I have been led to believe.

I would appreciate receiving from London urgent report of actions of Iranians and attitude of FonOff on whole question of placing Iranian problem on General Assembly agenda.

To Dept as 17 repeated Moscow 8 London 5.

MURRAY

891.00/1-446 : Telegram

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1946.

The Iranian Ambassador came in to see me this morning in order to examine the text of the proposal which had been made with regard to the Tri-Partite Commission to deal with the Iranian problem.

He said that his government had asked him to make his comments with regard to the proposal.

During the course of our conversation he asked me whether the proposal was an American or a British proposal. I told him that it had originally been made by Mr. Bevin but that certain amendments had been made to it by both the Russians and ourselves and that these

²⁰ In telegram 25, January 6, 1946, 10 a. m., Mr. Murray stated: "I welcome and am in complete agreement with point of view set forth in Deptel 4 Jan 2 which was received here subsequent to transmission Embtel 17 Jan 4." (891.00/1-646)

amendments had been approved by Mr. Bevin and incorporated into the draft which I showed him. The Ambassador asked what the final Russian attitude had been. I said that I had understood that they had decided at the last moment they did not wish to discuss it further at the time.

The Ambassador said that his government desired him to inquire, in case it should agree to the formation of such a commission and such a commission would be formed, whether the American representatives on it would give full support to Iranian sovereignty. I told the Ambassador that I did not believe it would be appropriate for the American Government to give any assurances other than those shown in the document. I pointed out that if he examined the document he would find the reply, particularly in view of the fact that the American Government had amply demonstrated during recent months that when it gave commitments such as those incorporated in the document, that it really lived up to them.

The Ambassador, after examining the documents, said that it seemed to him that there were in it several features rather dangerous for Iran, and that he would appreciate it if I would give him my personal opinion as to whether it would be to the advantage of Iran to agree to such a Commission. I told him that, in the opinion of the Secretary, it would be advantageous for Iran to agree to such a Commission since by agreeing to its formation, the Iranian Government would strengthen its position before the world and might also find a solution of the problems facing it. I added that we did not desire to bring pressure upon Iran to agree to such a Commission since we felt that any agreement of this kind should not be given under pressure.

The Ambassador said that he had received a message from the Iranian Ambassador in London to the effect that the latter had been instructed by his government not to present Iran's case to the United Nations Organization at the present time. He said that the Iranian Government's decision had been taken in view of the earnest plea made by the British Ambassador in Iran to the Iran Government not to present the matter to the United Nations until it had become clear that the Russians would not agree to participate in the Tri-Partite Commission. He asked if the American Government had changed its attitude and now desired Iran not to bring the matter before the United Nations Organization.

I told the Ambassador that I wished to make sure that he knew what our position had been and asked him to state his understanding of it to me. He replied that it was his understanding that the United States did not feel that it should endeavor to bring pressure in any

way upon Iran in the matter; Iran should decide for itself, in view of all the circumstances, whether it would be advantageous to it to bring the matter before the United Nations.

I told the Ambassador that he had stated what I understood to be the position of this Government and that I was sure that this Government continued to adhere to this position. I said that it was important he should give his government to understand that the Government of the United States was not encouraging Iran to present the case to UNO. The American Government would, of course, be glad if the matter could be settled outside of UNO and UNO would be spared facing a problem of this kind at its inception. Nevertheless, the United States Government was of the opinion that Iran should decide for itself what it should do.²¹

891.00/1-846 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 8, 1946.

[Received January 8—3:22 p. m.]

73. Tass article from Tabriz published Soviet Press January 8 reports meeting in Tabriz between Pischevari²² and American Consul Rossow, at which latter is said to have stated that he was glad to make acquaintance of Premier in whose person he welcomed National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan. Article states further that upon being asked by Rossow about further plans of government Pischevari observed that these plans were set forth in program. He expressed wish that this program might be realized without bloodshed. Rossow advised that way be left open for negotiations with Tehran to which Pischevari replied that Tehran itself keeps way closed. Rossow inquired how Pischevari would proceed if Shah acknowledged autonomy. Pischevari replied that recognition alone was small matter, guarantee was required that autonomy would be preserved. Article states that

²¹ In telegram 87, January 18, 1946, 8 p. m., to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius), at London, Acting Secretary of State Acheson stated: "Iranian Ambassador in call today requested assurance that American delegation to UNO will adopt a friendly and sympathetic attitude toward Iranian case when it is presented to UNO. He was again informed that while we would regret presentation of matters of this kind until UNO is well established, we adhere to our position that members of UNO should be entirely free to bring their problems to that organization. He was assured that American Delegation will treat the question if presented in a fair and impartial manner but that we can give no assurance in advance of attitude we will adopt in any hypothetical case." (501.BB/1-1846)

²² Jafar Pischevari (or Peshavari), "Prime Minister of the National Government of Azerbaijan" and Chairman of the Democratic Party in Azerbaijan.

Rossow in conclusion "promised to render all support to National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan".²³

Sent Department 73, repeated Tehran 3 and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

891.00/1-946 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TABRIZ, January 9, 1946—noon.

[Received January 11—11:18 p. m.]

3. Aside from stopping of Iranian troops and the well evidenced supplying of arms to rebel democrats, the most flagrant Soviet subversive intervention Azerbaijan is through the "Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan". Organized recently upon the return of its leaders from visit to Baku as guests of Soviet Union, its ostensible aims are the fostering of nationalities between the two Azerbaijanians. In recent days its drive for memberships assumed large and significant proportions.

Although the social and economic reforms are not entirely unpopular among the people here, they are assuredly opposed in the majority to Soviet domination, and only fear and intimidation lead them to endorse movements of this sort. However, the omnipresence of heavily armed Soviet troops, the general awareness of Soviet manipulation of recent revolt, and widespread fear of the ruthlessness of Soviet agents, have given rise to a deeply ingrained terrorism, such that a mere invitation to join such a society is tantamount to duress. The reality of this terror cannot be doubted since it pervades even the most casual contact with natives.

[Here follows discussion of specific cases of intimidation.]

Soviet sponsorship is openly indicated by fact that both the Soviet Consul General and the Soviet military commander have personally approached [several prominent Tabriz merchants to]²⁴ urge them to join.

As to real aim of society, Muhammad Beriya, local Minister of Education, founder and behind the scenes leader of the society, in

²³ In telegram 18, January 9, 1946, 7 p. m., the Department informed Tehran that "Press here has reported Tass despatch Jan. 8 from Tabriz to effect that Rossow in interview with Peshvari promised 'all kinds of aid' to National Govt Azerbaijan. Dept. spokesman in press statement Jan. 8 denied these allegations. He states that while Rossow did talk to Peshvari he merely listened and gave no assurances of any kind." (891.00/12-2945)

In a letter of January 9 to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), the Iranian Ambassador, then in New York, stated that the Tass report had made a bad impression and caused great surprise (891.00/1-946).

²⁴ Bracketed insertions in this telegram based on copy in Tabriz Consulate files.

response to direct inquiry denied that society aimed at annexation, but added the specific qualification "provided of course the Central Government meets our demands".

Evidence as to methods and aims of the society would appear to be sufficient in both volume and reliability toward any official notice to be taken of these terrorist subversive tactics.

As reported mytel 14, December 29,²⁵ the local PriMin's pliability and concern for world opinion may make it possible to hamper designs for independence provided adequate conciliatory measures are taken by Central Government. This would, however, merely be a half way measure since Soviet terrorism is so deeply ingrained. Only an occupation by some trusted power or powers could entirely eliminate it, but, even though Soviet denial could be expected, an expression of world concern as to such terrorism, perhaps by the United Nations, would go far in impeding it, and might give the people hope that some real effective measures would eventually be taken by the Security Council. Any statement for the attention of [the Azerbaijan public should be com]municated through me since only world news service published by the one authorized newspaper is Tass.

Unless some sort of energetic action is soon taken Azerbaijan must be written off.

Sent Department as 3; Tehran as 1.

Rossow

761.91/1-1046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TEHRAN, January 10, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received January 11—12: 52 p. m.]

44. Prime Minister told me yesterday that 2 days previously he had sent further instructions to Iran Ambassador London again authorizing me [*him*] to submit Iranian dispute for discussion by UNO Assembly. This reverses Hakimi's earlier action in ordering Taqizadeh to withdraw request (Embtel 17, January 4) and I believe is in response to strenuous objection expressed by Cabinet to that earlier step, which was taken under strong British pressure without consultation with other Cabinet Ministers. (I have learned that Ambassador Bullard insisted on having telegram drafted in his presence and himself sent it over British military radio).

British Ambassador has been holding conversations with Minister Foreign Affairs regarding details of proposed tripartite commission but Hakimi said yesterday there is little chance Iran Govt will find

²⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 520.

it possible declare its acceptance of proposal. Majlis sentiment seems definitely hostile. Criticism has been directed especially at suggestion regarding use of "minority" languages [which] govt objects to because it claims there is no minority problem. Govt has also suggested there should be Iranian members on commission.

Mossadegh ²⁶ made impassioned speech in Majlis yesterday bitterly attacking commission idea and thanking Russians for having rejected it. He compared proposal to Anglo-Russian partition agreement of 1907 ²⁷ and ill-famed Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919. ²⁸ Asserted it ran counter to independence of Iran. Urged that Azerbaijan difficulties be settled by direct negotiations with dissatisfied elements and if that failed by direct negotiation with Soviets. Said Russians had right to object if Iran Govt sought aid of third powers as intermediaries. Demanded resignation of Hakimi and formation of truly "neutral" govt.

Prime Minister was greatly disturbed by Mossadegh speech, which he regards as indirectly Soviet inspired and as confirmation of fear that Russians would reject or sabotage commission even if Iran Govt agreed to it. He expressed view only thing which would satisfy Soviets would be grant of oil concession northern Iran and that any Govt which refused such grant would be branded as hostile to USSR.

British attitude recently has strengthened my belief they are preparing make tacit deal leaving Soviets free hand in north while they consolidate British position in south (Embtel 1075, Dec 6 ²⁹). British are urging Iranians to accept tripartite commission and refrain from presenting their case to UNO, yet Bullard admits today he thinks there is almost no chance Soviets will agree to formation of commission. These tactics may well be intended to prevent any action at all and to make it possible for whole question to be shelved. British may have decided there is nothing to be gained by engaging in acrimonious public dispute with Russia in cause already lost and that they had better concentrate on making sure of their own sphere of influence in Persian Gulf.

I think it significant that Bullard, in his original note to Bevin suggesting tripartite commission, mentioned Khuzistan as possibly meriting special consideration and that final draft presented to Moscow Conference speaks of Arabic as one of minority languages which might be introduced in schools, etc. This may indicate that British

²⁶ Mohammad Mossadegh, Deputy in the Iranian Parliament, 1944-46.

²⁷ Reference is to the Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning their interests on the continent of Asia, signed at St. Petersburg on August 31, 1907, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 1, p. 550. Under the terms of the Convention, Iran was divided into Russian and British spheres of influence with a neutral zone in between.

²⁸ Signed at Tehran on August 9, 1919, *ibid.*, 1919, vol. II, p. 703.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 479.

envisage possibility of balancing an autonomous Azerbaijan under Russian domination with an autonomous Khuzistan under British domination. It will be recalled British formerly exercised informal protectorate over [Khuzistan] through late Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah (now Khorramshahr). They are still active in defending interests Khazal's family with Iran Govt.

I am especially struck by frantic urgency of British action in trying to persuade Iranians not to raise issue in UNO. It is at least surprising, in view of close Anglo-American collaboration on Iranian question at Moscow and before, that British Govt should have brought such strong pressure to bear on Iran Govt without even advance notice to Dept or this Embassy. Apart from fact this seems almost discourteous I cannot help but wonder whether British have not decided it could be embarrassing to them to have all facts of foreign intervention in Iran aired in UNO. However pure their motives may be, they may realize that to world public their dictatorial actions vis-à-vis Iran Govt and constant intervention in provincial affairs in south could be made to appear virtually as reprehensible as those of Soviet.

Sent to Dept as 44, repeated Moscow 13 and London 7.

MURRAY

891.00/1-1246: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 12, 1946—10 a. m.
[Received 7 p. m.]

53. Embassy requested on December 18 Soviet pass for travel Tabriz and return of Associated Press correspondent Joseph Goodwin during period December 24 to 31. Soviet Embassy stated January 9 present inappropriate time for travel Goodwin. I am informing Soviet Chargé he and other Soviet spokesmen have reiterated calm prevails Azerbaijan, and am requesting travel pass be issued forthwith.

No travel pass received thus far for Jernegan or Ferguson.⁵⁰ Embassy telegram 3, January 2.⁵¹

Dept may desire make most active representations to Soviet Government through Moscow Embassy and parallel representations in Washington through Soviet Ambassador, against Soviet attitude towards travel Americans in Azerbaijan.

⁵⁰ John D. Jernegan and C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., were Second Secretary and Third Secretary of Embassy, respectively, in Iran.

⁵¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 522.

Goodwin being informed status of matter. Department may wish make statement to press that Department and Embassy officials (Minor,³² Jernegan and Ferguson) have been prevented from performing their duties in Iran in consequence obstructionist tactics Soviet officials.³³

MURRAY

123 Rossow, Robert, Jr.: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 14, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received January 15—9:40 a. m.]

56. I regret I cannot agree with position taken in Deptel 25, January 11³⁴ for following reasons:

1. Whole episode of Tass despatch smacks of Soviet "frame up" especially since Rossow's . . . background is unquestionably known to Soviets. Should our Govt remove Rossow at this juncture, it would lend credence to Tass despatch and give impression we do not believe his denial given in his telegram 2, January 10.³⁵ Removal would completely discredit Rossow in Iranian eyes and would make him of no further value in Iran. Soviets without doubt are opposed to any American consular officer in Tabriz who follows vigorous course and Rossow's sudden flood of telegrams and interviews has

³² Harold B. Minor, Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs; for documentation on Soviet refusal to permit him to travel in Azerbaijan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 499-513, *passim*.

³³ Telegram 260, January 28, 1946, from Moscow, not printed, quoted a letter of January 22 from the Soviet Foreign Office which stated that the necessary instructions had been given to issue travel passes to Messrs. Minor, Jernegan, and Ferguson. The letter concluded: "There is sometimes delay in issuance of passes to zone of deployment of Soviet troops in Iran because Soviet Embassy in Iran must preliminarily confer on such questions with Soviet command." (761.91/1-2846)

³⁴ Not printed; it stated that Mr. Rossow's "continued presence in Tabriz will add to the impression that the official contact which he made with the rebel group implied American sympathy and support." The Department added that it believed it "wise to replace him at least temporarily". (123 Rossow, Robert)

³⁵ In telegram 52, January 12, 10 a. m., Ambassador Murray transmitted to the Department the text of Mr. Rossow's telegram 2 which stated: "Peshavari states vehemently he did not interpret anything in my conversations with him as connoting US approval of or sympathy with his regime, that he fully understood my visit to have been on purely personal and informal basis, and that he never made any statement remotely approximating Tass report. . . ."

"I can only conclude that Tass report is deliberate fabrication, probably of local inspiration, intended to cause me embarrassment.

"You may be assured that I have been and will be most cautious in my statements, and would under no circumstances attempt to express US policy in this region without specific instructions." (123 Rossow, Robert)

undoubtedly indicated to them fact that he intends to keep his Government fully informed of all events in Azerbaijan. We have permitted Soviets to effect removal of one American Consul (Kuniholm) from Tabriz³⁶ and I feel strongly we should resist their intrigues at all costs in present instance.

2. I fail to see how any officer sent to Tabriz can function efficiently without contact with only authority in power. I feel Rossow's contact with Pishavari has been valuable and has not in any way jeopardized our position in Iran. Only authority which could possibly object to his activities in this regard would be Iranian Govt and no such objection has materialized. My understanding is that sole reason for maintaining Tabriz Consulate is for reporting of political events and it seems difficult to see how this is to be done if our Consul can not interview the persons making the news. Certainly should Jernegan or Ferguson replace Rossow under these circumstances their hands would be tied as far as reporting is concerned.

They would not only be unable to approach any of rebel officials but all native informants would be afraid of report if got them [*sic*] through fear of reprisals. Little or no information could be obtained from Soviets and they would be forced to rely almost entirely on bazaar rumors.

3. While I realize personalities can not always be taken into consideration in matters of this sort I feel recall of Rossow would be unfair and humiliating to officer who has been working hard to provide Embassy and Dept with prompt and accurate information.

4. Rossow has been cautioned to say or do nothing which would in any way indicate to rebels that their movement in any way has American sympathy or support. I am convinced he has done and will do nothing in variance these instructions. I would appreciate therefore Dept's reconsidering matter as I can see no good and a great deal of harm accruing to our Government from change at Tabriz. I would appreciate urgent indication of Dept's reaction to above.³⁷

MURRAY

³⁶ For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 337-361, *passim*.

³⁷ In telegram 46, January 18, 8 p. m., the Department notified Mr. Murray that it deferred to his judgment and withdrew its suggestion that Mr. Rossow be replaced. It gave instruction that "Rossow should say or do nothing which might create an impression in Iran that he is endeavoring to bring about mediation between the rebels and the Iranian Govt or that he would be willing to play a mediatory role". (123 Rossow, Robert)

*The Head of the Iranian Delegation at the United Nations (Taquizadeh) to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations (Jebb)*³⁸

LONDON, 19 January 1946.

Owing to interference of the Soviet Union, through the medium of its officials and armed forces, in the internal affairs of Iran, a situation has arisen which may lead to international friction.

2. In accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Iranian Government has repeatedly tried to negotiate with the Government of the Soviet Union, but has met with no success.

3. Accordingly, the Iranian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on behalf of the Iranian Government, has the honour to request you, in accordance with the terms of Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Charter, to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council so that the Council may investigate the situation and recommend appropriate terms of settlement.

4. The Iranian delegation is prepared to assist the Security Council by furnishing a full statement of the facts which have given rise to the present situation, together with a copy of the relevant Treaty which binds the parties concerned.

S. H. TAQIZADEH

891.00/1-1246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1946—6 p. m.

53. Urtel 53 Jan 12. Dept believes that issuance of press statement suggested by Rossow in his no. 6 Jan 17³⁹ would be inadvisable at present time.

³⁸ Reprinted from United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1* (hereafter referred to as SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 1*), p. 16. Ambassador Taquizadeh had addressed the General Assembly, during its discussion of the Report of the Preparatory Commission on January 15, 1946, in connection with "the very disturbing situation prevailing in Iran"; for text of the address, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings*, p. 119.

³⁹ Telegram from Tabriz not printed; it advised the Department of indications that the issue of Azerbaijani independence would be brought to a head very soon in order to present the world with a *fait accompli* before the Iranian complaint could be considered by the United Nations. Mr. Rossow recommended that he be authorized to issue a press statement locally, timed to anticipate and prevent drastic action in this direction. (891.00/1-1746) Ambassador Murray supported the recommendation and outlined the text of a proposed statement (telegram 94, January 21, 2 p. m., from Tehran, 891.00/1-2146).

The Secretary has informed Dept ⁴⁰ that he "feels it highly undesirable for obvious reasons for US Govt to issue" at this time a public statement setting forth the difficulties which members of the Embassy and American journalists are encountering in obtaining Soviet permission to travel in Northern Iran.

Sent to Tehran.

Repeated to Tabriz, London and Moscow.

ACHESON

891.00/1-2146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 21, 1946—11 a. m.

PRIORITY

[Received 11:43 p. m.]

92. During interview January 19 with PriMin I expressed to him (as I did some time ago to Shah) my personal view that Iran Government should try to make direct contact with Azerbaijan dissidents utilizing for this purpose some of outstanding Azerbaijanis resident in Tehran, three of whom are Cabinet members. I pointed out that Azerbaijan "Prime Minister" Peshavari had repeatedly declared his willingness to negotiate with central government and that it might be well at least to test his sincerity. I stressed danger that failure of central government to make some sort of move toward settlement would give Tabriz leaders motive and pretext for declaring complete separation from Iran and requesting Soviet protection. I mentioned Rossow's report that silence of Tehran Government was discouraging Azerbaijan population and facilitating task of extremists who seemed to be working for final break. Hakimi was at first reluctant to attempt anything on grounds that Azerbaijan "government" is completely under Russian domination and so terrorized it could not come to any reasonable agreement. He asserted members of rebel government are scoundrels and pointed out Governor General Bayat had attempted conciliation in early December with complete lack of success.

⁴⁰ Secretary Byrnes was in London participating in the sessions of the United Nations; reference here is to telegram 656, January 18, from London, not printed. In telegram 472, January 16, the Department had informed London that Ambassador Murray was anxious to issue a statement concerning the United States Government's inability to obtain permits from Soviet authorities authorizing American officers to travel in northern Iran in performance of their official duties. The Department had also noted that Mr. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and Elbridge Durbrow, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, had approved release of the statement, the text of which was included in the telegram for the Secretary's approval "as we don't know whether it might upset his plans." (501.BB/1-1646)

I agreed that his objections might be well taken but urged that public gesture would have good effect on local Azerbaijan population by demonstrating it was not being forgotten by central government. It would also show world that Iran Government was doing what it could to solve own problems. Some benefits were to be expected even if negotiations came to nothing. PriMin agreed with this view and said he would let it be known through press and radio that Government would be willing receive representatives from Tabriz. He felt and I concurred that conversations could best be conducted in freer atmosphere of Tehran.

Sent Department 92 Moscow 29, London 16.

MURRAY

501.BC/1-146

Memorandum by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[LONDON,] January 22, 1946.

USSC 46/6

Subject: Proposed United States Position in the Security Council With Respect to the Iranian, Soviet and Ukrainian Requests.⁴¹

I propose that we adopt the following position with respect to all three of these requests:

- (1) That they should be treated identically.
- (2) That at the next meeting of the Security Council (which will probably be on Thursday ⁴²) I should either propose or support (depending on circumstances) the position that the Council should at that meeting decide to ask each of the three countries which have brought situations to the attention of the Security Council to appear at a stated date within the next week to present its case in elaboration of its letter to the President of the Security Council. An opportunity would of course be afforded the other states whose interests are directly affected to give their side of the cases. Separate days should be set for each of these hearings, perhaps successive days next week.
- (3) That at the next meeting of the Security Council I should propose or support an invitation to the Greek Government to be represented at the meeting when the Soviet case is presented; this would be done by a procedural vote in accordance with Article 31 of the Char-

⁴¹ The Soviet complaint alleged that the continued presence of British troops in Greece was fraught with grave consequences for the maintenance of peace and security; the Ukrainian complaint dealt with the situation in Indonesia. For documentation on the two complaints, see *ante* pp. 104 ff., and volume VIII, respectively.

⁴² Actually, the Second Meeting of the Security Council took place on Friday, January 25.

ter which provides: "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected." Except for Iran and the Ukraine which would be invited under (2) above, Greece appears to be the only country whose interests are specially affected in any of the three situations which is not on the Security Council and to which an invitation should therefore be extended; the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the Netherlands are members of the Council.

(4) That the Council, after hearing the formal presentation of the case by each of the three appellants and any remarks that other states, including those whose interests are specially affected, may wish to make, should study the briefs and documents submitted. Any decisions of the Council with respect to investigation or other proposals for dealing with the issues will be made after the Security Council has made its study of the documents and their presentation.

This recommendation is concurred in by Mr. Dunn, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. Hare and Mr. Bohlen.⁴³

501BC/1-146

Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations (Hare) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

TOP SECRET
USSC 46/34

[LONDON,] January 23, 1946.

In your conference on January 21 regarding the situation resulting from the raising of the question of Soviet-Iranian difficulties before the Security Council, the Department's memorandum entitled "Soviet-Iranian Relations" (USGA/Gen/24)⁴⁴ was taken as the basic document but you suggested that it might be useful to record certain additional matter which was mentioned during the conference, and also to have a collection made of the documents to which reference had been made. This memorandum and its attachments⁴⁵ have accordingly been prepared in compliance with your suggestions.

[Here follow accounts of the historical background of relations between Russia and Iran, the problem of Iranian oil, and the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran.]

⁴³ James Clement Dunn and Leo Pasvolsky were Senior Advisers to the United States delegation at the United Nations; George Wadsworth, Raymond A. Hare, and Charles E. Bohlen were Political Advisers to the delegation.

⁴⁴ *Ante*, p. 289.

⁴⁵ Attachments not printed.

UNITED STATES POLICY

In its weekly "Current Foreign Relations"⁴⁶ the Department summarized the then existing situation in northwestern Iran as follows:

"At the end of one month of disturbances in Iranian Azerbaijan the situation is as follows: The insurgent 'Democrats' are in firm control of all important towns and roads of Azerbaijan. They have elected a Governmental Assembly of Azerbaijan which has appointed a Cabinet. The 'Democrats' have demanded autonomy for Azerbaijan in all matters except foreign relations and war. They have acted throughout under the direction of the Soviets, although the latter have been careful not to take a direct part in the movement. The Iranian Government has been unable to act effectively, either directly against the insurgents, or through appeals to the Soviet authorities in Iran and Moscow. Iranian officials in Azerbaijan have been rendered powerless and Soviet forces have blocked all attempts to send assistance from outside the area. While at first the 'Democratic' movement had little popular support, it is gaining strength through the evident inability of the Iranian Government to cope with it. The disaffection may spread to other parts of the population, including the tribes. The Iranian Government is unable to restore its authority so long as Soviet troops are in Iran. It may also be difficult to do so after their withdrawal. There is widespread feeling among the Iranians that their only hope is US assistance since they fear the British might compromise with the USSR on spheres of influence. The people of Azerbaijan have just cause for complaint against the central government, whose administration in Azerbaijan has been oppressive, corrupt and inefficient. If a solution is not soon found, Iran is likely to be dismembered with the northern provinces eventually becoming parts of the USSR.

"Although oil has not been mentioned during the current dispute, some observers believe the Iranian Government's refusal to grant broad concessions in northern Iran to the USSR in 1944 is the cause of the present difficulty.⁴⁷

"Appreciating the seriousness of the issues involved, especially in relation to the success of the UNO, we have recently formulated three principles which we have applied to Iran and to which we believe the three major powers should adhere: There is no longer any need for foreign troops in Iran and they should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible. Iran has the sovereign right to move its armed forces about its territory without hinderance. Iran is entirely free to grant or withhold commercial concessions on its own territory on any terms agreeable to it and without being submitted to external pressure."

[Here follows discussion of the attachments to this memorandum.]

While various factors of course enter into the formation of our

⁴⁶ A booklet prepared weekly by the Department of State in order to summarize major developments of diplomatic character for the information of the Foreign Service. During December 1945, its name was altered, temporarily, to the *Weekly Review*. The three paragraphs here quoted were taken from the *Weekly Review* of December 20, 1945, p. 7.

⁴⁷ For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 452 ff.

policy, it would seem that emphasis should be laid on (1) the importance of this as a test case in assuring a free hearing and just decision to a small state victim of large state aggression and, even more important, (2) the danger that this situation holds of serving as a focal point for Anglo-Russian disagreement with all the grave implications which might derive therefrom.

501.BC/1-146

Memorandum by the Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations (Stevenson)

USSC 46/30

[LONDON,] January 24, 1946.

In talking with Secretary Byrnes just before he left today about the political issues, he expressed the following views:

When a state files a complaint alleging a "situation or dispute" we must assume that it is filed in good faith and that the complainant is entitled to a hearing and discussion of his complaint in the Security Council.

Applying this principle to the Iranian case, it should be our policy to support the right of Iran to present its case to the Security Council. If the presentation is "reasonable" we should actively support and speak for an investigation. }

This policy is, however, not intended to preclude a recommendation that bilateral negotiations between Russia and Iran be attempted first should the parties be disposed to proceed in that manner and should there be evidence of any reasonable likelihood of success. } In short, if full attempts have not been made for the parties to get together and resolve the question, it would seem proper for them to do so before commencing an investigation. In the event of any such bilateral negotiations the Security Council should be kept closely informed of all the developments.

A. E. STEVENSON

*The Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union at the United Nations (Vyshinsky) to the President of the Security Council (Makin)*⁴⁸

LONDON, 24 January 1946.

The delegation of the Soviet Union, acting on behalf of the Soviet Government, considers it necessary, in connexion with the appeal of the Iranian delegation addressed to the Security Council, to make the following statement:

1. The allegation made by the Iranian delegation of interference by the Soviet Union, through its officials and through its armed forces,

⁴⁸ Reprinted from SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 1*, p. 17.

in the internal affairs of Iran is not in accordance with the facts and is devoid of any foundation. In this particular case, the Iranian delegation repeats the statement made by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Government in November 1945.⁴⁹ This statement, however, was categorically refuted by the Soviet Embassy in Iran in its Note of 26 November.⁵⁰ It should also be noted that in its reply of 1 December 1945,⁵¹ the Iranian Government not only failed to disprove the facts referred to in the Soviet Note of 26 November, but also expressed, as is stated in the above-mentioned Iranian Note, "its satisfaction that, as is confirmed by the Embassy's reply, the interference of Soviet officials in the internal affairs of the northern districts of Iran is not in accordance with the facts". Moreover, in the same note, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran "expresses its satisfaction at the fact that, as has been pointed out, the Soviet officials fully respect the Tri-Partite Agreement⁵² and the Declaration signed and published in Tehran by the leaders of the three great Powers,⁵³ Allies of Iran."

These facts are sufficiently convincing evidence of the inaccuracy and groundlessness of the statement of the Iranian delegation regarding the alleged interference on the part of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Iran.

2. Equally in contradiction to the facts is the statement of the Iranian delegation that the Iranian Government has made unsuccessful attempts to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government on this question. This statement of the Iranian delegation is refuted by the above-mentioned facts, since the Iranian Government not only attempted to negotiate but entered into negotiations with the Soviet Government on this question, as is evident from the Iranian Note of 1 December, referred to above.

3. The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to point out that the Iranian Government is trying to use the presence of foreign troops in Iran in order to represent this fact as a violation of Iranian sovereignty and as a cause of the events which are taking place in Iranian

⁴⁹ For summary of note of November 17, 1945, from the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Iran, see telegram 959, November 19, 1945, from Tehran, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VIII, p. 431. The text of the note is printed in SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 1*, p. 50.

⁵⁰ For last paragraph of Soviet note, the key section in the Soviet reply, see telegram 1040, December 2, 1945, from Tehran, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VIII, p. 470. The full text is printed in SC *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 1*, p. 55.

⁵¹ For text, see telegram 1054, December 3, 1945, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VIII, p. 473, or SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 1*, p. 58.

⁵² The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Iran, signed at Tehran on January 29, 1942; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249.

⁵³ The Declaration regarding Iran, December 1, 1943, *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. IV, p. 413.

Azerbaijan. As a matter of fact, the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Iran is quite legitimate inasmuch as this right was granted to the Soviet Government by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 26 February 1921⁵⁴ and the Soviet-British-Iranian Treaty of 1942. The events in Iranian Azerbaijan have no connexion with the presence there of Soviet troops, as the indisputable and entirely objective facts bear witness. These events are of an exclusively Iranian and internal nature.

As is known, what is happening in northern Iran is connected with the aspirations of the population of northern Iran for national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State, and with the achievement of the wishes of the local population, which is nothing unusual for a democratic State.

4. At the same time, the Soviet delegation cannot but draw attention to the fact that propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union has of late been growing stronger in Iran with the manifest toleration of the Iranian Government. This propaganda in no way differs from the fascist propaganda which was carried on against the Soviet Union at the time of Riza Shah.

The anti-democratic and pogrom activity, hostile to the Soviet Union, on the part of the reactionary forces in Iran which are supported by certain influential Iranian groups drawn from the ruling circles and the police authorities, creates for the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and for Baku a danger of organized hostile actions, diversions and so forth.

The Soviet Government considers, however, that questions of this kind, which affect the relations between two neighbouring States, the USSR and Iran, can and should be settled by means of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government. The Soviet Government did not and does not refuse to accept this method of settling such questions arising between Allied Governments.

5. In view of these facts, and taking into consideration that in this particular case the conditions envisaged by Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter of the United Nations are lacking, the Soviet delegation regards the appeal of the Iranian delegation to the Security Council as devoid of any foundation and is categorically opposed to the consideration of the above-mentioned appeal of the Iranian delegation by the Security Council.

A. VYSHINSKY

⁵⁴ Treaty of Friendship between the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and Persia, signed at Moscow; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 384.

[The Iranian and Soviet letters of January 19 and 24 were brought formally to the notice of the Security Council at its meeting on January 25. Two major issues were discussed at this meeting: The question of the inclusion of the Iranian matter on the agenda of the Council and the question of Iran's right as a member of the United Nations to be invited to the Council's table.

The Iranian question was placed on the agenda with no objection. At this point, Mr. Vyshinsky stated:

"There is one point I would like to clarify: that is the inclusion of the Iranian question in the Security Council's agenda. Does this mean consideration of the substance of the question or discussion as to whether it should come before the Council at all?

If this item is placed on the agenda so that we may discuss whether the question should be considered, then I have no objection to its inclusion on the agenda for the next meeting. . . . The Soviet delegation . . . has put forward reasons proving that the statement of the Iranian Government should not be considered by the Security Council.

It therefore seems to me that we should, in the first place, thoroughly discuss this matter, and, as the Chairman suggests, the Soviet delegation should in any case have the opportunity at the next meeting of putting forward its reasons why this question should not be considered by the Security Council." (United Nations, SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, p. 16.*)

The President of the Council replied: ". . . I should like to say that the inclusion of the item in this agenda does give an opportunity for the Council to have a discussion, and that the USSR could, at the initial stage of that discussion, make such proposal as it might think proper. The inclusion would not deny to the USSR representative the opportunity of being able to move in whatever direction he might wish." (*Ibid.*)

In reply to a question by Mr. Bevin, the President of the Council stated further: ". . . It is for the Council itself to determine the procedure that it wishes to adopt in regard to this matter, that is, whether it wishes to proceed to a discussion or to take any other action it might wish." (*Ibid.*, p. 20)

Regarding the second issue, Mr. Stettinius stated: ". . . I wish to make very clear that the United States Government believes that any Member country of the United Nations which makes a complaint has a right to be heard at this table." (*Ibid.*, p. 18.) A motion by the Egyptian representative to this effect was adopted without a vote.

For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on January 25, see *ibid.*, pp. 15-20.]

891.00/1-2646

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1946.

Participants: The Ambassador of Iran
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Minor

Ambassador Ala called today, at his own request, on the Under Secretary. The Ambassador began the conversation by referring to Mr. Acheson's statement at a press conference to the effect that he believed Russian forces would withdraw from Iran by March 2d. Mr. Acheson replied that the statement was not a formal pronouncement regarding Iran but was made merely in answer to a question. He said that in his view the only proper attitude which the Department of State can take in a matter of this kind is to assume that a friendly power such as Russia will live up to a solemn commitment.

The Ambassador appeared to be satisfied with Mr. Acheson's clarification and then launched into a recital of the present status of the Iranian case against Russia. He reviewed the background of the dispute and stated that Russia had interfered widely in Iranian affairs during the occupation of northern Iran. (He said that it was a violation of the tripartite pact for Russia to prevent Iranian forces from going into northern Iran to put down the disturbance.) The Ambassador expressed concern that Russia seems to have in mind introducing troops into Iran or keeping troops there on the basis of the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty. The Ambassador said that while the Russians might have used this treaty as a pretext for entering Iran, in 1941, to put out the Germans, but that the Russians could not conceivably invoke the treaty at this time. The pertinent provision of this treaty states that Russia will have the right to introduce troops into Iran if Russia is threatened in Iran by a third power, and then only if Iran proves unable to remove the danger to Russian territory.

The Ambassador regretted that a great deal of confusion seems to have arisen with regard to the presentation of the Iranian case to UNO. He regretted that Prime Minister Hakimi had found it necessary to resign⁵⁵ since this had introduced a confusing element. He did not know whether the new Prime Minister Qavam would withdraw the case from UNO but he expressed the strong hope that this would

⁵⁵ The Hakimi Cabinet resigned on January 20.

not be done. The Ambassador ended the conversation by expressing the hope that the United States will support Iran in this critical time, but he did not ask for any particular commitment in this regard.

501 BB/1-2646 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

LONDON, January 26, 1946.

[Received January 28—2:25 a. m.]

1015. DelUN 101. Set forth below are the letters from the chief delegate of Iran to the President of the Security Council as received by the Secretariat on January 26, 1946

“Security Council

Letter From the Chief of the Delegation of Iran
to the President of the Security Council

Sir, The Iranian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations have taken note of the letter of 24 January 1946, addressed by the delegation of the Soviet Union to the Security Council and desire to bring to the attention of the Security Council the following facts:

(1) The continued interference of Soviet military and civil authorities in the internal affairs of Iran can be fully proved. The statement of the facts showing this interference and containing the necessary proofs will be submitted to the Security Council. The Iranian Government has in fact brought many instances of such interference to the notice of the Soviet Government in a number of notes which the Soviet Government have either completely ignored or failed to deal adequately with the complaint.

(2) While it is true that the Soviet Government in its note of 26 November 1945, contrary to the true facts, categorically denied the allegations of interference contained in the note of the Iranian Government of 17 November 1945, yet it remains the fact that in their note of 26 November 1945, the Soviet Government admitted that they had not been willing to allow the passage of Iranian reinforcements to suppress the revolt in Azerbaijan on the clearly unjustifiable grounds that, according to the Soviet Government the arrival of Iranian troops on part of their own territory would cause disturbance and blood and that in the event of the outbreak of disturbances the Soviet Government's word to maintain security in the areas stationed by her armed forces, be constrained to complement her armed forces. Later, however, in the Soviet Government note to the United States Government dated 29 November 1945,⁵⁶ they tried to find a new excuse for their action alleging that it was ‘a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurances of the democratic rights of Azerbaijanian population of northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits

⁵⁶ See telegram 4015, November 30, 1945, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 468.

of the Iranian state', which point is now reiterated in paragraph 3 of the letter of the delegation of the Soviet Union to the Security Council.

(8) In the circumstances the Iranian Delegation maintain that the conditions envisaged by Article 25 of the Charter are present and that the Security Council should, in accordance with the terms of the Charter, investigate this dispute between the Iranian Government and the Soviet Government.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) S. H. Taqizadeh
Head of the Iranian Delegation[⁵⁷]

[Here follows enclosure to the above-quoted letter: Note of December 1, 1945, from the Iranian Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Embassy in Iran, the text of which is quoted in telegram 1054, December 3, 1945, from Tehran, volume VIII, page 473.]

STETTINIUS

891.00/1-2846: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TEHRAN, January 28, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received 10:32 p. m.]

127. I saw Qavam yesterday immediately after he had received his formal appointment as Prime Minister. He showed me telegram he had just sent to Iran Ambassador London instructing him not in any way to weaken his efforts to have Iranian case considered by UNO but at same time to approach Vishinsky and ascertain whether opportunity offered for direct settlement of Iran-Soviet problems. Taqizadeh was directed to associate Soheily⁵⁸ with himself in this approach.

Qavam added that he proposed to attempt negotiations with Russians both here and in Moscow and that he further planned to send special mission to negotiate with Azerbaijanians. He remarked he would "tame" Azerbaijanians by giving them Provincial Council. (I understand he does not mean by this that he would recognize present Tabriz Assembly.) In connection proposed negotiations with Soviets I repeated remarks made previously to Shah and Hakimi re possible desirability of utilizing outstanding personalities outside ordinary diplomatic machinery and again pointed to success of such methods when employed by President Roosevelt. Qavam said he believed present Iranian difficulties with Soviets all date from oil crisis of late 1944 precipitated when Prime Minister Saed refused Russian

⁵⁷ For full text of Ambassador Taqizadeh's letter, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 1*, p. 19.

⁵⁸ Ali Soheily, member of the Iranian delegation at the United Nations and former Prime Minister.

demand for exploration rights in Northern Iran. He asked my opinion as to his proper course if he should be faced with another demand of this kind. I of course declined to give direct answer but recalled in general way President Roosevelt's advice given Shah in 1943 to effect Iran should not let her oil resources be preempted by foreigners but should endeavor to develop them in such way as to uplift welfare Iranian people. I mentioned that when it appeared our Govt might acquire Saudi Arabian concession, Roosevelt had been insistent we should develop it for benefit of Arabs. I said also that I realized difficulty involved in case of Russians where any concession would have to be granted to Govt since private enterprise did not exist in USSR.

I took occasion to say if Iran Govt should decide to reopen oil concession question we would expect to be notified so American companies could again present their proposals.

Qavam said his original intention had been to defer formation of Cabinet until after he had determined whether Soviets would be willing negotiate with him on satisfactory basis. However, he had decided this might take too long and it would be unwise to leave country without Cabinet for indefinite period. Accordingly I assume he will proceed at once to choose his Ministers.

He said at one point that he would be grateful for any advice Department or Embassy could give him in connection with carrying out of his task.

Sent Department as 127; repeated London 25; Moscow 34.

MURRAY

501.BC/1-2846: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

SECRET

LONDON, January 28, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received 6:25 p. m.]

1022. Personal for the Secretary. We had several interesting conversations on the Iranian, Greek and Indonesian situations prior to the Security Council meeting at 3:00 today which I am reporting fully for your information.

1. Wellington Koo⁵⁹ called upon me Sunday evening at 7:00 shortly after he had talked with the Soviets. He was very anxious to have the three complaints now before the Security Council handled in a manner which would not cause ruffled feelings. (He stated that the Russians had advised him that they were willing to negotiate with the Iranians and that the Iranians were likewise willing to negotiate. He therefore

⁵⁹ V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Representative at the United Nations.

proposed that the Security Council merely state that they were delighted that the two Governments were willing to negotiate and then the chairman could follow with a statement that the Security Council would be kept informed of the progress. Ambassador Koo thought this would be a satisfactory way of handling the matter. He then added that the Soviet Union was firmly opposed to the Council's passing any resolution of any kind on the Iranian situation.)

I stated that I did not like the suggestion that we agree not to pass any kind of resolution because it was of paramount importance at this moment to keep world confidence and world respect for the Security Council and I could not make any commitment that I would not insist upon some formal action by the Security Council even though the two countries stated they were willing to negotiate.) The only basis on which I thought it would be possible to drop the whole matter was if the Iranians asked that it be dropped and that they be given a chance to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

STETTINIUS

891.00/1-2446 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

74. I have given careful consideration to the recommendations contained in your 116, Jan 24,⁶⁰ and other telegrams concerning a public statement of the Am Govt's interest in the Iranian situation. I am inclined to believe that it would not be appropriate for this Govt to make a public statement of the kind suggested relating to a matter which has been formally placed before UNO. Our ability to contribute to a proper settlement of the difficulty will be greatly strengthened if we refrain from taking any action which might imply that we have already formed a fixed opinion with regard to the merits of the case.

If the new Govt in Tehran agrees to enter into direct negotiation with Russians on the matter, its hand will be greatly strengthened by the fact that its case is pending before UNO. I insisted in London that Iran should have a full hearing. My statement in this regard has been carried in the press and should have become well known to all interested persons in Iran.

BYRNES

⁶⁰ Not printed; it expressed the Ambassador's hope that the Department would reconsider its decision not to issue the proposed press statement on Azerbaijan and that "we should at least make it clear informally to Azerbaijan 'government' what American Government's attitude would be toward any drastic move." (891.00/1-2446)

891.00/1-2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 29, 1946—8 a. m.

[Received 1:01 p. m.]

130. Even though it may be superfluous I should like to draw attention to numerous flaws in Vishinsky's letter of January 24 to President of Security Council of UNO.⁶¹

1. That Soviet note of November 26 to Iran Govt denied assertions made in Iran Govt's note of November 17 can hardly be accepted as proof that Iranian complaints were unfounded.

2. Iran Govt's note of December 1 did not accept Soviet statement that Russian authorities were not interfering in northern Iran. Note expressed pleasure because it appeared from Soviet communication that "said measures will not be repeated" and went on to state Iran Govt's hope "that no such actions will ever again be taken by Soviet military authorities in the northern provinces." Repeated Iranian complaints regarding "deplorable incidents" that had occurred as result of interference with Iranian officials in north. Renewed request that Soviets allow freedom of action to Iranian security forces.

3. Exchanges of notes between Iranian FonOff and Soviet Chargé in which Soviets simply contradicted all statements made by Iranians and refused all Iranian requests cannot be considered "negotiations" in any true sense of word. Fact is that Iranian PriMin and Min-FonAff were never able engage in discussions with any Soviet official of consequence since Russians had withdrawn Ambassador and never responded to repeated Iranian offers to go to Moscow for high-level conversations. It will be further recalled that at Moscow Conference Molotov himself stated Soviet Govt could not discuss anything with "hostile" Iran Govt then in power.

4. I have already pointed out (Mytel 1195, December 28⁶²) that Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921 is not applicable to present circumstances. Unless Soviets can produce evidence that they are threatened by third power operating in Iran their reiterated assertion of rights under that treaty should be rejected out of hand.

5. Iranians have never asserted that mere presence of Russian troops in Iran was violation of Iranian sovereignty. They object solely to interference by those troops with activities of Iranian civil and military authorities.

6. Only Soviets and their stooges would be cynical enough to assert that presence Russian troops in Azerbaijan has no connection with recent events in that province. Apart from abundant other evidence

⁶¹ *Ante*, p. 309.

⁶² *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 516.

Soviet's formal refusal permit Iranian reinforcements to go to Azerbaijan should be sufficient to prove rebellion relied on Soviet protection.

7. Iranian newspaper criticism of USSR is no more severe than that directed against Britain. Again only Soviets would be so cynical as to pretend surprise or fear at being criticized by press in weak country whose sovereignty they are openly infringing.

8. It is absurd to assert that Baku is threatened by "organized hostile actions" from Iran.

9. If Soviet Govt really wished to settle difficulty by legitimate bilateral negotiations it has had ample opportunity before now to initiate such negotiations.

To Dept as 130, repeated London 26, Moscow 35.

MURRAY

891.00/1-2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 29, 1946—9 a. m.

[Received 1:41 p. m.]

132. Embtel 81, Jan 17.⁶³ In as much Goodwin instructed by Associated Press remain Tehran further 10 days to fortnight and authorization has not been issued for his travel Tabriz and return, Embassy will appreciate being informed whether Dept may not desire to take up matter with Moscow authorities for purpose of having truth re conditions in Azerbaijan made available to American public.

Daniel of *New York Times* was refused permission to visit Azerbaijan some weeks ago and now Goodwin, in addition to which Minor, responsible Dept official, was similarly refused. Our continued acquiescence toward local Soviet practice of refusing Americans permission to visit Azerbaijan on legitimate business may well lend encouragement to further restrictive acts against Americans that area. In any event, Soviet Embassy statement that present time "inopportune" (Embtel 53, Jan 12) for travel Goodwin in Azerbaijan constitutes inadequate reason for refusal and I feel we would be justified in insisting on issuance travel pass or reason for nonissuance acceptable to US.

Embassy has in mind, in this connection, successful efforts of Dept to obtain entry of American correspondents into countries eastern Europe under Soviet influence.

MURRAY

⁶³ Not printed.

891.00/1-2946 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET
URGENT

LONDON, January 29, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received 7:37 p. m.]

1064. Personal for the Secretary and the President.

1. Before the Security Council meeting this morning,⁶⁴ Bevin informed me that he had talked with Vyshinsky several times in the last couple of days. He felt that Vyshinsky had shown considerable nervousness at the present situation and stated that he showed a new friendliness and readiness to reach agreements. They had discussed the Bulgarian and Rumanian situations and Bevin had concluded from Vyshinsky's remarks that he was ready to drop the Russian charges regarding Greece and Indonesia if the United Kingdom would make satisfactory concessions in the Balkan situation. Bevin said that he had told Vyshinsky flatly that he would not allow the Iranian situation to be dropped by the Security Council, leaving Britain to stand alone in the dock on the Greek and Indonesian matters.

2. We also learned from the Iranians before the Council meeting that they had received instructions from their Govt to pursue the case before the Council. The Iranian Ambassador indicated rather vaguely that he had also received authority, if an opportunity developed, to open discussions directly with Vyshinsky. He did not believe that his Govt would negotiate directly with the Russians in Tehran. He felt strongly that any bilateral negotiations which he conducted in London should be pursued under the aegis of the Security Council and in accordance with the Council's recommendation. He did not want the Council to turn the dispute back to the parties for negotiation and to drop the case in the meantime.

3. Also prior to the meeting we were given to understand that the Russians would strongly oppose consideration of the case by the Security Council, and would object on various procedural grounds to the procedures which the President had indicated he would follow at the meeting.

4. At the Council meeting the President proposed that we should hear the Iranian case and the Soviet's reply, at that point the meeting

⁶⁴This meeting of the Security Council took place at 3 p. m. on January 28. Presumably, telegram 1064 was drafted the day before it was actually sent. For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on January 28, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1*, pp. 31-44.

should be thrown open for discussion of any resolution which any member desired to propose.⁶⁵ The USSR did not object to this procedure but attempted to reserve its right to object to any consideration by the Council of the substance of the dispute. The Iranian Ambassador thereupon read a long statement of the Iranian case, which contained little that was new. He ended up with a request that the Security Council recommend that the USSR remove its troops from northern Iran by March 2nd, that in the meantime the USSR should permit Iranian security forces to move freely into northern Iran and that it should cease interference in Iranian internal affairs.⁶⁶

Vyshinsky in reply stated that he would not deal with the substance of the complaint but only with procedural matters which were raised. His main points were (a) negotiations had taken place and the results had been declared satisfactory by the Iranian Govt which for this reason had not pursued the matter further; (b) for this reason the Iranian conflict was not a matter which under the Charter could be considered by the Security Council; and (c) that the Russians had never refused to negotiate and that they are still ready to go on with bilateral negotiations between the parties. He analyzed articles 33, 34, 36, and 37 and contended that none of them applied in this case. He ended by urging that the Council leave this matter for the moment, so that it could be solved between the parties by bilateral negotiations.

5. The Council decided to adjourn at this point, over Vyshinsky's objection, after about a 3-hour meeting. At the end of the meeting the President announced that since this was a dispute and since the USSR was a party to it, the USSR would be required under the Charter to abstain from voting on any decisions under Chapter 6. Vyshinsky raised no objection to this.

6. After the meeting I was advised very privately that the Chinese had been requested by the Iranians to present at the next meeting a resolution suggesting bilateral negotiations between the parties and in addition that contact had already been made between the parties to this end. Am attempting to confirm this.

STETTINIUS

⁶⁵ Telegram 1061, January 29, 1946, from London, reported in part: "After Iranian representative had been invited, without opposition, to sit without vote with SC, Chairman emphasized that this was first time that SC was performing its functions under Chapter VI. Since rules of procedure for its operation under Chapter are yet to be developed, SC would have to proceed on *ad hoc* basis this time, but should bear in mind that its action would constitute precedent.

⁶⁶ Ambassador Taqizadeh submitted a memorandum and other documents to the Security Council at this meeting; for texts, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser. supp. No. 1*, pp. 25-73.

501.BC/1-146

Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Special Assistant to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

USSC 46/33

[LONDON, undated.]

CALENDAR NOTES ON IRANIAN MATTERS

Tuesday, January 29

In the afternoon Mr. Stettinius asked Mr. Hare to call on Ambassador Taqizadeh, Head of the Iranian Delegation, to find out if possible what instructions he had received from his government in regard to placing the Iranian case before the Security Council. During the evening Mr. Hare reported back that he had had a conversation with Mr. Kazemi, second man on the Iranian Delegation, who told him that there had been no changes in the Iranian instructions. The Iranians were prepared to continue to pursue the case. The Iranians stated that they thought perhaps the best approach would be for the Council to recommend bilateral negotiations under the jurisdiction of the Council. He asked if the United States would make this proposal. He indicated that the Chinese had agreed to do so, but that it would be preferable if the United States would do it. (See Document: USGA/1a/Gen.30/Conv.45)⁶⁷

Mr. Noyes reported this conversation immediately to Mr. Bohlen, and later in the evening to Dr. Pasvolsky. That evening a telegram was received from Teheran reporting that the new Prime Minister had told his Ambassador that he planned to open bilateral negotiations with the Russians both in Teheran and in Moscow, as well as having instructed Ambassador Taqizadeh (together with Mr. Kazemi) to make contact with Mr. Vyshinsky in London (see Telegram *Red No. 1736*⁶⁸).

At the last two conversations referred to, the main questions discussed were the position we should take in the light of the public position of the Iranian government that they were prepared to enter bilateral negotiations. It was considered likely that the Iranian delegate would receive new instructions, as reported from the press, either instructing him or authorizing him to enter into bilateral negotiations. We considered it possible if not probable that the Prime Minister of Iran had already been in direct contact with the Russians in Teheran or Moscow as the Chinese had reported to us privately. It was also possible that the Prime Minister might even proceed to Moscow himself. There was discussion therefore of the advisability of taking

⁶⁷ Not printed.

⁶⁸ No record of this message found in Department files.

a position which would still be tenable if Mr. Vyshinsky announced at the meeting that his government had already begun direct discussions.

Wednesday morning, January 30

Immediately after the full delegation meeting held on the 7th floor of 20 Grosvenor Square, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Cohen,⁶⁹ Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Noyes, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Notter, Mr. Hartley,⁷⁰ and Mr. Hare assembled in Mr. Stettinius' office to discuss the United States position at the afternoon Security Council meeting. Mr. Pasvolsky read a statement which Mr. Wellington Koo had told him he proposed to make at the meeting.⁷¹ The general consensus was that this was a very poor statement and should not be used. Mr. Pasvolsky read a statement which he had prepared, copy attached.⁷² This was considered an excellent statement for Mr. Stettinius to use. Several minor revisions were made in the statement and in the accompanying resolution. (copy of revised resolution also attached)

At 11:30 the meeting adjourned to Mr. Stettinius' suite at Claridge's [Hotel]. Mr. Stettinius had just had a meeting with Sir Alexander Cadogan (this conversation is written up in ERS' Calendar Notes for that day).⁷³ Bevin was reported to be willing, after a full discussion of the meeting in the Council, to allow bilateral negotiations to take place under the sponsorship of the Council. He would not insist on a vote, but felt a statement from the Chairman would suffice. Mr. Stettinius had agreed to support a full discussion and said we also were willing to agree to bilateral negotiations between the parties, as long as the Council was kept informed.

Mr. Pasvolsky's resolution was discussed and approved. It was agreed that Mr. Hare would get in touch with the Iranian Ambassador immediately, to urge him to point out in reply to the Soviet statement at the last meeting that the Iranians had sought bilateral negotiations over the issue of the Soviets having prevented the Iranian service forces from proceeding into northern Iran, but that the Russians had refused to negotiate. He was to suggest then that it would be the wisest course for the Iranians then to state that he was prepared to undertake bilateral negotiations with the Russians as long as the case

⁶⁹ Benjamin V. Cohen, Senior Adviser to the United States delegation at the United Nations.

⁷⁰ Joseph E. Johnson, Harley Notter, and Robert Hartley were Political Advisers to the United States delegation at the United Nations.

⁷¹ Statement not printed.

⁷² Not printed; the statement was not made at the meeting of the Security Council during the afternoon of January 30.

⁷³ Memorandum of conversation not printed; Sir Alexander Cadogan was Principal Adviser to the British delegation at the United Nations.

remained before the Security Council, and the Security Council requested the parties to keep it fully informed of the progress and of the results of their negotiations.

Mr. Pasvolsky thereupon went off to see Mr. Wellington Koo to obtain his support for our resolution.

Mr. Hare reported back at about 1:30 to Mr. Noyes, by telephone, to the effect that the Iranians, as we had suggested, would seek the floor immediately upon the opening of the meeting, would make the argument that the Russians had never negotiated in good faith, would state that Iran would be willing to enter into bilateral negotiations under the aegis of the Council, if certain safeguards were provided. He also reported that the Iranians had received no instructions.

At quarter to two, Mr. Pasvolsky and Mr. Bohlen came in. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that the Chinese had agreed to our resolution. We met again just before the Security Council meeting.

[Annex]

RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

having examined the documents submitted to it by the representatives of Iran and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, relating to the dispute existing between the two countries;

having heard the oral statements made by these representatives;

having taken due cognizance of the declarations made by these representatives of their willingness to proceed with direct negotiations in an effort to find a mutually acceptable solution of their differences,

hereby expresses its hope that the differences between the two countries will thus be adjusted in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations; and

resolves:

1. That the appeal of the Iranian Government, communicated to the Security Council on January 19, 1946, remain on the continuing agenda of the Council until such time as the Council decides to remove it from its agenda; and

2. That the Governments of Iran and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics keep the Council currently and fully informed of the progress of their direct negotiations and of the results thereof.

761.91/1-3046: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

US URGENT

LONDON, January 30, 1946.

[Received January 30—9:02 p. m.]

1166. For the President and the Secretary of State. At this afternoon's meeting of the Security Council⁷⁴ the Iranians expressed their willingness to undertake bilateral negotiations under the aegis of the Council, if the Council so recommended, retained the matter before it, and requested the parties to report progress.⁷⁵ After 4 hours discussion we reached unanimous agreement on a resolution which took cognizance of the readiness of the parties to seek a solution by bilateral negotiations, requested the parties to report the results, and retained the right to the Council at any time to request information as to the progress of the negotiations.⁷⁶ Vyshinsky agreed to a supplementary statement by Bevin that if the reports were unsatisfactory the Council

⁷⁴ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on January 30, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1*, pp. 45-71.

⁷⁵ Ambassador Taqizadeh concluded his remarks by stating:

"In conclusion, I should like to say that, now that this dispute has come before the Council and has found a place on its agenda, it cannot be dismissed and must not be dismissed. In no circumstances must it go out of the hands of the Council; it must be pursued.

"If, as the Soviet representative said at the conclusion of his statement, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is ready for direct negotiations for the settlement of this dispute, we will be prepared to take part in direct negotiations, if the Council recommends this procedure to be adopted. We have always tried in the past, and have always wished to enter into direct negotiations. But now this procedure should be adopted according to a recommendation of the Council, and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Charter.

"The Council should take this matter under its jurisdiction; negotiations should proceed under its aegis. Progress should be reported to the Council from time to time, and results should be reported to it within a reasonable lapse of time. In this way, we are ready to get into direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but under no circumstances are we prepared to let the matter go out of the hands of the Council." (SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1*, p. 48)

⁷⁶ The resolution as introduced by Mr. Bevin and adopted unanimously by the Security Council read as follows:

"The Council,

"Having heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Iran in the course of its meetings of 28 and 30 January, and

"Having taken cognizance of the documents presented by the Soviet and Iranian delegations and those referred to in the course of the oral debates;

"Considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation; and that such negotiations will be resumed in the near future,

"Requests the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations." (*Ibid.*, p. 70)

could consider the matter at any time.⁷⁷ Before the resolution was accepted I stated that I would agree with the understanding that this matter remains of continuing concern to the Council until a settlement is reached in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.⁷⁸

Bevin made a very blunt statement charging among other things that the Soviets' admission that they had stopped the Iranian forces from moving into northern Iran indicated clearly a violation of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942.

I believe this is a satisfactory solution and one which will be not displeasing to the Iranians.

STETTINIUS

891.00/1-2946

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁷⁹

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1946.

We have had some hesitation in drafting the attached telegram to Moscow⁸⁰ since we are anxious not to do anything which will make

⁷⁷ Mr. Bevin's resolution, as originally drafted, included the following terminal sentence: "In the meantime, the matter remains on the agenda." (SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1*, p. 64). Mr. Vyshinsky commented: ". . . I am decidedly against this question remaining on the agenda of the Security Council. It must be removed in view of the express agreement for a friendly settlement of this question. I am convinced that we shall achieve results. Should we fail to achieve any results, then any member of the Security Council can come into the Security Council and say: 'Give us an account of what you have done to carry out the obligations which you have assumed at the meeting of 30 January 1946.'" (*Ibid.*, p. 66.) After further discussion, Mr. Bevin asked: ". . . If we put a full stop at the word 'negotiations', and take out the words 'the matter remains on the agenda', does he [Mr. Vyshinsky] agree—this is the question—does he agree that if the progress of the negotiations is not satisfactory, the matter can be discussed by the Security Council?" Mr. Vyshinsky's reply was: ". . . But, if, unexpectedly, owing to other circumstances or to the interference of some hot-heads, no results are achieved, then I can answer Mr. Bevin's question thus: 'Yes, in accordance with the terms of the Charter.'" (*Ibid.*, p. 70.) Mr. Bevin then dropped the terminal sentence in his draft resolution.

⁷⁸ Mr. Stettinius made three statements of substance during the discussion on January 30. He noted first: ". . . I do not believe that keeping the matter on the continuing agenda of the Council while negotiations are in progress, until a solution is found, is in any way incompatible with the Charter or the dignity of the Council, or any of its members. Moreover, it does not seem to me that the Council can divest itself of its responsibility in the situation which has been brought to its attention." (SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1*, p. 58). Later, he reinforced his position with the statement: ". . . It must be understood that the item remains on our continuing agenda." (*Ibid.*, p. 63) Finally, just prior to the unanimous adoption of Mr. Bevin's resolution, Mr. Stettinius noted: "Since I think I was the only one who insisted on the words 'remaining on the agenda', I wish to make my position clear at this time in relation to Mr. Bevin's recent proposal. I am willing to accept Mr. Bevin's proposal with the understanding that this matter remains a continuing concern of the Council until a settlement is reached in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter." (*Ibid.*, p. 71)

⁷⁹ Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary (Acheson) ; this memorandum was attached to telegram 132, January 29, from Tehran, p. 319.

⁸⁰ No. 232, p. 330.

still more complicated the negotiations which we assume will take place in the near future between Iran and the Soviet Union with regard to Azerbaijan.

Our reasons for recommending this action are briefly as follows:

1. Our failure to take any action might give the Soviet Government the impression that our numerous expressions of interest in the freedom of news are not based on any real intention on the part of this Government to endeavor to render it possible to back up American correspondents abroad.

2. Our failure to support the Embassy's request lowers the prestige of the Embassy in the eyes of Soviet officials in Iran and might render more difficult effectively to perform its functions of carrying out American policies in that area.

3. Unless Soviet officials can demonstrate that the presence of American correspondents in Northern Iran might be a threat to the security of that area, they have no ground to forbid our correspondents to enter that area. We should not continue for an indefinite period to acquiesce in the Soviet practice of barring American correspondents from non-Soviet territory.

4. The American public should not be prevented from obtaining the impressions of the American correspondents regarding developments in Iran.

LOY W. HENDERSON

501.BC/1-146

Memorandum of Conversation, by Raymond A. Hare, Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations

SECRET

[LONDON,] 2 February, 1946.

USSC 46/13 (Conv. 1)

During the Security Council meeting on Greece yesterday, I had a short conversation with Ambassador Taqizadeh regarding the decision taken by the Security Council in the Iran case and I mentioned to him certain of the more reassuring aspects of the result, stressing particularly the importance of the decision made in the Council's resolution in respect of reporting back to the Council on its demand, the effect of which was to make it possible to bring the matter back before the Council by a procedural vote.

The Ambassador replied that he was of course still very much disappointed that the Council's resolution had not made provision for maintaining the Iranian case on its agenda, this having been the stipulation on which he had indicated willingness to resort to direct negotiation. He added that he appreciated the importance of the provision made for reporting to the Council but the question which came to his mind was whether the necessary initiative would in fact be taken by

the Council should necessity arise. He had greatly appreciated the strong support which Britain, the United States and Australia had given Iran in the course of the debate and he hoped that he could count on their continued support. In view, however, of the difficulties in the relations between Britain and the Soviet Union, he thought it would be much better if the United States would raise the question of reporting in the event that the circumstances should so require and he asked if Iran could count on United States support in that regard. I replied that this was a question which I, of course, could not undertake to answer and that generally speaking it was difficult to give definite assurances upon the basis of hypothetical future developments. However, I suggested that the Ambassador would undoubtedly wish to bear in mind in this connection the past statements of American policy in respect of Iran and also the reservation made by Mr. Stettinius at the end of Wednesday's debate to the effect that the Iranian question should remain of "continuing concern" until a satisfactory solution is reached.

[Here follows comment by Ambassador Taqizadeh on the stand taken by various members of the Security Council during debate on the Iranian matter.]

Ambassador Taqizadeh said that, despite his disappointment in the Council's verdict, he wished to do everything possible to make the best of the existing situation and that he had accordingly approached Mr. Vyshinsky on Thursday and had suggested that they proceed at once to bilateral conversations as envisaged in the Council's resolution. Mr. Vyshinsky had replied that he would require instructions from Moscow in order to initiate such conversations and asked if Ambassador Taqizadeh had powers to enter discussions. The Ambassador replied that he was prepared to begin discussions immediately and emphasized to Mr. Vyshinsky the importance of "striking while the iron is hot". Mr. Vyshinsky said that he would seek instructions from his government immediately and hoped to have word back from Moscow within the course of the next day or so.

RAYMOND A. HARE

891.00/2-446: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TABRIZ, February 4, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received February 6—3: 32 p. m.]

15. [Here follows report by Mr. Rossow that he "called on 'Prime Minister' Peshavari this morning with a view to effecting release of large shipment of American-owned sausage casings now spoiling in Tabriz warehouse for lack of permit to ship out of Azerbaijan."]

I mentioned prevalent economic distress in province and inquired what steps were being taken in that regard. He replied that at request of merchants this government was preparing to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign governments. I said I believed only sovereign nationals [*nations?*] negotiated treaties. He replied he was aware of that but nation had to live and he had no alternative. I asked if he meant that he had changed his mind about remaining within Iranian nation. He answered no, but that nation had to have economic life. In reply to question he said he was not now actually in negotiation with any foreign government.

I said I had been informed that movie censorship board had been set up and that American films were being banned on political grounds. He replied this was not true but that films may have been cut on moral grounds. He added there may have been mistakes made but he would see they were not repeated.

I then asked conversationally what his impressions of recent Security Council hearings had been. Embarking on impassioned tirade he said that reference of this problem to UNO had been a great mistake because the affair was a purely internal matter between central government and Azerbaijan. He said no decision could be made on this matter without Azerbaijan's consent, and that any decision unfavorable to Azerbaijan, no matter where made and whether or not backed up by force, would be resisted. He said his people would not give up national existence and would fight for it to the last man and with sticks and stones if necessary. He continued, he bitterly resented the fact that this matter was being discussed over his government's head and without its consent and likened it to parents arranging marriage of a daughter.

I commented that my understanding was that case at issue was between Soviet Union and Iran and thus obviously an international matter, that UNO had been created for precisely such matters, that he had himself just said he did not consider province independent, and that therefore I could not quite follow his argument since provinces of a nation are not customarily consulted in international issues. He replied that Azerbaijan's special status must be recognized and it must be consulted directly in this affair.

I asked if he considered the position at which he had now arrived was irrevocable with respect to finding any satisfactory arrangement with central govt. He said it was irrevocable in the sense that his govt would not retreat one step in its struggle for national existence but that it was revocable in that if central govt wished to come to him the door for establishment of pleasant relations was not closed. He went on to castigate central govt for lack of cooperation and lack of efforts to arrive at satisfactory agreement. I asked then if he had ini-

tiated any such action. He replied that he had sent statement of Azerbaijan demands long ago to Shah and Majlis but that it had not even been acknowledged.

I then expressed interest in his recent speech (mytel 11, Jan 28⁸¹) and particularly the reference therein to "foreign imperialist nations" aiding his enemies, and inquired what nations he was referring to. He replied he had no specific nations in mind but that any nation that opposed Azerbaijan's national destiny fitted the description. He [went on] that he had said govts and not nations, that merely because a foreign govt adopted hostile policy did not mean he would consider nation an enemy.

I commented that knowing difficulties of moving large bodies of troops I had been rather surprised with March 2 so close not to have seen any apparent move on the part of Soviet troops toward evacuation. He said, "Why don't you ask the Russians why they don't leave." I replied I was not asking but merely commenting. He then said he was aware of lack of signs of departure, but that since Russians had been strictly neutral in the local affair, since occupation arrangement had been made with central govt and not with Azerbaijan, and since he had more pressing internal problems at the moment he did not intend to request Soviet troops to evacuate. He said perhaps eventually his govt might ask them to leave but that would have to be considered later.

His comment regarding Kurdish situation which followed above and concluded interview will be reported by separate telegram.⁸²

Sent Dept as 15; Tehran as 21, London and Moscow as 9.

Rossov

891.00/1-1246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1946—7 p. m.

232. Urtel 53, Jan. 12.⁸³ In view of statements by Soviet Emb Tehran that calm prevails in Azerbaijan, please request appropriate Soviet authorities to instruct Soviet military and diplomatic representatives in Iran to issue passes for travel in northern Iran to Arthur [Joseph] Goodwin of AP (urtel 132, Jan. 29⁸³) and such other ac-

⁸¹ Not printed.

⁸² No. 18, February 6, not printed.

⁸³ This telegram came from Tehran.

credited American correspondents who may wish to visit Azerbaijan for purpose of reporting to newspapers in this country.⁸⁴

Sent to Moscow, repeated to Tehran.

BYRNES

761.91/2-846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, February 8, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received February 9—10: 11 a. m.]

177. Qavam told me yesterday he doubts that Soviets intend to evacuate Iran by March 2. He said, however, that he hoped to arrange withdrawal as result of his projected conversations in Moscow⁸⁵ where he thinks he can create more friendly atmosphere.

He has evidently decided definitely to go himself to Moscow but has not settled exact time of departure or selected man to accompany him. He remarked this would have to wait until after formation of his Cabinet which he expects to complete within week.

I mentioned that certain quarters seemed to feel it unwise for him to make trip personally, to which he replied that he also had heard this said and believed that such remarks were intended to discredit him and weaken his position. He was emphatic in defending his decision to go.

In reply to my question Qavam said he still intended to send mission to Azerbaijan and that he planned to dispatch it at same time he himself leaves for Russia.

Prime Minister spoke with strong indignation of Reuters' report of his asserted decision to make sweeping concessions to Azerbaijanians and Russians. (My telegram 172 February 8)⁸⁶ When I saw him he had just held press conference at which he had flatly denied story. In discussing it with me, Qavam expressed conviction report originated with Seyid Zia ed-Din (his bitter enemy) and was designed first to discredit him with British and second by forcing him

⁸⁴ According to Moscow's telegram 442, February 14, such a request was made in a letter to the Soviet Foreign Office (811.91291/2-1446). In telegram 240, February 26, 1946, 10 a. m., from Tehran, the Department was informed that the Soviet Consul had instructions to issue no permits to foreign correspondents to visit northern Iran since they would write "silly" stories on the situation there (811.91291/2-2646).

⁸⁵ In telegram 154, February 4, 1 p. m., Ambassador Murray reported that Prime Minister Qavam had informed the Soviet Government of his plan to send a mission to Moscow and that the Soviet Government had replied that it would be delighted to receive the mission and hoped that the Prime Minister would head the mission (761.92/2-446).

⁸⁶ Not printed.

to deny any intention of making concessions to alienate Russians before conversations with them could begin. He was especially indignant with Reuters for publishing story without making any effort to check with him first.

To Dept as 177, repeated Moscow 43, London 31.

MURRAY

891.00/2-1146 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TABRIZ, February 11, 1946—noon.
[Received February 13—12: 13 a. m.]

20. Peshavari's consistent policy up to January 26 was to display patience, caution and forbearance vigorously protesting willingness to negotiate with Tehran, while at same time encouraging intolerable economic situation.

On above date he began new tactic of inflammatory and extravagantly belligerent pronouncements in intensity and culminating in proclamation reported mytel 19, February 9,⁸⁷ announcing creation of Army and commencement of conscription, and asking religious leaders somewhat inconsistently to declare Jahat or Moslem holy war. For past 2 days frenzied demonstrations have been staged in streets vainly attempting to foment support for Army and warlike spirit. The extreme vituperation and recklessness of Peshavari's recent statements have caused serious apprehension locally.

The apparent motive behind earlier policy of restraint was to allow Democrats and Russians to propagandize a superficial justification and attitude of innocence blaming all the evils of situation on "despotic reactionary" Tehran. It was apparent, however, that this cautious policy could not be long maintained as forecast mytel 5, January 16.⁸⁸

The motive behind new policy of verbal violence would appear obviously to give Russians an excuse for remaining in occupation to prevent "bloodshed, disorder and terrors of holy war," an idea already being voiced locally by known Russian sympathizers.

The schematic pattern appears skillful and clear, phase 1 providing propagandistic justification allowing Russians openly to render moral support and assistance to Democrat regime, and phase 2 providing excuse for practical support through continued military occupation.

It is believed that at this stage any negotiations between Tehran and Azerbaijan will not be successful unless very extreme concessions are made by former.

⁸⁷ Not printed; it stated that the proclamation was made by Mr. Pishevari as "Chairman of the Democratic Party and Prime Minister of Azerbaijan" and was published in the newspaper *Azerbaijan* on February 7 (891.00/2-946).

⁸⁸ Not printed.

Although as reported mytel 12, January 30 ⁸⁹ Security Council hearings caused momentary concern to Democrat leaders, withdrawal of issue from agenda, interpreted as Soviet victory, has encouraged them to prosecute with even greater vigor their increasingly belligerent policies.

Similar interpretation of withdrawal of issue was made by general public. Nevertheless, lack of execution of announced internal reforms and increasingly desperate economic conditions with unemployment widespread have produced cautious but almost unanimous opposition to every aspect of Democrat regime, earlier tentative support of internal program having been entirely withdrawn.

Only support of regime is from own active members estimated at not over five percent of population excluding those under duress. But disagreement over extremist terrorism, economic situation and Kurdish problem has even shaken internal organization of [Govt] and party directorate to the reported annoyance of Soviet mentors. Also fidayis ⁹⁰ have been deserting for lack of pay and restraint on looting.

Peshavari's fervent assertions that people support conscription and new national army are absolutely false. Opposition is almost unanimous and many of military age have gone into hiding, leaving draft quotas unfilled. Police have commenced summary impressment of any fit young males seen walking on streets.

• If Soviets withdrew, the Army and entire Democrat regime would undoubtedly crumble instantly of own accord. • But so long as Soviets remain and hope for help from outside is lacking, this opposition cannot be expected to have serious result, for though overt terrorist tactics have been played down since mid-January the general fear of Russians persists as strongly as ever.

Open contact between Soviet and local officials is limited to social and cultural affairs, but it is apparent to all observers that clandestine contact is continuous with local Soviet Consulate General and with all-powerful Soviet town commandants in interior.

There is no sign of Soviet military withdrawal. On contrary, they are reported letting 6-month contracts for local supplies and small groups of reinforcements are reliably reported continually arriving from Soviet frontier. Attention is also drawn to fact that in recent interviews (mytel 15, Feb 4) Peshavari virtually admitted remain in occupation. At same time his vehement insistence that on decision of Security Council depended future his regime, almost amounted to flagrant admission of Soviet intervention.

⁸⁹ Not printed.

⁹⁰ Civilian armed volunteers of the Pischevari regime.

Although independence of Azerbaijan has not been proclaimed in so many words, it is believed recent words and actions may be accepted as tantamount thereto. Further secessionist indications are that wearing of imperial insignia and display of Shah's portrait have recently been forbidden.

Sent Dept as 20; Tehran as 27; Moscow and London as 13.

[Rossow]

761.91/2-2246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1946—4 p. m.

321. Top Secret for Kennan. In view of the Iranian-Soviet negotiations which are taking place in Moscow,⁹¹ we feel it is important that you should have a clear exposition of the position adopted by the US Representative on the Security Council and the considerations which led to the adoption of that position. The following summary is therefore for your information and such use as you may deem advisable in any conversations you have with the Iranian Prime Minister during his stay in Moscow. It is of course obvious in view of the position which the US Government has adopted before and during the presentation of this case to the Council, that we do not wish to give any impression that we are uninterested in the outcome of the negotiations or that we would view with favor any arrangement which might impair the independence and integrity of Iran. Conversely you will, of course, understand that under no circumstances should any impression be conveyed to him that the US is seeking to influence the course of the negotiations or to encourage the Iranian delegation to adopt an unreasonable attitude.

Begin Summary. The Iranian case as originally presented before the Council was in essence a charge of interference in internal Iranian affairs and of preventing the exercise of Iranian sovereignty on Iranian territory in violation of the tripartite pact of 1942. Had the case been pressed before the Council in the original form presented, the US Representative would have supported Council action. However, the resignation of Hakimi whose Government presented the original case and the appointment of Qavam on the eve of the hearings altered the basis of the Iranian case. Since Qavam had publicly announced on assuming office that he intended to seek bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Government and the Soviet Government was urging that the matter be so dealt with, the Council had no clear grounds for

⁹¹ The Iranian mission headed by Prime Minister Qavam left Tehran by Soviet plane for Moscow on February 18.

taking direct jurisdiction over the matter. The US Representative, however, considered it of great importance to make it plain that while accepting the willingness of both parties to negotiate, the question having been brought before the Council should remain its continuing concern pending settlement. (The US Representative would have preferred that the question be left formally on the "continuing agenda" and so proposed.) When this suggestion was not supported by other members of the Council, Mr. Stettinius withdrew his proposal but on the express understanding that the matter would remain the continuing concern of the Council until it was settled in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter. (In view of the wording of the resolution, which it is assumed you have, and the statements of other members of the Council particularly the US and British, it is clear that ample opportunity is afforded to the Iranian Government to return the question to the Council either on its own initiative or through a third party in the event that the negotiations take a turn which the Iranian Government regards as threatening the integrity of Iran. This Government has publicly made clear its expectation that the results of the present negotiations agreed to by the Council will be in full conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.) *End Summary.*

In view of our position in this matter, it is of course extremely desirable that we be kept currently informed of the course of negotiations in Moscow, and in your discretion you may express to Qavam the hope of this Government that he will keep you advised.

BYRNES

761.91/3-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 2, 1946.

[Received March 2—11:34 a. m.]

610. Press March 2 carries despatch "Soviet Troops in Iran". Full translation follows:

On February 25 at time of conversation with Iran Premier Qavam, he was informed of decision of Soviet Government that on March 2 withdrawal will begin of portion of Soviet's troops from Iranian districts that are relatively more peaceful, that is, from districts of Meshed, Shahrud and Samnan located in eastern part of Iran. As regards Soviet troops in other districts of Iran they will remain in Iran pending examination of situation.

Sent Dept. as 610, repeated Tehran as 35, London as 109, and USPolAd and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

861.24591/3-346 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)*⁹²

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

165. For the Ambassador. Iranian Ambassador told Department evening March 2 that he would appreciate it if we would register immediate protest to Soviet Government for its failure to withdraw troops from Iran on March 2 in accordance with treaty obligations. He said that he was acting without instructions but was sure, from his knowledge of basic policies of Iran, that the Shah and his Government would approve his suggestion and that he had already telegraphed the Shah and his Government on the subject.

We told him that we had as yet no report to the effect that the Shah or any responsible member of the Government had made it clear that Soviet decision to retain troops beyond March 2 had been taken without the approval or consent of the Iranian Government. Any representations which this Government might make, therefore, in the circumstances might be lacking in effectiveness, since they could be based only upon an assumption, not upon definite knowledge, that retention of Soviet forces was without the consent of the Iranian Government.⁹³

British Embassy has submitted to Department⁹⁴ draft of a note of protest which British Government is proposing to present to the Soviet Government. This protest is based upon Soviet violation of the Tripartite Treaty to which Great Britain is a party. It seems to us that the only basis on which we could make a protest would be the violation by the Soviet Union of the territorial integrity of Iran. If Iranian Government has assented to retention of Soviet troops in Iranian territory it would be difficult for us to substantiate a charge of this nature, unless we were in possession of strong evidence of duress.

BYRNES

⁹² This telegram was repeated to Moscow as No. 366 and to London as No. 1951.

⁹³ In a conversation with the Secretary of State on March 4, the Iranian Ambassador made a further request for U.S. representations to the Soviet Union concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. The Secretary said that he was interested in knowing the attitude of the Iranian Government in this matter and he hoped the Ambassador would communicate with him when he received a message (761.91/3-446).

⁹⁴ On March 2.

761.91/3-446 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, March 4, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

[Received March 4—4: 40 p. m.]

642. ReEmb's 532, February 25 and 546, February 26.⁹⁵ Having returned to my desk today after illness of nearly 2 weeks, I called this afternoon on Iranian PriMin Qavam. He appeared very depressed; said that he had been able to reach no understanding at all with Russians;⁹⁶ that he was planning to leave for Tehran tomorrow, and that he was seeing Stalin for last time tonight.

Stalin, he observed incidentally and with some sadness, was very rough.

He inquired whether we were making a *démarche* to Soviet Government similar to that of British with respect to Soviet troops remaining in Iran after March 2. I told him this question had been raised in Washington by his Ambassador and explained why our Government was not in position to make such *démarche* following closely in this explanation the lines of Dept's 366, March 3.⁹⁷ He then informed me that he had himself entered protest with Soviet Government over failure to remove troops. I inquired the terms in which this protest had been made and he went out to another room to fetch a copy of the document. When he returned, he explained he had just learned that the note had actually not been delivered because the official designated to deliver it could not be received at Narkomindel⁹⁸ until 6 o'clock this afternoon Moscow time. Nevertheless, he showed me a copy of the communication which he stated would be delivered. When entering Narkomindel at 6:15 this evening, I saw Iranian Counselor coming out so I assume note was actually delivered. Communication referred to *Izvestiya* report about troops remaining in Iran, (from which I gather that the Iranian Government had had no direct communication apprising them of Soviet decision) stated that this was flatly

⁹⁵ Neither printed.

⁹⁶ In telegram 622, March 2, 1946, noon. Mr. Kennan reported information from a source he thought reliable that the "Russians have been putting tremendous pressure on Persian Prime Minister Qavam. They have advanced three initial demands, first that Persians recognize autonomy of area now in insurgent hands, second that they grant oil concessions requested by Russians in '44 and third that they agree to continued presence of Soviet troops in northern Persia." The third demand might be retracted if their demand for oil concessions were granted. (761.91/3-246)

⁹⁷ See footnote 92, p. 336.

⁹⁸ People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

contradictory to terms of 1942 treaty, registered a categoric protest against this, and requested Soviet Government to withdraw troops at once. I told him I would inform my Government this step was being taken. He said he would inform Tehran telegraphically this evening along this same line.

He said that he had already raised with Russians in oral conversation this question of troops remaining and had asked on what ground they could justify this. They replied that Persian delegate at Paris Peace Conference in 1919 had raised question of cession to Persia of large portions of Russian territory and that Persian delegate had later and quite recently occupied a high position in Tehran Government. Russians could therefore not feel secure against Iranian plans of aggression and for this reason had to keep troops there.

He then inquired whether I thought they could count on our Government's support if they failed to reach an agreement with Russians. I told him that I could only say that my Government took highly serious view of its obligations as a member of UNO and that if this question were returned to Security Council either by Iran or by third party, I was sure my Government would do everything in its power to see that questions were solved in conformity with principles and purposes of UNO Charter. I added that as far as retention of Soviet troops was concerned, I found it hard to conceive that Soviet reference to statements made at Versailles Peace Conference would be considered in UNO as constituting very weighty grounds for maintenance of Soviet troops in Iran in violation of treaty obligations.

In leaving, I expressed to PriMin the hope that perhaps in his final interview with Stalin there might still be some unexpected turn for the better and asked him to keep me informed if by any chance he did not carry out his plan of leaving in the morning.

British Chargé who called on Qavam this morning told me Qavam had given him following version of course of talks. He, Qavam, had requested Russian assistance in dealing with situation which had arisen in northern Iran. Russians had flatly declined to give such assistance. [They had revived demand for oil concessions to which he had simply replied that he was unable to discuss this question in view of existing Iranian law forbidding such questions to be discussed with any country having troops on Iranian territory. They had also asked for recognition of autonomy of local regime in northern Iran and he had explained that he also had no authority to discuss this question.] With this, discussions had come to an impasse and he saw no further reason for remaining here.

Although both my British colleague and I have heretofore been skeptical as to ability of Qavam to stand Russian pressure, I must

say that I now have impression that Qavam came here so closely restricted by his own Government in what he could do that it was impossible for him to reach any agreement with Russians except in open defiance of his own Government which he was unwilling to contemplate.

Sent Dept 642; repeated Tehran Secret for Chief of Mission 39.

KENNAN

861.24591/3-546

The Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Secretary of State

No. 2936

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1946.

SIR: In the course of my conversation with Your Excellency, yesterday morning,⁹⁹ I had the honour to request that the United States Government, which is a signatory of the Declaration of Teheran and of the United Nations Charter, be good enough to protest in Moscow against the breach of faith of the Soviet Government in failing to withdraw their forces from the whole of the North of Iran by the second of March 1946,—the ultimate date fixed by the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942.

Your Excellency observed that before taking action, the State Department would need to be informed of the attitude of the Prime Minister of Iran, who is at present negotiating in Moscow, in the matter of the Soviet default.

As I had surmised, it is now officially confirmed by a cable received from our Prime Minister by my colleague in London and communicated to me this morning, that Mr. Ahmad Qavam, Premier of Iran, protested in writing against the failure of the Soviet Government to live up to its solemn pledge, and would welcome and appreciate American intervention at this critical juncture.

It would, therefore, appear that there is no longer any obstacle to prevent Your Excellency from issuing the necessary instructions to your Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow.

I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that in accordance with information received from well-informed quarters the Soviet Government are making the evacuation of Iran depend upon the acceptance by the Persian Government of certain very important demands whereas the withdrawal of foreign allied forces at the end of the war has always been considered unconditional.

May I venture to ask Your Excellency to use the great influence of the American Government to obtain the unconditional evacuation of Iran by the Soviet forces?

Please accept [etc.]

HUSSEIN ALA

⁹⁹ See footnote 93, p. 336.

761.91/3-546 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TABRIZ, March 5, 1946—1 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

[Received March 6—6:25 a. m.]

40. Exceptionally heavy Soviet troop movements have been going on since yesterday as follows: On night March 3—450 Soviet trucks heavily laden with supplies, mainly ammunition, departed Tabriz toward Tehran. Last night 20 tanks with 100 trucks departed in same direction and had reached Bostanabad early this morning.

Two regiments of cavalry with two attached batteries of artillery, equipped for full field operations, departed Tabriz this morning toward Marand. It is not definitely known whether they will go on to Zhulfa or turn off toward Khoi, Rezaieh and Maku. However very heavy forage shipments made during past week by Soviets from Tabriz particularly to Rezaieh would seem to indicate latter direction of march. It is further reported from Mahabad that Kurds are preparing to assert claim to Turkish Kurdistan and plan to commence military operations to that end soon.

Another strong force of Soviet cavalry was observed 2 days ago marching southward through Girgan with Iraq frontier as reported destination. In apparent conjunction with this movement 9 Soviet tanks left last night in direction of Maragheh.

There remain in Tabriz at least 2 regiments of cavalry and some artillery but no known armored elements. During past 3 nights several large truck convoys loaded with troops have been observed arriving from direction of Soviet frontier.

Sent Department 40, Tehran 55; Moscow 32; London 20; Ankara 7; Baghdad 5.

Rossow

861.24591/3-546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

385. Please deliver immediately the following note to Mr. Molotov:

"I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I have been instructed by my Government to deliver to the Government of the Soviet Union the following message:

The Government of the United States has been informed that the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to retain Soviet troops in Iran after March 2, 1946, that this decision was taken without the consent of the Iranian Government, and that Soviet troops continue to remain on Iranian territory in spite of the protests of the Iranian Government.

It will be recalled that in reply to a note addressed on November 24, 1945 by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union¹ suggesting the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran, the Soviet Government on November 29 stated that the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran was governed by the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of January 29, 1942. The Government of the United States understood from this statement that it was the intention of the Government of the Soviet Union that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran not later than March 2, 1946, six months after the date of the signing of the instrument of surrender with Japan on September 2, 1945. This understanding was based upon Article Five of the Tripartite Treaty referred to above which states:

'The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier.'

So far as the Government of the United States is aware, this commitment was not questioned at the recent meeting of the Security Council in London which agreed that the Soviet Union and Iran should seek a solution of their differences by direct negotiation.

The decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty has created a situation with regard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the Declaration Regarding Iran dated December 1, 1943, can not remain indifferent. That Declaration announced to the world that the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom were 'at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran'. In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the maintenance of troops in Iranian territory by any one of the three signatories to that Declaration, without the consent and against the wishes of the Government of Iran, is contrary to the assurances contained in that Declaration. Furthermore it was generally accepted during the various discussions which took place at the meeting of the Security Council in London that the retention by a member of the United Nations of its troops in the territory of a country which is also a member of the United Nations, without the consent of the Government of that country, is not in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and that the withdrawal of such troops should not be made contingent upon other issues.

The Government of the United States, in the spirit of the friendly association which developed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the successful effort against the common enemy and as a fellow member of the United Nations, expresses the earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet Union will do its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran, to promote the international confidence which is necessary for peaceful progress among the peoples of all nations.

¹ See telegram 2386, November 23, 1945, to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 448.

The Government of the United States trusts that the Government of the Soviet Union, no less than itself, appreciates the heavy responsibility resting upon the great powers under the Charter to observe their obligations and to respect the sovereign rights of other states.

The Government of the United States requests that it be promptly advised of the decision of the Government of the Soviet Union which it hopes will be in accord with the views herein expressed."²

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London and Tehran.

BYRNES

861.24591/3-646 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
URGENT

Moscow, March 6, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received March 6—10:30 a. m.]

682. Text of note set forth in Dept's 385, March 5 concerning failure Soviet Govt to withdraw troops from Iran has been transmitted urgently to Molotov this morning.

Sent Dept as 682 repeated Tehran as 45 and London as 124.

KENNAN

861.24591/3-646 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

TABRIZ, March 6, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received March 8—10:20 a. m.]

41. Soviet troop reinforcements continue arriving night and day by truck and rail from Soviet frontier, and are being constantly re-deployed from here. Also yesterday 46 new medium tanks arrived from Soviet Union by rail.

General Bagramian, Soviet Army Commander with spectacular combat record, has arrived and taken command of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, superseding Lieut. General Glinsky who is only Corps Commander and has no extensive combat experience.

More tanks and truck loads of supplies and troops, mainly infantry and dismounted cavalry, have been departing Tehranward since yesterday (mytel 40, March 5) and Tabriz-Tehran road has been closed indefinitely to non-military traffic because of these movements. Truck loads of Azerbaijan Army troops are also reported departing in same direction in relatively large numbers.

Additional Soviet troops including strong force of motorized infantry have departed southward towards Mahabad and Iraq frontier.

² In telegrams 397 to Moscow, 173 to Tehran, and 2053 to London, respectively, the Department on March 6 authorized the conveying of the substance of the United States note to Prime Minister Qavam at Moscow, and to appropriate Iranian and British officials (861.24591/3-646).

Previously reliable confidential informant states he was told yesterday by high officer that the two cavalry regiments which left yesterday toward [Mahabad?] and were to be joined by third regiment already in the field and that they were proceeding to Bazorgan on Turco Iran frontier [garble] and Maku. This point governs main accessible frontier to Turkey. [Garble] said this cavalry was not from Tabriz occupation force but had been brought to Tabriz from Russia during past weeks and fitted out here.

Report from recent travellers indicate that Soviet troops already stationed in frontier region have been heavily reinforced in both troops and equipment. It is also reported that large numbers of Kurd Army troops are being moved northward by truck from Mahabad and Rezaieh region to points on Turk frontier.

All Soviet troops departing from here are equipped for combat and there seems noticeable lack in their supply trains of garrison types of equipment. All observations and reports indicate inescapably that Soviets are preparing for major military operations.

Postscript: During encoding a report has come in that another shipment of tanks had arrived from Soviet Union. General Bagramian is said to be specialist in tank warfare.

Sent Dept 41; Tehran 56; Moscow 33; London 21; Ankara 8; Baghdad 6.

Rossov

861.24591/3-646 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, March 6, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received March 6—4: 33 p. m.]

687. In accordance with Dept's 397, March 6,³ I called on Qavam again this evening and conveyed to him substance of note to Molotov sent in pursuance to Dept's 385, March 5. Since he does not understand English, I translated appropriate passages of note orally into French for him. He made no comments but nodded approvingly from time to time.

He confirmed to me that he expects to leave tomorrow morning and to stop over one night at Baku. Journey to Tehran, he explained, was too tiring to make in one day.

He showed me text of final communiqué which Russians had proposed to him. General sense was that they had discussed in amicable and agreeable atmosphere questions of interest to the two Governments and that talks would be continued in Tehran between Iranian Government and new Soviet Ambassador to Iran. He said that he

³ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 342.

had declined to accept this text and had altered portion to read that in connection with arrival of new Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, the two Governments would continue their efforts to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions of the various questions of interest to them. [I?] only had a glimpse of Russian text on that document so this is not a verbatim version. What significance of this change is, I cannot say. Qavam's version appears, however, to leave much wider leeway for Iran Government in further talks in Tehran.

He said dinner last night had been cordial with many toasts and speeches. As Dept knows, this means in Russian circumstances—exactly nothing. But fact that he stayed over and that dinner was given at all is itself significant.

On occasion of both my visits to him, he showed interest in status of Security Council at present moment, particularly as to whether it was in permanent session and where. I told him it was my understanding that it was in permanent session although I was not sure what would be considered its seat at this moment.

Sent Dept 687, repeated Tehran as 46.

KENNAN

861.24591/3-746 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

TABRIZ, March 7, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received March 8—6:06 a. m.]

42. Mytel 41, March 6. I cannot overstress the seriousness and magnitude of current Soviet troop movements here. This is no ordinary reshuffling of troops but a full scale combat deployment.

Last night another force consisting of 20 medium tanks, 20 armored cars and 40 truck loads of infantry departed Tehranward, and another force of 12 tanks and an undetermined quantity of motorized infantry departed later south toward Mahabad. These movements were in addition to continued piecemeal movements in both directions and there is reason to believe considerable numbers of troops are being moved by devious routes avoiding points where they could be observed.

Streets are filled with armored force personnel far outnumbering the cavalry which was the main arm here. More trucks and armored vehicles are in evidence than horses.

New tanks are still continually arriving by rail. This morning I observed the unloading of 12 new mediums. At same time, ammunition, both artillery and small arms, was being unloaded and installed directly into the tanks. About 30 new trucks were also in UK loading zone.

Soviets have reopened [garble] formerly abandoned ammunition dumps and are transporting large volume of stores there. Checkposts which had been used only during revolution period have been reestablished.

Soviets have refused without explanation to issue me a pass to go to Mahabad.

I expect communications to be cut at any moment.

Sent Department 42, Tehran 57, Moscow 34, London 22, Ankara 9, Baghdad 7.

Rossov

861.24591/3-646 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

182. Re Moscow's 687, Mar 6, repeated to Tehran as 46. You may inform Iranian Govt that Qavam, in conversation with Kennan in Moscow, showed interest in status of Security Council at present moment and was told that Security Council was in permanent session but that present seat of Security Council was uncertain. You may further inform Iranian Govt that Security Council in London adjourned until a time to be determined by the President of the Council. It was informally understood in London by the Security Council that its next meeting would be held in New York about March 21. However, the Council can be convened by its President at any time. The Council is accessible through de Freitas-Valle, President of the Security Council or Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations who are understood to be in London now.

You may also point out that Article 28 of the UN Charter provides as follows: "The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously."

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow.

BYRNES

861.24591/3-846 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

2108. Personal and top secret for Gallman only from the Secretary. Deptel 2053, Mar 6.⁴ You are instructed to inform Bevin in strictest

⁴ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 342.

confidence that, if a satisfactory reply to the United States note of Mar 6 is not received and if the Soviet Govt continues to retain troops in Iran against the wishes of the Iranian Govt, this Govt feels that it will have no choice but to place the matter without delay before the UN Security Council. Our action would be based on our obligations as a member of the United Nations and as a signatory of the Declaration Regarding Iran. This Govt would appreciate being informed whether the United Kingdom, as the third signatory of the Declaration Regarding Iran, desires to join the US in placing the Iranian question before the Security Council.⁵

Sent to London. Repeated to Tehran, no. 422, Personal and Top Secret for Murray⁶ from the Secretary, and to Moscow, no. 184, Personal and Top Secret for Kennan from the Secretary.

BYRNES

Editorial Note

At the request of an officer of the Historical Office, Department of State, a memorandum entitled "Events Relative to the Azarbaijan Issue—March 1946" was prepared on August 16, 1965, by Edwin M. Wright of the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, who in 1946 was Special Assistant to Mr. Henderson. The memorandum stated in part:

"On the morning of March 6, 1946, a telegram came in from Rossow [No. 40, page 340] stating that unusually heavy troop movements of Soviet forces in Azarbaijan were taking place. Rossow had obtained

⁵ Telegram 3004, March 14, 6 p. m., from London, reported that the British Foreign Office was preparing a reply to the Department's query which "intended to mention the possible desirability of Iran's bringing its own case before Security Council so as to avoid raising question of right of British and ourselves to vote in event we took joint initiative and also to make reference to the different positions in which British and ourselves would approach matter in view of their being parties to Anglo-Russian-Iranian treaty, whereas we would presumably emphasize our special interest in fulfillment of Tehran Declaration." (861.24591/3-1446)

⁶ In telegram 188, March 8, 5 p. m., the Department directed Ambassador Murray to inform the Shah of the substance of telegram 2108 to London. It then stated: "In your conversation with the Shah please stress the seriousness with which this Govt regards the assurances given by the late President Roosevelt when he signed the Declaration Regarding Iran.

"You may use your discretion regarding the extent to which you discuss this matter with Qavam and other appropriate Govt officials." (861.24591/3-846)

In telegram 308, March 10, 5 p. m., Ambassador Murray replied: "I delivered Dept's message to Shah this morning just before arrival of Qavam telling His Majesty that I hoped this information would strengthen his hand in dealing with Prime Minister if latter should prove to be so discouraged or depressed as to be in danger of weakening his attitude toward USSR. I emphasized strongly vital importance of continued firmness on part of Iran Govt in refusing to agree to presence Soviet troops in Iran. He likewise urged me to emphasize it to Prime Minister, which I shall do when I see Qavam late this afternoon." (861.-24591/3-1046)

the assistance of several merchants in various parts of Azarbaijan, through their Tabriz headquarters, to report any unusual Soviet activities. This telegram mentioned Bostanabad (found on no maps) and a series of other obscure places. Mr. Henderson asked me to prepare a large blown-up map of Azarbaijan which would indicate the movement of Soviet forces taking place. It was expected new information might confirm and add to this telegram by the 7th. But nothing came in the next morning. (Actually, Rossow had sent a second, more detailed telegram on the 6th, but it arrived the morning of the 8th.) [No. 41, page 342.] About 4:30 p. m. on the 7th, Mr. Henderson stated that he thought Mr. Byrnes ought to see the map as it was and he called the Secretary's office for an appointment. Mr. Minor and I were told to report at 6:00 p. m., because Mr. Henderson had an appointment which he could not change. So Mr. Minor and I took the map up at 6:00 p. m. to Mr. Byrnes' office. Once the Secretary had familiarized himself with the map, we pointed out the size and direction of each thrust. Mr. Byrnes asked the significance of each arrow and noted that they aimed at the Turkish border, the Iraqi border, a third was headed due south (possibly indicating a thrust toward the oilfields), and a drive toward the capital at Tehran.

"Mr. Byrnes, having gone over the telegram and verified the place names with the map, remarked that it now seemed clear the USSR was adding military invasion to political subversion in Iran, and, beating one fist into the other hand, he dismissed us with the remark: 'Now we'll give it to them with both barrels.' He told us to be ready to present it at a meeting the next morning, March 8th.

"On the morning of March 8th, two more detailed telegrams came in [Nos. 41 and 42 from Tabriz, pages 342 and 344]. Mr. Minor and I added their information on the map showing that the USSR was moving fast toward their objectives. Mr. Henderson then took Mr. Minor and myself to a meeting in which Dean Acheson, Alger Hiss, Ben Cohen, Charles Bohlen, and possibly others, were present. It was near noon. We explained the map and the three attached telegrams.

"There was considerable discussion of the telegram of March 5th [No. 385 to Moscow, page 340] and the fact that the USSR seemed to ignore it completely. All agreed that these Soviet moves were clear violations of every agreement mentioned in the telegram of March 5th. Only one conclusion could be drawn—the USSR seemed to be determined to face Iran and the rest of the world with a *fait accompli*. How strongly could the US react? We had no information from the U.K. as yet. Mr. Acheson stated that we ought to let the USSR *know that we were aware of its moves*, but 'leave a graceful way out' if it desired to avoid a showdown. With this in mind, Mr. Hiss had scribbled a draft statement and passed it to Mr. Henderson. Mr. Minor

and I left the meeting at this point, but later in the afternoon, a second telegram was sent to Moscow (Niact #425 [*infra*])." (File No. Pol 23-7-Iran)

861.24591/3-846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

425. For Kennan. Please deliver following message to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:⁷

"The Govt of the US has the honor to inform the Govt of the Soviet Union that it is receiving reports to the effect that there are considerable movements of Soviet combat forces and materials of war from the direction of the Soviet frontier towards Tabriz and outward from Tabriz in the direction of Tehran, Mahabad and various points in Northwestern Iran.

The Govt of the US desires to learn whether the Soviet Govt, instead of withdrawing Soviet troops from Iran as urged in the Embassy's note of Mar 6, is bringing additional forces into Iran. In case Soviet forces in Iran are being increased, this Govt would welcome information at once regarding the purposes therefor."

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London and Tehran, Ankara and Baghdad.⁸

BYRNES

Editorial Note

The transcript of President Truman's press and radio conference of April 24, 1952, states that "in 1945 he had to send an ultimatum to the head of the Soviet Union to get out of Persia. The President said that they got out because we were in a position to meet a situation of that kind." The announcement led to a series of questions and answers at the conference during which the President reiterated his statement.

Later the same day, a White House spokesman made an oral statement to the press which explained that "the President was using the term ultimatum in a non-technical layman sense. He said that the President was referring to United States leadership in the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council and through diplomatic channels, in the Spring of 1946, which was the major factor in bringing about Soviet withdrawal from Iran."

No documentation on the sending of an ultimatum to the Soviet Union has been found in the Department files or in the files of the

⁷ Message delivered to the Foreign Office on March 9.

⁸ As telegrams 2117, 187, 201, and 103, respectively.

Department of Defense, nor have several of the highest officers of the Department in 1946 been able to affirm the sending of an ultimatum.

Expressions of President Truman's views on this matter are published in his *Memoirs*, volume II, pages 94-95 (1956) and in *Truman Speaks*, page 71 (1960).

861.24591/3-846 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 8, 1946.

[Received March 8—11:46 a. m.]

717. Press March 8 reports Qavam was seen off Mar 7 by Molotov and others and upon departing expressed "complete confidence that in very near future all misunderstandings will be resolved." Soviet-Iranian communiqué referred to his series of conversations with Stalin and Molotov and concluded "In negotiations held during these conversations and conducted in atmosphere of friendship questions were discussed of interest to both parties. Both Govts will exert all efforts so that with appointment of new Sov Amb to Iran favorable conditions will be created for further strengthening of friendly relations between both countries."⁹

Sent Dept 717; repeated Tehran 49 and Frankfurt.

KENNAN

861.24591/3-1146

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)

[WASHINGTON,] March 11, 1946.

Dr. Daftary¹⁰ said that while the Iranian Ambassador was proceeding on the assumption that Prime Minister Qavam will remain entirely steadfast in prosecuting the Iranian case before the Security Council, he wished to know whether the United States would be willing to initiate an inquiry in the Council in case Qavam for any reason

⁹ In telegram 742, March 9, 9 p. m., from Moscow, the Chargé stated: "For your interest to note that Soviet authorities have not as yet seen fit to apprise their public in any way of nature and seriousness of situation which has currently arisen with respect to Iran. Laconic announcement published March 2 on retention of Soviet troops in certain areas of Iran 'pending clarification of situation' made no reference whatsoever to any international agreement in light of which this date was significant. Thus average Soviet citizen is utterly unaware of political crisis created by this action on part of his Government. Fact that British evacuated all their troops by March 2 was, of course, not reported. Nor have any of diplomatic exchanges on this subject been mentioned by Soviet press or radio." (861.24591/3-946)

¹⁰ A. A. Daftary, Counselor of the Iranian Embassy.

felt unable to instruct his own representatives to do so. Dr. Daftary recalled that at the last meeting of the Council, a resolution was passed requesting USSR and Iran to report back to the Council the result of their further negotiations. The Iranian Ambassador is anxious that some one at the next meeting of the Council should call for this report. Since Iran is not a member of the Council, it might be difficult for Iran either to report or to call for a report, even assuming that Qavam remains anxious to press the case.

I assured Dr. Daftary that his request would be given due consideration in the Department.

861.24591/3-1146: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 11, 1946—4 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

315. I left Shah's Palace yesterday in time to greet Qavam on his arrival at airport 12:45 a. m. He was given enthusiastic welcome by huge crowd and went at once to Palace where he gave Shah brief report. At 5 p. m. he received me at his home. Following is substance of conversation which lasted 2½ hours and which he asked be kept entirely confidential:

1. Before questioning him about Moscow conversations I gave him copy of our note of March 6 to Soviet Government¹¹ which he had not previously seen and had its substance translated to him. I also thought it desirable and necessary to use discretion you had given me in your telegram 188, March 8¹² to inform him of intention of my Government, in case Soviet Government continues to retain troops in Iran contrary to wishes of Iran, to parallel action of Iranian Government by placing matter immediately before Security Council. (Shah had not told him of this). As I had previously done with Shah (my telegram 308, March 10¹²) I hammered at point that it was of most extreme importance that there should be no sign of weakening or haziness with respect to Iran's determination to act on her own behalf in this connection. I gave him no indication that US Government might act on own initiative if Iran failed to act.

Prime Minister then said that before reciting course of Moscow talks he wished to ask what America and Britain could or would do to assist Iran in case Soviet Government ignored our present protests and proceeded to do as it wished here. I replied it was impossible to give precise answer to such question at this moment; however, I believed he was aware of important pronouncements you had recently

¹¹ See Department's telegram 385, March 5, 7 p. m., to Moscow, p. 340.

¹² Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 346.

made in your address before Overseas Press Club;¹³ I had stressed to Shah yesterday the seriousness with which my Government regards assurances given by President Roosevelt when he signed Declaration Regarding Iran; and finally the step contemplated by my Government on behalf of Iran at next meeting of SC was of incalculable importance and advantage to Iran in present crisis.

2. Qavam said he had raised three points in Moscow: (a) He had tried obtain Soviet promise to withdraw troops before March 2; (b) He had asked for Soviet moral support in settling Azerbaijan difficulties; (c) He had requested appointment of new Russian Ambassador to Iran (which has been done).

With regard point *a*, Stalin at first advanced 1921 Irano-Soviet treaty as justification for retaining troops, which Qavam had countered by citing text and accompanying notes to show clearly treaty was inapplicable and by recalling that he himself had been in office at time treaty signed and knew from personal knowledge what was intended. Soviets had then raised "hostile attitude" of Iranian delegation at Paris Conference, to which Qavam replied that head of delegation had been Moshavar-ol-Mamalek (Ali Gholi Kahn Ansari¹⁴) who had later negotiated and signed 1921 treaty to which Soviets so often pointed with pride. Russians ultimately fell back on bald and unexplained statement that their "interests" required retention of troops in Iran.

On point *b* Stalin had said Azerbaijan was internal question for Iran. Why should Iranian Government be so disturbed, since Azerbaijanis were asking only autonomy, not independence? In any case, USSR could do nothing because "Soviet honor was involved". This statement was not explained.

Qavam answered that constitution did not allow autonomy. If Azerbaijan were autonomous other provinces would follow and central government would lose all control. Iran [apparent omission] Molotov suggested that Iranian Government recognize existing Azerbaijan regime minus Minister of War and Minister Foreign Affairs. Qavam indicated he was willing to compromise on Azerbaijan but could go only so far as provincial councils law allowed and could not possibly accept present arrangement.

3. Both Stalin and Molotov separately had raised question of oil concession to Russia. Molotov had insisted upon discrimination shown in making grant to Britain and refusing anything to USSR. Qavam had refused to discuss question because of Majlis law prohibiting oil negotiations with foreign countries. He had pointed out that present

¹³ On February 28; for text of address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 10, 1946, p. 355.

¹⁴ Persian Foreign Minister. The Peace Conference, meeting in 1919, refused to seat the Persian delegation.

Majlis would never repeal law and only hope of reopening question lay in election of new Majlis which was impossible so long as Russian troops remained in Iran. Molotov then asserted that Bayat, when Prime Minister,¹⁵ had offered to form Russo-Iranian company, 51% Russian and 49% Iranian, to develop north Iran oil. USSR had rejected this but was now willing to accept it. Molotov embodied this proposal in a written note to Qavam which also contained suggestion that Iranian Government should recognize existing Azerbaijan regime. When Qavam reiterated his inability to do anything contrary to constitution or law, Molotov withdrew offer to accept asserted Bayat proposal and said Soviet Government would insist on full oil concession.

I gathered this request for oil grant was only affirmative demand made by [Soviets?] during course of conversations.

4. In strictest confidence and without explaining context out of which remark arose, Qavam told me that at one point Stalin and Molotov had burst out with statement that, "We don't care what US and Britain think and we are not afraid of them." (He asked me not to report this to my Government and said he had not told Shah.)

I suspect this may have been elicited by some effort on Qavam's part to advance American and British attitude as reason for his inability to comply with Soviet wishes.

5. In one talk Stalin had stressed necessity for social reforms in Iran saying that if England had made reforms in America she would not have lost us and if she did not make reforms in India she would lose India. Even in England itself reforms were essential. Qavam had replied he wished to make reforms but this would be possible only if Iran were left alone.

6. At end of talks Soviets had proposed text of joint communiqué including statement that "negotiations had been conducted in spirit of friendship and good understanding" and that they "would be continued in Tehran thru new Soviet Ambassador". Fearing this phraseology was intended to indicate that negotiations had ended in agreement and so prevent further recourse to UNO Qavam crossed out words "good understanding". Likewise to prevent possible assertion that negotiations were still in progress he had changed final sentence to read that two Governments would make every effort through new Ambassador to consolidate friendly relations.

7. I remarked that rumors had reached Tehran from Moscow to effect he (Qavam) might be confronted with temptations leading

¹⁵ Morteza Qoli Bayat was Iranian Prime Minister from November 1944 to April 1945.

toward disloyalty. I myself did not believe these stories and hoped his actions would give them the lie. He threw up his arms in disgust and assured me he had told me the whole truth.

8. I asked whether Russians had tried to have him substitute continued conversations with Soviet Ambassador here for renewed discussions in Security Council to which he replied that they "would have liked" to have him do that.

9. Prime Minister said that throughout he had made every effort to avoid provoking Russians. Nevertheless it appeared some of conversations had taken on very strained note.

10. At end our conversation I asked Qavam what he intended to do next. He said he wanted to send full written account to Ala and asked me to forward it through our pouch. I agreed but pointed out situation was urgent and telegraphic action seemed indicated. He appeared to acquiesce but did not make clear statement as to instructions he would give Ala nor did he say definitely that he would ask further immediate consideration by SC. However, he did say that Iran had not and would not withdraw its petition to SC.

On whole I was relieved by his straightforward account of Moscow talks and felt he was telling truth though he may have suppressed some points. His failure to commit himself clearly regarding action in regard to UNO may be suspicious but may also easily be explained by fact he had just returned from tiring trip with no time to rest before he saw me, that until our interview he had not seen our note of March 6 nor heard of action we proposed to take in SC and needed time to grasp and reflect on significance of these points and finally that he should properly consult his Cabinet before committing himself on question of this nature.

I am seeking another appointment with Prime Minister in a day or two at which time I hope to elicit something more positive.

Because Qavam's attitude did not seem entirely clear as regards UNO action I arranged audience with Shah this morning. I told His Majesty that I had no grounds for suspecting Prime Minister of weakening but would like him (Shah) to make sure Qavam understood situation and vital importance of Iranian action. I am sure Shah is completely clear on this.

His Majesty expressed grave concern over rumors of possible Soviet *Putsch* in Tehran to seize capital and gain control of Government. He pointed out that if this should happen Soviets could dictate instructions to Ala, prevent Iranian appeal to UNO and so make parallel Irano-American action impossible. He suggested that in such a case US and Britain could nevertheless act on own initiative on basis their obligations and voice true Iranian sentiments.

Shah made point that Iranian case is now far more simple and clear cut than at time of London UNO discussion since continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran after March 2 is obvious breach of treaty and makes it unnecessary to demonstrate that Soviet authorities are interfering in any other fashion. I agreed and said that in view of this strengthening of Iranian case it would be utter folly for Iran to weaken at this stage.

In connection my interview with Qavam Shah asked if I had urged on him danger to himself as well as to his country of any flirtation with proposals from Soviets to install him in high office in which he would be used, squeezed dry and tossed aside. I said I had not mentioned this but would be prepared to do so at next opportunity.

Sent Department 315; repeated Moscow 89; London 54.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-1446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 14, 1946—1 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 3:20 p. m.]

335. Qavam last night gave me his definite promise that within 2 or 3 days he would send instructions to Ala to present Iran's complaint to Security Council.

At FonOff reception this morning he said he had already ordered instructions to be drafted. Added he would tell Ala to adopt tone of moderation in his presentation in order avoid arousing unnecessary antagonism on part of Soviets.

PriMin outlined five slightly differing procedures he might follow:

1. Arrange to have SC inquire as to results of Irano-Soviet conversations on basis of understanding reached at London session. (This would have advantage from Qavam viewpoint of avoiding overt Iranian action before SC.)

2. Make direct appeal to SC and say nothing to USSR.

3. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy here that this was being done because Soviet troops continued in occupation of Iran.

4. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy that appeal would be withdrawn if Soviet troops were evacuated in 15 or 20 days.

5. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy that this was being done because Iranian constitution forbids presence foreign troops in country unless authorized by Majlis. Point out that Majlis authorization expired when Tripartite Treaty expired March 2 and that PriMin could not acquiesce in violation of constitution. He would tell Soviets this should not be considered unfriendly act since he would be merely fulfilling his legal obligation.

(Qavam told me today he intends to adopt procedure 5.)

He asked my opinion which I gave on personal basis to effect it would be best for Iran to take initiative in making appeal and that I saw no objection to procedure 5. I suggested that if procedure 4 were adopted he should make sure that case was not withdrawn from SC before Soviet troops had physically left country pointing out that Russians had already violated one promise this regard. He assented.

In course of conversation which I consider highly satisfactory I reemphasized utter importance of action by Iran to speak out for herself in defense of her rights so long as she is free to speak. Qavam agreed. I further stressed simplicity and strength of Iran's present case and advantage of having advocate of Ala's high caliber to present it. I also pointed out that in coming Council meeting Iran could act with advance assurance of US support which it had not had at London meeting.

Since we cannot be sure Iranian FonOff will give Ala adequate background information Dept may wish to give him substance of such parts of my two recent conversations with Qavam as it deems appropriate. Furthermore although I am satisfied with Qavam's assurances it is always possible that Russians will apply great pressure on him when they learn of his decision and try to persuade him to withdraw instructions. Accordingly I suggest Dept urge upon Ala importance of immediate action on his part to get matter before SC as soon as he receives his instructions. Once case is presented formally it will be easier for Qavam to resist pressure.

I opened our talk yesterday by giving PriMin copy of Dept's press release of March 12¹⁶ on our inquiry of Soviets regarding increase of troops in Iran. He was unimpressed and took line that we should not ask Russians about such matter because they would be sure to lie but rather to tell them that we knew reinforcements were arriving.

He then asked what I would do in his place if Soviet troops should occupy Tehran on ground that lives of Russian nationals were in danger. I asked whether Russians had approached him on that score. He said no. I expressed surprise saying his own FonOff had mentioned a conversation with Soviet Embassy personnel this subject. (Shah also had told me Russians had asserted their officials were in danger here.) Qavam then summoned Homayunjah¹⁷ who was inclined to play down matter but on being pressed by PriMin finally produced full memo of conversation which Qavam read with obvious surprise. Memo gave details confirming Shah's statement that Soviet Embassy here had expressed fear for safety of its personnel. In light of PriMin's evident surprise I think his question to me must

¹⁶ Department of State *Bulletin*, March 24, 1946, p. 483.

¹⁷ Mohammad Ali Homayunjah, Under Secretary of State in the Iranian Foreign Office.

have been motivated by some remark made to him in Moscow rather than by Soviet approach to FonOff here. (This strengthens my feeling he has not yet told full story of Moscow talks.)

In reply to his question, I told PriMin I felt pretext that lives of nationals in foreign country were endangered had become too obvious a device since Hitler had used it so often. In any case, I considered PriMin could not afford to allow any foreign government to assert that with all Iranian army *gendarmierie* and police at his command, he was unable to maintain order and protect foreigners in his capital. Such admission on his part would be virtual abdication of sovereignty.

I asked again about Qavam's written protest filed in Moscow. He at once produced copy which my interpreter read. It was forthright, clear and emphatic, used the word "protest" and asked immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. He has sent me copy.¹⁸ I pointed out this document would be important in SC discussion of case.

To Dept as 335; repeated Moscow 100, London 59.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-1546: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY

Moscow, March 15, 1946.

[Received March 15—10:29 a. m.]

815. Soviet press March 15 publishes Tass denial reading as follows in translation:

There has been published in American press a statement of State Department of USA that there is taking place in Iran a shifting of Soviet Military units through Tehran and [toward?] western frontier of Iran. Tass is authorized to state that this report absolutely does not correspond to reality.

Sent Department 815, repeated Tehran 62, Tabriz and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

861.24591/3-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 15, 1946—1 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

[Received 6:56 p. m.]

343. Confidential emissary from Qavam came to see British Ambassador and myself this morning with following message:

¹⁸ Translated text transmitted to Department in telegram 337, March 15, 1946, 9 p. m., from Tehran, not printed. The Prime Minister's note was dated March 3. (861.24591/3-1546)

Soviet Chargé called on Prime Minister yesterday and said Soviet Government had heard he planned to make complaint to Security Council. Chargé said this would be regarded as unfriendly and hostile act and would have unfortunate results for Iran. He therefore advised Qavam not to take any such step.

Prime Minister replied that presence foreign troops Iran after expiration Tripartite Treaty was unconstitutional and that if he failed to act he would be called to account by his people and eventually by Majlis. Further cited fact that case remains before Security Council which can ask for report on basis London decision.

Apparently because of the stout resistance shown by Qavam during their long conversation Soviet Chargé finally shifted his position slightly and pressed Prime Minister at least to refrain from taking initiative himself and to await request from Security Council for report.

(Qavam asks that no reference ever be made to this conversation with Chargé, whether in Security Council or elsewhere.)

Through his emissary Qavam asked Sir Reader and me for our advice as to his course in light of Soviet threat. Further asked what support he could expect from US and British if he took risk of bringing complaint to Security Council. Our visitor explained that Prime Minister feels his responsibility keenly and would be glad of any loophole to escape Soviet wrath while at same time protecting interests of Iran. He is therefore tempted to follow Chargé's advice and leave it to Security Council itself to raise question.

Sir Reader and I replied that we could not give official advice on matter of such gravity without consulting our Govts. Personally, however, we felt Iran's case would be gravely prejudiced if she did not herself speak out soon since Soviets would undoubtedly exert even greater pressure on Iran Govt at time of Security Council meeting to force her to keep silent and would then argue that Iran's silence indicated all was well.

In this connection our visitor (who is highly intelligent and holds high position though not member of Cabinet) suggested that Soviets would probably send new Ambassador here in very few days to hold out hopes to Qavam and persuade him to renew Moscow conversations here. Having accomplished this he would advise Qavam that any recourse to Security Council in midst of negotiations would be highly improper and unfriendly and would destroy all hope of Irano-Soviet reconciliation thus at one and same time tempting Prime Minister with hopes of salvation and bludgeoning him with threats of utter distaste [*disaster?*]. Visitor also suggested as a possible alternative line of Soviet action that, after persuading Qavam to delay appeal,

they would overthrow his Cabinet between now and March 25 and see to it that new Cabinet would be completely under their control thus eliminating all possibility of Iranian appeal to Security Council. I concur entirely in this reasoning and believe Sir Reader does too.

Although I remain convinced, as I have told Shah and Prime Minister repeatedly, that Iran's sole frail hope of salvation lies in quick appeal to Security Council, direct and ominous threat by Soviet Chargé makes immediate situation so grave that I hesitate to say anything further to Qavam without definite word from Dept as to its present position. I therefore request urgent instructions as to official reply I should give to his request for advice and his query regarding support he could expect from US if he defies Soviet warning.

Sent Dept 343, repeated Moscow 104, London 61.

MURRAY

123 Rossow, Robert : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TABRIZ, March 15, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

NIACT

[Received March 16—11:16 a. m.]

83. This morning at 10:00 I had my chauffeur drive me in consular car with American flag flying prominently over hood, down road to railroad station which is about 4 miles west of city. About 800 yards from station is road turning off toward freight unloading zone and on toward Maragheh. Soviet sentry was blocking that road. We made no attempt to turn off but continued to passenger part of station, the sentry making no gesture whatsoever to stop car. However, after we turned around and started back to town sentry came out into main road and stopped car. He kept us there about 10 minutes till a Soviet non-com arrived. He ordered me gruffly to get out of back seat and into front. When I failed to move he barked his command again. I told him I was American Consul. At that he leveled his carbine at me and with a jabbing gesture repeated his command. This time I obeyed. Then on command another soldier got in back seat and leveled their weapons, one had carbine and the other a submachine gun, at the backs of our heads and ordered us to drive down toward unloading zone to some headquarters. On arrival the soldiers got out and posted three submachinegunners around car. They disappeared but a lieutenant came out about 20 minutes later and gruffly questioned my driver (my Russian is very limited) as to what we were doing there. I told driver to repeat I was American Consul and was just taking morning drive. He then went away and about half an hour later a captain came out and gruffly told us to get back to town and not to try to come that way again.

I made immediate strong protest to Soviet Consul General who excused incident as merely result of excess zeal of ignorant soldiers. He said it was assuredly not directed against my person nor my official position. He said he would investigate and have soldiers reprimanded if found wrong. He said he hoped I would forget about incident. I impressed upon him the seriousness of matter and neither accepted nor rejected his remarks.

Sent Dept 83, Tehran 67, Moscow 40, London 27.

Rossow

891.77/3-1546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, March 15, 1946—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received 9:42 p. m.]

345. Embtels 114 [144] Jan 31; 180, Feb 9; 189, Feb 12.¹⁹ American press clippings for month of February sent Embassy by Dept have just come to my attention and I believe it highly advisable for Dept to correct in whatever manner may be most feasible impression which American press has gained that Soviets have turned back northern section of Iran's state railways. Railway has not been turned back and stories in American press that it has can only serve to give American public totally erroneous idea that Soviets have in some instances shown friendly and conciliatory policy toward Iranians and have given indications that they will eventually evacuate country. I feel it most important American public have no illusions about Soviet policy in Iran and trust Dept will lose no time in correcting stories about return of railway to Iranians which originated with announcement last month that actual turnover had begun.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-1546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

10. You are commended for the energetic and thorough manner in which you have been keeping Dept informed regarding military and other developments in your area.

Reports have been received from London that on Mar 13 an official of the FonOff made a statement to the effect that reports from Washington regarding movement of Soviet troops in Northern Iran had been exaggerated. According to Brit info only two fresh columns of Soviet troops had been observed in Northern Iran.

¹⁹ None printed.

Please inform Dept regarding extent to which you are keeping in touch with Brit Consul General in Tabriz and whether his estimates of movements of Soviet armed forces and military equipment differ materially from yours.²⁰

Sent to Tabriz, repeated to Tehran as no. 213, to London as no. 2328 and to Moscow as no. 479.

BYRNES

861.24591/3-1546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1946—8 p. m.

US MOST URGENT NIACT

214. British Embassy has just informed Dept that the British Ambassador in Tehran has telegraphed the FonOff that the Governor of the National Bank ^{20a} on behalf of Qavam has informed you and him that the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires has threatened that the Soviet Govt would regard as an unfriendly act an appeal by Qavam to the Security Council, and that the Prime Minister in view of this threat wished to have the advice of the British and US Govts and to know what support they could give him.

The telegram goes on to state that you and the British Ambassador agreed that while you personally thought the failure of Iran to appeal would prejudice her case you felt that you must consult your respective Govts before giving any advice.

The Embassy also informs us that Bevin has instructed the British Ambassador in Tehran to inform the Iranian Govt that in his opinion there is no course open to Iran but to appeal to the Security Council.

Please tell Qavam that there is nothing in the circumstances for Iran to do but immediately to file an appeal with the Security Council. You should remind him that we have already given him assurances of our full support to such an appeal.²¹

BYRNES

²⁰ Telegram 357, March 18, 10 a. m., from Tehran, reported: "British Embassy states it does not feel Rossow's reports exaggerated and that British Consul's reports from Tabriz have reported same info. British here deny sending anything to London belittling Soviet troop movements in Azerbaijan and they state they fail to understand statement made by FonOff official." (861.24591/3-1346). Mr. Rossow stated in telegram 90, March 20, 1946, noon, that "I have maintained closest possible contact with Brit Consul throughout my assignment here. We have traded information without restraint. . . . He has just confirmed my constant belief our reports and estimates are essentially same." (861.24591/3-2046)

^{20a} Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran (Banque Mellie).
²¹ In telegram 216, March 16, 11 a. m., the Department notified the Ambassador in Tehran: "The question raised in your 343 of Mar. 15, 1 p. m. [p. 356] has already been answered in our 214 of Mar 15, 8 p. m.

"We fully approve the position taken by you during the course of the conversation reported in the telegram referred to above." (861.24591/3-1546)

861.24591/3-1746 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State*TOP SECRET
US URGENTTEHRAN, March 17, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received March 17—3:30 p. m.]

352. Having received early this morning urtel 216, March 16²² I anticipated instructions sent urtel 214, March 15 (which was delayed in transmission) and called on Qavam at noon today. While I was with him your 214 was received and delivered to me and I conveyed your message to PriMin at 12:45 p. m.

At request of Brit Ambassador I again assured PriMin that Brit and American attitudes on this point were identical.

Qavam said he concurred in our views and would send telegraphic instructions to Ala tonight or tomorrow. (Brit Ambassador has since told me he has received same assurances.)

PriMin said arrival of new Soviet Ambassador is expected tomorrow, a prospect which evidently disturbs him a great deal because he foresees that Ambassador will try to deter him from recourse to Security Council and endeavor to involve him in renewed negotiations. In fact Qavam told me today that present Soviet Chargé had already assured him difficulties would be removed following arrival of Sadchikov and appeal to SC would be unnecessary (Qavam further repeated direct to me his account of Chargé's threat as reported mytel 343, March 15). This confirms me, and I think Qavam as well, in belief that Sadchikov's mission is to confuse issue and make it possible for Russia to prevent SC action by asserting bilateral negotiations are still in progress.

PriMin asked my advice as to manner in which he might deal with new Soviet Envoy, pointing out that refusal to talk with him would seriously worsen Irano-Soviet relations, whereas if he entered into any sort of conversations he would give Russians pretext they are seeking. I replied that there are many subjects which he could well discuss with Ambassador without compromising Iran's position regarding withdrawal of troops. He could make clear to Sadchikov that question of evacuation in accordance terms Tripartite Treaty is not subject for negotiation, that he (Qavam) is prohibited by constitution from negotiating in this connection and that only place question could be discussed is Security Council. Having thus stated his position there would be nothing to prevent him from carrying on conversations on other subjects of interest to the two Govts. I also emphasized that whatever unpleasantness might result from an immediate appeal to SC would be much less than was to be expected from a later appeal,

²² Not printed, but see footnote 21, p. 360.

made after Sadchikov had arrived and had attempted to open conversations. I therefore urged PriMin to get off instructions to Ala before new Ambassador presented himself. Qavam seemed to agree with my observations.

As sidelights on situation Qavam called to my attention new attacks in Soviet press on Iranian claims at time of Versailles Conference and fact that Soviet Chargé has excused himself from FonOff luncheon tomorrow in honor Sir Reader Bullard on obviously manufactured excuse that he has to meet his Ambassador (who cannot possibly arrive until well after luncheon will be over).

PriMin mentioned *Herald Tribune* editorial which he had seen quoted in our radio bulletin in which it was stated Iran was in great need of reform and that it was unthinkable for America to go to war over desert wastes of Iran. This seemed to disturb him. I pointed out that editorial began by condemning Russian attitude toward Iran. I went on to say that *Herald Tribune* is staunch Republican paper and could be expected to differ from views of Democratic Administration. I had just finished reading great quantity of American newspaper clippings on Irano-Soviet situation which I would be glad to send him and I had been struck by fact that virtually every paper in every part of US had strongly supported Iranian case and called for action by UNO.

By close of conversation Qavam repeated what he told me March 14: That he would instruct Ala to be moderate in presenting case in SC. He observed that Ala is great patriot, deeply concerned over possible fate of his country and family and that he is inclined to be excitable. PriMin therefore thought it well to warn him against being carried away and provoking Russians. I agreed this might be desirable and added that Iran's case is so clear that calm dignified presentation of facts should be sufficient to win it.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-1746: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

Moscow, March 17, 1946—9 p. m.
[Received March 17—5:37 p. m.]

843. Moment is opportune, I feel, for an attempt to recapitulate implications of present Soviet activities in Iran as seen from Moscow.

First of all I consider it almost a foregone conclusion that Soviets must make some effort in immediate future to bring into power in Iran a regime prepared to accede to major immediate Sov demands, particularly continued maintenance of Sov armed forces in Iran and granting of oil concessions. This effort will of course be made through

subservient Iranian elements without direct responsibility on Sov side. Sov forces in Iran will serve this scheme by sheer force of intimidation and if necessary by preventing any forceful interference with its execution.

Some such development seems probable because

(a) Sov Govt has no intention of withdrawing its troops from Iran. On the contrary, reinforcements, even though not on large scale, have been sent in.

(b) Sooner or later the Sov Govt must give some explanation to the world for continued presence there of their forces in violation of treaty engagements.

(c) Delay in giving answer to our inquiry indicates Sov Govt is reluctant to base its action solely on security requirements of USSR and is waiting for some sort of development which will make possible a better answer.

(d) Answer which would best commend itself to Sov mind would be that Iranian Govt had requested troops to remain.

(e) Coming UNO session and string which SC still has to Iranian question make some early solution imperative.

I find it hard to conceive that Sov Govt could be planning overt Sov aggression against Turkey at this juncture. There has been no special political buildup for this here nor as far as I can see any attempt to create a pretext for such action. This is not to say that smashing of Turk power, achievement of Sov bases on Straits²³ and establishment of "friendly" regime in Ankara may not be objectives of Sov policy to be pursued in due course and time. It is also not to say that Sov armed Kurds might not now begin to make trouble along Turkish border leading to disturbances which might later be cited as grounds for Sov interference. But there is not sufficient evidence here for concluding that present Sov military preparations in northern Iranian sector envisage an immediate Sov attack on Turkey.

With respect to Iraq, situation is not so clear. Here there is some evidence which points toward a Sov inspired and Sov armed Kurdish action to seize Mosul district with Sov forces in background prepared to back up insurgents in favorable circumstances and perhaps to come in after them, ostensibly at Kurd request. It must be emphasized that there has been big propaganda buildup here for difficulties with British and to extent such an attempt on Mosul district might cause difficulties with British, it may be considered a possibility from standpoint of psychological preparation here. But we here do not have impression that Sov Govt plans to push this to point of open break with London. Unless there has been some tremendous and fundamental decision taken here to forego all advantages of further cooperation with western world and to enter on path of complete defiance

²³ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 801 ff.

and armed isolation, a turn of events for which we have as yet no evidence, then I feel Russians will try in whatever action they may undertake in Middle East to keep just this side of the line which would mean a complete diplomatic break with British. They are doubtless prepared to face very serious diplomatic and political difficulties but to attain their objectives they will try to gauge their action, if our hypothesis is correct, in such a way as to stop just short of the decisive point. Naturally this involves a considerable risk that they may not estimate accurately the line of delimitation or that their action may automatically carry them farther than they originally planned to go. But I believe that these are risks which they have probably taken into calculation and which they have deemed to be warranted in view of immediate and ultimate objectives involved.

Thus it appears to me that whatever action may be undertaken in pursuance of present Sov preparations in that area, Russians must try to hold it down to point where it can be given a local character, i.e., where it should not place either Sov or British Govts in a position from which national prestige would not permit withdrawal. Any other line of procedure would, I must reiterate, imply a profound change of Sov policy on a world wide scale of which we here have no evidence. It is not like the Kremlin to blunder casually into situations, implications of which it has not thought through.

Sent Dept 843 ; repeated Tehran 67 and London 146.

KENNAN

861.24591/3-1846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, March 18, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received 11:50 p. m.]

362. Capt. Gagarine²⁴ and Rossow have requested permission to attempt trip from Tabriz to Rezaieh presumably to check on disposition Soviet forces and activities of Kurds. I have instructed them not to attempt this or travel anywhere in Kurdistan.²⁵

Unless Dept considers it vitally important to have first-hand information on reported Soviet troop concentrations in Irano-Turkish frontier region I do not propose to send any American officer into

²⁴ Alexis M. Gagarine, Assistant Military Attaché in Iran. In telegram 362, March 18, 4 p. m., the Ambassador in Tehran reported that "Gagarine arrived Tabriz March 17 having traveled by road from Tehran. Reports having seen personally Soviet column of 25 tanks moving direction of Tehran. Says Soviet garrison Qazvin increased and Soviet infantry unit at Zenjan. Observed armed Red troops in same trucks with armed Azerbaijan 'Democrats.'" (861.24591/3-1846)

²⁵ In telegram 223, March 19, 7 p. m., to Tehran the Department agreed fully with Murray's view, that "travel of official personnel in Kurdistan is presently unwise." (861.24591/3-1846)

that area at present. Territory is inhabited by armed Kurds who are apparently under little or no control and I think there would be grave danger of a serious incident which might even be engineered by Russians to divert attention from main issues involved in present crisis. It seems to me we should try to avoid anything which would confuse matters when Iran's case is brought before Security Council.

I should appreciate Dept's comment.

To Dept as 362, repeated to Moscow 110 and Ankara.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-1946 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

MOST IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1946.

222. Secretary General UNO issued following press release here today at 5:00 p. m.:

"The Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie, received yesterday, at 7:00 p. m., the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency Hussein Ala.

Ambassador Ala, under instruction from his Government, delivered to Secretary General Trygve Lie the following communications:

March 18, 1946.

'My dear Secretary General,

In accordance with telegraphic instructions received this morning from my Govt, I have today addressed, in your care, a letter to the Chairman of the Security Council, bringing to his attention a dispute between Iran and the U.S.S.R.

I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of that communication, which was sent to New York, and I should be extremely grateful if Your Excellency would have the appeal of Iran put on the agenda of the Security Council due to meet on March 25th.

Believe me, my dear Secretary General,

Yours sincerely,

s/ Hussein Ala'

March 18, 1946.

'Sir,

Pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, Iran brings to the attention of the Security Council a dispute between Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This dispute has arisen by reason of new developments since the adoption by the Security Council of the resolution of January 30, 1946, relating to the earlier dispute between Iran and the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. is maintaining Soviet troops in Iranian territory after March 2, 1946, contrary to the express provisions of Article V of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. is continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran through the medium of Soviet agents, officials and armed forces. These acts are in violation of the aforesaid treaty, and also in violation of the Declaration of Teheran and the Charter of

the United Nations. The immediate and just solution of this dispute by the Security Council is of the greatest importance to the preservation of the good relations with the U.S.S.R. which Iran wishes to maintain as an independent and sovereign state, and to the survival of the purposes and principles which the members of the United Nations have solemnly undertaken to respect.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

s/ Hussein Ala'

"Secretary General Trygve Lie has formally acknowledged receipt of the communication in a letter to the Iranian Ambassador, and has transmitted the communications to the representatives of the members of the Security Council thru their diplomatic missions in Washington.

The Iranian request is, therefore, on the provisional agenda to be submitted for approval of the Security Council at the first sitting in New York, now scheduled for Monday, March 25, 1946."

BYRNES

[In telegram 224, March 20, 1946, to Tehran (repeated to London and Moscow), the Department informed the Ambassador:

"In releasing to press copy of his letter to Secretary General UNO [see *supra*], Iranian Ambassador made following press statement here 5 pm March 19:

"This notice speaks for itself. I desire, however, on behalf of my Govt to emphasize that the bringing by one party before the Security Council of the United Nations of a dispute of this kind should not be interpreted as an act of unfriendliness by the other party.

"The Govt of Iran feels compelled to take this course because of its responsibilities to its people and because of the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution of Iran. No Iranian Govt could take any other course. We have every hope that this dispute will be decided by the Security Council with such expedition and justice that it will leave no room for misunderstanding.'" (861.24591/3-2046)]

The Representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations (Gromyko) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie) ²⁶

LONDON, 19 March 1946.

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I ask you to take steps in order to postpone the date of the meeting of the Security Council from 25 March to 10 April. The question which was raised by the Iranian Government before the

²⁶ Reprinted from SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., *supp.* No. 2, p. 44.

Security Council is unexpected for the USSR Government, since the negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Government of the USSR are being conducted at the present time.

In view of the above, the Government of the USSR is not prepared now to take part in the discussion of the question raised by the Iranian Government in the Security Council. In order to secure the necessary preparation of the Government of the USSR to participate in the consideration of this question in the Security Council, naturally, some time is required. That is why the Government of the USSR suggests postponing the meeting of the Security Council until 10 April.

ANDREI A. GROMYKO

861.24591/3-2046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1946—6 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

226. 1. With reference to our telegram no. 188 of Mar 8²⁷ stating the intention of this Govt to parallel the action of Iran, Stettinius is today sending the following letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

“I have received your letter of Mar 19²⁸ informing me of the action of Iran in filing with you the two letters of Mar 18, copies of which you enclosed.

Under instructions from my Govt, I wish to inform you that when the Security Council reconvenes I shall move:

(1) That consideration of the letter filed by Iran be placed at the head of the agenda of the Security Council.

(2) That, in connection with the consideration of this letter, Iran and the USSR be requested to report upon the negotiations which may have taken place between them in accordance with the Resolution of the Council adopted February 1 [*January 30*], 1946.”

2. After considerable study of procedural and other considerations we have come to the conclusion that this line of action is the most effective and appropriate which we can take at this moment in the carrying out of our obligations arising from the Declaration of [*Regarding*] Iran and the Charter of the United Nations. You may make this clear to the PriMin when delivering to him a copy of the letter.

BYRNES

²⁷ Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 346.

²⁸ Not printed.

740.00119 Council/3-2146

*Extract of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, March 21, 1946*²⁹

TOP SECRET

"I am sure Mr. Byrnes will agree that this question of an immediate invitation to Molotov³⁰ is now inevitably caught up in the tangle over Persia created by Gromyko's letter of 19th March to the Secretary-General.

2. I do not object in principle to the idea of a preliminary meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris, indeed I think it would be a good thing provided always that the Peace Conference is held more or less on the date suggested. But I am convinced it would be a great mistake to send the invitation to Molotov at the present moment as it would play straight into Molotov's hands, since Gromyko's letter shows that the Russian game is to delay the hearing of the Persian dispute until they can fix matters in Persia in the way they want. The danger I see is that the Russians might seize on the invitation to justify transferring consideration of Persia to the Paris meeting. I am sure that we ought not to allow the Security Council to be sidetracked in this way. So I very earnestly hope Mr. Byrnes will not send the invitation until the Security Council has taken Persia.

3. In my view the Council should meet as planned and decide its agenda and timetable by procedural vote. We would certainly support putting the Persian complaint at the top of the agenda, as Mr. Stettinius has proposed in his letter of 20th March to Secretary-General, and we would press for it to be discussed immediately. We would then naturally ask why there has been no reply to our note to Soviet Government, we have fulfilled our obligation under the 1942 treaty and we are entitled to ask what Soviet troops are still doing in Persia.

4. The vital question is now whether or not the Soviet Government will withdraw their troops in accordance with their treaty obligation. There is no need for the Soviet Government to prepare a case on this simple issue and the Security Council would be failing in its duty if it agreed to an adjournment while Russian troops remained on Persian soil.

²⁹ Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on March 21 with the statement: "I enclose an urgent message which Mr. Bevin has asked me to convey to you."

³⁰ On March 6, the Secretary of State proposed to Mr. Bevin the convening of a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the draft treaties of peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland in advance of the Paris Peace Conference scheduled for May 1, 1946; see Mr. Byrnes' memorandum of conversation, March 6, vol. II, p. 25.

5. As regards the question of negotiations between the Soviet and Persian Governments, our evidence is that it is untrue that negotiations are still in progress, and this is borne out by the terms of the complaint which Persian Government have filed.

6. If Soviet Government were to refuse to attend the proceedings on March 25th or walk out if the Persian question is put down for discussion before April 10th, personally I think the Council should go ahead as far as it can without a Russian representative. Such action by the Soviet Government would be a direct challenge to the authority of U.N.O. It seems to me therefore that we have got to face this situation squarely. Any weakening or inconsistency on this fundamental Persian issue would put U.N.O. on a slippery slope. I believe that the whole future of the United Nations is at stake.

7. Please give Mr. Byrnes very urgent message in the above sense.³¹

861.24591/3-2246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

TEHRAN, March 22, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received March 24—12: 49 p. m.]

383. National Bank Governor Ebtehaj called on me late evening March 21 to report that new Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov had seen PriMin afternoon of March 20 only few hours after reaching Tehran and had suggested that Soviets might withdraw troops from Iran if Shah and PriMin would sign letter to him assuring Russia that arrangements would be made for joint Irano-Soviet exploitation of north Iranian oil. Ebtehaj said he had not learned this from Qavam but from intermediate source in whom he had absolute confidence. He feared Qavam might be tempted by offer and be tricked into some agreement which would leave loophole for Russians to run out on their part of bargain. He was, therefore, anxious for me to see PriMin before latter saw Shah at lunch today.

³¹ In reply Mr. Byrnes stated, in part: "Much disturbed by your recent note. I intend to insist on serious consideration of Iran question at forthcoming meeting of the Security Council. I will attend meeting on behalf of our Government. I regret you do not plan to come because issue is necessarily critical and may affect whole future of United Nations. I should not favor any meeting at Paris which would indicate in advance that final disposition of Iran question was to be delayed. I intend to insist on final disposition now." For full text of Mr. Byrnes' reply, see telegram 2740, March 21, 10 a. m., to London, vol. II, p. 33. For further reply by Mr. Bevin on March 22, see *ibid.*, p. 34.

Mr. Byrnes directed Ambassador Caffery to emphasize, similarly, to the French Foreign Minister the importance he attached to obtaining final disposition of the Iranian question and his hope that Mr. Bidault would attend the sessions of the United Nations (telegram 1319, March 21, 6 p. m., to Paris, filed under 861.24591/3-2146).

I had two and half hour conversation with PriMin this morning which he asked be kept completely confidential. (I again assured him that leak on Soviet Chargé's threat³² had not come from American source.) To induce him to talk I opened by telling Qavam of Gromyko's letter to Lie requesting postponement of Security Council meeting and of President's public statement that meeting would not be postponed. I also reminded him of Stettinius' statement at London SC meeting that US Govt considered withdrawal of foreign troops from any country which requested it should not be subject to any conditions.³³ I stressed importance of this position.

PriMin did not explicitly confirm Ebtehaj version of his talk with Sadchikov but from his remarks I am sure that account was substantially correct.

According to Qavam Sadchikov expressed himself as having been surprised and upset on learning at Baku of Iranian appeal to SC saying he had thought it had been understood that he was coming to Tehran to continue Moscow negotiations. PriMin replied by reminding Sadchikov of him [*his*] protest filed at Moscow against continued occupation of Iran and of changes he (Qavam) had insisted on making in proposed communiqué in order to show that negotiations were not to be continued Tehran. He thought he had made it clear that presence Soviet troops in Iran after March 2 tied his hands so far as negotiations were concerned. Sadchikov said Stalin felt it was regrettable that during Moscow talks Iran had made no single gesture favorable to USSR, especially with respect to oil. PriMin answered by saying he had not rejected any Soviet proposals, since law did not permit him consider proposals regarding oil. He further said that if Soviet Govt pressed him to do anything against law his only course would be to resign. New PriMin could hardly be more favorably disposed to USSR than he.

Qavam then asked me hypothetical question which confirms my belief in Ebtehaj story. He said (in effect): What would you do in my place if Soviet Ambassador should offer to effect withdrawal of Soviet troops in exchange for an understanding regarding exploitation of oil in northern Iran? I said I could only speak personally but felt he should be extremely careful about any sort of written agreement or exchange of letters exclusively involving Iran and USSR. He had already had experience in which Soviets had broken pledged word embodied in formal treaty and should have even less reason to depend on any less formal, bilateral, understanding. However, if he could induce Russians to commit themselves before SC to withdraw

³² See telegram 343, March 15, 1 p. m., from Tehran, p. 356.

³³ See, for example, the statement made by Mr. Stettinius at the Twenty-First Meeting of the Security Council on February 15, 1946, SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1*, p. 301.

by certain date he would have more binding assurance. I also suggested it would be well for him to leave way open for Soviets to save face if he could do so while safeguarding Iranian interests.

Essence of Qavam's thinking as it developed in course of conversation was:

1. He fears that if SC censures USSR and asks withdrawal of troops Russians will vent their wrath on himself and on Iran, which could be harrassed in many ways by Soviet Govt, and that UNO could not provide adequate protection.

2. He considers that from viewpoint of practical politics understanding with USSR on northern Iranian oil is long overdue. He asserted that Soviet complaints that Iran had discriminated in favor of Britain by granting AIOC³⁴ concession were hard to meet in light of fact controlling interest in AIOC is held by British Govt. He believes any future Majlis will approve concession to Soviets and that such concession is inevitable.

3. He believes he can get around law prohibiting oil negotiations by arranging for a joint Irano-Soviet Company with the two Govts sharing control. He admits even such company would ultimately need Majlis' approval for its operations but is confident this can be obtained. Meanwhile during period before new Majlis assembles, he asserts approval can be granted by Cabinet decree subject to later Majlis confirmation. (I would hesitate to pass on correctness of his legal position in this reasoning, which seems to me open to grave doubt. However he might be able to carry it off in circumstances.)

4. He is considering preparation of an agreement in very general terms which would provide in principle for joint Irano-Soviet oil exploitation as inducement for Soviets to withdraw troops. He would draft this very carefully to make troop withdrawal a condition precedent. He added this agreement might be expanded to include subjects other than oil.

Primin was to lunch today with Shah and Hosein Pirnia (Motamen-Ol-Molk) an outstanding elder statesman and patriot. He was to see Sadchikov again at 5:00 this afternoon. Unless Shah dissuaded him I believe he planned to suggest to Sadchikov some sort of arrangement such as that indicated above, to be conditioned on Soviet pledge to SC that troops would be withdrawn by specified date not more than 6 weeks distant.

Sent Department as 383; repeated Moscow 191; London 72.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-2246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1946—7 p. m.

233. Soviet Amb in letter of Mar. 20 [19] to UNO requested postponement of Security Council meeting until April 10 on grounds that

³⁴ Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

presentation of Iranian case was unexpected, since negotiations between Russia and Iran are now being conducted, and hence the Soviet Govt is not prepared to discuss the question before Security Council.³⁵ Iranian Amb in note of Mar 21 [20] to UNO requested that action not be delayed, stating that the continued presence of Russian forces in Iran beyond Mar 2 is not a proper subject for negotiation under the Charter or Iranian Constitution.³⁶ He said that delays already encountered have intensified the critical situation in Iran and that further delays would cause harm to Iranian interests.

President Truman in statement to press Mar 21³⁷ stated that this Govt will not agree to postponement of Mar 25 meeting and further that it will insist on immediate consideration of Iranian case.

Soviet Amb told press Mar 22 that Russia has a firm and definite position in this matter. The meeting he said should be postponed in interests of Iran itself since hasty action would only complicate the question as far as Iran is concerned.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow and London.

BYRNES

891.24/3-1246 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1946—8 p. m.

236. Urtel 318, Mar. 12.³⁸ Present policy precludes sale of surplus arms, ammunition and instruments of war to Iran.³⁹ While Dept is prepared to consider amendment of policy to permit sales to Iran upon receipt from Iranian Govt of firm request specifying exact materials

³⁵ In telegram 915, March 22, 6 p. m., the Chargé in the Soviet Union stated: "I wish to invite Dept's attention to fact that Iran's appeal to Security Council, although several days old, has not as yet been referred to directly or indirectly in Soviet press. Neither, of course, has press referred to Soviet request for delay in SC session. Today's press reported that Soviet Ambassador has arrived in Iran but this brief message contains no hint concerning any further negotiations between the two Governments.

"On the whole the Soviet public continues to be largely unaware of existence of an international crisis resulting from Soviet action in Iran." (861.24591/3-2246)

³⁶ The Iranian letter of March 20 also stated that the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Iran called for at the London meeting of the United Nations "have failed"; for text of the letter, see SC *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 2*, p. 45.

³⁷ For the text of President Truman's press conference of March 21, 1946, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962) pp. 163, 164.

³⁸ Not printed; it stated that Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley, Chief of the United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army, had made formal inquiry of the Embassy concerning sale by the United States to Iran of military equipment essential for the maintenance of security involving its armed tribes (891.24/3-1246).

³⁹ For the Department's "present policy" on disposal of military-type surplus equipment to foreign governments, see Secretary's Staff Committee document SC/R-184, February 5, 1946, volume I, documentation on United States National Security Policy.

desired, no assurance can be given at this time that approval would be granted. Desired material might, of course, be available from private manufacturers.

BYRNES

[In telegrams 531 and 538, both dated March 23, 1946, the Department requested Moscow to send in full text "the most literal and careful translation" of the Soviet note of November 29, 1945, to the United States concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran. The request was made "for purposes of verification, particularly part containing implication that 1942 treaty is only controlling factor." (861.24591/3—2346) For text of the Soviet note, see telegram 4015, November 30, 1945, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, volume VIII, page 468. The nature of the reply by Moscow is given in footnote 84, *ibid.*, page 469.]

861.24591/3—2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 23, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 4: 51 p. m.]

384. Mytel 383, March 22. While Qavam was telling me yesterday of his thoughts regarding possible arrangement with USSR on oil he interposed statement that if any such arrangement were made he would see that Americans were given same rights for exploitation of oil in Baluchistan.

When I mentioned in passing that British had also sought oil concession in Baluchistan he expressed surprise and said that British have already received all oil rights they will ever get in Iran and that southern oil still unallocated will go to Americans.

This bears out his long record of favoring American enterprise in Iran. Among other instances Dept will recall he was Prime Minister in 1923 when Sinclair concession was negotiated.⁴⁰

MURRAY

861.24591/3—2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 23, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received March 24—8: 56 a. m.]

387. As I hope you have gathered from mytel 383, March 22, I have not encouraged Qavam to make any concessions to Soviets in

⁴⁰ For documentation on the granting of an oil concession in Iran to the Sinclair Exploration Company, see *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 711-736.

order to obtain withdrawal their troops. I have repeatedly reminded him of our position that evacuation foreign troops from any country should be unconditional. On other hand I have not tried to discourage him from making proposal he has conceived as set forth mytels 383, and 385 March 23 ⁴¹ although I might possibly have done so. In adopting this course I was influenced by following considerations:

1. Lacking specific instructions from Dept it would have been grave responsibility to attempt interference in vital negotiations of this kind. I could not be sure that US Govt or UNO could save Iran from consequences if I succeeded in persuading PriMin to give up plan which he had himself devised and which appeared to stand some chance of success.

2. I am impressed with fundamental importance of securing withdrawal Soviet troops while at same time creating conditions under which Iran and Soviet Union can live together amicably. From my necessarily limited vantage point here I can see little utility in winning a resounding victory over USSR in SC meeting if it either (a) fails to result in evacuation of Iran or (b) leaves Russians smarting under humiliating defeat and determined to revenge themselves on Iran. Both Qavam and Ebtehaj have pointed out that Iran has long common frontier with Russia and latter would have unlimited opportunities to make trouble for Iran Govt in northern area even if troops left Iran. Ebtehaj pointed out, possibly reflecting PriMin's thoughts, that Iran could not keep appealing time after time to SC for protection against her powerful neighbor.

3. Realizing that UNO is still in formative stage, I have wished to avoid encouraging any intransigence on part of Iranians which would make its task unnecessarily difficult. I believe it is important to leave way open for Soviets to withdraw gracefully from untenable position they have gotten into.

4. Qavam feels, perhaps correctly, that some sort of oil concession to Russia must and should be made eventually. If this is true it might as well come now when it can help resolve extremely delicate international situation.

5. While Soviet oil concession northern Iran presents obvious danger of Soviet penetration in this country it does not, of course, represent any actual or potential loss to US in oil, since there is no possibility that we could get concession that area. Even if we could it is my understanding its exploitation by us would be commercially im-

⁴¹ Telegram No. 385 not printed; Ambassador Murray advised of a report from Mr. Ebtehaj that the Prime Minister "seemed to have come to decision on questions discussed mytel 383, March 22. He told Ebtehaj he would try to get Soviet agreement whereby Iran and Russia would inform Security Council that Russian troops would leave Iran not only by a fixed date but also according to detailed time schedule. . . . As inducement for this he would offer Russians executive agreement for joint oil explorations northern Iran." (861.24591/3-2346)

practicable because of great transportation costs to Persian Gulf involved. As shown in mytels 383 and 385 PriMin is aware of dangers Russian entry into field would present and intends to draft agreement so as to minimize them as much as possible.

6. PriMin's plan is completely in Persian tradition, which accepts as matter of course that justice must be cajoled by special inducements to perform her duties. Considering that Qavam is old style Persian grandee brought up in that tradition it is unlikely that my personal representations against his proposal would have persuaded him to drop it. (This is not to say that powerful official arguments adduced by our Govt, if it is prepared to take such action, might not have effect.)

7. Finally with international relations so strained in all parts of world I would hesitate to reject any solution of Iranian problem which would be reasonably satisfactory and would permit our Govt and UNO to turn to the many other pressing problems confronting them.

In summary much as I regret possibility that Iran will be forced to pay bribe to secure what should be accorded her automatically as of right, I do not feel that proposed solution is too bad. Majority of Iranians themselves would probably accept it with good grace. Ebtehaj seems quite enthusiastic and remarked to me that if Qavam succeeds in his efforts it will bring ray of hope to all other small nations lying within Russian orbit. If plan goes through it should provide reasonable basis for improved Irano-Soviet relations despite fact that it leaves many openings for possible future difficulties. We cannot after all provide Iran with an insurance policy against all potential dangers.

Furthermore, I would consider that contemplated agreement would be at least partial victory for US Govt and UNO, since I am absolutely certain Russians would have forced their demands to limit if it had not been for firm stand taken by America in upholding UNO Charter. Iranians realize that if Russian troops leave Iran it will be solely due to our action and they are immensely grateful.

Sent Dept as 387, repeated Moscow 121; London 74.

MURRAY

891.00/3-2046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET
MOST IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1946—5 p. m.

239. We are not in a position, in view of uncertainty of course of events in Iran, to give you definite instructions in reply to urtel 371

Mar 20.⁴² We leave to your discretion the reply you should make to Shah or Govt if you are approached for advice as to whether they should remain in Tehran or move to some other place. We have full confidence in your judgment and are sure you will not give any advice which will entail responsibility or obligation on the part of this Govt. While we believe it would be better for Shah and Govt to remain in Tehran even if this involves some danger or inconvenience, it is recognized that circumstances may develop which make this inadvisable.

If Shah leaves Tehran with his court for purpose of setting up Govt at some other place in Iran, you may find it advisable to designate a secretary of Embassy to accompany him. If however he leaves Tehran merely to take refuge elsewhere it seems to us that it would be preferable not to detail a secretary to accompany him. We leave this, however, to your discretion.

The question of the recognition by this Govt of a new Govt in Iran will of course depend on circumstances. In general we would not recognize a new Govt brought about by duress.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow and London.

BYRNES

861.24591/3-2446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 24, 1946—1 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 1:25 p. m.]

392. Last night I learned from American correspondents of press conference given yesterday by Qavam in which latter was understood to say that it did not matter whether Security Council meeting was

⁴² Not printed. It read in part as follows:

"Although passage of time without any Soviet move to occupy Tehran may indicate that such move is less likely, I feel we should keep in mind that it is a possibility. If it should materialize there is further possibility that Shah and Cabinet might flee to some other part of the country . . .

"Since both Qavam and Shah recently have consulted me frequently on questions of policy I think it most probable that they would ask advice of our Government in connection with any plan to leave capital. I request therefore that Department consider question and inform me at earliest possible moment what I should say if I am approached on subject by either Shah or Prime Minister. . . .

"In view of grave potential dangers involved in flight of Iranian Government, Department may wish to consider whether it could find means to fortify Government against Soviet pressure if Shah and Cabinet remain in capital regardless of Soviet occupation. In my opinion, if this could be done it would be preferable solution.

"I should further appreciate instructions regarding course to be followed if Government decides to leave capital. Would Department wish a representative of this office to accompany it? My own feeling is that we would have to maintain some contact with Shah and Prime Minister. . . ." (891.00/3-246).

delayed week or two and that he had reprimanded Ala for opposing postponement.⁴³ Correspondents received impression Prime Minister felt problem might be settled without SC action.

I saw Qavam this morning and expressed surprise and concern that he should have made public statements of this kind. I remarked that it seemed curious time for him to appear to belittle importance of SC in light of stand taken by US Government and fact that even Stalin had just emphasized importance he attached to it.

Qavam replied that correspondents must have misunderstood his remarks which were general in character and that he had not intended to convey impression they seemed to have received. (Since Mozaffar Firuz⁴⁴ who is fast becoming Qavam's evil genius acted as interpreter I can believe Prime Minister's remarks may have been distorted in translation.) On my urging he summoned another press conference this morning to correct impression given yesterday. To ensure against distortion this time I left my own confidential interpreter Saleh to handle translation.

Qavam said he had not sent any new instructions to Ala regarding presentation of Iranian case to SC and that he did not intend to do so unless and until he reached some satisfactory agreement with Soviets here.

In reply to my question Prime Minister said he had not definitely presented to Soviet Ambassador proposal for joint oil exploitation as inducement for withdrawal Soviet troops. However, he still had this idea under active consideration and did not believe Russians would evacuate without this concession. He did not indicate when he planned to broach his suggestion to Sadchikov but it would seem time is too short for anything to be done this regard before SC meets tomorrow.

He asked my counsel regarding proposed agreement. I said I could give him no advice. I agreed that it was important for Iran Government to build satisfactory basis of understanding with USSR but he must make his own decision as to advisability of offering oil rights to achieve this. Once again I reminded him that US did not consider it should be necessary for Iran to purchase withdrawal of foreign troops.

⁴³ In telegram 388, March 24, 8 a. m., Ambassador Murray reported: "Department may be interested to know that Qavam has expressed to Ebtahaj strong annoyance at Ala's action in announcing that Iranian Government opposed delay in Security Council meeting. He said this statement was made without authorization and considers it was unnecessary since President Truman had already declared American position to this question. . . . Essentially Qavam has been trying to soothe the Russians whenever possible and he feels Ala has not grasped this clearly." (861.24591/3-2446)

⁴⁴ Assistant to Prime Minister Qavam and Director of Propaganda in the Iranian Government.

I saw Shah last night and learned that he favors Qavam's contemplated deal with Soviets as does Motamen-Ol-Molk. Shah also remarked that he did not think Soviets would agree to any multi-lateral scheme for development of northern Iranian oil.

To Department as 392 repeated Moscow 123, London 76.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-2446: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray) ⁴⁵

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1946—5 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

238. We fully approve position taken by you as outlined in your 383, 385, 387 and 391 [392].⁴⁶ It is important that no one should obtain false impression that our determination to carry out our obligations under the Charter and the Iran Declaration has been influenced in the slightest by a selfish interest on our part in Iranian petroleum. Please make it clear, therefore, in case Iranian officials again refer to possibility of petroleum concessions for us in Baluchistan (urtel 384) that any American interest in the Baluchistan fields which may exist has no relationship whatsoever with our efforts to prevail upon the Russians to remove their troops and we prefer that this interest be not discussed in connection with withdrawal of Soviet troops and related problems.

Repeated to London as 2606. Repeated to Moscow as 542. Repeated to US Delegation—New York as #1.

BYRNES

861.24591/3-2546: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

Moscow, March 25, 1946.

[Received March 25—10:25 a. m.]

928. Following Iranian materials appear Soviet press March 25.

1. Tass announcement "regarding evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran" which reads as follows in translation:

"The withdrawal of Soviet troops in Iran from districts of Meshed, Shahrud and Semnan begun March 2, 1946, has already been finished. By agreement with the Iranian Govt the evacuation of the remaining Soviet troops began March 24. The Soviet command in Iran esti-

⁴⁵ Marginal notation by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Henderson: "Sent at personal suggestion of the Secretary."

⁴⁶ For telegrams 383, 387, and 392, of March 22, March 23, and March 24, respectively, see pp. 369, 373, and 376. Telegram 385, March 23, 11 a. m., not printed, but see footnote 41, p. 374.

mates that the complete evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran can be concluded in the course of 5-6 weeks if nothing unforeseen should take place."

2. Tass despatch from Tehran "statement of Qavam Es Saltane". Despatch is translated as follows:

"Iranian Premier Qavam Es Saltane today told correspondents in Tehran that differences between Iran and Russia can be solved before session of Security Council takes place. It is of no significance whether the session takes place March 25 or 14 days later. If the question of evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran and other problems are not settled sooner the Iranian question will be included on the agenda of Security Council. Answering question of a correspondent concerning the letter of the Iranian Ambassador in Washington Hussein Ala to the General Secretary of the UNO Trygve Lie the Iranian Premier emphasized categorically that this letter was written and sent by the Iranian Ambassador without the knowledge and sanction of the Iranian Govt. Qavam Es Saltane told correspondents that he had sent strict telegraphic instructions to Hussein Ala in which the necessity of avoiding the repetition of such arbitrary action in the future was pointed out. Qavam Es Saltane expressed confidence that the Iranian question would be settled satisfactorily. The most important question is the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran. All the other problems depend upon the solution of this question. The question of Azerbaijan has comparatively little importance. It can be settled by means of negotiations as soon as agreement is reached concerning the evacuation of Russian troops from Iran. Qavam Es Saltane denied reports that after March 2 additional Soviet troops came to Iran."

3. Tass despatch from Iran reporting that at press conference in Tehran Qavam Es Saltane in replying to question of foreign correspondents on circumstances which led to arrest of Seyid Zia⁴⁷ stated that decision to arrest him was adopted without any pressure from the side and was caused exclusively by the threat which Seyid Zia's subversive activity represented to the international security of Iran.

Pravda March 25 also announces appointment of Gromyko permanent representative of Soviet Union on Security Council.

Sent Dept 928, repeated Tehran 74, London 161 and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

861.24591/3-2546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 25, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received March 26—8:03 a. m.]

395. Following information given me today by Qavam:

1. Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov called on him last night 7 o'clock with three notes: First note said Soviet Govt would evacuate all Iran-

⁴⁷ Seyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, prominent Iranian politician.

ian territory within 5 or 6 weeks "if nothing further happened". (Sadchikov said he did not know what this latter phrase meant but guessed it might refer to Azerbaijan situation.) Second note proposed that Irano-Soviet company be formed to develop Iranian oil, 51% to be Russian and 49% Iranian. Third note offered to intercede to adjust Azerbaijan situation on basis that "Prime Minister of Azerbaijan" should be known as Governor General, Cabinet Ministers should be known as Directors of Offices, and local Majlis should be known as Provincial Council.

2. Sadchikov called again at 10 p. m. with telegram just received from Moscow saying Soviet Govt pleased to learn of arrest of Seyid Ala [*Zia*]-Ed-Din and announcing Soviet intention to withdraw troops at once from Karaj and Kazvin in accordance request of Iranian Prime Minister.

3. Qavam intends to reply to first note by expressing appreciation and requesting evacuation be completed in 4 weeks. He will also insist that Russian decision be communicated formally to Security Council. (He may already have taken this action.) In reply to second note he plans make counterproposal on oil development. In reply third note he will decline offer of Soviet intercession and negotiate direct with Azerbaijan "Government".

4. He has not modified Ala's instructions in connection Security Council discussion. I infer he will wait to see that Soviets carry out their assurances before doing anything in this respect.

Sent Dept as 395, repeated London 77, Moscow 124.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-2546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

TEHRAN, March 25, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received March 26—10:45 a. m.]

397. At noon today I advised Qavam of Department's position re Baluchistan oil as stated urtel 238, March 24. I explained that while we duly appreciated his consideration of American interests it must be clearly understood that his assurances this regard were gratuitous on his part and must never under any circumstances be considered to have any relation to question of Soviet evacuation of Iran. I wanted there to be no misunderstanding on this point. Prime Minister agreed that I had correctly stated case and said his offer had been entirely on his own initiative.

I acted promptly in order to avert two dangers which I thought might possibly arise in this connection :

1. In all good faith Qavam might make bid for American public favor by announcing assurances he had given me. I feared he might not realize folly of such step.

2. If Russians learned of Qavam's informal promises (as is likely to happen sooner or later) they might cite them as evidence that we were engaged in making same kind of deal with Iran on oil as they themselves were trying to force through. They could then plausibly charge us with adopting righteous attitude while at same time making profit out of Irano-Soviet dispute. I therefore wanted to make the record clear with no possibility of misinterpretation.

To Department as 397, repeated London 78, Moscow 125.

MURRAY

*Statement by the Soviet Representative at the United Nations
(Gromyko)* ⁴⁸

[Extracts]

“I would begin by making an official declaration on behalf of the Soviet Government. Negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Government of Iran have resulted in an agreement regarding the evacuation of Soviet troops still in that country. It is already known that the evacuation of these troops began some time ago, on the 2d of March. As regards the evacuation of the troops still remaining in certain zones of Iran, I would state that in accordance with an agreement concluded between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments the evacuation of these troops began on the 24th of March, that is, two days ago, and will probably end within five or six weeks unless unforeseen circumstances arise.

In conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 30 January in its session at London, the differences between the Governments of the Soviet Union and Iran were to be handled by negotiations between the two parties, bi-lateral negotiations.

⁴⁸ Made before the Security Council in New York City on the morning of March 26; reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, April 7, 1946, p. 568. The statement, with substantial language changes, is printed in SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 11.

For an account of the meetings of the Security Council on March 26 and of the discussions preceding the morning meeting, see telegram 6, March 26, from New York, p. 383.

In telegram 949, March 26, from Moscow, Stalin was quoted as saying in a press statement: “. . . As regards the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, it, as is known, has already been solved in a positive sense by agreement between the Soviet Government and the Government of Iran.” (861.24591/3-2646)

In conformity with this decision, negotiations between the two Governments did take place. These negotiations brought about positive results—the positive results which I have already mentioned—results agreed to and agreements between the two parties.

Therefore the decision to place this subject on the agenda of the Security Council contradicts not only the facts of the situation, but the letter and the spirit of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on the 30th of January.

For these reasons I propose that the question raised by the Iranian Ambassador in the letter of the 18th of March should not be included in the agenda of the Security Council.”

*Statement by the Secretary of State*⁴⁹

I cannot agree with the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics nor support the amendment he offers to the agenda.

The facts before the Council are that the Iranian Government, through its representative, brought to the attention of the Council a dispute between Iran and the USSR which it declared was likely to endanger international peace and security. The Iranian Government further stated that contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of 29 January 1942, the USSR was maintaining troops on Iranian territory after 2 March. In its letter to the Council, it further declared that the USSR was continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran through the medium of USSR agents, officials and armed forces.

The Iranian Government, through its representative, referred to these facts as constituting new developments arising since the action of the Council on 30 January.

Today the representative of the USSR states that there has been an agreement. If that information is correct, then the USSR Government should have presented to the Council for its consideration a joint statement from the Iranian Government and the USSR Government stating that an agreement had been arrived at and asking that there be no further consideration of the question. But that is not the case. The Iranian Government has not withdrawn its letter.

Though we have tried to ascertain the facts, we have not ascertained from the Iranian Government that there has been an agreement.

Therefore, when a Member of the United Nations advises the Council that a situation exists which is likely to threaten the peace and security of the world, we cannot deny to that nation the opportunity to

⁴⁹ Made before the Security Council on the morning of March 26; reprinted from SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 13. The statement, with minor changes, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 7, 1946, p. 570.

be heard, to say whether or not there has been an agreement, to say whether or not it wishes to withdraw its complaint.

If that is not correct, then all that a Government represented on the Council would have to do when a complaint was made against it would be to advise the Council that there had been an agreement, and on the strength of that statement, to ask that the complaining Government should be denied the opportunity to have a hearing.

All that is contemplated now is the adoption of an agenda which would give to the Iranian Government an opportunity to present facts which in the opinion of that Government constitute a threat to international peace. Surely the Council cannot deny to any Member of the United Nations the opportunity to present a request of that kind, filed in complete accord with the provisions of the Charter.

If there has been an agreement, certainly the Council would want to hear that fact stated by the representative of the Iranian Government. If there has been an agreement, we must assume that the representative of the Iranian Government will make a statement as to the agreement. We must put this matter on the agenda; we must give to the Iranian Government an opportunity to say whether or not there has been an agreement.

If there is not a complete understanding between the Iranian Government and the USSR Government, that fact will be disclosed when opportunity is given to both parties to the dispute to make a statement. When that is done, the Council can take the matter under consideration and determine whether it can take any action to bring about complete agreement. But certainly it cannot deny to a Member of the United Nations that states that a condition exists which is likely to threaten international peace and security, even the opportunity to present its case.

501.BC/3-2646 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET
URGENT

NEW YORK, March 26, 1946—9:45 p. m.

6. Tuesday's Council session⁵⁰ opened with all the members fully aware of the existing tension revolving on Russia's insistence upon postponement of discussion of the Iranian question. By the time the delegates convened for the session at 11 a. m. there was a distinct possibility that Russia would withdraw from these Security Council meetings and possibly from UN as a whole.

⁵⁰ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on Tuesday, March 26, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 10-43.

There was indication of this at the luncheon given by Secretary-General Lie Monday noon for Security Council members. At the luncheon Mr. Stettinius had a conversation with Mr. Gromyko concerning the Iranian question. Gromyko advised Mr. Stettinius that at the Tuesday meeting of the Council he would make a statement which would make his position very clear.

Gromyko stated that while he was perfectly willing to have the ceremony opening the Council session he could not participate further if we pressed the Council to deal with the Iranian question before April 10.

When Gromyko asked Mr. Stettinius if the U.S. position was still firm, Mr. Stettinius replied that it was the American delegation's opinion that the Iranian question should be dealt with promptly. Mr. Stettinius inquired if a short postponement would help him. Mr. Gromyko replied: "I don't need any help." He reiterated that in the event the Security Council decided to deal with the Iranian question before April 10, he would not participate in the discussion.

At this point, Mr. Stettinius suggested: "Perhaps it would be wise for some of us to have a discussion about this whole question after the meeting today or this evening."

On Tuesday, by the end of the day's sessions the situation was completely in the open but apparently was not as serious as feared. Gromyko stated that if any substantive matters on the Iranian question were discussed Russia "could not participate and could not attend" such discussions.⁵¹ However, this was interpreted by the U.S. and other delegations to mean that the Soviet delegation would not withdraw completely from Security Council or UN deliberations.

All of Tuesday's Council discussion centered on procedural matters. After Russia's motion to take the Iranian question off the agenda was defeated, by a vote of nine to two, Poland supporting Russia, Council members voted to accept the Iranian item in the Secretary-General's proposed agenda.

With passage of this item, Mr. Gromyko immediately proposed postponement of discussion on the Iranian question and this precipitated lengthy and detailed argument which boiled down to three specific proposals:

1. Gromyko's proposal that the whole question be postponed until April 10;

2. Egypt's proposal that the Iranian representative be called in to explain how he felt about postponement, and then the Council would decide from the views presented there as to whether or not postponement was indicated; and

3. Australia's suggestion that Iranian views and documentary material be presented in writing, as well as orally, for quasi-judicial

⁵¹ For amplification of Mr. Gromyko's views, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 37.

Council deliberation, discussion and decision, on whether or not the Iranian question should be postponed.

Secretary Byrnes and Sir Alexander Cadogan of United Kingdom appeared to be bearing the brunt of the argument, urging, first, that postponement could not be countenanced if Iran was in a desperate situation, and second, that Iran—as a pledge to all other small nations—must at least be heard by the Council.⁵² Poland's Dr. Lange backed Soviet arguments thoroughly, with some amplification, but urged that documentary evidence come from Teheran and not from the Iranian Ambassador alone. Mexico took issue with Gromyko's proposals practically at every turn. Van Kleffens, of Holland, pointed out that the Council was obliged, under Article 31, to allow Iran to participate since it was quite obvious that Iran's interests were "specially affected".

With tempers fraying and little progress being made, delegates finally agreed on France's proposal that a three-man subcommittee thrash out the three aforesaid proposals and come to agreement on what the Council should do about them and present their conclusions by 3 p. m. Wednesday. Dr. Quo, Council Chairman, then appointed the U.S., U.S.S.R. and France to this committee, to the apparent discomfiture of all three. Adjournment, which had been sidetracked by Bonnet's subcommittee proposal, came quickly after this.

Ambassador Ala, Iranian representative, hopes to be called to present his case, and is extremely anxious to tell his country's story to the Council. He intends to put forth a lengthy exposition of his country's situation, and will of necessity present many substantive items to the Council, as well as his views on whether or not discussion should be postponed. His main objective, it was said, is to keep the Iranian question definitely on the continuing agenda.

[Here follow discussions on matters other than the Iranian question.]

BYRNES

861.24591/3-2746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT NIACT

TEHRAN, March 27, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received 10:10 p. m.]

411. Mytel 395, March 25. During conversation which he requested be kept completely confidential PriMin told me late this morning that he had as yet made no final agreement with Soviets. Added that he had complained to Soviet Ambassador about statements made by Gromyko and Stalin to effect agreement had been reached. However

⁵² The most significant statements made by Secretary of State Byrnes are to be found in SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 30-36.

he showed me two draft notes which I understood he intended to give Sadchikov today in reply to notes latter delivered March 24.

I gathered he had already discussed their purport with Sadchikov. Substance was as follows:

1. First note expressed appreciation for Soviet decision to withdraw troops and asked that this be notified formally to Security Council omitting qualifying phrase "unless something unforeseen happens". (Qavam said he had asked Soviet Ambassador to write him letter stating this phrase would be omitted. Latter had replied he was sure Soviet Govt would acquiesce as soon as other agreements were concluded.)

2. Second note consisted of counterproposal to Soviet suggestion for joint Irano-Russian company to exploit Iranian oil. (Qavam remarked that this was real crux of present crisis, that oil was what Russians really wanted.) Points covered were:

a. Participation should be equal for both countries instead of 51 percent Russian and 49 percent Iranian as Soviets had suggested.

b. Iran should be called upon to make no financial contribution. She would furnish land which would constitute her share of capital. Russians would provide technical personnel and equipment.

c. Duration should be 30 years instead of 50 years as proposed by Soviet Govt.

d. Russians had suggested exploitation should cover provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan and that part of Khorassan contiguous to Soviet frontier. (Virtually all of northern Iran.) Qavam suggested omitting areas of Azerbaijan contiguous to Turkey and Iraq arguing that otherwise international friction would be aroused which would be in interest of neither Iran nor USSR.

e. Any security forces needed for whatever purpose in connection with exploitation should be solely Iranian.

With respect to third Soviet note dealing with Azerbaijan Govt, Qavam apparently had not prepared reply. He said however he had talked to Sadchikov on this subject and had said he was willing to negotiate with Azerbaijanis within limits permitted by constitution. He had thought it would be well for Azerbaijanis to send delegation to open negotiations. Soviet Ambassador had replied that if Qavam could go no further than that he considered it useless to attempt negotiations.

PriMin remarked to me that he did not want Soviets to interfere in details of his dealings with Azerbaijanis, all he wanted from Soviet Govt this connection was its general moral support and that he had so advised Sadchikov. Apparently this Azerbaijan phase of his negotiations with latter is still hanging in air.

In reply to my insistent questioning and to my surprise and disquiet PriMin said that he intended to keep word of his proposed agreements with Russians strictly confidential. He read me telegram he had sent Ala last night or today informing latter of negotiations but instructing him not to reveal them to SC or anyone else. If Ala were asked whether Irano-Soviet agreement had been reached he was to reply that he would have to inquire of his Govt and Qavam would then give him instructions as to what further statements he could make. (PriMin said he himself drafted telegram and I think it possible he even encoded it himself. It was marked to be decoded only by Ala.)

Qavam asked my opinion regarding this procedure. I replied that without instructions from my Govt I could express no definite opinion. However he should consider very carefully consequences of attempt to keep agreement of this sort secret⁵³ and should realize that he might run into serious trouble. He should be thinking of answer he would give Ala when latter requested directions on how to answer probable SC request for report on Irano-Soviet negotiations.

I think it probable Qavam's secretiveness in this matter is result of Soviet pressure.

In course of talk I asked whether Qavam considered formal Soviet assurance to SC regarding troop withdrawal would be sufficient protection. He replied by asking my view. I suggested he might do well to instruct Ala to see that question remained one "of continuing interest" to Council even after present discussions should have terminated and until all Russian troops have been withdrawn. I believe he plans to follow this course.

Although Qavam did not make clear exact manner in which he intended to handle Iranian case in present SC debate I assume he will have Ala continue to press matter until he (Qavam) reaches what he considers satisfactory agreement with Russians in negotiations here after which Ala will be instructed to announce that Soviet assurances for troop withdrawal are satisfactory and Iran considers case closed provided assurances are fulfilled.

To Dept as 411; repeated Moscow 131, London 83.

MURRAY

⁵³ In telegram 414, March 28, 10 a. m., Ambassador Murray stated: "If you wish me to do so I think I could convince Qavam at this stage that his best course lies in being entirely open and aboveboard with Security Council revealing his oil negotiations together with any agreement which may result from them. I believe this could still be done in such way as to save face for Russians since both they and Qavam could say with some degree of truth that agreement had not been forced out of Prime Minister but had been freely and voluntarily negotiated." (861.24591/3-2846).

501.BC/3-2746 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

NEW YORK, March 27, 1946—10:55 p. m.

10. The United Nations Security Council continued to discuss Wednesday afternoon⁵⁴ the advisability of immediate consideration of the Iranian question after the Soviet delegation walked out of the Chamber in protest over the failure of the Council to accept its demand to postpone all action on that issue until April 10.

Andrei Gromyko, Soviet delegate, who had argued in vain for hours for the delay, and his three advisers dramatically stalked out of the Chamber shortly after the Council had voted down the Soviet postponement proposal.

Before taking this action Gromyko made a brief statement, pointing out that he had made it clear that for reasons he had expressed that he could not as a representative of the Soviet Union participate further in the meeting. He then carefully packed his papers in a case and led the three advisers out of the hall.

The Soviet group left the Chamber at 5:20—more than 2 hours after the meeting opened. Up to that time delegates discussed without a break their views on the Soviet postponement motion. Arguments followed much the same line as the previous day.

Chairman Dr. Quo Tai-Chi opened the third New York Security Council session with a report that the three-nation sub-committee had been unable to reach agreement on the postponement question. He called for additional observations.

The sub-committee, comprising delegates of France, U.S.S.R. and the United States, was named late Tuesday when the Council was confronted with three separate proposals on the Iranian issue.

Again on Wednesday U.S. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, and Gromyko had the leading roles in debate on the Iranian question. Byrnes steadfastly maintained that the Council should not act on the Soviet postponement motion until it had heard the views on the suggested delay from the Iranian representative.

The U.S. delegate pointed out that he had information from the American representative in Iran that no settlement had been reached in the Iranian-Soviet negotiations. He said that all confidence in the effectiveness of the Security Council would disappear if the Iranian representative were denied a chance to state his Government's views on the postponement motion.

⁵⁴ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on Wednesday, March 27, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 44-70.

"UN will die in its infancy of inefficiency and ineffectiveness," Byrnes added.⁵⁵

Considerable discussion followed before the actual vote on the Soviet postponement motion was taken. Only Russia and Poland voted for the delay.

After the vote the Polish, Egyptian and French Ambassadors were called on for remarks before Gromyko had a chance to announce he would leave the Chamber.

The Council then proceeded to vote on an Egyptian motion to invite the Iranian representative to express his views on postponement before that body decided whether to delay consideration of the substance of the Iranian complaint that the presence of Soviet troops and agents in Iran pose a threat to international peace and security.

Seven votes were required to carry the Egyptian motion and eight were obtained. Australia and Poland abstained and Russia was not represented at the time.

Ambassador Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, whose letter of March 18 called the Security Council's attention to what was termed a dispute between Iran and the Soviet Union, was then asked to sit at the delegates' table.

Ala said that he knew of no agreement, secret or otherwise, on the matter now before the Council. He added that negotiations at Moscow between the Iranian Prime Minister and officials of the Soviet Government, including Stalin and Molotov, did not result in an agreement because of the Russian demands. He pointed out that Soviet troops were still in Iran, despite a treaty calling for their evacuation by March 2. He said he was prepared to proceed immediately with the case.

When Ala began to discuss the substance of the complaint, Secretary Byrnes suggested that he confine his remarks, as closely as possible, to the question of postponement.

Ala then said he had no instructions from his Government to agree to a postponement. He added that Soviet troops and agents in Iran interfered with internal affairs and that demands had been made on Iran's sovereignty. He described the situation as explosive. He stated that a delay would be a threat to peace, and then asked for immediate action on the issue.⁵⁶

When the Polish delegate indicated he would like to ask certain questions of the Iranian representative, it was suggested that he wait until the next meeting for answers, in view of the lateness of the hour.

⁵⁵ For full text of Mr. Byrnes' remarks, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 49.

⁵⁶ For text of Ambassador Ala's remarks, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 62.

He was agreeable and Chairman Quo adjourned the meeting at 6:45 p. m.

The Security Council will meet in private session Thursday afternoon at 4:00 o'clock.⁵⁷

[BYRNES]

861.24591/3-2746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 28, 1946—3 p. m.
MOST IMMEDIATE NIACT

248. From Byrnes for Murray. With reference to your Niac 411 Mar 27, 5 p. m., please inform Qavam that we appreciate his keeping us closely informed regarding his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador and will respect his request that this information be kept strictly confidential. However, the position of the American Representative on the Security Council will become very difficult unless the Council receives information promptly concerning certain aspects of the negotiations, particularly the fact that the Soviet Ambassador continues to qualify his assurances regarding troop withdrawal until agreements are reached regarding oil and Azerbaijan. We have maintained resolutely before the Council that the Iranian request to present its case should be granted on the ground that according to our information the claim of the USSR that an understanding has already been reached is not correct. If the present status of the bilateral negotiations were clearly reported to the Council, our contention that no agreement has been reached would be indisputably established. If no report of the status of the negotiations is made the impression will be created that Soviet-Iranian negotiations are progressing smoothly and that the United States is pressing the case of Iran for its own purposes.

It is no longer possible for Iran to continue both to plead its case in the Council and at the same time to carry on secret bilateral negotiations regarding which it is unwilling to inform the Council. Iran is entitled to have its case considered by the Council, but Qavam should authorize Ala immediately to inform the Council regarding the status of the negotiations. [Byrnes.]

ACHESON

⁵⁷ The purpose of the private session was to discuss the serious problem arising from the walkout of the Soviet delegation. In telegram 9, March 27, 10 p. m., the Secretary noted that "Under terms of the Charter the Security Council cannot take a substantive decision when any member of the Big Five Powers is absent from the meeting, unless the absentee has been declared a party to a dispute. The Soviet Union has not been officially declared a party to a dispute. This poses a serious problem as Gromyko has repeatedly declared in the last 2 days that he cannot participate in or attend as a representative of the Soviet Union any Security Council meeting prior to April 10 at which the Iranian issue is discussed." (501.BC/3-2746)

761.91/4-846

*Memorandum on Private Meeting of Members of Security Council,
March 28, 1946, 4: 10 p. m.*⁵⁸

TOP SECRET

(Memorandum based on confidential minutes of the meeting which were seen by officers of the Delegation but were not available for circulation and were not to be copied.)

Present:

President—Mr. Quo Tai-Chi	(China)
Mr. Hodgson	(Australia)
Mr. Velloso	(Brazil)
Mr. Hassan Pasha	(Egypt)
Mr. Bonnet	(France)
Mr. Najera	(Mexico)
Mr. Van Kleffens	(Netherlands)
Mr. Lange	(Poland)
Mr. Cadogan	(United Kingdom)
Mr. Byrnes	(United States)
Mr. Stettinius	(United States)
[Mr. Lie]	

1. Dr. Quo stated that since he had been unable to assure Mr. Gromyko that the Iranian question would not be discussed, Gromyko had felt himself unable to attend the meeting, but that the Soviet representative had indicated his willingness to discuss the situation with the President, or one member or a group of members of the Council.

2. After a general discussion in which the desirability of sending a delegation to discuss the situation with Gromyko was considered, general agreement was reached that no delegation should be appointed since such a procedure was not thought fitting for the Security Council and might be embarrassing to Gromyko, but that individual representatives might consult with him.

3. Mr. Van Kleffens remarked that executive meetings should be held only when no other course was open, and then business should be confined to procedural matters with discussions of substance held to a minimum. Colonel Hodgson stated his government thought that in such meetings under no circumstances should matters of substance be discussed.

4. Mr. Cadogan said that since his government wished the Security Council to conduct an immediate investigation of the Iranian application, he considered the Council should resume its meetings to show that it was impossible for one member to veto discussion.

⁵⁸ Prepared by the United States Delegation to the United Nations at New York on April 8; given control number US/S/4.

5. Mr. Byrnes then presented a preliminary draft of a proposal he intended to make, which he stressed was not being submitted for adoption, but merely as a basis of discussion. The draft was almost exactly similar to the statement the Secretary delivered at the Council on March 29 (see page 437 of Journal No. 22 of the Security Council), except that in the draft of March 28 Mr. Byrnes specified April 1 as the date replies should be received, and in his statement the next day the date was April 2.⁵⁹ Mr. Byrnes then said in his opinion the seriousness of the dispute would be greatly diminished if the USSR could assure the Council that the withdrawal of troops was not predicated upon any Iranian concessions, and that the "unforeseen circumstances" did not refer to further agreements or concessions. Mr. Byrnes emphasized that the assurances he specified would not only be consistent with the Soviet-Iranian understanding as quoted by Gromyko, but would also agree with the statement Vyshinsky had made at the January 30 Council meeting that under the resolution then adopted, any member, at any time, could call for an immediate report from the parties.

6. Subject to detailed consideration, Mr. Hassan expressed general agreement with the Byrnes' statement. Mr. Hodgson, however, thought that such proposals would be appropriate only after investigation, and that since no evidence on the merits had been called for, the Iranian representative at the next meeting should be asked to confine his statements to the issue of postponement. If there was no postponement, he continued, both the Iranian and Soviet representatives should be asked to submit a written statement setting out the full facts since in the absence of the Soviet representative Ala should not make an oral statement. Mr. Hodgson was willing to have a time limit set, since he only wished to secure the facts, and had no desire to delay the proceedings. Mr. Byrnes in reply said that the information sought in his proposal, plus the statement already before the Council, would be sufficient to enable the Council to form its conclusions, and would further obviate the embarrassing situation of obtaining a full Iranian, but no Soviet case. Mr. Cadogan thought that if Ala were to make an oral statement, public opinion might be distressed if he were denied the right to make further oral statements. Mr. Najera agreed with the substance of Mr. Byrnes' proposals, which he considered a compromise between the Egyptian and Soviet motions in the Council, and suggested that Mr. Gromyko be informed of them before the next meeting. Mr. Bonnet, while in general agreeing with Mr. Byrnes, pointed out that the Council would be unable to vote on questions of substance.

⁵⁹ This concerned the date the Soviet Union and Iran were to report to the Security Council on the status of negotiations between them; see telegram 17, March 29, from New York, p. 396.

7. Dr. Lange considered that the request for information from the two governments involved a decision of substance, that such a decision could not be taken with[out] the USSR's concurring vote, and that while the Secretary General might request information his action could not be taken in the name of the Council. Replying, Mr. Cado-gan thought the Council could advise the President to request the information, but in any event no decision of substance was involved, for at San Francisco there had been agreed that no one power could prevent investigation. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the parties to a dispute did not vote. Dr. Quo then reminded the group that the Committee of Experts was considering the procedure by which the existence of a dispute should be established, and Mr. Byrnes said he considered this a highly important question which would have to be discussed in an open meeting.

8. There was general agreement that Ala should attend the next meeting to answer Mr. Lange's questions as well as any others. It was also agreed that Mr. Byrnes would revise his draft and express his views at the next meeting; that Mr. Gromyko should be informed of the meeting in the usual way, and that the next meeting would be held at 3 PM the following day.

9. Mr. Lie considered it would be necessary for him to talk with his legal experts concerning both Mr. Byrnes' proposal and the general position arising from Mr. Gromyko's withdrawal. He also suggested an informal meeting of the Council members to discuss the temporary headquarters of United Nations, and said in conclusion the Committee of Experts would present additional rules of procedure within a few days.

The meeting rose at 6:40 PM.

501.BC/3-2946 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

TOP SECRET
URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1946—noon.

575. . . .

For your info, following is outline of position which Secretary proposes to take in further discussions of Iran problem :

- (1) We are not going to agree to Sov request for postponement.
- (2) In view of ambiguity as to whether there is an understanding or not, and if there is an understanding why it is that Iran cannot accept it, we plan to ask both Sov and Iran Govs to let Council know status of any so-called understanding or any other agreement which has been reached or is in the course of discussion. It is planned to

request both Govs to make this info available for Council meeting on April 2. We have confidential info from Qavam as to general character of negotiations but he has insisted that neither we nor his Ambassador can use this info since he fears that its disclosure might further antagonize SovGov. We are therefore making requests to both Govs in an effort to bring details of proposed agreements into open in order that it may be clear why we are taking firm stand in Council.

(3) Our position will not be one of antagonism to Sov Union but will be couched in terms to indicate that Council is desirous of helping to arrive at a constructive settlement which will strengthen Iran hand so that they will not have to accept agreement under pressure.

(4) We hope in this way to prevent possibility of Sov troops being used to bring pressure on IranGov to reach unequitable agreement. We plan not to back away from insistence that Sov troops must withdraw unconditionally.

ACHESON

861.24591/3-2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 29, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received March 30—11:25 a. m.]

424. Following is substance of talk I had with Qavam today:

He has not yet reached agreement with Soviets and thinks final understanding will still take some time.

Yesterday he delivered to Secretary of Soviet Embassy three notes: First dealing with troop evacuation, second with oil and third with adjustment Azerbaijan situation. First two evidently followed lines indicated mytel 411, March 27. In connection troop withdrawal I gathered he did not insist on completion in 4 weeks. He said he had been unable obtain from Soviet Ambassador any clarification of phrase "unless something unforeseen happens". With respect oil I understood he had modified his previous draft proposal to provide for 50-year duration of company as requested by Soviet Govt instead of 30 as he had intended. Otherwise these two notes presumably were as he showed them to me March 27.

Note on Azerbaijan stated Qavam's willingness to allow use of Turkish language so long as Persian remained official language and to allow Provincial Council to appoint all subordinate officials in province. Governor General would be appointed by Tehran Govt subject to approval by Provincial Council. Three functions: War, finance and police (and, of course, foreign affairs) must be reserved absolutely to Central Govt.

PriMin did not make clear to me whether he was merely informing Russians of his position this regard or was requesting their intercession to bring about Azerbaijan settlement on this basis. He said, however, that he had told Soviet Secretary that unless his proposal on Azerbaijan was accepted he would regard any oil agreement as nullified (I pointed out that obviously he should also refuse oil agreement if troop evacuation was not carried out on schedule. He agreed and said he would make this clear to Soviets.)

We had lengthy discussion on question of whether he should inform Security Council of these negotiations. I cited points made by Ebtehaj (mytel 414, March 28⁶⁰) and added suggestion that revelation need not necessarily be embarrassing either to him or to Russians since it could be said that negotiations had been free and based on logic of situation. Although I did not directly urge him to take decision either way, at end of conversation and in reply my direct question, Qavam stated emphatically that he had decided to instruct Ala to give full information to SC whenever he requests such authority. I suggest you convey this to Ala.

PriMin stated he had already sent telegram to Ala touching lightly on steps where he had felt latter might have gone too fast but in effect fully endorsing Ambassador's actions to date.

I asked whether Qavam intended to withdraw complaint from SC if his exchanges of notes with Soviets resulted in agreement. He replied that Ala had been and would be instructed to see that matter remained of continuing concern to SC until last Russian soldier had left Iran.

PriMin remarked that he had not told British of his oil negotiations and asked whether I thought he should do so. I said I could give no official advice. However, I thought he should remember that Britain was also signatory to tripartite treaty of 1942 and might well feel entitled to be informed. If he failed to tell British what he was doing he would risk their displeasure and would gain little since news of agreement would soon reach them in any case. He wanted British support in SC and wanted to be on good terms with all Iran's neighbors. I felt he could present matter to them in such way that they would not object since he could point out importance of laying foundation for permanent good relations with USSR. He should, however, take care not to invite counter-demand by Britain for oil rights. Qavam said he agreed with my observations and would inform British on this point.

In conclusion Qavam declared that he did not take seriously Soviet walk-out from SC and believed they would eventually return to

⁶⁰ Not printed.

meeting. He expressed optimism that satisfactory settlement would be reached.

Sent Dept 424; repeatd London 86, Moscow 137.

MURRAY

501.BC/3-2946 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, March 29, 1946—9:15 p. m.

17. With the Soviet delegate absent for the second consecutive day, the United Nations Security Council at a public meeting Friday,⁶¹ unanimously adopted a U.S. proposal calling on Russia and Iran to report to the Council the existing status of negotiations between these two Governments.

As a result of this action, Secretary-General Trygve Lie was instructed by the Council Chairman Dr. Quo Tai-Chi to request the Soviet and Iranian Governments to forward this information in time for the next Council meeting on Wednesday morning, April 3, at 11 o'clock. At this time the Council will decide whether to consider immediately substance of the Iranian complaint that the presence of Soviet troops and agents in Iran poses a threat to international peace and security.

The proposal, introduced by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, was promptly endorsed by the nine other delegates present. Under its terms the Soviet Union and Iran are specifically asked to advise whether the reported withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran is conditional upon the conclusion of agreements between the two Governments on other subjects.

Byrnes' original statement asked for the information to be forwarded in time for a meeting of the Security Council next Tuesday, April 2. Some delegates favored a longer period and Chairman Quo compromised by setting Wednesday morning, April 3, as the date for the next session.

The U. S. statement took note of the fact assurances have been given the Council by the Soviet representative that the Soviet Union has commenced to withdraw its troops from Iran; that it is the intention of the Soviet Government to proceed with the withdrawal of its troops as rapidly as possible; and that barring "unforeseen circumstances" the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran will be completed within 5 or 6 weeks.

The statement delivered by Byrnes continued:

"The Iranian representative has stated that the dispute with the

⁶¹ March 29; for the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on that date, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 70-82.

Soviet Union arises from the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in the Tripartite Treaty of Jan. 29, 1942, and has requested the Council to recommend their prompt and unconditional withdrawal!"

It also recalled the Soviet representative's announcement that the withdrawal was being made in accordance with an understanding with the Iranian Government has not been confirmed by the Iranian Government.

The statement also said that assurances given the Council by Gromyko had not been completely unqualified, but are subject to change in the event of "unforeseen circumstances", and added that apparently negotiations on certain matters are still proceeding between the two governments about which the Council is not fully informed.

It pointed out that if the Council should see fit to recommend the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, the withdrawal could not be completed in a substantially shorter period than the 5 or 6 weeks' time limit specified by the Russian delegate.

"But the members of the Council must be solicitous to avoid any possibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran being used to influence or coerce the Government of Iran in negotiations with the Soviet Government. If the Council could obtain more adequate and exact information regarding the status of any negotiations between the Soviet and the Iranian Government, the Council might be able to satisfy itself that the assurances of the Soviet Government as to the prompt withdrawal of troops from Iran are in fact for all practical purposes unconditional. In that event there might be no need for the Council to go into the substantive issues, provided it reserved the right to both parties to have the case immediately taken up by the Council should there be any developments which threaten to retard the withdrawal of troops," Byrnes' statement said.⁶²

⁶² For the full text of Mr. Byrnes' statement, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 74, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 21, 1946, p. 620. Telegram 19, March 29, 10 p. m., (relayed to Tehran in Department's 258), which furnished the text to the Department was signed by Mr. Byrnes and concluded as follows: "As I emphasized in conversation with Ambassador Ala today it is essential that the Iranian Government make clear to the Council the exact status of its conversations with the Soviet and the extent to which, if any, conditions are attached to the promised withdrawal of Soviet troops. I suggested to Ala that it might be appropriate for the PriMin to inform the Soviet Ambassador that in view of the demand by the Security Council for information it [he] could no longer refrain from making a statement regarding the pending negotiations dealing with the question of whether the withdrawal of troops was conditional upon agreements on other matters. The Premier might also express the hope to the Soviet Ambassador that the Soviet Government would inform the Council that no conditions were attached to the promised withdrawal of the troops and would make a similar statement to the PriMin so that there would be no discrepancy in the reports by the Soviet and Iranian Governments to the Council. If the Soviet Government could not do this, the PriMin might make clear he would have to inform the Council that the withdrawal of troops had been made conditional upon agreement on other subjects.

"Urgent action is necessary in view of date set for replies." (861.24591/3-2946)

All delegates present not only endorsed Byrnes' statement, but also took occasion to thank the U. S. Secretary for presenting it.

Shortly after the meeting opened, Chairman Quo invited Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, to join Council members in their discussion on procedural aspects of the Iranian issue. Ala proceeded to answer questions, three of which were asked by the Polish delegate just before the close of Wednesday's (March 26) open session.

Ala said that his Government's instructions were broad and clear and gave him discretion to act as he saw fit in behalf of Iran. He added that he had acted in accord with his instructions and had reported all he had done to his Government.

Ala said that he had no information, official or otherwise, that any Soviet troops have returned to Russia from Iran, although they may have moved within Iran. He declared that there could be no true negotiations between the two countries while Soviet troops remained in Iran and that the Iranian Prime Minister had instructed him to urge the Security Council to recommend that Russian armed forces be evacuated unconditionally.

The Iranian Ambassador pointed out that one of the reasons why the Prime Minister had asked him to act was that as head of the Iranian Government he wanted to be free of pressure from any outside Government. He also stated in reply to a question that the new Iranian Parliament could not be elected until foreign troops are withdrawn unconditionally from Iran, explaining that such a stipulation had been voted by the last Parliament before it went out of office.

In regard to Gromyko's assertion that only details of a Soviet-Iranian agreement remained unsettled, Ala said that at best such was a misunderstanding. No agreement has been concluded and the indefinite character of the Soviet assurances increases tension in Iran, Ala declared, in urging immediate Security Council consideration of the Iranian complaint.

[STETTINUS]

S61.24591/3-3046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

TEHRAN, March 30, 1946—8 a. m.
[Received 8:10 p. m.]

426. For the Secretary. Last evening I delivered to Qavam message contained urtel 248, March 28. I urged upon him that our Govt and Security Council were trying to help him and that his best course was to be entirely open and honest and establish completely clean record for Iran.

Qavam agreed and assured me he would send instructions to Ala last night. However, he pointed out that it was vitally important

to avoid breach with Soviets and he feared Soviet Ambassador here might break off conversations if Ala took initiative in informing SC of current Irano-Soviet negotiations. He thought it would be far better if this information were elicited from Ala by questions from Council members. I concurred. PriMin therefore said that his instructions to Ala would authorize him to divulge negotiations only in response to questions which might be put to him.

He was also reluctant to have revealed all details as to terms of proposed agreements. I said that so long as agreements remained in present stage of negotiation I thought it would be unnecessary for Ala to do more than state subjects under discussion and explain that exact terms had not yet been settled because talks were still continuing and no final understanding had been reached. However as soon as agreements should be signed I felt Ala might as well inform SC of full details especially since they would certainly become known sooner or later. Again Qavam agreed and said he would instruct Ambassador accordingly.

[Here follows final paragraph of telegram, which concerns the Prime Minister's conversations with the British Chargé.]

MURRAY

861.24591/3-3046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN, March 30, 1946—noon.

[Received March 31—10 p. m.]

433. Except for Azerbaijan Soviet evacuation is reported well under way or about to get under way from northern areas previously occupied.⁶³ Karaj has been completely evacuated and Qazvin is almost clear. Reports have been received of evacuation of Firuzkuh, Shahi and Babol. Transports have been observed in Pahlavi harbor and heavy troop movements in direction of Pahlavi from Qazvin.

Sent Dept 433, repeated Moscow 139, London 88.

MURRAY

861.24591/4-146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 1, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received April 1—3 p. m.]

435. Qavam told me this morning he has still not arrived at any agreement with Russians.

⁶³ Telegram 104, March 30, from Tabriz, reported ostentatious Soviet troop movement indicating evacuation was starting that morning (861.24591/3-3046).

He has received and answered message from Ala conveying Trygve Lie's request for information on Irano-Soviet conversations. I understood his reply to Ala gave latter summary of talks substantially as I have previously reported them.

PriMin said that Soviet Ambassador had made oral reply to his notes on oil and Azerbaijan. On latter points Soviets agreed to conditions Qavam had laid down (mytel 411, March 27) and said they would use their moral influence to bring about settlement on that basis. Qavam indicated to me he is no longer worried on this score.

With respect oil, however, Sadchikov said Moscow made following counterproposals:

1. Since Iran proposed to furnish no capital other than value of land, USSR could not accept equal participation of two countries and must insist on 51% Russian holdings.

2. Western Azerbaijan must not be excluded.

3. Instead of requiring Majlis approval within 3 months of its re-assembly, agreement must call for Majlis approval within 6 months after March 24 (date of commencement of Red Army evacuation of Iran).

Moscow accepted stipulation that security in connection oil exploitation should be furnished solely by Iranian forces.

On March 31 Qavam sent emissary to Sadchikov to say that he could not recede from his demand that Irano-Soviet participation must be on equal basis. (He would, however, consent to some sort of subsidiary arrangement whereby USSR would in fact receive 51% of profits.) Further he could not include western Azerbaijan except for small piece of territory contiguous to USSR and not contiguous to Turkey or Iraq. PriMin told me he had sent message that if Russians were not satisfied with these terms, "they could do whatever they pleased".

PriMin said he had received report this morning that Soviets had established new military post east of Qazvin which he feared might be intended as intimidation following his rejection of counterproposals on oil.

Qavam asked me what attitude I thought Security Council would take toward his negotiations. I replied that I thought he had done wisely to give Ala facts and that so long as he (Qavam) was negotiating freely, not under duress, I believed Security Council would recognize his right to make agreement with USSR.

He also asked my views as to possible British reaction, to which I made substantially same reply.

(In this connection I realize that in broad picture mere presence Soviet troops in Iran constitutes form of duress. However, it may also be argued with some force that course of Qavam's negotiations to

date in Moscow and Tehran demonstrates pressure on him is not overwhelming and that agreements which may be reached will have been result of give-and-take discussion by both sides.)

Qavam seemed worried by fact he is in position of revealing subjects of Russian communications to him which Soviets had marked "Secret". He feared this would antagonize them. I tried to reassure him by pointing out these matters must necessarily come out eventually.

Sent Dept, repeated Moscow 140, London 89.

MURRAY

861.24591/4-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 2, 1946—1 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

[Received April 3—6:45 a. m.]

439. For the Secretary. Most unfortunately I did not receive until late last night urtel 19, March 29 from New York relayed in Deptel 258, March 29.⁶⁴ (For reasons for delay see mytel 440, April 2.)⁶⁵

I saw Qavam at 10 this morning and read him your statement in Security Council March 29 together with account of your remarks to Ala as to procedure Iran Govt should follow to induce Soviet Govt to disavow any conditions which might be attached to withdrawal Red Army troops from Iran. Prime Minister had received nothing from Ala this subject.

Qavam said he greatly regretted delay in receipt your message since he would have been glad to adopt course you suggested. He was at first reluctant to take any action now for two reasons:

1. Because he felt it too late to have any influence on Security Council proceedings and
2. Because he feared his request to Soviet Ambassador for concerted Irano-Soviet statement would be met by counterproposal that Soviet Govt would agree only if Iran Govt accepted Russian terms on oil deal.

I urged on him that it might not be too late and that in any case it would always be to his advantage to get Soviet acquiescence in unconditional withdrawal of troops regardless of Security Council proceedings. I reminded him that he himself had from first endeavored persuade Soviet Ambassador to eliminate qualifying phrase "unless something unforeseen happens." With respect possible Russian counterproposal I remarked Russian bargaining position might

⁶⁴ See footnote 62, p. 397.

⁶⁵ Not printed; the reasons given for the delay were the methods of transmittal and coding by the Department (124.916/4-246).

be weaker than he assumed. Soviet Govt was in very embarrassing position before Security Council and might be glad to give assurances suggested in order to avoid discussion of substantive issues.

Prime Minister ultimately agreed with viewpoint I presented and said he would speak to Sadchikov tomorrow morning along lines you suggested to Ala.

MURRAY

861.24591/4-346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 3, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received April 3—12: 54 p. m.]

456. For the Secretary. In press conference today Prince Firuz revealed Ala would inform Security Council that Soviet note of March 24 regarding withdrawal of Soviet troops did not contain any qualifications. This is correct according to information Qavam has recently given me and I do not want you to be misled by statement in first paragraph mytel 395 March 25 to effect that note said Iran would be evacuated "if nothing further happened". This qualification was not contained in any note and was merely communicated orally to Qavam by Soviet Ambassador when latter called at 10 p. m. March 25, 3 hours after he delivered note.

MURRAY

501.BC/4-346 : Telegram

The United States Representative to the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, April 3, 1946—9: 20 p. m.

29. The Security Council met Wednesday morning, April 3,⁶⁶ at 11: 13 a. m. to consider replies from the Governments of the Soviet Union and Iran on the "existing status" of bilateral negotiations between those two countries. Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, Soviet delegate, was not present.

Council Chairman Dr. Quo Tai-chi invited Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, to sit at the Council table. Dr. Quo read letters from Secretary-General Trygve Lie, advising that he (Lie) had requested the Soviet Union and Iranian representatives to have their Governments submit reports on the status of their negotiations. The Chair-

⁶⁶ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 3, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 83-87.

man also read a letter from the Prime Minister of Iran, stating that Ala has been and continues to be fully accredited and qualified to represent Iran before the Council.

The Soviet reply to the Council's request for information said that negotiations had led to an understanding regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and that other questions were not connected with the withdrawal.⁶⁷ The Soviet report did not mention "unforeseen circumstances", a proviso included by Gromyko in earlier statements to the Council.

The Iranian answer⁶⁸ said that the negotiations had not achieved "positive results" and Soviet agents, officials and armed forces continue to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. It pointed out that on March 24—the day before present session of the Council opened—the Soviet Ambassador to Iran informed the Iranian Prime Minister that the promise to evacuate Russian troops from Iran within a period of 5 or 6 weeks was on the condition that no unforeseen circumstances should occur. Three days later, in another conversation with the Iranian Prime Minister, the same Soviet representative said that there would be no further cause for anxiety and no unforeseen circumstances would take place if agreement could be reached on the questions of oil concessions and a form of autonomous government for the Province of Azerbaidjan, the Iranian report added.

After the replies had been read, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes said that he did not care to discuss them until he had an opportunity to study them. He then asked Ala whether in the light of the replies he had any suggestion to make as to what action should be taken by the Council.

Ala answered that Iran would be willing not to press further at this time for consideration of the matter, provided the Soviet representative would be willing to remove the condition of "unforeseen circumstances" relating to the withdrawal of troops and give the Council assurance that the troops would be evacuated unconditionally not later than May 6, and provided that these matters remain on the agenda of the Council for consideration at any time.⁶⁹

Chairman Quo adjourned the meeting at 11:45 a. m. until 11:00 a. m. Thursday, April 4, with the observation that replies had been

⁶⁷ The reply by Ambassador Gromyko was dated April 3. It also stated that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran had been renewed on March 24 and would be completed within one-and-a-half months. For text of the reply, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 84.

⁶⁸ By Ambassador Ala, dated April 2; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 85.

⁶⁹ For text of Ambassador Ala's statements, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 87.

received too late to enable the Secretariat to make copies for the delegates.

Wednesday afternoon Security Council delegates met informally at a closed session to discuss latest developments in the Iranian question.⁷⁰

The Security Council's committee of experts Wednesday afternoon, April 3, reached agreement on the redrafting of eighteen provisional rules of procedure.

[STETTINIUS]

123 Rossow, Robt., Jr.: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TABRIZ, April 4, 1946—9 a. m.
[Received April 5—9: 48 a. m.]

113. There has been no major Soviet troop movement in or out of Tabriz since that reported mytel 105, March 31.⁷¹ Only rear echelon activities observed here.

Attention is directed to large volume of troops and material that passed through Tabriz during March. These are deployed somewhere in this province believed mainly in area south of Lake Urmia. If Soviets do begin to evacuate, we here in Tabriz will very well know it. Furthermore if Soviets intend to evacuate by May 6, which I do not believe, they will have to start very soon for it took 4 weeks to bring these troops and materials in and it will presumably take as long to move them out.

I strongly urge the following:

(1) That Department and Embassy remove all prohibitions against my travel in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. I do not believe there is undue danger involved in such travel and there is now an officer to leave in charge here in my absence.

(2) That I be authorized to insist upon being given a Soviet pass to go wherever I choose in my consular district. When Soviets refused to give me pass for Mahabad (mytel 42, March 7) Soviet Consul General's subsequent absurd explanation was that he did not know whether Mahabad was in his consular district. Since for other reasons I was not able to make trip at the time anyway, I was not in position to press matter.

(3) That my insistence re passes be accompanied by general attack on Soviet pass requirement. There is not now the slightest shred of

⁷⁰ A memorandum on the Second Executive Meeting of the Security Council, held at 3 p. m., April 3, 1946, not printed; it was prepared by the United States Delegation at the United Nations on April 8 and was given control number US/S/5 (filed under 761.91/4-846).

⁷¹ Not printed; it reported movement out of Tabriz of a large column of Soviet trucks carrying troops and a few trucks moving artillery (861.24591/3-3146).

justification legal or otherwise for requiring passes for travel here and requirement is a flagrant interference in conduct of American Government affairs. Please instruct urgently.^{71a}

Sent Department as 113, Tehran 93, repeated Moscow 61, London 40, Ankara 25, Baghdad 21.

Rossow

861.24591/4-446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 4, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

[Received 4:22 p. m.]

460. At 10:30 this morning Qavam informed us that he has reached virtual agreement with Soviet Ambassador on all points under discussion and that draft notes to be exchanged on withdrawal of troops, oil, and Azerbaijan are in process of preparation. (Communications on Azerbaijan will be merely unsigned memoranda since Prime Minister prefers keep this question on informal basis to avoid pretext for Soviet intervention.)

Qavam saw Sadchikov late last night and they prepared together text of communiqué to be issued as soon as Moscow approval obtained. Sadchikov promised to get approval by telephone, and Prime Minister thinks statement may be made public today.⁷² Substance of draft which we saw is:

1. Negotiations begun in Moscow have been continued Tehran and full agreement reached.

^{71a} In telegram 114, April 5, Mr. Rossow reported a serious deterioration in the security situation in Tabriz during the past week as evidenced by the relaxation of party discipline and the arming of irresponsible elements who made no secret of their hatred of Americans and British (391.1115/4-546). The Department informed him in telegram 13, April 5, that "while we agree fully that you should be free to travel about your district and are entitled to receive Soviet pass without delay, it is our feeling that, due to delicate situation in Tabriz described in urtel 114 Mar 4 [April 5] you should not travel extensively and should not press Russians at this moment for travel permit" (861.24591/4-546). The following day Ambassador Murray directed Mr. Rossow to impress on Mr. Pishevari the extreme importance of safeguarding the lives and property of foreigners at all times (telegram 64, repeated to the Department as No. 476, 891.00/4-646).

On April 7, in telegram 116, Mr. Rossow reported the views of the "Deputy Prime Minister" of Azerbaijan that while his government did not consider itself sovereign and independent, it did not recognize the Central Government as representative of the will of the people and did not recognize any of its laws and treaties if they were in opposition to that will (691.1112/4-746).

⁷² The communiqué was signed by the Iranian Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador at 4 a. m., April 5. Written notes were exchanged the same day; texts of the exchanges dealing with the evacuation of Soviet troops and the oil accord were transmitted in telegram 485, April 9, p. 413.

2. Soviet troops will be entirely withdrawn from Iran in 5 or 6 weeks. No conditions are attached this withdrawal.

3. An agreement for joint Irano-Soviet Oil Company will be submitted to Majlis within 7 months.

4. Azerbaijan is purely internal Iranian problem and will be settled by Iran Govt direct with inhabitants of province.⁷³

Prime Minister said that on receipt of Moscow agreement to foregoing communiqué he would instruct Ala inform Security Council that this was in fact position of affairs and that matter could be considered settled. We suggested it would be well to make clear that question would not be considered finally settled until all Soviet troops had in fact been withdrawn. Qavam assented and said he would incorporate such statement in his telegram to Ala.

Major terms of oil deal as agreed upon in principle are:

(1) Term of company to be 50 years.

(2) During first 25 years control to be 51% Soviet and 49% Iranian. During second 25 years control to be on basis of equality for both Govts.

(3) Territory to be covered by company's operations is Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan, Northern Khorassan and that part of Azerbaijan east of line drawn southeast from junction of Irano-Soviet-Turkish frontiers along eastern side Lake Rezaieh to Miandoab (this excludes all territory directly contiguous to Turkish and Iraqi frontiers).

(4) All security forces in connection company operations to be Iranian.

Azerbaijan understanding remains as stated mytels 429 [424?], March 29 and 435, April. 1.

Qavam seemed exceptionally cheerful and evidently considered solution arrived at as satisfactory, although he admitted he had had to give way on question of percentages of participation in oil company.

He said he had been much disturbed by Ala's statements in SC yesterday, since Ambassador had gone beyond his instructions. One specific point he mentioned this connection was Ala assertion Soviets had said evacuation would be carried out without condition "if satisfactory agreements were reached on other points". He said he had never even told Ala about this. We gathered his instructions to Ala had been to make only general statement that negotiations were being

⁷³ According to telegram 480, April 8, 10 a. m., from Tehran, the Iranian Prime Minister on April 7 informed an officer of the American Embassy that he contemplated inviting an Azerbaijani commission to enter negotiations with an Iranian commission. He also stated that the interpretation of the communiqué by press correspondents and others to mean that Iranian security forces would not be sent into Azerbaijan after Soviet withdrawal was incorrect and that gendarmes and army forces would be sent into the province in due course. (861.24591/4-846)

carried on, that conditions were not attached to troop withdrawal, and that exact subjects and character of agreements could not be announced until they had been concluded.

It was after learning of Ala's declaration that Qavam sent for Sadchikov last night and proposed issuance of communiqué. He said Sadchikov was highly annoyed by Ala remarks, since on previous day he and Qavam had mutually agreed that both Iranian and Soviet representatives would formally assure SC troop withdrawal was unconditional (Deptel 258, March 29⁷⁴ and mytel 439, April 2) and would so make unnecessary any discussion of substantive questions. Soviet Ambassador complained Qavam said one thing here and another thing through his representative New York. However Prime Minister had told him that was water over dam and had persuaded him to agree to communiqué in order remedy matters.

Sent Dept 460, repeated Moscow 147, London 95.

MURRAY

501.BC/4-446 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, April 4, 1946—6 : 45 p. m.

35. The Security Council, at a 95-minute meeting on Thursday, April 4,⁷⁵ agreed on a solution to the Iranian question. The vote was 9-0 with Australia abstaining.

With the Soviet delegate still absent, the session was called to order at 11:10 a. m. by the Chairman, Dr. Quo Tai-Chi. The agenda was adopted without comment. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, was invited to take a seat at the Council table.

U. S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes submitted a resolution,⁷⁶ which deferred action on the Iranian issue until May 6, 1946, under the following conditions:

1. That the Council note the statements of the Iranian representative that the appeal to the Council arises from the presence of Soviet troops in Iran and their continued presence there beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942.

⁷⁴ See footnote 62, p. 397.

⁷⁵ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 4, see SC. *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 88-99.

⁷⁶ For text of the draft resolution offered by Mr. Byrnes, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 88.

2. That the Council note the responses on April 3, 1946, of the Soviet and Iranian Governments⁷⁷ pursuant to the Secretary General's request for information as to the status of negotiations between the two Governments, and as to whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops was conditioned upon agreement on other subjects.

3. That the Council, in particular, note and rely upon the assurances of the Soviet Government that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran has already commenced and that Russia expects that the complete evacuation of its troops from the whole of Iran will be accomplished within 5 or 6 weeks.

4. That the Council note that the proposals under negotiation between the Iranian and Soviet Governments are not connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

5. That the Council is solicitous to avoid any possibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran being used to influence the course of negotiations between the two Governments.

6. That the Council recognizes that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the whole of Iran cannot be completed in a substantially shorter period of time than that within which the Soviet Government has declared it to be its intention to complete such withdrawal.

The resolution also provides that the Soviet and Iranian Governments shall report to the Council on May 6 whether or not the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed, and that the Council will then decide what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required.

The resolution left the way open for the Council to consider at any time, as the first item on its agenda, reports from any member of the Security Council on developments which may retard or threaten to retard the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran.

In support of his proposal Byrnes said that it spoke for itself, but pointed out that it rested upon his earlier suggestion that the Soviet and Iranian Governments should be communicated with through their representatives. He added that he had stated then that if the Council were able to ascertain adequate and exact information as to the status of the negotiations, the Council might be able to satisfy itself that the assurances of the Soviet Government as to the prompt withdrawal of troops from Iran were in fact, for all practical purposes, unconditional.

Egypt, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Poland, Mexico and France, in the order named, voiced support for the proposal and praised the course followed by the U.S. Secretary, before Australia announced that it would refrain from voting on the resolution.

The Australian delegate took exception to the procedure followed by the Council and to what he termed an incomplete investigation of the facts in the Iranian question. He said that the case posed a chal-

⁷⁷ The Iranian response was dated April 2, 1946.

lenge to the Council and that, in his opinion, the Council did not face the challenge. In stating that he would refrain from voting, the Australian delegate said that he was reserving the right to call for an investigation of all facts on May 6.

The Netherlands delegate endorsed the resolution, paid tribute to Secretary Byrnes and disagreed with the Australian delegate, stating that he did not believe the Council shirked its duties under the charter.

Chairman Quo, speaking for China, also endorsed the resolution and paid tribute to Secretary Byrnes for his valuable contribution to the Council.

On a show of hands vote only Australia abstained from supporting the resolution.

Chairman Quo then called on the Iranian representative. Ala said that the fundamental problem was to have all foreign troops removed from Iran. He added that the people of Iran were willing to accept the Soviet pledge, as the Security Council had, that its troops would be withdrawn unconditionally by May 6. Once this is accomplished, Ala said that he believed the Iranian Government will be able to negotiate with the Soviet Union on other questions.

Ala praised the Council for its firmness and courage. He said that the Council action already had instilled a feeling of confidence among the smaller nations, and concluded that the results achieved have significance of permanent value and that Iran has received something from the Council which it could not have obtained alone.

Secretary Byrnes expressed appreciation for the adoption of his resolution and said that he was happy to hear the Iranian representative agree to the solution. He added that the withdrawal of troops from Iran without condition was the only sane method to follow. The U.S. Secretary concluded by expressing the opinion that the United Nations today was truly a center for harmonizing international differences.

[Here follow discussions of matters other than the Iranian question.]

[STETTINIUS]

[The Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, interviewed Generalissimo Stalin on April 4. The question of Iran was one of the matters discussed; for Ambassador Smith's report on the interview, see telegram 1053, April 5, 6 p. m., from Moscow, volume VI, page 732.]

501.BC/4-846 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

PRIORITY

NEW YORK, April 8, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received 8:20 p. m.]

41. For Byrnes from Stettinius. Official text (Doc. S/30) of a letter dated April 6th from Ambassador Gromyko to the Security Council President has just been received. It follows:

Mr. President: On 26 March, when the Security Council proceeded to consider the Iranian Government's statement of 18 March regarding the delay in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, I proposed, under instructions from the Soviet Government, that this question should not be considered by the Security Council.

I pointed out on that occasion that, under the understanding with the Iranian Government, full evacuation of the Soviet troops from Iran was started on 24 March and would be completed in 5 or 6 weeks and that in consequence the Security Council had no reason to consider the Iranian question.

The Security Council, however, did not agree with the Soviet Government and retained the Iranian question on the agenda. In the meantime the Soviet-Iranian negotiations continued and, as is known from the joint Soviet-Iranian communiqué published on 4 April, an understanding on all points was reached between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments.

This has fully confirmed the accuracy of the Soviet Government's statement of 26 March and the absence of any reason for bringing the Iranian question before the Security Council for consideration.

The Soviet Government, moreover, cannot ignore the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 4 April. Under this resolution the Security Council decided to continue the consideration of the Iranian question on 6 May despite the fact that on 3 April the Soviet Government stated that the question of the evacuation of Soviet troops had been settled by an understanding reached between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments. Such a resolution of the Security Council might have been well-founded if the position in Iran had threatened international peace and security, as provided in article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Under the Charter, the Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It is, however, quite obvious that in fact such a position did not and does not now exist in Iran, so that the Security Council had no reason to give further consideration to the Iranian question on 6 May.

Accordingly, the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council of 4 April is incorrect and illegal, being in conflict with the Charter of the United Nations.

For the above-mentioned reasons the Soviet Government insists that the Iranian question should be removed from the agenda of the Security Council.

I have the honour, etc.,

Signed. Andrei A. Gromyko
Ambassador

His Excellency,
Dr. Quo Tai-Chi,
President of the Security Council.

STETTINIUS

501.BC/4-846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1946—7 p. m.

URGENT

11. For Stettinius. You should not oppose the placing of Gromyko's letter on agenda, or its being considered as the first item, if he so moves. If a motion to delete the Iranian question from the Council's jurisdiction is made you should strongly oppose along the following lines:

There seems to be no occasion for the Council on the basis of the letter of the Soviet representative to rescind at this time the resolution that it adopted on April 4 deferring further proceedings on the Iranian case until May 6.

The United States is pleased to learn that the Soviet Government is satisfied (1) that an agreement has been reached between the Soviet and Iranian Governments on all questions and (2) that the Security Council will find no reason for further discussion of the Iranian question on May 6. The United States sincerely hopes that the difficulties between the two governments have been satisfactorily adjusted on the basis of freely negotiated agreements and that on May 6 upon being informed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran has been completed the Council will be able to drop the case from its agenda.

Twice however the difficulties between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government have been brought to the Council's attention by the Government of Iran. On the first occasion the Iranian Government complained of activities of the Soviet troops on Iranian territory which it contended were not authorized or permitted by the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942 and interfered with the sovereignty of Iran. On the second occasion the Iranian Government complained of the continued presence of the Soviet troops in Iran

without its approval beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in that Treaty.

In the view of the United States the complaints of the Iranian Government were properly brought to the Council's attention under Article 34 of the Charter. It is the clear duty of the Council to consider the complaint of any sovereign state that foreign troops are being used in its territory to interfere with its sovereignty in a manner not authorized or permitted by treaty. It is the clear duty of the Council to consider the complaint of any sovereign state that foreign troops are continuing to remain on its territory without its consent beyond the date authorized by treaty. Such complaints present grave issues under Article 2, section 4 of the Charter, as to "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Charter." When such complaints are presented to the Council, clearly it is not permissible for the Council to take the position that the continuation of the conditions complained about would not endanger international peace and security.

On the basis of the Soviet assurances that withdrawal of Soviet troops had commenced and that the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran would be completed within 5 or 6 weeks, the Iranian representative stated that his Government would be willing to have further proceedings deferred until May 6, provided that the Iranian appeal remained on the agenda. The Iranian representative did not state that Soviet troops had remained in Iran after March 2 with the approval of the Iranian Government. The Soviet assurances as to the prompt withdrawal of their troops from Iran and the willingness of the Iranian government to accept those assurances made it possible for the Council to proceed on the basis that the conditions which the Iranian Government had complained about would not be allowed to continue. Those assurances, however, did not establish that the conditions complained of did not exist. The Council must satisfy itself that the Soviet troops in Iran which gave rise to the conditions complained of have been withdrawn.

If nothing occurs to interrupt the withdrawal of Soviet troops and their withdrawal is completed by May 6, there will be no need for the Council to go into the substantive issues involved, and on May 6 the Iranian appeal may be dropped from the agenda. But nothing has been submitted to the Council which would justify the Council in reopening the case to take affirmative action to drop the Iranian appeal from the agenda on the request of the Soviet Government before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran has in fact been completed.⁷⁸

BYRNES

⁷⁸ The above statement was not made, being set aside in favor of the one proposed in Department's telegram 20, April 13, p. 420.

891.6363/4-846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

281. We greatly regret that Emb has approached PriMin with regard to negotiations on behalf American oil companies.⁷⁹ As stated in Deptel 238, Mar 24 we are anxious that impression should not be obtained that we have been influenced in our recent actions before Security Council by selfish interest in Iranian petroleum. In that telegram we stated that any interest which Americans might have in Baluchistan fields should not be discussed "in connection with withdrawal of Soviet troops and related problems".

We do not wish any discussions with regard to possibility of Americans obtaining oil rights in Iran carried on by representatives this Govt or American oil companies at least until Soviet troops have evacuated Iran or until law prohibiting such negotiations is no longer effective. In no event should such discussions take place until Dept has stated that it has no objection and until arrangements have been made which would give interested American companies an equal opportunity.

Please make our position clear to representatives in Iran of interested American oil companies stressing they should make no approach on subject to the Iranian Govt until clearance has been given by Emb. We have informed interested oil companies in US in this sense.

In view of conversation reported in your telegram under reference you should again inform PriMin of our attitude in this regard.⁸⁰

BYRNES

861.24591/4-946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, April 9, 1946.

[Received April 9—10:50 p. m.]

485. Following translated texts of notes dated April 4 exchanged

⁷⁹ In telegram 481, April 8, 11 a. m., from Tehran, (received April 8, 11:26 a. m.), the Ambassador had reported: "Jernegan [Second Secretary of Embassy] called on PriMin yesterday to ask whether he would now be willing to receive negotiators on behalf American oil companies. Qavam asked how soon they might be expected and was told it seemed unlikely any could reach Tehran in less than month. He thereupon said he would be perfectly willing to receive them. Asked whether this would embarrass him in his relations with Soviets, Qavam replied that so long as American interest was confined to Baluchistan he would anticipate no trouble in that respect." (891.6363/4-846)

⁸⁰ In telegram 500, April 10, 4 p. m., Tehran reported: "Jernegan saw Qavam this morning and explained that our prior inquiry regarding possibility of American oil negotiations had been purely for background information and that American Govt did not desire early opening of such negotiations. PriMin said he understood and recalled that we had already made clear our position this regard. He remarked that there was plenty of time." (891.6363/4-1046)

between Prime Minister Qavam and Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov. Texts were published here April 8.

a. From Sadchikov to Qavam: "I hereby have the honor to inform Your Excellency that according to instructions received the Soviet Army Command in Iran has taken all preliminary steps for the complete evacuation of Iranian territory by all Soviet Army units within a period of one-and-one-half months as from March 24, 1946."

b. From Qavam to Sadchikov: "I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have taken note of the purport of Your Excellency's note stating that as a result of instructions received by the Soviet Army Command all preliminary steps for the complete evacuation of Iranian territory by all Soviet Army units within a period of one-and-one-half months starting from March 24, 1946, have been carried out."

c. From Qavam to Sadchikov: "Following the conversations which have taken place between us I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Imperial Government of Iran agrees that the Iranian and Soviet Governments should establish a joint Irano-Soviet Company to explore and exploit oil producing territories in northern Iran under the following fundamental conditions:

1. During the first 25 years of the company's operations 49% of the shares will be held by Iran and 51% of the shares will be held by the USSR, and during the second 25 years 50% of the shares will be held by Iran and 50% will be held by the USSR.

2. Profits accruing to the company will be divided in proportion to the shares of each party.

3. The boundaries of the lands originally allotted for exploration are those (shown) on the map which Your Excellency left with me during our conversation on March 24 with the exception of the part of western Azerbaijan situated on the western side of a line commencing at the point of intersection of the boundaries of Iran, Turkey and the USSR, crossing the eastern shore of Lake Rezaieh, and reaching the city of Miandoab, as additionally indicated on the said map on April 4, 1946. Meanwhile the Iranian Government undertakes not to grant a concession in the territory situated west of the said line to foreign companies or to Iranian companies with foreign participation or employing foreign capital.

4. On the Iranian side the capital will consist of the oil bearing lands mentioned in Article III which after technical operations shall contain oil wells the produce of which may be useful for the company and on the Soviet side the capital will consist of any kind of expenditures involved, instruments, equipment, and the salaries of the experts and laborers who may be needed for the extraction and refining of oil.

5. The period of operation of the company is 50 years.

6. After the expiration of the period of the company's operation the Iranian Government shall have the right to purchase the shares belonging to the USSR and/or to prolong the period of operation of the company.

7. The protection of the lands subject to exploration, the oil wells and all installations of the company will be carried out exclusively by Iranian security forces.

The agreement to be concluded later for the establishment of the said joint Irano-Soviet oil company according to the text of this note will be presented for ratification by the new Iranian Majlis as soon

as it has been elected and has begun its legislative activity in any case not later than 7 months after March 24 of the current year.”

d. From Sadchikov to Qavam: Note identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with note quoted immediately above.

Sent Department as 485, repeated Moscow 152, Tabriz 68, London 100, Cairo 199.

MURRAY

501.BC/4-946 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, April 9, 1946—7:30 p. m.

URGENT

[Received 7:36 p. m.]

49. For Byrnes and Acheson from Stettinius. Following is an unofficial text of a letter from the Iranian Ambassador reportedly submitted to Lie April 9. Official text⁸¹ will be sent as soon as available, but had not been submitted to the International Secretariat by 6:30 p. m., April 9.

“Sir: Permit me to thank you for your note of April 8, 1946 forwarding for my Government a copy of Mr. Gromyko’s letter of April 6 requesting that the question brought to the attention of the Security Council by Iran be removed from the agenda.

I am instructed to state that the position of the Iranian Government remains the same as stated to the Security Council in the meeting of April 4, 1946. It is the desire of my government that the matter referred by Iran to the Security Council remain on its agenda as provided by the resolution adopted on April 4, 1946.

Hussein Ala.”

STETTINIUS

861.24591/4-1046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 10, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 2:17 p. m.]

498. Prime Minister said today that Ala’s action on asking that Iranian question be retained on Security Council agenda was taken on basis earlier instructions. Qavam has sent no new instructions to Ala and at moment has no intention of doing so.

He would prefer to have matter remain on agenda but fears Soviets may soon demand that he join in their request for its withdrawal. (They have not yet approached him.) If they do, he proposes first to say that he can see no harm in letting question remain in present

⁸¹ For the official text, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. 2*, p. 47.

status before Security Council, but if Russians insist he feels he will be obliged to inform Council at least that Iran would not object to its elimination from agenda. He suggested Iran Govt might include in such communication an expression of hope that it would not prove necessary again to request Council action.

In this connection Prime Minister asked whether, if subject should be removed from agenda at this time, Iran could not return to Security Council at any time should circumstances require. Jernegan replied that he believed this was correct, since Council is supposed to be in continuous session. Qavam seemed to be debating with himself as to how far he could trust Russians. At one point he asked whether we believed Soviets could fail to carry out evacuation in view of public commitments they have made.

MURRAY

861.24591/4-1046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

MOST IMMEDIATE

295. Reurtel 498 Apr 10. With reference to Qavam's question whether Iran could return to Security Council at any time should subject be removed from agenda, please inform him immediately that while it is true that Council is intended to be in continuous session, actual experience in Iranian case up to present will demonstrate how difficult it may be in practice for Iran to obtain a prompt hearing. You should remind him Iran's request to be heard at Council table 2 weeks ago was granted only after the most strenuous efforts on part of US and other members of Council.

You should add that if Iran should ask for the withdrawal of the case after it had insisted so strongly that it be kept on the agenda until May 6 impression might well be created that Iran had not been entirely frank with the Council. It might appear that Iran had been using Council merely to bargain for better terms rather than to obtain assistance in upholding principles. There is a danger that Iran consequently would run the risk of losing much of the world sympathy and support which it presently enjoys. Members of Council would be likely to receive without enthusiasm an Iranian request for restoring the case to the agenda and no assurance could be given that such a request would receive majority approval.

For your info I am leaving for France on Apr 22⁸² and probably will not be back in Washington until after May 6.

BYRNES

⁸² To participate in the Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Paris from April 25 to May 16, 1946.

861.24591/4-1146: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 11, 1946—10 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

[Received April 12—5:19 a. m.]

510. At 7 tonight Jernegan saw Qavam and delivered carefully and fully substance of message contained your telegram 295, April 10.

Prime Minister who appeared dejected, said that he had seen Soviet Ambassador less than hour previously. Sadchikov had told him that Iranian insistence on continuance of case before Security Council was insult to USSR and would not be tolerated. After signature of agreements of April 4 there was no reason for keeping matter before SC. Iranian attitude indicated lack of confidence in Soviet word and would strain relations between two Governments.

Qavam had argued that present status of question before SC did no harm but eventually, under insistent pressure by Sadchikov, he had promised to telegraph Ala to withdraw case from Council.

Jernegan urged that he reverse that decision, pointing out danger that he would lose UNO support and find himself facing Soviets alone. In negotiations so far Iran had been able make reasonably satisfactory arrangements with USSR only because of SC support. Without that bulwark she would be entirely in hands of Russians. Jernegan added that Soviet action in bringing pressure to have case withdrawn was itself highly suspicious. It would seem better for Qavam to continue to pin his faith in SC despite Russian threats, especially in view of fact he had successfully defied previous threats when he first appealed to Council.

Prime Minister admitted force these arguments but insisted he could not refuse Soviet demand that he change Ala's instructions. He remarked that when dealing with lion you must cajole it and feed it, not attempt to match your claws against his. He felt position was extremely difficult. If he antagonized Soviets now he might lose all he had gained. Among other things Russians might break off economic negotiations at present in progress and also make impossible his contemplated negotiations with Azerbaijanis.

At end of hour of discussion he made following request: That Embassy should report circumstances to you, explaining dilemma in which he found himself, and ask if United States could not so arrange matters in SC that favorable attitude toward Iran could be maintained even if she acquiesced in withdrawal of case now. Being in full position [*possession?*] of facts, he hoped you would understand and be prepared again to come to Iran's aid if necessary. Meanwhile, he would withhold despatch of new instructions to Ala until we had had reply from you, putting Sadchikov off with some excuse or other. When Jernegan suggested that US delegation to SC might continue

to be sympathetic but could not guarantee attitude of other members, Qavam said he thought US and Britain between them should be able manage it.

Jernegan expressed regret that Prime Minister found himself unable definitely to refuse Soviet demand and promised to convey his request to you immediately.

Request urgent reply.

[MURRAY]

501.BC/4-1246 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, April 12, 1946—1:10 p. m.

[Received 2:03 p. m.]

69. To Secretary of State from Stettinius. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, called upon me at my apartment this morning at 11:15 at his request.

He commenced the interview by saying that he was not feeling at all well, that the strain of recent events was beginning to show on his nerves. He then stated that he thought it would be very helpful for him to have a frank exchange of views with me this morning relative to the Iranian situation, with particular emphasis upon the procedure to be followed at Monday's⁸³ meeting.

Ala stated that prior to Gromyko submitting his letter to Lie requesting the Iranian matter be taken off the agenda that he had exchanged messages with Qavam in which it was agreed that it was vitally important that the matter be continued on the agenda until May 6. After Gromyko's letter to Lie was received, Ala communicated with Qavam stating that based upon the understanding that he had had several days previous, he had submitted his letter to Lie stating that Iran was desirous that the matter be continued. Ala said that inasmuch as he did not receive disapproval of this action he has assumed it was in accordance with Qavam's desires.

Ala then referred to the fact that after the press releases from Tehran in which Qavam was quoted as having said that now that satisfactory arrangements have been made with the Soviet Union the whole question could be dropped by the Security Council, that he had communicated with Qavam, asking whether this was a correct interpretation of his statement. Qavam immediately replied saying that this was not accurate and that he was desirous of the matter remaining on the agenda. Ala then stated that he had heard through reliable

⁸³ April 15.

sources in the last 48 hours that great pressure was being brought on Qavam to instruct him, Ala, to state before the Security Council that it would be satisfactory to Iran that the matter be dropped.

Ala said that last night he had sent a very strong message to Qavam stating that in the event of such instructions, if he took such a position, he would lose the sympathy of the nation's position, he would lose the sympathy of the nations who had rallied to Iran's support in the last 2 weeks, that it would show weakness and indecision, and that he would have great difficulty in ever getting the Iranian question before the Security Council again if it were taken off the agenda. Ala then added to me personally that if Qavam sent him instructions to take the Iranian matter off the agenda of the Security Council, he would not execute those instructions and would resign.

Ala then inquired as to what I felt the procedure would be on Monday afternoon and whether it was likely that he would be called to the table. I replied saying that I thought it was unlikely that he would be called to the table and it would be best from the Iranian standpoint that he not be. That I felt the normal procedure would be for the chairman to ask the Soviet representative if he desired to supplement his written statement with an oral statement; that after the Soviet statement was made undoubtedly several countries would immediately make statements defending the Byrnes resolution; and that I had every reason to believe that the Council would decline to alter that resolution and would insist on the Iranian matter remaining on the agenda until May 6. Ala stated that this would be an ideal solution from his standpoint.

[Here follows Mr. Ala's analysis of various matters and his statement concerning a remark attributed to Mr. Gromyko that he might not be present at the Security Council meeting if he, Ala, were called to the table and participated in the deliberations.]

STEMINIUS

861.24591/4-1146 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, April 12, 1946—7 p. m.
 MOST IMMEDIATE NIACT

308. Please inform PriMin that I have given careful consideration to his views as reported in your 510 Apr 11 and fully appreciate his difficulties. You should point out to him, however, that any indication of willingness on his part to have the Iranian case dropped from the agenda of the Security Council would be likely to create an impression on world opinion and among members of the Council that Iran wished to have the Council act merely to help it in its negotiations and not because it believed as it stated, that the presence of

troops of another Govt threatened international peace. Furthermore, a feeling might be engendered that the members of the Security Council should not be expected to engage in protracted and at times acrimonious discussions for the purpose of endeavoring to uphold the integrity and independence of a country which is unwilling to maintain a firm stand on its own behalf.

The one request urged by Iran above all others was that this case remain on the agenda until foreign troops had withdrawn. The Council granted Iran's request. If Iran now says it wishes to have case removed from agenda before troops are withdrawn how can it hereafter expect any Govt give serious attention to its appeals.

The most friendly and sincere advice that I can give to the PriMin, in the interests of Iran and of developing a United Nations strong enough to maintain peace, is that he take the attitude that the question whether the Iranian case should be dropped or remain on the agenda is one entirely for the Security Council to decide. The Council and not Iran placed it on the agenda and did it by a unanimous vote. Iran should stand firm in respecting the decision already taken by the Council and be prepared to report to the Council on May 6 as requested.

BYRNES

501.BC/4-1246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET
URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1946—4 p. m.

20. For Stettinius. Reference Department's telegram 11, April 8 and your 69 of April 12.

1. The Iranian Government may join the Soviet Government in asking that the Iranian question be dropped from the agenda. If such a proposal is made formally to the Security Council or even if it is merely announced officially in Iran prior to your having an appropriate opportunity to make the statement contained in Department telegram 11 you should instead take a position along the following general lines:

The United States is pleased that the Soviet Union and Iran consider that the issues between them are in course of being solved in a manner satisfactory to both parties. The difficulties between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government have twice been brought to the Council's attention. On the first occasion the Iranian Government complained of activities of the Soviet troops on Iranian territory which it contended were not authorized or permitted by the

Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942 and interfered with the sovereignty of Iran. On the second occasion the Iranian Government complained of the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran without its approval beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in that Treaty.

In the view of the United States the complaints of the Iranian Government were properly brought to the Council's attention under Article 34 of the Charter. It is the clear duty of the Council to receive the complaint of any sovereign state that foreign troops are being used in its territory in a manner not authorized or permitted by treaty. It is the clear duty of the Council to receive the complaint of any sovereign state that foreign troops are continuing to remain on its territory without its consent beyond the date authorized by treaty. Such complaints present grave issues under Article 2, section 4 of the Charter, as to "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Charter." When such complaints are presented to the Council, clearly it is not permissible for the Council to take the position that the continuation of the conditions complained about would not endanger international peace and security.

The Council had before it on April 4 when it adopted the resolution on the Iranian matter the assurances given to it by the Soviet Government that withdrawal of Soviet troops had commenced and would be completed by May 6 and that this withdrawal was not conditioned upon other matters being discussed by the two Governments. These assurances and the willingness of the Iranian Government to accept them were the basis upon which the Council acted. I emphasize the facts that these assurances were given to the Council itself and that the action of the Council on April 4 was to continue the matter to May 6 in the hope and belief that the withdrawal of Soviet troops by that date would have disposed of all phases of the matter before the Council. Thus the assurances given to the Council and the action taken by the Council are interdependent.

We are now asked to consider this matter again and prior to May 6. It is not represented to us that the situation in connection with the withdrawal of troops has in any manner changed since April 4. Neither the Soviet nor the Iranian Government suggests that the assurances will not be carried out nor that they will be carried out sooner than was anticipated on April 4. To consider the case at this time would raise many difficult and grave questions which my Government hopes and believes will be rendered moot by the withdrawal of troops in accordance with the assurances. We do not see that any advantage would be gained by going into such questions at this interim phase of the matter. For these reasons my Government does not believe that there are valid grounds for changing the procedure adopted by the Council on April 4 for the disposition of the Iranian case.

That procedure seems to us sound and proper and I, therefore, move that the proposal that the matter be dropped from the agenda be brought before the Council on May 6, so that all remaining phases of this matter can be dealt with at the same time. On that date we sincerely hope that upon being informed that the withdrawal of Soviet

troops from Iran has been completed, the Council will be able to drop the matter from the agenda. It seems to us that that would be the appropriate time to take action on the pending proposal.⁸⁴

2. If your efforts to postpone action on an Iranian proposal to drop the case are not successful, you should vote against the proposal.

3. If you have occasion to use the statement set forth in telegram 11 of April 8, we suggest that in the second and third sentences of paragraph 5 the words "consider" be changed to "receive" and that the words "to interfere with its sovereignty" in the second sentence be eliminated.

4. We suggest that you may wish to approach Gromyko informally this week end to see if you cannot persuade him to allow his letter of April 6 to be passed over without discussion by the Council. You can point out to him that he has made his record and that if he allows discussion of his letter to go over to May 6 there will then be nothing to argue about. That would seem to be the proper time for the whole matter to be disposed of satisfactorily to all concerned. This would avoid additional controversy as we will oppose his proposal that the matter be dropped now. If he should be agreeable to such a suggestion, there would then, of course, be no need for you to make on Monday either the statement contemplated in this telegram or the statement contained in telegram 11.

BYRNES

861.24591/4-1346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 13, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

515. Jernegan saw Qavam at 7 tonight and conveyed in full message transmitted urtel 308, April 12.

Qavam was obviously still uncertain as to his best course and extremely reluctant to risk offending Soviets. He again pointed out that if he failed comply their wishes they might turn against him on Azerbaijan question, in which he must have their moral support to achieve settlement. They could withdraw Soviet troops from Iran as agreed but supply arms to Azerbaijanis and encourage them resist. Tehran Govt would be forced send troops and precipitate fighting, whereupon Russians could assert right to intervene to protect security their frontiers.

He admitted however that Soviets might also break their agreements even if he acquiesced in their demand to withdraw case from Security

⁸⁴ Mr. Stettinius delivered this statement on April 15, substantially as set forth here; see telegram 75, April 15, from New York, p. 424.

Council. Jernegan pointed out in such case Iran would be left completely defenseless and urged that in long run Iran would face fewer dangers if she relied on UNO and made it possible for that organization to become real force for security.

Ultimately with evident misgivings, after long discussion, Prime Minister agreed that he would not instruct Ala to request withdrawal of question from Security Council. However he did not want Ala to continue his aggressive tactics in opposing Soviet move. At Jernegan's suggestion, based on final paragraph urtel under reference, he decided he would direct Ambassador that, if called upon by Security Council to make statement, he should say only that Iran left matter entirely in hands of Council for whatever decision it might choose to take.

MURRAY

501.BC/4-1546: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

PRIORITY

NEW YORK, April 15, 1946—6:10 p. m.

[Received 6:19 p. m.]

73. Letter from the Iranian Ambassador to the President of the Security Council, dated 15 April, 1946:

Iranian Embassy New York, 15th April, 1946.

Sir: On April 9, 1946, I had the honour to state, in accordance with the instructions of my Government, its position regarding the request of the Soviet representative on the Security Council that the Council remove from its agenda the matters relating to the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran and the interferences in the internal affairs of Iran. In my letter, I informed the Council of the desire of my Government that these matters remain on its agenda as provided by the resolution adopted on 4 April, 1946.

Yesterday, April 14, my Government instructed me to make to the Security Council the following statement:

“As a result of the signature of the agreement between the Iranian Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, it has been agreed that the Red Army evacuate all Persian territory by the 6th May, 1946. The Iranian Government has no doubt that this agreement will be carried out, but at the same time has not the right to fix the course the Security Council should take.”

This morning I received a further telegram from my Government reading as follows:

“In view of the fact that the Soviet Ambassador has again today, 14 April, categorically reiterated that the unconditional evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army will be completed by the 6 May, 1946, it is necessary that you immediately

inform the Security Council that the Iranian Government has complete confidence in the word and pledge of the Soviet Government and for this reason withdraws its complaint from the Security Council.”⁸⁵

STETTINIUS

501.BC/4-1546 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, April 15, 1946—10:25 p. m.

75. The Security Council discussed for more than 3 hours Monday afternoon, April 15,⁸⁶ the Russian demand that the Iranian question be removed from its agenda, and adjourned without taking a vote. The discussion will continue at a meeting called for 11:00 a. m. Tuesday, April 16.

Chairman Dr. Quo opened the meeting at 3:00 p. m. All delegates were present. The provisional agenda was adopted without comment.

The Chairman read a letter from the Iranian Ambassador, announcing that Iran wished to withdraw its complaint from the Security Council. Dr. Quo said the letter was given to him by the Iranian representative at 2:00 p. m. Monday, April 15.

A telegram received by the Iranian representative from his Government was quoted in the letter as follows:

[Here follows last paragraph of telegram 73, April 15, from New York, printed *supra*.]

Ambassador Gromyko was the first speaker. He called attention to his letter of April 6 in which he “insisted” that the Iranian question be removed from the Security Council agenda. He said that the Security Council decision of April 4 (the vote to review the Iranian question on May 6) could be justified only if the situation in Iran constituted a threat to the peace and security of the world. He added that only a person without any “sense of reality” could argue that the situation did constitute a threat to peace. Gromyko argued that the April 4 Council decision was therefore contrary both to the spirit and the letter of the Charter. He also stated that the Security Council

⁸⁵ In a telephone conversation at 9:15 a. m. and in person at approximately 10 a. m. on April 15, Ambassador Ala informed Mr. Stettinius of his Government's binding instruction to withdraw the Iranian complaint. The same morning, Mr. Stettinius informed Sir Alexander Cadogan that he had notified the Secretary of State of this development by telephone and that Mr. Byrnes felt “they should play for time.” Shortly after, Mr. Stettinius gave Dr. Quo his opinion that “they should just wait and let nature take its course and see what happened.” The memoranda by the United States Representative summarizing his conversations with the Iranian, British, and Chinese delegates are filed under 501.BC/4-1546.

⁸⁶ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 15, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 122-141.

could not take a decision on situations or disputes of the kind referred to in the Charter without having heard both parties immediately concerned, and maintained that this condition had not been fulfilled because of the Soviet Union's refusal to participate in the discussions prior to April 10.

Gromyko said that the arguments put forth in his letter of April 6 and his supplementary remarks proved that the demand for the removal of the Iranian question from the agenda was well founded. He added that such was clear even before the Iranian Government decided to withdraw the request it had made to the Security Council. He asked the Council to remove the Iranian question from its agenda.⁸⁷

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., followed Gromyko. He said that the U.S. was naturally pleased to learn that the Soviet Union and Iran considered that the issues between them are in the course of being solved in a manner satisfactory to both parties. He pointed out, however, that it was not represented to the Council that the situation in Iran, in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, has changed at all since the Council decision of April 4.

"Neither the Soviet, nor the Iranian Government suggests that the assurances will not be carried out, nor that they will be carried out sooner than was anticipated on April 4. To reconsider the case at this time would raise many difficult and grave questions, which my Government hopes and believes will be rendered moot by the withdrawal of troops, in accordance with the Soviet assurances. We do not see that any advantage would be gained by going into such questions at this interim phase of the matter. For these reasons, my Government does not believe that there are valid grounds for changing the procedure, adopted by the Council on April 4 for the disposition of the Iranian case, and will therefore not support the motion to delete the Iranian matter from the agenda at this time," Stettinius declared.

The U.S. representative concluded with the hope that on May 6, upon being informed that withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran has been completed, the Security Council will be able to drop the matter from the agenda.⁸⁸

[Here follows further discussion of the Soviet motion by delegates of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Brazil, all voicing opposition to the motion.]

. . . Gromyko spoke for a second time for his motion to delete. He said that even Iran now said it was not necessary to continue the matter, and the remarks of the U.S. and United Kingdom delegates

⁸⁷ For text of remarks made by Ambassador Gromyko, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 123.

⁸⁸ For full text of remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, see *ibid.*, p. 126, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 28, 1946, p. 706.

only tended to confuse the issue. Gromyko said there was nothing left to consider since Iran had withdrawn its request.⁸⁹

[Here follows further discussion in which the Soviet motion was supported by the delegates of France and Poland and opposed by those of Mexico and Egypt.]

Speaking for a third time Gromyko said that the U.S. proposal was contrary to the Charter as it denied a member nation the right to withdraw a request. He added that his doubts about whether the U.S. and U.K. were really anxious for a quick, peaceful solution of the Iranian case were confirmed by the position these countries had taken in today's debate. He accused the U.S. delegate of claiming "to know better than the Iranian Government what the Iranian Government should do in order to reach a solution of its difference with the Soviet Union."⁹⁰

At this point Chairman Quo said it was getting late and asked if the members would object to adjournment until morning, explaining he still had the names of several speakers on the list.

Stettinius said he did not object to the adjournment, but he wanted to make it clear that the U.S. had made no proposal. He added that his remarks merely outlined the U.S. views on the Soviet request to delete the Iranian question from the agenda.

Sir Alexander Cadogan said that the Soviet delegate was entirely wrong about his expressed doubts over the U.K. position. He added that the British Government always had wanted a quick, peaceful solution of the question, which it believed had been found in the Council resolution of April 4. It was the Soviet representative who had brought the matter up at this time by asking the Council to rescind its own resolution. Had he not done so, Cadogan concluded, we should have heard, I hope, no more of the Iranian question."

Dr. Quo adjourned the meeting at 6:20 p. m.

[STETTINIUS]

861.24591/4-1646: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
URGENT

TEHRAN, April 16, 1946—9 a. m.
[Received 12:15 p. m.]

532. Embtels 515, April 13 and 518, April 15.⁹¹ Qavam last night gave Jernegan following account of developments resulting in instructions to Ala to request withdrawal Iranian appeal to Security Council:

⁸⁹ For text of these remarks made by Ambassador Gromyko, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 133.

⁹⁰ For text of these remarks by Mr. Gromyko, see *ibid.*, pp. 139-141, *passim*.

⁹¹ Latter not printed.

Soviet Ambassador learned of new instructions sent Ala to leave matter for decision of Security Council and protested to Prime Minister this was illogical because Iran simultaneously professed confidence in Soviet evacuation yet did not follow Soviet action in asking Council to drop complaint. Qavam replied his action not illogical in view initial Soviet qualification that troops would be withdrawn if "nothing unforeseen occurred".

Sadchikov then stated that this qualification had been made before agreement had been reached between Iran and USSR and at time when it seemed possible elements hostile to Russia might be able to force out Qavam. Since that time agreements had been signed and Qavam's friendly Govt remained in power, therefore reservation no longer obtained. Under circumstances he insisted Prime Minister must direct Ala join in request to drop question from agenda.

Qavam drew up formula which was approved by Cabinet to effect that since Soviet Ambassador on April 14 had given assurances that evacuation would be completed unconditionally by May 6, Iran Govt wished to withdraw its appeal to Security Council. After consulting Moscow, Sadchikov informed Qavam at 9:30 yesterday morning that this was acceptable and instructions were despatched accordingly.

Qavam apologized to Jernegan for having failed to inform us of his action, saying it was due solely to rapidity of events and not to any intent to slight American Govt in any way. (From talks with British Chargé we learn British had been even more in ignorance of developments than we.)

Jernegan said he feared Prime Minister's decision would be regretted by American Govt but he hoped and was sure American Govt hoped that it would achieve results Prime Minister desired.

Qavam said that in addition to renewed assurances re evacuation, Sadchikov had again given assurances that Soviets would use their influence with Azerbaijanis to have latter keep their demands within limits Prime Minister felt he could grant, as stated Embtel 424, March 29. (Mozaffar Firuz told Jernegan last night that preliminary, indirect negotiations with Azerbaijan are under way and it is hoped get Azerbaijan delegation to Karaj soon.)

MURRAY

501.BC/4-1646: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, April 16, 1946—7:30 p. m.

80. The Soviet demand for removal of the Iranian question from the agenda again occupied the attention of the Security Council at a

2-hour meeting Tuesday morning, April 16.⁹² No decision was reached. The Council will meet again Wednesday afternoon, April 17, at 3:00 o'clock.

Chairman Quo opened the 33rd meeting at 11:11 a. m. All delegates were present. The provisional agenda was adopted without observation.

Dr. Quo announced that he had received letters from the French delegate⁹³ and Secretary General Trygve Lie since the close of Monday's session. The French letter, proposing the adoption of a resolution on the Iranian case, follows:

"Having again considered at its meetings of the 15 and 16 April, the question which it had placed on its agenda on 26 March 1946 at the request of the Government of Iran and which formed the subject of its resolution of 4 April;

"Takes note of the letter dated 14 [15] April addressed to it by the representative of the Government of Iran in which the latter informs the Security Council of the withdrawal of its complaint;

"Notes that an agreement has been reached between the two Governments concerned;

"Requests the Secretary General to collect the necessary information in order to complete the Security Council's report to the Assembly, in accordance with article 24 of the Charter on the manner in which it dealt with the case placed on its agenda on 26 March last at the request, now withdrawn, of the Government of Iran."

Lie's lengthy letter commented on legal aspects of the Iranian case. Dr. Quo suggested after both letters had been read that Lie's communication be referred to the Committee of Experts for study and report to the Security Council. He pointed out that the Secretary General's letter was given to him but a short time before the meeting opened, and inasmuch as it contained a number of legal points the delegates would probably want to study them as well as the Committee of Experts.

Lie's letter said that it was arguable that, following withdrawal by the Iranian representative, the Iranian question would be automatically removed from the agenda unless the Security Council voted:

1. An investigation under article 34;
2. A member brought it up as a situation or dispute under article 35;
3. The Council proceeded under article 36, paragraph 1, which would appear to require a preliminary finding that a dispute existed under article 33, or that there was "a situation of like nature."

The Secretary General added:

"An argument which may be made against the view of automatic removal from the agenda is that once a matter is brought to the at-

⁹² For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 16, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 142-152.

⁹³ Henri Bonnet.

tention of the Council, it is no longer a matter solely between the original parties, but one in which the Council collectively has an interest, as representing the whole of the United Nations. This may well be true; but it would appear that the only way in which, under the Charter, the Council can exercise that interest is under article 34, or under article 36, paragraph 1. Since the Council has not chosen to invoke Article 34, in the only way in which it can be invoked, i.e.: through voting an investigation, and has not chosen to invoke article 36, paragraph 1, by deciding that a dispute exists under article 33, or that there is a situation of like nature, it may well be that there is no way in which it can remain seized of the matter."⁹⁴

The suggestion of the Soviet delegate that the Committee of Experts be given a time limit of 2 days in which to report their findings on the Secretary General's letter was agreeable to Chairman Quo and other delegates. The Chairman announced that the suggestion that the Committee of Experts report to the Council by Thursday was adopted.

Mr. Stettinius was the first delegate called on at a continuation of the discussion on the Soviet demand to remove the Iranian questions from the agenda.

The U. S. delegate stated he was sorry the Soviet delegate had seen fit Monday, April 15, to question the U.S. motives in the Iranian case. He thought all delegates should avoid indulging in accusations against the motives of any of the United Nations. He pointed out that the only motive of the U.S. was fulfilling the objectives of the UN Charter.

Mr. Stettinius recalled the Soviet position that the entire Security Council action, including the April 4 resolution to defer the issue until May 6, was illegal and not in conformity with the Charter. Mr. Stettinius stated he did not believe that the subsequent Iranian request for withdrawal of the complaint should divert the Council's attention from this "unjustifiable" Soviet charge. He thought it was within the power of the Council to continue the Iranian question on the agenda, even though Iran had withdrawn its complaint.

The U. S. delegate did not think circumstances justified a reversal of Council's resolution of April 4. He was of the opinion that it would be unwise for the Council to drop the Iranian matter from its agenda, even though the parties concerned had requested such action. He pointed out that the principal factor in the case was the presence of

⁹⁴ For full text of the Secretary-General's letter of April 16, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 143, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 28, 1946, p. 707.

In telegram 81, April 16, 1946, 10:15 p. m., Mr. Stettinius stated: "The United States delegation feels that the communication submitted to the Security Council on April 16, 1946, was drafted with other than purely legal considerations in mind. It is considered extremely dubious practice for the Secretary General to put in an unsolicited interpretation concerning a matter which should be decided by the Council alone. This is particularly true in view of the fact that eight members of the Council had already put forth contrary opinions to those expressed by Mr. Lie." (501.BC/4-1646)

Soviet troops in Iran after the expiration of the Tripartite Treaty and against the protests of the Iranian Government.

"The Council cannot ignore the fact that the sudden reversal by the Iranian Government of the position which it has steadfastly maintained until yesterday occurred while Soviet troops were still physically in Iran," the U. S. representative declared.

Retention of the matter on the agenda did not infringe on the sovereign rights or independence of Iran, nor interfere with the agreements already reached between the two parties. On the contrary, it afforded them the opportunity of demonstrating to the Council and to the world that the confidence reposed by the Council in the assurances received in this matter was fully justified, Mr. Stettinius said. He concluded by pointing out that the April 4 resolution would make it possible on May 6 or before if the withdrawal is completed before that date, for the Council to dispose of the Iranian case in conformity with its responsibilities under the Charter.

Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet delegate, said that it was impossible to desire a quick and calm and peaceful settlement of the difference between the Soviet Union and Iran, and at the same time to insist on keeping this question on the agenda. He added that this was the case because it was known to all delegates that the Soviet and Iranian Governments had reached an understanding on all questions at issue between them.

Gromyko described the position taken by the U.S. delegate as "quite illogical". He acknowledged that he called "things by their names" in the previous day's discussion and said that he did not expect Mr. Stettinius to agree with him.

Gromyko said that the U.S. argued earlier that the Iranian question should not be deleted from the agenda because Iran did not agree to it. He said that argument was put forth repeatedly by Mr. Byrnes. Now, he asserted the Iranian question did not exist and the only logical conclusion was that it be removed from the agenda.

"However, I observe that the delegate of the U.S. sacrifices logic in order to prolong and inflate the so-called Iranian question," Gromyko concluded.

The Netherlands delegate believed the issue was the question, "who is master of the Council's agenda: the Council or States who are parties to a dispute or situation". He thought it could only be the Council who determined what was and what was not on the agenda. He pointed out that the Council alone admitted a question to its agenda. He thought that it was incontrovertible that the Council alone should decide whether the application of the party to strike a matter off the agenda should be granted. This, he said, was borne out and reinforced by the Charter which clearly gives several organs

of UN duties and powers independent of the will of the parties to a dispute.

The Netherlands delegate said that he was afraid that if the Charter were interpreted to give the parties sole power to judge, the door would be wide open for abuses. He added that it would be an incentive to bring diplomatic pressure to bear in order that the question placed before the Council be withdrawn from the agenda by the parties who requested it to be placed there.

Speaking for a second time, the U.S. delegate pointed out that the U.S. resolution of April 4 set forth many other reasons than those mentioned by the Soviet delegate.

Chairman Quo advanced China's views on the question, stating that the Council had an obligation to interest itself in questions coming within the scope of the Charter. He said that the Council had the right to determine the time and manner in which to examine a problem placed before it and that he would stand by the April 4 resolution.

Chairman Quo proposed to put the Soviet demand to delete the Iranian question from the agenda to a vote. The Polish and French delegates suggested that a vote on that question would be out of order, as report from the Committee of Experts on the Secretary General's letter should come first. The French delegate also said that he would ask for a vote on his resolution, which was submitted by letter at the opening of the meeting, before the Soviet motion when the Committee of Experts had reported.

The Chairman was agreeable to delaying the vote until the Committee of Experts reported. After the question had been discussed by several delegates there was no objection to that procedure.

[Here follow last two paragraphs dealing with matters other than the Iranian question.]

[STETTINIUS]

501.BC/4-1646 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1946—7 p. m.

URGENT

28. Reference your number 78, April 16, setting forth the memorandum of the Secretary General.⁹⁵

1. We suggest that both in the Committee of Experts and in the Security Council our position with respect to this memorandum should be along the following lines :

The Iranian complaint was properly brought under Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Charter. The Council on April 4 for reasons

⁹⁵ Telegram 78 not printed ; regarding the memorandum, see telegram 80, *supra*.

recited in its resolution of that date deferred the Iranian matter until May 6. There is no provision in the Charter which provides for the withdrawal of complaints or in any way provides for the termination of the Council's connection with any matter brought before it.

The various articles referred to by the Secretary General deal with the authority of the Council to take action after consideration of cases brought before it. There has been no consideration of the merits of the Iranian case. We and other members of the Council hope that there will be no occasion for consideration of the merits of this matter. The question of what if any action the Council could or should take is not before the Council at this time. By its resolution of April 4 the Council deferred these and all other questions relating to the Iranian case until May 6. The language of the resolution in this respect was that "the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until May 6".

The Council will on that date determine what disposition it will make of the case. Certainly the Council could on that date, if conditions seem to it to warrant it, decide under Article 34 to consider the Iranian matter on its merits. The question now raised by the Soviet and Iranian communications to the Council will automatically come before the Council on May 6.

2. We agree with what we understand is your view that our representation on the Committee of Experts for the consideration of the Secretary General's paper should continue unchanged. We think that our representative on the Committee of Experts⁹⁶ in addition to presenting our views on the Secretary General's memorandum should make it clear that he does not feel that the Committee of Experts can do more than interchange views on this matter which relates to important substantive interpretations of the Charter which must be made by the Security Council itself.

BYRNES

501.BC/4-1846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1946—10 a. m.

29. The following comments are an amplification of yesterday's telegram⁹⁷ on the Secretary General's memorandum and also take into account Mr. Bonnet's proposed resolution to which you may have to speak.

With particular reference to the Secretary General's memorandum we think you should emphasize that all that the Council did with respect to the Iranian matter by its resolution of April 4 was to defer further proceedings and any possible action by the Council until May 6. In effect the Secretary General now suggests that it might

⁹⁶ Joseph E. Johnson.

⁹⁷ No. 28, April 16, *supra*. Telegram 29 was drafted on April 17.

be illegal for the Council not to take action until May 6. The Secretary General suggests the Council must now take action to drop the matter from the agenda. It has been the Council's hope that this very action will seem appropriate on May 6. It appears it is a curious legal doctrine that the Council must now take action when it after careful consideration has decided by an overwhelming majority to defer any action until May 6.

The issues now under discussion in the Council relate in our opinion solely to the Council's own methods of procedure. It seems to us manifest that the Council must have wide latitude in the determination of its procedure with respect to any particular case before it. There is nothing in the Charter which requires a different approach. On the contrary Article 30 expressly provides that the Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. This authority obviously extends to adoption of particular methods of procedure not specifically covered by existing formal rules.

The whole practice of the Council in the past has demonstrated general agreement on the part of all members that prior to determining whether to consider a matter on the merits the Council should and indeed must engage in a preliminary discussion of any such matter. This is all that the Council has so far undertaken with respect to the Iranian case and in carrying out that discussion the Council on April 4 by its resolution of that date for its own reasons recited in the resolution determined to defer further proceedings, which would include further discussion, until May 6. Subsequently the Soviet representative has insisted on renewing the discussions before that date. This is of course within his rights but it is for the Council itself to determine what it considers the most effective and orderly method of procedure in this as in other cases.

It follows from the above considerations that the Council can and in this particular case has discussed a matter without having determined whether or not to take it under active consideration on the merits under Article 34. Under any other view of the Council's authority it would be in no position to determine whether to proceed with consideration on the merits and it could not for reasons of its own convenience and orderly procedure select a particular time for its exploratory discussions. The filing of the complaint gives rise to the necessity for preliminary discussion but when the Council has once fixed a date for such discussion the mere withdrawal of the complaint does not deprive the Council of authority to go forward with such discussion. This continues to be a matter for the Council itself to determine.

Mr. Bonnet's proposed resolution also deals with procedural aspects of the matter. It apparently proposes to change the procedural decision reached by the Council on April 4 by leaving the whole question

of collection of information as to the results of the Iranian matter having been brought before the Council to the Secretary General for report by the Council to the Assembly. It seems to us that the procedure already decided upon by the Council whereby it can on May 6 itself consider further developments in the Iranian matter is preferable. We therefore see no need nor valid basis for a change in the Council's determination of April 4.

BYRNES

891.00/4-2646 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, [April 23, 1946.]

[Received April 26—1:10 p. m.]

578. Following is complete text of communiqué issued by Iran Government yesterday:⁹⁸

"Since formation of present government, Council of Ministers has given much of its attention to the 'Azerbaijan events'. After making studies and considering the intentions of our dear and esteemed co-citizens, the Council of Ministers has decided that, as far as the limits of our constitutional laws permit, the ideals of the said province should be realized and has decided to welcome our dear compatriots to brotherhood and unity. Therefore the decision of the Council of Ministers as regards this matter is hereby communicated for the information of the public.

"The powers which under the law of Rabi Ol Sani of lunar year 1325 (law of 1907 authorizing election of Provincial Councils) Articles 29, 90, 91, 92, and 93 of the supplement approved for the Provincial Councils are hereby specified and confirmed in Azerbaijan as follows:

"(1) The directors of the services of agriculture, commerce and industry, local transportation, education, health, police, courts and offices of public prosecutors, and finance supervisors will be elected by the Provincial Councils and, in accordance with state regulations, their official commissions will be issued by the central government in Tehran.

"(2) The governor of the province will be appointed by the central government after having ascertained the views of the Provincial Council. Army and *gendarmerie* commanders will be appointed by the central government.

"(3) The official language of the province is Persian as in all other parts of the country. All official administrative and judicial acts will be in Persian and in Azerbaijani (Turki). The first five grades of the elementary schools will be taught in Azerbaijani.

⁹⁸ In telegram 582, April 24, 10 a. m., from Tehran it was stated that the communiqué "appears designed to show good faith of Govt and considerable length it is willing to go in allowing measure of local autonomy. Announcement comes at time when Tabriz radio and press are rattling saber vigorously and denouncing Qavam gov't as no better than its predecessors, and conciliatory policy proclaimed in communiqué should help strengthen Gov't case before world opinion." (891.00/4-2446)

“(4) When allocating tax revenues and budget credits for the country, the government will take into consideration the requirements of Azerbaijan for prosperity, for reconstruction, for educational and hygienic reforms and other works.

“(5) The activities of democratic organizations and labor unions in Azerbaijan are free as in other parts of the country.

“(6) No action will be taken against members of ‘Democrat’ party for participation in ‘Democrat’ movement in the past.

“(7) It has been agreed that the number of deputies from Azerbaijan in the national Majlis will be increased in proportion to the actual population of the province. At the inauguration of the fifteenth Majlis, a proposal to this effect will be introduced and, after approval, the appropriate additional number of Deputies will be elected.”

WARD

501.BC/4-2346 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, April 23, 1946—10:02 p. m.

99. The Security Council at its 36th meeting Tuesday, April 23, decided to continue the Iranian question on its agenda until May 6, 1946. The Soviet delegate declared that the Soviet Government considered the decision contrary to the Charter and that it could not participate in any future Security Council discussion on the Iranian issue.

The meeting opened at 3:05 P. M. with all delegates at their places and Mr. Afifi, the Egyptian delegate presiding. After the provisional agenda was adopted the Chairman called attention to the report from the Council's Committee of Experts on the Secretary General's letter commenting on legal aspects of the Iranian case. This report offered the majority opinion that the Security Council alone should decide of which matters it is “seized”.⁹⁹

The Soviet delegate, speaking on the Committee of Experts report, said that the fact the experts were not able to reach a unanimous agreement led to the conclusion they followed the instructions of the heads of their delegations. He pointed out that the Secretary General's memorandum concluded that the Council cannot deny a sovereign

⁹⁹ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 23, see SC, *1st yr., 2nd ser., No. 2*, pp. 201-214.

At no time was a United States statement made in the Committee of Experts or in the Security Council that followed at all closely the substance of telegrams 28, April 16, and 29, April 18, to New York, pp. 431 and 432, respectively. The Committee of Experts considered the Secretary-General's memorandum at five meetings on April 16, 17, and 18. A summary record of its deliberations is found among the records of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, in documents S/Procedure/60, 62-64, and 66. For text of the Committee report, dated April 18, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 2*, p. 47.

country the right to withdraw an appeal. The Soviet delegate recited the reasons he had given at earlier meetings why the Iranian question should be stricken from the agenda and concluded:

“Irrespective of the fact that the Charter gives no proper ground for the retention of this question on the agenda, some members of the Council are still trying, in vain, to have it remain on the agenda. These attempts are doomed to failure, Mr. President, and they will only discredit those who make them for they are attempting to sacrifice the Charter in order to give an opportunity for further discussion of this so-called Iranian question. Any attempt to make use of the Iranian question for this purpose is doomed to failure and is likely to have the most regrettable consequences.”

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the U.S. had consistently maintained that there was no reason for the question being brought before the Council at this time. He saw no reason why the Iranian question should not have been allowed to remain on the agenda until May 6 as the Council voted on April 4. The U.S. delegate said that he was unable to agree with the conclusions reached by the Secretary General in his memorandum on legal aspects of the case. He emphasized that the U.S. strongly supported the opinion offered by the majority of the Committee of Experts.

“We believe that the argument in the Secretary General’s memorandum discloses a concept of the functions of the Security Council which is rather limited and which, if accepted, would have serious consequences for the future of this body. In ratifying the Charter, the United Nations placed upon the Security Council itself very great responsibilities. The Charter also gives us the powers commensurate with these responsibilities. Mr. President, I repeat that I am unable to concur in the proposal that the Iranian question should at this time be dropped from the list of matters of which the Council is seized,” Mr. Stettinius asserted.

The U.S. delegate added that he could not support a French proposal¹ calling for the Council to take note of reports and agreements on the Iranian question and instructing the Secretary General to compile a report for submission to the General Assembly in September. He thought that the French proposal dealt with procedural aspects of the question and would, if adopted, reverse the Council’s April 4 resolution.

The Australian representative reviewed briefly the questions before the Council. He listed them as the Soviet request for removal of the Iranian question from the agenda and the French proposal to instruct the Secretary General to compile a report on the Iranian question for

¹ For the French resolution, see telegram 80, April 16, from New York, p. 427. For the text of Mr. Stettinius’ remarks, see SC, *1st yr., 1st series, No. 2*, p. 203. or Department of State *Bulletin*, May 5, 1946, p. 752.

the General Assembly. He said that Australia shared the majority view of the Committee of Experts.

Mr. Hodgson again cited the lack of facts in the case and recalled that he had reserved the right to call for the facts. He mentioned the Iranian-Soviet oil agreement made while Soviet troops were in Iran and the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran in the time specified by the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. He wondered whether this alleged breach of the 1942 treaty constituted a threat to peace and said that he thought the Council still was competent to call for a complete investigation. He said that Australia would not vote for either the Soviet resolution to strike the question from the agenda or the French proposal.

The French delegate made a strong appeal for his resolution which he had offered at a previous meeting. He thought the Council could vote for it without diverging from the Charter and disagreed with the U.S. stand that it dealt exclusively with procedure.

[Here follow views of the delegates on the various resolutions.]

At this point all delegates, with the exception of the Chairman, had expressed their views and the Chairman called for a vote. The Council agreed that the French resolution could be considered an amendment to the Soviet request to strike the Iranian question from the agenda, and the Soviet delegate associated himself with the French proposal. Poland, France and the Soviet Union voted for the French resolution by a show of hands.

The Soviet delegate inquired about the Soviet proposal. The Chairman advised him that there were 3 votes in favor of it and 8 in opposition. Gromyko then declared that in view of the agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran on all questions and the withdrawal by Iran of the appeal the Soviet Government considered the decision contrary to the Charter. He added that the Soviet Government could not take part in future discussions in the Security Council on the Iranian question.

[Here follows discussion of matters other than the Iranian question.]

[STETTINIUS]

891.00/4-2546: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, April 25, 1946—noon.

[Received 8:31 p. m.]

590. Following is outline of current political situation Iran as it appears to Embassy:

(1) Soviet evacuation of Khorassan and Caspian provinces seems

to be nearing completion and Rossow's latest reports from Tabriz indicate Soviet forces may at last be leaving Azerbaijan as well. However, there are persistent reports from all northern provinces of growing numbers Caucasian and other Soviet citizens in civilian clothes, many obviously soldiers. This together with intense Soviet activity with Azerbaijan army as shown recent Tabriz reports clearly points to Russian intention of maintaining influence that area despite military withdrawal.

(2) Although they have agreed to persuade Azerbaijanis to accept Qavam's terms, it is quite possible Soviets may be in process of double-crossing Prime Minister by encouraging Tabriz government to hold out for full autonomy and providing it with arms and requisite military technicians to permit successful defiance of Tehran. Blustering style of public utterances Tabriz (Tabriz tel 131 April 22² gives one example) may be merely bravado or designed strengthen Azerbaijani bargaining position in projected negotiations with Iran Government but may equally be indication of intention to reject any diminution of present *de facto* independence. Rossow doubts Tabriz will make substantial concessions.

(3) Qavam is evidently attempting to appease Russians wherever possible but at same time endeavoring to stop short of position in which his Government would become outright puppet. He wants to convince Moscow his Government is "friendly" without making such concession that he could never hope to reestablish full Iranian freedom of action. In pursuing this policy he has: (a) made oil deal (b) offered quite liberal terms to Azerbaijan (c) vacillated in his position with reference to Security Council and ultimately yielded to Soviet pressure in asking that case be dropped (d) Arrested Seyid Zia-ed-Din, General Arfa³ and certain lesser lights hostile to Russians; suppressed most outspoken anti-Soviet newspapers and released from suspension all Left publications; transferred or dismissed many army officers and Government officials considered anti-Soviet. (e) Removed ban on Tudeh⁴ meetings; appointed or permitted appointment of many Tudeh members, or sympathizers to posts in Government; definitely recognized Tudeh labor organization (although labor unions have no legal status in Iran) and even appointed its leader, Rusta, as member of new Higher Labor Council. (f) Consistently been conciliatory in his public statements regarding Azerbaijan question and issued positive orders to security forces to refrain from at-

² Not printed.

³ Hassan Arfa, who had been relieved of his position as Iranian Chief of Staff in February 1946.

⁴ The Masses (Communist) Party in Iran.

tacking or provoking Democrats and not to enter Azerbaijan until given specific permission by himself.

On other side of picture Qavam successfully rejected most extreme Russian demands on Azerbaijan and oil, did appeal to Security Council and follow through up to certain point in face of strong Soviet pressure, and has backed up Schwarzkopf⁵ in carrying out program of *gendarmarie* reinforcement in Caspian provinces as Russians evacuated.⁶ (Schwarzkopf says Tudeh are greatly disturbed by this latter move and believes they had planned coup in Mazanderan.) Prime Minister has ordered all members of all parties in Caspian area to turn in arms by May 12 and has ordered *gendarmarie* to maintain order regardless of who may attempt disturb security. He has not appointed Tudeh members to any of highest Government posts and is evidently attempting restrain them from drastic action. There are definite indications he has no intention of cutting loose from old-line landlord ruling class even though he is trying modify its economic and social attitude.

Embassy is still of opinion Qavam is acting as sincere patriot and has not sold out to Russians in any way.

(4) Prime Minister's internal policy is closely tied to foreign policy and consists primarily in attempting to remove grounds for foreign assertions that Iran is so backward she cannot manage own affairs or be trusted to maintain "democratic" (i.e. non-Fascist) government. To accomplish this he has: (a) Announced or caused to be announced programs of reforms in army and municipal policy. (This has additional effect of tending to placate Tudeh which attacks these organizations as instruments of reaction.) (b) Encouraged and assisted Schwarzkopf in making changes in *gendarmarie* looking toward greater efficiency. (He has not done anything to permit Tudeh infiltration into *gendarmarie*.) (c) Established new industrial and mining bank. (d) Created Supreme Economic Council and called for working out of 5-year economic plan. (Embtel 462, April 4).⁷ (e) Created Higher Labor Council composed of representatives of Government, Tudeh labor organization, business, university professors and Mayor of Tehran. Objectives this body as laid down by Qavam are to work out plans for adjustment employer-worker rela-

⁵ Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Chief of the American Military Mission with the Iranian *gendarmarie*; raised to rank of Brigadier General in July 1946.

⁶ In telegram 695, May 15, 1946, 3 p. m., Tehran reported that Iranian army and gendarme forces were being pushed gradually to the north through Gilan in the east and Kurdistan in the west but that these forces had not penetrated into Azerbaijan nor had they entered Astara, the frontier town on the Caspian Sea (891.00/5-1546).

⁷ Not printed.

tions, draft new labor law, plan reforms in landlord-tenant relationships on farms, recommend projects to combat unemployment, and study means for effecting economies in government administrations. (f) Caused Ministry Agriculture to announce plans for agricultural improvements including new schools, irrigation projects, etc.

Whether or not these various projects will bear fruit remains to be seen, but Qavam is at least launching them with promptness (for Iran) and is in general conducting himself with more decision and determination than any other Prime Minister in recent years.

(5) Russians are undoubtedly better pleased with Qavam than with his predecessors in office, but Embassy doubts they will rest content indefinitely with his variety of "friendly" government.

Already Tudeh party, which can be relied upon to follow Soviet line, has begun to snipe at Prime Minister as showing reactionary tendencies, although party has not yet broken with him. It is conducting vigorous campaign to strengthen its position (has already reestablished itself in Tehran) and is displaying increasingly aggressive attitude toward national and international matters, party is pushing Bahrein issue⁸ insistently and seizes every opportunity to attack United States and Britain as imperialist powers. Recent violent press attacks on Schwarzkopf, full texts of which being sent air mail, suggest that Soviet-inspired drive to destroy American influence here is being launched.

Coming Majlis elections will be of crucial importance. There is much apprehension among moderates and conservatives here lest Tudeh gain such strong representation as to enable it to hamstring any cabinet which declines follow its dictates.

Danger is that Qavam, in pursuing his modified appeasement policy, will be forced to acquiesce in constant strengthening of Russian-backed groups to point at which he will be left only with choice of knuckling under entirely or being overthrown in favor of true puppet government. Collateral danger is that he will be physically unable to stand up under terrific burden he is carrying in his attempt single-handed to resolve critical diplomatic crisis and put life into moribund Iran Government machine. Some believe they already detect signs of weariness and feel PriMin is beginning to yield ground for that reason. In any case Qavam is walking tight rope and will need all his strength and political cleverness to keep his balance.

Sent Department 590, repeated Moscow 176 and Paris for Amdel.

WARD

⁸ See footnote 39, p. 45.

Files of the Council of Foreign Ministers : Lot M88 : Box 2063

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] April 28, 1946.

Participants: Secretary Byrnes
Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen⁹
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Pavlov

The following is a summary of the conversation by subjects which took place before and after the dinner given by the Secretary for Mr. Molotov:

[Here follows section dealing with Bulgaria, printed in volume VI, page 100.]

Iranian Case

Before dinner, Mr. Molotov complained to the Secretary of the attitude of the United States in the Iranian case. He charged that the actions and attitude of the United States in the Security Council had not been those of a friend. He particularly mentioned U.S. refusal to postpone consideration of the case until April 10, as requested by the Soviet representative, and our insistence in keeping the matter on the agenda even after full agreement had been reached. The Soviet Government felt that it was the victim of an "anti-Soviet campaign" which had artificially exaggerated the Iranian situation and that the Security Council was being used as an instrument for the furtherance of this campaign.

After dinner, the Secretary outlined in great detail, with the help of Mr. Cohen, the actual course of events in the Security Council. The Secretary pointed out that the United States had attempted to be as conciliatory as possible and, by providing the resolution of April 4, had in effect postponed any discussion of the merits of the case until May 6, when we had hoped there would be nothing to discuss and the entire case dropped. He said that Gromyko's subsequent motion to expunge the case from the agenda would merely serve to reopen the matter when it had in effect been really closed.

⁹ Counselor to the United States delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers.

During the course of the discussion, both Molotov and Vyshinsky admitted that no agreement had been reached until April 5, and in general did not appear to be very much convinced with their own arguments.

The Secretary recalled the efforts he had made at Moscow with Generalissimo Stalin and with Mr. Molotov to deal with the Iranian question precisely in order to prevent its coming before the United Nations when he had then told them the United States would be forced to take a position in opposition to the Soviet Government.

Mr. Cohen made the point that, whereas before a public event such as the retention of Soviet troops, beyond the treaty date, in Iran had occurred, it was possible to attempt privately to arrange matters in dispute, but that once a public event such as in this case had occurred, the issue had to be met in the light of public opinion, and it was impossible then to settle such things on the basis of any deal.

In reply to the Secretary's reference to the words "unforeseen circumstances" in the original Soviet assurances to the Iranian Government regarding withdrawal, Mr. Molotov stated that this phrase was to safeguard against the establishment of a new Iranian Government hostile to the Soviet Government. Once this was no longer regarded as a danger, the Soviet Government withdrew the qualifying clause. (It is interesting to note that by this statement Mr. Molotov went far toward admitting that the Soviet troops were retained in Iran in order to influence internal political developments in that country.)

The observations of Molotov and Vyshinsky again reveal the Soviet thesis that the relations between the great powers were more important than the strict observation [*observance?*] of the Charter and that their actions and policies in effect were outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Although Molotov and Vyshinsky did not withdraw their complaints of "unfriendly action" on the part of the United States, they did not press the arguments with any great vigor and the subject was dropped.

[Here follow remaining two sections dealing with Germany and Austria, printed in volume II, page 146.]

123 Doohar, Gerald F. P. : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Tabriz (Doohar)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1946—7 p. m.

14. Reurtel 137, Apr 27.¹¹ We feel that it would be undesirable for you or Rossow to make a visit in present circumstances to Mahabad

¹¹ Not printed.

as guests of Qazi Mohammad's¹² since Qazi still is a leader of an independent movement against Central Iranian Govt.¹³ Furthermore such visit might be interpreted throughout all Middle East especially in Iraq and Turkey as manifestation of American sympathy for Kurdish aspirations for establishment of independent Kurdish state.

Sent to Tabriz, repeated to Tehran.

ACHESON

861.24591/5-146 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ward)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

383. Please ascertain Iranian Govt's plans for compliance by May 6 with request embodied in Security Council resolution of Apr 4 "to report to the Council whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed." If plans are negative or uncertain, you should make clear to Qavam that US Govt considers that compliance by members of the United Nations with requests of Council is of paramount importance in strengthening effectiveness of that organization. Reply urgently.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to N.Y.

ACHESON

501.BC/5-246 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)*¹⁴

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

42. For Stettinius. With respect to the date upon which SC will resume consideration of the Iranian case in accordance with the resolution April 4 we feel that if it were likely that the reports from the Iranian and Soviet Governments would be received prior to May 6 the proceedings should be resumed on that date, preferably in afternoon.

We feel, however, that it is unlikely that the reports will be so received and since the Soviet and Iranian Governments have until

¹² Chief Kurdish leader in Iran.

¹³ In telegram 648, May 6, the Chargé in Tehran recommended that ban on travel of Tehran Embassy and Tabriz Consulate personnel to Kurdistan be lifted on assumption that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn by May 7. The Department, in telegram 398, May 7, agreed that ban on travel in Kurdistan be removed as of that date. (124.91/5-646)

¹⁴ This telegram was repeated as No. 2075 to Paris for the Secretary of State.

midnight of May 6 to make their reports on the status of the Soviet troop withdrawal, May 7 would be the most practicable date for the Council to resume proceedings.

We believe that a meeting held on May 6 prior to the receipt of the reports might have an undesirable effect. The attention of the world press and opinion might needlessly be focused on the absence of these replies when they might actually be received up to midnight on that date. Should you determine, however, that the sentiment of the other members of Council strongly favors a meeting on May 6 regardless of the midnight deadline you should not oppose it.

We do not believe that the Council should meet on a date later than May 7 in view of clear terminology of the April 4 resolution and of the unfavorable world opinion which might be aroused by such a postponement.

ACHESON

501.BC/5-246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

43. For Stettinius. Following suggestions are submitted for your guidance at the time of resumption of Council proceedings on Iranian case.

1. If Soviet and Iranian Governments report complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, our position should be that no further proceedings on the subject are required and that the matter should be dropped from the agenda. In this event you may feel it desirable to make a statement along the following lines: The Security Council's resolution of April 4, 1946 requested the Soviet and Iranian Governments to report by May 6 whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed and provided that the Council would then consider what, if any, further proceedings would be required. In view of the reports made by the Iranian and Soviet Governments stating that withdrawal of the Soviet troops has been completed, it is the position of my Government that no further proceedings are required and that the Council be no longer seized of the case.

2. If the Iranian Government reports complete withdrawal of Soviet troops but the Soviet Government fails to report, our position should be the same as 1 above. In this event you should make a state-

ment along the lines suggested in paragraph 1 above but prefaced by an expression of regret at the failure of the Soviet Government to respond to the request of the Security Council for information.

3. If the Iranian Government or both Governments fail to report you should propose for support SC action calling upon the Secretary General to request an immediate report from the non-complying party or parties and stating that the Security Council should continue to be seized of the matter.

4. If Iranian Government reports that Soviet troops have not been completely withdrawn, you should propose or support an adjournment of the SC for 1 or 2 days in order that members may have an opportunity to study the issues involved in the light of the report. Under such circumstances our position will depend on the factual situation relating to the withdrawal and whether extenuating circumstances exist or have been alleged in the Iranian report and further guidance will be sent to you.

5. We have requested Tehran Embassy¹⁵ to keep us informed on a day-to-day basis of the factual developments there. We will transmit the information to you.

Sent to New York; repeated to Tehran and Moscow, and Paris for the Secretary.

ACHESON

501.BC/5-346 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET
URGENT

NEW YORK, May 3, 1946—1:45 p. m.
[Received May 3—1:01 p. m.]

138. Sir Alexander Cadogan advised me this morning that he had talked to Mr. Lie last evening regarding the date of the meeting on Iran. Lie reported he had talked to the President of the Council about this matter and thought that the best thing to do would be not to set a date for the meeting now. If parties reported by midnight on May 6, he would get in touch with the President immediately and they could call a meeting on short notice. Sir Alexander had apparently told Lie he thought this was satisfactory. I told Sir Alexander I did not agree with this and would talk to Dr. Afifi Pasha about it and let him know the result.

I then arranged to see Dr. Afifi Pasha. I told him what Sir Alex-

¹⁵ Telegram 386, May 2, 1946, 6 p. m., not printed.

under had reported to me and advised him that I felt that this was an undignified procedure for the Council; I thought the Council ought to set now the date of its meeting for the afternoon of Tuesday, May 7; it seemed to me the Council should assume that the Russians and Iranians would act in accordance with the request of the Council in its resolution of April 4; if the Russian troops had evacuated Iran by midnight Monday there was no reason why the parties could not report that by Tuesday at 3 o'clock. In any case I thought the Council should meet as was contemplated in the resolution of April 4. If no reports had arrived by that time, the Council would have to make up its mind what to do about the situation.

Dr. Afifi agreed wholeheartedly with this suggestion. He said that he had discussed this question with Mr. Lie and had made this same suggestion to him. Lie had advised he would discuss the matter with the other members of the Council and let him know.

Dr. Afifi said he would call Lie immediately and advise him that a meeting should be called immediately for Tuesday at 3 p. m.

We discussed what was likely to happen at the meeting. I advised him that if from our own sources it appeared that the Russians had completed the evacuation and if the Iranians reported that fact, we would not insist upon a report from the Russians but would be agreeable to taking the matter off the agenda. I also advised him we thought the Council should not take the matter off its agenda without a report from at least the Iranians. In that case we felt the Council would have to ask the Secretary General to communicate with the parties. Dr. Afifi agreed that this would be the right approach to the problem.

He indicated that he felt it was likely that the Russian troops would have withdrawn. His private information was to the effect that they were leaving groups of "armed civilians" behind. He doubted whether the Iranians would raise this question, however. He thought they would be under severe pressure to report that the evacuation was completed and that they would probably do so. If they found later that there continued to be Russian interference they might possibly raise the matter again.

In regard to the question whether Gromyko would attend the meeting on Tuesday, Dr. Afifi thought that he probably would if he knew in advance that both parties would make satisfactory reports and that the Council would take action to drop the matter from its agenda. Otherwise, he did not believe he would be present.

[Here follows discussion of matters other than the Iranian question.]

[STETTINIUS]

861.24591/5-446 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State*SECRET US URGENT
MOST IMMEDIATETEHRAN, May 4, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received May 4—5 : 50 p. m.]

638. Deptel 383, May 1. Qavam informed me this evening that he is despatching a commissioner to Azerbaijan “within a day or two” to ascertain in his behalf whether evacuation of Soviet troops is accomplished fact. He will inform Ala of this “probably tomorrow” and will instruct Ala to so inform Security Council and also inform Council that Iranian report to Council on Soviet evacuation will be made subsequent to receipt of report from above-mentioned commissioner.

Qavam states that according to latest information received from Soviet and Iranian sources all Soviet troops will be evacuated from Iran, including Azerbaijan, not later than May 6.

Acting Chief of Staff today informed Military Attaché that according to available but questionable information all Soviet troops have already been evacuated from whole of Iran (Deptel 388 [386?]¹⁶, May 2 which was only received today).

Sent Dept 638, repeated Moscow 183.

WARD

891.00/5-446 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State*SECRET
US URGENTTEHRAN, May 4, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received 8 : 15 p. m.]

639. Qavam told me this evening his negotiations with Azerbaijanis are deadlocked. Principal point of disagreement is disposition of Azerbaijan Army. Prime Minister is insisting it must be completely disbanded and that any armed forces stationed that province in future shall be composed of regular conscripts with officers appointed by Tehran. Pishevari has refused accept this. Other disputed points are :

(1) Prime Minister demands that National Majlis Azerbaijan be dissolved and completely new elections be held for Provincial Council. Pishevari wants present Majlis preserved intact and simply converted bodily into Provincial Council.

(2) Qavam wants Azerbaijan finances controlled by commissioner appointed by Tehran, with locally appointed “comptroller” under

¹⁶ Not printed ; but see telegram 43, May 2, p. 444, paragraph 5.

him to represent provincial interests. Pischevari insists Chief Finance Officer must be locally named with Tehran appointee as subordinate comptroller.

Contrary to unofficial reports, Qavam says there has been no discussion as to who shall be appointed Governor General.

Prime Minister saw Pischevari and Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov this morning, Sadchikov being present as mediator. According to Qavam, Pischevari persisted in intransigent attitude to such point that he (Qavam) lost his temper and used "undiplomatic language". At this point Sadchikov intervened and suggested discussions be postponed. Prime Minister hopes to see Pischevari tomorrow in effort to reach agreement. If this fails he expects Pischevari to return to Tabriz day after tomorrow but does not anticipate that this will mean complete break as he thinks either Pischevari or some other Azerbaijan representative will return later to resume conversations.

Qavam says he has told Pischevari plainly that he could not and would not make concessions beyond those publicly announced (Embtel 578, April 23). He said constitution forbade it and he further lacked authority from his Cabinet. Dept will recall he told me same thing May 1.

Sent Dept 639; repeated Moscow 184; and Paris for Delam.

WARD

861.24591/5-546: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 5, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received 6:45 p. m.]

640. Deptel 386, May 2.¹⁷ After consulting both British and Iranian authorities and other sources, Embassy feels it may safely be said that to date all of Northern Iran except possibly for Azerbaijan has been completely evacuated. British Military Attaché has just returned from trip along Caspian Littoral all the way from Astara to Bandar Shah and reports complete evacuation except for scattered units engaged in miscellaneous duties connected with physical details of evacuation. Reliable gendarme officer has returned from trip through all of Mazandaran and reports evacuation completed.

Information on number of Soviet troops left behind in civilian clothes is contradictory but in any case there do not appear to be many. This does not apply to Azerbaijan, accurate information on developments there not being available in Tehran. Gagarine who left for Tabriz by car May 3 should by now have arrived and he and Dooher should be able to provide reports on progress evacuation in Azerbaijan.

¹⁷ Not printed.

Our estimate is that evacuation of uniformed troops will be complete by specified date but that number of troops in civilian clothes will be left in Azerbaijan.¹⁸

Sent Dept 640; repeated Moscow on 85.

WARD

891.00/5-646: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 6, 1946—10 a. m.

US URGENT

[Received 5:48 p. m.]

641. We learned last night that on May 3 Shah sent his aide General Riazi, to British Ambassador Le Rougetel¹⁹ to express fear lest PriMin Qavam rush into agreement with Azerbaijanis which would leave Azerbaijan Army in being and prevent reestablishment of regular Iranian Army in province. Shah thought Qavam would feel obliged conclude agreement before May 6 and might make excessive concessions to achieve this. He hoped British would use influence to prevent it.

Le Rougetel reported this to Bevin at Paris and yesterday received instructions in following sense:

1. British Govt saw no reason why Qavam need conclude agreement by May 6. If he were being pushed to do so by Russians it might mean they wanted Iranian Govt recognition of continued existence Azerbaijan Army, nominally as part of Iranian Army, in order that they might claim tanks and other arms turned over to Azerbaijanis were in reality supplied to Iranian Govt and so not proper subject of any complaint.

2. Qavam should not hasten agreement merely to induce Russians to evacuate Iran. British Govt had no intention of passing over in silence any further failure of Russians to carry out their agreements this regard. PriMin should remember Iran question still on Security Council agenda.

¹⁸ In telegram 147, May 6, 4 p. m., Mr. Doohar reported complete evacuation of uniformed Soviet troops and matériel from the Tabriz area except for a small detachment of semi-military railway personnel awaiting the arrival of a Central Government Commission in order to turn over railway materials. He was unable to verify personally the Soviet evacuation of the rest of Azerbaijan because of the refusal of the local government to grant travel permission. However, he cited reliable reports from various parts of the province indicating Soviet withdrawal except for frontier towns, which might easily be evacuated before the deadline (861.24591/5-646). In telegram 148, May 7, noon, Mr. Doohar stated: "Analyzing results of personal observation Tabriz and reliable reports from several large towns in province I am convinced that evacuation of Soviet uniformed troops and such material not turned over to Democrats was completed by last night deadline." He noted that this opinion was held also by British and other foreign consular officials. He pointed out, however, that Soviet penetration by means of Caucasian immigrants was being pushed. (861.24591/5-746)

¹⁹ Sir John H. Le Rougetel, who was designated British Ambassador to Iran on April 18, 1946.

3. However British Govt felt that Iranian Govt and Azerbaijan Govt should be able reach amicable agreement and felt Iranian Govt should avoid use of force against Azerbaijan.

Le Rougetel was authorized communicate foregoing views to Shah and Qavam. Bevin expressed opinion it would be useful if American Embassy supported this action.

British Ambassador was to see Shah and/or Qavam last night. I have not heard result.

In absence of instructions I do not propose make any formal *démarche* this regard, although I feel British position is well taken. As reported mytel 639, May 4, Qavam has given me to understand he will stand firm and does not intend to be rushed into making concessions beyond his publicly announced position. However experience has shown he sometimes weakens in situations of this kind when strong pressure is brought to bear and I think it might be useful if Dept were to instruct me to inform him of US Govt's views.²⁰

In this connection I assume Dept agrees that continuance of well-armed Azerbaijan Army under control of local govt Tabriz would effectually perpetuate present *de facto* independence of province and make any agreement reached by Qavam purely face-saving device.

Sent Dept 641; repeated Moscow 186 and Paris for Delam.

WARD

501.BC/5-646: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

US URGENT

NEW YORK, May 6, 1946—noon.

[Received 11:15 p. m.]

147. For Acheson, Henderson and Hiss.²¹ The following letter from the Iranian Ambassador²² was received by Trygve Lie at 9 p. m., Daylight Time, May 6th. This text was received by telephone:

"Sir: On the 4 April, 1946, the Security Council resolved 'that the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until 6 May 1946, at which time the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government were requested to report to the Council whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed and

²⁰ In telegram 400, May 7, 8 p. m., the Department informed the Chargé: "We leave to Amb's discretion views which should be expressed to Qavam regarding negotiations between Govt and Azerbaijanis. For our part we do not believe this Govt should accept responsibility for advising Qavam as to methods he should use in reasserting Iranian authority in Azerbaijan." (891.00/5-746)

²¹ Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

²² Ambassador Ala called on Mr. Stettinius at about 11:30 a. m., May 6, prior to the sending of his letter; for the nature of their conversation, see telegram 2147, May 7, to Paris, *infra*.

at which time the Council shall consider what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required. . . .

The Iranian appeal set forth in the letter of 18 March 1946 related to two matters which it was stated were likely to endanger international peace and security. The first of these referred to the maintenance of Soviet troops on Iranian territory after 2 March 1946; and the second (which was first presented to the Council at its meetings in London) referred to Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

With respect to the withdrawal of troops, the Soviet Union has officially informed the Security Council that the evacuation would be completed during a period of one-and-one-half months from 24 March 1946.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, it is impossible for me to make a complete report at this time. On the basis of the information received by me from my government up to 5 o'clock this afternoon, I am able, however, to present to the Council the following report.

Soviet troops have now been completely evacuated from the Provinces of Khorassan, Gorgan, Mazanderan and Gilan. This information is based upon investigation made by responsible officials of the Government of Iran.

So far as the Province of Azerbaijan is concerned, the Government has been informed through other sources that the evacuation of Soviet troops from that Province has been going forward and it is said will have been completed before 7 May 1946. These reports have not been verified by direct observation of officials of the Iranian Government. The reason for this is that, as previously pointed out to the Council, the Iranian Government has been unable, because of the interference complained of, to exercise effective authority within Azerbaijan since 7 November 1945, and from that time to the present has had no opportunity to ascertain through its own officials what are the conditions prevailing throughout that Province.

While it is hoped that arrangements can be made which will remove the unfortunate results of the interference complained of, it is impossible to forecast at this time with certainty what the subsequent developments will be. As soon as the Iranian Government is able to ascertain through its official representative the true state of affairs in the Province of Azerbaijan, the facts will be reported promptly to the Council.

I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

Hussein Ala
Iranian Ambassador.

His Excellency

Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha

President of the Security Council."

STETTINIUS

861.24591/5-746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1946—2 p. m.

2147. For Secretary Byrnes. Iranian Ambassador informed Stettinius on May 6 that he intended deliver written report to Security

Council later in day. Although without information from Tehran since May 3, Ala intended to report that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from all northern provinces except Azerbaijan and were, according to latest reports, in process of evacuating that province but that this could not be confirmed since Tehran Government had no representatives in Azerbaijan. He also planned to refer to Russian interference in Iranian affairs and to continuing negotiations between Premier Qavam and the Azerbaijanese regarding home rule. Ala asked Stettinius whether Council would remove the question from agenda since Iran probably would not be able confirm withdrawal by May 8. Stettinius indicated there might be grounds for postponing consideration for few days until conclusive report could be received and queried necessity of report on May 6 since deadline was midnight. Ala promised to consider this aspect of situation but evening May 6 he delivered to Lie letter along lines indicated in conversation with Stettinius.

Ala had also suggested to Stettinius that it would be desirable for Security Council to retain question on agenda, even after official confirmation of Soviet evacuation had been received. Stettinius pointed out that such a course was not envisaged by Security Council's resolution of April 4 and would certainly meet with violent objections from USSR. Ala continued to urge this action, and Stettinius, although indicating objection to proposal, said he would consider matter further.²³

ACHESON

861.24591/5-746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1946—4 p. m.

49. We suggest that at the meeting of the Council tomorrow afternoon you make a statement along the following lines.

The Security Council, in its resolution of April 4, requested the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government to report to the Council on May 6 whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed.

The Soviet Government has not complied with the request of the Council.

The Iranian Government, on its part, has complied with the request in a preliminary manner—and apparently as fully as conditions per-

²³ In telegram 151, May 7, 10:30 p. m., Mr. Stettinius reported he had informed Sir Alexander Cadogan the same day "that the U.S. position was that under the circumstances there was no basis for remaining seized of the matter, if Iran reported complete Soviet evacuation." (501.BC/5-746)

mit. In its report the Iranian Government states that it is not possible at this time for its representative to make a complete report because it has had no opportunity to ascertain through its own officials the conditions prevailing in the Province of Azerbaijan.

In view of the statement of the Iranian Government that it will report promptly to the Council the true state of affairs in Azerbaijan as soon as it is able to ascertain the facts through its official representatives, I wish to submit for the consideration of the Council the following resolution:

“Resolved that in view of the statement made by the Iranian Government in its preliminary report of May 6, submitted in compliance with the Resolution of April 4, 1946, that it was not able as of May 6 to state whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed, the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian matter in order that the Government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain through its official representatives whether all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran; that the Iranian Government be requested to submit a complete report on the subject to the Security Council as soon as it has information which will enable it so to do and that in case it is unable to obtain such information by May 20, it report on that day such information as is available to it; and that immediately following the receipt of a further report on this subject from the Iranian Government, the Council shall consider what if any further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required.”

ACHESON

891.00/5-846: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

TEHRAN, May 8, 1946—6 a. m.
[Received May 9—8: 17 a. m.]

659. From Allen.²⁴ During my initial call on Prime Minister this morning Qavam said that communication which Ala had addressed to Security Council in past few days was in accord with instructions he had sent Ala. In response to my specific question he stated his instructions to Ala had included statement that Iran was unable inform Council fully regarding evacuation Azerbaijan because of activities of Soviet Union in that province.

As regards present negotiations with Pishevari, he said that they had achieved no results. At his last meeting with Azerbaijan delegation, he had again informed Pishevari that he could not modify in any way the 7-point program which he had announced some time ago, as basis for agreement with Azerbaijan. Yesterday when he had called in Soviet Ambassador to impress upon him desirability of

²⁴ George V. Allen, the appointed Ambassador to Iran, did not assume charge of the Embassy until May 11.

public statement by Soviet Govt that all Soviet troops had withdrawn from Iran, he had informed Soviet Ambassador that he could not alter his position with Azerbaijan delegation, would have to resign his position if no further progress could be made. Soviet Ambassador told Qavam he hoped he would not resign since if he were followed by another Prime Minister who had a conciliatory policy, no advantage would be gained by resignation of Qavam who had pioneered this policy and was carrying it out so diligently. If new Prime Minister should carry out policy of coercion, bloodshed would result, and Iran would become scene of "international warfare". Qavam said that although Soviet Ambassador had said "international warfare" and not "civil war", he (Qavam) did not take remark very seriously.

The Prime Minister then told me in the utmost confidence that his difficulties were not so much with Pishevari as with the Shah. He said that he felt confident he could make arrangements with Pishevari and that they had actually come fairly close to an agreement, on the basis of the appointment by Tehran (1) of a governor general in Tabriz, and (2) of an officer from the Iranian Army to take command of the Azerbaijan forces, the latter to be selected by the Tehran Government from among five officers of the Iranian Army to be dominated [*nominated?*] by Pishevari. There still remained some difference over the question of finances, Pishevari insisting upon appointing the Director General of Finances of Azerbaijan, but Qavam thought this point could be arranged. Qavam said that the Shah objected to the proposed arrangement, and insisted upon sending three brigades of the Iranian Army (5,000 or 6,000 men) into Azerbaijan immediately, one to be station at Tabriz, one at Rezaieh, and one at Ardabil. Qavam was convinced that this action would result in fiasco, since dissatisfied elements in army and elements friendly towards Azerbaijan regime would probably go over to other side. In view of size of Azerbaijan forces (alleged to be 30,000), Qavam was afraid central forces would be defeated. He was convinced that best method of handling situation was to win Azerbaijan back under Tehran control by pacific penetration. The Shah, on other hand, insists upon forceful occupation of the area.

Qavam said that his primary difficulty with the Shah resulted from the Shah's insistence upon exercising, in practice, his nominal position as Commander-in-Chief of Army. Qavam hoped very much that I would give the Shah good advice on the occasion of my forthcoming visit to him.

In response to my specific inquiry as to whether negotiations between Tehran and Tabriz, now being on, could be considered an

internal Iranian matter, Qavam stated that this was not the case. He said that while the Russians gave the open appearance of aiding the two parties in getting together, he knew that Russians would aid Azerbaijan if matter developed into armed conflict.

In reply to another question regarding the numbers of armed civilian Russians left behind in the northern provinces, Qavam said that it was impossible for him to determine their number, but that he felt confident there were many such persons in Azerbaijan but not in the other four provinces. He said that they were well armed and were "officers, not enlisted men".

In response to a further question, he said that as far as he was aware the military supplies and arms Russians still retained at time of their departure were taken away with them. He added, laughing, that they did not need to leave any behind, since they had armed the Azerbaijanis well already.

The two commissioners sent to Azerbaijan to determine whether Russian troops had withdrawn had visited only Tabriz and Julfa up to present time. Russian troops had in fact evacuated those points.

Qavam asked whether a public statement by Soviet Ambassador, or by Soviet Govt in Moscow, that all Russian troops had withdrawn from Iran would be satisfactory. I said that I did not think that would be sufficient, and that Iran Govt should make a further report to the Security Council as soon as it was in position to state on first hand knowledge that all Soviet troops had withdrawn. I pointed out that public statements to the press are neither a sufficient nor appropriate means of conveying information to the Security Council of the United Nations. Qavam nodded acquiescence.

The Prime Minister said that Soviet Ambassador had requested permission for 40 Soviet trucks to remain in northern Iran, to be used in fighting locusts. Soviet personnel to man these trucks would remain on Soviet side of the border (apparently until needed for locust control work). Qavam had refused the Soviet request, stating that any residue either of Soviet troops or material in northern Iran would give rise to claims that Soviets had not fully evacuated the country.

In response to my inquiry, he said that he was satisfied with Colonel Schwarzkopf and his mission, and that he liked Colonel Schwarzkopf personally. He also thought that General Ridley and the members of his mission were doing the best they could but that the Shah had not permitted them to accomplish anything with the Army.

During the conversation Qavam emphasized that he spoke in strictest confidence, both as regards his relations with Shah and his statement that Iran was still suffering from British as well as Soviet

pressure. As regards the latter, he may have been referring to his belief that British are trying actively to oust him in favor of a Prime Minister who would follow less conciliatory course with Russia. [Allen.]

WARD

501.BC/5-846: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, May 8, 1946—9:30 p. m.

158. Security Council. The Security Council at its 40th meeting Wednesday, May 8,²⁵ unanimously adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution deferring further proceedings on the Iranian question in order that the Government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain whether all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran. The Soviet Union was not represented at this session.

Mr. Stettinius was accompanied by Herschel Johnson, his recently appointed deputy,²⁶ who arrived in New York yesterday.

Following adoption of the provisional agenda, Chairman Hafez Afifi Pasha called on Mr. Stettinius. The latter pointed out that the Security Council in its resolution of April 4 requested the USSR and Iran to report to the Council on May 6 whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed. He said that the Soviet Government had not complied with the request and Iran has replied only in a preliminary manner, but apparently as fully as conditions have permitted.

Mr. Stettinius called attention to the Iranian statement that it would report to the Council on the true state of affairs in Azerbaijan as soon as it was able to ascertain the facts through its own official representatives before introducing the following resolution:²⁷

“RESOLVED: That in view of the statement made by the Iranian Government in its preliminary report of May 6, submitted in compliance with the resolution of April 4, 1946, that it was not able as of May 6 to state whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed, the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian matter in order that the government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain through its official representatives whether all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran; that the Iranian government be requested to submit a complete report on the subject to the Security Council immediately upon the receipt of the information which will enable it so to do; and that in

²⁵ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on May 8, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 246-252.

²⁶ Herschel V. Johnson was appointed to this position on April 23, 1946.

²⁷ For Mr. Stettinius' statement and text of the resolution, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 247, or Department of State *Bulletin*, May 19, 1946, p. 853.

case it is unable to obtain such information by May 20, it report on that day such information as is available to it at that time; and that immediately following the receipt from the Iranian Government of the report requested, the Council shall consider what if any further proceedings are required.”

[Here follow comments by various delegates on the resolution, and discussion of matters other than the Iranian question.]

[STETTINIUS]

861.24591/5-946 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ward)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

408. Conversation with Ala before Security Council meeting May 8²⁸ revealed Amb's feeling that Council resolution should recognize existence of two Iranian complaints; should treat at this time only one complaint dealing with presence of Soviet troops in Iran; and should anticipate future Council action upon other complaint charging interference by Soviet agents, officials and armed forces. Henderson pointed out that whole context of Council proceedings on Iranian matter seemed to treat Iranian appeal as single complaint and reminded Ala that Iranian letter of April 15²⁹ referred to the withdrawal of "its complaint" from Security Council. Ala admitted use of word in singular in Iranian withdrawal note was most unfortunate. Henderson said he doubted that US, particularly in absence of clear statement by Iran to Security Council on subject, would be able to maintain position that Iran had withdrawn only that portion of its complaint regarding presence of Soviet forces and had not withdrawn portion regarding Soviet interference in internal affairs.

Before Council meeting, this matter was considered further in discussion with Cadogan, Van Kleffens, and Afifi Pasha. UK and Netherlands representatives were sympathetic with Ala's contention and felt that interference issue should be kept alive. It appeared that both representatives had been approached by Ala in this connection. Van Kleffens suggested introductory statement limiting concern of resolution to matter of withdrawal Soviet forces. It was finally agreed that such limitation might cause Council controversy, which was considered undesirable at this time.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to London, Moscow and Paris.

ACHESON

²⁸ As recorded in telegram 156, May 8, 5 p. m., from New York, not printed.

²⁹ Quoted in telegram 73, April 15, from New York, p. 423.

891.00/5-1146: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State*SECRET
US URGENTTEHRAN, May 11, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received 4: 32 p. m.]

678. Following presentation of credentials this morning I had considerable conversation with Shah and Qavam, latter being present throughout in his capacity as Foreign Minister. His presence was unfortunate as far as obtaining significant information was concerned, since it was evident that Shah and Qavam were hesitant to speak entirely frankly in each other's presence.

As concerned Iranian case before Security Council, I said Iran had great sympathy in the United States in its efforts to maintain its independence, but added that some difficulty was caused Secretary of State by fact that there did not appear to be complete understanding at all times between the Iranian Government and its representative in New York. As illustration, I cited fact that Ambassador Ala stated to Council on April 3 that no negotiations were going on between the Iranian and Soviet Governments concerning either the presence of Soviet troops in Iran or Soviet oil concession, since negotiations on neither of these subjects would be legal. Following day agreements were announced in Tehran on both subjects, making it evident that negotiations had in fact been going on. I stressed importance of assistance Security Council could give nation like Iran but also importance of that nation presenting its case to Council in most positive and exact manner. Both Shah and Qavam expressed understanding of difficulties created. Shah then asked what Council could do in actual fact to assist Iran. He evidently had in mind that the Council had no security forces at its disposal. I said that in spite this fact, Council could accomplish great deal through public opinion, as evidenced by fact that Iran was today free of regular Soviet forces.

As regards elections, Shah said they would be held "soon". He and Qavam agreed, however, that 2 or 3 months would probably be required between issuance of decree calling for elections and actual holding thereof. No mention was made of foreign supervision. Qavam indicated he had in mind his promise to submit Soviet petroleum agreement to Majlis by October 24.

I said, principally for Qavam's benefit, that program of reform which he had announced shortly after assumption of office had made a favorable impression in the United States, and I hoped he would have opportunity to institute it soon. Shah interposed that country must be united and independent before other measures could be undertaken.

Qavam said that Pischevari and Azerbaijan delegation were still here, but offered no comment on progress of negotiations.

In general, Shah's policy is more likely to produce bloodshed than Qavam's but latter's conciliatory attitude towards Azerbaijan may result in continued existence of the Azerbaijan Army. Qavam thinks that Tehran Government can gain control over this army gradually by penetration. Shah favors more direct and stronger methods. It is possible that if Qavam continues to find Azerbaijan delegation intransigent, he may move in the direction of Shah's position. If he does so, and if fighting results, with indirect or direct support of Azerbaijan by USSR, I consider it likely Iranian Government will present to Security Council new complaint against USSR.

ALLEN

501.BC/5-846 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1946—3 p. m.

58. For Stettinius. Urtel 156, May 8.³⁰ We have given careful consideration to question raised by Mr. Ala whether a finding by Security Council that all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from whole of Iran would justify Council action in dropping that portion of Iranian complaint relating to interference by Soviet agents, officials, and armed forces in the internal affairs of Iran, as well as that portion relating to continued presence of Soviet forces in Iran.

Mr. Ala has taken position that Iranian Govt, in its letter of Apr 15,³¹ did not intend to inform Security Council that its complaint with re[gard] to such interference was being withdrawn. According to Mr. Ala, it intended to limit its request for withdrawal to that portion of its letter of Mar 18 relating to continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran.³²

We have thus far been under impression that Iran, in its note to Security Council of Apr 15, had in using the words "withdraws its complaint" meant to withdraw both aspects of its complaint. We would not be in position to support contention that Iran had not intended to withdraw every aspect of its complaint against Soviet Union in its letter of April 15 unless Iran itself should on its own behalf make a clear statement to Security Council to that effect.

³⁰ Not printed, but see telegram 408, May 9, to Tehran, p. 457.

³¹ Quoted in telegram 73, April 15, from New York, p. 423.

³² For texts of Mr. Ala's letters of March 18, see telegram 222, March 19, to Tehran, p. 365.

If Iranian Govt does make such a statement, we should accept it at face value on the ground that Iran alone is able to give a true interpretation of its note. If Iran should insist that Soviet agents and officials are continuing to interfere in internal affairs of Iran and that its complaint in this regard has not been withdrawn, we should take position that this allegation represents continuation of complaint of Mar. 18.

We would have no objection, of course, if Iran should desire to raise the interference issue as an entirely new case, which action would not in our opinion be precluded by any action of Security Council in disposing of matter of presence of Soviet armed forces in Iran.

In either event, if the matter of interference comes up on Council's agenda, we should advocate that procedure in Council follow past practice under which Iranian Govt would first be asked to appear before Council and make statement in support of complaint of interference, and that Soviet Govt be given an opportunity to reply.

This position should be taken in Council itself and may, in your discretion, be imparted to other representatives on Security Council who may approach you on subject.

Sent to New York, repeated to Tehran, Moscow and Paris, and London.

ACHESON

891.00/5-1346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 13, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 4:10 p. m.]

680. Qavam informed me this morning that Pishevari on Azerbaijan delegation who returned to Tabriz today, left in an angry mood. Qavam feels that their annoyance is due primarily to failure to achieve positive results and is not directed against him personally since Azerbaijan representatives seem convinced that he wishes to follow conciliatory policy and avoid fratricidal bloodshed.

Following rupture of negotiations, Soviet Ambassador told Qavam that while he regarded matter as internal one, he was afraid Qavam's continued failure to reach agreement with Azerbaijan would result in "iron and blood". Qavam feels Soviet Ambassador is putting pressure on him rather than on Azerbaijanis.

Qavam, as appears to be his custom, asked my advice. I said that it would seem to me his duty and responsibility to make a clear and frank public statement now regarding the negotiations. He hesitated

to agree, saying that such statement would annoy Azerbaijanis and might lead to agitation in other Northern Provinces and even in Tehran itself. He said Azerbaijan Government might react to his public statement by declaring that it would have no further dealings with him. I said that while decision was his alone, there were occasions on which responsible official must take measures he considered proper and just in spite of difficulties and that Qavam might well consider this such occasion.

Qavam asked several times what assistance Security Council could give Iran if fighting should result. I said I wanted to speak to him in all frankness and sincerity. I would not advise Iran to approach Security Council again unless two conditions existed: (1) his Government must be confident it could establish clear case of foreign interference in Iranian affairs and be willing to place all evidence unre-servedly before Council, and (2) his Government must be prepared to pursue the matter firmly, regardless of any pressure which might later be exerted by any government on him to change his course. I said Security Council had been able to render Iran certain aid in the past in spite of difficulties made for Council by wavering policy of Iranian Govt particularly as regards conflicting statements made by Ala in New York and Firuz in Tehran.

I referred to press reports that Soviet Ambassador had been present at meeting between Qavam and Pishevari, pointing out that this close association of Soviet Ambassador in discussions with Qavam's acquiescence might make it difficult for Iran subsequently to establish case before the Security Council of Soviet interference in internal Iranian matters. Soviet representative in New York could state that his Govt had been invited to participate. Qavam said he appreciated point and repeated that Soviet Ambassador's presence had been fortuitous and had, at any rate, been in accord with Soviet assurances of assistance in Azerbaijan negotiations.

It is evident that Qavam desires more specific assurances than he has received of positive aid which the Council can give to Iran. He thought mere commission of inquiry would be of little assistance. I told him that I did not believe he appreciated sufficiently aid which World Organization could give him if he gave it full opportunity.

In addition to points of difference with Azerbaijan already known, i.e., control of Azerbaijan Army and finances, and appointment of Governor General, Qavam revealed further point of disagreement which may be highly important. While Qavam agrees to plan for division of public domain among peasants, Azerbaijan delegation demands that Tehran Govt immediately redeem all ceded domains for distribution among peasants. Ceded domains are those previously granted by Crown and may have been sold subsequently many times.

Qavam said latter would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to purchase. As regards future, Qavam said that he would issue statement regarding negotiations and leave next move to Azerbaijan.

Sent Dept 680, repeated Moscow 192, and Paris.

ALLEN

891.00/5-1446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY

TEHRAN, May 14, 1946.

[Received May 14—9:53 a. m.]

686. Following announcement issued here last night by Prime Minister Qavam:

“On this occasion when the public is watching the course of the negotiations between the Government and the representatives of Azerbaijan, I deem it necessary to bring the result of the conversations of the past 15 days to the attention of the public to the end that the facts may be made clear.

The representatives of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan who came to Tehran are aware that I exerted every effort to settle the questions at issue in a spirit of goodwill and conciliation. After the publication of my communiqué of April 21, 1946, containing the seven points of the Government communication, many circles raised objections and considered that in my attitude I had exceeded the limits of the existing laws.

Although I have had confidence in the goodwill of the representatives of the Azerbaijan representatives, as a result of the negotiations of the past 15 days I am sorry that some of their demands surpassed my legal powers and the Government's seven points. Perforce the negotiations were suspended until such time as a way for the solution of the problem can be found, and the representatives of Azerbaijan left for Tabriz.

The questions in which the Government's legal powers and the seven points were at variance with the demands of the representatives of the Azerbaijan inhabitants were as follows:

1. According to article 2 of the Government's communiqué the right of appointment of the Governor General of Azerbaijan rested with the Government in consultation with the Provincial Council but the representatives of the Azerbaijan inhabitants insisted that the appointment of the Governor General should be made by the Government on the proposal of the Provincial Council.

2. According to article 2 of the communiqué of April 21, 1946, the Government was to appoint the military and *gendarmerie* commanders but the representatives of Azerbaijan believed that the appointment of such commanders should be made on the proposal of the Provincial Council subject to the approval of the Government.

3. The division of public domains and ceded lands among the peasants which has taken place in Azerbaijan, as a result of the recent developments, should be confirmed by the Majlis and is beyond the legal powers of the Government.

The above and several other points were discussed but since the final decision should be reached by the Majlis, the representatives of the Azerbaijan inhabitants returned to Tabriz to report (to their colleagues) and receive instructions in the matter.

Since I am willing to settle the questions at issue with perfect goodwill and conciliation it is obvious that I am prepared to continue the negotiations with a view to the adoption of a plan which shall not be at variance with the laws of the land. Since according to law and the accord reached with the Soviet Government concerning the northern oil, the Fifteenth Majlis should meet within 7 months from the date of signature of the accord, general elections should take place as soon as possible. I expect that the Azerbaijan representatives will provide the necessary facilities to the end that the Government may announce the general elections in conformity with law and the inhabitants may freely elect their deputies and send them to the capital.

I hope that with the goodwill and patriotism which I have found in the representatives of the Azerbaijan inhabitants, the necessary means can be found to allay public anxiety and the present difficulties will be eliminated with due consideration of the Government's legal duties."

Sent Dept 686, repeated Tabriz 92, Moscow 193, London 120 and Paris.

ALLEN

861.24591/5-1546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 15, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

698. Qavam informed me this morning that he had sent telegram to Pishevari last night informing him that colonel in the Iranian Air Force and two inspectors from Qavam's office would leave for Azerbaijan Friday to ascertain whether Soviet troops had left Iranian soil. Qavam said it would obviously be impossible for them to make definitive report by May 20, even if they were allowed to conduct investigation at all. I urged him to send factual report of exact status of matter to Ala by May 20. Qavam agreed to do so.

I pointed out that Security Council might again defer Iranian case until say June 1. Qavam said that would be "all right".

It seems to me very unlikely that Security Council will receive any definitive report from Iranian Govt on Soviet troops for some time, due to difficulties which Iranian officials will experience from Azerbaijan govt in making thorough investigation.

While it is difficult for me to suggest what period of time Security Council should allow for Iranian Govt to obtain information regarding Soviet troops, there is some advantage in having definite date set on which the Council will consider the matter again. If no date is set, Iranian Govt is under no specific pressure to obtain information or report.

During my official call on the Soviet Ambassador this morning I asked him outright whether Soviet troops had left Iran. His answer was as follows: "The last Soviet military unit left Iran on May 5 and there are no more Soviet troops in Iran. The Soviet Govt fulfilled entirely its agreement with the Iranian Govt on this subject." The latter sentence is not correct since Soviet units were still in Iran as late as May 9 or 10 but I now believe all uniformed troops have left.

Sent Dept 698; repeated Moscow 196 and Paris.

ALLEN

891.00/5-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

TEHRAN, May 15, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received 3:12 p. m.]

699. Qavam expressed the opinion to me today that the Tehran Govt must grant several concessions to Azerbaijan. He specified the questions of Commander-in-Chief of Azerbaijan Army and Governor General. He thought Tehran must concede these points to Pishvari to prevent Azerbaijan from declaring independence from Iran and repudiation of the dynasty. Qavam thought that other provinces and even Tehran might take similar action with regard to the dynasty.

Qavam said that the Shah had interfered in the recent negotiations by refusing to concur in any concessions to Azerbaijan beyond the seven-point program announced in advance. As regards Pishvari's statement on the radio last night that failure to reach agreement in the negotiations had been due to influence exercised by irresponsible authorities, Qavam said Pishvari meant the Shah. Qavam declared he had not told Pishvari of the Shah's interference in the negotiations and that Pishvari had reached his conclusion by deduction. I am inclined to doubt the latter statement. Qavam has clearly made every endeavor to remain in the good graces of Azerbaijan and Leftist elements. Even if he did not accuse Shah in so many words he certainly let Pishvari understand that he, Qavam, could reach a settlement except for the Shah's opposition.

Qavam asked me to impress the Shah with the necessity for making these concessions to Azerbaijan if he wanted to save the unity of Iran and the crown. Regardless of whether Qavam's views in this matter are sound, it does not seem to me a question which I should attempt to give advice, certainly in the absence of a request by the Shah for his [*my?*] opinion. I would welcome Department's views.³³

Qavam said without elaboration, that a refusal to make further concessions to Azerbaijan might well result in war between Iran and the Soviet Union. I am inclined to believe that both in this statement and his remarks regarding the dynasty, Qavam is building up arguments in favor of making concessions to Azerbaijan.

Sent Dept 699, repeated Moscow 197 and Paris.

ALLEN

861.24591/5-1646 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

435. While our attitude in Iranian matter must be governed by nature of Iranian reply our present thinking follows these lines:

We favor dropping Iranian case from agenda if (1) Iran fails to report on May 20 as requested or (2) Iran reports it is unable to ascertain facts concerning Soviet troop withdrawal but fails to make clear-cut statement that this is due to Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs.

We favor retention of Iranian case on agenda if (1) Iran reports its inability to ascertain facts is due to continued Soviet interference or (2) Iran requests Security Council remain seized of the complaint because of continuation of Soviet interference. In these two eventualities we favor following past procedures under which Iran would be permitted to state its case and Soviet Govt be allowed to reply.

Dept has indicated to Stettinius our view that S.C. should meet on May 22 to consider Iranian reply.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Amdel, New York.

ACHESON

³³ In telegram 440, May 17, 7 p. m., to Tehran, the Department stated: "We agree with your view that this is not kind of question in which you should give unsolicited advice. We are confident that you will be able, in case your advice is sought directly by Qavam or Shah, to give a reply which will be consonant with the assurances contained in the Declaration on Iran and which at the same time will avoid giving impression of a partisan attitude on part of this Govt in purely internal Iranian affairs." (891.00/5-1546).

861.24591/5-1746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 17, 1946—4 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

[Received May 17—2:40 p. m.]

709. Deptel 435, May 16. In all likelihood Iran will report to Council on May 20 that it is unable to ascertain facts regarding Soviet withdrawal but Iran will not make clear cut statement that inability is due to Soviet interference.

Action by Council to drop case from agenda will come as disappointment to many people in Iran, notably Shah and his group. However, further continuation of case on agenda is beginning to lose its efficacy in Iran and mere continuation may place Council in somewhat ridiculous plight. Fact that Soviet troops are generally believed to have withdrawn would make further continuation appear based on technicality without great substance.

It would be preferable from our point of view for US delegate not to make motion to drop case from agenda since we have been principal exponent of retaining case and our sudden change would be inevitably misconstrued.

If case is dropped, I strongly urge that US delegate point out that action is without prejudice to Iran's right to bring matter to Council's attention again if Iran should subsequently obtain information that all Soviet troops have not withdrawn or that foreign interference in internal Iranian affairs exists.³⁴

ALLEN

501.BC/5-2046: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 20, 1946—3:15 p. m.

URGENT

[Received May 20—3:12 p. m.]

201. Ambassador Ala and Judge O'Brian³⁵ called on me today at Ambassador Ala's request. Mr. H. Johnson and Mr. Noyes were with me.

³⁴ In telegram 712, May 18, noon, the Ambassador in Iran reported that the Soviet Ambassador regarded the dispatch of Iranian representatives to Azerbaijan to report on Soviet troop withdrawals as an affront to the Soviet Union (861.24591/5-1846).

³⁵ John Lord O'Brian of the firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee and Shorb. The services of this law firm had been engaged by the Iranian Government to assist in preparing its case before the Security Council.

Ambassador Ala said he had received no new information since Friday but expected a wire from Qavam today. Qavam had given him long and detailed explanations of his discussions with Pischevari and the reasons for Qavam's refusal to accept Pischevari's demands for autonomy beyond the Govt's seven points. Ambassador Ala said that Qavam was clearly in a very difficult position. In the last of the conversations with Pischevari, the Russian Ambassador had been present and had unexpectedly sided with Pischevari in spite of previous agreement with Qavam on the Government's seven points. Later the Russian Ambassador had talked of blood and iron and had appeared to threaten Qavam with serious consequences if he did not accept Pischevari's demands.

Ambassador Ala indicated Qavam felt that the Russians were "riding" him and were right there at his doorstep in strength. He appreciated what the Security Council had done and hoped it could help Iran in her troubles. He apparently did not feel that he could take the initiative in the Security Council at this time.

Ambassador Ala then went on to say that he hoped that the Council could do something to help the situation. Latest newspaper reports indicated a situation bordering on civil war. Judge O'Brian indicated that he was very surprised at the report that the Iranian Government had attacked Azerbaijan since from the tone of Qavam's cables it had not appeared that he was thinking of using force. He suggested that possibly the Iranian Army had gotten out of hand. Ambassador Ala interrupted to say that these reports came only from the Tabriz radio up to this time. He asked whether we had any information on the civil war and I said we did not. Both Ambassador Ala and Judge O'Brian made it clear that they felt the Russians were continuing to interfere in the present situation and that Russia was pulling all the strings in Azerbaijan at the present time. Her army might have gotten out of Iran officially but there was ample evidence that they had left behind soldiers in the Azerbaijan army or armed civilians and that they had equipped and trained the Azerbaijan Army with an eye to the present troubles. They thought that with the start of the fighting in Iran a new phase had been reached; that the Council could not ignore the present situation.

I asked Ambassador Ala whether he would report today. Ala said he would; that if he received no further telegram from Iran, he would have to report simply that he understood a Government commission had reached Tabriz but that no report covering Soviet withdrawals

had yet been received from them.³⁶ I asked whether he would be able to make any references to continued Soviet interference. Ambassador Ala said he continued to feel that Iran had withdrawn only part of its complaint and that the complaint of interference still stood. I said I understood that and that Ala had indicated that to the press; I wondered, however, if this was the position of the Iranian Government. Judge O'Brian indicated that they had not received instructions on this point from Qavam and seemed to feel that it was rather doubtful whether Qavam could under the circumstances agree to take this position.

Ambassador Ala suggested that the Council might send a commission on investigation. I did not comment directly on this but in a discussion Judge O'Brian said that they were in position to present facts to such a committee. We indicated this was a new element since we had assumed that when the Iranians withdrew the complaint this meant that they would not present any further facts to the Council supporting their earlier claims. Judge O'Brian did not reply directly but said they had some evidence and depositions here in New York.

I then said that while we did not like the situation, it appears to us that after Iran's action in withdrawing her complaint, it would be most helpful if she would take some affirmative step to help us deal with this difficult situation. I suggested that Ambassador Ala might come to the table at the forthcoming meeting on Wednesday and make some statements along the lines he had made in our discussion, which would make it possible for other members of the Council to take action without carrying the full responsibility on their own shoulders. Ambassador Ala said he would consider this very carefully.

STETTINIUS

[In telegram 720, May 20, 4 p. m., from Tehran, Ambassador Allen reported that the Iranian Prime Minister had "expressed hope to me last night that American delegation would state specifically at

³⁶ Mr. Ala, in a letter of May 20 to the President of the Security Council, stated that there was not sufficient first-hand information available to his Government as to the true state of affairs throughout Azerbaijan to make the complete report requested by the Security Council. Information available to him indicated that the Iranian Government was still prevented from exercising effective authority in Azerbaijan and that Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs had not ceased. He asserted that the course of events since his report of May 6 demonstrated that the threat to the integrity of his country and to international peace had grown more serious. He noted further that if the reports of armed conflict in Azerbaijan were true, the danger to international peace and security was serious and imminent. For text of Ala's letter, which was sent also to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 2*, p. 52, or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 2, 1946, p. 941.

time Iranian case is dropped from Security Council agenda that Iran was free to bring to the Council's attention any further information it might obtain regarding either Soviet troops which might have been left behind in Iran or regarding interference in Iranian affairs by Soviet nationals." (861.24591/5-2046) In telegram 210, May 21, 1946, 11:10 a. m., Mr. Stettinius advised that he had informed the Netherlands Representative to the United Nations the same morning "that while we were still studying the situation and had no fixed position at the moment, our minds were running along the line of asking Ala to explain why his Government has not been able to supply the information the Council requested, and when he felt they could supply the information. By this means we might continue the item on the agenda until the Iran Government is in a position to make a firm statement." (501.BC/5-2146).]

861.24591/5-2146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 21, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received May 22—5:56 p. m.]

726. PriMin today telegraphed Ala stating he had sent Inspection Committee from Tehran to investigate evacuation of all of Azerbaijan and that during one week vital areas such as Tabriz and suburbs, Marand, Julfa, Khoi, Salmas, Maku, Rezaieh and Miandoab were carefully inspected. Inspectors' reports state no sign has been found of Soviet troops, armaments and transportation equipment. Telegram concludes that according to investigations in all places through local notables Soviet troops did evacuate Azerbaijan May 6th.³⁷

It is clear from this that Qavam intends to report to Security Council without reservation that Soviet troops have left Iran. It is also clear from my talks with him that he knows that as result of this action present Iranian case will be dropped from agenda.

So far as possible new case is concerned, PriMin seems to have in mind possibility that if he gets substantial evidence of continued Russian interference in Iran he will approach Soviet Govt with it first and express hope that he will not find it necessary to make renewed appeal to Security Council.

Sent Dept 726, repeated Moscow 201.

ALLEN

³⁷ A telegram from the Iranian Prime Minister along these lines was quoted in a letter of May 21 from Ambassador Ala to the President of the Security Council; for text of letter, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 2*, p. 53, or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 2, 1946, p. 942.

501.BC/5-2146 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*SECRET
URGENTNEW YORK, May 21, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received May 21—7 p. m.]

217. I called on M. Parodi³⁸ at 4 o'clock this afternoon by appointment. Mr. J. E. Johnson³⁹ accompanied me.

I told Parodi that the United States is considering very seriously bringing the Iranian question in its present status to the attention of the Security Council under article 35 of the Charter. If my Government definitely decides to do this I will make a statement to that effect at the Council meeting tomorrow, May 22, with the request that it be placed on the agenda for a meeting on Monday, May 27. I emphasized that this would constitute a separate agenda item and would not be dependent upon the information which the Iranian Government may present to the Council tomorrow. I explained that in the opinion of my Government the situation in Azerbaijan continues to constitute a matter of the kind with which the Council is legitimately concerned, and that this would remain true even though the Iranian Government should report that Soviet troops were completely withdrawn.

I further explained that the United States contemplates proposing the establishment of a Commission of Investigation to proceed to ascertain the facts with respect to the continuance of Soviet interference and to the reported civil war. I added that we are aware that a resolution proposing such a commission would require a substantive vote and that the question of a possible veto therefore arose.

I requested Parodi's comments which were elaborated in the subsequent discussion in the course of which we told him of the UP story to the effect that the Iranian Government had officially announced that their Commission of Inquiry reported that all Soviet troops had been withdrawn by May 6, and of the AP report that Prince Firouz had stated that Ala, in referring in his recent letter to continued Soviet interference, was expressing his personal views and not those of the Iranian Government. We also attempted without success to obtain Parodi's views with respect to the question of whether Soviet absence at the time of the vote would constitute a veto. We further endeavored, also without success, to persuade him that whether or not the matter constitutes a dispute within the meaning of chapter 6, the Soviet Union is a party to a dispute within the meaning of article 27 (3), since it is directly interested in the subject. On this second

³⁸ Alexandre Parodi, the French Representative at the United Nations, who had assumed the Presidency of the Security Council on May 17.

³⁹ Joseph E. Johnson, Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs.

point, Parodi first inquired whether this interpretation was generally accepted, and when informed that it is not, commented that he did not see how one could maintain that a dispute exists when the interested states do not make such a claim.

Parodi inquired on what basis the Iranian question could be considered within the Council's competence if both parties maintain they are satisfied. He was informed that we have reports indicating that Soviet civilians remain in Azerbaijan and that Soviet troops are in the Azerbaijanian Army. Reference was also made to the role of the Soviet Ambassador in the negotiations between Pishevari and Qavam.

Alluding to the question of the freedom of action of the Iranian Government, Parodi expressed doubt whether a government which is actually engaged in fighting a civil war can be regarded as not having freedom of action.

At the end of the conversation, Parodi inquired whether the United States would not be satisfied to bring the situation to the attention of the Council as a new matter, without proposing at once the sending of a Commission of Investigation. We made no direct reply.

Throughout the conversation, which was hampered by language difficulties, Parodi manifested a spirit of caution, both as French delegate and as Chairman of the Council. He promised, however, to reflect on the matter, adding that the suggestion advanced by the United States took him somewhat by surprise as he had thought that the withdrawal of Soviet troops by May 6 constituted at least a "little" victory for the Council.

STETTINIUS

501.BC/5-2146 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1946—8 p. m.

67. For Stettinius. We suggest that at tomorrow's meeting of the Security Council you make a statement along the following lines with respect to the Iranian matter:

In view of the record of Soviet-Iranian difficulties and differences and in view of the conflicting reports relating to the current situation in northern Iran, particularly in Azerbaijan, my Government would consider it most unfortunate for the Security Council at this time to drop the Iranian matter from its agenda. It will be recalled that in the Council's resolution of April 4 the Council called upon the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government to report by May 6 whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed. The Soviet Government has made no report and no statement on this subject. Until today the Iranian Government was unable

to report factually as to Azerbaijan. It has today made a report which on its face is incomplete and deals with only a portion of the province of Azerbaijan. Moreover we must bear in mind that the presence of Soviet troops on Iranian territory has been only one of the subjects which has been a matter of dispute between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments. For these reasons my Government earnestly recommends that the Security Council should not at this time drop the Iranian matter from its agenda.

I wish to add that my Government, which, as is well known, has followed developments in the Iranian matter with the greatest concern, has recently been giving careful consideration to requesting upon its own initiative an investigation by the Council of the situation in northern Iran in order to assist the Council to determine whether the continuation of the situation in northern Iran was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. I do not at this time propose that the Council take further action with respect to the Iranian matter but I do wish to emphasize the feeling of my Government that it is most desirable that the Council continue to remain seized of the Iranian matter and indicate thereby its continuing concern in the developments with respect to northern Iran.

BYRNES

501.BC/5-2146 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 21, 1946—10:00 p. m.

URGENT

212. Security Council. Following the telephone conversation with the Department at noon Tuesday, May 21, on the Iranian question, various members of USdel conferred with some of the delegations in regard to the tentative U.S. proposal to draw the Council's attention to the situation in Iran and to send an investigating commission to Iran to ascertain the facts.

The position of some of the other delegations, as reported in separate telegrams Tuesday afternoon,⁴⁰ is that France, Netherlands and Egypt indicated opposition to the proposal; while the Australian, British and Chinese delegates, lacking any definite instructions from their Governments, indicated that they personally favored the proposal.

M. Parodi (France) commented that he did not see how one could maintain that a dispute exists when the interested States do not make such a claim. Dr. Afifi (Egypt) was very firm in his view that

⁴⁰ None printed.

for the Council to attempt to send out a commission of investigation would be a serious mistake and was doubtful whether this could be done over the Soviets' objection. He also felt it to be out of the question that such a commission would be allowed into Azerbaijan to make their investigation.

Dr. Van Kleffens (Netherlands) appeared favorably impressed with the U.S. proposal for bringing a new case, but was doubtful if it could be considered a dispute under article 27 (3), thus preventing a Soviet veto. He also was firm in his view that it would be a mistake to send an investigating commission since he felt the commission would never be allowed to enter Azerbaijan, a situation which would make the Council look impotent.

Before completing a check of the remaining delegations, USdel was informed by telephone of a possible change in instructions, which set forth that more time be taken to consider the problem and to discuss the matter more fully with other delegations.

Upon receipt of new instructions from the Department ⁴¹ Tuesday evening, USdel planned to contact some of the delegates previously reached in order to advise them of the change in plans.

[Here follows discussion of matters other than the Iranian question.]

STETTINIUS

501.BC/5-2246 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, May 22, 1946—8:30 p. m.

223. Security Council. With the Soviet delegate absent, the Security Council at its 43rd meeting May 22,⁴² discussed for 90 minutes latest developments in the Iranian question and adjourned without reaching a decision. Ambassador Hussein Ala of Iran sat at the Council table, and answered questions of the delegates.

Various proposals were made, but only a Netherlands' motion that the Council adjourn until an early date with the understanding that a meeting could be called at the request of any member was adopted. The Council remained seized with the Iranian question.

The Polish delegate, and to a lesser extent the French representative, favored removal of the Iranian question from the agenda, but the majority of the members were not satisfied that the latest report from the Iranian Prime Minister constituted a clear-cut declaration that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from the whole of Iran by May 6.

⁴¹ Presumably telegram 67, *supra*.

⁴² For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on May 22, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, pp. 287-305.

Mexico was represented by a new delegate, Padilla Nervo, when President Alexandre Parodi (France) called the session to order at 11:06 a. m. The provisional agenda and the Mexican delegate's credentials were adopted without observations.

The President said that a telegram had been received from the Government of Iran which was at first understood to be concerned with the Iranian question. He was referring to a message which was later found to refer to the world food situation. He called attention to the May 20 letter of Ambassador Ala which stated that while precise information on the situation in Iran had not been received, he (Ala) concluded that conditions set by the Security Council had not been fulfilled. Chairman Parodi then asked Assistant Secretary General Sobolev to read a May 21 telegram from the Iranian Government, which pointed out that the Prime Minister of Iran had sent a commission to Azerbaijan to investigate carefully regions such as Tabriz and its suburbs, Marand, Julfa, Khoy, Salmas, Maju, Rizaiyeh and Mianduab. The Prime Minister's message added that telegraphic reports are to the effect that no trace whatever of Soviet troops, equipment or means of transport were found, and that according to trustworthy people, who were questioned in the above-mentioned places, Soviet troops evacuated Iran on May 6th.

The British delegate wondered what proportion of the territory formerly occupied by Soviet troops was represented in the places named in the latest report and whether the report satisfied the Government of Teheran that the evacuation of Soviet troops was complete. He said he should like to know what steps the Commission took to satisfy itself and to verify that equipment and means of transport had been removed and whether reports that Soviet soldiers had been left behind in Azerbaijan in civilian clothes had been investigated.

Dr. Lange (Poland) regretted the way the whole Iranian matter had been treated by the Council, calling attention to the April 15 letter in which Iran withdrew its complaint from the Council. He thought the Iranian question had been used to create trouble and make Iran a perpetual and permanent football of big power politics. He said the latest statement of the Prime Minister of Iran closed the case effectively and was of the opinion that the question as to whether the Iranian Government was able to send its agents to Azerbaijan should be treated as an internal affair attributable to conflicts between the Province and the Central Government.

At the suggestion of Dr. Van Kleffens (Netherlands), Ambassador Ala was at this point invited to sit at the Council table. In response to questions, Ala said that in his opinion the first Iranian complaint that Soviet representatives were interfering in the internal affairs of Iran brought at the London meetings was still on the Council agenda. He stated that the Iranian complaint of March 18 concerned the

failure of the Soviet Government to withdraw its troops on the date stipulated in the Tripartite Treaty, but that it also maintained the first complaint of interference had not ceased. He thought that the April 15 letter from the Government of Iran, which came after the Soviet Government had assured the Iranian Government that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran by May 6, and which asked that the complaint be withdrawn, dealt only with the evacuation issue. He felt that the Iranian complaint on interference had not been withdrawn.

Before calling on Mr. Stettinius, President Parodi said that he thought as President of the Council he should express regret that the first communication received in New York from the Iranian Government came without the specific orders from the Iranian Government and was shortly afterwards contradicted by the Iranian Prime Minister.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that the Council again defer action on the Iranian matter, explaining that the U.S. did not believe that the Council had sufficient basis for taking definite action. He called attention to conflicting reports on the current troubled situation in Iran and the record of the Soviet-Iranian difficulties and differences and said the U.S. would consider it most unfortunate for the Council at that time to drop the Iranian question from the list of matters of which it was seized.

The U.S. representative stated that the Soviet Government had made no report to the Council and no statement on the subject of evacuation of its troops from Iran and the Iranian Government had been unable until May 21, to report any official findings as to Azerbaijan. He described the latest Iranian report as incomplete and inconclusive, adding that it dealt with only the western portion of the Province of Azerbaijan. The presence of Soviet troops in Iranian territory has been only one of the subjects which has been a matter of controversy between the Soviet and Iranian Governments, he said.

Mr. Stettinius declared that the U.S. Government had followed developments in the Iranian question with the greatest concern and recently had considered requesting upon its own initiative an investigation by the Council of the situation in Northern Iran in order to assist the Council to determine whether the continuance of the situation there was likely to endanger international peace and security. He said he was not suggesting an investigation at that time, but emphasized that his Government thought it most desirable that the Council continue to remain seized of the Iranian matter, indicating thereby its continuing concern in this potentially dangerous and as yet unclarified situation.⁴³

⁴³ For the text of Mr. Stettinius' remarks, see SC, *1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2*, p. 287.

Sir Alexander Cadogan (U.K.) endorsed the U.S. suggestion, stating that the latest word from the Iranian Government was an interim report which was inconclusive. He wondered whether the Commission sent to Azerbaijan enjoyed liberty of movement and action, pointing out that its information appeared to be largely second-hand.⁴⁴

Ala asserted that he believed it was long after May 6 that Soviet troops had actually been withdrawn from Azerbaijan, if they actually have been entirely evacuated. He described the latest telegraphic report from his Prime Minister as inconclusive, pointing out it did not clearly state that all troops from the whole of Azerbaijan had been withdrawn.

At this point Ala reminded President Parodi that he was bound by the time limit which had been fixed by the Council for May 20 to put in a report on that date giving what information on the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran was at his disposal. He said he had truthfully represented the situation in his letter of May 20, but the next day he received a communication from his Government and he had submitted that also.

In answer to a series of questions from the Polish representative, Ala said that the Iranian Government was not in authority in Azerbaijan; that the lack of authority there stemmed from Soviet interference; that he knew of no interference from any other large power; and that the Iranian Government was faced with a hostile army in Azerbaijan which was created under the Soviet supervision and which will not let the regular Army of Iran into Azerbaijan. Asked by Dr. Lange how the investigating Commission got into Azerbaijan and whether the Commission made its inspection through a telescope from an airplane, Ala replied that the Commission was a temporary unit and that it presumably went into Azerbaijan with the permission of Tabriz. Ala added that the Commission traveled in a Soviet plane.

The Iranian Ambassador disclosed that the Soviet Ambassador to Iran was present during recent discussions between Prime Minister Qavam and Pishevari and that the Soviet representative urged Qavam to accept the unacceptable demands of the "insurgent" Azerbaijan group. He added this amounted to interference in Iranian internal affairs.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Telegram 169, May 23, noon, from Tabriz, reported that the verification by the Iranian Government "consisted of conducted tours of five or six towns in Pishevari's car. Pishevari told correspondents today that although commission 'have freedom to visit any part of Azerbaijan, they are of course not allowed to see any Azerbaijani military installations.'" (891.00/5-2346)

⁴⁵ In telegram 219, May 22, 6:45 p. m., Mr. Stettinius gave his opinion "that Ala had made up his mind before the meeting that this was his last chance to speak and that he could serve his country best by speaking out openly today. . . . In my opinion Ala has intentionally taken his political life in his hands in speaking out so courageously and openly today." (501.BC/5-2246)

Mr. Stettinius said that he believed more than ever after hearing Ala the Council would make a mistake if it dropped the matter and repeated his suggestion that action be deferred.

President Parodi offered a compromise proposal, providing that the Council continue the Iranian question on its agenda for a week or 10 days and, if at that time no information had been received contradicting the May 21 telegram of the Iranian Prime Minister, the matter would be dropped.

Parodi's proposal was not acceptable to the British delegate who said that he believed a definite and conclusive statement from the Iranian Government that the evacuation had been completed was necessary before the Council could remove the issue from its agenda. Stettinius associated himself with Cadogan's statement.

A discussion on various adjournment suggestions followed. Dr. Lange proposed that adjournment be voted with the stipulation that the Council direct a query to the Iranian Government asking it to state definitely with a yes or no answer whether the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed. The Dutch and British delegates thought the Iranian Government was experiencing enough difficulties and such a telegram might prove embarrassing.

The Van Kleffens motion to adjourn until an early date was carried by nine votes with Dr. Lange abstaining. Following the adjournment vote, the President put the Lange proposal to dispatch a query to the Iranian Government to a vote and it was defeated when only Parodi and Lange favored sending such a telegram.

[STETTINIUS]

501.BC/5-2246 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

451. SC member has expressed to Stettinius his concern that Ala's forthright statements to Council today (Summary of proceedings being sent you separate tel⁴⁶) may result in his being recalled or repudiated by Qavam. Ala's statements were made in reply to specific questions from Council members and, in view recent reports from Tehran, appear to have gone beyond his definite instructions. Member feels strongly Ala has rendered outstanding service to Council and that it would be most unfortunate for UN if he were to be recalled or repudiated. He expressed hope Dept might request you to use your influence so that Qavam will not recall or repudiate Ala.

⁴⁶ No. 453, May 22, not printed; it furnished the text of telegram 223, printed *supra*.

We feel that recall or repudiation of Ala at this time would impair ability of Council to give aid to Iran and hope Qavam will refrain from taking precipitous action against Ala under Soviet pressure. Ala has told us that, while he may have gone beyond specific instructions in certain instances, he feels he has properly interpreted Qavam's factual cables and has taken action which Qavam would instruct if Iran were not under Soviet pressure. In any event he has felt it his duty as representative of Iran to speak out truthfully in the interests his country regardless consequences to himself. It should be stated Ala has followed this course of action on own decision and has not been influenced by Dept to go beyond his instructions.

Sent Tehran repeated Moscow as Dept's 953, and New York as Dept's 70.

BYRNES

861.24591/5-2346 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

459. Since US position in SC Wed differed from tentative position outlined my 435, May 16, you will be interested in factors causing change of policy.

On Mon, May 20, earlier position was changed to forthright stand calling for new case involving situation of Soviet interference and for establishment commission of inquiry to be sent to Iran. This stand was based upon following developments: (1) Reports of civil war in Iran; (2) Iranian letter to SC dated May 20, which gave no indication of when if ever complete report would be forthcoming; (3) Brit instructions that Cadogan propose as procedural matter commission of inquiry to investigate presence Soviet forces in Iran. Taking into account world opinion re SC, past initiative of US in Iranian case, *prima facie* evidence of Soviet interference, and time element affecting instructions of other SC reps, Dept was willing for US rep to offer strong affirmative resolution, despite recognition of probable Soviet veto preventing adoption resolution.

On Tues, May 21, certain developments occurred which led to modification of above stand in favor of action subsequently taken by US rep outlined my 453, May 22.⁴⁷ Those developments were: (1) Tehran reports (a) that no civil war existed, (b) that Qavam was advising Ala of Soviet troop withdrawal, (c) that Commission of Inquiry would not be welcomed by Iran, (d) that Ala's letter of May 20 had

⁴⁷ Not printed; but see footnote 46, p. 477.

been repudiated; (2) attitude of SC members (*a*) some anxious to drop Iranian case, (*b*) others merely willing retain case on agenda, (*c*) only Brit rep definitely agreeable to strong US proposal, (*d*) Dutch and Egyptian reps fearing commission would be vetoed or denied entry Azerbaijan with consequent loss of dignity to SC, and (*e*) time element operating against new instructions to SC reps generally which would insure support US proposal.

Purpose of US proposal adopted by SC setting no fixed date for further consideration Iranian matter was to permit our freedom of action, in light of developments, along either of two future courses: (1) to agree to drop Iranian case should some other SC member so propose and should majority SC sentiment favor such action; (2) to permit us or some other SC member to move for affirmative Council action in matter of Soviet interference.

Dept following current developments closely and would appreciate your info on following subjects: (1) presence of and interference by Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, especially in areas not covered in Iranian letter May 21; (2) specific instances of interference of Soviet agents, officials, or soldiers in civilian clothes in Iran, especially in Azerbaijan; (3) degree of Soviet pressure behind recent statements of Qavam and Firouz; (4) possible future reaction of Iranian Govt to SC commission of inquiry. In addition to treatment above subjects your estimate of general situation and your recommendation of specific future US position SC would be appreciated.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to N.Y., London, and Moscow.

BYRNES

501.BC/5-2446 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET
URGENT

NEW YORK, May 24, 1946—1:30 p. m.
[Received May 24—12:53 p. m.]

226. Ambassador Gromyko informed me last evening that the Tass radio broadcast from Moscow yesterday to the effect that the Soviets had evacuated all their troops from Iran by May 9 was "official."⁴⁸ He made this statement with considerable emphasis.

In a discussion of the Iranian situation with a member of the USdel last evening, Sir Alexander Cadogan indicated that he thought it was

⁴⁸ Telegram 1631, May 24, from Moscow, advised of a despatch from Tbilisi printed in the Soviet press on May 24 reporting an announcement by the Trans-Caucasian Military District that the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed on May 9. The despatch stated that the date of evacuation corresponded with the evacuation plan announced by the Military District at the end of March. (861.24591/5-2246)

likely that Ala would be repudiated very shortly. He expected the Russians to put heavy pressure on Qavam to state they were satisfied that the Soviets had completely withdrawn, and to repudiate Ala's contention that Iran had never intended to withdraw its complaint regarding Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs. Sir Alexander said he had reported his views to the Foreign Office. He thought that if Qavam submitted to Soviet pressure, there was really nothing for the Council to do but to drop the matter from its agenda. He thought that if it were necessary to do this, it was important that at the same time some members of the Council should make it clear to the world that they considered that the Iranian Government had been put under heavy pressure by the Soviets; that the separatist movement in Azerbaijan was a direct consequence of Soviet interference in the past in a violation of the 1942 treaty and of the Charter. He also felt that if Qavam gave the USSR a clean bill of health, this would be an inopportune moment for any other member of the Council to bring a new complaint against the USSR; that it would be wise to wait for further developments which might provide a basis for Council action.

STETTINIUS

501.BC/5-2546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 25, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

[Received 4:38 p. m.]

750. Qavam received me immediately following receipt Department's 451 May 22. In response my opening question regarding his reaction to Security Council's decision retain Iranian case on agenda he said attitude American delegation pleased him but attitude and remarks of his own delegate had caused him most serious embarrassment and difficulty. He then launched into strong criticism of Ala before I had opportunity to explain purpose my visit.

It seemed evident he felt he had no alternative but to recall Ala in view of impossible position in which Ala's letter to Security Council of May 20 had placed Qavam. He read me the telegram he had just sent Ala, instructing him categorically to withdraw from Security Council any statements Ala had made beyond his instructions. Qavam said Soviet Ambassador had called on him at 11 p. m. May 21, accusing Qavam of double dealing and hypocrisy. Qavam said Ala's statements before Security Council on May 22 to effect that Soviet Ambassador had insisted upon Qavam's accepting unacceptable Azerbaijan demands and that Qavam's instructions to Ala regarding withdrawal of Soviet troops were inconclusive, had laid Qavam open

to proper complaint by Soviet Ambassador of duplicity, since Qavam had assured Sadehikoff he was satisfied all Soviet troops had left and would report definitively to Council to this effect. Moreover Qavam said that in all fairness he must say that the Soviet Ambassador had never pressed him to accept unacceptable Azerbaijan demands.

I told Qavam that while I could appreciate difficult position in which he found himself, I could say that from close association with Ala over long period, I had never known Ala to refuse to carry out instructions he received from Tehran, however objectionable they might be from his point of view. I referred specifically to Ala's request that Council drop Iranian case, under instructions in which, Qavam knew, Ala did not concur. I felt confident Ala would carry out loyally any instructions he received and suggested that Qavam might wish to instruct Ala very precisely. Qavam said he had done so three times already, the latest being a few hours previous to our conversation. He had no confidence however that Ala would obey his last instructions any better than previous ones.

He said Soviet Ambassador had complained bitterly against Ala on three occasions, once in the presence of the Shah, and had pointed out that if a Soviet diplomat went beyond his instructions for one minute, he would be recalled immediately.

I then pointed out that Ala's recall at this time might well do serious harm to Security Council and consequently to Iranian interests. Recall now would be construed as repudiation not only of Ala's unauthorized statements but everything he had said. Qavam then suggested he might allow Ala to remain as Ambassador in Washington but send separate delegate to United Nations. I said such action at present would be open to same objections as Ala's recall. I suggested that Qavam might wish to instruct Ala to return to Washington, but without withdrawing his credentials as Representative to United Nations. I agreed to suggest to Department that American delegation in Security Council attempt to arrange matters so that Ala would not be called personally to Council table again in near future. Qavam asked how Iran could express views to Council under such arrangement. I said Ala could communicate with Secretary General in writing whenever Qavam instructed him to do so.

Qavam said my suggestions seemed reasonable. At close of discussion, he agreed not to take any action regarding Ala's recall at present, and I agreed to make recommendations to Department in foregoing sense.

Meanwhile Tabriz Government continues violent demand for recall and punishment of Ala, and local Tudeh Press is following similar line.

I urge Department to impress on Ala urgent necessity for him confine his remarks to letter of his instructions.

ALLEN

S91.00/5-2546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

464. Ala informed Dept officials in confidence May 24 of receipt on May 23 of instruction from Qavam to withdraw from SC letter of May 20. This letter had asserted dispute between Iran and USSR "cannot be said, in reality, to have been resolved in manner consistent with purposes and principles of Charter of UN" and that recent events "demonstrated that threat to integrity of Iran and to international peace has grown more serious". Amb has replied to Qavam in following sense: throughout Iranian case, he has had single purpose of strengthening Qavam's hand in holding out for seven points in negotiations with Pischevari and in effecting settlement consistent with Const of Iran; on May 20 and at all times, he has told SC only truth as furnished by latest cables received from Qavam at the time; that SC members knew what Ala had said was true and had so informed press; and that, therefore, it would be unconvincing to retract anything that he has said to SC. Reply continued at length to underscore seriousness of situation re Azerbaijan and suggested that Qavam alone seemed unaware of true state of affairs in North. In sending this reply, Ala had in mind Qavam's recent cables to effect that interference is obviously continuing; that Iran, while not overlooking immediate pressure of Russians, needed UN assistance; and that Pischevari's charge against Qavam of double-dealing had admittedly posed a choice for Qavam to make between UN and USSR.

In our view, Qavam would materially weaken ability of UN to assist Iran if he should insist upon withdrawal of letter.⁴⁹ Furthermore, disavowal by Iran Government of Ala for his efforts on behalf of Iran would be likely to strengthen belief already prevalent in some circles that it is useless to endeavor to preserve Iranian independence and integrity so long as members of Iranian Government show a greater desire to propitiate the very forces which they admit privately are interfering in Iranian internal affairs than to give UN the facts which it should have in order to take effective action in the matter.

BYRNES

⁴⁹ The letter was not withdrawn.

501.BC/5-2546 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 25, 1946—2:45 p. m.

URGENT

[Received 3:20 p. m.]

233. Dr. Quo (China) and Sir Alexander Cadogan (UK) called upon me this morning. Cadogan opened the conversation by stating that Van Kleffens yesterday discussed with him various alternative methods for dealing with the Iranian matter. He added that he and Quo had been in conference this morning and had reached certain tentative conclusions which they wished to discuss with me. Since Quo was indisposed, Cadogan did practically all the talking.

Cadogan said he thought that Ala would very probably receive instructions today to notify the Council within the next 48 hours that his Government desires the entire Iranian matter to be dropped by the Council. Cadogan and Quo thought that in the event we do not hear from Ala by, say, Tuesday mid-day, some member of the Council should ask for a meeting not later than Wednesday at which it would be requested that Ala come to the table. They believe Ala should then be asked whether his Government still desires that the second half of the original London complaint relating to internal interference in Iran be continued on the agenda. If Ala responds affirmatively and states that the Iranian Government wishes the question of internal interference to be kept on the agenda, the Council should then reach a decision to remain seized of the question.

However, if Ala on instructions states that his Government does not desire that this aspect of the problem continue on the agenda, Cadogan and Quo agree with Van Kleffens that the Council should then take some collective action. This should preferably be in the form of a resolution indicating that, while the Council is not fully satisfied with conditions in Iran, no useful purpose can be served by continuing the question on the agenda longer.

Cadogan and Quo left me at 11:45 a. m. to draft a resolution in the above sense. Cadogan will give me a copy and I shall transmit it immediately to the Department.⁵⁰

Before leaving, Cadogan volunteered that, in any event, he did not feel his proposed course of action would interfere in the event that the United States at any time would wish to enter a new complaint within the Council, as suggested by us a few days ago.

STETTINIUS

⁵⁰ Transmitted in telegram 234, May 25, 1946, 4:30 p. m., not printed.

891.00/5-2546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 25, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received May 26—4:30 p. m.]

752. Background furnished in Department's 459, May 23, regarding US attitude on Iranian case in Security Council is most helpful. Qavam had expected report he made to Security Council to result in case being dropped from agenda, and line we took in meeting of May 22 caused some surprise but apparently no harm done.

I suggested some caution in future regarding press reports of civil disturbances. We will make every effort to keep Department promptly informed of any significant developments in this field.

As regards specific questions at end of telegram under reference:

1. I think it entirely safe to say there are no Soviet troops in Soviet uniforms in Iran with possible insignificant stray exceptions. On the other hand, there is too much evidence of presence of Soviet citizens in Azerbaijan, many with military training, to leave any doubt on this score. I have tried hard to obtain some estimate regarding numbers but few persons are willing to make any guess. Vice Consul Dooher, arrived today from Tabriz, estimates 2500 persons in city of Tabriz who could properly claim Soviet citizenship but he says this is mere guess and that many of them are of Turkish race and might also have claim to Iranian citizenship. He has heard one estimate of 150 genuine Russians from European Russia, but thinks this number too small if Soviet consular staff and officials are included. Tabriz is by far largest single center of Soviet activity. As regards interference, majority Soviet subjects are in Azerbaijan Army uniforms and are in charge Azerbaijan detachments at key points. Captain Gagarine says blond officer in Azerbaijan uniform who stopped him en route Tabriz could neither read nor speak anything except Russian. It would be unwarranted to assume from this incident that number of persons this type in Azerbaijan is necessarily large.

2. Specific instances of Soviet interference other than type indicated above are hard to establish, particularly in view difficulty to define what constitutes interference. Pishevari visits Soviet Consulate Tabriz frequently, especially in times of crisis, and Soviet Consul sees him often. It is evident that Pishevari leans on him heavily for advice, but I doubt very much that Soviet agents have found it necessary to use threats or even pressure. Pishevari group seeks Soviet assistance, often more than it obtains. As regards Soviet activities in Tehran, Security Council case seems to have had salutary effect on Soviet attitude, at least for the moment. Soviet Ambassador is bewildered by Qavam's unpredictability and especially by Ala's statements, and he suspects, despite Qavam's denial, that Qavam may be instructing Ala to take line he has.

3. While Firuz is playing Soviet game he is doing so for own ulterior motives of retaining power and ultimate revenge on Shah. As regards Qavam, while strong and improper Soviet pressure was exerted on him while Soviet troops were still here, I could not honestly

say that at present he receives or acts on Soviet advice more often than on my own. Qavam thinks he is playing clever game with Leftists and Soviets, to obtain firm control of government and elect a Majlis he can dominate. Qavam probably expects to turn against Leftist at what he considers proper time, perhaps 6 months hence.

4. At present moment Iranian Government and large part Iranian public would not welcome Security Council inquiry commission. However, Qavam appreciates strength which Security Council gives him and might possibly welcome inquiry or at least threat of inquiry later if negotiations with Azerbaijan go badly.

As regards general situation, Iranian Minister Posts and Telegraph Ghaffari reflected to me yesterday attitude voiced frequently by important Iranian officials, including Qavam, that British actions and interference in Iranian affairs today are as extensive and objectionable as Soviet. My request for factual evidence of present British activity usually produces merely references to past history, but recent press story (see Moscow 623 [1623], May 23⁵¹) that Ghaffari has confirmed British failure to evacuate Bushire, indicates attitude of large part Iranian officials and public.

It is not difficult to envisage that if next Iranian Cabinet is only slightly more to Left than present one, it might complain to Security Council against Britain. If suitable opportunity or provocation should arise even Qavam who knows that British do not like him might appeal against alleged British activity. Such an appeal would be carried through with more consistency than one against Soviets because of less fear of reprisals and equal if not more public support.

Actions of British in withdrawing troops by March 2 and overwhelming difference between British and Soviet attitudes towards Iranian case in Security Council seem, remarkably enough, not to have made any great impression on Iranians. In my view, Iranian appeal against British interference at present would be unwarranted, since British Ambassador appears to be carrying out loyally his instructions to keep hands off.

It is important to keep Iranian attitude towards British in mind to interpret Iranian Government's attitude towards question of Soviet interference before Security Council. I would suggest caution on our part to avoid getting too far out on a limb on question of Soviet interference without more positive evidence to support Ala's general accusations. Our sponsorship of complaints which are difficult to substantiate convincingly may rise to plague us in future cases before Security Council.

I am inclined to think on balance that it would be preferable for Security Council to terminate existing case on agenda. Iranian Government should not be encouraged to bring new case in future unless

⁵¹ Not printed.

it has clear evidence which it is willing to place before Council and to stick to its guns. It may become appropriate for a member of Security Council to raise new case on his own initiative, but I do not think we should attempt to fight any case based on continuing Soviet interference unless we have more demonstrable proof than at present.

Open Soviet interference during last fall and winter has already achieved its purpose in the establishment of a functioning Azerbaijan govt and subsequent reports of concrete Soviet intervention are becoming increasingly scarce. It is entirely possible that Russians feel their work is so well done they can afford to leave rest to Azerbaijanis themselves except for the offer of advice from time to time. This latter is form of intervention almost impossible to prove.

Most likely case for Council intervention in connection Azerbaijan dispute would result from open Soviet assistance to Tabriz in case of civil war.

ALLEN

761.91/5-2646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 26, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 4:36 p. m.]

753. Shah indicated to me last night his increasing dissatisfaction with what he termed passive policy Qavam and his conviction that Govt must take forceful measures to prevent country from becoming puppet of USSR. He made every effort to obtain from me assurances of more direct American support to counteract Soviet penetration.

I repeated to him advice I had given him and other Iranian officials that only effective support US could give Iran was through United Nations.

Shah said this was not immediate enough for Iran's needs and expressed desire for American and British activity in Iranian affairs to offset Soviet activity. I said such policy was contrary to American character and urged him not to invite any foreign interference since whole effort of UN [US] was to prevent foreign interference in Iran.

ALLEN

891.00/5-2746

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1946.

The Iranian Ambassador called today at his own request. He referred to a telegram he sent last week to Prime Minister Qavam urging

that the Prime Minister take a strong line vis-à-vis the Russians and the Azerbaijanis, and that he keep the Iranian case before the Security Council. The Ambassador then gave a summary of a reply he received yesterday from the Prime Minister. This telegram reiterated the Prime Minister's previous messages to the effect he is resolved to follow a policy of conciliation with the Russians. The Prime Minister declared in strong terms that the Ambassador's action before the Security Council had caused him the greatest embarrassment. As a result of this the Prime Minister stated that henceforth Mr. Ala was to confine his activities to acting as Iranian Ambassador to the United States. The Ambassador was to take no action before the Security Council. The Prime Minister stated that if matters are to be taken up with the Security Council, the Iranian Government will "find some other means of doing it."

The Ambassador stated he was not surprised at this action by Qavam. He had expected this and had even anticipated that he might be dismissed as Ambassador. He said that he had taken this risk with his eyes open and had decided that he must speak out clearly in protection of the interests of his country. Ambassador Ala again urged that the Department take a strong line in the Security Council in protection of Iranian interests.

501.BC/5-2746 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 27, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 9 : 29 p. m.]

237. At Sir Alexander Cadogan's request, I attended an informal meeting this afternoon in his sitting room. Dr. Quo, Dr. Van Kleffens, Mr. Herschel Johnson, Mr. Noyes and Mr. Lawford⁵² were present. Sir Alexander said that Dr. Van Kleffens had suggested certain changes in the draft resolution which I sent you in No. 234 of May 25.⁵³ He subsequently circulated a revised draft which I am wiring separately in No. 238.⁵⁴

I said that I had sent a copy of the first draft of this resolution to Washington but was not yet in a position to tell them what my Government's views would be. I said I had received some preliminary

⁵² Valentine G. Lawford, attached to the British delegation at the United Nations.

⁵³ Not printed, but see telegram 233, May 25, from New York, and footnote 50, p. 483.

⁵⁴ Not printed.

reactions.⁵⁵ Our view was that it would be wiser not to take any immediate steps to hold a Council meeting. I thought we should wait until Ambassador Ala submitted a report to the Council and then hold a meeting 2 or 3 days later. I also stated that our preliminary thinking was to the effect that if the Iranian Government, as expected, stated that they were satisfied that the Soviet troops had withdrawn and wanted the Council to drop the whole matter from its agenda, we would favor dropping the matter from the Council's agenda. We had almost made up our minds that in such an event it would be inopportune to request the Council to investigate the situation in Azerbaijan along the lines of the proposal I had discussed with them last week. I indicated that we would not want to take the initiative in requesting the Council to drop the matter from its agenda; we were wondering whether it would not be best to let the French and Polish delegations make such a proposal.

There seemed to be considerable agreement with these points. It was pointed out that this coming Thursday was a holiday and probably the Council would not want to meet between Wednesday and Monday. If by Monday Ala had not reported, Sir Alexander thought we might want to take some action to have a meeting. I agreed and said I thought we also would want to do so. Sir Alexander also indicated he would be glad to have the French and Polish delegation make the original proposal to drop the matter but thought it might be necessary for one of the "right thinking delegations" to make the specific suggestion. I said I could not comment on the resolution as a whole but I understood that my Government had not decided whether it wanted to drop the matter with a stern rebuke to the Soviet Union, a moderate statement of dissatisfaction, or with no comment whatever.

⁵⁵ These views were transmitted by telephone on May 27 to Mr. Noyes in New York by Mr. Hiss. Mr. Hiss' memorandum of conversation on that date stated in part:

"As a result of the morning meeting in Mr. Acheson's office I informed Mr. Noyes by telephone that the subject of telegrams 233 and 234 of May 25 had not yet been taken up definitively with the Secretary although the Secretary had apparently indicated very briefly to Mr. Acheson that his initial reaction was that the case would have to be dropped if Ala were, as anticipated, to inform the Council that Soviet troops have withdrawn from all of Azerbaijan and that the Iranian Government wishes to withdraw all aspects of its complaint from the agenda.

"I said that we were all in complete agreement that there seemed to be no reason for hurrying a decision and that we could not quite understand why Cadogan and Quo seemed to feel that some action was immediately necessary. We felt that until the anticipated report from Ala eventuates no action is called for and that even after such a report by Ala no action would be called for for three days or so. Consequently we certainly disagreed with the suggestion made by Cadogan and Quo, as reported in telegram 233, that a meeting should be asked for by Wednesday. In this connection I said that we also thought it would be inadvisable as suggested by Cadogan and Quo to have Ala present at the next meeting of the Council in as much as this would only compromise Ala." (861.24591/5-2746).

Van Kleffens raised the question whether or not this resolution could be passed by procedural vote. It was apparently the general view that a decision to drop the matter from the agenda should be taken by a procedural vote, but there appeared to be some doubt as to whether the Council could state its collective opinion on the matters in the resolution by procedural vote. It was suggested that if these matters were put in whereas clauses, with the resolution merely stating that the matter was dropped from the agenda, this might avoid the difficulty.

[Here follows further discussion of the draft resolution.]

STETTINIUS

891.00/5-2846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 28, 1946—10 a. m.

US URGENT

[Received 3:57 p. m.]

762. Deptel 464, May 25. Ward saw Qavam last night and conveyed Dept's views that withdrawal of Ala's letter of May 20 to SC would be unfortunate.

He did not indicate that Ala had approached Dept but rather explained our interest on basis of Qavam's remarks to Ambassador as reported Embtel May 25.⁵⁶

PriMin said Ala had disregarded instructions to withdraw letter and apparently had no intention of withdrawing it. It appeared from his remarks that Qavam does not plan to pursue matter further, although he is apprehensive Soviet Ambassador may continue to press for withdrawal.

He asserted he was very anxious not to weaken Iran's position before UN and wished to maintain good will and sympathy of American Government and people toward Iran.

Qavam said Ala had been ordered return Washington. If Iran should need representative to appear again before SC, new one would be designated.

ALLEN

501.BC/5-2846 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 28, 1946—11:20 p. m.

URGENT

247. Security Council. Sir Alexander Cadogan revealed in a conversation Tuesday afternoon, May 28, that the Foreign Office agreed

⁵⁶ Telegram 750, p. 480.

that a Council meeting should be deferred for a few days in the expectation of a report from the Iranian Government. If this report states that Soviet troops have been evacuated, but does not state that they withdraw charges of Soviet interference, then the Council should remain seized only of the latter charge. If Iran desires to withdraw both complaints, the Foreign Office feels that the complaint on interference should be retained on the agenda until the Council was fully convinced there was no interference.

Cadogan explained that this would be done by changing his draft resolution—dropping the second paragraph and adding to the end of the fourth paragraph a sentence to the effect that the Council should remain seized of the Iranian matter until it was satisfied that there was no longer any interference by the U.S.S.R. in the internal affairs of Iran.

Mr. Stettinius explained to Cadogan that he probably could not support Cadogan's original draft resolution since the U.S. felt it would be unwise for the Council to state formally that it was dissatisfied with its own decision, thus putting the Council in an undignified position. Cadogan said he would inform the Foreign Office of this immediately and, in addition, of the fact that the U.S. favored a simple resolution merely referring to the Iranian report and stating that the Council therefore dropped the matter.

It was agreed that if no report were received from Iran by June 4, there should be another discussion of the question of whether a Council meeting should be called to consider what should be done.

[Here follows an account of further discussions by members of the American delegation with members of the Australian, Mexican, and French delegations on the Iranian situation and on other matters.]

STETTINIUS

891.00/5-3146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 31, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received May 31—1:35 p. m.]

777. It seems evident that Qavam is attempting to conciliate Tudeh Party in anticipation forthcoming elections and is making every effort to elect Majlis which he can control. Since Tudeh is only large, well organized and functioning political machine in Iran he wishes to use it for his own purposes if he can.

Thus in Embassy's opinion Qavam's action in removing Ala from position of Iranian representative before Security Council was not solely or even primarily result of Soviet pressure but was basically

internal political move designed to placate Left elements in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. (Personal pique against Ala may also have had some influence in decision.)

Qavam is continuing to play risky political game. He appears to believe that once he has elected Majlis under his own control he can reverse trend to Left and steer Government more towards center.

He is undoubtedly aware of danger that situation might get beyond his control (many Rightists believe this has already happened) but is willing to risk it, apparently feeling that course to Left at moment is only means of settling Azerbaijan question peacefully and winning elections. His recent decree calling for distribution of state lands to peasants is important maneuver in this direction.

Additional dangers are that even if Qavam should succeed in electing Deputies he desires, he may not be able to control them. Moreover, political machine will be built up which will fall into subversive hands whenever Qavam leaves office.

On other hand, Qavam's friendly attitude towards Tudeh has one potential advantage in that it might tend to remove Tudeh feeling that Party must depend on Soviet support to prevent being suppressed. Any encouragement that could be given Tudeh to become genuine Iranian Party without looking abroad for support would of course be helpful.

ALLEN

891.00/6-146

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1946.

The Iranian Ambassador called at his request to see the Secretary. He told the Secretary he appreciated very much an opportunity at this busy time to see him to tell him about the troubles in Iran.

The Ambassador said that since he had last talked with the Secretary on April 4 they had gone through many vicissitudes in the Iranian case. He had reported the true facts to the Security Council. On May 6 he reported that in the provinces of Iran where they had representatives evacuation had taken place, but in Azerbaijan where the Iranian Government had no representatives it is difficult to give an opinion as to what is happening. Later, he said, he reported that his Government had sent a Commission of inquiry and at the same time he drew attention to the fact that it is hard for Iran to exercise any authority in this province in view of outside interference. He said the situation in Azerbaijan is deteriorating very fast, where there is a puppet government supported by the Russians. It is being made

into practically an independent state. The Army is equipped and supplied by Russia. Qavam is under extreme pressure to do what the Russians want, even to the point of having to dismiss certain members of his cabinet. He said Qavam has not contradicted what he has reported to the Security Council but he has asked him not to make any further reports to the Council.

The Ambassador said US assistance is very necessary in the Security Council to prevent the Iranian case being dropped from the agenda. He said if the situation in Iran is allowed to continue he fears for the security not only of Iran but of Turkey, Iraq and other nearby countries. The Ambassador made a strong appeal for the US to come to the aid of Iran.

The Secretary asked what the Shah is doing about Qavam.

He said the Shah sees him and advises him, but Qavam does things without consulting the Shah. Qavam even dismissed and arrested the Chief of Staff⁵⁷ who was serving his country. Qavam took this action which he knew was contrary to the Shah's wishes.

The Secretary inquired if there is any explanation of Qavam's action; is he under such influence by the Russians that he must meet all their demands?

The Ambassador said he had not given up hope that Qavam is really trying to do what he thinks best and that he will be loyal to his people. He said he had urged Qavam to resist the demands of the Russians, and then if their country is overrun by the Soviets, the United Nations will take action and justice will rule. He said Iran cannot send troops to Azerbaijan because they would clash with the people there who are under Soviet influence and there would be bloodshed and the Russians would then have an excuse to come back into Iran.

The Secretary inquired what would be the difference in having the Soviet troops return in the open and take over the country and having them take it over in the manner the Ambassador had described. If it is done in the open the Security Council could investigate the reasons, but to investigate removal of an individual from the Iranian cabinet would be difficult.

The Ambassador said certainly it would be better to have them do it in the open. He pointed out that Qavam does not say that he is satisfied with the situation in Azerbaijan; he simply says nothing about it because he cannot truthfully report that he is satisfied.

The Secretary said the problem was a hard one to get at, if Qavam is allowing outside pressure to force him to make changes in the cabinet and say nothing about matters that should be reported, and acting

⁵⁷ Presumably General Arfa; see telegram 590, April 25, from Tehran, p. 437.

contrary to the wishes of the Shah. He said if Qavam would stand up for what is the best interest of the Iranian people it would be easier to handle.

The Ambassador said the Shah may have to make a decision, but if he dismissed Qavam he fears that Qavam would rally a large following and bring on civil war, which would cause the Russians to come back with their troops.

The Secretary said he would look into the matter with the people in the Department directly concerned.

The Secretary praised the Ambassador for his courage in this difficult situation.

861.24591/6-446 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1946—8 p. m.

482. Brit, Netherlands and Chinese reps SC yesterday agreed to suggestion of US Deputy rep that there was no necessity for SC meeting this week on Iranian matter, unless some further word was forthcoming from Iranian Govt. Cadogan has recent instructions to press for retention of Iranian matter on agenda, regardless of whether Iranian Govt asks that matter be dropped. Purpose of Brit position is to indicate to Iranians that SC stands behind them and to the world that Council disapproves of Sov tactics. Van Kleffens position remains not to drop matter without statement that Council is dissatisfied with situation. Quo has new instructions to support dropping matter from agenda if Iranians want whole matter dropped and if Council is not prepared to consider some affirmative action. If matter is dropped, he hopes Council can indicate to world that it is not satisfied with present situation and that matter remains of continuing concern to Council.

Johnson stated that US is carefully considering whole matter, and that our position as stated at last meeting SC still stands, but should be considered tentative and subject to possible change.

BYRNES

[No further word was forthcoming from the Iranian Government. The Security Council did not hold a meeting that week on the Iranian question (nor indeed for the remainder of 1946) and remained seized of the matter, as had been determined at its meeting on May 22 (see telegram 223, May 22, from New York, page 473).

In memorandum No. SD/S/786 of December 10, 1946, Mr. S. K. C. Kopper of the Division of International Security Affairs drew the following conclusions from the deliberations of the Security Council on the Iranian question :

"1. The Security Council did not undertake a substantive examination of the second Iranian complaint. Consideration which the Council gave to the case was limited to procedural phases.

"2. The Security Council established the precedent of conducting its business in the absence of one of its permanent members. The test of whether the Security Council could take substantive action in the absence of a permanent member was not made.

"3. The Security Council determined that withdrawal of the complaint by a Member of the United Nations does not obligate the Council to cease to be seized of the complaint.

"4. The Secretary-General established the precedent of submitting opinions to the Council on matters of which it is seized.

"5. The Security Council is faced with the problem of what credence should be given to the statements of a representative of a Government who was duly accredited by that Government but who in reality seemed to be partially repudiated." (IO files)]

891.00/6-546 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET

US URGENT

TABRIZ, June 5, 1946—noon.

[Received June 7—6:57 a. m.]

183. Following is summary of political situation this district :

There has been no lessening of Soviet penetration of Azerbaijan govt and Democratic Party. At present this penetration consists chiefly of tutelage and instruction on high level policy, and control of political security thru strategic placement of personnel who are plainly of Soviet origin. Latter personnel are continually observed on streets in Azerbaijan uniforms or in civilian clothes and can be identified not only by their constant use of Russian language but frequently by features, for numbers of them are obvious north Russian types, although Soviet Caucasians are in the majority. All observers also agree that Soviet railroad personnel, who wear uniforms of military type, have been at least tripled for no known reason. Popular belief is that they are Soviet political agents.

All reports, supported by analysis of recent public pronouncements, indicate that Soviet Union has instructed Azerbaijan Govt to come

to terms with Tehran.⁵⁸ Both Azerbaijan Govt and Soviet Union appear to have adopted a definitely defensive policy now with respect to Azerbaijan problem. Timing of this shift of policy together with reports of explanations from within party and Azerbaijan Govt, and press attacks against US, show plainly that it resulted from strong American stand at Security Council coupled with strong attitude of world press. Everyone here gives US full credit for this weakening of Azerbaijan Soviet policy, and bitterness of party and government hierarchy against US has accordingly increased. This has produced a series of violent editorial attacks against US, coupled with protestations of Azerbaijan govt's innocence and altruism, and continually reiterated insistence that Azerbaijan problem is internal affair. Propaganda crudely follows straight line.

Sent Dept 183; Tehran 179; Moscow 120; London 56.

Rossov

891.00/6-646

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[Extract]

SECRET

TEHRAN, June 6, 1946.

DEAR LOY: . . .

In addition to seeing a good deal of the Shah and Qavam, I have had to receive innumerable delegations of Iranians, almost all of whom insist that the United States must play a more positive role in internal Iranian affairs. I have repeated almost *ad nauseam* that the United States is exerting every effort to prevent internal interference in Iranian affairs and that we cannot adopt the very tactics to which we object so strenuously, and insist that the United Nations is Iran's best safeguard. However, Iranians are so accustomed to outside interference they resemble a man who has been in prison a long time and is afraid to walk out into the sunlight. The only way they can think of to counteract one interference is to invite another. My statements often send Iranians away with the feeling that the United States is not really interested in Iran and cannot be depended upon to give them much actual assistance, with the result that some of them

⁵⁸ Information of a similar character had been given to Ambassador Allen by the Iranian Prime Minister on June 1 (telegram 791, June 1, 4 p. m., from Tehran, not printed).

turn to the Soviet Union for support rather than attempt to stand on their own legs. I believe, however, that in the long run our policy will begin to make an impression and am confident we should continue to follow it.

GEORGE

891.00/6-1046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TEHRAN, June 10, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received June 10—1:45 p. m.]

821. In long conference with Qavam this morning I explained to him in all frankness what, I felt confident, American reaction would be to certain of his policies and recent communiqués.⁵⁹ As regards latter I found three points which are particularly objectionable from American points of view: (1) Tendency to castigate any opposition to Qavam as reactionary, Fascist and traitorous; (2) tendency to give Qavam himself personal credit for all policies and accomplishments of his Government; and (3) warm expressions of friendship for USSR without any reference to any other nation. As regards first two objections I said they would remind the American public of communiqués issued by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Personal build-up of Qavam himself would remind Americans of similar build-ups for Franco, Hitler and Stalin and would seem to point towards a personal dictatorship. As regards third objection I said United States naturally welcomed friendly relations between states and that if relations between Iran and Soviet Union were on genuinely solid foundation, we could only rejoice. However I reminded him that American public is thoroughly aware that United States made strenuous efforts during past 12 months to obtain early withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran, and that when we were unable to obtain agreement from other powers, we withdrew our troops anyway at considerable sacrifice in effort and shipping taken from other areas. I said American public was also well aware that we had supported Iran's right to be heard before Security Council, even to extent of adversely affecting our relations with our great Soviet ally. American

⁵⁹ In telegram 817, June 8, 4 p. m., Ambassador Allen had expressed his concern at the seemingly steady trend of the Qavam Government toward outright appeasement of the Soviet Union and Leftist Iranian elements and his apparent effort to consolidate his position by crushing internal opposition from Rightist elements. After spelling out the matters which concerned him (along the lines of telegram 821), the Ambassador had concluded: ". . . it is time we recalled to Qavam that he should bear in mind reaction to his policies in US as well as in Russia and that remedy for former repressive and pro-British policy of the Right does not lie in repressive, and pro-Soviet policy of the Govt now." (891.00/6-846)

public could not help wondering why these efforts on our part in Iran's behalf remained without any evidence of appreciation in Qavam's communiqués. To put it quite bluntly I said certain people in US would begin to wonder whether we had made a mistake in our policy towards Iran. Perhaps if we had retained our troops here illegally until we had got such concessions as we desired out of Iran and if we had organized and supported a revolt against the Central Govt behind our lines perhaps Iranian Govt communiqués would now be fawning over the United States.

As regards Qavam's policies, I cited his suppression of opposition newspapers and arrest of political opponents without specific charge or public hearing. I expressed strong doubt that he would permit any newspapers to publish articles against the Soviet Union similar to those published every day against the United States and Americans.

Qavam said that his communiqués were for Iran and not the United States. He also believed they had been poorly translated to me. He said primary purpose of his latest communiqué was to quieten rumors that his policy of division of public domain would extend to private property. I said that it was not this feature of communiqué to which I was raising objection.

In parting Qavam expressed much appreciation for my bringing these views to his attention so frankly. I believe interview will have salutary effect, at least in letting Qavam know that American reaction must be reckoned with, and that he will be more mindful of this factor in future.⁶⁰

ALLEN

[A 15-point agreement between the Iranian Government and the local authorities in Azerbaijan was signed at Tabriz on June 13 by Mozzafar Firuz and Jafar Pishevari. The text as printed in the Tehran and Tabriz press was sent to the Department from Tehran in despatch 53 and from Tabriz in telegram 193, both dated June 16. The despatch noted that the phrasing of the agreement made it appear that the seven articles of April 22 (see telegram 578, April 23, from Tehran, page 434) had been accepted in full and that the agreement was merely an interpretation of the articles. It noted also that while the agreement was being publicized as a full and final settlement, a number of the most important provisions called for further agreement as soon as possible. (891.00/6-1646)]

Under the terms of the agreement, the Iranian Government recognized the existing National Assembly of Azerbaijan as the Provincial Council; was to select the Governor General of Azerbaijan from a

⁶⁰ In telegram 507, June 11, 7 p. m., to Tehran, the Department approved Ambassador Allen's statements made to the Iranian Prime Minister as set forth in telegram 821 and commended him for his initiative (891.00/6-1046).

group of names presented by the Provincial Council; would incorporate Azerbaijani regular and volunteer forces into the Iranian Army and *gendarmierie*, respectively, their status to be determined by the Iranian Government and the Provincial Council; and agreed that 75% of Government receipts in Azerbaijan were to be appropriated for local expenditures, the remainder going to Tehran. The agreement also was made applicable to the Kurds, Assyrians, and Armenians residing in Azerbaijan.

According to despatch 280, July 24, 1946, from Tabriz, the National Government of Azerbaijan was formally dissolved by a resolution adopted by the third and last general session of the Azerbaijan National Majlis on June 25 (891.032/7-2446).]

891.00/6-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, June 15, 1946—11 a. m.

US URGENT

[Received 12:25 p. m.]

844. Dept's 512 [511], June 12,⁶¹ which reached here June 14. Some of views expressed in British memo⁶² are along lines British Ambassador has been recommending to his Government and some were thought up in London.

Suggestion that US and UK make joint approach⁶³ is not advisable in my view. Our effectiveness here is already weaker than it should be, due in considerable part to conviction in minds many Iranians that clever British, realizing Britain's own vulnerable position, are using well-meaning but somewhat naive Americans to support Britain's imperialistic aims. No amount of denials seems to have any effect in shaking this conviction. We can accomplish more for ourselves and for Britain as well by acting separately in Iran. British Ambassador is fully appreciative of this situation. He told me today how impossible it would have been for him to have stated to the press the few obvious truths reported in my 833, June 13.⁶⁴ His motives

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² No. 29/ /46, June 11, not printed.

⁶³ To the Iranian Prime Minister to take a firmer line with the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union and that he be made to understand the danger of his present course.

⁶⁴ Not printed; it reported remarks made by Ambassador Allen to a group of Iranian journalists, all of whom were anti-Tudeh. The Ambassador concluded his remarks by stating:

"The responsibility of the press to keep the public accurately informed is particularly great at a time like the present, just prior to elections. It is important that all papers be free to publish various views so that the voters may have an opportunity to study the issues involved.

"It is in my view regrettable and even unethical for any journalist to take advantage of the liberties of the freedom of the press in a democratic country to attempt to bring into power any government which would stifle that freedom." (891.00/6-1346).

would have been impugned immediately by almost every Iranian from the Shah down. US is still given enough credit for acting on principle without selfish aims to enable us to do things British could not think of doing. We would lose this credit immediately if we began joint approaches to Iranian Govt.

British suggestions that Qavam be asked to take firmer line against Tudeh and against Russians and that Iranian Govt be encouraged to look to UN for help is of course excellent. This is exactly what British Ambassador and I are both doing every day, in every way we can think of. Specific instructions from our Governments might strengthen our hands but I have been acting on assumption I had such instructions, of standing nature. British Ambassador has already made suggestion to Qavam regarding supervisors for elections but PriMin reacted strongly against any such idea. Subsequently a report came to me through Colonel Stetson⁶⁵ that Qavam would actually welcome UN commission but that for political reasons he must appear to oppose. Stetson is inclined to believe from channel of report that PriMin intended for it to come to me but both British Ambassador and I are rather dubious. Qavam loves power too much to want any outside supervision. If he should come to feel internal situation had got beyond his control and outside help might assist him to stay in power, he might risk UN commission but he has given no indication as yet that he doubts his ability to keep reins. If we suggested commission, I fear we would give Russians first class propaganda weapon without accomplishing anything positive.

As regards British suggestion regarding more propaganda activity on our side, this Embassy is doing all it can along this line with ridiculously small means at our command (see Embtel 812⁶⁶). We are also encouraging native liberal groups.

British Ambassador is making great effort to work in closest harmony and contact with this Embassy but he naturally does not tell me everything he tells London. I suspect British suggestion of joint approach resulted from telegram he undoubtedly sent to London recently, reporting his suspicion that Qavam, at Moscow's instigation, is attempting to drive wedge between US and UK in Iran. Le Rougetel reverted to this theme again today. His rather strained reasoning on the point is that Qavam has taken initiative in suggesting that Britain and Russia each state their aims in Iran. This in Le Rougetel's mind could only lead to new tripartite Iranian, UK-USSR treaty. USSR is confident US would object to such a treaty on grounds that it would constitute division of Iran into spheres of influence. Le Rougetel suspects Russia intends to denounce whole

⁶⁵ Col. John B. Stetson, Jr., Field Commissioner in Iran for the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.

⁶⁶ Dated June 7, not printed.

idea, blame Britain for suggesting it, and stand firmly with us in opposition. British Ambassador believes joint US-UK approach to Qavam now would tend to counter Russian game. I concur that overall British and American policies in Iran have similar aim but I do not believe joint approach is most effective means of achieving it.

ALLEN

891.00/6-1746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, June 17, 1946—11 a. m.

US URGENT

[Received 11:39 a. m.]

850. Analysis of June 13 agreement between Tehran and Tabriz governments does not deserve the high praise which Qavam, through his Director of Propaganda, Firouz, has bestowed on it. Their characterization of agreement as victory for Qavam is justified only to extent that Iran may now become united country without civil war. However, instead of Azerbaijan returning to Iran the province seems likely to take over country, especially since so-called Democratic Party of Azerbaijan will remain in full control there; Democrats in Azerbaijan and Tudeh Party in remainder of Iran are working hand in glove. These two groups are both typical Communist parties everywhere in sense that both are highly disciplined, totalitarian and pro-Soviet. Azerbaijan party is strongest of the two since it has its own army which Tabriz agreement leaves intact at least for time being and perhaps indefinitely.⁶⁷

Value of agreement depends on manner in which it is carried out.⁶⁸ Qavam undoubtedly thinks that by policy of conciliation and even friendship for Azerbaijan leaders he can gradually bring them under his control.

More and more observers are beginning to suspect that Qavam has gone so far over to the pro-Soviet camp he cannot retract. Some are convinced he does not wish to retract since he feels that during next few years which is only period of time man of his age is concerned with

⁶⁷ In telegram 197, June 19, from Tabriz, Mr. Rossow analyzed the agreement as follows: "The only gain by Central Govt in making agreement was purely formal acknowledgment of its authority. It is in no sense in control of province. In actual fact nothing has been changed. The same men (Democrats) are still in power here, control of Azerbaijan Army remains here, and there is no indication of any reduction in the number of Soviet personnel in Azerbaijan uniform and civilian clothes." (891.00/6-1946)

⁶⁸ Telegram 856, June 18, noon, from Tehran, reported the initial implementation of the agreement with the selection of Salamollah Javid (or David), former Azerbaijani Minister of Interior, as Governor General of Azerbaijan. The Governor General was described as strongly pro-Soviet and an ardent party member. (891.00/6-1846)

Soviet Union will be dominating force in this area and friendship with USSR is his best means of remaining in power. Qavam's actions during next few weeks should show his true intentions more clearly.

ALLEN

891.00/6-1746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, June 17, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

[Received June 17—11:05 a. m.]

852. One of most significant provisions of agreement signed at Tabriz June 13 is article 7, which provides for incorporation of considerable part of Azerbaijan volunteer forces into Iranian *gendarm-erie*. Additional remark to this article provides that since *gendarm-erie* has acted during recent years in manner to arouse hostile public opinion, it is agreed that wishes of people, particularly in Azerbaijan, be brought to knowledge of chief of government in order that decision may be taken changing the name of that organization.

Shah told me last night that he understood plans were afoot to remove Colonel Schwarzkopf. Whether the plans are concurred in by Qavam or are merely Tudeh schemes is not yet certain. Qavam had told both me and Schwarzkopf several times he is pleased with latter's work; Embassy received note from Foreign Office today approving the 12 additional men for *gendarm-erie* mission who have been under discussion for some time. However, Qavam is taking one step after another to appease Tudeh and might give in to their pressure against mission. Since we have objected strenuously to Tudeh allegations that US imposed mission on Iran, it will be difficult for us to insist on retention of mission if Government requests cancellation. Discussions regarding renewal of mission agreement are due any time after July 2, or 3 months prior to termination present agreement. I am convinced mission could be strongest force for law and order in Iran, if allowed to function at all properly and might be means of preventing Communists from seizing power. However, chances of its being allowed to function properly are not good.

Qavam might possibly propose compromise by which mission would continue on understanding that Schwarzkopf himself be recalled, since he personally has been especially singled out for Tudeh attack. While Schwarzkopf has assured me he is willing at any time to give up position if US interests require, I doubt we should accept such a compromise arrangement if offered. Schwarzkopf has done outstanding job here and we should avoid any action which would indicate our acquiescence in unjustified attacks against him. Moreover, any mission which remained under such compromise would stand little chance of being allowed to function properly.

Possible alternative arrangement might be for mission to remain intact under Schwarzkopf but only as a training mission without executive authority. In all probability, however, this would so weaken *gendarmérie*, especially if as now proposed it must absorb Azerbaijan Fidayis, that its strength would be vitiated. It is not unlikely that such weakening of mission's authority would only whet appetite of pro-Soviet elements for further curtailment.

Discontinuance of mission would be serious step along road towards complete Soviet domination of Iran and I hope some means can be found to avoid this step.

Department's instruction or thoughts in the matter would be welcome.

ALLEN

891.00/6-1546 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

533. My 511, June 12.⁶⁹ In reply to Brit memo June 11⁶⁹ Dept will give Balfour informally paraphrase of appropriate portions your 844, June 15, and of following views offered for your guidance.

(1) Joint Anglo-US representations to Qavam are considered inadvisable, since they may give rise to impression that US and UK are forming bloc in Middle East opposed to Soviet Union. Recognizing common interests of US and UK in maintenance of peace in Middle East, however, it would be helpful for you to keep in close touch with Brit Amb with regard to various representations which each may individually make to Qavam. In your conversations with Qavam, you should continue to impress upon him that, if his foreign policy persists in preference for a single great power and apparent disregard for those powers which are truly interested in future welfare of Iran, there is dangerous possibility that Iran will be deprived of its status as an independent nation, either by being absorbed into Soviet orbit of satellite states or by being divided into foreign-dominated spheres of influence. Persistence in such a policy would strengthen those groups who already take view that it is useless to endeavor to support independence of a people who are unwilling to take firm stand on their own behalf. While voluntary abandonment of Iranian sovereignty in favor of foreign domination may appear to be an easy way out of Iran's present difficulty, it is not an effective long-range solution. Furthermore, Iran could probably never, through its own efforts, extricate itself from this domination.

⁶⁹ Not printed.

(2) We agree that Iranian Govt should be encouraged to look not only to Soviet Union but also to other countries, and increasingly to UN, for assistance in solving its social and economic problems. So long as US is convinced that Iran is endeavoring to maintain its political and economic integrity as an independent country, attitude of US will continue to be sympathetic towards Iranian requests for assistance and support. With regard to UN observers in forthcoming Iranian elections, we feel it inadvisable to make such suggestion to Qavam. Soviet resistance, both in and out of SC, would probably in itself defeat such scheme. Further, SC generally does not appear favorable at this time, and conditions presently prevailing in Iran would militate against observers achieving objective of enforced fair elections.

(3) We feel that no opportunity should be lost to impress upon Qavam advantage to Iran of internal reform. Obviously, such reform should be carried out by patriotic Iranians working for good of Iran and not by persons who may use reform program as instrument to bring Iran under foreign domination.

(4) In connection with (3) above, Qavam might well encourage formation of truly Iranian political parties which would provide alternative to Tudeh Party and would carry Iran along road to democratic political advancement.

ACHESON

891.105A/6-1746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1946—5 p. m.

552. Your 852, Jun 17. We share your views re usefulness *gendarmerie* mission and advisability its continuation. Our views on specific questions raised follow: (1) We do not favor withdrawal of Schwarzkopf or full mission solely because of Sov opposition or pressure. (2) We would have no alternative but to withdraw mission on suggestion of Iranian Govt. (3) We should give serious consideration to withdrawal of mission on our own volition if Iranians fail to support it or if they create working conditions so unfavorable that mission is no longer a constructive force in Iran or a positive element in American-Iranian relations. Before agreeing to renewal contract by Sep 2, Dept would like to have from you and Schwarzkopf statements that you are satisfied Iranian attitude and operational conditions warrant renewal. (4) We do not favor possible compromises involving either withdrawal of Schwarzkopf while retaining rest of mission or reduction of mission to mere advisory group. Either suggestion by Qavam would probably be based on Sov pressure and would be but an opening wedge to further fatal curtailment of mission. Also

such compromises would indicate an unfavorable or at least half-hearted attitude on part of Iranians which would make success of mission more than questionable.

Entire question of continuance this and Ridley missions in Iran in Dept's opinion revolves around degree to which Qavam will orient his foreign relations in coming months exclusively toward Sov Union. We feel it would be advisable to delay decision on renewal Schwarzkopf contract, as was done last year, until late summer in order better to judge trend of events in Iran. Your views on this and other points solicited.⁷⁰

ACHESON

121.5491/6-2146 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

559. Would appreciate your confirmation of report in AP Tehran despatch Jun 22 that Emb had protested to Iranian Govt incident reported Tabriz 198, Jun 21,⁷¹ (repeated Tehran as 190.) Dept greatly disturbed over incident, which appears to represent endeavor by Azerbaijan to apply arbitrary totalitarian methods used by Sov forces when stationed in Iran, and feels that strong protest to Iranian Govt is called for. Iranian Govt should be requested to investigate incident, indicate what action if any is contemplated against persons involved, and what steps will be taken to prevent recurrence. These views were expressed by Dept official in conversation with Iranian Amb who promised to bring them to attention of ForMin.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Tabriz, Moscow and London.

ACHESON

⁷⁰ The agreement concerning the *gendarmerie* mission was renewed for a period of 2 years in an exchange of notes on July 25 and August 8, 1946; for texts, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 31, p. 424.

⁷¹ Not printed; Mr. Rossow reported that the previous day the Military Attaché, the Military Attaché for Air, the Assistant Military Attaché, and a fourth member of their party were arrested and held under armed guard at the Tabriz airport for 7 hours on the pretext that they had landed without authority. The Military Attaché had been assured previously by the Iranian Foreign Office that clearance had been arranged. Despite Mr. Rossow's "most vigorous representations", the officers were not permitted to leave the airport until at 5 p. m. the Acting Governor General of Azerbaijan consented to bring the officers to Tabriz where they were held under armed guard at the telegraph office. Finally they were released on condition that they would depart the following day if landing permission were not granted. Mr. Rossow summed up the manner of the local officials as "hostile, disrespectful and insulting to the prestige of the United States". The Chief of Political Police informed the Consulate on the morning of June 21 that landing permission had been granted and expressed his hope that "we would not harbor rancor" since the matter was an error of the Central Government. (121.5491/6-2146)

891.00/7-146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN, July 1, 1946—11 a. m.
[Received July 2—6:14 a. m.]

919. Prime Minister Qavam has finally issued formal announcement expected for some time concerning formation new political party under his leadership, to be known as "Democratic Party of Iran". Choice of name evidently resulted from desire to steal thunder of "Democrats of Azerbaijan" and also doubtless to unify country and possibly in hopes of taking Democrats of Azerbaijan under his wing. Prime Minister's party will begin active operations within 2 weeks and expects to be organized throughout Iran in time for elections. Backbone of party will doubtless be Government officials in Tehran and provincial authorities appointed by Qavam.

Also announced yesterday was formation of "Liberal Front" based on agreement signed by leaders of Iran and Tudeh parties. Outstanding signer for Iran party is Allahyar Saleh, former member staff this Embassy and brother of Ali Pasha Saleh, Embassy's Iranian adviser and chief interpreter. While details are lacking it seems likely that Iran and Tudeh parties will collaborate in forthcoming elections, nominating candidates in different constituencies and supporting each other's candidates throughout country. It is possible this action may substantiate reports of split in Tudeh party between radical Iranian Nationalists and outright Moscow puppets. Latter have dominated party up to present.

Platforms of two leading groups in forthcoming elections, i.e. Democrats of Iran and Tudeh Iran Party coalition, seem practically identical. They both boil down to independence and reform. Qavam's speech launching his new party was as full of vituperation against reactionaries and enemies of reform as anything Tudeh has said. Character of two parties will depend entirely upon individual leaders who adhere to each. In actuality Qavam's group will probably be more conservative in spite of fiery Leftist pronouncements it will make.⁷²

⁷² In telegram 981, July 14, 3 p. m., Ambassador Allen reported two divergent opinions regarding the Prime Minister's new party that were prevalent in Tehran. The first opinion had it that the Prime Minister was outsmarting the Soviet-sponsored Tudeh by stealing their thunder and that he endorsed conservative nationalism, although he appeared superficially to be pro-Soviet. The opposing view was that creation of the new party represented the second phase of the Soviet Union's political penetration of Iran, the first phase being the establishment of the hard-core Tudeh which operated as a terrorist tool. The second phase centered on a new party with a harmless face which would attract the support of many elements including conservatives. Eventually, according to the theory, the Tudeh would attach itself to the new party and obtain full control, as it had done successfully in Azerbaijan. (891.00/7-1446) In telegram 620, July 19, 7 p.m., the Department advised Tehran of information from the Iranian Ambassador that the Prime Minister viewed the new party as an indigenous group serving Iranian national interests and as not subservient to any foreign interests (891.00/7-1946).

Elections will probably not be held until September and might be deferred even longer.

Repeated Moscow as 238.

ALLEN

121.5491/7-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, July 2, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received July 3—1:17 p. m.]

942. Deptel 559, June 27. Embassy has forwarded by pouch full report on incident involving detention in Tabriz of Military Attaché personnel.⁷³

Embassy's protest was in form of letter to Chief of Protocol,⁷⁴ reciting events which occurred and ending with following paragraph:

"I trust, dear Mr. Samii, that you will be able to take such action as will cause you to be able to assure the Embassy that further instance of this kind will not occur."

In addition I have spoken to Samii about incident emphasizing diplomatic status of Americans involved and stressing necessity for Iran Govt to [be] respectful international practice this regard. I suggested issuance of written or stamped clearance for aircraft as means of avoiding difficulties but repeated insistence that persons with diplomatic status, and identified as such, should never be held in detention under any circumstances.

Last night Samii told officer of Embassy that Iran Embassy in Washington had forwarded Dept's complaint to Foreign Office. He attempted to minimize incident but after several attempts to explain it away he finally admitted that thus far Central Govt simply has no control over province of Azerbaijan.

Sent Dept 94, repeated Tabriz 111.

ALLEN

891.77/7-346 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1946—7 p. m.

575. In course conversation today⁷⁵ Iran Amb stated Qavam has telegraphed him, in reply to Ala's inquiry, to effect that railways in

⁷³ Despatch 65, June 29, not printed.

⁷⁴ Dated June 29.

⁷⁵ The conversation between the Iranian Ambassador and Messrs. Henderson and Minor took place on July 2 (memorandum of July 2 by Mr. Minor not printed).

north are still under control of Russians but that Russian commission will soon arrive in Iran to effect turnover. Qavam said also that Russians are still in temporary control Pahlevi airport.

ACHESON

711.00/7-1546

Policy and Information Statement on Iran Prepared in the Department of State

[Extract]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1946.

I. CURRENT US POLICY TOWARD IRAN

A. *General Political.* Our policy toward Iran is one of assistance in its efforts to strengthen the nation's sovereignty and to raise living standards by democratic processes. This policy is embodied in both the Declaration Regarding Iran of December 1, 1943 and the Charter of the United Nations. In the Declaration, President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that their Governments would continue economic assistance to Iran and gave assurances of respect for the maintenance of Iranian independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In the Charter, Iran and the United States, together with the other United Nations, subscribed to the principle of sovereign equality of states and the purpose of advancing human welfare.

The objectives of our policy toward Iran are: (1) To encourage friendly relations of Iran with all states, and thus prevent the loss of Iranian independence either by being divided into Soviet and British spheres of influence or by being absorbed into the Soviet orbit of satellite states; (2) to create a condition of internal security, and thus prevent a situation which might invite foreign intervention; (3) to produce a healthy internal economy so as to preserve a system of free enterprise and to nourish multilateral international trade, thereby preventing the growth of economic discontent and, in consequence, the possibility of a controlled, totalitarian economy; (4) to encourage democratic institutions and processes, and thus prevent the growth of a dictatorial regime which might either oppose or limit friendly intercourse with other nations.

Implementation of our policy toward Iran is sought by the following means:

(1) Diplomatic. Through Embassy channels, we have reiterated, and shall continue to stress our friendly concern for Iran's well-being. This concern is expressed unilaterally, in the desire to avoid any appearance of a bloc more opposed to the Soviet Union than interested in Iran. Every opportunity is taken to make clear to the Iranian

Government the danger to Iran of its present tendency to orient itself exclusively toward the Soviet Union. It may become necessary to remind the Iranian Government that the Declaration Regarding Iran was based upon the implicit desire of Iran itself to enjoy sovereign equality with other nations and that voluntary surrender of sovereignty by Iran to the Soviet Union relieves us of the obligations expressed in the Declaration. Through United Nations channels, we have supported, and will continue to support, Iran's position as an independent state. Should a situation arise in Iran which might lead to international friction, we would not hesitate to support an investigation by the Security Council.

(2) **Military.** Our military policy does not at this time contemplate the use of force to achieve our objectives in Iran. During the war, this Government sent non-combat troops to Iran to assist in aid-to-Russia operations and sent, at the request of the Iranian Government, two advisory military missions—one to advise the Army in quartermaster matters, another to assist in the organization, training, and administration of the *Gendarmerie*. When the wartime purpose of Allied forces in Iran was achieved, US troops were withdrawn from Iran and US properties there almost entirely disposed of before January 1, 1946.⁷⁶ The UK and the USSR were asked by this Government to do likewise. Since the purpose of the two US military missions—namely, to assure an adequate internal security force—has not been achieved and since the Iranian Government desires their continuance, the Ridley-Schwarzkopf Missions remain in Iran. Effort is being made to obtain legislation granting the President authority to maintain military missions of this nature beyond the period of national emergency. So long as Congressional legislation permits their detail, and provided the Iranian Government desires and supports these missions, they will be made available. To enhance the success of the missions, we are assisting the Iranian Government in obtaining essential, non-combat supplies for the Iranian Army and the *Gendarmerie*.

(3) **Economic.** Our economic policy does not at present contemplate loans to Iran for political purposes. We are, however, prepared to extend advisory economic assistance to Iran upon request. Effort is being made to amend present legislation, which now permits the sending of official US civilian missions to certain countries, so that such missions can be sent, when appropriate, to any country, including Iran. Our policy is to channel economic assistance, in so far as possible, through the United Nations, the International Bank, and related international organizations on a cooperative, non-exclusive basis.

⁷⁶ For documentation on the disposition of American military installations and other surplus property in Iran, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 566 ff.

It is our policy to discourage the present tendency of the Iranian Government to grant exclusive economic concessions to the Soviet Union and to make clear the political consequences of such an orientation.

(4) Information. By a planned program of information and cultural relations with Iran, we propose to bolster the desire of the Iranian people for independence and to influence their development along democratic lines. This program involves the demonstration, by all available media, of US institutions and opinions, against a background of factual reporting of world news not furnished by any other source. Should other means of implementing our Iranian policy become impaired, this means should be intensified proportionately. Since the validity and effectiveness of our policy depends upon the conviction and support of the American people, we insist upon the unfettered flow of news between Iran and the United States. The Department is considering an information program for the US public concerning Iran and the Middle East, with the view to emphasizing the importance of the area in US foreign relations.

711.91/7-3146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, July 31, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received 9:09 p. m.]

1049. Shah reverted at length yesterday to his favorite theme that only hope for Iran to withstand continued Soviet propaganda among Iranian masses is economic development to raise standard of living. He emphasized especially development of water power and he hopes American firms will become interested from investment and management point of view. He said principal necessity is large American loan, which he realizes we will not extend if Iran seems likely to become Soviet puppet state but he is convinced loan is Iran's only hope.

I repeated necessity for specific plan of development and for detailed projects before loan could be considered. He said comprehensive 7-year plan is practically ready.

I expressed personal view that most likely means for Iran actually to obtain American credits seemed to me through individual projects sponsored by American companies such as airway project by TWA, electric power project by Westinghouse, communications project by International Telephone and Telegraph, etc.

We have every reason, in view of Declaration Regarding Iran and for other reasons, to consider sympathetically Iranian requests for economic assistance and Shah's views concerning raising standard of living are excellent.

Any guidance Department may give me on this subject will be welcome.⁷⁷

ALLEN

891.00/8-646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, August 6, 1946—noon.

[Received 3:07 p. m.]

1080. Recent reshuffle of Iranian Government,⁷⁸ while apparently sudden, has been in Qavam's mind for 2 months or more. Following agreement with Pishevari in June, Qavam said he might take one or two Tudeh members and an Azerbaijani into Cabinet. When he decided to move, however, he did so very swiftly, taking his Cabinet, Shah and country completely by surprise. While no representative of Tabriz government has yet been added, it is still possible that Pishevari, or one of his associates, will be given portfolio soon.

I feel confident change of Ministers resulted from Qavam's belief he can handle Tudeh Party better inside Government than out and from his effort to absorb Tudeh organization into his political party. However, Secretary Rossow, who was in Azerbaijan during development of puppet regime there, points out many similarities between sequence of events there and here, and thinks Qavam has already lost control of situation.

First state [*stage*] in Azerbaijan was formation of Tudeh. Second was formation Democrats of Azerbaijan, which appeared to oppose Tudeh at start and consequently attracted considerable number fairly respectable followers on this basis. Third stage (which is one we are just entering in Tehran) was union of Tudeh and Democrats of Azerbaijan forces. Result was complete domination of Government by better organized, financed and supported Soviet agents.

Rossow feels situation in remainder of Iran has now gone so far full Soviet domination of whole country is inevitable and Qavam could not retrieve situation, even if he exerted his utmost.

Many similarities between developments in Azerbaijan and those taking place in Tehran are evident. However, there are also differ-

⁷⁷ In telegram 760, September 12, 1946, the Department advised the Ambassador in Iran that the Export-Import Bank could not consider more than a small loan to Iran because all but a small part of its resources had been committed to meet relief and rehabilitation needs of war-devastated countries, but stated that "the new International Bank is institution designed to handle long-term loans for major development projects such as Shah's 7-year plan." (891.51/9-1246)

⁷⁸ In telegram 1062, August 2, 10 a. m., the Ambassador in Iran had reported a reshuffling of the Qavam Cabinet to admit three Tudeh leaders as Ministers of Health, of Education, and of Commerce and Industry. A fourth Cabinet post—the Ministry of Justice—had been given to an individual who had recently agreed to collaborate with the Tudeh Party and was generally recognized as virtually a party member. (891.002/8-246)

ences which furnish basis for belief situation here is not irretrievably lost. Outstanding consideration is Qavam's continued support of Schwarzkopf Mission which is anathema to Tudeh Party. Moreover, there are no Russian speaking agents from Caucasus in high position here. Azerbaijan group established themselves in power behind Soviet bayonets but no such entrenchment of Tudeh has been possible here.

I regard situation as gloomy but by no means desperate.

ALLEN

891.00/8-1346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, August 13, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received August 13—3:58 p. m.]

1116. Following my conference with Qavam today regarding Helmand River matter he asked me to stay for very serious talk concerning political situation. He said he expected delegation from Azerbaijan headed by Governor General Djavid to arrive in Tehran in few days. He said he was determined to find out immediately, whether Tabriz government wanted Azerbaijan to be part of Iran or not.⁷⁹ He said he would be very firm, and that if negotiations broke down he might have to use force to bring Azerbaijan back into Iranian nation, much as he hesitated to shed Iranian blood. He said his principal worry was that in case of resort to force he feared USSR would supply Azerbaijan with guns, tanks, airplanes, money and men in civilian clothes who would pose as volunteers. He asked what I thought UN would be able to do to help Iran.

I said that as he was of course aware USSR had veto in Security Council over substantive action by that body. Moreover, UN had no security forces or armaments available. Nevertheless I believed that in case of flagrant support by USSR of separatist movement in Iran and in case Iran placed matter strongly and unreservedly before Security Council, I could not believe that those nations which were determined to make UN a forceful organization capable of defending small nations from aggression, would sit by idly and admit that organization was incapable of any assistance in case of this kind. I referred to speeches by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes calling on members of UN to believe in UN and to base their policies on it as only hope for better organized world in future. I said I thought some means would be found to aid nations which did so.

⁷⁹ In telegram 1104, August 10, 1946, 5 p. m., from Tehran, the Ambassador had reported that negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Azerbaijani authorities regarding the status of Azerbaijani regular and volunteer forces had broken down and that relations between the two governments had seriously deteriorated (891.00/8-1046).

I suggested to Qavam that if negotiations with Azerbaijan broke off, he should make it abundantly clear to world that rupture came because Tabriz Government was not willing for Azerbaijan to become part of Iran again. This would make it clear that he was fighting for Iran's integrity. He could cite plenty of evidence that Azerbaijan group have failed even to abide by more than generous agreement Qavam gave them in June.

Qavam was in most determined mood I have found him since my arrival here. He said he knew that Azerbaijan group and probably Soviet press would denounce him as Fascist and reactionary, but he was prepared for all that. He said reason he had been so overly conciliatory to Azerbaijan and Tudeh up to present was his lack of confidence in Iranian Army but he had that confidence now. If USSR would remain neutral he did not fear results.

If Qavam appeals to Security Council again, I believe he will do so wholeheartedly and unreservedly. I hope Council will be able to show its ability to function in what may be real test.⁸⁰

Sent Department 1116; repeated Paris, London and Moscow.

ALLEN

891.00/8-2546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, August 25, 1946—noon.
[Received 3:46 p. m.]

1153. Principal points of my conversation yesterday with Qavam were:

(1) He was especially interested and impressed by Department's approval of views I had previously expressed to him regarding ability of UN to assist Iran in case of Soviet interference (Embtel 1116, August 13 and Department's 692, August 16⁸¹). I pointed out again that while USSR has veto in Council and UN has no security forces, nevertheless nations which were determined to make UN successful and potent international organization would find means to make it function in defending member states against aggression. I added again that Iran must be prepared to place its case unreservedly and wholeheartedly before SC if Iran expected latter to be able to help. Qavam said security measures his Govt was already taking to prevent

⁸⁰ In telegram 1117, August 13, 6 p. m., Ambassador Allen reported a conversation with Prime Minister Qavam during which he expressed the hope that the latter might visit the United States in September since it was especially appropriate for the Prime Minister of the first member of the United Nations to present a substantive case to the Security Council to head his country's delegation to the General Assembly (891.002/8-1346). In telegram 692, August 16, 6 p. m., the Department expressed its concurrence with the Ambassador's views regarding Iran's relations with the UN and Qavam's attendance at the General Assembly (891.00/8-1346).

⁸¹ No. 692 not printed, but see footnote 80, above.

infiltration of Soviet civilians into Iran and to defend capital against Soviet-inspired Tudeh uprising were already straining Iranian budget and that possible need for assistance would be financial.

(2) I told Prime Minister in all friendliness but frankly that I was disturbed by reports I had received that he was not following course, in his discussions with Azerbaijan delegation, which would maintain Iran's integrity. I said I would welcome his correction if my information was wrong but that according to my reports he was inclined to accept Azerbaijan demands that Azerbaijan Army and Fedaiyeh forces remain as they are, under Soviet control and infiltrated with Soviet secret police. I said no surer or quicker road to loss of Iran's independence could be taken. Qavam admitted that Azerbaijan demands were exorbitant but denied he had made any concessions. He said he was merely listening to them at present, to draw them out.

(3) Qavam admitted he had been disappointed in his experiment of taking Tudeh members into the Cabinet. He had hoped they would prove to be patriotic Iranians when they saw from the inside how USSR was treating Iran every day but they had continued to follow the Soviet line. Qavam said Tudeh Party was clearly directed by Soviet Embassy. He strongly implied that he was searching for good basis for throwing Tudeh members out of Cabinet.

(4) Conversations with Azerbaijanians will continue for several days. So far only military matters have been discussed but today equally difficult financial questions will be on agenda. Bank Melli Director Ebtehaj telephoned this morning just before conference with Azerbaijanians to find out Prime Minister's mood and to repeat his own determination to remain absolutely firm against Azerbaijan demands.

(5) My general impression is that Qavam is very reluctant to resort to other than conciliatory means with Azerbaijan but that in the end he will use force.

ALLEN

891.00/8-1346 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1946—7 p. m.

725. Urtel 1153. Reiteration on Aug 25 your views expressed to Qavam Aug 13 (Urtel 1116) concerning possible UN assistance vis-à-vis SovUnion suggests that our concurrence Aug 16 (Deptel 692⁶²) may have been interpreted more broadly than was intended. In concurring with your views re Iran's relation with UN we had in mind wholehearted Iranian submission substantive case to SC in event clear Sov violation Iranian sovereignty. While Dept appreciates and endorses your efforts to stiffen Qavam's attitude it is hoped that he has

⁶² Not printed; but see footnote 80, p. 512.

not gained any mistaken impression as to either UN capabilities or US intentions from your statement that "nations which were determined to make UN successful and potent international organization would find means to make it function in defending member states against aggression."

We are confident that you understand fully present limitations UN security action. For your private information, any subsequent measures by US beyond those possibilities would depend upon decision at highest level in light of prevailing circumstances.

We concur fully in objectives which doubtless prompted your remarks in point and our comments in no way modify our general position and support of attitude outlined in your previous conversations. Repeated to Moscow as no. 1570 and London as no. 6344.

ACHESON

891.6363/9-646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, September 6, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received September 6—1:50 p. m.]

1192. During conversation with Prime Minister yesterday subject turned to oil, which Qavam considers chief Soviet aim in Iran. If USSR can obtain its desires both as regards oil and Azerbaijan it will do so but if forced to choose between the two he feels confident Soviets will drop Azerbaijan.

In response to my request for information regarding basis for his discussion of oil with Soviet authorities in face of law which apparently forbids such discussion, he said he could not discuss "concession" but there was no difficulty about discussion joint development arrangement.

I remarked that American Government felt that as long as law remained on books, we should respect it and not embarrass Iranian officials by attempting to discuss subject. I added that as long as Iranian case remained on agenda of UN, we did not wish to have our motives in supporting Iran impugned. Qavam said he appreciated our reasoning and our attitude, adding cryptically that Soviet angle should be cleared up in another couple of months. As regards the law, he said he could discuss joint development arrangements with any one at any time. He then said, significantly and pointedly, that if he had in hand at the moment an American proposal based on a model development contract, his hands would be strengthened materially in dealing with Soviets since he could show Soviets what a just and proper proposal was like.

While I had not intended to get on subject of oil when I requested interview and I received no indication during conversation that Qavam

had planned his remarks, yet the rapidity with which he seized opportunity to make his point and earnestness with which he spoke shows he has had in mind talking with us about oil.

Qavam's remarks could well be taken as an invitation to us to make a petroleum proposal and as such they deserve considerably more attention than the similar suggestion recently made to me by Shah,⁸³ since Qavam has power to carry out his ideas.

[Here follow Ambassador Allen's thoughts regarding possible formation of a joint company to develop Iranian-Baluchistan oil.]

ALLEN

711.91/9-2646

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) to the Secretary of State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Reid)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1946.

There is attached a series of questions concerning United States strategic interests in Iran which the Department of State requests you to transmit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. In view of the strong political interest of the Department of State in Iran, particularly in the present serious situation of internal strife, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this as matter of high priority.

H. W. MOSELEY,⁸⁴
for J. H. Hilldring

[Annex]

PROPOSED QUESTIONS TO JCS

1. To what extent does the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider Iran to be an area of vital strategic interest to the United States for defensive or counter-offensive purposes, or as a source of supply?

2. In what way does the JCS consider the United States strategic interest in Iran to be related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area as a whole?

3. In what manner does the JCS consider that United States strategic interest would be affected by:

(a) A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south?

(b) Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan?

(c) The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq?

(d) Soviet domination of the whole of Iran?

⁸³ See footnote 25, p. 34. For further documentation on the question of Iranian oil, see pp. 30-50, *passim*.

⁸⁴ Special Assistant to General Hilldring.

4. Given the existing inadequacy of Iranian security forces and the political desirability of strengthening the authority of the central government, does the JCS consider that a program of assistance by the U. S. to the Iranian military establishment would contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area?

740.00119 Council/9-2746: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris*⁸⁵

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

5142. Secdel 1005. On instruction, Ala called today to communicate contents lengthy message from his Govt summarizing recent developments Southern Iran, particularly possibility Brit complicity. Iranians have what they believe to be conclusive evidence of incitement southern tribes by several Brit consular officers. Recall of principal person in allegations, Consul General Trott of Ahwaz, has been requested. Bevin has promised Iranian Amb to London to investigate fully and to take appropriate action in circumstances. Brit Amb Tehran denies involvement any Brit consular officer. Qavam has now instructed Iranian Amb London to bring complete evidence to attention Brit Govt and takes position that if satisfaction cannot be obtained by this means, Iranian Govt has no recourse but to bring matter before "International authority".⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Secretary of State Byrnes was attending the Paris Peace Conference, which met from July 29 to October 15, 1946.

⁸⁶ In telegram 1219, September 12, from Tehran, Ambassador Allen had reported a conversation with Prince Firuz, who asserted he had irrefutable proof that the British had engineered the recent plot by the Qashqai and Bakhtiari tribes to seize control of southern Iran, and declared that Iranian Government was considering appeal to the Security Council. Charges were made against the British Consul General at Ahwaz, Mr. A. C. Trott, and the question of his recall was raised. (741.91/9-1246) In telegram 1231, September 14, the Ambassador observed that he was "more and more convinced that entire question of plot was built up, out of smallest, if any, basis, for political purposes." (891.00/9-1446)

According to telegram 8506, September 30, from London, Mr. Bevin, after studying the full British Foreign Office report on the Trott case, was satisfied that there was nothing to the Iranian charges (702.4191/9-3046). Telegram S743, October 10, from London, reported that instructions had been sent to Ambassador Le Rougetel in Tehran to suggest to the Iranian Prime Minister that he withdraw the request for Mr. Trott's removal, in which case the British would publish a statement containing a section intended for the tribes, as Mr. Qavam desired; or if Mr. Qavam refused to withdraw the request, the British would issue a shorter statement denying any connection with subversive activities in Iran (891.00/10-1046).

Telegram 8866, October 16, from London, reported that the Iranian Government had withdrawn its request for Mr. Trott's recall and that the Foreign Office planned to issue "as a reply to parliamentary question what amounts to statement desired by Qavam." (702.4191/10-1646) For text of Mr. Bevin's remarks addressed to the House of Commons on the matter, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 427, col. 902.

Qavam has impression US Govt may have had some foreknowledge of recent events and was not displeased by them. Ala was assured that US had no forewarning and that recent events can, in our opinion, only be detrimental to Iran. He was told further that declared US policy of continued economic assistance to Iran has not been altered.

In reply to Ala's request for guidance concerning advisability his Govt bringing UN case against Brit, Amb was informed that this is naturally an important matter for decision only by Iran Govt. However, he might wish to consider precedent established in Iranian complaint against Soviet Union made at SC meeting in London, in which SC took position that matter should first be referred to parties in dispute for direct negotiations. We would hope, therefore, that Iran would not hesitate to enter into full and frank discussions with Brit in hopes of amicable settlement without bringing case before UN. Amb might also wish to consider whether precipitate action against Brit at this time might not play into hands of Russians and work to eventual detriment of Iranian sovereignty.

Sent Paris, repeated London, Tehran, Moscow.⁸⁷

CLAYTON

891.00/9-2846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, September 28, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received September 29—12: 27 a. m.]

1289. There are some additional indications that British are envisioning possible severance of Azerbaijan from Iran as an alternative to continuance of present situation, which they fear will result in incorporation of larger part of country into Soviet sphere. Idea seems to be that it would be preferable to cut off rotten part of apple rather than let it infect remainder. British Ambassador referred in conversation yesterday to what he feels is prime necessity for establishment of definite frontier between USSR and Iran. He feels that continued effort of Tehran Government to regard Azerbaijan as part of Iran is contrary to realities and results in mushy condition in which there is no clear-cut frontier and Soviets can continue to infiltrate into Tehran and exert pressure southward. Apparently his idea is that if Tehran Government would definitely break with Tabriz Government and establish strong military forces along Iran-Azerbaijan border, Tehran might then be better able to resist Soviet-inspired demands in rest of the country, such as inclusion of Tudeh in Cabinet and other conciliatory measures Tehran Government has been continually making in effort to keep Azerbaijan as part of nation.

⁸⁷ As Nos. 6882, 810, and 1729, respectively.

British official policy undoubtedly continues to support a united Iran, including Azerbaijan, if this can be realized, and British Ambassador's inclination to look with certain complacency on loss of Azerbaijan may not reflect London thinking. However, overriding British consideration is to keep their oil concession, and all Britishers view Iran through that perspective.

I am inclined to believe that severance of Azerbaijan would not in fact relieve Soviet pressure on rest of country and might well place USSR merely in stronger position to realize other aims. Nor am I ready to admit that Azerbaijan has been irreparably lost, even though its recovery seems remote at the moment. Moreover, while I realize that present national boundaries of Iran, which result from historical accident or ancient conquests, are not sacred and that Azerbaijanians may be closer in language and feelings to Turks in Turkey and USSR than to Iran, it seems to me we have no alternative but to continue to support integrity of Iran in accordance with Declaration Regarding Iran and United Nations Charter.

Sent Department 1289 repeated London 154 and Moscow 274.

ALLEN

891.00/9-3046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

TEHRAN, September 30, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received October 1—7 a. m.]

1293. In long conference with Prime Minister yesterday, held at his request, Qavam told me he realized that policy of conciliation towards Azerbaijan had not yielded favorable results and had merely encouraged other sections of country to make impossible demands. Qavam said he was contemplating sharp change of policy, based on strong insistence upon Iranian sovereignty throughout country. He fully realized he would be immediately castigated as turncoat and Fascist reactionary and would face serious internal difficulties. City of Tehran would even be in danger from almost certain Tudeh Party disturbances.

Qavam said new policy would in no way lessen his determination to institute far-reaching economic reforms which Iran needed so urgently. But to reestablish Iran as a nation and create conditions which would have some permanence, Iran needed immediate assistance along two major lines, military supplies and substantial financial credits. Iran could only look to United States for these. Before he undertakes new policy he would welcome assurance that United States would render assistance. He asked me to report conversation promptly and expressed hope for an early favorable reply.

I said I would naturally report his request immediately.

During conversation I expressed confidence that United States had in no way altered policy stated in Declaration Regarding Iran which contained assurances of American respect for Iranian sovereignty and our desire to assist Iran economically. I read to him Department's 810, September 27, 7 p. m.⁸⁸ (sent to Paris as Secdel 1005) which fortunately had just reached me. I pointed out, however, that subsequent to signature of Declaration in 1943, both United States and Iran had become parties to a broader and more important instrument, the United Nations Charter. United States bases its foreign policy squarely on that Charter and encouraged other member states to do likewise. Nations like Iran which felt threatened with foreign interference for [*and?*] aggression should place reliance in UN for assistance. We should face the fact realistically that America could probably be moved to aid Iran seriously only to the extent its aid was regarded by American public as being given to support UN. Iran was making direct request of United States for combat military equipment and for credits which I understand Iranians felt should total 250 million dollars. I expressed opinion that sooner we came down to earth and viewed situation realistically the more progress we would make. My Government had told me 10 million dollars was most Iran could expect in credit from Export-Import Bank. As for combat equipment we had refused to sell any even to Latin America or China. I said I hoped in [*my?*] views were unduly negative since I would like nothing better than to be able to give him fullest encouragement. I knew Soviets had already offered him combat equipment to fight southern tribes. I hoped he would not yield to obvious temptation to accept this help which would have political strings attached. I could not encourage him to expect more direct American help than I honestly felt he was likely to get, but if my Government would give a more favorable response, no one would be more pleased than I.

Qavam said he realized foregoing was realistic appraisal of probable American reaction. At present moment he had little basis for new approach to UN but he might have better basis later. Present case against Britain would have to rest on intrigues between Consul General Trott and Bakhtiari, but latter tribe was not actually causing trouble. There was no adequate evidence of British instigation of other tribes which were causing difficulties. Case against Russia would be likewise rather hard to prove now, in view of Soviet troop withdrawals. He knew Soviets were involved in Azerbaijan but he would probably have to capture some Soviet Caucasians as exhibits before he could make much of a case. At same time he was basing his policy on UN and as evidence of this fact had decided to head Iranian delegation to General Assembly meeting himself. He knew, however,

⁸⁸ See footnote 87, p. 517.

that United States was dominant member of UN and he felt that only through assurance of our support could he prevent Iran from falling under domination of either foreign powers or subversive elements.

As indicated above, I would welcome instructions which would justify more favorable response to Qavam and also to Shah, who has been pressing me along same line for some weeks.

Repeated Paris, London 155 and Moscow 275.

ALLEN

740.00119 Council/10-146: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1946—7 p. m.

5214. Secdel 1027. We are somewhat disturbed here by recent trend events in Iran. Situation, we feel, holds elements threat to international peace and security through possible involvement UK and USSR in protracted Iranian civil war. Even if such possibility should not materialize, outcome present situation cannot fail to be detrimental to Iranian sovereignty, UN principles and US policy objectives. Result might well be either division Iran into sphere of influence or domination Iran by single foreign power.

We feel that best possible hope preserving Iranian independence would be to strengthen Qavam's hand by positive show US interest in Iran through full implementation our declared policy of economic assistance. For example, Iran has requested Exim Bank loan for development purposes,⁸⁹ including irrigation projects, modernization transportation, water works and electricity for Tehran. Am[erican] firm is about to make overall economic survey as part comprehensive program for economic and social development, to be carried out by Am companies. While Qavam has pleaded for US economic assistance on many occasions, Allen has so far been unable give effective assurances due to our hitherto narrow concept of economic aspects our Iranian policy.

It seems to us not unnatural that in absence material assistance from disinterested friendly power Qavam should yield to selfish foreign pressures. We should welcome any views you may wish to give for our guidance.

ACHESON

⁸⁹ In note No. 1394, September 9, 1946, from the Iranian Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State, not printed. The four projects enumerated in the note involved a total expenditure of 2,800 million rials, the equivalent of about \$85 million, and called for a loan of about \$45 to \$50 million. (891.51/9-946)

740.00149 Council/10-346 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, October 3, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received October 3—12: 37 p. m.]

4962. Delsec 1025. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. I feel we should extend economic help to the Iranian Government through sales of non-combat surplus property if any is available and through an Eximport Bank credit. In the light of my limited knowledge of the present situation in Iran I should not believe it wise to supply combat material (as suggested by Qavam in Tehran's telegram No. 1293 to Department⁹⁰). Any contrary decision should be given most careful prior consideration.

Repeated Tehran 19.⁹¹

BYRNES

891.00/10-546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 5, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received October 5—4: 11 p. m.]

US URGENT

1324. Qavam told me today that his plans to attend UN General Assembly had had to be changed yesterday in view of formal and pressing demand he had just received from Soviet Ambassador for immediate holding of elections. Consequently, he would not be able to leave Iran for the present.

He said that 2 weeks ago Soviet Ambassador had asked him about elections and he had replied that elections were impossible as long as Azerbaijan question was not settled. He requested that Soviet authorities assist him in effecting agreement with Azerbaijan. Soviet Ambassador telegraphed this to Moscow and received reply stating that Qavam's answer was not acceptable and insisting upon fulfillment of Qavam's undertaking to submit oil agreement to Majlis. Qavam said that as result of Soviet insistence he had no alternative but to hold elections. He expects royal decree setting date for elections to be issued in few days and elections to be held one month thereafter. Meanwhile, he hopes to come to some kind of agreement with Azerbaijan which he says will return Khamseh province to Tehran but which will leave question of Abzerbaijan Army for further negotiation.

⁹⁰ Dated September 30, p. 518.⁹¹ In telegram 1322, October 5, the Ambassador in Tehran reported that the substance of Mr. Byrnes' telegram had been conveyed to the Iranian Minister (891.00/10-546).

In reply to my question, Qavam said detailed oil agreement was yet to be drawn up for presentation to Majlis since only agreement in principle had so far been reached. Detailed agreement would have to be worked out between now and date Majlis assemblies, which cannot possibly take place before November.

Elections will be rather a farce if held under present circumstances, with serious armed warfare going on in south and with Azerbaijan completely independent and defiant of Qavam. However, any elections held in Iran would probably be rather *pro forma* affair under best circumstances and Qavam's principal aim to go through motions satisfactory to USSR. Moscow will apparently be satisfied with any group which will ratify oil agreement. Iranian constitution contains significant provision that Deputies from Tehran and vicinity can form a quorum to convene Majlis under some circumstances.

Qavam denied rumor that he has considered making executive agreement with USSR to enable Soviet petroleum exploration to begin immediately, in exchange for Soviet agreement not to press for early elections. Qavam doubted Soviets would agree since they have sent Sichoff²² to Tehran and have required Sadchikov to defer his leave for month in order to press for elections.

Sent Department 1324, repeated London 162 and Moscow 280.

ALLEN

891.00/10-646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT

TEHRAN, October 6, 1946—noon.
[Received 2:55 p. m.]

1325. Shah said last night he had just signed decree calling for immediate "preparations" for elections. He does not know exact date elections will be held but presumes they will take place in "about a month". He hesitated to sign decree in view of disturbed state of country but decided he could not assume responsibility for further delay.

Shah is afraid Parliament to be elected will be divided between outright Soviet spokesmen and Deputies loyal to Qavam. He thinks latter group will also be susceptible to heavy Soviet pressure and that consequently new Parliament will "end Iranian independence" unless strong action is taken beforehand. He is toying with idea of asking Qavam to resign to enable formation of interim government to conduct elections. Announced basis for Shah's action would be that Qavam, who is leader of political party, should not conduct elections

²² S. I. Sychev, Chief of the Middle Eastern Division of the Soviet Foreign Office.

in which his party is a contestant. Real basis for Shah's concern is his fear that new Parliament, elected under control of Qavam and Muzzafar Firuz, would be hostile to him and to western democracies.

In response to Shah's request for advice I said decision was one no foreigner had right to suggest and he must decide with his own counselors. He said counselor in whom he had greatest confidence and trust was Hussein Ala, who was unfortunately in Washington. He would welcome Ala's views

I am unable to guess Shah's probable action but suspect he may end by doing nothing, which may be best in circumstances. I have frequently cautioned him during conversations regarding Qavam that he should consider carefully the alternative. If he should force out present Cabinet and substitute for it reactionary regime regarded by Iranians as British stooges results would be shortlived. I am confident British themselves would not welcome such a regime. On other hand, there is real danger that new Parliament elected under present government may be Soviet-dominated. On balance I am inclined to let matters take their course. I would welcome Department's observations on situation since US attitude as expressed to Shah, whether of positive or negative nature, may have important bearing on his actions.

Sent Department 1325; repeated London 163.

ALLEN

891.00/10-846

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1946.

Ambassador Ala, when he calls on you this afternoon, will probably bring to your attention what he considers to be the very critical situation in Iran and request American assistance at this time. The Ambassador will probably also request that this Government reopen the Iranian case before the Security Council.

Ambassador Ala yesterday informed us of the very serious view taken by him, and shared by the Iranian Ambassador in London, concerning conditions in Iran. The Ambassador feels that Iran has arrived at a crossroad where it must choose between exclusive orientation toward Russia and a more balanced policy within the spirit of the Charter of UN. He believes that the Russians are now exerting the strongest kind of pressure on Qavam to cause elections to be held, even while Azerbaijan is still outside the authority of the central Government and while the tribes in the South are rebelling against strong Russian infiltration throughout Iran. The Ambassador believes that if elections are now held the Russians will consolidate

their position in Northern Iran and eventually gain control of the entire country.

Ambassador Allen shares Mr. Ala's concern. We feel that the situation is critical and that we should do everything within our power to prevent Iran from slipping into the Soviet orbit. I need not elaborate on the consequences for this country of Iran's falling under Soviet domination. In addition to our political interests in preserving the sovereignty of all small states and in holding the line against Russia in this area, we have discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the matter of US strategic interest in Iran. The JCS is strongly of the opinion that our strategic interest would be greatly harmed by division of Iran into spheres of influence or by Iran's falling completely under Soviet domination. They hold the view that the oil fields in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are absolutely vital to the security of this country.

We do not believe that the present Iranian case before the Security Council should be reopened at this time, since it may be contended that Qavam is following a sovereign and voluntary course of action. However, we do feel that some action on the part of this Government is required if Iran's sovereignty is to be protected and the country prevented from taking immediate action leading to loss of the country's sovereignty. We feel Qavam is following a pro-Soviet course of action, not because he desires to do so or because he believes it is in the interest of his country. We feel that Qavam is making concession after concession to the Russians of a nature which will eventually undermine the sovereignty of Iran and that one reason for his course of action is our inability to take concrete steps to assist Iran economically or politically. We have had on too many occasions to meet Iran's requests for assistance in a half-hearted or negative fashion. Unless we can consistently show Qavam by action that he can count on the support of this country, in and out of the United Nations, Iran will, in our opinion, inevitably give way to Russian pressure, with all that such yielding entails for the interest of this country. Specifically, it seems to us that Qavam should be urged to hold fast in the protection of Iran's sovereignty. He should be encouraged to hope for American assistance in implementing his announced program of reform. He should be encouraged to hope for an American loan for internal development. He should be encouraged to hope for the supply by this country to Iran of combat supplies necessary to maintain internal security. Furthermore, he should be specifically informed at once that the holding of elections before the central Government has resumed its authority over Azerbaijan would represent a step extremely dangerous to the continued independence and sovereignty of Iran.

It is hoped that in your conversation with Ambassador Ala you will be able to give him, for transmission to Qavam, an indication of this country's real interest in Iran and our resolve to implement fully the declared US policy toward that country. A show of our interest in Iran would be emphasized by sending an official of the State Department to Iran at this time to discuss the whole Iranian problem with Ambassador Allen and to carry a formal message from the President or the Secretary to the Iranian Prime Minister. A good occasion is afforded by the departure of a special plane being sent by the President to Baghdad on October 19 for a period of a week.

LOY W. HENDERSON

891.00/10-846

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs (Minor)

[WASHINGTON,], October 8, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Minor, MEI

The Iranian Ambassador called today at his request. He said that he wished to emphasize to the Department the seriousness of the situation in Iran. He said that the Province of Azerbaijan is now entirely under the control of the Democrats, who are under Russian influence, so that the central Government has virtually lost control of this important state. In addition to this grave difficulty, the southern part of Iran is now torn by civil strife. Whatever the degree of British complicity in the southern rebellion, the Ambassador gave his opinion that the movement is a normal and natural reaction of the tribes against Russian infiltration into Southern Iran and domination over the central government. It all, in his opinion, goes back to the original "sin" of Russian aggression in northern Iran. Ambassador Ala declared that Iran now stands at a cross road, and the next moves may well determine Iran's destiny. He stated frankly that, while he has up to this point been sure that Qavam is following a patriotic course designed to protect Iran's independence, he is not now so sure of this. His general impression is still that Qavam has followed his present course because of necessity, since the Russians are on top of Iran and since little hope of assistance from any other power is evident. Iran, the Ambassador said, continues to pin its hope on the United States. He sincerely believes that Qavam has followed this course by default and that he will alter his course if encouragement is given by the United States.

The situation in Iran is made critical by the fact that Qavam has now agreed to hold elections. The Ambassador said he was at a loss to understand how Qavam could agree to hold elections for the Majlis at a time when Azerbaijan and part of the South are [not?] under the control of the central Government. The elections will certainly have the effect of returning to the Majlis a solid bloc of Soviet dominated deputies from Azerbaijan and possibly from other northern areas. The result of this Soviet bloc will be to give the Russians virtual control of the central Government and all that that entails. If this course of action is carried through, Iran will have lost a major degree of sovereignty.

With this background in mind, Ambassador Ala suggested that the United States should now help Iran in the following three ways:

1. The Iranian case should be reopened before the Security Council by the United States. The Ambassador said that conditions in Iran are much worse than in May when the case was postponed temporarily. With Russian aggression still effective in the North and rebellion in the South, a full inquiry should now be made and a commission sent to Iran to investigate.

2. The United States should express to Iranian officials, through its Ambassador at Tehran, the serious view this Government takes of the trend of events and recommend that the impending elections in Iran should be postponed.

3. In addition to bringing American views to the attention of Soviet officials through our Ambassador, it would be very helpful if this Government could send an official of the State Department to Iran with a more personal message from this Government, to express the American Government's viewpoint more fully and carefully than could be done by telegraph.

Mr. Acheson assured the Ambassador of the very close interest this Government has in the course of events in Iran. As to the possibility of reopening the Iranian case before the Security Council, Mr. Acheson did not wish to express an off-hand opinion without full consultation on the subject. However, he told the Ambassador frankly that it would be very difficult for this Government to reopen the Iranian case when there is no indication that the Iranian Government has altered the stand it took before the Security Council in the spring when it requested that the Iranian case be dropped from the agenda. We are not at all sure of what the Iranian reaction to such a move might be, and we do not know that Qavam would approve of reopening the case or sending a commission of inquiry. This is a question which should be carefully considered before any action is taken. Concerning the second of the Ambassador's points, Mr. Acheson said that this Government has on many occasions expressed a great interest in the Iranian affairs and only recently instructed Ambassador Allen⁹³ to

⁹³The reference is presumably to telegram 844, October 8, to Tehran, *infra*, which was drafted the previous day.

express to Qavam the dangers which appear to be inherent in the proposed aviation agreement with Russia. We will continue to take a close interest in Iran and make every effort to implement our declared policy of economic assistance to that country. As to the specific point of recommending to Qavam that elections not be held, Mr. Acheson said he had some misgivings about such definite interferences in Iranian internal affairs. He thought that the appropriate course of action would be to give Qavam assurances of American interest and support so that he might feel strengthened to take whatever action he might feel suitable in the circumstances to protect Iran's sovereignty. Replying to the third of the Ambassador's points, Mr. Acheson said that the possibility of sending an official of the State Department to Iran on a special mission will be discussed with officials of the Department. In closing Mr. Acheson said he wished the Ambassador to take away the impression that the United States Government is sincerely interested in Iran and desires to be of assistance at this critical time.

891.796/10-846 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

844. Ur 1293, Sept 30 and 1294, Sept 30.⁹⁴ We are deeply concerned your reports Iranian Govt giving favorable consideration to Russian request that an aviation company with 50 percent Russian participation be organized for servicing Northern Iran.

We feel that in granting such request Iranian Govt would greatly facilitate realization of what appears to be Soviet plans absorb Northern Iran into Soviet sphere. Such a company would be certain to pass under full Soviet control and with Soviet support would be able without difficulty to eliminate all competitors and obtain monopoly on what promises to become most important means communication and transport in Northern Iran. Manner in which Russians exploit monopoly this kind is illustrated by way in which they decided on political basis who could travel by air between Tehran and Tabriz on Soviet controlled airlines during recent Azerbaijan crisis.

We are endeavoring live up to our assurances to support independence and territorial integrity Iran but responsibility for maintaining such independence and integrity rests primarily on Govt Iran. If Iranian Govt has not ability or courage to resist demands from abroad

⁹⁴ No. 1294 not printed; it reported Ambassador Allen's understanding that the Iranian Cabinet might approve the request of the Soviet Union for a "50-50 aviation company" to exercise a monopoly of routes in northern Iran. The Ambassador noted that Prime Minister Qavam might be urged to yield to the request since he contemplated strong action against Azerbaijan "soon". (891.00/9-3046)

for concessions, granting of which is likely to result in impairment Iranian sovereignty or integrity, our difficulties in living up to our assurances are enhanced.⁹⁵

Furthermore granting of such concession may eventually prejudice operation US trunk lines through Iran and establishment direct air communications other than those controlled by Russians between Iran and Afghanistan.

You may discuss this matter in your discretion with appropriate Iranian officials.

Sent Tehran; repeated London, Moscow and Paris.

ACHESON

891.00/10-846 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 11, 1946—7 p. m.
MOST IMMEDIATE

858. Urtel 1336 Oct 8.⁹⁶ We agree that it would be difficult for us to take any further action in Iranian case before SC in absence Iranian initiative. Amb Ala so informed by me in conversation Oct 8. In view our belief, however, that critical situation in Iran due at least in part to Soviet pressure and continued Soviet interference in Iranian affairs, we feel for time being at least Iranian case should be retained on SC agenda. If during conversation between you and Qavam question should arise you may say you feel your govt would support an Iranian appeal to SC against continued foreign interference provided Iran would accompany such appeal with appropriate evidence such foreign interference.

We doubt that an Iranian request to GA for permission observe elections would contribute materially alleviation situation in Iran. In our opinion Iranian govt requesting such commission would immediately become *persona non grata* with Soviet govt which would refuse longer to cooperate with it and would probably make it impossible for such commission to carry out its functions. It seems to

⁹⁵ In telegram 1331, October 7, 1946, Ambassador Allen had quoted Qavam as saying that there had been no recent developments regarding proposal made to him some time before by the Soviet Union for establishment of a joint Iran-Soviet company to be given monopoly of commercial aviation in northern Iran, that Iranian Government had made a counterproposal two months ago offering the Soviet Union 25 percent ownership, but that nothing had been heard of it since. Mr. Allen indicated that this was entirely contrary to reports from highly responsible sources that Qavam was on the point of agreeing to original Soviet proposal. The Ambassador also commented that the recent excitement about the proposed aviation agreement may have resulted from discussions between junior Soviet and Iranian officials without the Prime Minister's knowledge. (891.796/10-746)

⁹⁶ Not printed; Ambassador Allen reported that several Iranian political leaders had urged that a United Nations Commission be sent to Iran to supervise or observe the elections and to investigate the whole question of foreign interference in Iran (891.00/10-846).

us any Iranian govt willing resist Soviet pressure would be in stronger position if it would insist no elections be held until law and order restored throughout the country or at least that no elections be held in areas over which Iranian govt not able exercise control.

If, however, Qavam should ask whether this govt would support Iranian request to GA for permission observe elections you may, after giving him our views re matter, state that if Iranian govt feels elections must be held in spite its lack of control over whole country and if it desires UN supervision such elections we would support such request. This request, however, should be dissociated from SC consideration of case before it and based merely on Iran's desire obtain benefit UN's advice on electoral practices which such commission would be able to supply as result its observations. This distinction between SC consideration of interference and GA concern with elections is important, because GA cannot take any action under Art 12 on matter of which SC is seized. As indicated above we think SC should continue to be seized of present Iranian case.

In our opinion holding elections in Iran in present circumstances may well result in complete loss of Iranian independence and eventuality which may have serious consequences throughout whole Middle East. We hope therefore Qavam will reconsider his decision or at least consider possibility postponing elections in Azerbaijan and Fars (as US postponed elections in South during Civil War) until such time as govt regains full control there while continuing plans for elections other provinces.

Sent Tehran, repeated Secdel Paris 5485, London 7150, Moscow 1813.

ACHESON

711.91/10-1246

*Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to Major General John H. Hilldring*⁹⁷

TOP SECRET
SWN-4818

WASHINGTON, 12 October 1946.

Reference is made to the State Department memorandum dated 26 September 1946 which transmitted a series of questions prepared by the Department of State concerning United States strategic interest in Iran.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered these questions and have advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:

"It is apparent that the questions propounded by the Department of State are based on an assumption that a war with Soviet Russia is a

⁹⁷ This memorandum was directed to General Hilldring in his capacity as Department of State member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

possibility. On that assumption the following replies based on military considerations are an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a consideration apart from such assumption, it must be realized that the interests of the United States and its military capabilities would be adversely affected by loss of Middle East oil occurring through possible Soviet domination of Iran by means other than war.

"1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that as a source of supply (oil) Iran is an area of major strategic interest to the United States. From the standpoint of defensive purposes the area offers opportunities to conduct delaying operations and/or operations to protect United States-controlled oil resources in Saudi Arabia. In order to continue any military capability for preventing a Soviet attack overrunning the whole Middle East including the Suez-Cairo Area, in the first rush, it is essential that there be maintained the maximum cushion of distance and difficult terrain features in the path of possible Soviet advances launched from the Caucasus-Caspian area. Otherwise the entire Middle East might be overrun before sufficient defensive forces could be interposed. As to counteroffensive operations, the proximity of important Soviet industries, makes the importance of holding the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area obvious. This is one of the few favorable areas for counteroffensive action. Quite aside from military counteroffensive action in the area, the oil resources of Iran and the Near and Middle East are very important and may be vital to decisive counteroffensive action from any area.

"2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that United States strategic interest in Iran is closely related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East area as a whole as follows:

"Our best estimates indicate that the USSR does not now derive sufficient oil from sources within her borders to support a major war. The objective of the fourth Soviet five-year plan is 35,000,000 metric tons production annually. Again, our best estimates indicate this tonnage is only sufficient to meet the total Russian peacetime needs upon the expiration of this fourth five-year plan. The USSR and Iran have formed a joint Russian-Iranian oil company to develop oil resources in northern Iran, an area geologists consider an improbable source of large oil production, a fact which must be well known to the Russians. Hence, her motives in forming this Russian-Iranian oil company are subject to suspicion. Loss of the Iraq and Saudi Arabia sources to the United States and her allies would mean that in case of war they would fight an oil-starved war. Conversely, denial of these sources to the USSR would force her to fight an oil-starved war. However, due to Russia's geographic position, great land mass, and superior manpower potential, any lack of oil limiting air action by the United States and her allies or hampering their transportation ability or their war production would be of great advantage to the USSR. It is therefore to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces removed as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East.

“3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

“*a.* A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south would enhance the ability of the Soviets to achieve their ‘security’ ends in this area by political means while having the effect of serving notice to other countries that the western democracies admit their inability to protect their strategic interests in this area. Further, it would give the Soviets opportunity to perfect transportation facilities in northern Iran, to organize northern Iran for defense, and to prepare northern Iran as a possible base for operations against British and/or American oil resources in southern Iran and Saudi Arabia. It would allow the Soviets to move their forces half way to these sources of oil without serious opposition. It would, for all practicable purposes, nullify any ability the British may have at present to protect the oil fields in Iraq and, finally, it would be another step in the encirclement of Turkey.

“*b.* Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan would, from the strategic point of view, be the least objectionable of the four situations propounded in question three. It nevertheless would be a permanent penetration into Iran and thus permit movement of Soviet forces close to the oil fields of Iraq.

“*c.* The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq would adversely affect United States strategic interests by introducing into the area a state owing its existence to the USSR, and therefore strongly influenced by the Soviets and hence probably a willing instrument of the USSR for the creation of discord, dissent, and revolt in the Near and Middle East. Such a state would very probably include the sources of British oil in the Kirkuk area. In this case the revenue now derived by Iraq from Britain for the use of these oil resources would revert to the newly created Kurdish state. Such a situation would probably cause the dissolution of the present government of Iraq and a subsequent chaotic condition from which might arise a new government oriented toward the USSR instead of toward the western democracies. Since Iraq stretches to the head of the Persian Gulf and the Abadan oil refineries are practically on the border of Iraq, our strategic resources in the area would be endangered.

“*d.* Soviet domination of the whole of Iran would entail all of the objections raised in *a*, *b* and *c* above but with the possible adverse effects on United States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East greatly intensified.

“4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that token assistance by the United States to the Iranian military establishment would probably contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East by creating a feeling of good will toward the United States in the central government of Iran and would tend to stabilize and strengthen that government. They are informed that

the immediate security objective of United States policy toward Iran is to prevent civil disturbances which might invite intervention by powerful neighbors and which might endanger United States economic interests in the Persian Gulf area. They feel that, in support of this objective, the United States should accede to Iranian requests for non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable amounts, to enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal security, in view of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own military needs as they have no established sources for security supplies. They consider such non-aggression items of military material as small arms and light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps short range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate for release to Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of Iran, so long as the United States is satisfied that Iran demonstrates a desire to maintain its independence in the community of nations. Technical advice given unostentatiously and on request would also be appropriate and contributory to the defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the Near and Middle East area. United States military missions now in Iran should remain there, but any additional military mission to Iran would be inadvisable at this time.

"The military implications in the existing international situation concerning Iran are closely related to the military implications of the current Turkish situation, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished their views to the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 24 August 1946." *

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID

Secretary

891.51/10-1546

The Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 1574

The Iranian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that he has been instructed by his Government to have recourse to the State Department's support and good offices in securing a credit of ten million dollars for a period of thirty years bearing interest at the rate of three percent.

This credit will be earmarked for the purchase of arms and equipment in the United States and abroad through the Foreign Liquidation Commission in America, as approximately detailed in the accompanying list,⁹⁸ which are urgently required to render the Iranian Army more mobile and put it in a better position to fulfil its duty

*Note: Copy forwarded to State Department in letter to Acting Secretary of State from Secretaries of War and the Navy dated 31 August 1946. [Footnote in the original; for memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, dated August 23, 1946, see p. 857.]

⁹⁸ Not printed.

in the maintenance of law and order within Iran's borders and in defending the integrity and independence of the Country without any thought of aggression.

In view of the American Government's desire, as expressed in the Declaration of Teheran of December 1st, 1945 [1943], to maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, the Ambassador feels sure that the State Department will do its utmost to assist him in obtaining as expeditiously as possible the credit requested by his Government.

Further particulars and detailed lists of the arms and equipment will be furnished as required.

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1946.

891.00/10-1546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 15, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 3:31 p. m.]

1371. Shah said last night that Qavam had called on him earlier in the day to repeat assurances of loyalty and of confidence that elections could be arranged to avoid a Soviet-dominated Majlis. Shah told me that aside from question whether Qavam's assurance and confidence were genuine, he greatly doubted Qavam's ability to carry out such plans, in view of Qavam's loss of freedom of action.

Shah said he was uncertain regarding maintenance of security. I said he should approach question from point of view that constitutional methods were being followed and that military action was not necessarily involved. At same time he should, of course, be prepared for whatever security contingency might arise.

I am unable to predict what course the Shah will follow. The city is full of rumors of an impending change of government and it is always possible that Qavam may be the first to act.

Repeated London 169, Moscow 293.

ALLEN

891.00/10-1846

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1946.

There is attached hereto a memorandum prepared in this Office reviewing the background of events in Iran and suggesting certain

action which, if taken, might strengthen the hands of this Government in its efforts to preserve the independence of Iran and to prevent that country from succumbing to Soviet pressure and thus passing completely into the Soviet orbit of satellite states.

You will note that these suggestions include (1) the extension of credits to Iran for the purpose of financing specific approved development projects which have for their general purpose the raising of Iranian standards of living and (2) the sale to Iran of a limited amount of nonaggression military equipment to enable the Iranian authorities to maintain internal order.

We feel that unless we show by concrete acts that we are seriously interested in carrying out our various assurances to Iran, the Iranian Government and people will eventually become so discouraged that they will no longer be able to resist Soviet pressure. If the suggestions contained in the attached memorandum are approved at the highest levels of the Department, it will be much easier for the various Offices to solve the problems which arise daily with regard to Iran.

It will be observed that the memorandum is devoted primarily to long-term policies. We are faced at the present time, however, with an extremely critical situation in Iran which may require quick action on our part. Recent telegrams from Tehran are causing us deep concern. It has become clear to our Ambassador and to us that Qavam is now virtually a prisoner of his own policy of retreating before Soviet pressure and that Iran is daily losing what remains of its independence. The Shah apparently is alarmed at the situation and is considering utilizing the authority vested in him by the Iranian Constitution to dismiss Qavam and appoint a new Prime Minister. . . . We have been hoping that at a given point Qavam would show the required degree of firmness, but have reluctantly come to the point of view that Qavam has become so enmeshed in Soviet intrigue that he is no longer in a position to act as defender of the independence of Iran.

It is quite possible that within the next few days the Shah will remove Qavam and appoint a new Prime Minister. If such an event should take place, in our opinion we should at once give to the new government all appropriate moral support and at the same time make it clear that we are now prepared to extend to Iran the economic assistance which we have been promising for the last three years.

There is at the present time in Washington an Iranian military mission, headed by a Brigadier General, which is endeavoring to purchase on credit \$10,000,000 worth of nonaggression military equipment. Thus far, we have been noncommittal with regard to this request. We can not delay giving a reply much longer. In case the Shah should appoint a new Prime Minister, it seems to us that we should indicate our willingness to sell at least a certain amount of

this type of equipment to Iran at once.¹ It is our understanding that the Export-Import Bank has no authority to advance credits for the purchase of arms. Our suggestion, therefore, is that we sell such surplus noncombat military equipment as is obtainable to Iran on credit and a reasonable amount of nonaggression, combat equipment for cash.¹ A separate memorandum on this subject is being prepared.

LOY W. HENDERSON

[Annex]

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1946.

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN

[Here follows background material.]

In brief, the Iranian question transcends the mere bilateral relations between Iran and the United States. Politically, it involves our policy of supporting the independence of small countries in the spirit of the United Nations. Strategically, it involves the defense of our military interests in the entire Near and Middle Eastern area, having particular relevance to the position we have taken with regard to Turkey. Both the political and strategic aspects of this problem are an integral part of the broader question of United States relations with the Soviet Union.

These political and strategic interests require that we should give positive encouragement and assistance to Iran in an endeavor to save it from falling completely under Soviet domination and to rescue it if possible from its present state of partial subservience to the Soviet Union. In implementation of our declared policy toward Iran and of our moral commitments under the United Nations Charter, it is recommended that the following steps be taken by this Government:²

1. Ambassador Allen be authorized to express to the Shah and the Prime Minister on appropriate occasions the genuine interest of the United States in the independence of Iran and assure them that this Government is prepared, so long as the Government of Iran sincerely desires independence and is willing to stand up for its sovereignty against external pressure, to support the independence of Iran not only by words but by appropriate acts.

2. This Government be prepared to extend an Eximbank loan to Iran to enable the carrying out of specific approved development projects, the execution of which will tend to raise Iranian standards of living.

3. This Government furnish, in reasonable quantities, arms and ammunition requested by the Iranian Military Mission presently in

¹ Marginal notation by the Secretary of State: "OK J.F.B."

² Marginal notations indicate the Secretary of State's approval of these steps.

this country, for the purpose of maintaining internal security. This view is supported by recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as follows: "The United States should accede to Iranian requests for non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable amounts, to enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal security, in view of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own military needs as they have no established sources for security supplies. They (JCS) consider such non-aggression items of military material as small arms and light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps short range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate for release to Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of Iran, so long as the United States is satisfied that Iran demonstrates a desire to maintain its independence in the community of nations. Technical advice given unostentatiously and on request would also be appropriate and contributory to the defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the Near and Middle East area."

4. United States military missions in Iran be supported and strengthened, and legislation permitting their detail beyond the period of national emergency should be supported before Congress.

5. Information and cultural relations between Iran and the United States should be intensified by a well-executed program.

These recommendations are based on the assumption that Iran still possesses a degree of independence and that the Iranian Government is working for the true national interests of the country. Should the course of events cause us to believe that the assumption no longer holds, the recommended acts would of course not be taken but held in abeyance.

891.002/10-1946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 19, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

[Received October 20—10:33 a. m.]

1390. [Here follows an account of the changes in the Qavam cabinet.³]

. . . new Cabinet is primarily straight Qavam Party government, in contrast to previous coalition government. Its formation has resulted from combination of circumstances, but primarily from realization by Qavam that collaboration with Tudeh was not possible. My representations to Qavam on October 11th regarding loss of independence of

³ In telegram 1384, October 18, 11 a. m., Ambassador Allen reported discussions between the Shah and Prime Minister Qavam on the formation of a new government. He noted that the situation had been brought to a head as a result of the Prime Minister's decision three days before to replace the Governor of Tehran, a Tudeh sympathizer, with a member of his Democrats of Iran Party and that the three Tudeh members of the Cabinet objected strongly and absented themselves from the Cabinet meeting of October 18. The Ambassador concluded that the Prime Minister was taking advantage of the situation to try to eliminate them from the Cabinet. (891.00/10-1846)

his Government ⁴ and British Ambassador's insistent advice and warning against collaboration with Tudeh in forthcoming elections have helped bring about decision. Tudeh Cabinet members angered Qavam by truculent attitude they took against settlement of Fars revolt and by inordinate demands they made for control of forthcoming Majlis. Soviet Ambassador overplayed his hand and used threatening tone in recent conversations with Qavam. These and other considerations have convinced Qavam that his efforts to maintain coalition government could not continue and that he must make a clear-cut break with Tudeh. He will try to avoid open break with Moscow, and Muzzafar Firuz is slated to go to Moscow as Ambassador.

I do not believe Tudeh Party will accept Qavam's decision quietly. While it may take several days or even weeks before their full reaction is felt, I have no doubt they will attempt to organize demonstrations and serious disturbances may result. All Qavam's powers of manipulation will be needed to prevent Azerbaijan from breaking into armed hostilities. Soviet reaction against him will probably be violent, in spite of his efforts to conciliate USSR.

New Cabinet is very considerable improvement over former one. It is fortunate that change came about on Qavam's own initiative since serious difficulties which would have risen if Shah had had to force change on Qavam have been avoided.

Repeated London 173 and Moscow 295.

ALLEN

S91.002/10-2046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 20, 1946—noon.

[Received 2:01 p. m.]

1391. Embs 1390. Shah gave me last night his version of events which brought about changes in Cabinet which differs somewhat from that previously reported. Shah said that following his conversations with me on Oct 14 (Embs 1365 ⁵) he determined to force Qavam out and had decided to take action today (Oct. 20). Rumors that Shah planned to arrest Qavam became current and on Oct 16

⁴ In telegram 1354, October 12, noon, Ambassador Allen reported that he had brought to the attention of the Iranian Prime Minister the facts that immediately after a recent Cabinet meeting discussing the aviation agreement with the Soviet Union, a member of the Cabinet had informed the Soviet Embassy of the exact position taken by each member and that within 24 hours a Soviet official had demanded of a Cabinet member why he had opposed Soviet interests. Mr. Allen pointed out to the Prime Minister that "when such conditions existed, it was obvious that present Government of Iran had no freedom or independence and that we might as well recognize the fact and cease pretending." (701-0091/10-1246)

⁵ Dated October 15, 10 a. m., not printed.

Qavam called on Minister War to find what true situation was. Minister of War told Qavam he was not aware of Shah's plans but knew that Shah was disgusted with continual pro-Soviet orientation of Govt and that Army was entirely loyal to Shah and would do whatever he ordered.

Qavam asked for audience with Shah next morning (Oct 17) and declared his willingness to follow any instructions. Shah says Qavam was "trembling with fright". Shah said his first requirement was that both Firuzes and three Tudeh members must be dismissed from Cabinet and Qavam's party must fight Tudeh with all its strength during coming election. Nothing further must be heard of coalition with Tudeh or collaboration agreement [regarding?] election. Qavam promptly agreed to everything except dismissal of Muzzafar Firuz, pleading to keep him on at least for short while. Shah says he became furious, banged tables, and told Qavam that mention of Firuz again would end any cooperation between himself and Qavam forever. Shah said he wanted Firuz either in prison or out of country immediately. Qavam suggested sending him to Moscow and Shah agreed provided it was done immediately. Before Qavam left palace he and Shah drew up new Cabinet list.

They agreed to keep matter entirely secret for 24 hours to avoid Tudeh demonstrations but Qavam promptly told Firuz, who told Soviet Ambassador. Latter demanded to see Qavam immediately and did so that night (Oct 17). Sadchikov used abusive language and succeeded in weakening Qavam's nerve. Next morning Qavam called again on Shah in much agitation and expressed fear that Soviet troops might enter country if change of Cabinet went through. Shah says he expressed disbelief that USSR would invade Iran but that even so he was determined to go through with change and immediately call on UN for help in case of attack. They then agreed to announce new Cabinet without further delay.

Principal difference between foregoing account and my telegram yesterday (number 1390) is that Shah does not consider Qavam deserves any credit for initiative in changing Cabinet, although he admits that Qavam has become angry against Tudeh and is glad to be rid of them.

Shah told me he spent three sleepless nights trying to decide whether it was best to give Qavam another chance. He finally concluded that since Qavam had brought Tudeh into Govt Qavam should assume responsibility for ousting them. In response to his question I said I thought he had acted wisely and that manner in which change had

come about was most fortunate. Dept's 880, October 18⁶ has [omission] Dept's assumptions are entirely correct and telegram appreciated.

Repeated London 174 and Moscow 296.

ALLEN

891.51/10-2246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 22, 1946—5 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

[Received October 23—10:17 a. m.]

1400. Ebtehaj called again today to press for reply to enquiry regarding credits, reported in Embtel 1262, September 21, 2 p. m.⁷

It would be most helpful at this juncture, when Iranian Govt has made gesture of independence from foreign domination by eliminating members of Cabinet who were under foreign control, if I could be authorized to offer some encouragement on subject of credits. I believe present is psychological moment for US to show that its assurances of economic assistance, given over signature of late President Roosevelt, are genuine. Frequent inquiries I received on this subject from Shah, Prime Minister and Ebtehaj are becoming embarrassing.

Ebtehaj said today that Iranian Govt contemplates utilizing first its own available resources in carrying out economic development plans for country, and that these resources may be sufficient to provide half the funds needed for overall project. He thought it might be up to 2 years before foreign credits will actually be needed. However, the Iranian Govt is unwilling to embark on the considerable plan contemplated until it submits detailed project to Eximbank and World Bank and obtains assurances that the remaining credits necessary will be forthcoming. Ebtehaj has in mind that perhaps \$250,000,000 will be needed in foreign credits. He hopes that something like 100,000,000 will come from Eximbank and 150,000,000 from International Bank. He realizes that amount suggested from Eximbank is larger than that bank is accustomed to lend but he feels that Iran should be considered in special category in view of political position of Iran and promises of economic assistance. Current negotiations between Iranian Govt and British officials and AIOC are expected to increase materially dollar availabilities to Iranian Govt with which to repay credits. This subject will be covered in following telegram.⁸

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Not printed; it conveyed an urgent plea from Mr. Ebtehaj for a more encouraging attitude by the United States Government toward economic assistance in Iran (891.51/9-2146).

⁸ Telegram 1404, October 24, 1946, not printed.

One important means US Govt could help immediately would be to make possible overall economic survey and engineering studies, which Ambassador Ala reports will cost \$225,000 plus expenses. This survey is necessary before Iranian Govt can properly document and support its applications for credits to Eximbank and World Bank.⁹

ALLEN

[In telegram 1456, November 11, 1946, 11 a. m., the Ambassador in Tehran reported that on November 9 the Iranian Council of Ministers had approved financial settlement with the British which provided that sterling accretions between March 2 and October 31, 1946, would be 60% convertible into gold and subsequent accretions would be 100% convertible to gold until July 1947, when sterling would become convertible under Anglo-American financial agreement. The telegram also noted that the British had sold £5,000,000 worth of gold to the Banque Mellie in final settlement of the Anglo-Iranian financial agreement which expired on March 2, 1946. (891.51/11-1146)]

891.00/10-2846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

909. After studying urtel 1415 Oct 28¹⁰ and your previous telegrams and reports on same subject we still are inclined to view expressed our 858 Oct 11 that any Iranian Govt willing resist Soviet pressure would be in stronger position if it would insist no elections be held until law and order restored throughout country.

We can understand your feeling re continuation of Govt by Cabinet decree but are wondering if such Govt would be less representative of desires of Iranian people than one formed by Majlis composed of Deputies selected in part by Soviet puppet gov't. of Azerbaijan and in part by Qavam in conjunction with Tudeh party leaders and other Iranian politicians. You will recall that in urtel 1358 Oct 14¹¹ you referred to reported hope of Qavam that settlement would be

⁹ The Iranian Ambassador, on October 24, notified the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that his Government had decided to make application for a long-term credit of \$250,000,000. A copy of the letter was sent to the Department by the Bank on October 30. (800.515 BWA/10-3046)

¹⁰ Not printed; in it Ambassador Allen stated: "I am being pressed by various factions to aid in efforts to have elections postponed but have refrained from taking any position in matter. While convening of Majlis involves risk of concessions being granted, on demands of USSR, which may be detrimental to Iranian independence, I am inclined to think it is a risk we cannot avoid. In principle Embassy should not assume responsibility for continuation of Government by Cabinet decree . . ." (891.00/10-2846)

¹¹ Not printed.

reached on basis 60 percent members Majlis from his party and 40 percent from other parties. It seems to us if coming elections merely represent method by which Qavam in connivance with Azerbaijanis, Tudeh and others is to select members of Majlis, Shah may have some justification in what appears to be his fear that Qavam with hand-picked Majlis will be so strong he can pursue whatever policy he desires.

Have recent actions or attitude of Qavam caused you revise your feelings with regard to him indicated in urtels 1359 Oct 14¹² and 1371 Oct 15? Has confidence of Shah in Qavam been restored to any extent since Cabinet reshuffle? We had obtained impression reshuffle was made only because of pressure on part of Shah with backing of army rather than because of any change of heart by Qavam. In urtel 1358 you stated preparations for elections were going forward on assumption that both Azerbaijan and Fars matters will be settled. Fars matter has been settled but according MA Tehran tel Oct 21 Azerbaijanis have broken off negotiations with central govt and returned Tabriz. Do you not consider likely that holding of elections in Azerbaijan in such circumstances would be regarded as decision on Qavam's part to abandon efforts to reassert Iranian authority in that province and to permit it to remain indefinitely under Soviet control?

Dept would appreciate your further views on subject.

BYRNES

801.00/11-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 2, 1946—11 a. m.

US URGENT

[Received 1:27 p. m.]

1430. Deptel 909 October 30. Dept's uncertainty concerning my attitude towards Qavam is fully understandable since on October 15 . . . I felt Qavam had to go, whereas 5 days later (Embassy's 1391, October 20) I felt Shah had acted wisely in permitting him to form new govt. Answer lies in unexpected action by Tudeh in refusing to attend Cabinet meeting on October 16 which offered Qavam another chance. It is difficult to predict now how much longer he will wait, but wisdom of Shah's letting him form another govt has already been justified in increasing attacks on him in Tudeh and Moscow press without any blame being levied so far against Shah, who has reserved his power for future use.

¹² Not printed.

I have felt ever since my arrival here and continue to feel that Qavam has many characteristics which fit him well for position of Prime Minister of Iran at this time. He is indisputably able politician and while his conduct of foreign affairs has often been weak-kneed in face of Soviet threats, we must keep in mind his appeals to US for help have been answered by advice to depend on United Nations for security. Our advice has been best we could give, but Qavam's problems are immediate and cannot await debates in New York on question of veto. I have been distressed and no little annoyed at Qavam's failure to appreciate strength of world opinion in support of Iranian independence but he is old school politician who wants somebody else to test out how many army divisions world opinion is worth.

I admit certain sympathy for Qavam and my conclusion 2 weeks ago that he had to go was reached with considerable reluctance. . . . his apparently indestructible attachment for Mozafar Firuz, whose action in trying to blackmail Cabinet officers into agreeing to Soviet aviation proposal (Embtel 1354¹³) was last straw. Qavam's failure to throw out Tudeh even after he was convinced they were Soviet puppets was also annoying, but I was aware that action along this line involved risk of serious internal disturbances which Qavam might well hesitate to run. But Firuz is thoroughly distrusted by every class of Iranian and his dismissal would have been popular move at any time.

Qavam dismissed Firuz from Cabinet only under Shah's strong insistence and Firuz retains considerable influence over Qavam. Minister of War told me today that Qavam had agreed with Soviets that Firuz could remain in Iran until after elections. Ahmedi said Soviets were not pleased about Firuz appointment to Moscow since he is much more useful to them here than in USSR. At the moment Firuz is able to do less mischief than when he was in Cabinet as Minister of Propaganda but if Qavam continues to allow him to wield great influence behind scenes, Shah may find it necessary (and possibly in not distant future) to dismiss Qavam. Even so, it is best that Qavam has assumed responsibility for recent change in Cabinet.

As for elections, I appreciate Dept's reasons for favoring postponement and these considerations may well prevail here. However, Tudeh and Qavam[']s Democrats?] of Iran are becoming increasingly bitter in denouncing each other and Qavam's followers are becoming more outspokenly anti-Russian in spite of Qavam's efforts to tone them down. Firuz is capable of making deal with certain Tudeh deputies,

¹³ Dated October 12, not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 537.

either with Qavam's tacit consent or behind Qavam's back, but general elections will be contest between Tudeh and rest of country with Qavam counting votes.

Election will be farce. Press is now carrying stories that voting is expected to take place between November 10 and 15 but not a candidate has yet been nominated and nobody has openly announced his candidacy. If elections are postponed there is no reason to believe they will be any better as our idea of elections go. Cabinet in power will win, and question seems to be whether we should advise Shah to remove Qavam not whether we should advise postponement of elections.

Qavam told British Ambassador 2 days ago he planned to send inspectors to Azerbaijan to observe elections and if inspectors reported elections were not fair he would not let Azerbaijan Deputies be seated. British Ambassador feels this will not accomplish purpose since once Azerbaijan deputies are elected, Qavam will not be able to withstand pressure to admit them. Le Rougetel has requested London's authorization to tell Shah elections should be held only in parts of Iran controlled by Tehran Govt. He admits his proposal, if accepted by Iranian Govt, would probably result in separation of Azerbaijan from Iran, but he is much afraid to let Azerbaijan stooges have voice in affairs of all of Iran, including southern oil fields, and would much prefer to see Azerbaijan severed from nation. I agree that Qavam would probably not be able to keep Azerbaijan Deputies out of chamber, once elected, but am not prepared as yet to admit integrity of Iran can not be preserved. British Ambassador's suggestion smacks me slightly of 1907,¹⁴ although Le Rougetel would deny such an implication. Decision as to best course is difficult, but I still believe our best policy is not to assume responsibility ourselves for opposing elections. Shah and others who favor postponement but who do not have nerve enough to say so openly, would like nothing better than to be able to say United States has advised against them, in order to turn Soviet blasts against US. Soviets would say US was trying to block Soviet oil concession. We may have to oppose Qavam again soon, but I suggest we keep hands off the elections question, at least for the moment. I do not mean to say we should urge them, and if the Persians defer them, well and good. If Dept has instructions, from its wider vantage point, I would be glad to have them.

Sent Dept 1430 repeated London 177 and Moscow 301.

ALLEN

¹⁴ Reference is to the Convention between Great Britain and Russia; see footnote 27, p. 300.

891.51/11-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 2, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 3:07 p. m.]

1431. Minister of War called on me yesterday to say he had received word from Ambassador Ala that favorable consideration was being given in Washington to granting of credit of 10 million dollars to Iran for purchase of military supplies.¹⁵ He was not clear whether loan would be for purchase of surplus supplies in US as well as abroad, but he hoped credit might be available for purchase of new equipment from factories as well as surplus. Ala reported that my recommendation in matter might be important.

I said I had heard nothing of such a loan other than efforts by General Schwarzkopf to work out 2 million dollars supply purchase for *Gendarmerie* and General Ridley's efforts to obtain spare parts for trucks. Ahmedi said Iranian Army Purchasing Mission in Washington was active in matter. I have discussed question with Generals Grow¹⁶ and Schwarzkopf and we are agreed that US military missions to Iran cannot succeed unless some means is found to replenish army and *gendarmerie* noncombat supplies which are practically exhausted. Iranians have formed great expectations of US Army mission under Grow and are already talking about request that it be doubled in size and giving it more responsibility. Russians are waiting on doorstep to furnish all sorts of supplies, combat material included, and recently made generous offer to Qavam during southern troubles. Qavam wisely refused because he knew strings would be attached and Soviet advisers to Iran army would follow shortly thereafter. Soviet Army Officers on Persian Gulf and Indian border is not pleasant to contemplate, but as Grow points out, Iranians may turn to USSR in desperation if their army runs out of trucks, shoes, uniforms and blankets.

I realize need of Iran for such credit can be argued from standpoint foreign exchange holdings and metallic reserves of Bank Melli, on which Treasury probably possesses very able reports from Glendinning,¹⁷ but in my opinion political factor overshadows economic. Also question arises whether Iran is good enough political risk to

¹⁵ See memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, October 29, p. 255.

¹⁶ Brig. Gen. Robert W. Grow, successor to General Ridley as Chief of the American Military Mission with the Iranian Army.

¹⁷ C. Dillon Glendinning, Treasury Representative in the Middle East.

warrant credit, but same question is involved in our maintaining military mission here at all. We have to take some risk and we increase odds in our favor by giving Iran support. Embassy recommends as sympathetic consideration as feasible to Iranian request.

ALLEN

891.00/11-846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 8, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received November 8—1:20 p. m.]

1450. I took Dooher to see Qavam today to give PriMin firsthand information concerning present situation in Azerbaijan. Dooher emphasized that Kurdish leaders particularly Ammar Khan and chiefs of Western Kurds but also including Qazi Mohammad, are strongly opposed to Communism, having been disillusioned by Soviet failures to furnish them promised assistance, and are ready to join Central Govt in attack on Azerbaijan provided they are assured that Tehran Govt will coordinate its military activity with them and will promise that afterwards it will not follow again the repressive tribal policy of Reza Shah.¹⁵ Qavam showed great interest in Dooher's remarks and asked numerous questions about Tabriz govt and leaders. Qavam said he was determined to occupy Zenjan within 10 days, by force if necessary.

I assured Qavam that US had not wavered in its policy of supporting integrity of Iran, in spite of suggestions which had come to me that severance of Azerbaijan from Iran might be preferable to allowing Communist poison permeate Iran. I pointed out, however, that US would hardly be able to continue indefinitely to support Iranian integrity unless Tehran Govt gave evidence of being at least as interested in this subject as we are. Consequently, I welcomed his statement that he would use resources at his command to extend his authority to Zenjan. I said I thought Zenjan was not enough but that it would at least be a start. Qavam said he intended to progress "little by little".

An American missionary who returned to Tehran yesterday from Tabriz says that Tabriz forces are digging trenches in front of Zenjan and give every appearance of intending to put up strong resistance.

ALLEN

¹⁵ Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran until his abdication in 1941.

891.51/11-1346: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

MOST IMMEDIATE

949. We hope within next few days give you helpful info concerning fuller implementation US policy toward Iran, particularly economic. In meantime (urtel 1471, Nov 13¹⁹) we can inform you for your discreet use we have tentatively agreed furnish upon request reasonable amounts non-aggression military material to Iran for purpose maintaining internal security. We are endeavoring arrange sale combat and non-combat items through FLC on credit, with understanding that value combat material be limited 10 million dollars.

ACHESON

711.91/11-2246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1946—7 p. m.

976. We have given careful consideration urtels urging US implement more fully its declared policy assistance Iran. In view great importance we attach Iranian problem, not only in terms Iran-US relations but also in terms UN principles supporting independence small countries and US strategic interests Middle Eastern area as a whole, we feel measures listed below should be taken in implementing our announced policies re Iran.

1. You may express to appropriate Iranian officials on appropriate occasions genuine interest US in independence Iran and assure them this Govt is prepared, so long as Govt Iran sincerely desires independence and demonstrates willingness stand up for its sovereignty against external pressure, support independence Iran not only by words but also by appropriate acts.

2. We are prepared to consider sympathetically pending Iranian request sale reasonable quantities nonaggression military material to assist Iran in maintaining internal order. Conversations at present taking place between Iranian military mission and appropriate US officials. For your info, possibilities of credit for arms purchase are now being explored.²⁰

3. We hope to be able maintain US military missions Iran if desired by Iranian Govt and will continue to support before Congress legislation permitting their detail beyond period national emergency. Rec-

¹⁹ Not printed.

²⁰ In a letter of November 26 to Brig. Gen. Mohammed Mazhari, Chief of the Iranian Military Purchasing Mission in the United States, Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, as Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, stated that the United States was prepared to extend credit to the Iranian Government to purchase certain arms and equipment at prices substantially lower than original cost (891-24/11-3046).

ommendations these missions would be appreciated re present requests Iranian Military Purchasing Mission.

4. We are hoping be able intensify our informational and cultural program Iran. In this connection, revision surplus property obligations would make funds available purposes increased cultural exchange.

In connection with this program Dept is earnestly endeavoring obtain Exim Bank approval in principle to loan for Iran. Since we have not yet been able obtain Bank's approval you should make no commitment or statement to Iranian Govt other than to indicate Dept is giving question sympathetic consideration.

In bringing these measures attention Iran authorities, you should make clear US assistance Iran is based on assumption Govt Iran is working in true interests people Iran and to this end will endeavor steadfastly preserve Iranian sovereignty and independence.

ACHESON

891.00/11-2446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 24, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 2:08 p. m.]

1517. PriMin Qavam informed me today that he had definitely determined to send security forces into Azerbaijan²¹ and that if the authorities there resist (and he expects they will), he will appeal to Security Council for assistance. In response to my inquiry he said perhaps 2 or 3 weeks would be required to despatch the forces and bring matters to head. He contemplates making immediate appeal to SC whenever fighting starts.

I pointed out that SC concerns itself with matters threatening international peace. He said he was aware of this and that if fighting broke out in Northern Iran he would inform Council that situation existed which might endanger world peace. I asked specifically whether he had in mind any appeal or statement to General Assembly, possibly informing that body of action he was taking to reassert Iranian sovereignty over Azerbaijan. He replied in negative, stating that his appeal would be to Security Council where, he said, Iranian case was fortunately still on agenda.

²¹ In telegram 1514, November 22, 1 p. m., the Ambassador had reported the issuance of a proclamation by the Prime Minister stating that elections would be held in various districts when security forces of the Iranian Government were present in those districts. The proclamation was obviously issued with Azerbaijan primarily in mind but did not specifically mention that province. Previously the Prime Minister had intended to send civilian inspectors to observe the elections in Azerbaijan, hoping thereby to establish a basis for refusing to admit Soviet-controlled Deputies to the Majlis. (891.00/11-2246)

I reminded him that last April he had informed SC that all differences between Iran and Soviet Union had been settled and that there was no longer any case for SC to consider. I said Soviet representative on Council would be certain to cite this statement of Iranian Govt and that consequently Iranians would need new evidence of interference or threat to peace as answer to Soviet argument. He said his appeal, if made, would present new evidence.

In order to obtain this he was thinking of sending 1,000 soldiers to Azerbaijan, 500 to be concerned with elections and 500 to patrol Soviet border to seize Soviet agents or supplies coming south.

As regards type of assistance SC would render, Qavam realized troops could probably not be sent to aid Iran but he felt Iran must bring to Council's attention situation which threatened peace and leave it to Council to determine what assistance it would render. He hoped members of Council would at least show their approval of Iranian Govt's efforts to maintain its sovereignty.

At end of conversation I said I wanted to inform my Govt specifically regarding situation. He said "I will send troops to Azerbaijan, there will inevitably be fighting, consequently the probabilities are very strong that Iran will appeal to Security Council for aid soon."

Since we have been urging Iran and other UN members to base their policy on UN, I hope Department will again feel in position to support Iran's case strongly if presented. While every effort must be made to assure that case presented is strong one and that Iranian Govt goes through with it wholeheartedly, Qavam appreciates difficulties he placed US in last time and I do not think he will repeat his previous performance. He said he would like to coordinate his plans with US in closest detail when he prepares appeal.

ALLEN

S91.00/11-2746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 27, 1946.

[Received November 27—10:29 a. m.]

1528. Local newspaper *Etelaat* asked me following question today: "What is your opinion regarding the recent decision of the Government of Iran to send security forces to various parts of Iran, including Azerbaijan, in connection with the forthcoming elections?"

I answered as follows: "It is the well-known policy of the American Government to favor the maintenance of Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity. This principle was stated in the Declaration Regarding Iran signed at Tehran December 1, 1943 and is embodied in the principles of the United Nations Charter. The announced

intention of the Iranian Government to send its security forces into all parts of Iran, including any areas of Iran where such forces are not at present in control, for the maintenance of order in connection with the elections, seems to me an entirely normal and proper decision.["]²²

ALLEN

891.00/11-2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 29, 1946—4 p. m.

NIACT

[Received December 2—1: 51 p. m.]

1536. Prime Minister asked me to come to see him urgently this morning. He said the Soviet Ambassador had demanded to see him last night and had informed him, on instructions from Moscow, that the sending of Iran troops into Azerbaijan was considered by the Soviet Govt as undesirable because it would create difficulties "within Azerbaijan and on the Soviet-Iran frontier".²³

Qavam considers these Soviet representations to be in the nature of a threat and consequently interference in Iranian affairs. He says he is determined to carry out his announced intention of sending forces into Azerbaijan, mentioning the figure 10,000 as being necessary to do the job, but he is afraid, in view of the Soviet Govt's attitude, that USSR will send Soviet troops to support the Azerbaijan Govt.

Prime Minister asked me to obtain American Govt's reaction most immediately to his idea of notifying Security Council of Soviet Ambassador's representations to him. Qavam's idea is that Iran would make such notification under Iran's obligation to inform Security Council of any situation which might threaten international peace. He would not make any specific request of Council, leaving any action which Council might desire to make, up to the Council.

Qavam said he would avoid making any reply to Soviet Ambassador until he heard from US, but emphasized his anxiety to receive our reply within 24 hours if possible.

As regards action members of Council might take in respect to above Iranian notification, it seems to me that various members of

²² In telegram 1000, December 4, 7 p. m., the Department expressed its approval of Ambassador Allen's reply to the question asked by *Etelaat* (891.00/11-2746).

²³ Telegram 1534, November 28 noon, from Tehran, reported that on the day after the Iranian Government had announced its intention to send security forces to all parts of Iran in connection with the elections, the Soviet Ambassador made urgent calls on the Iranian Prime Minister and the Shah, inquiring whether an attack on Azerbaijan was intended. Both replied that the despatch of forces was a normal and routine one in connection with the elections and that no attack on anybody was involved. Tehran also noted that the Soviet Ambassador gave no indication of his Government's intentions but that his visits had heightened Iranian apprehension of Soviet intervention. (891.00/11-2846)

Council might express appreciation for Iran's action in keeping Council informed of developments, in accordance with provisions of Charter; and might say that it is both Iran's privilege and obligation to do so in situation of this kind. As regards Iran Govt's decision to send security forces into all parts of Iran, in connection with elections, it would also be most helpful if members of Security Council would add that Iran Govt's actions are considered entirely normal and proper.

I hope Dept will authorize me to inform Prime Minister that American Govt considers Iran fully justified, if it so desires, in notifying Security Council in above sense. It would also be most helpful at this juncture if I could inform Qavam that American representative on Council will reply somewhat along lines I have suggested. I realize that we usually avoid giving any indication in advance of actions we plan to take in Security Council, but in present instance Qavam will be greatly discouraged, in face of strong Soviet pressure, unless he can have some indication that we will give him moral support publicly.

I should add that British Ambassador discussed with Qavam several days ago question of possible advance notification by Qavam to Security Council of Qavam's intention to send troops into Azerbaijan. When le Rougetel reported this conversation to Bevin, latter expressed view that advance notification would serve little or no useful purpose. Present case, however, is quite different since notification would be based on representations made by Soviet Ambassador yesterday. It seems to me that it would be difficult for us to advise Qavam that we do not think he should inform Council of Soviet actions.

If Dept's definite reply will be delayed, I would appreciate at least tentative acknowledgment and views most immediately.

ALLEN

891.00/12-146: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
MOST IMMEDIATE

TEHRAN, December 1, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received December 2—4: 02 a. m.]

1540. 1. British Ambassador has just shown me telegram from Bevin stating that he had discussed matter with you in New York²⁴ and that you were inclined to believe Iran Govt was justified in informing Secretary General of Soviet Ambassador's representations regarding sending troops to Azerbaijan. Bevin seems reluctant to

²⁴ Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin were attending the Third Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met in New York City from November 4 to December 11, 1946.

have matter come before Council. He suggests that Qavam might ask Soviet Ambassador for Soviet views in writing, which could be answered by Iranians and both notes made public by Iran Govt here. Difficulty with this suggestion seems to me to be: (1) Soviet Govt would undoubtedly suspect that written statement was desired for publication and would refuse to give it, and (2) Iranian Govt would be much discouraged by our coolness towards its desire to bring matter to Council.

Bevin requested more specific information regarding representations made to Qavam by Soviet Ambassador. According to Qavam, they consisted simply of oral statement, under instructions from Moscow, that sending of Iran troops into Azerbaijan would create difficulties "in Azerbaijan and on Soviet-Iran frontier". I fully realize that Soviets would probably try to depict these representations as mere statement of fact, given to Iran in nature of friendly advice. Bevin is understandably reluctant, just as we are, to encourage Iranians to present new case unless it is a strong one. However, oral "advice" from Soviet Union, which country like US or Britain could follow or ignore as we chose, becomes an imperative matter for Iran which Qavam cannot ignore. He must either accept it, thereby acknowledging that Soviets can prevent him from sending troops into Iranian province, or he can refuse it, in which case he needs world support.

At time this telegram is sent Embassy has received no reply to our 1536 November 29.

ALLEN

891.00/11-2946 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen) ²⁵

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, December 2, 1946—10 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE NIACT

993. (1) After examining urtel 1536 Nov 29 (which arrived 2 p. m. Dec 2) and urtels 1539 ²⁶ and 1540 Dec 1, and after studying Brit Amb's telegrams on subject which have been shown us by Brit Emb, we are unable to understand precisely what advice or assurances Qavam desires. We observe in his conversation with Brit Amb of Dec 1 a shift in his position and a general weakening of his attitude vis-à-vis Soviet Union. Matter so urgent, however, we feel we should give you our views without awaiting clarification.

²⁵ This telegram was cleared with the Secretary of State, in New York, by telephone.

²⁶ No. 1539, December 1, 4 p. m., not printed.

(2) It seems to us that Iranian Central Govt is justified in taking appropriate measures, including the dispatch of troops, in order to restore its authority in Azerbaijan. We do not see how valid elections can be held in Azerbaijan so long as that province is not under control of Central Govt.

(3) If Qavam should refrain from taking appropriate measures to restore authority of Central Govt in Azerbaijan merely because of pressure brought to bear upon him by Soviet Amb, he will be adding to difficulties which we have been encountering in carrying out our policy of supporting integrity and independence of Iran. If on other hand following dispatch by Qavam of troops into Azerbaijan he should have reason to believe that Soviet Govt is interfering in Iranian affairs by giving support to Azerbaijan movement and he should bring this matter to attention of Security Council, American Govt will be prepared to pursue matter energetically. You can assure Qavam that this Govt will give its unqualified support to Iran or to any other power the integrity and independence of which may be threatened by external forces, provided that power shows courage and determination to maintain its own independence and freedom of action and provided it is willing to make its position clear to world.

(4) You may further inform Qavam that we feel that he would be justified at this point in informing SC of situation with regard to Azerbaijan. If he decides to do so he might care to incorporate in his communication some of following points: (a) Iranian Central Govt, despite protracted negotiations, has not as yet been able by peaceful means to reassert its authority over the province of Azerbaijan; (b) he has therefore decided to send Iranian forces into Azerbaijan to supervise elections and to reestablish order and restore authority of Iranian Govt; (c) he has taken this decision notwithstanding a message delivered to him by Soviet Amb on behalf of Soviet Govt to effect that if Central Govt forces are sent to Azerbaijan there will be disturbances in that province and along the Soviet border; (d) his present communication to SC is in nature of further report on developments in Iranian question pending before SC and he hopes that in view of situation in Azerbaijan SC will continue to be seized of Iranian question.

(5) Such communication would not of course be considered as invitation for SC to act at this juncture. It would however place SC upon notice re possibility that Iranian case might again become active in immediate future.

ACHESON

891.00/12-346 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State*SECRET
URGENTTEHRAN, December 3, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received December 3—10:32 a. m.]

1548. Deptel 993, December 2, 10 p. m., reached the Embassy about 10 this morning and I called on Prime Minister at noon. He was highly appreciative of the views expressed and considered them outstandingly forthright and helpful. He asked to be permitted to take notes. My translator helped him make notes but my representations were oral.

At end of conversation Qavam said he intended immediately to instruct his representative to the United Nations to notify Secretary General, for information of Security Council, situation regarding Azerbaijan. He gave every indication of intention to follow closely points suggested by Department. While his communication will probably be worded in as conciliatory manner as regards Soviet Union as is feasible in circumstances, he said he was anxious to notify Council fully regarding situation.

I pointed out at beginning of conversation that Dept was not entirely clear regarding precise questions on which he wished advice and assurances, in view of some difference between reports of British Ambassador and my own.

Qavam said some difference was natural since he had talked with each of us for 2 hours and there would not only be some inevitable variation in his words and in translations but also in our drafting. He said what he wanted to know in essence was reaction of American Govt to present situation in Iran and our advice regarding course we felt Iranian Govt should best pursue to maintain its independence. He said Dept's reply covered questions he had in mind perfectly.

During discussion Qavam said he had not intended to press us for views regarding his decision to send forces into Azerbaijan, because he had decided he must do so anyway, but he welcomed our concurrence.

It is clearly Qavam's present intention to follow up matter in Security Council along lines suggested in paragraph 3 of Department's telegram under reference, if Soviet support of Azerbaijan makes this course appropriate. I did not wish to inquire closely regarding military operations but would guess that Government intends to move within week or 10 days.

May I express my own appreciation for clarity and forthrightness of telegram under reference. While delay in transmission my 1536²⁷ was regrettable and I hope reason therefor can be clarified to determine future reliability of SSU channel, Dept's promptness in replying prevented embarrassment here.

ALLEN

891.00/12-346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 3, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received December 3—1:11 p. m.]

1549. During talk with Qavam today he said election preliminaries would begin on December 7 as scheduled in Azerbaijan. He expects preliminaries to take some time, and while procedure may be completed in some areas sooner than others, he does not expect actual balloting to begin anywhere for at least 40 days, and elections will not be completed for perhaps 3 months. His manner in referring to elections shows he was not greatly concerned about them and I suspect his principal interest is in going through sufficient motion to keep down Soviet pressure on the subject.

Question of ratification by Majlis of Soviet oil concession came into conversation briefly. I said I had no instructions on this subject, although I believed that my Govt would not wish to oppose in principle the granting of a concession to USSR. Qavam said drafting of detailed Soviet oil proposal was "something for the future" and that he would like to discuss details with me when time came for drafting.

I said only American interest in question of which I was aware was our general interest in preservation of Iranian sovereignty. I hoped final agreement would adequately protect Iranian economic as well as political interests and would contain provision regarding sale of oil at world market price in free foreign exchange.

ALLEN

891.00/12-646 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1946—7 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE NIACT

1012. For your confidential info Iranian Amb states following communication sent to SYG, UN, N.Y. Dec. 5:

"Sir: In connection with the dispute arising out of the interferences

²⁷ Dated November 29, p. 549.

in the internal affairs of Iran previously complained of, I have the honour to submit for the attention of the Security Council a report respecting the present state of affairs in the Province of Azerbaijan. No request for action is made at the present time, though it will be apparent that the decision of the Security Council to continue seized of this question should remain unchanged. The purpose of the report is to keep the Security Council informed of the further consequences of the interferences previously complained of. I am, Sir, your obedient servant, Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador and Representative of Iran before the Security Council."

Attachment. "His Excellency, The Honorable Herschel V. Johnson, President of the Security Council, Lake Success, New York. Sir: My Government has instructed me to submit this report in connection with the complaints previously made to the Security Council against interferences in the internal affairs of Iran. It will be recalled that a result of these interferences is that the Central Government has been denied the exercise of effective control in the Province of Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, in spite of every effort to remove by conciliatory means the consequences of these interferences, the Central Government has not yet been able to re-establish its authority in that Province.

Elections to provide for the selection of the Madjless, our National Legislature, have been called to take place throughout Iran beginning December 7th. In order to assure that the election procedures are duly followed, it has been arranged that military forces shall be stationed in all the provinces of Iran. Those in control of affairs in Azerbaijan have objected to the entry of such Government forces into that Province. The Soviet Ambassador at Teheran, acting under instructions from his Government, has given friendly admonition that the movement of Government forces into this part of Iran may result in disturbances within that Province and on the Persian borders adjacent to Russia, and advised that the Government's plans be abandoned.

It is, of course, the duty of my Government to exercise its sovereign responsibilities, and to assure that the elections are carried out impartially in Azerbaijan as well as in the rest of Iran; and my Government for that purpose must station its troops in Azerbaijan no less than in other parts of the Country. It is hoped that this will not be used as a pretext for hostile demonstrations, but my Government will not fail to take the action necessary to maintain law and order throughout Iran, even though disturbances may be threatened.

The decision of the Security Council to remain seized of the questions raised by the complaints of Iran has demonstrated its concern regarding the consequences of the interferences that have occurred in the past. My Government has, therefore, felt it to be its duty to furnish the information contained in this report in order that the Council may be in a position better to interpret the course of events in the Northwestern portion of my Country. I am, Sir, your obedient servant, Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador and Representative of Iran before the Security Council."

Sent Tehran rptd London, 8064, Moscow 2093.

ACHESON

761.91/12-746

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1946.

The Iranian Ambassador telephoned from New York today at noon to tell me the contents of two important telegrams he had received from Prime Minister Qavam in Tehran.

The first telegram reported a second interview with the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran. The Soviet Ambassador referred to the "friendly advice" which he had given, on instructions from his Government, to Mr. Qavam a few days ago, namely that "difficulties" would ensue from the despatch of Iranian Central Government forces into the province of Azerbaijan abutting on the Soviet frontier. He recalled that Mr. Qavam promised to take the matter up with the Iranian Council of Ministers and stated that he had awaited the decision of the Council. The Soviet Ambassador reiterated that the action contemplated by the Iranian Central Government would lead to "disturbances" to which "the Soviet Government cannot be indifferent". He stated that if there were any shortcomings in the agreement reached by the Iranian Central Government and the Azerbaijan authorities, Qavam should remedy them by "friendly conversations" with Azerbaijan officials. Otherwise, he stated, there would be "clashes of arms" involved in "partisan warfare" which would extend to the Soviet frontier. The Soviet Ambassador continued that defeated forces in Azerbaijan might be expected to cross the border into the Soviet Union and that there would be "trouble".

Mr. Qavam replied that delay in communicating to the Soviet Ambassador the decision of the Iranian Council of Ministers was occasioned by the fact that a Friday holiday intervened and that certain Cabinet Ministers had been in Zenjan in connection with the Central Government's reoccupation of that city. Mr. Qavam could now state, however, that the decision had been taken with regard to the despatch of troops to the whole of Iran in connection with the forthcoming elections. This attitude, he stated, cannot be changed and no exception can be made for the province of Azerbaijan. Mr. Qavam stated that he attached importance to the friendly advice of the Soviet Ambassador but that he was responsible to Iran and the Iranian laws, and that no pressure or possibility of disturbances should deter him in his duty to send forces into all provinces of Iran. Mr. Qavam stated that it was not intended to attack any province of Iran but merely to assure security during the course of elections. The Soviet Ambassador suggested that Mr. Qavam send a commission of "liberal-minded men" and of the press to observe elections in Azerbaijan. He recalled

that the Soviet Union had acted as mediator in the initial negotiations between the Central Government and Azerbaijan and stated that the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent to dangers on its frontiers".

Mr. Qavam replied that such a commission would give no assurance of orderly elections, that Azerbaijan is Iranian territory, and that there is no danger to such a powerful state as the Soviet Union. He reminded the Soviet Ambassador that Soviet frontiers are not confined to Azerbaijan and enquired whether internal affairs in other states bordering the Soviet Union might likewise be considered dangerous to the Soviet Union. Mr. Qavam stated that the Soviet Government should be able to protect itself and should leave Iran free in this internal matter.

The Soviet Ambassador concluded by saying that he had fulfilled his mission undertaken on instruction from his Government. He stated that if Mr. Qavam does not accept Soviet advice and persists in his course toward Azerbaijan, the Soviet Government "will have to revise its attitude toward you personally".

Mr. Qavam concluded his statements by saying that if he were subject to threat, should abandon his efforts on behalf of Iran and step aside, anyone chosen to succeed him as Prime Minister would take the same action that Qavam is taking now. Mr. Qavam stated that his decision was not a personal one but reflected the public opinion of Iran.

Having reported the above conversation Mr. Qavam requested Ambassador Ala to send the contemplated report to the United Nations and let him know the results as soon as possible.

The second telegram was received at 10 p. m. Friday, December 6. Mr. Qavam referred to the statement which Mr. Acheson had made to him recently concerning Iranian relations with the United States and the United Nations.²⁵ Mr. Qavam stated that he had sent instructions to Mr. Ala before receipt of Mr. Ala's telegram embodying that statement. Mr. Qavam said he was "steadfast" before the Soviet Ambassador and that Iranian forces would soon move into Azerbaijan to maintain security there during elections. He reported that Azerbaijan was considering hostile measures and had mined the roads at the provincial border. Mr. Qavam stated that the Tabriz radio had been violent in its attacks upon him and the Central Government, that the Tudeh press had apparently taken the lead of the Soviet Government, and that the Soviet Ambassador had threatened him personally. In spite of all this, Mr. Qavam emphasized that he will not change his position. He recalled that the subject of Iran is still

²⁵ See telegrams 993, December 2, to Tehran, and 1548, December 3, from Tehran, pp. 551 and 553, respectively.

on the agenda of the Security Council and that Council action is the only hope Iran has of preventing Soviet interference. He recalled that Iran had assisted the Allies during the war and now wished to be helped in its efforts to implement reforms already announced, certainly not to be threatened by great powers and at least to be left alone. He stated that other powers should not, by assistance to traitors, encourage the dismemberment of Iran but should leave Iran to set its own house in order. Mr. Qavam stated that he is relying upon Security Council attention to the present Iranian situation and hoped for positive results.

The Iranian Ambassador said he intended to see Mr. Herschel Johnson, United States President of the Security Council, Saturday afternoon and to attempt to see Mr. Bevin if he were still in New York. Mr. Ala said that on the strength of his latest telegrams from Tehran, he wondered whether a second note for the attention of the Security Council was now in order. Mr. Henderson observed that Mr. Qavam appeared to be steadfast in his present course of reliance upon the United Nations and that Mr. Ala might wish to take action only on specific instruction from his Prime Minister. Mr. Ala stated that he would immediately ask Mr. Qavam what further action was now desired.

L[OY] W. H.[ENDERSON]

501.BC/12-746

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting United States
Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)*

CONFIDENTIAL
SD/S/795

[NEW YORK,] December 7, 1946.

Participants: Ambassador Hussein Ala of Iran
Mr. Gholam Abbas Aram, First Secretary of Iranian
Embassy
Mr. Herschel V. Johnson

AMBASSADOR ALA: I believe Mr. Johnson has seen my letter which was addressed to him and it has been circulated as I understand. That letter was purposely restrained in tone and I asked for no immediate action from the Security Council because the Iranian Prime Minister was anxious to give the Soviet Government an opportunity to refrain from interfering and for saving face and not creating difficulties for the Iranian Government. He is acting with great tact in Teheran, but unfortunately I must give Mr. Johnson some more inside information to show that if the letter is restrained and no action is asked, it doesn't mean that we are not feeling very strongly about the situation, that we are extremely anxious. In fact, several cables have been re-

ceived since I sent in that letter to the President to indicate that the Prime Minister is getting almost desperate in this present situation because the Ambassador—the Soviet Ambassador—has called on him again, and now in this second interview has intimated that not only is he giving friendly advice not to send those forces into Azerbaijan but he says also that the Soviet Government cannot disregard—cannot remain indifferent to the situation which will be created once these forces get into Azerbaijan.

[Here follows a further account by Ambassador Ala of the conversation between the Iranian Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Iran, along the lines of Mr. Henderson's memorandum printed *supra*.]

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you very much, Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR ALA: It is a very great emergency in our country and I may come at any moment to write another letter to ask that action is taken.

MR. JOHNSON: Until that is done, I am going to simply take note of the information which you have communicated to me and it will not be necessary, I think, unless there is some further development between now and Tuesday for me to make reference to this communication before the Council, because the Council is still seized of the Iranian question.

AMBASSADOR ALA: That's right.

MR. JOHNSON: And all of the members of the Council will have received this letter and unless it is commented by someone else and unless there is some new development, I do not intend to bring it up.²⁹ I think that perhaps that would be the best.

[Here follows further discussion of Iranian-Soviet problems.]

891.00/12-1146: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 11, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received December 11—11:39 a. m.]

1580. Soviet Ambassador made further urgent and strong representations to Qavam last night regarding Azerbaijan question. Qavam sent for me this morning to read telegram he had just drafted to Ambassador Ala on subject. Qavam told Ala that report was for his confidential information for the present and that he should await further instructions before taking any action (i.e. before reporting it to Security Council).

²⁹ Mr. Ala's communication was not referred to at ensuing sessions of the Security Council.

Soviet Ambassador demanded to know why Qavam had reported his "friendly advice" to Security Council. Qavam replied in effect that it was because of threatening tone Ambassador had used in giving that advice. Soviet Ambassador grew very angry, became rude, and declared that Soviet Government would not remain passive in face of this disturbance near Soviet frontier.³⁰ Conversation lasted hour and half, and Soviet Ambassador left in very bad temper.

Qavam assured me he was not disturbed by these Soviet threats but he was somewhat uneasy lest Iran might not be supported strongly in Security Council. I expressed confidence that he would find support in Council in direct proportion to firmness with which he maintained Iranian sovereignty.

Repeated London 185, Moscow 310.

ALLEN

891.00/12-1246: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 12, 1946.

[Received December 12—10:10 a. m.]

1582. Azerbaijan situation is not entirely clear but it seems very probable the war is over. There has been very little fighting, in fact Gaflicu Pass was left undefended for some inexplicable reason, only one bridge in the pass being blown. Tehran troops occupied Mianeh at 3 p. m. yesterday without meeting resistance. Djavid telegraphed Qavam requesting termination of hostilities and saying he would go to Mianeh to arrange for peaceful occupation of Azerbaijan by govt troops. Qavam, in consultation with Shah, replied that his officers would discuss matter with Djavid in Tabriz. Meanwhile Chief of Staff ordered army to proceed to Tabriz in all haste.

There was division in Tabriz govt, Djavid and Shabostari who have been much less extreme than Pishevari and Daneshyan, favoring surrender while latter wanted to fight.³¹ Djavid presented question to Azerbaijan Council and gained majority. Extremists have fled from Tabriz, probably to Russia.

Soviet Ambassador called on Shah last night at 6:00. I have not yet received report of meeting but Shah assured me few minutes before Ambassador's arrival that he had no intention of allowing Ambassador to frighten him or to let anything deter him from bringing Azerbaijan fully back under Iranian sovereignty now.

³⁰ Telegram 1567, December 8, 3 p. m., from Tehran, had advised of reports that clashes had taken place between Iranian and Azerbaijani forces but that no serious fighting had occurred (891.00/12-846).

³¹ In telegram 1579, December 11, 1946, 3 p. m., Ambassador Allen advised of a telephone call from the Iranian Minister of War that he had received a telegram of surrender from Pishevari and Djavid at 2 p. m. (891.00/12-1146).

Soviets are said to have let Azerbaijanis know that USSR could furnish them little more than moral support, which was not enough in face of determined move by Central Govt forces. Qavam's notification to Security Council seems to have been well-timed.

Tehran Govt and populace are rather in a daze, incredulous that war could be over so easily and hesitant to celebrate too early lest there be a hitch somewhere.

Repeated London 186 and Moscow 311.

ALLEN

S91.00/12-1246 : Telegram

The Consul at Tabriz (Sutton) to the Secretary of State

TABRIZ, December 12, 1946.

[Received December 16—1:14 p. m.]

263. Just a year and a day after it was founded the Democrat regime of Azerbaijan crumbled in a few hours yesterday. It had shown increasing weakness during past month and as tension rose morale declined. It was evident that people had no wish to fight and that leaders could count on little or no support. Today it is as if we live in a different city. The pall is lifted. I have never seen so many smiling faces since I came to Azerbaijan. They are relieved and happy.

Early yesterday afternoon martial law was declared and 8 o'clock curfew imposed but immediately afterward submission to Tehran was announced and all directives were thereafter disregarded. About midnight shooting could be heard in barracks area and continued until morning. By daybreak Democrats were in full flight. Although warned against disorder I felt it was important for me to be seen and to do what I could to convince people that security would be maintained. I do not share my British colleague's view that at this critical moment we should keep out of sight. I therefore drove through streets and called on remaining civil and religious leaders. At sight of my car with American flag people cheered and applauded and shouted long live America. These were same people who stared sullenly at me few days ago as if they wondered why I was here.

Many civilians are armed and engaged in hunting out former Democrats but there is little general disorder. Intermittant firing continues but has no particular objective. I went to Governor's palace and found it virtually empty except for Shabostari, President of Provincial Council, who is loyally trying to maintain semblance of control. He was always considered most respectable of Democrats and seems still activated by purely patriotic motives. I told him I wanted to do what I could to assist during the period of uncertainty and to prevent violence. He was most grateful and said he had been up all night and would stay at his post until central government troops

arrived. As I left I saw first armed uniformed soldiers I had seen but discovered that they were Assyrians who were afraid of being killed and wanted me to take them to some place of safety. I told them I would do my best to prevent disorder but that they should stay where they were.

I then went to Democrat headquarters and found it deserted except for a few heavily armed soldiers who did not know what or who they were guarding. They said Beriya, head of the Labor Union, was inside but when I entered I found only a stray member of the committee who knew little of anything. Pischevari's office which, until the day before, was the center of authority was littered with bread and eggs and empty cups and cigarette butts, the traces of the last few hours of indecision. No one knows where Pischevari is. I was told that Beriya's car had been attacked and that he had been taken to Soviet hospital so I went to see if I could find him. Hospital doors were barred and there was angry crowd outside which had demolished the car of the man who had been most popular of all Democrats. Doctors told me Beriya had been there but escaped by back door. I continued to drive about town through milling crowds who cheered when they saw my flag. Shots were fired near us but I saw only one blood covered spot on main street which looked as though someone had been killed there. I finally found Djavid who said there was only handful of security forces left and that he hoped Iranian troops would arrive today or tomorrow.³² This was discouraging news I had heard for I have misgivings about what may happen after nightfall if forces do not arrive. I have done what I can and will continue to move about town to encourage feeling of security as much as I can. The rest depends upon time and Tehran.

Sent Tehran as 445.

SUTTON

891.00/12-1746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 17, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 2: 14 p. m.]

1597. Principal reason for sudden collapse of Azerbaijan movement, in Shah's opinion, was (1) surprising weakness of Tabriz military organization, (2) high morale and determination of Tehran forces, and (3) most important, conviction by all concerned (Soviets, Iranians and Azerbaijanis) that United States was solidly supporting Iranian sovereignty.

³² In telegram 264, December 14, the Consul at Tabriz reported that a small force of the Iranian Army had occupied Tabriz in the early evening of December 13 (891.00/12-1446).

In view of Soviet Ambassador's strenuous efforts to prevent sending of Tehran forces to Azerbaijan and his frequent declarations to Shah and Qavam that USSR would not remain indifferent if those forces proceeded, people are asking why Soviets failed to give Azerbaijan any significant material assistance. Practically every Iranian, including notably the Shah, thinks answer lies primarily in fact that Soviets were finally convinced that US was not bluffing and would support any United Nations member threatened by aggression.

Embassy has received numerous visits from Iranian Cabinet officers and officials, including Minister of War, Minister of Finance, Governor of National Bank, President of last Majlis, et cetera, to express appreciation to America for "giving back Azerbaijan to Iran.[""]

At an informal social gathering last night Shah made a fulsome and even embarrassing tribute to our help. Azerbaijan was referred to by others present as the "Stalingrad of the western democracies" and the "turn of the tides against Soviet aggression throughout the world". I emphasized that Iranians themselves had regained Azerbaijan and that any credit for enabling Iran to accomplish this free from outside interference, was due to existence of a world organization which could mobilize opinion against such interference.

Repeated Moscow 314.

ALLEN

123 Allen, George V.: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1946—7 p. m.

1052. Personal from Sec to Amb. I should like to express to you my gratification at the recent favorable turn of events in Iran and my personal appreciation for the admirable manner in which you have handled an extremely important and delicate situation. You have fulfilled all the expectations I came to have on the basis of your fine work in New York last spring. I like to think of the achievement of Iranian unity not in terms of victory or defeat for any outside nation, but rather as proof of the strength and effectiveness of the United Nations in helping those countries which truly desire independence. I hope that you will continue to impress upon Iranian leaders the great importance of carrying out a program of economic and social reform and of raising the standard of living of the Iranian people, thereby enabling Iran to make a contribution to the community of nations.

Sincere good wishes to you and your family for Christmas and the New Year.

BYRNES

891.00/12-2046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1946—7 p. m.

1054. Now that Iran Govt has been able reassert authority over Azerbaijan we hope Qavam will adopt conciliatory attitude toward people that province and refrain from repressive or retaliatory measures against Russians, Azerbaijanis and Kurds. We believe that granting of general amnesty and limiting of punishment to judicial process against few guilty leaders would have good effect on world opinion and tend to counter Soviet statements that Iran is reactionary.

We feel that Qavam has splendid opportunity at this point to show statesmanlike qualities, mold Iran into homogeneous nation and put into effect reforms which he has stated are basis of his program and in general lead Iran toward a fuller life for the people and an improved place among the United Nations. It would be regrettable if through inaction or lack of publicity Soviet view that political trend in Iran is retrograde should gain currency in world. To prevent this we feel Qavam should lose no time in announcing and giving full publicity to a clear-cut program of social, constitutional and tribal reform which will leave no doubt that Iran is looking forward and not backward. In this connection we believe Qavam should refrain to extent possible from suppressing opposition parties and press but rather should encourage democratic processes and establishment of responsible press through positive leadership and by issuing official clarifying statements where misstatements have been made or truth distorted.

You may in your discretion make these views known to Qavam.

BYRNES

891.00/12-2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 23, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received December 23—12:35 p. m.]

1619. While view expressed by French officials³³ has also been suggested by various persons here, I do not believe it correct. Soviet

³³Telegram 6202, December 20, 5 p. m., from Paris (repeated to Tehran and Moscow), reported that French officials had expressed the view that the Soviet Union had come to an understanding with the Iranian Prime Minister under which it abandoned the Tabriz regime and secured a firm promise from Qavam that the Majlis would ratify the Soviet oil concession at an early date (891.6363/12-2046).

Govt made strenuous efforts, through its Ambassador here and through Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, to prevent Iranian Govt from sending its troops to Azerbaijan. Both Shah and Qavam considered these efforts genuine and expected that USSR would assist Azerbaijanis much more effectively than they did. For this reason original military plan of Iranian Govt extended only to occupation of Mianeh. If this could be achieved Iranians planned to wait and see what happened. Sudden collapse of Tabriz movement was obviously as great surprise to Qavam as it was to Shah and everyone else.

Why Soviets failed to give more assistance to their puppets in Tabriz is difficult to judge here. From evidence we can see whole question was badly handled by Soviet officials from beginning. Such help as Soviets gave Azerbaijan regime during past year was rather niggard and accompanied by close bargaining. Soviets made Azerbaijanis pay high prices in wheat and other commodities for such supplies as were accorded. While considerable amounts of automatic rifles, ammunition, and light equipment were furnished, no heavy armament was included. Soviet Consul General in Tabriz, instead of guiding regime unobtrusively, demonstrated his control in brazen and swaggering manner, thus depriving Pishavari of the considerable local support he gained among Azerbaijanis during early days of regime. As result, when Iranian forces entered province local people themselves overthrew regime. Of the large number of persons sent into Azerbaijan from Caucasus, only two, Pishavari and Daneshyan, appear to have had much ability.

Soviet Ambassador here or his principals in Moscow misjudged Qavam's psychology and overplayed their hand by threatening him personally. Qavam had been wavering on question of notification to SC but Soviet threat angered him. When he received word that US concurred in his right to notify Council he decided to do so on the spot, without even consulting his Cabinet.

It is suggested that Soviet failure to send combat units to support Azerbaijan may have resulted from fact that Azerbaijan regime collapsed too fast, from internal considerations in USSR, from broader questions of foreign policy connected with Europe, from fear of SC and world opinion censure, or combination of all of them. General impression here is that SC saved Iran from invasion.

Department requested repeat to Moscow if appropriate. Moscow's views regarding foregoing would be useful to us.

Sent Paris repeated Dept as 1619.

ALLEN

891.00/12-2746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, December 27, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received December 27—4:06 p. m.]

4476. Paris telegram 6202, December 20.³⁴ While we would not exclude possibility that Azerbaijan rebel collapse was due to USSR having abandoned Tabriz for oil deal with Qavam Government, we are more inclined to accept obvious interpretation that Shah and Qavam called Tabriz bluff and that USSR, caught unprepared in Azerbaijan, decided not to show its hand by interfering openly on behalf of its puppet (Department's 2177, December 24³⁵). British Minister Counselor here also believes that Tabriz collapse was not result of a Moscow-Tehran deal.

Essential factor causing Tabriz collapse was that when Tehran had mustered its quailing courage, and calling upon United Nations, had suddenly challenged Tabriz to showdown, USSR decided to let its Azerbaijan stooges fall rather than overtly support them—and thereby show its hand. Had, however, Tabriz made any show of determined stand, USSR might well have come to its aid with at least a major propaganda campaign.

To us, most surprising element in situation was weakness camouflaged Soviet military and political machine in Azerbaijan. Granting that regime had alienated masses, it still seems strange that USSR had not organized in province forces composed, if necessary, largely of Soviet Azerbaijani adequate to resist timid tentative Iranian advance. Poor organization and overconfidence may account for this Soviet failure.

If USSR lacked inside Azerbaijan reliable instrument to defend its interests there, only alternative by which it could retain control would be to march Soviet Army back into that Iranian province. Had issue been solely between USSR and Iran, Soviet Army might now be in Zenjan. But because of Qavam's appeal issue threatened to become concern of UN with USA actively interested in it. It was these considerations which presumably gave Kremlin pause. Iran is no stronger than UN and UN, in last analysis, is no stronger than USA. [The Soviet Union?] for a complex of external and internal reasons is not willing on ground which is not well prepared to face at present a showdown with USA.

Collapse of Azerbaijan house of cards was a major victory for UN—and for a firm policy toward USSR.

³⁴ See footnote 33, p. 564.

³⁵ This telegram transmitted text of Tehran's telegram 1619, *supra*, to Moscow (891.00/12-2346).

It must not be thought, however, that Kremlin will resign itself to this humiliating reverse. It will continue to maneuver not only for oil concessions but also for political (and strategic) ascendancy in Iran.

Department, please repeat Tehran as Moscow's 151 and Paris, as Moscow's 459.

[SMITH]

IRAQ

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IRAQ; ELEVATION OF THE AMERICAN LEGATION AT BAGHDAD TO THE STATUS OF AN EMBASSY¹

890G.00/2-446

Memorandum by Mr. Adrian B. Colquitt of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1946.

A. *General Political.* Our present policy toward Iraq is to contribute in every suitable way to the economic and cultural development of that country, while giving appropriate encouragement to its growing desire to achieve complete control of its own affairs and to play a more important role in world affairs.

In Iraq, as in other countries of the Near East, the United States has cultural and commercial ties of long standing, and the policy of this Government has been directed in recent years at protecting these interests and at assuring that American citizens and American interests are treated on a non-discriminatory basis. Such treatment was provided for by a Tripartite Convention between the United States, Great Britain and Iraq which was signed in 1930, when Iraq was still a mandate.

Iraq is still one of the less fully developed states, both politically and economically, in the Near East. It is, moreover, a country in which British interest for many years has been preponderant and in which that interest has not diminished in recent years as it has in certain other Near Eastern countries. The United States, in its relations with Iraq, has not sought to undermine or oppose the influence which the British Government exercises over the political and economic life of the country. It has been our practice, as it has been in neighboring countries, to support the general lines of British policy where such policy was not inimical to our own interests. This does not mean, of course, that the United States has given its approval to many of the British policies toward the Iraqi Government. It is undeniable, however, that one of the reasons for the lack of a more

¹ For documentation on the consideration given by the Department of State in 1945 to elevating Legations of the United States in Iraq and other Near Eastern countries to the status of Embassies, see *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VIII, pp. 19 ff.

well-defined or characteristic policy of this Government toward Iraq is the existence of the powerful British influence in that country.

As Arab nationalism grows, Iraq promises eventually to assume a key position in the Arab world. It will be increasingly necessary for us to maintain closer relations with Iraq, since our standing in the entire area will to a considerable degree be dependent on the attitude of Iraq toward the United States. The chief issues arising between the two countries will thus be in the political sphere and will turn upon Iraq's growing leadership among the Arab countries. There is also the question of Palestine,² in which Iraq has shown a great interest and an evident desire to be in the vanguard of the Arab opposition to the Zionists. The Iraqi fear lest the Government of the United States support the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine handicaps our efforts to develop friendly and close relations.

701.90G41/9-2646 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moose)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1946—7 p. m.

370. Brit Embassy has informed Dept³ an exchange notes between Brit and Iraqi Govts has been completed⁴ providing for appointment Iraqi Ambassador to London and waiving perpetual precedence Brit Ambassador Baghdad. Notes will be published Sept 27.

CLAYTON

123 Pinkerton, Lowell C. : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moose)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1946—2 p. m.

399. For Moose. [Here follows instruction to seek the *agrément* of the Iraqi Government to the appointment of George Wadsworth as United States Minister to Iraq.]

In this connection and re Deptel 370 Sept 26 you should draw attention Iraq Govt our recent exchange of Ambassadors with Egypt⁵ and state that we would be prepared to exchange Ambassadors with Iraq in case Iraq should desire elevation its Legation at Washington to Embassy in accord with growing international importance Iraq and

² For documentation on this subject, see pp. 576 ff.

³ In note of September 26, not printed.

⁴ The exchange of notes took place at Baghdad on August 2, 1946; for text, see British Cmd. 6918, Iraq No. 3 (1946). Airgram A-157, May 13, 1946, from Baghdad, informed the Department that by the end of April 1946, the British had removed from Iraq all their Political Advisers "(not to be confused with British Advisers to Ministries of Iraqi Government)", a few remaining in civilian capacities (741.90G/5-1346).

⁵ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 78 ff.

should be prepared to accord an American Ambassador Baghdad the precedence inherent in normal diplomatic practices. In case Iraq should care to have such exchange effected in near future Wadsworth could begin his mission as Ambassador rather than Minister. For your information and discreet use he will probably leave Beirut for Baghdad in January.

BYRNES

[In a memorandum of telephone conversation, October 25, an officer of the Department indicated that a spokesman for the British Embassy had informed him that the Iraqi Prime Minister had requested the views of the British Ambassador on the American proposal and had been informed that the Ambassador "welcomed the step as a logical sequence to the voluntary abrogation of precedence which has in the past been accorded to the British Ambassador" (123 Wadsworth, George).

The Iraqi Foreign Minister handed a note to Mr. Moose on October 26 welcoming the elevation of the American Legation to the status of an Embassy and the appointment of Mr. Wadsworth as Ambassador; in a note of November 14, the Foreign Minister advised that his Government was prepared to grant the American Ambassador at Baghdad the precedence accepted in normal diplomatic usage (124.90G/10-2846, 11-1546). The White House announced Mr. Wadsworth's appointment on November 23. The Iraqi Foreign Minister received Mr. Moose as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Embassy on December 28 and agreed that the United States Mission should have Embassy rank effective the same day (123 Moose, James S.)]

LIBYA

[Documentation relating to disposition of the Italian colonies is contained in volumes II and III covering the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference.]

MOROCCO

ASSENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE DECISION TO POSTPONE THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE STATUS OF TANGIER¹

881.00/1-846

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 27747

LONDON, January 8, 1946.
[Received January 23.]

SIR: As a result of a slight difference of opinion between an officer of the Embassy and Under Secretary Harvey,² respecting the terms of the Anglo-French Agreement of last August, concerning the status of Tangier,³ Mr. Harvey has written the following letter:—

“When you called on New Year’s Eve we spoke about the question of calling the full conference on Tangier in Paris, and I recalled that according to the decision reached last summer there could be no conference so long as the Franco regime lasted.⁴ I have checked our records and quote below the relevant provisions which were agreed in Paris. The Anglo-French Agreement, Article 2, states that ‘As soon as possible and not later than six months from the establishment of the Provisional regime, the French Government will convoke a conference at Paris of the following powers parties to the Act of Algieras:⁵ United States of America, Belgium, United Kingdom, Spain, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, subject to Article 11 below, Italy.’

“Resolution No. 1 in the Final Act is in the same sense but both these statements are, however, subject to the declaration made by the United States, British and French delegations at the end of the Final Act. Paragraph 2 of this declaration runs as follows:

‘While considering that the conference of the powers signatory to the Act of Algieras should not be held without Spain, the three delegations do not think it desirable that Spain should be invited to the conference so long as the present government in Spain continues in power; they suggest that at the appropriate moment

¹ For previous documentation on the status of the International Zone of Tangier, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 601 ff.

² Oliver Harvey, Acting Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

³ The texts of the Anglo-French Agreement, August 31, 1945, and the Final Act of the Paris Conference concerning re-establishment of the International Zone of Tangier, also dated August 31, 1945, are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 21, 1945, pp. 613-618.

⁴ For documentation on the attitude of the United States with respect to the Franco regime in Spain, see vol. V, pp. 1023 ff.

⁵ Signed April 7, 1906; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495, or Department of State Treaty Series No. 456.

the French Government should consult on the question of the conference with the United States, British and Soviet Governments.'

"As we see it, there is therefore no question of a conference being called so long as Franco is in power, though in April, after the interim agreement has run its term of six months, it will be open to the French Government to discuss with your Government, the Soviet Government and with ourselves any problem of policy in regard to the calling of a conference. Admittedly the drafting on this point is *not* tidy owing to last minute difficulties at the conference but the above is the effect of the conclusions as a whole as we see them. At present, however, the provisional regime seems to be settling down satisfactorily and it does not look as if it will be necessary to raise the question of a full conference in the near future—unless, of course, Franco goes."

The Embassy is not convinced that the viewpoint expressed by Mr. Harvey in his closing paragraph was in the minds of all of the Delegates present at the Paris conference, and for this reason the matter is brought to the attention of the Department.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
W. PERRY GEORGE
Counselor of Embassy

881.00/1-846 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1946—5 p. m.

1387. Embs despatch 27747, Jan 8. While we have not yet been consulted by French re next Tangier Conference we are of opinion that Three Power Declaration at end of Final Act cannot legally be considered overriding consideration in calling new Conference. In signing Final Act intention of American delegation was merely to take note of views of other Govts as set forth in respective declarations, and to regard reference to prior consultation by French Govt solely as a suggestion. Our view is therefore that from technical standpoint provisions of Article 2 Anglo-French Agreement and Resolution 1 of Final Act require French Govt to convoke Conference at Paris not later than April 11.

Nevertheless in view of obvious difficulties in meeting to decide permanent status of Tangier as long as Franco remains at head of Span Govt we are in agreement with general sense of Brit memo that Conference should not be held in immediate future. We expect of course that French in due course will determine attitude of other Govts by consultation as suggested in declaration.

We also agree with Brit that interim regime is working satisfactorily and that no need exists at present for undertaking final revision. Moreover, the legal validity of the continuance of the provisional admin beyond April 11 would appear to be adequately provided for by Article 1 of Anglo-French Agreement.

Sent to London as no. 1387; rptd Paris for Childs as no. 677; to Madrid as no. 199; to Tangier as no. 59; and to Moscow as No. 254.

BYRNES

881.00/4-646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, April 6, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received April 6—2:11 p. m.]

1077. French Chargé received reply from Soviet Govt to French Govt's inquiry concerning Tangier conference. Soviet note states that Franco cannot be invited to take part in any such conference and that in these circumstances Soviet Govt has no objection to postponement of conference to later date.

Sent Dept 1077; repeated Paris 85; London 184; Tangier unnumbered and Lisbon for Madrid 6.

SMITH

881.00/4-1246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, April 12, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received April 14—1:20 p. m.]

1745. Embassy has received note dated April 8 from FonOff^e inquiring re intentions of American Government with respect to convocation of Conference of Powers Signatories of Act of Algeciras as contemplated by Final Act of Tangier Conference of 1945.

Note observes that faithful to spirit of declaration signed by it at time, French Government does not consider it possible to convoke such conference without participation of Spain. Note adds that on other hand, French Government "does not consider Spanish political situation permits envisaging, within the time foreseen by the Final Act, namely, before April 11 next, the calling of a conference at which Spain might be represented inasmuch as there is excluded in advance any idea of the participation of delegates of General Franco in such a conference.

^e Not printed.

“In case American Government shares the views of the French Government on the necessity of postponing to a future date the opening of the projected conference, the Ministry will not fail to consult it again on the subject as soon as the development of the Spanish political situation may permit.”

Please instruct concerning reply to be made to note.

Sent to Washington as 1745, repeated to London as 250, to Madrid as 91, to Moscow as 118, to Tangier as 7.

CAFFERY

881.00/4-1646 : Telegram

The Chargé in Spain (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

MADRID, April 16, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received April 16—10:12 p. m.]

718. In course of conversation yesterday Acting Under Secretary Foreign Affairs told me that Spanish Foreign Office after considerable discussion had decided not to raise Tangier question thru diplomatic channels on expiration 6 months' period of provisional regime. Acting Under Secretary, who is Aguirre de Carcer, an expert on Tangier, said he had favored bringing matter up but that Minister⁷ had overruled him.

Sent Tangier Paris London by courier.

BONSAL

881.00/4-1246 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1946—3 p. m.

1794. Embtel 1745 Apr 12. You may reply to FonOff that this Govt likewise is of opinion that conference to determine future status of Tangier could not be held within time envisaged in Final Act signed in Paris Aug 31, 1945 because of obvious difficulties of holding conference without Spain and impossibility of inviting Span Govt to participate while Franco is in power. You may add that this Govt will be glad to have French Govt consult with it again on the subject when there are indications that situation in Spain will make it possible to convoke conference.

Sent Paris as 1794. Rptd Tangier as 146, London as 3398, Madrid as 559, Moscow as 744.

BYRNES

⁷ Martín Artajo, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

PALESTINE

INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARAB-ZIONIST CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE; THE QUESTION OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE¹

867N.01/1-946: Airgram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary
of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, January 9, 1946.

[Received January 21—4: 35 p. m.]

A-5. Shertok² informed me today Jewish Agency Executive has decided that the Agency as such should give evidence before Joint Inquiry Committee. He indicated majority in favor of participation was small and there was very strong minority opposition. He himself will carry most of burden of giving evidence, but Dr. Weizmann^{2a} is expected to give preliminary general statement.

Shertok said this decision was not being made public at this time and requested Department not to publish it.

PINKERTON

867N.01/1-1746: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic and
Consular Officers and Officers in Charge of Missions³*

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1946—11:25 a. m.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, after completing its series of hearings in the United States,⁴ will proceed on January 18th to London, via the *Queen Elizabeth*, to conduct a series of hearings there from January 25 to 31. Although the itinerary from that point is tentative at this time, it is expected that the Committee will depart

¹ For previous documentation on these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 678 ff.

² Moshe Shertok, Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

^{2a} Chaim Weizmann, President of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

³ Sent to 23 posts in Europe and the Near East.

⁴ For statement issued by the White House on January 7, 1946, when the Committee began its hearings in Washington, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 9. Information on the hearings held in Washington is contained in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 20, 1946, p. 74.

for the continent approximately February 1st to visit Germany and various other countries for a period of about 1 month. While on the continent the Committee will have Berlin as its headquarters and most of the travel in other countries will be by small sub-committees. It is planned that the Committee will open hearings in Cairo on March 1. After a short stay there it will proceed to Palestine, where it plans to remain for a period of about 1 month.⁵

As announced by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on November 13, 1945 the terms of reference of the Committee are as follows:

"1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.

"2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression, and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

"3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.

"4. To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe."

The Committee consists of the following members: (American) Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Chairman; Frank Aydelotte; Frank W. Buxton; Bartley C. Crum; James G. McDonald; William Phillips; (British) Sir John E. Singleton, Chairman; Wilfred P. Crick; Richard H. S. Crossman; Sir Frederick Leggett; Major Reginald E. Manningham-Buller; Lord Morrison.

[Here follow several paragraphs on staffing.]

The War Department has dispatched to the various Theater Commanders communications requesting that Army facilities be made available to the Committee. You are likewise requested to render to the Committee every assistance in the discharge of its responsibilities.

⁵ For the actual itinerary of the Committee and its sub-committees, see Department of State, *Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 20, 1946* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 52.

Funds have been allotted to the Committee by the Department of State and current expenditures will be met by the Administrative Officer. Any expenses incurred on behalf of the Committee by you will be reimbursed by him in cash or by check.

ACHESON

867N.01/1-1746 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)*

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1946—8 p. m.

96. Members of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry are proceeding to Europe immediately and desire to visit Soviet zones in Germany and Austria as well as Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary to study position of Jews in those areas. Purpose of Committee is to examine position of Jews in European countries where they have been victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution and practical measures taken or contemplated in those countries to enable Jews to live free from discrimination and oppression and to estimate number who desire or will be impelled by their condition to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

Please communicate foregoing to Foreign Office and state that direct requests will be submitted to Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary and to Soviet authorities in Soviet zones of Germany and Austria. Stress Dept's earnest desire that necessary instructions be issued to Soviet representatives in these areas to grant permission for Committee representatives to make contemplated visits.

Committee representatives desire to visit Soviet zone in Germany during first half of February and other areas in last half of February.

Personnel of Missions to various areas follows:

[Here follow lists of Committee representatives and their proposed destinations in Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Hungary.]

Dept understands that similar instructions are being sent to British Embassy in Moscow. Please concert with your British colleague in approaching foreign office.⁶

ACHESON

⁶ In telegram 216, January 24, from Moscow, Mr. Kennan reported that on the previous day he had addressed a letter on the matter to Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Foreign Office, and that the British Embassy had also done so (867N.01/1-2446).

867N.01/2-446 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Schoenrich)*RESTRICTED
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1946—6 p. m.

52. Immediately following telegram contains text of a message received from Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, now in London, for communication to Govts of Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon.

Officers in charge missions in foregoing countries should join their respective British colleagues in presenting this communication to the Govts to which they are accredited. British Foreign Office has already forwarded message to its representatives in foregoing countries with similar instructions. In presenting communication it should be made clear that you are forwarding a message from Committee only and that Committee's consideration of views of Arab states does not constitute the consultations to which this Govt is committed in advance of any basic change of policy in Palestine.

Consular officers in charge at Jerusalem and Aden should similarly communicate the Committee's message to Govts of Trans-Jordan and Yemen, where British Colonial Office is taking parallel action.

Sent to Baghdad, repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Aden and Beirut (for repetition to Damascus). Also repeated to London for Judge Hutcheson.

BYRNES

867N.01/2-446 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Schoenrich)

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1946.

53. "The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry into the question of European Jewry and the Palestine problem was constituted by His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States with terms of reference requiring it among other things 'to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine'. The Committee has had the advantage of hearing members of the Arab delegations to the United Nations Assembly in London. The Committee proposes to sit in Cairo probably during the first week of March and is inviting the League of Arab States to submit written and oral evidence there. It will also invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine to appear before it in Jerusalem. The Committee fears that the time at its disposal may not be sufficient to allow it to visit the

Arab capitals other than Cairo. The Committee wishes, however, to assure the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria and Lebanon that if that Government in addition desires to acquaint the Committee more directly with their views on the question of Palestine the Committee will be happy to receive anyone whom they may designate to represent them before the Committee during its stay in Cairo. Should the Government[s] of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria and Lebanon decide to be represented in this way they are requested to communicate their intention to the secretary of the Committee at the British Embassy in Cairo."

Sent to Baghdad, repeated Jidda, Beirut (repeat to Damascus) Cairo, Jerusalem and Aden.

BYRNES

867N.01/2-646

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman*⁷

Subject: British Government's Decision Regarding Jewish Immigration into Palestine.

I believe you will be interested to know that the British Government has authorized provisionally the resumption of Jewish immigration into Palestine at the rate of 1500 immigrants per month,⁸ pending the report of the Anglo-American Committee.

The British Government has twice submitted this proposal to the Arab States, on November 13, 1945 and January 5, 1946. Although no definite answers have been received from the Arab States, the British Government feels that some of the Arab Governments are well disposed toward the British proposal, but are deterred from replying favorably by their hesitancy to support openly a proposal which, whatever its merits, might subject them to the criticism of the Arab League.

The British Government needs such a quota to take care of those of the 900 illegal immigrants now under detention in Palestine who

⁷ File copy not dated; memorandum drafted on February 6, 1946.

⁸ According to telegram 24 of January 4, 1946, from British Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman, and airgram A-23, February 13, from Jerusalem, the quota of Jewish immigration into Palestine had been fixed by the British White Paper of 1939 (British Cmd. 6019: *Palestine, Statement of Policy*, May 1939) at 75,000. This quota was exhausted as of December 14, 1945. The new monthly quota of 1500 for 3 months commenced as of the following day. From the total of 4500 certificates, deductions were to be made by the British Government for 1350 illegal immigrants and for 700 legal immigrants expected shortly. The Jewish Agency was granted 1,000 certificates for distribution. The Government retained the balance for illegals expected to arrive during the period ending March 14, 1946. (867N.01/1-546, 2-1346)

might be found admissible if a quota existed. Also, certain classes of immigrants from Europe for whom the British military authorities have already arranged transport are being held up en route for lack of a quota.

In establishing this provisional monthly quota of 1500, the British Government has indicated that it will give preference to European Jews having a special claim, such as those to whom commitments have been made, or relatives of Jews already established in Palestine.

The British Government is making known its decision informally to the Arab States in the belief that official communications might inspire formal catalogues of objections.

JAMES F. BYRNES

867N.01/2-1946 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
PRIORITY

Moscow, February 19, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received February 19—2:57 p. m.]

489. ReDeptel 96, January 17. Reference Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Have received answer dated February 18 from Dekanozov to my letter of January 23^{8a} re visit of members of Committee of Inquiry to Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria as well as to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary which reads as follows:

“The Soviet Govt is consistently and steadily following a policy which excludes all kinds of racial discrimination including that in relation to Jews. Pursuing this policy the Soviet authorities in the Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria are suppressing any attempted manifestation of racial discrimination in these zones.

As concerns the position of Jews in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, as is known, the armistice terms with these countries provide for the abolition of every kind of racial discrimination and the respective Allied Control Commissions are keeping a careful watch on the execution by Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary of this condition of the armistice.

In accordance with this the Soviet Govt does not see any necessity for a visit to the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria as well as Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary by the members of the above-mentioned committee, concerning the creation, purposes and functions of which the Soviet Govt, moreover, was not informed.”

Please repeat to Berlin, Vienna, Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, Paris and London.

KENNAN

^{8a} See footnote 6, p. 578.

867N.01/3-146: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

CAIRO, March 1, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received March 1—3: 28 p. m.]

401. Anglo-American Committee arrived last night without Aydelotte who is expected from London shortly. Hearings begin Mena Hosie [*House*] Saturday morning with Azzam Pasha⁹ speaking for Arab League supported by representatives of member states. Hamdi el-Pachachi¹⁰ and Iraqi colleagues are expected to testify in personal capacity Monday. Committee leaving for Palestine Tuesday night.

League's statement given to Legation in advance asserts interest of all Arabs in Palestine, reviews formation of Arab League as manifestation of Arab unity which Palestine as Jewish state would frustrate. Opposition of League to Zionism is declared not based on racial prejudice but on its inconsistency with democratic principles, on its threat to security and tranquility of Jewish community in Arab states, and on failure of Zionism as solution of world Jewish problem. Opposition of Arab League to Jewish immigration and transfer of land is declared to be as determined and absolute as to Jewish state.

In conclusion League demands abolition of mandate and creation of Palestine as independent Arab state. It further declares that League by appearing before Committee, does not recognize right of Committee to decide Palestine issue or of US or Britain to handle problem exclusively.¹¹

Full text of statement by pouch. Copies to London and Arab capitals.

TUCK

⁹ Abdul Rahman Azzam, Secretary-General of the Arab League.

¹⁰ Iraqi Prime Minister.

¹¹ Despatch 1382, March 4, 1946, from Cairo (received in the Department on April 2), stated:

"The Chairmen were under the impression that Azzam Pasha would give testimony on behalf of the League and that representatives of the Arab states would appear on behalf of their governments. Azzam Pasha and the representatives of the member states designated by their governments to appear before the Committee had agreed, however, that Azzam Pasha should speak on behalf of the League and that the representatives of the member states would confirm the statement made by him. Thus when upon the invitation of the Chairman, Judge Hutcheson, representatives of the Arab states were called upon to speak, H.R.H. Prince Seif al-Islam Abdullah, as representative of Yemen, arose and read a brief statement in which he affirmed the League's position and stated that Yemen as an Arab state considered Palestine a part of the Arab countries, that it objected to Jewish immigration into Palestine, to the establishment of a Jewish state and the making of Palestine into a Jewish national home.

"This statement, by agreement among the Arab states, was later introduced into the testimony as the view of all the states." (867N.01/3-446)

867N.01/4-1646

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Satterthwaite)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1946.

Participants: Under Secretary
Mr. Robert [R.] Nathan ¹²
Mr. Gilbert ¹³
Mr. Satterthwaite, NE

Mr. Nathan and Mr. Gilbert called again on the Under Secretary at 12:30 today. Mr. Acheson opened the conversation by saying that their project had been given much thought and study. He and Mr. Clayton ¹⁴ had discussed it at length with Mr. Vinson ¹⁵ and the latter had reached the conclusion that the best method of handling it would be to have an amendment introduced providing the Eximbank with additional funds not only for the Jordan Valley Project but for other projects in the Middle Eastern area as well.

To introduce an amendment providing funds for this specific project alone, Mr. Acheson added, would be contrary to the accepted policy of leaving the actual administration of loans to the Bank's directors. A single project of this type would, moreover, run into both domestic and international complications, whereas if the amount they proposed were doubled and the amendment were drafted in general terms to provide for expenditures on constructive projects in that area such as the proposed Jordan Valley Authority, these objections might be overcome in part at least.

Another factor to be considered, Mr. Acheson said, was that the site of the proposed project is at present under British Mandate and that no international authority has yet been created to carry it out. In these circumstances for Congress to appropriate funds for this project would be analogous to the British appropriating funds for some project in Puerto Rico without first consulting us.

¹² Deputy Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion in 1945.

¹³ Possibly Richard V. Gilbert, Economic Adviser to the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration until he resigned in February 1946.

In a conversation with Mr. Acheson on April 3, Mr. Nathan had sought Department support for Congressional authorization of an increase of \$250,000,000 in the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank, to be earmarked for a Jordan Valley hydro-electrification project. Mr. Acheson pointed out the difficulty of undertaking a project in Palestine alone because American motives would be misconstrued and attributed to the pressure of Jewish groups. He stated that a sort of Tigris-Euphrates Valley Authority and a Nile Valley Authority as well as projects in Iran and Saudi Arabia should also be considered in a general plan. (867N.6463/4-346)

¹⁴ William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

¹⁵ Fred M. Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. Nathan inquired whether the Department intended to sponsor the project. To this Mr. Acheson indicated that neither the Administration nor the Department are directly sponsoring it and that it would be unwise for them to do so, as he understands it to be the President's underlying philosophy that the Eximbank should carry on relatively small operations, but that major emphasis should be placed on the International Bank, the International Fund and the British loan.

Mr. Gilbert said that they had in fact considered taking up their proposal with the International Bank. As it is not yet operating, however, they felt that too great a delay would be involved.

Mr. Nathan expressed his strong feeling that the Jordan Valley Project could make a constructive contribution to the serious problem of Arab-Jewish relations. He suggested that it might even be welcomed by the British, since he felt that there was bound to be trouble after the Committee of Inquiry issued its report. He asked how soon the report would be finished. Mr. Acheson said he didn't know but rather imagined that the Committee would be breaking all records for such committees if it succeeded in finishing its report before the deadline, in this case May 7. He also pointed out in this connection that the Department had rigidly followed the rule that it would not issue instructions or suggestions of any kind to the Committee, since it was appointed by the President, but would rather limit itself to facilitating the Committee's work.

In response to Mr. Nathan's inquiry whether Mr. Acheson had discussed this matter as yet with the Secretary, Mr. Acheson replied that he had not done so and that it had been handled so far by Mr. Vinson, Mr. Clayton and himself. Mr. Nathan remarked that he thought it important that Mr. Byrnes should be informed. Mr. Acheson stated that in view of this he would be glad to talk it over with the Secretary this afternoon if possible and that he would telephone Mr. Nathan of the result.

867N.01/4-1946

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1946.

Subject: Mr. Bevin's¹⁶ Request Regarding Report of Palestine Committee of Inquiry

1. I enclose a copy of Lord Halifax's letter to me of yesterday's date,¹⁷ transmitting a message from Mr. Bevin in which he expresses

¹⁶ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁷ The British Ambassador's letter not printed.

the earnest hope that no action be taken by the United States Government on the report of the Palestine Committee of Inquiry without prior consultation with him.

Mr. Bevin is also particularly anxious that publication should not take place either in Britain or the United States before he has had an opportunity of consulting the United States Government.

If you concur, I shall inform Lord Halifax that we shall be glad to comply with Mr. Bevin's request.¹⁸

2. In a Top Secret telegram received this morning, Judge Hutcheson states that he is flying to Washington with the report, arriving Sunday, April 21. He hopes that you will be able to see him on Monday, April 22, in order to receive the report.

JAMES F. BYRNES

867N.01/4-2546: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers*¹⁹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1946—10 p. m.

Report AngloAm Committee Inquiry re Palestine will be published May 1 according to present plans. Summary of main conclusions for your strictly confidential info follows:

1. No hope in countries other than Palestine of substantial assistance in finding homes Jews wishing or forced leave Europe. But this is world responsibility and Palestine alone cannot meet Jewish emigration needs. AmBrit Govts in association other countries should endeavor find new homes all displaced and nonrepatriable persons both Jews, non-Jews. Since most will continue live Europe, AmBrit Govts should endeavor secure basic human rights freedoms as set forth UN Charter.

2. 100,000 certificates for Jewish victims Nazi Fascist persecution should be authorized immediately for admission Palestine. Certificates awarded as far possible 1946 and actual immigration accelerated as rapidly conditions permit.

3. Exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to Palestine should be disposed of once for all on three principles: Jew shall not dominate Arab in Palestine and vice versa; Palestine shall be neither Jewish nor Arab state; form of govt ultimately established shall fully protect interests of Christian, Jewish, Moslem faiths under international guarantees. Ultimately Palestine to become state guarding interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike according fullest

¹⁸ Marginal notation by President Truman: "Approved—but it [might] just give the British a chance to pull their usual stunt. H.S.T."

¹⁹ At Jerusalem, London, Moscow, Paris, Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Tangier, and Ankara.

measure selfgovt consistent three principles above. Palestine as Holy Land completely different from others hence narrow nationalism inappropriate. In view ancient [and] recent history Pal neither purely Arab nor Jewish land. Jewish National Home has right to continued existence protection development. Minority guarantees would not afford adequate protection for subordinated group. Struggle for numerical majority must be made purposeless by constitution.

4. Hostile feeling between Jews Arabs and determination of both achieve domination makes almost certain attempt establish Palestinian state or states now or some time to come would result in civil strife possibly threatening world peace. Palestine Govt should continue under mandate then UN trusteeship until hostility disappears.

5. Mandatory or trustee should declare Arab economic, educational, political advancement in Palestine equal importance with Jewish and prepare measures bridge present gap by raising Arab standards. Perhaps advisable encourage formation Arab community on lines Jewish community.

6. Pending trusteeship agreement Mandatory should facilitate Jewish immigration while ensuring rights and position of other sections population not prejudiced. In future Pal Govt should have right decide number immigrants admitted in any period having regard to well-being of all Pal people. View disapproved that any Jew anywhere can enter Pal as of right. Any immigrant Jew entering Pal contrary its laws is illegal immigrant.

7. Land transfers regulations should be amended on basis freedom sale, lease, use of land irrespective race, community, creed. Stipulations that only members one race, community, creed may be employed in connection conveyances, leases, agreements should be made nugatory and prohibited. Govt should closely supervise holy places and localities to protect from desecration offensive uses.

8. Not competent assess value plans presented for agricultural industrial development. Such projects if successful of great benefit but require peace and cooperation adjacent Arab states. Full consultation, cooperation required from start with Jewish Agency and Arab states affected.

9. Reformation of educational system both Jews Arabs and introduction compulsory education.

10. Should be made clear beyond doubt to both Jews Arabs that attempts by violence, threats, organization or use illegal armies to prevent execution of report if adopted will be resolutely suppressed. Jewish Agency should resume cooperation with Mandatory to suppress terrorism, illegal immigration, maintain law order.

ACHESON

[In telegram 172, April 30, 1946, 6 p. m., the Department notified Baghdad that "American members of Committee were appointed by and responsible to President and such matters as release of report and determination of American Govt policy toward it have been handled by White House not Department. . . . Dept is not in position to state at this time to what extent report will be adopted as policy this Govt or what procedure will be followed in this connection. Committee was of course completely free to make its own decision and you should take every suitable opportunity to point this out and to stress that Committee received no instructions from either Government outside its terms of reference." (867N.01/4 2646)

In a memorandum of April 24 to Under Secretary of State Acheson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) stated: "On a first reading of the Recommendations and Comments of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, it is our opinion that the Committee has done a thorough and conscientious piece of work, it has not evaded any important issues, and it has produced a set of general recommendations which constitute a reasonable and intelligently-defined compromise solution. . . . In one aspect or another, the Report will doubtless be a bitter disappointment to both Arabs and Jews, but it will doubtless be generally regarded as an honest and impartial effort." (867N.01/4-2446)]

740.00119 Council/4-2747

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)²⁰

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] April 27, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Bevin, accompanied by Mr. Robert Dixon
The Secretary
Mr. Matthews

Mr. Bevin called at his request and took up a number of matters. He said that he felt he must return to London over the week-end for talks with the Dominion Prime Ministers and asked the Secretary if he would be willing to forego his Sunday meeting. The Secretary agreed.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 1, dealing with food.]

2. *Palestine*. Mr. Bevin spoke at some length on the subject of Palestine and urged delay in the publication of the report of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry. He said that while Britain

²⁰ Mr. Matthews was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which took place at Paris, April 25-May 16.

was prepared to go ahead and permit the immigration of 100,000 Jews, they could not all go to Palestine immediately. What worried him most, he said, was the fact that the Jews are acquiring large supplies of arms, most of them with money furnished by American Jews, and are in a very aggressive frame of mind. He said that most of the immigrants were carefully selected for their military qualities by the Jewish Agency and he urged that we join the British in forcing the Jewish Agency to cease its aggressive tactics. He said that the point has about been reached where he must consider the possibility of a complete British withdrawal from Palestine. At present he is forced to retain four Divisions there and this cannot go on indefinitely. He realizes that after British withdrawal there might be Russian penetration in the area and that it would weaken the whole situation in the Middle East, but he sees little hope of any improvement unless we accept a share of the responsibility. He said he hoped we could send some American troops there. He indicated he would send the Secretary a memorandum on the question with particular reference to several objectionable paragraphs in the Commission of Inquiry's report. During the course of his remarks, Mr. Bevin asserted that the Jews through their aggressive attitude were "poisoning relations between our two peoples".

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3, 4, and 5, dealing with Greece, the Italian Colonies and Egypt, and bases in the Pacific, respectively.]

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

867N.01/4-3046 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris ²¹

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1946.

1970. From Acheson for Secretary Byrnes. The President has asked me to transmit urgently to you the following message which you may care to discuss with Mr. Bevin :

"Following is the text of a statement which I shall issue at 7:00 p. m. today, simultaneously with the release of the Anglo-American report on Palestine: ²²

²¹ Mr. Byrnes was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris. On April 28, in telegram 2025, he advised Mr. Acheson of a communication from Mr. Bevin expressing the hope that the United States would not make a statement of policy on Palestine without consulting with the British Government. Mr. Byrnes noted he was willing to agree but requested Mr. Acheson to apprise President Truman. The President informed Mr. Acheson at their regular meeting on April 29 that he felt it necessary to issue a statement when the report was released on May 1. Subsequently the White House sent the President's proposed statement to Mr. Acheson for communication to Mr. Byrnes. It was done in this telegram (1970). Mr. Byrnes, in a telephone conversation with Mr. Acheson on April 30, stated he did not object to the President's making the statement and that he would mention it to Mr. Bevin. (740.00119 Council/4-2846.)

²² The report of the Committee, dated April 20, 1946, was released by the Department of State in 1946 as Publication No. 2536.

'I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest dispatch. The protection and safe-guarding of the Holy places in Palestine sacred to Moslem, Christian and Jew is adequately provided in the report. One of the significant features in the report is that it aims to insure complete protection to the Arab population of Palestine by guaranteeing their civil and religious rights, and by recommending measures for the constant improvement in their cultural, educational and economic position.

I am also pleased that the Committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939 including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition to permit the further development of the Jewish National Home. It is also gratifying that the report envisages the carrying out of large scale economic development projects in Palestine which would facilitate further immigration and be of benefit to the entire population.

In addition to these immediate objectives the report deals with many other questions of long range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement. Harry S. Truman'".

Repeated to London. Adding following heading "Urgent repeat of telegram 1970 to Paris which follows should be conveyed at once to Mr. Harriman."²³

ACHESON

867N.01/5-146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

LONDON, May 1, 1946.

[Received May 1—1: 58 p. m.]

4650. At close of question hour in Commons this afternoon Prime Minister²⁴ made statement on Palestine report. Text obtained from Foreign Office reads as follows:

"His Majesty's Government desire to express their appreciation for the care and trouble which the Committee have devoted to the preparation of the report. They hope that it will prove to be a notable contribution to the solution of the problems of Palestine and of the Jews in Europe both of which they have so much at heart.

"His Majesty's Government received the report only last week. His Majesty's Government and the US Government jointly appointed

²³ Telegram 1970 was repeated to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) as 3618 the same day. In telegram 3634, April 30, Mr. Acheson requested Ambassador Harriman to transmit the text of the President's statement to the British Foreign Office (867N.01/4-3046).

²⁴ Clement R. Attlee.

the Committee and the report is addressed to both Governments. His Majesty's Government are now studying it and will consult with the Government of the US as soon as possible.

"The report must be considered as a whole in all its implications. Its execution would entail very heavy immediate and long-term commitments. His Majesty's Government wish to be satisfied that they will not be called upon to implement a policy which would involve them single-handed in such commitments and in the course of joint examination they will wish to ascertain to what extent the Government of the US would be prepared to share the resulting additional military and financial responsibilities.

"The report recommends that 100,000 certificates for the admission of Jews to Palestine should be awarded immediately, so far as possible in 1946, and that actual immigration should be pushed forward as rapidly as conditions permit. The practical difficulties involved in the immediate reception and absorption of so large a number would obviously be very great.

"It is clear from the facts presented in the report regarding the illegal armies maintained in Palestine and their recent activities that it would not be possible for the Government of Palestine to admit so large a body of immigrants unless and until these formations have been disbanded and their arms surrendered. As the report points out private armies constitute a danger to the peace of the world and ought not to exist. Jews and Arabs in Palestine alike must surrender their arms. The Committee have drawn attention to the failure of the Jewish Agency to cooperate in dealing with this evil and have expressed the view that the Agency should at once resume active and responsible cooperation with the mandatory power. His Majesty's Government regard it as essential that the Agency should take a positive part in the suppression of these activities. They hope that both Jewish and Arab leaders will give patience and restraint. His Majesty's Government recognize that decisions must be taken as soon as possible but meanwhile the House will understand that I am unable to make any further statement."

[Here follows an account of further discussion in the House of Commons.]

HARRIMAN

867N.01/5-246 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, May 2, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 2: 53 p. m.]

136. Committee report has been discussed at length by Jewish Agency Executive which has decided to issue no statement pending indication of action to be taken by British Government. Am advised general feeling of Executive was favorable to immediate concessions to refugees but was bitterly opposed to parts of report denying basic

Zionist political aims. One member Political Department said "Zionist political aims have been sacrificed to philanthropy."

Arabs were not surprised at contents of report but have nevertheless reacted violently. Higher Committee has called general Arab strike for May 3, has decided to increase its membership to 40 possibly with view to action and sporadic disturbances are expected. Reception being held today by Iraqi Consul General for birthday of King of Iraq was cancelled yesterday "because of situation in Palestine". Jamal Husseini²⁶ in public statement said Arabs everywhere would fight implementation of report particularly immigration of hundred thousand and indicated his belief report was made under American pressure. Police state there is distinct possibility of Mufti²⁷ coming to Damascus and if he should be able to do so immediate uprising of Arab population is expected.²⁸

PINKERTON

867N.01/5-346

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas
(Hilldring) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1946.

As anticipated, the British are stalling on the Anglo-American Committee's recommendation for authorization of 100,000 immigration visas to Palestine. Mr. Attlee has announced that action upon this recommendation will be withheld pending (a) disarmament of the Jewish underground Army in Palestine and (b) guarantee of military and financial assistance by the U.S. This position is inconsistent with the Committee's recommendation, which attached no such conditions, and, in fact, is reported to be the position which was considered by the Committee but was specifically rejected by it.

Our military and political interests in Germany and Austria require that we press for immediate implementation of the Committee's recommendation. I believe that unless we exercise unremitting pressure to this end, these interests will not receive adequate representation by our Government and there will be no effective counteraction to British tactics of stalling and confusing the entire issue.

²⁶ Jamal al-Husseini, leading member of the Arab Higher Committee.

²⁷ The Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini.

²⁸ In telegram 140, May 4, 1946, noon, from Jerusalem, Mr. Pinkerton reported that the Arab Higher Committee had sent a letter to Prime Minister Attlee rejecting the Committee report as an outcome of Anglo-American political expediency and denouncing it as a violation of previous commitments to the Arabs, of the Atlantic Charter, and of Allied principles. The letter announced that "pending the decision of the British Govt, the Arabs will proceed to organize their national forces, and to prepare means of defense in order to resume our national struggle." (867N.01/5-446)

The answer to Arab opposition in the Middle East and to Britain's negative attitude may very well be demonstrations by Jewish displaced persons in Germany and Austria and scathing comments by Jewish leaders and organizations in this country. In order to further our interests in Germany and Austria, i.e., to resettle the Jewish displaced persons as expeditiously as possible, I think that all the Jewish pressure should be directed against the British rather than against both U.S. and British Governments jointly. This result, I believe, can be achieved only if this Government pursues an aggressive public policy of needling the British to implement the Committee's recommendation for entry of 100,000 immediately and without reference to future action on any other aspects of the Report. Since the British have already put us on the defensive by Mr. Attlee's public announcement, I believe that it is essential that we announce immediately our forthright position in favor of entry of the 100,000. Such an announcement should be accompanied by a generous gesture which will counteract the British inference that we are only ready to advise but not to assist materially.

I suggest, therefore, that you discuss with the President the following recommendations for immediate action :

a. A public statement by the President stressing the urgent necessity of immediate implementation of the Committee's recommendation for issuance of 100,000 immigration visas.

b. A public offer by the U.S. Government to assume primary responsibility for movement of all of the 100,000 from Europe to Palestine. This offer should be accompanied by a statement of the President's intention to designate an outstanding U.S. citizen (preferably by name) as his Personal Representative to coordinate the movement of these persons. Such an individual would be empowered to coordinate and mobilize the resources of the Army, War Shipping Administration, UNRRA, Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and Jewish voluntary agencies, in order to effect the movement. It is believed that the net cost of such an operation to the U. S. Government would be not more, and perhaps even less, than the expense of maintaining Jewish displaced persons in camps in Germany and Austria for another year.

If you concur, I will prepare an appropriate memorandum to the President for your signature.

J. H. HILLDRING

867N.01/5-346 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, May 3, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received May 4—2: 35 a. m.]

770. Reaction here to Anglo-American Committee report bitterly critical. Individuals and Arab organizations have voiced their oppo-

sition while newspapers almost without exception attack report as disastrous and in complete variance with justice for Arab rights. Blame for recommendation generally assigned to America, an attitude encouraged by widely-printed remarks of President and other Americans welcoming recommendations.

Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of Arab League, called on me to present protests of Arab League against report and to voice belief that American position in Arab world would inevitably deteriorate if the recommendations became policy. He said that he was sorry to come on such a mission. Arabs had long held America and Americans in high regard but if this report were to become policy an entirely different attitude would prevail. When asked why he put blame for report on America, he replied that Britain had long been recognized as enemy of Arabs. America by report had shown that it was now an enemy.

Report in his opinion could only add fuel to the flames. Zionists had achieved in report all they could desire at this time. They would now be encouraged to renew their terrorist activities. Arabs on other hand had now nothing but despair. Those who had kept quiet in expectation of implementation of White Paper now had every reason to renew fight dropped in 1939. He declared report in its support of Zionism and repudiation of Arab claims could have been written in any Zionist office in America. When it was pointed out that the report repudiated Jewish state, he retorted only three things mattered: Immigration, land and future government. The report gave Zionists two things which could lead only to Jewish state: Immigration and right to purchase unlimited land while denial of right to control immigration and land transfer was repudiation of all of Arab rights.

He said that from moment report had appeared, he had been besieged by representatives of every Arab state. He had talked by telephone with most Arab capitals and could confidently say that Arabs were united in their complete opposition to the policy of report. He could not prophesy what steps League might take although he was under tremendous pressure to authorize drastic and serious action. He was considering calling extraordinary session of League to recommend best course of action. He asked that his representations be transmitted to my Government. Azzam called on British Ambassador the following day and made similar representations.

Only on one or two occasions during his call did Azzam Pasha depart from his usual moderate tone but there was no doubt of his sincerity nor the seriousness with which he regarded report as destructive of Arab rights and of American position in the Arab world. Similar views have been given to press.

Other interested parties have communicated their views to Legation. Protest signed by Arab Union, Moslem Brotherhood, Moslem Youths, Arab Palestine Society received yesterday. One observer stated that many Egyptians regarded report as particularly disastrous. Hitherto, American statements on Zionism had been explained away as having been made with an eye to elections. This report by allegedly impartial commission together with the President's remark welcoming recommendations especially those concerning further immigration and establishment of Jewish national home would now be regarded by Arabs as revealing true American attitude towards Palestine because of which America could count only on Arab hostility. This observer held that Russia and Zionists only would benefit from report.

[Here follows press and other comment.]

Paraphrase by pouch to London and Arab capitals.

TUCK

867N.01/5-446 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

BAGHDAD, May 4, 1946—noon.

[Received May 8—8:25 p. m.]

229. Foreign Ministry has sent Legation copy of Iraq Government's formal protest to British Embassy against findings of Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry. Iraqi Government points out that it "holds Great Britain solely responsible for the policy which is being applied in Palestine" and that U. S. is being informed as matter of courtesy. Highlights of protest, complete translation of which follows by air, are as follows:

1. Iraqi never recognized the validity of the Committee nor bound itself to accept its recommendations.

2. "Justice demands that fate of Palestine be decided by its legitimate inhabitants only."

3. Committee's claim that Palestine is only land offering substantial hope for Jewish immigration is strange indeed since Committee has not investigated capacity of U.S. or British possessions as haven for Jews.

4. Committee ignored Arab rights in Arab country.

5. "Committee's recommendation for entry of 100,000 Jews is flagrant aggression against Arab rights and challenge to humanitarian principles and international pledges which have been made to them. Immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and continued Zionist immigration thereafter is dangerous not only to the Arabs of Palestine but to all the Middle Eastern Countries and this danger will undoubtedly result in bloodshed and in disturbing the peace and security in this part of the world."

6. Removal of restrictions covering transfer of lands to Zionists will once again enable Jews to strip Arabs of their possessions and means of livelihood.

7. Committee was unduly influenced by "Zionist pressure in U. S.—unfortunate plight of Jews in Europe and through Zionist terrorism in Palestine."

8. "Adoption of any of the Committee's recommendations which fall short of the 1939 White Paper shall be regarded as an unjust act calculated to disturb international peace in the Middle East."

9. The British Government as mandatory power is alone responsible, legally and morally, for what will take place in and for Palestine in the other Arab countries.

10. The interference of USA in Palestine's affairs has no legal validity because if the U.S. were devoid of Zionist influence its relationship with Palestine would be like that of any other power of the United Nations.

MOOSE

867N.01/5-646 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JIDDA, May 6, 1946—9 a. m.

URGENT

[Received 11:32 a. m.]

129. (1) Sheikh Iusuf Yassin Deputy FonMin returned yesterday afternoon from Riyadh and departed early this morning for Cairo where he will discuss Palestine inquiry report with Arab League officials (Legtel 127, May 5²⁹). He told me on arrival only that the reaction of the King to the report was "very bad".

(2) I am informed that staff members of British Legation here in conversation with Saudis are successfully conveying impression that recommendation for entry of hundred thousand Jews into Palestine was one purely of American origin against which British members struggled unsuccessfully.

SANDS

867N.01/5-646

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*³⁰

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1946.

Subject: Proposed Procedure Regarding the Palestine Report.

I am attaching for your approval the draft of a telegram which I believe you might wish to send to Mr. Attlee regarding the Palestine

²⁹ Not printed.

³⁰ Draft transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Mr. Henderson on May 3. The latter's transmitting memorandum noted that "The situation developing in the Near East with regard to the report makes it all the more desirable in our opinion that we should take some action as soon as possible looking toward consultation with Arabs and Jews". Mr. Henderson also added two marginal notations. One stated: "We are of course playing with dynamite"; the other stated: "You may prefer to discuss this orally with the President". In an appended memorandum of May 6 to Mr. Henderson, Mr. Acheson noted: "I took this over to the President who kept the memorandum and the telegram. He seemed to approve it but wants to talk it over with some of his people." President Truman gave his approval on May 8; for the telegram sent to London the same day, see *infra*.

report. This telegram is based on the assumption that the report constitutes a valid basis for determining this Government's policy toward Palestine and for initiating the consultations between Arabs and Jews to which both the American and British Governments are committed.

It is likely that the British Government will approach us in the near future with a view to determining the attitude of the two Governments toward the Committee's report. It is almost certain that the British Government will desire to consult the Arabs and Jews before deciding to take action on any of the Committee's recommendations. In our opinion, it is desirable that the two Governments reach as soon as possible a decision regarding the report as a whole so that all parties may know to what extent the Governments intend to base their future policy upon the report.

The procedure which we propose is: first, an approach to the British Government along the lines of the attached draft message; second, consultations with Jews and Arabs, carried out concurrently but not jointly by the two Governments; third, consultation between the two Governments as to the policy which they will adopt toward the report as a whole; and fourth, a public announcement of that policy, which would include references to the placing of Palestine under United Nations trusteeship. If you desire, the Department of State will be glad to undertake the consultations with Jewish and Arab organizations in behalf of this Government, and will inform you promptly and fully of the replies received.

DEAN ACHESON

867N.01/5-646: Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*³¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1946—1 p. m.

I have been considering the next steps which should be taken with regard to Palestine and believe that the first thing to be done is to initiate the consultations with Jews and Arabs to which both our Governments are committed. I believe the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry offers a basis for such consultations and I contemplate the adoption of the following procedure, on which I should welcome your comments:

The report will be brought by this Government in the immediate future to the attention of the Jewish and Arab organizations specified

³¹ Sent to the Ambassador in London as Department's telegram 3816, with the instruction: "Please deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister Attlee."

below as well as the Governments of Arab States with which this Government maintains relations with the request that they transmit their views on it within a certain period, say two weeks. On receipt of their views this Government will consult the British Government and then proceed to determine its attitude toward the report as a whole and to issue a public statement as to the extent to which it is prepared to accept the report as the basis for its Palestine policy.

I imagine that the British Government will wish to take concurrent action and should be glad to know if this assumption is correct. In view of the urgency surrounding the question of the admission to Palestine of the 100,000 Jews whose entry is recommended by the Committee, I sincerely hope that it will be possible to initiate and complete the consultations with Arabs and Jews at the earliest possible moment.

The organizations and groups in question would be: American Zionist Emergency Council, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Conference, American Council for Judaism, American Jewish Congress, Institute for Arab American Affairs, Agudas Israel of America, New Zionist Organization of America, Jewish Agency, League of Arab States, Arab Higher Committee, Governments of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

867N.01/5-346

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Merriam) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1946.

Assistant Secretary Hilldring, in his memorandum of May 3, states that our military and political interests in Germany and Austria require that we press for immediate implementation of the Committee's recommendation, and that in order to further our interests in these countries the resettlement of Jewish displaced persons should proceed as expeditiously as possible. He advocates that this Government pursue an aggressive public policy of needling the British into issuing 100,000 immigration certificates for Palestine immediately and without reference to future action on any other aspects of the report.

This recommendation apparently fails to take into account any aspect of the complicated Palestine problem other than the European. Before any action along such lines is contemplated, the following points should be given the most serious consideration:

(1) The whole question of procedure has already been put up to

the President with the Department's observation that, since the Committee's ten recommendations form a carefully integrated whole, the various parts cannot be singled out for separate treatment. At the same time we urged that the report as a whole be adopted as this Government's policy at the earliest possible moment.

(2) Until the United States Government is prepared to accept the report, which it has not yet done, its status is simply that of a recommendation. It would seem unwise for this Government to take active steps to give effect to it, either in its entirety or in part, before it is adopted as the official policy of this Government.

(3) Our policy toward, interests in, and relations with the various Arab countries in the Near East, chiefly Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, are of an importance which is certainly commensurate with our interest in the future of the occupied zones of Europe. The Arab reaction to the Committee's recommendations has been swift and alarming. The Arabs have singled out the recommendation for putting 100,000 Jews into Palestine for criticism of the strongest kind, and they give every indication of the intention to resist. We have many political, economic and educational interests in these countries. Our educational interests, for example, have taken more than a century to build up, and they constituted a sheet anchor in the Middle East when we were militarily weak. These American schools and colleges require Arab good will for their continuance and effectiveness. Our Near Eastern trade and petroleum interests cannot be neglected, nor the desirability of our maintaining friendly relations with the countries located in the vital Near and Middle Eastern area.

(4) According to sources in close contact with the displaced Jews of Europe, the removal of 100,000 persons from the American zones in Germany and Austria would be a temporary solution at best, as they expect the influx of DP's from the Soviet Russian zones to continue unabated and soon fill the vacuum.

(5) The fact that the Committee was bi-national and its report a joint Anglo-American undertaking would seem to preclude unilateral action of any sort on our part, certainly at this stage. If, without full consultation with the British, the President were to issue a statement similar to that recommended in the memorandum under reference, British resentment would follow as a virtual certainty, to the inevitable detriment of our long-range interests in Palestine and elsewhere. It may be recalled that the British Prime Minister reacted strongly to the President's espousal of the 100,000 recommendation in view of the fact that no accompanying commitment was made to share responsibility for the results of carrying it out.

(6) Last but not least, this Government has committed itself on various occasions to take no action involving a change in the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. We have also made it known that the hearings before the Committee did not constitute this consultation. If all or part of the report were to be put into operation by us without such consultation, it would be regarded as a breach of faith which could not fail to have repercussions of a very serious nature.

GORDON P. MERRIAM

867N.01/5-946 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, May 9, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 8:43 p. m.]

213. Regarding Department's circular telegram April 25, 10 a. m. [p. m.], I have delayed reporting Syrian and Lebanese reaction to Palestine Commission Report to end that all essential factors might be covered. Some of these were slow in developing, and it was only yesterday that occasion could be made for effective discussion with Prime Minister Jabri in Damascus.

2. In general, reaction in press, public and official circles has been disillusionment, hardening into determination to resist implementation of Commission's recommendations. This was clearly foreseen by Emir Faisal³² who one week before publication of report said to me, "I am afraid we Arabs will have to resist, by force if necessary, though that I should greatly regret because of our countries' otherwise truly friendly relations."

3. Disillusionment is particularly bitter as regards American Government attitude as voiced in Mr. Truman's statement of April 30th.^{32a} Local Arabs argue substantially as follows:

That from mountain of documentation and testimony commission, like its predecessors, should produce only ineffectual mouse was not unexpected. That Britain should again let Arabs down was not surprising per se although surprisingly shortsighted in sight Soviet pressures in Middle East. But that United States, by voice of its President, should take so unreservedly pro-Zionist attitude was shocking to all those who had long counted on its erstwhile seeming ardor to implement principles of international justice in postwar world.

³² Presumably the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister.

^{32a} See telegram 1970, dated April 30, p. 588.

4. Elaboration of this theme stresses Roosevelt promises (*id est* in letter of April 12, 1945, to Syrian President³³) that American Government would take no decision regarding basic situation in Palestine without full prior consultation with Arabs, as well as our recent assurances that Commission's inquiry did not constitute such "consultations" and that by "Arabs" we specifically meant Arab Governments.

5. It is then argued that nothing could affect Palestine situation more basically than imposition of 100,000 Jewish refugees and abrogation of White Paper guarantees regarding land transfers and future immigration. Consequently, Mr. Truman's statement is read as clear promise to Zionists that such imposition and abrogation will be major elements of America's Palestine policy.

6. I have been so much impressed by intensity of resulting anti-American feeling in official circles and among informed public that I venture to suggest Department consider issuing official statement reiterating assurances mentioned above and/or directing me to reiterate them formally, preferably in writing, to Syrian and Lebanese Governments prior to scheduled Arab League Council meeting at Bludan³⁴ May 18.

[Here follows statement made by the Syrian Prime Minister on May 4, concluding with his question as to whether the United States wished the Arabs to take their case to the Security Council as one endangering international peace.]

8. As Jabri's concluding query may be indication of policy to be proposed to Arab League, Department may wish to give me indication of its reaction thereto. I replied that, while Palestine problem was of such international importance that final word might perhaps well be left with UNO, it would seem wiser for time being to consider Commission's findings as simple recommendation, however unpalatable to Arabs, with respect to which consultations on intergovernmental plane appear to be next logical step.³⁵

9. In Lebanon, Prime Minister Solh issued brief statement May 3 declaring Commission's recommendations unacceptable and undertaking to support Palestine Arab position and to cooperate with Arab

³³ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 704.

³⁴ In Syria.

³⁵ In telegram 215, May 22, 1946, 7 p. m., the Secretary of State "in general" approved the position taken by Minister Wadsworth. He added, for the Minister's background information, that "high officials of UN Secretariat including Assistant Secretary-General for Security Council Affairs Sobolev have indicated their belief that it is unlikely that Palestine question will be lodged at this time before the Security Council, or for that matter, any other organ of UN. We share this view." (867N.01/5-946)

states in safeguarding Arab rights. Following day Council of Ministers decided to request early extraordinary convocation Arab League Council. Yesterday Parliament devoted 2 hours to members' protest and ministerial declarations. Highlights of latter were:

[Here follow these highlights and further Lebanese and Syrian reaction.]

14. It may be appropriate to end this review by drawing special attention to suggestion ventured in paragraph 6 above. President Dodge of American University and other leading Americans here support it.

Paraphrases to London, Moscow and Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

740.00119 Council/5-946 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET
URGENT

PARIS, May 9, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received 9:35 p. m.]

59. Delsec 482. For the President from the Secretary. Bevin has given me a copy of a memorandum prepared by his Govt for his use in discussing with me the Anglo-American Committee's report on Palestine and the Jewish question of which the following is a summary:

1. A brief examination shows that the commitments involved in giving effect to the report would involve the expenditure of large sums of money and the employment of military forces to an extent beyond the capacity of His Majesty's Govt to meet alone. Before any decision is taken as to whether the report should be put into force or not the British Govt must know what assistance they can count on obtaining from the US Govt.

2. The military burden is the more important one. Before any decision could be taken to admit 100,000 additional immigrants as recommended in the report, the illegal Jewish armies must be suppressed and there must be a general disarmament throughout Palestine. Otherwise these armies would be swollen by recruits drawn from the new immigrants. The implementation of the report would cause serious repercussions throughout the Arab world involving additional military commitments which the British Govt could not undertake alone in present circumstances.

3. The British now have an equivalent of two and one-half divisions in Palestine. The British Govt considers that adoption of the Committee's report would make necessary reinforcements of the

order of two infantry divisions and one armoured brigade. There is no possibility of providing these reinforcements from British sources if they are to meet their inescapable commitments in other parts of the world. It would be necessary for American forces of the required strength to be immediately available before the policy recommended could be endorsed by the British Govt. and it would be essential to obtain a guarantee that American assistance would be sustained at full strength so long as the commitment in Palestine lasted. A token contingent would not be sufficient.

4. A conservative estimate is that the recommendations of the report would involve an expenditure of from 60,000,000 to 70,000,000 pounds in Palestine during the next couple of years if the new immigrants are to be housed and fitted into the economy of the country. Over a period of 10 years the expenditure involved would be from 115,000,000 to 125,000,000 pounds. The foregoing figures exclude the cost of development schemes such as the Jordan Valley project which is estimated to cost 76,000,000 pounds.

5. Zionists have suggested that expenditures of this nature be met from reparations allocation for the victims of Nazism but the total available from this source for both Jews and non-Jews is only about 7,500,000 pounds. Even allowing for a maximum effort by world Jewry, there will obviously be a much larger residue than the British Govt will be able to bear alone and it would be glad to know to what extent it can count on American financial assistance should it be decided to put these measures into operation.

6. The British are convinced that they would not be in a position to put the report into operation without substantial financial and military contributions from the US Govt.

7. Both the British and US Govts are committed to consultation with the Arabs and Jews before a new policy is adopted which fact would preclude the British Govt from giving immediate effect to the report.

8. Consideration should be given to the form of such consultations and whether the US would be associated with the British Govt in conducting them.

9. If the US Govt is unable to agree to assist in implementing the report the British Govt will have to consider what its future policy in Palestine is to be. Meanwhile some other state may refer the matter to the Security Council at any moment as a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

10. The British Govt considers that the Committee on Refugees and

Displaced Persons of the Economic and Social Council should deal with the question of the disposal of the Jews for whom immigration to Palestine has not been suggested.³⁶

[BYRNES]

867N.01/5-1046 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*³⁷

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 9 May, 1946.

Thank you very much indeed for your message of yesterday about Palestine and for your kindness in consulting me. Your message arrived while I was in Cabinet—I brought it at once before my colleagues. We are all agreed that closest cooperation between our two Governments on this matter can only be to the benefit of all concerned. We are most grateful for your communication and for the suggestions which you make which we are now studying. I am sorry I cannot send you a final reply immediately but as I have explained to your Ambassador I want particularly to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary who as you probably know has had a preliminary talk with Mr. Byrnes. I hope he will be able to come from Paris during the weekend for consultation.

2. I realise the need for speed; but, in order to ensure that we make the best possible approach to the problem, I should be grateful if you could wait a few days until I am in a position to give you the considered views of my Cabinet colleagues. Meanwhile I hope you will give consideration to the suggestions put to Mr. Byrnes by the Foreign Secretary, especially that there should be some provision for the study

³⁶ In telegram 2260 (Delsec 481), May 9, 1946, 6 p. m., from Paris, Secretary Byrnes informed President Truman as follows: "Mr. Bevin has discussed with me your message to Attlee as to Palestine. He says the problem of arranging for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt is so acute he earnestly hopes you can delay sending your request to Jewish and Arab organizations. . . . I think it would be wise to delay request until 20th so we can have time to consider whether our course will commit US to military assistance. They urge they cannot act without assurances of our military and financial assistance. If after reading Bevin's statement you are willing to make any commitment that would involve military assistance, I suggest asking Eisenhower's opinion as to the number of troops that contribution might ultimately involve." (740.00119 Council/5-946) For documentation on the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, see pp. 69 ff. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, United States Army.

In telegram 2266, May 10, 1946, 8 p. m., Mr. Acheson notified Secretary Byrnes that the President concurred in the latter's view that it would be wise to defer consultations until May 20 and authorized him to so inform Mr. Bevin (740.00119 Council/5-946).

³⁷ Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador (Halifax) on May 10.

by experts of our two Governments of the financial and military liabilities involved and that if possible this study should take place at the outset and before the proposed consultations with Jews and Arabs.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3 and 4 dealing with subjects other than Palestine.]

867N.01/5-1046

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Mahmoud Hassan, Minister of Egypt
Mr. Ali Jawdat, Minister of Iraq
Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon
Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, Minister of Saudi Arabia
Dr. Costi K. Zurayk, Chargé d'Affaires of Syria
Mr. Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State
Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs

At their request the diplomatic representatives of the five Arab countries in Washington were received by the Acting Secretary of State at 12:30 o'clock today.

The Egyptian Minister acted as spokesman for the group, which included the Minister of Iraq, the Minister of Lebanon, the Minister Saudi Arabia and the Chargé d'Affaires of Syria.

The Egyptian Minister stated that the representatives of the five Arab states acting under instructions of their Governments had called in order to present to the American Government notes³⁸ setting forth the views of the Arab countries with regard to the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. The Minister continued substantially as follows:

It had been the understanding of himself and of the other Arab representatives in Washington—and this understanding had been conveyed to their respective Governments—that the American Government had taken the position that the Anglo-American Committee was an advisory body and that neither the British nor the American Governments necessarily be bound by its findings. Furthermore, he and the other representatives in Washington of the various Arab Governments had been assured that before any steps would be taken which would result in a change in the basic situation in Palestine,

³⁸ Identical notes of May 10 not printed; they enclosed an identical undated memorandum, the text of which is printed in the *New York Times*, May 17, 1946, p. 6, col. 2.

Arabs and Jews would be consulted. In the opinion of the Arab world, the introduction of 100,000 Jews into Palestine would bring about a basic change of the situation in that country. He was sure that this opinion must be shared by everyone acquainted with the situation in Palestine. He wished to point out that President Roosevelt on various occasions had assured the heads of Arab States that the Arabs would be consulted before any change would be made in the basic situation in Palestine. The President had also given assurances that he would take no action hostile to the Arabs. These assurances had made a deep impression upon the Arab world which had confidence in the word of the President and of the Government of the United States.

The report of the Anglo-American Committee had made a painful impression upon the Arab world. The Arabs were not satisfied with the suggestions contained in it and they hoped that the British and American Governments would consult with them before taking action based upon it. In view of the violent reaction which the report had caused in the Arab countries, he would like to suggest that the American Government at least before the 18th of May, the date of the next meeting of the Arab League, issue an announcement to the effect that it does not consider itself necessarily bound by the recommendations contained in the report of the Anglo-American Committee and that in any event it would live up to its assurances to consult with Arabs and Jews before adopting a policy calling for action which would alter the basic situation in Palestine.

The Acting Secretary thanked the Ministers for the notes which they were giving him and stated that he appreciated the frankness with which they had expressed the views of their Governments. He could assure them that the Government of the United States had every intention of living up to the assurances which it had given and of consulting Arabs and Jews before making a definite decision with regard to the report on the basic situation in Palestine.³⁹ He added that the views of the Arab Governments set forth in the notes which had been handed to him would be given careful study.

³⁹ In a memorandum of May 10 to President Truman, Mr. Acheson noted that the assurances in this sentence had been given by him to the Arab Chiefs of Mission pursuant to the President's authorization (867N.01/5-1046). On May 17 he sent identical replies to their notes of May 10, which stated in part: "I wish to take this opportunity to renew the assurances which I expressed to you during our conversation on May 10 . . . when I stated that it was the intention of the Government of the United States to consult with Arabs and Jews before taking any definite decision relative to the Committee's report." The full text of his replies is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 26, 1946, p. 917.

Assurances similar to those in the notes of May 17 were telegraphed by Mr. Acheson to Abdul-Karim Mutahher, Yemenese Foreign Minister, on May 17 in response to his telegram of May 11; and by President Truman to the Amir of Trans-Jordan and the President of the Lebanon on May 22 in reply to their telegrams of May 11 and 14, respectively, and to the President of Syria on May 24, in response to his telegram of May 16 (867N.01/5-1246, /5-1146, /5-1446, /5-1646). The text of the President's telegram of May 17 to Prince Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq, is printed in *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, vol. II, p. 148.

867N.01/5-1346 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁴⁰

TOP SECRET

[London, undated.]

Personal and Top Secret. I have now been able to consult the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet on your message of 8th May concerning Palestine. We agree that the consultations with the Jews and Arabs to which both our Governments are committed should be initiated as quickly as possible. I hope however that in view of the delicate negotiations which we are at present conducting in Egypt, you will feel able to postpone any approach to the parties concerned until 20th May at the earliest.

We also think that the suggested period of two weeks is too short for the Arab Government and Jewish Organisations to prepare and submit their views on the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations and that it would be preferable to allow them one month.

As I said in my previous telegram we think it important that there should also be some provision for the study by expert officials of our two Governments of the implications of the Committee's Report, with particular reference to the military and financial liabilities which would be involved in its adoption. We would prefer these official discussions between experts to precede the consultations with Jews and Arabs, but if this suggestion does not meet with your approval they can be conducted either simultaneously with or after those consultations.

It also seems to us most desirable that as a final stage in the consultations which we are contemplating every effort should be made to convene a conference at which Arab and Jewish representatives would meet with representatives of our two Governments to consider the whole question on the basis of the Committee's report and of the results of the preliminary consultations both between Arabs and Jews and between our own experts.

Our two Governments would then be in a position to make known their decisions on the issues dealt with by the Committee of Enquiry, having had the fullest opportunity of bringing their own views into harmony and of promoting the largest possible measures of agreement between the other interested parties.

⁴⁰ Transmitted to President Truman by the British Embassy on May 13; copy received by the Department from the same source the following day.

867N.01/5-1346 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, May 13, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received May 13—5:47 p. m.]

152. Chief Secretary ⁴¹ informs me ship carrying about 1600 illegal immigrants from Black Sea due to arrive Palestine within 2 weeks and as all available certificates from quota for April-May as well as 300 from May-June quota have been used for Spezia immigrants situation will become very embarrassing. Govt has received reports that other immigrants have left or are about to leave from Greece and that entire tempo illegal immigration is being stepped up. He has no suggestion as to possible Govt action with regard to illegals in view of exhaustion of quotas to which they might be charged—Chief Secretary says illegal immigrants are not type whose entry is contemplated by Committee report but are potential reinforcements of illegal armies. He doubts whether admission 100,000 would have any effect upon illegal immigration.

PINKERTON

867N.01/5-1646 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁴²

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

I have given careful consideration to your two messages concerning Palestine and am pleased to note that you and your colleagues share our feeling regarding close collaboration between our two Govts. We are proceeding with arrangements for consultations with Arabs and Jews so that the communication to them may be made on May 20. I hope that this will be agreeable to you and that your Govt will take concurrent action. I am still most anxious to have these consultations completed as early as possible but in view of your feeling that two weeks would be too short I am agreeable to extending the period to one month. We are drawing up a covering memorandum to be handed to Arab and Jewish representatives at the time their views on Committee's report are requested and we will furnish your Govt with an ad-

⁴¹ Of the Palestine Government.

⁴² Sent to London as Department's telegram 4074, with the instruction: "President desires the following message to be transmitted to Prime Minister Attlee in reply to latter's telegrams of May 9 and May 14 [13]." Telegram 4074 was repeated to Paris for Secretary Byrnes as No. 2383.

vance copy of this memorandum. We assume Brit Govt similarly will let us have an advance copy of any covering memorandum it may decide to use.

As regards question of studies to be made by experts of the two Govts, with respect to certain matters arising out of report, we are proceeding to organize an appropriate group from among officials of this Govt. However, as Brit Emb has already been informed by Dept of State, we do not believe it would be advisable to have these discussions between experts of the two Govts precede the requests for the views of Arabs and Jews. It is our belief that latter (i.e. the consultations) might serve to clarify issues involved and narrow field in which expert discussions would take place. At same time, however, we believe at least preliminary expert discussions can be initiated as soon as the views have been requested. In this connection it would be of the greatest usefulness if we might have as soon as possible some indication of subjects which your gov't thinks should form basis of these discussions, as well as any further detailed suggestions.

We have noted your proposal for an eventual conference which would include Jewish and Arab representatives. We believe that this is something which our two Govts should have in mind during the consultations with interested parties and that it is at least possible such a conference might be convened at a suitable time if results of consultations with Arabs and Jews indicate that a conference would be helpful. For the moment I do not feel able to give you a more definite reply on this point.

867N.01/5-2046 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁴³

TOP SECRET
URGENT

LONDON, 19 [18] May 1946—6 p. m.
[Received May 18—11 p. m.]

Personal and Top Secret. I am most grateful to you for your telegram of May 17th [16] and much appreciate your readiness to meet our views in regard to timing of the approach to the Arabs and Jews and also in regard to the time limit to be allowed for these consultations. We also have been considering the form which our consultations with Arabs and Jews should take.

On the Jewish side we propose to consult only the Jewish Agency, in view of the special position conferred on it by article 4 of the Mandate as the accredited representative of Jewry in matters relating to the Jewish National Home. On the Arab side we shall consult the Arab Higher Committee and the States of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and the Yemen.

⁴³ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the White House on May 20.

We are proposing that the following communication shall be handed by His Majesty's Representatives to the governments of the states above mentioned and by the High Commissioner to the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency on May 20th.

"In a statement made in Parliament on the 13th November, 1945, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced the intention of His Majesty's Government to consult all parties concerned before reaching a decision on any recommendations which might be made to them by the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine. In pursuance of this undertaking, His Majesty's Government will be glad to be furnished with the views of on each of the 10 recommendations put forward by the Committee. They will further be grateful if these views may be communicated to them not later than the 20th June, 1946 ends."

I am in entire agreement with your suggestions regarding the discussions between our officials and will let you have shortly our idea as to the subjects which should form the basis of these discussions.

I am glad you think that the idea of a conference is one which is worth consideration and hope that procedure above described may eventually make it desirable.

867N.01/5-1946 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers ⁴⁴

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1946—8 a. m.

US URGENT NIACT

On May 20 you should address communication to Govt to which you are accredited enclosing text of memo which is being transmitted in Dept's immediately following telegram as well as copy of report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry with appendices. Memo is that referred to in Dept's circular May 16 ⁴⁵ and is also being sent together with copy of report to interested groups in this country. British representatives in your area will probably receive instructions from their Govt also to ascertain views of Arabs and Jews and you should offer to associate yourself with them in approach. Cairo will approach Arab League and Govt of Yemen as well as Egyptian Govt and Jerusalem will approach Arab Higher Committee, Jewish Agency and Govt of Trans-Jordan. Dept plans make public in near

⁴⁴ At Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, and Jerusalem. The circular telegram was also repeated to London with the following addition: "Memo mentioned is same as contained in Dept's 4136 of May 19, noon." For No. 4136, see *infra*.

⁴⁵ Not printed.

future fact that views of Arabs and Jews have been requested ⁴⁶ and will release text of memo.

Beirut inform Damascus.

Repeated London for information only.

ACHESON

867N.01/5-1946 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the
United Kingdom (Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

4136. For your info following is text of memorandum regarding Palestine ⁴⁷ which is mentioned in our no. 4074 of May 16,⁴⁸ of which Brit Emb was handed copy for transmission to London :

"In inviting comments and suggestions on report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Govt of US desires to make the following observations :

1. Report is advisory in character, consequently, its recommendations are not binding. However, US Govt is giving careful consideration to report in view of standing of members of Committee, of fact that report was unanimously approved by them and of fact that they were entirely free to arrive at any conclusions which to them seem fair and reasonable. US Govt will also give careful consideration to views of Govts and organizations which it is now consulting. Judging from preliminary reactions to report in various quarters, criticism is to be expected. In view of importance of this problem and sincere desire of US to arrive at a policy with regard to Palestine which will be both humane and just, this Govt greatly hopes that general character and trend of observations and suggestions may, so far as possible, be of a constructive nature.

2. By means of participation of American citizens in work of Committee, and through present consultation, Govt of US is seeking info and assistance looking to formulation of its policy on several difficult and complex problems. It readily recognizes that other Govts and organizations will have their own respective attitudes in regard to these questions which may or may not be similar to attitude which shall be adopted by US. US Govt is grateful for cooperation and help which have already been accorded to Committee of Inquiry and

⁴⁶ For text of the Department's announcement on May 21 that "the Government of the United States, in conjunction with the British Government, has taken steps to initiate the consultations with Jewish and Arab leaders regarding Palestine to which both Governments have been committed", see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 2, 1946, p. 956. The text of the Department's letter of May 20 seeking the views of various American organizations with a particular interest in Palestine is printed *ibid.*

⁴⁷ The memorandum here quoted was approved by President Truman on May 18, and sent as a circular telegram to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, and Jerusalem on May 19, 9 a.m.

⁴⁸ See footnote 42, p. 607.

hopes that assistance and collaboration will continue to be forthcoming as these matters develop. US Govt, for its part, will be prepared at all times to reciprocate to best of its ability many courtesies which have been afforded to its citizens and representatives by interested Govts and groups.

3. The interest of US in questions considered in report is believed to be legitimate and is based upon following:

(a) Compassion for and a desire to assist victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, both Jews and non-Jews.

(b) The fact that for a number of years American citizens have been contributing substantial assistance to upbuilding of Jewish National Home in Palestine, and that there is every reason to expect that their interest will continue.

(c) The deep interest which the American Government and its citizens have in maintaining and promoting mutually beneficial and harmonious relations between US and countries of NE in political field, in education and other cultural activities, in trade, and in economic development.

(d) The value placed by US upon contributions which NE countries have made and will doubtless continue to make to the cause of world peace and prosperity and to upbuilding and effectiveness of international organization created for these purposes.

4. This Govt will be glad to receive comments and suggestions regarding report as a whole or any part of it, and would be grateful if these could be received, at latest, 30 days from today."

ACHESON

867N.01/5-2446 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Harriman)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1946—4 p. m.

4262. We spoke to Brit Embassy May 21 re reports circulating in Near East as reported specifically by Legations Beirut and Jidda alleging that Brit representatives in area were informing Arabs that American members of Palestine Committee had exerted pressure on Brit members to obtain their agreement to certain recommendations more favorable to Jews than Arabs. We pointed out that regardless of fact that Committee's deliberations were *in camera* with no record kept it would appear most regrettable if such activities on part of Brit Govt officials should occur at time when the two Govts were seeking earnestly to follow a common policy with regard to the Committee's report.

Brit Embassy agreed forward matter London for investigation.

Sent London. Rptd Beirut, Jidda, Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad.

BYRNES

867N.01/5-2746 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁵⁰

TOP SECRET

[London, undated.]

Personal and Top Secret. In your message of the 17th [16th] May, you asked me to give you some indication of the subjects which, in the opinion of this Government, should form the basis of discussion between our expert officials. The following list enumerates the various matters on which decisions would be required before the report could be implemented and I think that a full and frank exchange of views between our officials on all these matters would be of great value to both our Governments.⁵¹

Recommendation No. 1.

(a) The further efforts to be made by the two Governments in association with other Governments to find new homes for displaced persons generally.

(b) The finding of new homes for Jewish displaced persons outside Palestine.

(c) The steps that might be taken to secure that practical effect is given in Europe to the provision of the United Nations Charter calling for the "Universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion".

Recommendation No. 2.

(a) The cost of

(1) Transporting;

(2) Temporarily accommodating and maintaining and,

(3) Permanently housing the 100,000 Jewish immigrants proposed for admission to Palestine.

(b) The provision of transport.

(c) The supply of materials for housing.

(d) The capital assets necessary to enable productive work to be found for the immigrants.

(e) The financing of this immigration.

(f) The rate at which 100,000 immigrants could be absorbed into the economy of Palestine without creating widespread unemployment.

(g) The method of selection of immigrants.

⁵⁰ Sent to Secretary Byrnes by the British Minister (Balfour) on May 27, with the request that the Department forward the message to President Truman. This was done by Mr. Byrnes in a memorandum the following day.

⁵¹ In a memorandum of May 27, 1946, to Mr. Acheson, Mr. Henderson described the list of subjects as "very comprehensive and well thought out". (867N.01/5-2746)

Recommendation No. 3.

(a) The measure of self government, in the near future, consistent with the three principles laid down by the committee in this recommendation.

(b) The possibility of devising a workable constitution in which, in accordance with the committee's suggestion, a numerical majority would not be decisive.

Recommendation No. 4.

(a) The nature of the administering authority to be defined in the trusteeship agreement for Palestine—a single state, two or more states, or direct administration by the United Nations.

(b) The states to be regarded as “directly concerned” for the purpose of article 79 of the Charter.

(c) The prospect of negotiating a trusteeship agreement for Palestine on the basis of the report with whatever group of states may be recognised to be “directly concerned”.

Recommendation No. 5.

(a) The measures necessary to bridge the gap now existing between Jewish and Arab standards of living.

(b) The cost of these measures.

(c) The advisability of encouraging the formation by the Arabs of a communal organisation similar to that already established by the Jews.

Recommendation No. 6.

(a) The possibility of defining more precisely than is done by the committee in the comment upon this recommendation the principles which should be observed in regulating future immigration into Palestine.

(b) The prevention of illegal immigration.

(c) The form in which the Jewish Agency should be required to cooperate in such prevention.

Recommendation No. 7.

(a) If the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 were rescinded, the nature of the legislation required to provide adequate protection for small owners and tenant cultivators.

(b) The measures necessary to ensure that too large a proportion of the land does not become unalienable through acquisition by one or other community.

(c) The prevention of illegal land seizures.

Recommendation No. 8.

(a) The methods to be adopted in the examination, discussion and execution of plans for large scale development in Palestine.

(b) The chances of obtaining the willing cooperation of adjacent Arab states in the execution of such projects.

(c) The possibility of combining Jewish finance with Government responsibility and control.

(d) The difficulties inherent in the legislation required to secure for the Government power to regulate the use of underground water and determine rights to surface water.

(e) The consequences of omitting from the trusteeship agreement any provision of the kind contained in article 18 of the Mandate.

Recommendation No. 9.

(a) The cost of introducing compulsory primary education in Palestine.

(b) The period within which primary education could be made universal.

(c) The cost of increasing facilities for secondary, technical and university education for the Arab population.

(d) The measures necessary to increase the control exercised by the government over the Jewish educational system.

Recommendation No. 10

(a) The preparations necessary for suppressing Arab or Jewish attempts to prevent by force the execution of the report.

(b) The suppression of terrorism and the liquidation of private armies.

(c) The form in which the Jewish Agency should be required to cooperate in such suppression and liquidation.

General questions arising from the report.

(a) The probable reaction of the two communities in Palestine to the adoption of the report.

(b) The repercussions in the Middle East generally of the adoption in Palestine of a policy based upon the report.

(c) The additional military commitments which would follow from a decision to adopt such a policy and the sources from which these commitments would be met.

(d) The incidence of the finance for the additional expenditure, capital and recurrent, required by the adoption of such a policy.

(e) The effect of such a policy on British and American interests in the Middle East.

(f) In view of the difficulties which may be foreseen in negotiating a trusteeship agreement for Palestine and of the fact that trusteeship system is not yet operating, the possibility of referring the problem of Palestine to the United Nations organisation in advance of the preparation of a trusteeship agreement.

(g) If the problem is referred to the United Nations by a third party, the attitude of the United Kingdom and United States Governments.

2. I suggest that the discussions might conveniently be initiated about a week before the date on which we expect to receive the replies of the Arabs and Jews to the reference made to them on May 20th. This would enable the ground to be surveyed in advance. I hope with you that the consultations now in progress may serve to clarify the questions under discussion.

867N.01/5-2746 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, May 27, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received 9:32 p. m.]

170. In reply to request for comments and suggestions on Anglo-American Committee report (reDeptel May 19, 9 a. m.⁵²). Arab Higher Committee "reject it completely". They say Arabs of Palestine are "sole people to decide on their fate and they reject any foreign intervention in their country". They summarize their demands as (1) abolition of mandate, cessation of Jewish immigration and of land sales; (2) establishment of Arab democratic govt and (3) removal of foreign troops. Full text by air mail.

PINKERTON

867N.01/5-2846 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JIDDA, May 28, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received May 28—12:15 p. m.]

165. 1. In audience today Amir Faisal handed me sealed personal letter from King Abdul Aziz to President Truman⁵³ for me to carry and deliver earliest possible.

2. Amir Faisal said

"You will understand that no action can possibly be taken by Saudi Govt on projects of cooperation such as TWA proposals or Treaty of Commerce and Friendship⁵⁴ so long as we are in doubt about the intentions of your Govt toward us. It would be useless to discuss specific lines of cooperation so long as the atmosphere is clouded by

⁵² See footnote 47, p. 610.

⁵³ Copy not available.

⁵⁴ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1032 ff.

grave distrust of the basic USA policy in the Middle East. I personally still hope that your Govt will not sacrifice the good will and the considerable investment of the American people in the Middle East in favor of Zionism. Surely the mutual best interests in this area of 140,000,000 Americans and of 45,000,000 Arabs will prevail against the special pleading of almost 5,000,000 Jewish lobbyists. It is precisely America's total interest in the Middle East that would be sacrificed.

3. If I, one of the few Arabians who know and love America, am disillusioned, imagine the state of mind of my fellow countrymen who do not know the USA. Yet as matters now stand, I would not wish to return to the USA where the friendship for which I worked there, as you have worked here, appears to be held in contempt.

4. The last communication from your Govt, the alleged 'consultation', brought the worst injury to date. It petulantly asks for quick and constructive comment on a problem which is much more our concern than America's, and it was followed by an announcement of an immigration policy for Palestine which renders the pretense at prior consultation a mockery. The Arab nations will shortly determine a Palestine policy for themselves."

Sent Dept as 165; repeated Cairo as 73; Jerusalem 4; Beirut 3; Baghdad 5.

EDDY

867N.01/5-2946 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, May 29, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received May 29—4:45 p. m.]

251. ReDeptel 215, May 22.⁵⁵

1. In brief conversations with Lebanese President May 25 and Syrian Prime Minister May 27 regarding Palestine problem I gathered clearly that neither favored reference to UN Secretariat.

In general I gather that any recourse to UNO is disfavored by majority nationalist leaders on alleged ground that fair interpretation of charter principles could not be expected in view obvious pro-Zionist sentiment in highest American and British official circles, as result shameless Zionist special pleading and political pressures and because experience at San Francisco and London showed tendency of many smaller countries' representatives to vote in line with British and American lobbying directives (*sic*).

One very good Arab source sums up current Arab tactical objectives in arranging current meetings of chiefs of state and Arab League Council as follows:

It is hoped thereby to persuade British and American Governments that if they adopt policy designed to implement Anglo-American

⁵⁵ Not printed; but see footnote 35, p. 600.

Committee's recommendations they will incur deep-seated enmity of Arab world with subsequent serious damage to their position and interests therein.

Same source added that later Arab objective may become recognition of right of Arab states to be considered "states directly concerned" if Great Britain proceeds to drafting of trusteeship agreement to replace mandate under article 79 of United Nations Charter. A corollary would be insistence that question of 100,000 Jews in British and American military zones camps be referred to ECOSOC and divorced from basic political consideration of Palestine problem.

2. There follows translation of body of note dated May 27 from Syrian Foreign Ministry in reply to Legation's memorandum of May 20 (reDepcirtel May 16⁵⁶).

a. "The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments [to the Legation of the United States and has the honor to refer] to the Legation's memorandum dated May 20, 1946 regarding the desire of the United States Government to learn the viewpoint of the Syrian Govt concerning the recommendations of the Anglo-American Inquiry Commission, the Syrian Government prefers to postpone giving its detailed viewpoint on each one of the recommendations until the exchange of viewpoints, forming of a common plan and discussion of the Palestine question by the Arab Governments is accomplished.

b. "Nevertheless, the Syrian Government cannot but express now and in a general way its deep surprise at the issue of such recommendations which resulted from a superficial and hasty study. From such an inadequate study the commission could not foretell the consequences of these recommendations which are as a whole an injustice to the rights of the Arabs, a threat to their existence, and a menace to peace and order in this part of the world.

c. "The Syrian Government while expressing its disapproval of these recommendations, which contradict the right and aspirations of the Arab nation as a whole and Palestine in particular, fully trusts the United States Government will not rely on these recommendations in determining its Palestine policy.["]

3. [Here follows report on press comment in Syria and Lebanon.]
Paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

867N.01/6-546: Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁵⁷

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1946—10 a. m.

US URGENT

Thank you for sending the list of the subjects which your Govt

⁵⁶ Not printed.

⁵⁷ Sent to London as Department's telegram 4482, with the instruction: "President requests you deliver following message to PriMin Attlee in reply to latter's telegram regarding Palestine received through Brit Emb on May 27."

would like to have discussed by the experts of the two Govts in connection with the Palestine report. Our feeling is that the matter is one which will require a rather extensive exchange of views and we have certain plans for the setting up of a special group to handle this and related questions arising out of the report. We are proceeding to organize this group as quickly as we can and in the meantime we have turned your list over to the various experts in the State and War Depts with the request that they give it their immediate attention.

We are hopeful that members of the group of experts will be able to proceed to London as soon as possible as suggested by Mr. Bevin.⁵⁸ As we doubt however that our plans will be sufficiently advanced for our side to begin the discussions on the report as a whole at the time you suggest, namely one week prior to June 20, we are planning to send to London by that time one or more experts to discuss the urgent physical problems arising out of the transfer to Palestine of the 100,000 Jews mentioned in the report.

While it will take considerable time to find satisfactory answers to all the problems which you have listed, we feel it would be highly desirable that we begin immediately consideration of the question of the 100,000 Jews whose situation continues to cause great concern. I can assure you now that we shall take responsibility for transporting these persons as far as Palestine and shall lend necessary assistance in the matter of their temporary housing. We shall be glad to consider also providing certain longer term assistance for them. This last matter, however, should be reserved for the more general conversations.

We understand, of course, that until after June 20 it will not be possible for our two Govts to make any definite decisions with regard to any of the points contained in the report. We are anxious however in view of the urgency of the problem of the 100,000 Jews to initiate the discussions between the two Govts on the physical problems directly connected with their transfer as soon as possible.

867N.01/6-746

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] June 7, 1946.

In accordance with your request, there are given below our views regarding the proposal of Mr. Robert Nathan to amend the Export-

⁵⁸ In memorandum of May 18 from the British Embassy, not printed.

Import Bank Act for the purpose of financing Jewish settlement and general economic development in Palestine.⁵⁹

1. The proposed amendment rests on certain assumptions, namely: that restrictions upon Jewish immigration into Palestine and land purchase will be removed; and that 100,000 Jewish displaced persons in Europe will be permitted to enter Palestine at once. These assumptions may turn out to be correct, or they may not. At all events, this question of finance, though important in itself, is only one of a considerable number of important questions relating to Palestine which should be considered and weighed together by the Cabinet Committee which is being organized. That Committee is, or soon will be, the proper body to determine, in consultation with the British, etc., the financial needs of Palestine and the extent to which and the manner in which the United States Government should assist. Enactment of this legislation at this time would jump the gun.

2. From the point of view of our relations with the Arab world, this legislation would have an extremely bad effect because of the recognition of the Jewish Agency as "an appropriate borrower" under the Act. The Jewish Agency, in theory, acts as the representative before the Government of Palestine of all Jews, Zionist and non-Zionist. It is so recognized under the Mandate, and, as Mr. Nathan points out, is authorized to develop the country's natural resources under supervision of the Government. In fact, however, it is a Zionist-dominated organization and is regarded by the Arabs as the principal agency by which the Zionists are moving to achieve economic and political domination of Palestine. The Arabs would, therefore, regard such a provision as clinching evidence that the United States Government will back Zionist political aspirations in Palestine by its overwhelming economic and financial power. Moreover, the Arabs would jump to the conclusion, however unwarranted, that since no Arab borrowing agency is mentioned, they would receive no benefit, or that their benefits would be controlled by this Jewish organization. It is precisely because of the extreme care with which proposals of this sort must be considered, that the Cabinet Committee is being formed.

3. The Export-Import Bank is perfectly capable of deciding what organization or organizations are acceptable as borrowers. Its judgment in such a matter should not, as a matter of principle, be restricted in any way.

In conclusion, we would suggest that, if possible, Mr. Nathan's proposal be turned over to the Cabinet Committee, when formed, for appropriate consideration. If an immediate decision is required, you might wish to inform Mr. Nathan orally that work on the report of

⁵⁹ See memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, April 16, p. 583.

the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry will have to reach a somewhat more advanced stage before the Department will be able to take a position on legislation of this type.

867N.01/6-746

The British Minister (Balfour) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1946.

DEAR LOY: Gordon Merriam⁶⁰ recently drew Michael Tandy's⁶¹ attention informally to statements alleged to have been made to the Syrian Government and to Saudi Arabian citizens by British officials in Syria and Saudi Arabia, of which you had learned in reports from the United States Legations at Beirut and Jedda.

These alleged statements, you will remember, were to the effect that the British members of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry had yielded to the pressure of their American colleagues (and specifically to an ultimatum that non-compliance would prejudice passage of the British loan) before acquiescing in proposals favourable to further Jewish immigration into Palestine. It was also learned that American Civil Aviation interests in the Near East believe themselves to have been placed at a commercial disadvantage with competitive British interests by these alleged statements.

His Majesty's Minister at Beirut⁶² gives a categorical denial to the charge that such statements have been made by British officials within his jurisdiction and further points out that, when the Pan-American Airways mission to Syria paid its second visit to Damascus on the 2nd May, the Anglo-American Committee's report had only just been published. Moreover the mission had left Syria before the press campaign against the report had fully developed. Shone is, however, aware that suspicions of this kind are unfortunately entertained in local American circles. He cites a specific charge voiced by a member of the American community in Beirut that the British Press Office is responsible for whatever anti-American tone the Arabic press may on occasions display. The charge is quite unfounded and, as you probably know, His Majesty's Legation at Beirut have been in communication with the United States Legation upon the point.

It would at the same time be idle to deny that Arab public opinion is inclined to lay a large measure of responsibility for the Committee's recommendations upon its American members, in view of the known

⁶⁰ Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁶¹ Presumably A. H. Tandy, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

⁶² Sir Terence A. Shone.

sympathy and influence commanded by Jewish interests in the United States. The Arab press is, however, little, if any, less bitter against His Majesty's Government, among other counts, for having invited the cooperation of the United States in the solution of the Palestine question!

With regard to the charges in respect of Saudi Arabia, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda ⁶³ reports that there is an insistent conviction in Arab circles of American pressure, both inside and outside the Committee of Enquiry, which it is quite impossible to remove by argument. He further suggests the possibility that Saudi Arabians, voicing this assumption in conversation with members of the United States Legation, may have invented local British support for it, in the hope both of strengthening their story and of embarrassing British officials. He is in any event positive that no such statements have been made by any responsible member of his staff.

As you have no doubt been informed, the London *Times* recently reported that the British Cabinet had had an opportunity of learning from the British members of the Anglo-American Committee the factors which influenced the production of a unanimous report. Grafftey-Smith points out that to many Arabs a plain statement of this kind inevitably suggests, however unjustifiably, the thesis of American pressure. He concludes by saying that, if the accusation were true, it would argue a complete lack of moral courage and individual conscience in the British members of the Committee. Consequent damage to British prestige in the Arab world would so clearly outweigh any temporary commercial advantage that it is difficult to believe that British officials would circulate such allegations.

Mr. Bevin, who has learned of these charges with some concern, wishes the State Department to be assured that he fully shares their desire that no encouragement should be given either to Arabs or Jews in any efforts they may make to drive a wedge between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government on the Palestine issue. He regrets that the United States Ministers in Beirut and Jedda do not appear to have approached their British colleagues before reporting to Washington and asks me informally to recommend this procedure, should subsequent difficulties of this nature arise.

Please feel free to use this letter as you think fit. I wonder whether, for example, you think advantage should be taken of Colonel Eddy's visit to Washington to ascertain more precise details, such as the names of the members of the British Legation staff alleged to have made the statements, as well as those of the Saudi Arabian nationals to whom

⁶³ Laurence B. Grafftey-Smith.

the alleged statements were made. If so, Tandy or I are entirely at your disposal for further discussion.⁶⁴

Yours sincerely,

JOHN BALFOUR

867N.01/6-746 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton)

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1946.

198. At Press Conference June 6 correspondent stated it is understood that US and Brit are committed to consult Arab and Jewish interests before determining any permanent long-range policy for Palestine and asked President why cannot US insist on immediate admission of 100,000 Jews as recommended by the Anglo-American Committee without regard to such long-term consultations. President replied that we had made such a recommendation to Great Britain but there were certain details and obstacles which would have to be overcome such as housing, road building and other things. President added that the Foreign Ministers were now working on it.

Correspondent asked President if what he said meant that Great Britain has agreed that 100,000 Jews should be allowed to enter Palestine. President said that it did not and that he had made a statement on what we would like to do in order to settle the matter. He added that we and Great Britain were trying to come to a conclusion on it.

Sent Jerusalem, repeated Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus and London.

BYRNES

867N.01/6-746

Memorandum by the Acting State Department Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Matthews) to the Secretary of the Committee (Moseley)

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1946.

The British Government has proposed, in connection with the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, that experts of the British and American Governments should meet as soon as possible to discuss certain implications arising out of the Committee's

⁶⁴ In a memorandum of June 17, Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs noted:

"In commenting on Mr. Balfour's letter to Mr. Henderson of June 7, Colonel Eddy told me that every British official who has recently talked to him in the Middle East has said officially that the British have been forced into their present stand on Palestine through the actions of the United States.

"Yusef Yassin also told Colonel Eddy that the British in Saudi Arabia have informed him that they would have taken a more pro-Arab stand in regard to Palestine if it had not been for United States pressure." (867N.01/6-746)

recommendations. A list of the topics on which the British Government desires the views of this Government is attached⁶⁵ (Appendix A) and it will be observed that several of these questions are of particular interest to the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is particularly true in the case of the points raised with respect to Committee recommendations numbers 4 and 10 as well as certain general questions raised by the British regarding the report as a whole (see page 3 of Appendix A). Copies of the Committee's report have already been furnished the Secretariat.

In order that representatives of this Government may be prepared to discuss fully the various issues with the British experts, it is requested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments be obtained with respect to the particular items referred to above as well as any other issues arising from the report.

As the possibility of this Government's sharing with the British Government in a future trusteeship for Palestine under the United Nations has been mentioned in various quarters and may be formally proposed by the British Government, it would also be appreciated if the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments would indicate their views as to whether from a long range standpoint, having regard to this country's national interests, to our position in the United Nations, and to our interest in the security of the Middle East as of other areas it would be advantageous for this Government to undertake a joint trusteeship with Great Britain for Palestine.

It is further requested this inquiry be treated as a matter of high priority in view of the proposal of the British Government that discussions regarding this entire question begin not later than June 13.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

867N.01/6-1146 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁶⁶

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 10, 1946.

Top Secret and Personal. Thank you for your telegram.⁶⁷ I am very glad to hear that you will be able to send a group of officials to discuss the problem with our officials here.

2. You will, of course, understand that His Majesty's Government will not feel able to determine their policy on any one of the Committee's recommendations until they have examined the results of the

⁶⁵ See undated telegram from the British Prime Minister to President Truman, p. 612.

⁶⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on June 11. The substance of the message had been furnished to the Department the previous day, however; see footnote 68, p. 624.

⁶⁷ Of June 5, p. 617.

official consultations on the Report as a whole. As regards the admission of 100,000 immigrants for example, it is necessary to consider not only the physical problems involved but also the political reactions and possible military consequences. These in turn may be found to depend to some extent on the conclusions reached in respect of the Committee's other recommendations.

3. In the circumstances we consider that it is preferable that the discussions should begin with the full groups on both sides and doubt whether any useful purpose would be served by the sending of an advance party.

867N.01/6-1046 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)*⁶⁸

SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1946—7 p. m.

4600. For Amb Harriman. On May 27 we received through Brit Emb a message from PriMin Attlee to President listing various problems raised as result of report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry which Attlee suggested should be the subject of discussions between the experts of two Govts. Attlee also suggested that these discussions might conveniently be initiated about June 13. In our telegram to you, 4482 of June 5,⁶⁹ President asked you to inform PriMin that we doubted that our plans would be sufficiently advanced to enable us to begin discussions on whole report by June 13 but that we were planning to send to London by that date one or more experts to discuss the urgent physical problems arising out of transfer of 100,000 Jews.

President is setting up a Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems⁷⁰ under chairmanship of SecState composed of Secretaries of State, War and Treasury. The members of this

⁶⁸ The drafting of this telegram was completed on June 10, presumably before the Department knew of Mr. Attlee's message, *supra*. At 5:10 p. m., June 10, by which time Mr. Henderson had been apprised of the message, he sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State which said in part: "We feel that regardless of this message from Attlee, the experts whom we have assembled should go on to London as planned and endeavor to assist the Embassy in carrying on at least preliminary talks with the British officials. If they don't go we may be bogged down for several weeks and a delay of this kind would be unfortunate at this time." (867N.01/6-1046)

⁶⁹ See footnote 57, p. 617.

⁷⁰ This was done under Executive Order 9735, June 11; for text of order and statement made the same day by President Truman, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 23, 1946, p. 1089. Mr. Henderson had sent to Mr. Acheson on May 23 a draft outline of the composition and functions of what was then described as an "Inter-Departmental Commission on Palestine" (867N.01/5-2346).

Committee are to appoint alternates who will organize a group to assist in early consideration of recommendations of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and of views which may be submitted as a result of the consultations thereon and in the determination of the steps to be taken by this Govt in regard to Palestine and related problems.

In view of the urgency of the problems of the displaced Jews in Europe it has been decided that without waiting for organization of this group to be completed conversations should begin at once in London with purpose of examining physical problems which would be involved in transfer to Palestine of 100,000 Jews. These discussions with Brit are to be of a purely exploratory nature as it is not possible for two Govts to reach any definite decisions in this matter until after June 20, the date by which the comments of Arabs and Jews with regard to the report as a whole should be received.

It would be appreciated if you would undertake these discussions with the assistance of a group of experts who are planning to depart by air from Washington for London on June 12. They will bring with them written instructions regarding their mission. No publicity is being given to purpose of this mission although departure of group will undoubtedly become known. Group will comprise Evan Wilson, Assistant Chief of NE, L. W. Cramer, Office of Assistant Secretary Hildring, and probably three army officers who are being designated by War Dept. War Dept has advised ComGenUSFET and ComGenUSFA of Mission and has suggested their holding suitable officers available for participation in London discussions. If you agree this would be desirable please immediately inform the Commands direct.

It is intended that members of preliminary group will remain in London only so long as they are needed to assist Emb in carrying on discussions pending arrival in London of representatives of President's Cabinet Committee. We would like in particular for Wilson to return to Washington to assist in connection with general work of Cabinet Committee⁷¹ just as soon as you feel he can be spared.

Please immediately inform FonOff of foregoing and provide all appropriate assistance to preliminary group such as secretarial help, office space, etc. Dept cannot stress too highly importance of this mission and feel certain Emb will cooperate to fullest extent possible.

BYRNES

⁷¹ In a memorandum of June 18, 1946, to Mr. Acheson, Mr. Henderson stated: "More generally speaking, we believe that the Department ought to yield place to the Cabinet Committee in regard to the Palestine question and not to take any action regarding it except at the Committee's direction or with its concurrence." Mr. Acheson noted his agreement in a marginal notation. (867N.00/6-1846)

[In an address to the Labor Party Conference at Bournemouth on June 12, 1946, British Foreign Secretary Bevin stated that he would have to place another division of British troops in Palestine if 100,000 Jews were placed there tomorrow and that he was not prepared to do so. Moreover, he stated, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be unable to carry the tremendous financial burden involved.]

867N.01/6-1446

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁷²

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

In reply to your telegram of June 10 concerning the Palestine talks, I of course agree that it will not be possible for our two Governments to reach any definitive decisions regarding any of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee until after June 20. I also am appreciative of the considerations which will undoubtedly impel your Government to give the most careful consideration to determining its future action regarding all of the Committee's recommendations including that pertaining to the 100,000 Jews.

Nevertheless, I consider that our two Governments should without delay endeavor to make detailed plans for the transfer of the 100,000 Jews to Palestine. These plans would thus be ready for use when definite decisions are made. I feel moreover that considerable time would be saved, when the two Governments discuss all of the various matters relating to the report, if such plans had already been devised. It is for this reason that we are instructing our Ambassador in London, Mr. Harriman, to initiate preliminary conversations at once with representatives of your Government relative to these technical and physical problems. He will be assisted by a group of representatives of the State and War Departments who are proceeding to London this week.

We are organizing as rapidly as possible the group which is to go to London to discuss the report in more detail. Meanwhile, however, I hope that your Government will agree to begin now the exploratory conversations relative to the purely technical issues involved in the transfer to Palestine of the 100,000 Jewish displaced persons, whose situation requires such urgent attention.

⁷² Sent to London as Department's telegram 4722, with the instruction: "Following message is for delivery to Premier Attlee from President."

867N.01/6-1446 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁷³

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 14 June, 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. I am glad to be able to tell you that a delegation of British officials has now been constituted for the purpose of discussing the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry with the United States officials whom you are sending to London. The Delegation is composed of Representatives of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Treasury and the Services. Its Chairman is Sir Norman Brook, additional Secretary to the Cabinet.

This Delegation will make contact immediately with the advance party expected tomorrow from Washington, with a view to preparing the ground for their discussions with the Representatives of your Cabinet Committee. I should like, however, to draw your attention again to the decision of His Majesty's Government, to which I referred in my telegram of June 10th, that we cannot determine our policy on any one of the Committee's recommendations until we have examined the results of the official consultations on the Report as a whole. More particularly, we cannot contemplate accepting the proposal to admit large numbers of Jews to Palestine without very careful consideration of the effects which such a decision, when announced, would have in the light of the other proposals we were making at the same time. Tension is mounting in Palestine and we are satisfied that precipitate action on the immigration question alone would provoke widespread violence. I am sure you will appreciate that His Majesty's Government cannot take this risk.

867N.01/6-1746 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, June 17, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 12:07 p. m.]

198. Summary Jewish Agency's reply to request for comments on Anglo-American Committee report is as follows:

1. Views regarding and reasons for Jewish state "remain valid and unaltered".

⁷³ Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, on June 15.

2. Urge immediate implementation recommendation for admission 100,000 Jewish victims of persecution and cancelation discriminatory land transfer laws. They hope Governments will cooperate in vast transport and resettlement involved.

3. Hesitation and delay in implementing above positive recommendations has given rise serious misgivings and such delay is considered indefensible with Jews still confined DP camps and their position generally in Europe deteriorating.

4. After implementation in good faith of recommendations that first 100,000 Jews be enabled reach Palestine immediately, Jewish Agency is prepared to discuss with Governments US and UK any matters arising out of Committee recommendations.

Full text by airmail.

PINKERTON

867N.01/6-1946: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, June 19, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 8:20 p. m.]

292. Following are synopses of:

- (1) Reply ⁷⁴ to our memorandum of May 20; and
- (2) Comment on Palestine Committee's 10 recommendations, (reLegtel 290, June 17 ⁷⁵).

1. League is glad United States Government recognized recommendations as advisory only, considers Committee possessed neither legality nor permanency, believes some members lacked impartiality, nevertheless facilitated enquiry because of cherished friendly relations with peace-loving United States endangered by clamorous American Jewry seeking American support for Jewish state.

Interference by these American Jews in violation rights of Palestine Arabs and consequent investment Jewish-American funds for political objective merit censor [*censure?*] rather than favor of United States Government. Resulting Palestine question was not created by Nazi persecutions but by earlier mistaken British policy based on Balfour Declaration.⁷⁶ Palestine offers no solution to Jewish problem. Support of Zionism is persecution of Palestine Arabs. In confusion of two questions justice is lost.

Had United States attempted solve racial persecution on world-wide humanitarian basis, Arabs would have gladly lent support.

⁷⁴ By the League of Arab States.

⁷⁵ Not printed; it reported that Secretary-General Azzam had handed to Mr. Wadsworth on June 15 a note transmitting the League's reply (890B.00/6-1746).

⁷⁶ For text of letter concerning a Jewish national home in Palestine written by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Walter Rothschild on November 2, 1917, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. iv, p. 752, footnote 14.

American material and moral aid have led Zionists to believe they can dictate their will in Palestine. To this end they have organized armed forces. While United States works for United Nations principles, clamorous American Zionists work to precipitate clash between Arab and American policies and interests.

If Zionist threat of force continues Arabs cannot stand supine. It is unlikely a clash could be localized. Mandatory power's inability to disband Zionist army is already apparent. Surely United States does not support policy of might against right. Even worse, these developments and American support of Zionism is poisoning Arab thought and engendering hitherto unknown anti-Semitism. Had these energies and funds been directed elsewhere for solution of Jewish problem good fruit for all would have resulted.

We share sincerely American Government's desire that firm good political, economic and cultural relations continue despite efforts of political Zionists and hope avoid necessity defend existence of Palestine Arabs.

We are sending British Government, now responsible for administration of Palestine, detailed comment on Committee's biased recommendations. It should know that neither Zionist forces nor its own can free it from former pledges or basic policy of 1939 White Paper.

Finally, knowing Committee Enquiry does not constitute consultations promised by United States Government, we stress that this reply should likewise not be so construed. True consultation requires better opportunity for exchange of views and understanding. We recall Roosevelt letter of April 5, 1945 to Ibn Saud.⁷⁷

2. Partiality towards Zionist case has been shown by some members of Committee. Clearly too some came to carry out already formulated policy, such as recommendation that 100,000 immigrants be accepted this year, no more no less, same figure proposed by President Truman. In general, recommendations do not follow logically from fact finding.

Hurried enquiry precluded penetration to basic facts of Palestine situation. Due consideration was not given rights of rising Arab nationalism or of Arab League to speak for regional interests. Recommendations contravene interests of every Arab nation.

Committee was influenced by sentimental tides and failed give practical consideration to problems inherent in its recommendations. Those based on economic projects are impossible because contingent upon cooperation between Arabs and Zionists. Recommended immigration ignores legal and natural Arab rights. On fundamentals Committee's apparent desire to impose particular policy by force cannot be reconciled with principles of democracy and United Nations.

First recommendation strangely reports hopelessness of finding homes for Jews except in Palestine when vast areas exist especially in

⁷⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 698.

British Empire and United States. Transfer to Palestine can only mean sacrifice of Palestine on altar of Zionist political greed.

Second recommendation. Another strange contradiction is recognition that 100,000 would be heavy load on Palestine, that even without immigration population density of its settled area will rise in 14 years to 450 per square mile, and that Palestine is poor in resources and industrial possibilities.

Third recommendation. Principles here enunciated would impair government by majority and envisage unjust equalization of position, Arab rights being based on over thousand years settlement whereas Jews rely on weak historical association severed 2,000 years ago. This is contrary to practice and law of nations, discriminating against Palestine Arabs and depriving them of rights enjoyed in other Arab lands.

Fourth recommendation. To continue present government until hostility between Jew and Arab disappears would violate mandate itself. Jews seek majority and Jewish state; Arabs will never admit this Zionist dream, now encouraged by Committee's views on immigration.

Fifth recommendation. Palestine Arab living standard is not inferior to those in Egypt, Syria or Lebanon where no conflict exists with prosperous Jewish communities. Basis of conflict in Palestine is forced establishment of Jews of heterogeneous cultures; additional reason is mandatory budgeting of 5 per centums for education, health and social services against 30 per centums for security and officials.

Sixth recommendation. Continued immigration would ignore Arab rights; already percentage Arab population has been reduced to 69 from 87 in 1922. White Paper voiced decisive conviction that immigration had already injured position and rights of Arabs.

Seventh recommendation. Committee ignored fact that several earlier British attempts along lines now recommended resulted in complete failure; also that 1940 land transfer regulations were result studied British effort to afford Arabs just protection.

Eighth recommendation. Suggests projects requiring cooperation of neighboring Arab states, whereas no Arab state would further any project furthering Zionist expansion, a danger to themselves as well. No project for Palestine development can be considered unless guarantee be given that Arab character of Palestine will be maintained.

Ninth recommendation re education is reasonable, but so long as mandate and present policy continue sufficient funds cannot be envisaged. This is additional reason for Palestine independence.

Tenth recommendation. Whereas British treated Arabs with utmost severity when they rose to defend natural rights, Jewish aggression meets patience and tolerance and Jews are not disarmed. Arab Higher Committee was suppressed without due proofs, whereas

Jewish Agency is unmolested although refusing cooperation in restoration of order and companion of terrorists. To put Arab and Jews on same level in this regard falsifies situation.

(Paraphrases to Arab capitals).

WADSWORTH

867N.01/6-1946: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to
President Truman*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 19, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received June 19—2: 49 p. m.]

6109. Personal and Top Secret for the President and the Acting Secretary. Repeated to AmEmbassy Paris Top Secret and Personal for the Secretary. The Prime Minister asked me to call late this afternoon to inform me that the British Government was much concerned over the terrorist developments in Palestine. He said that the military in Palestine had so far acted with great restraint although there had been certain British soldiers killed. They were now concerned, however, over reports of plots to kidnap and hold as hostages British officers and plans to expand the terrorist activities. He expected to have a fuller report from Palestine tomorrow morning and then the Cabinet will meet to decide what action should be taken. He told me he would advise me of the decisions taken. In the meantime he asked that I inform you in the strictest confidence of his concern.

The Prime Minister said he thought it would be helpful if Mr. Grady⁷⁸ and his associates could come to London as soon as possible.

I hope to be able to give you fuller information tomorrow.

HARRIMAN

867N.01/7-246

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee*⁷⁹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 21 June 1946.

With regard to the request of 7 June 1946 by the Acting State member, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Appendix), fol-

⁷⁸ Henry F. Grady, alternate for the Secretary of State on the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems; for statement by Mr. Byrnes, released June 11, on Mr. Grady's appointment, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 23, 1946, p. 1089. Goldthwaite H. Dorr and Herbert E. Gaston served as alternates for the Secretaries of War and Treasury, respectively.

⁷⁹ Circulated within the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on June 21 as SWNCC 311. The Committee agreed, on June 27, to transmit the JCS paper to the Department of State. In telegram 3142, June 26, 1946, from Paris (DelSec 634), the Secretary directed Mr. Acheson to "make certain that the President sees the JCS paper on Palestine". Mr. Acheson responded in telegram 3129, June 27, 1946 (Secdel 360), that he had handed the paper to the President. (740.00119 Council/6-2646)

lowing are comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on certain topics proposed by the British for joint consideration in connection with the recommendations of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine.* It will be noted that no definitive recommendations are offered on many of the difficult political aspects of this problem, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not feel they should advise.

We urge that no U.S. armed forces be involved in carrying out the Committee's recommendations. We recommend that in implementing the report, the guiding principle be that no action should be taken which will cause repercussions in Palestine which are beyond the capabilities of British troops to control.

Should the question of using any U.S. forces arise, we would point out that, under present War and Navy Department commitments to the Congress, only very limited forces could be spared from tasks in which we are already engaged. Such contingents might in theory be of a size to contribute to pacifying the situation *in Palestine*, but we believe that the political shock attending the reappearance of U.S. armed forces in the Middle East would unnecessarily risk such serious disturbances throughout the area as to dwarf any local Palestine difficulties. Such a condition would, among other effects, invalidate entirely any current estimates of required strengths of the Army and Navy. Further, the Middle East could well fall into anarchy and become a breeding ground for world war.

It is believed that implementation of the report by force would prejudice British and U.S. interests in much of the Middle East and that British and U.S. influence would consequently be curtailed except as it might be maintained by military force. The USSR might replace the United States and Britain in influence and power through the Middle East.

As to the importance of a stable Middle East, friendly to the Western Powers, it is obvious that this area is the buffer between Russia and the British Mediterranean life line. If the peoples of the Middle East turn to Russia, this would have the same impact in many respects as would military conquest on this area by the Soviets. Under these conditions, even if Turkey maintains her internal and political integrity, it is highly questionable that she could continue her stand on the Dardanelles⁵⁰ and maintain her position as other than a satellite Russian state. Also, for very serious consideration from a military

*A limited number of copies of this report was circulated to the State, War and Navy Departments with SWN-4393 dated 7 June 1946. [Footnote in the original.]

⁵⁰ For documentation on the question of the Turkish Straits, see pp. 801 ff.

point of view is control of the oil of the Middle East.⁸¹ This is probably the one large undeveloped reserve in a world which may come to the limits of its oil resources within this generation without having developed any substitute. A great part of our military strength, as well as our standard of living, is based on oil.

As to U.S. participation in a Palestine trusteeship, we consider that military advice must rest on our supposition that such participation would lead to military involvement, on which subject our views are stated above.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that in implementing the report of the Anglo-American Committee, no action be taken which would:

- a. Commit U.S. armed forces, or
- b. Orient the peoples of the Middle East away from the Western Powers, as the U.S. has a vital security interest in that area.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFARLAND
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary

867N.01/6-2146: Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Kuniholm) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, June 21, 1946—noon.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

296. Lebanese Foreign Office yesterday gave me:

- (1) Reply to our memorandum of May 20;
- (2) Copy of Lebanese reply to British note of same date;
- (3) Copy of the comment furnished British Government on recommendations of Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry;
- (4) Copy of note inviting British Government to begin immediate negotiations with all Arab Governments for an accord to settle Palestine problem in conformity with objectives and principles of United Nations.

Lebanese action conformed closely to procedure forecast by Arab League Secretary General Azzam (reference Legation's telegram 290, June 17⁸²) and argument was in harmony with reply and comment of Arab League (reference Legation's telegram 292, June 19).

Lebanese position, expressed more emphatically to British than to US, was denial of right of United States to take any unilateral action on Palestine outside framework of United Nations, and insistence that

⁸¹ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 18 ff.

⁸² Not printed, but see footnote 75, p. 628.

the only juridically interested parties were Arab states themselves and Great Britain as mandatory power; these parties by negotiation should reach agreement on Palestine to be submitted to General Assembly of UN. Both competence and authority of Palestine Commission was rejected.

[Here follows summary of the four Lebanese documents.]

Copies of all four notes were forwarded to Department this morning by air pouch and paraphrases to Arab capitals.

KUNIHOLM

867N.01/6-2146 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, June 21, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received June 22—8:36 a. m.]

1108. Legation received this morning note dated yesterday from Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs reply to Legation's note No. 128 of June 1 transmitting portent of Dept's cirtel May 19 and replying that Egyptian Govt had studied Anglo-American Committee's report in conjunction with states of Arab League and transmitting note containing its observations and recommendations together with translation of memo addressed to US Govt by Secretary General Arab League. Memo from Egyptian Govt contains five general observations followed by specific comment on each of Committee's recommendations:

(1) After Committee was appointed partiality of portion of Committee towards Zionism was revealed, others were known Partisans of Zionism before nomination.

(2) Committee or certain of its members were designated to ratify a policy established in advance its recommendation of 100,000 Jews coinciding with number recommended by Truman proves absence of logical link between truths which Committee admitted and its recommendations.

(3) Committee by its haste failed to get to bottom of essential questions. It did not give these questions sufficient attention: Arab Nationalism and its right to life and development; Arab League and its right to organize relations between members and to safeguard regional interests.

(4) Recommendations not practical; based on sentiment not study of economic, military and administrative problems emanating from recommendations. Economic project based on unrealizable collaboration. Immigration was recommended before effect on life of Arabs and their legitimate rights was ascertained.

(5) Committee contradicted itself particularly on principles as when it pretended to hold to principles of democracy and of UN Charter at same time it imposes its determined policy on people deserving democratic life and right of decision on their own political fate.

[Here follow specific Egyptian comments on each of the Committee's recommendations, a statement that it was a manifest impossibility to reconcile the claims of Arabs and Jews, and a discussion of the Arab League's reply to the Committee report.]

TUCK

[The comments of the Iraqi Government on the Committee's recommendations were transmitted by Baghdad in telegrams 347, June 20, 1946, and 354, June 21; those of Abdullah, King of Trans-Jordan, were sent in Jerusalem's telegram 201, June 19. In general, they paralleled the comments made by other Arab sources. (867N.01/6-2046, /6-2146, /6-1946) In telegram 356, June 21, Baghdad reported an official statement by the Iraqi Government that the Arab states would regard acceptance of the recommendations as an unfriendly act, that the Arab League reserved full freedom of action to resist aggression and that full responsibility for the troubles which would take place in Palestine and other Arab lands would rest on those who upheld and carried out the Committee's report (867N.01/6-2146).]

867N.01/6-2546 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Clark) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JIDDA, June 25, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 8 : 45 p. m.]

196. From Childs.⁸³ Azzam Pasha informed me upon his return from Bludan⁸⁴ to Cairo 22nd, members of Arab League had decided unanimously to open negotiations with British Government as mandatory power for Palestine re determination its future status. Collective note in this sense was addressed by League to British Government

⁸³ J. Rives Childs, the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia.

⁸⁴ An extraordinary meeting of the Arab League Council convened at Bludan, Syria, from June 8 to 12, 1946. The question of Palestine was the chief matter discussed. Of the decisions made public, the following were the most significant: The formation of a Palestine Committee of the Arab League and of a supreme Arab Committee in Palestine; a call for the demobilization and disarmament of the Zionists in Palestine; and the formation of a special fund for Palestine to which all Arab Governments would contribute (despatch 448, June 19, 1946, from Damascus, filed under 890B.00/6-1946).

Secret decisions were also made at Bludan. The latter provided that if the American and British Governments accepted the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and attempted to put them into execution, the Arab countries would defend themselves by not giving them any new concessions; by not supporting their special interests in any educational institution; by a moral boycott; by considering cancellation of any concession in the Arab world; and by complaining to the United Nations and to the Security Council of the United Nations. The secret decisions were transmitted from Beirut in despatch No. 188, October 16, 1947, by Lowell C. Pinkerton, who at that time was Minister to Lebanon. He noted that he "had no reason to doubt that the veil of secrecy has been removed from the Bludan Secret Decisions." (890B.00/10-1647)

on June 15 and Arab states, members of United Nations, had addressed individual notes on same subject.

Action was taken by those states as ones "directly concerned" under article 79 of UN Charter. If no agreement could be reached with British Government before September meeting of Assembly for joint Anglo-Arab submittal of agreed-upon project to that body the Arab states would at once submit proposals separately. Those states were prepared to accept British trusteeship for Palestine over period of 10 years if assurance obtainable of Palestine independence at end of period. Azzam expected and hoped reference of Palestine problem to United Nations to be welcomed by both American and British Governments as it would place problem where it belonged, not as exclusive concern of two powers but of all members of United Nations. Arab states fully prepared to accept their share burden helping solve humanitarian question displaced Jews but they see no reason why Palestine, an Arab country, should be called on to bear it in its entirety.

Above submitted in view its importance, notwithstanding it may have been received from other sources.

Sent Department as 196, repeated Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus, London. [Childs.]

CLARK

867N.01/6-2646 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁸⁵

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 25, 1946—9:30 p. m.

URGENT

[Received June 26—1:20 p. m.]

Personal and Top Secret. The American and British officials who are making a combined study of the implications of the Anglo-American Committee's second recommendation, proposing the early immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, are now within sight of the end of their work. I understand that it should be possible for the American experts to leave London for Washington before the end of this week.

I know you share my anxiety that discussion of the other nine recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee's report should be put in hand at once. The Jews and Arabs have now replied to our request for their comments and we must expect increasing pressure for a decision on the report as a whole. The local situation in Palestine is difficult and is not made easier to handle by the uncertainty about the attitude of our two Governments to the report.

⁸⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House on June 26.

I therefore suggest that the second phase of the conversations between officials should begin during the week ending 6th July. The British delegation will be ready at any time after the beginning of that week to welcome Mr. Grady and his colleagues.

867N.01/6-2646 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Childs)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1946—7 p. m.

173. In your discretion you are authorized to speak to King or Foreign Minister, when you present your credentials, along following lines.

King's letter ⁸⁶ was taken directly to President Truman by Colonel Eddy day he arrived in Washington. President has studied letter carefully and will reply soon.

We of course regret that Saudi Arabian Govt was disappointed in report of Joint Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. We sincerely hope that SAG will give full consideration and weight to all sections of report, which we feel was an honest effort to reach balanced and equitable conclusions.

Recommendation that 100,000 Jewish refugees be admitted to Palestine is a humanitarian proposal for relief of displaced persons and, in Committee's view, would not be a step toward a Jewish state. The Committee believed that 100,000 could be settled in Palestine without prejudice to the rights of Arabs now living there. It is further believed that admission of this number, when taken into account with other recommendations contained in report, would not constitute a change in basic situation.

At all events, overall policy of this Govt with respect to these questions has not been determined as yet and they are being given most careful examination and thought by recently constituted Cabinet Committee, which has duty of making policy recommendations to President.

It may be useful to recall that in course of its short history, US has received (between 1820 and 1938) more than 38 million immigrants, large numbers of whom might be classed as refugees, and that during the recent World War this country has received 250,000 refugees.

ACHESON

⁸⁶The communication cited in telegram 165, May 28, from Jidda, p. 615.

S67N.01/6-2746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, June 27, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received June 27—3:21 p. m.]

6342. For Merriam from Wilson. Final meeting this afternoon approved report prepared by Drafting Committee summarizing results of our conversations.⁸⁷

Preface of report states terms of reference of group and points out discussions were limited to physical and economic problems involved in recommendation 2 with no account taken of political and military repercussions or connection with other recommendations of Anglo-American Committee.

Body of report contains discussion of principal problems involved under headings of target, illegal immigration, method of selection, infiltration and measures whereby it might be checked, priority groups, issue of certificates by Jewish Agency under specific directive, transportation, reception in Palestine, rate of movement, cost of moving and absorbing the 100,000, provision of materials and supplies and general financial effect. Text of outline plan for operation is then given. Annexes give statistics regarding displaced Jews, rules governing issuance of certificates, and discussion of rate at which immigrants could be absorbed in Palestine. Latter annex comprises:

- (1) Statement of views of British Delegate;
- (2) Jewish Agency memorandum submitted by US and
- (3) report of Subcommittee comparing the two.

Among principal points made in report are that final decision on maximum rate could not in any event be taken without regard to political considerations connected with conditions in Europe and Palestine beyond scope of present discussions, that rates taken as basis for calculations in report are 4,000 and 10,000 monthly (with exception of transportation estimates which include higher hypothetical rates), but

⁸⁷ The exploratory conversations on the physical problems involved in the transfer of 100,000 Jews to Palestine began at London on June 17. On June 21, Sir Norman Brook requested Ambassador Harriman to transmit the request of the British Government that a representative of the United States Chiefs of Staff be sent to London to hear the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on overall Middle East strategic questions as they related to Palestine (867N.-01/6-2246). In telegram 466, June 23, 1946, from Paris to London, the Secretary of State expressed the view "that any military discussions between the British and US on the specific subject of Palestine are most undesirable at this time and that nothing should be done now which might be construed as indicating a US interest in the possibility of US military involvement in Palestine." (867N.-01/6-2346). Mr. Byrnes was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held at Paris from June 15 to July 12, 1946.

that nothing in report is intended to preclude either Govt from pressing for higher or lower figure. On cost of absorption, point is made that little difference exists between estimates of Agency and British Delegates when former are made to conform with latter's assumptions, that British Delegates do not consider cost of operation to be less than 100 million pounds from public or private sources, but that Agency has informed President Truman that even if requested assistance should not be forthcoming, they are prepared to bear entire cost as they estimate it. With regard to paper just submitted by British Delegates on general financial effect of admission of 100,000 and resultant expenditures in behalf of Arab population which British Govt would consider necessary, point is made that report of Anglo-American Committee is intended to be read as a whole and that start of movement of 100,000 should be accompanied by initiation of proposals of committee for improvement of Arab standards. Agreed defer this paper for later consideration.

Meeting discussed possible announcement to be made to press and matter will be considered further tomorrow.⁸⁸

As authorized by Dept Cramer is departing tomorrow morning for USFET for one day conference prior to returning to Washington. Dougherty, Billingsley, Lewis and I are scheduled to leave tomorrow afternoon by American Airlines flight 21 for Washington. [Wilson]

HARRIMAN

867N.01/6-2946 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁸⁹

TOP SECRET

[LONDON, undated.]

Top Secret and Personal. Prime Minister to President of the United States. In view of the continuance of terrorist activity in Palestine culminating in the recent kidnapping of six British officers, His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that drastic action can no longer be postponed. The High Commissioner has accordingly been authorised to take such steps as he thinks necessary to break up illegal organisations, including the arrest of any individ-

⁸⁸ According to telegram 6371, June 28, 1946, from London, a statement was issued by the British Foreign Office on June 28 with the approval of Ambassador Harriman. It stated that "Certain technical problems arising from recommendation No. 2 of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry have been examined with a view of preparing the ground for further discussions with the group of US officials representing the President's Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems which is expected to arrive in London shortly." (867N.01/6-2846)

⁸⁹ Delivered to the White House on the night of June 28; copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Lord Inverchapel in a letter of June 29.

uals against whom there is clear evidence that they are responsible for the present campaign of violence. The authority does not extend to any comprehensive disarming of the whole civil population at this stage.

I understand that the High Commissioner intends to take action early on the morning of Saturday, June 29th.⁹⁰ It is proposed to raid the Jewish Agency and to occupy it for a period necessary to search for incriminating documents. At the same time, members of the Agency considered implicated directly or indirectly in Hagana outrages will be arrested. Similar action will be taken in the case of headquarters of illegal organisations.

I regret that such action should have become necessary while we are engaged in discussing the report of the Anglo-American Committee; but we could not resist the conclusion that we could no longer, without abdication of our responsibility as the Mandatory Government, tolerate such open defiance and that, while discussions regarding the future of Palestine are proceeding, law and order must be maintained. We shall make it clear that our action is not merely made necessary by the recent outrages by the Jews but is also a first step towards restoring those conditions of order without which no progress can be made towards a solution of the long term problem. Our action will be directed, not only against the maintenance of existing private armies or similar illegal organisations, but also against their future creation by either community.

You will remember that the Anglo-American Committee called upon the Jewish Agency to resume active cooperation with the Mandatory Government in suppressing these illegalities. I need not add how much we should welcome any statement you may feel able to make indicating your support of our determination to bring to an end the violence and terrorism in the Holy Land.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Telegram 211, June 29, 10 a. m., from Jerusalem, reported that at an early hour of the morning, British military forces temporarily occupied the premises of the Jewish Agency and various buildings in Tel Aviv and searched several widely separated Jewish colonies in what was described as an "exceptionally large operation". It also noted the High Commissioner's statement that the "sole aim of present operations is suppression of violence rather than reprisals and that action taken against Agency was based upon evidence of its part in organization, direction and cooperation with terrorist groups." (867N.01/6-2946)

⁹¹ In a telegram of June 29, 1946, to President Truman, Ambassador Harriman stated: "The Prime Minister has sent me this morning for my personal information, a copy of the telegram which he had sent you earlier informing you of the action the British Government has taken regarding the terrorist activity in Palestine. If you do not wish to reply direct, is there any aspect of this situation which you would wish me to discuss informally with Mr. Attlee?" (867N.01/6-2946).

Mr. Truman responded as follows: "There does not appear to be any aspect of the Palestine situation that you should discuss informally with Attlee at the present time." (Department's telegram 5149, July 2, to London, 867N.01/7-246)

867N.01/7-146 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JIDDA, July 1, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received 8:20 p. m.]

207. Department's 173, June 26. Following presentation letter of credence Prince Faisal offered customary dinner to staff and leading members American community and I had opportunity to inform him that reply to King's letter might be expected soon, that overall Palestine policy not yet determined but being considered by Cabinet Committee.

In long discussion which followed, and which full report being made by despatch, Viceroy⁹² expressed considerable gratification that no final decision reached and expressed most earnest hope that decision would be a just one which would not prejudice the greatly valued friendship of the US by Saudi Arabia. He added Palestine question was matter of life and death to Arabs who viewed Zionist aspirations Palestine as having ultimate end of swallowing up Arab world. His statements were temperate but firm. He reiterated that Saudi Arabia and Arab world were placing great store in sense of justice of US.

In this initial talk with mouthpiece of King, I am convinced that unless we proceed with utmost circumspection in considering all phases of possible repercussions of Palestine question, we may raise difficulties for ourselves in this most strategic area of vital national interest which will plague US constantly in years to come and render abortive purposes to which we have subscribed in Charter of UN.

Sent Dept as 207, repeated Cairo as 90, Beirut as 8, Baghdad as 8, Jerusalem as 8, Damascus as 3.

CHILDs

867N.01/7-146 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁹³

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1946—8 p. m.

Personal and Top Secret. I share the feeling expressed in your message of 26 [25] June 1946 that the American Cabinet Committee on Palestine and the British delegation should initiate their discussions as soon as possible. The Committee has made arrangements to depart for London by air on July 13. It is now studying the problem and awaiting the return of the American experts who have been discussing in London the technical aspects of the early immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

⁹² Prince Faisal was Viceroy of the Hejaz.⁹³ Sent to London as Department's telegram 5126.

867N.01/7-246 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁹⁴

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

Replying to your message of June 28,⁹⁵ I join with you in regretting that drastic action is considered necessary by the mandatory government while discussions of the report of the Anglo-American Committee are in progress. I also join with you in a hope that law and order will be maintained by the inhabitants of Palestine while efforts are being made toward a solution of the long term policy.

867N.01/7-346

Press Release Issued by the White House, July 2, 1946

The President conferred today with the following American members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Mr. Louis Lipsky and Rabbi Abba H. Silver.

The representatives of the Jewish Agency gave the President their views of recent events in Palestine.

The President expressed his regret at these developments in Palestine. He informed the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the Government of the United States had not been consulted on these measures prior to their adoption by the British Government. He expressed the hope that the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine would soon be released and that the situation would soon return to normal.

The President added further that it was his determination that these most recent events should mean no delay in pushing forward with a policy of transferring 100,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine with all dispatch, in accordance with the statement he made upon the receipt of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The President indicated that the Government of the United States was prepared to assume technical and financial responsibility for the transportation of these immigrants from Europe to Palestine.

He expressed his thanks for the workmanlike suggestions embodied in the letter which the American members of the Jewish Agency Executive sent him on June 14 with respect to the technical and finan-

⁹⁴ Sent to London as Department's telegram 5150, with the instruction: "Kindly transmit following message from the President to PriMin."

⁹⁵ See undated telegram, p. 639.

cial problems involved in the transfer and resettlement of the 100,000 immigrants.

867N.01/7-446 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁹⁶

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 4, 1946—10:40 a. m.

[Received 1:55 p. m.]

Personal and Top Secret. I note from your telegram of 2nd [1st] July that the representatives of your Cabinet Committee plan to leave for London on 13th July to begin the second stage of the discussions on the Palestine report.

I am increasingly concerned about the timetable of these discussions in relation to our parliamentary situation here. I have promised that the House of Commons shall have an opportunity to debate the Palestine problem before Parliament rises for the summer recess on 2nd August. Parliamentary interest in this question is so keen that I could not deny facilities for this debate. But you will realize that in such a debate I shall be placed in an embarrassing position if no further progress has been made towards an agreement between our two Governments on at least the main recommendations of the report. It would certainly be very difficult to conduct such a debate in Parliament here while the discussions between officials of the two Governments were still proceeding in London.

I am also concerned about the effect in Palestine of delaying much longer a decision on the important issues dealt with in the report.

We have also to take into account the notification from the Arab states that, unless some arrangement satisfactory to them has been reached meanwhile, they will bring this matter forward at the meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations in September.

For all these reasons it has become a matter of the greatest urgency that the officials' discussion should begin at the earliest practical moment and be conducted with the utmost speed. I should have wished myself to set 20th July as a target date for the completion of their work. But if they do not begin until the 15th July I do not imagine that they can finish by the 20th. This moves me to ask yet again whether it would not be possible for them to leave Washington earlier. Every day gained is of value and I should still like to see these talks start as early as possible in the week beginning 8 July.⁹⁷

Thank you also for your further telegram of July 2 and for what you say therein. Best wishes.

⁹⁶ Copy transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the White House on July 4.

⁹⁷ In telegram 3293, July 5, 2 p. m., the Secretary of State, at Paris, requested "that this matter should be hurried up as much as possible." (867N.01/7-546)

867N.01/7-446 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁹⁸

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1946—9 p. m.

Personal. I fully appreciate the problems brought out in your message of July 4, and in compliance with your wishes we are arranging that our committee and their staff of 12 depart by air from Washington on Wednesday evening July 10. If there are no delays en route they should be in London ready to start discussions on Friday next.

I would appreciate it very much if you could talk personally with Ambassador Grady and Mr. Dorr upon their arrival.

I join you in the hope we can reach an agreement on the main recommendations of the report by the target date you mention.

HARRY TRUMAN

867N.01/7-946 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁹⁹

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 8 July, 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. Many thanks for your telegram of July 6th [5th] and for action you have taken to expedite the departure of your committee and their staff. We shall all here be ready for discussions to begin on Friday next.

I shall be delighted to see Ambassador Grady and Mr. Dorr upon their arrival and have asked Averell¹ to let me know immediately they arrive.

867N.01/7-946

*Memorandum on Matters Regarding Palestine To Be Considered Before the London Conference*²

*Probable
Recommendations
of Cabinet
Committee*

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Is U.S. willing to employ military forces? | No |
| 2. Is U.S. willing to act as Trustee or Co-Trustee in Palestine? | No |
| 3. Is U.S. willing to support Anglo-American Committee report as a whole, including "No Jewish, no Arab State"? | Yes |

⁹⁸ Sent to London as Department's telegram 5213.⁹⁹ Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Lord Inverchapel on July 9.¹ Ambassador Harriman.² Marginal notation: "Top page approved by President Truman in interview with Grady, July 9 '46". The authorship of the memorandum is not indicated but it was prepared, presumably, in the Cabinet Committee on Palestine. Attached to it is an undated "Memorandum of Board of Alternates to Cabinet Committee as to certain matters to be discussed with the British in London", not printed.

*Probable
Recommendations
of Cabinet
Committee*

4. Is President willing to ask Congress to admit say 50,000 non quota victims of Nazi persecution? Yes
5. Is President willing to ask the appropriate lending agencies (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank) for substantial funds for development of Middle-Eastern countries, including Palestine? Yes
6. Is President willing as part of the immediate 100,000 program to support admission of Palestine to the International Bank and a loan of up to \$200,000,000 for sound projects, or failing this a loan of \$50,000,000-\$100,000,000 by Export-Import Bank for such projects? Yes
7. Is President willing as part of 100,000 program* to ask Congress for grant-in-aid to Palestine of \$25,000,000 up to \$50,000,000 for aid in improving conditions of the people of Palestine on the assumption that the British government will make a like grant? Yes
8. Is President willing to end preferential displaced persons care for future infiltrees in Europe? Yes
9. Should any future announcements of our policy contain some emphasis on our interest in the Palestine situation as part of our larger interest in the peoples of the Middle East, their regained political equality and their economic development, and of our understanding at any rate of their points of view? Yes

867N.01/7-846

*President Truman to the King of Saudi Arabia
(Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud) ³*

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1946.

YOUR MAJESTY: It was a great pleasure to me to receive Your Majesty's letter of May 24, 1946 ⁴ containing your preliminary views regarding the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, which was brought to me by my good friend and former Minister to Your Majesty's Government, Colonel William A. Eddy, the day he arrived in Washington, and I wish to assure Your Majesty that it will be a very real help to me to have the benefit of Your Majesty's considered views on this most difficult question.

*Note: Total cost of 100,000 program estimated at \$450,000,000 (exclusive of costs of transportation which the U.S. will bear) of which Jewish sources estimate they can make \$250,000,000 available. [Footnote in the original.]

³ Sent to the Legation in Jidda in instruction No. 1, July 13, 1946, for transmittal to King Ibn Saud.

⁴ The communication cited in telegram 165, May 28, from Jidda, p. 615.

I am deeply gratified by the close and friendly relations which have always existed between our two Governments and between Americans and Saudi Arabs generally. Although the questions under discussion between us are not without difficulty, I sincerely trust that these relationships will remain cordial and strong in the future.

I was very pleased that Your Majesty recognized the humanitarian principles which have motivated this Government in its approach to the Palestine problem. American interest in this question is of long standing and has been accentuated by the dire and urgent needs of victims of Nazi persecution. I am very conscious of the deep significance which all Arabs attach to Palestine and I particularly welcomed the visit to Riyadh of a sub-committee of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The report of that Committee reflects the complexity of the situation in Palestine. Its unanimous recommendations made after careful and dispassionate study I feel sure you will agree call for careful consideration by all.

I am sincere in my belief that the admission to Palestine of 100,000 Jewish refugees this year would neither prejudice the rights and privileges of the Arabs now in Palestine, nor constitute a change in the basic situation. I am convinced that Palestine can absorb 100,000 additional residents through its existing economy without interfering with the present inhabitants.

I have appointed a Committee of three members of my Cabinet to ensure careful consideration of the report on our part and to advise me. To that end they will engage in discussions with the British Government. I am hopeful that the situation will be further clarified by consultations with the Arabs and the Jews and that we can remain in close touch with the interested parties on these questions.

With my sincere wishes for the continued health and happiness of Your Majesty and for the prosperity of your people, I have the honor to remain your very good friend.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/7-1946: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, July 19, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received July 19—2: 53 p. m.]

6851. Personal for Secretary from Grady. Since our arrival in London⁵ we have been in constant meetings with representatives of

⁵ The Cabinet Committee on Palestine arrived in London at noon, July 12, and conferred with the British Prime Minister early the same afternoon (867N.-01/7-1546).

the British Cabinet and have explored numerous possible solutions to the Palestine problem.

Our thinking is now along the lines of provincial autonomy under which plan Palestine would be divided into two partially self-governing Arab and Jewish provinces with an overall Central Govt. Jerusalem and the Hegeb [*Negev?*] would remain under the direct jurisdiction of the mandatory. (This plan seems to offer the only means now apparent of moving the 100,000 into Palestine in the near future. It is strongly backed by the British Govt)

The British have indicated no desire for our military aid or participation in a trusteeship. Present financial plans are well within the program outlined by us to the Cabinet Committee.

The British plan to invite the Jews and Arabs to London for consultations on a suggested settlement as soon as it is accepted by the British and American Govts. They presently expect to implement the plan under the mandate pending submission of a trusteeship agreement but if the proposed solution is not accepted by the Jews and Arabs the British indicate an intent to bring the matter before the United Nations. In any event it is expected that a report will be made to UN.

The plan as presented by the British is almost a verbatim copy of the plan for provincial autonomy submitted anonymously to the Anglo-American Committee in January by Sir Douglas Harris of the Colonial Office. Some changes in the plan are now under discussion. Copies of the plan without maps are in Anglo-American Committee files in care of Porter or Hurowitz.

I hope to be able to cable you the substance of a proposed agreement and an indication of the boundaries in the next few days. [Grady]

HARRIMAN

867N.01/7-2046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 20, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

2235. Heretofore, USSR has contrived to remain on fence regarding Palestine problem. It permitted and covertly encouraged its mouthpieces abroad to criticize Zionism. But inside USSR line was to play no favorites, commiserate with both Jews and Arabs, and denounce Anglo-American perfidy.

First clear indication of USSR sliding over to Arab side of fence appeared in lecture given by Victor D. Lutski. Lectures of this type are of course not private expressions of individual scholars but officially approved statements of Soviet point of view.

Main points of Lutski lecture were: (1) Anglo-American interest in Palestine is dictated by oil and military considerations; (2) Zionism is tool of imperialists and does not serve interests of Jewish masses; (3) "Large majority of Palestine's population consider it as Arab country and look upon Jews already living in country as citizens of future Arab independent democratic Palestine with full and equal rights."

[Here follow observations concerning the audience and a summary of the lecture and of the questions and answers.]

SecState pass to London as Moscow's 318 for Mr. Grady. Pass to Beirut; Beirut pouch to Jerusalem, Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo.

SMITH

867N.01/7-2246: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

JERUSALEM, July 22, 1946.

[Received July 22—1:26 p. m.]

242. Between 12:20 p. m. and 12:40 p. m. today large party armed Jews disguised as Arabs attacked and destroyed with heavy explosives large part of Palestine Government Secretariat located in Annex King David Hotel. While casualties both killed and wounded are believed to be large, no official statement yet issued. Officer Administering Government Sir John Shaw and Acting Chief Secretary Gutch, Attorney General Gibson, are known to have escaped injury. Hotel suffered severe damage. Americans in hotel and vicinity escaped injury. Total curfew on Jerusalem and all exits. Official communiqué will be issued later today.

[HOOPER]

867N.01/7-1946: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

5541. Personal from Secretary for Grady. Appreciate info contained Embtel 6851, July 19. Do not have copy Harris plan which in customs with other Anglo-American Committee documents. Clearance may occupy some time. Please telegraph summary Harris plan with changes thus far envisaged and airmail complete copy.

Are we to understand from urtel Brit do not contemplate transferring 100,000 displaced Jews from Europe to Palestine until agreement covering whole future of Palestine along lines Harris plan has

been approved by both Jews and Arabs or, in case Jews and Arabs do not agree, by UN? If such is Brit attitude we are concerned lest transfer these Jews will be almost indefinitely delayed. It has been our hope that some kind of agreement might be reached between Brit and ourselves which would make it possible for transfer Jews begin near future.

Would also like to raise following questions: 1) Who would control immigration and land transfers under Harris plan, the autonomous provincial Govts or over-all central Govts 2) Does Harris plan contemplate partition Palestine into two partially self-governing Arab and Jewish provinces under a trusteeship plus certain areas under central Govt without any provision for termination trusteeship in manner which would result eventually in an independent Jewish state and an independent Arab state. If so, what would be advantage this plan over one which would result immediate partition with full independence resultant Arab and Jewish states, leaving Arabs and Jews work out their differences directly thus avoiding difficulties and misunderstandings which are likely result from third-party supervision 3) Have Brit definitely refused agree to adopt plan along lines recommended in principle by Anglo-American Committee which might be acceptable to moderate elements both groups and which would permit immediate transfer of 100,000 4) What are specific Brit objections plan of Govt worked out here which would contemplate unitary Palestine based on Arab Jewish cooperation commencing on lowest local territorial levels extending upwards through larger territorial units into Govt itself.

BYRNES

867N.01/7-2246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 22, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received July 22—5: 13 p. m.]

6913. From Grady. Brook has just left with Ambassador Harriman and me the following draft of a reply to Arab note of June 19:

“His Majesty’s Government drew attention, in the notes which they communicated to the states members of the Arab League on 20th of May, to their previous undertaking that they would consult all parties concerned before they reached a decision on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine. In accordance with this undertaking they readily accept the proposal made by the Government of X, in concert with the other Arab Governments, to enter into negotiations on the subject of Palestine.

“His Majesty’s Government have the honour to invite the Government of X to send a delegation to London for this purpose. They will communicate to the Government of X as soon as possible the date which they will propose for the opening of negotiations. This date will, if possible, be so arranged as to enable the conversations to take place before the session of the United Nations General Assembly which, as at present planned, will begin on the 23rd of Sept, 1946. It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government that other interested parties shall be similarly consulted at the same time.”

Foreign Office proposes to send this by Wednesday noon, London time, and would welcome any comments Dept may wish to make prior to that time. Foreign Office feels necessity of not delaying reply further because presence of Dr. Weizmann here seems to have created impression in Arab countries that British Government is beginning negotiations with him on settlement of Palestine question.

I am assuming that Dept does not wish our participation in these negotiations. British Government is willing to have us participate but has feeling that such participation on our part might be out of line with their mandatory responsibilities and lead to demands from other non-mandatory countries to participate also in negotiations. I concur in this view. However, the question of our participation in the negotiations with the Arabs and Jews is not one that requires immediate decision. [Grady.]

HARRIMAN

867N.01/7-2246 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

5572. For Grady. Urtel 6913 July 22. We have no objection to Brit draft reply to Arab note of June 19. We are glad Brit not binding themselves to stop immigration into Palestine pending end of negotiations as requested by Syrian note to Brit copy of which furnished Dept in Emb despatch 827 June 25.⁶

We consider US commitment consult Arabs and Jews was discharged by our invitation May 20 for their views. However, we remain open for consultation by any and all interested parties whenever they desire.

We do not believe we should participate forthcoming negotiations between Brit, Jews and Arabs.

BYRNES

⁶ Not printed.

867N.01/7-2346 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1946.

5581. For Grady. The President today made following statement on Palestine "I have learned with deep regret of the destruction by a bomb of the building in Palestine in which were located the Palestine Government and the Brit military headquarters, resulting in the killing of approximately 50 men and women, soldiers and civilians. Every responsible Jewish leader, I am sure, will join me in condemning the wanton slaying of human beings. At this time representatives of the US Govt are in London conferring with representatives of the Brit Govt as to steps to be taken to implement the report of the Palestine Committee which recommended, among other things, the immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Such acts of terrorism will not advance, but on the contrary might well retard, the efforts that are being made, and will continue to be made, to bring about a peaceful solution of this difficult [problem.]"

Sent London, repeated Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo, Jidda.

BYRNES

867N.01/7-2446 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, July 24, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received July 24—8:32 a. m.]

6952. From Grady. Secret and Personal. We are today cabling you complete text of agreement on joint recommendations to both Govts on Palestine and I believe it merits most expeditious consideration and acceptance. The British are anxious to proceed with it without delay in view of developments in Palestine and of the impossibility of allowing situation to continue as it is. British Cabinet is considering transmitting to Arabs and Jews and then making them public proposals contained our agreement as soon as approved by our Govt. They would of course consult you formally on this before action and would contemplate simultaneous publication here and Washington.

Questions raised in your No. 5541 of July 22, 7 p. m. are answered in proposed agreement. (Joint committee unanimous in conviction plan agreed to is only realistic solution at this time particularly if any extensive Jewish immigration is to be realized.) It leaves ample

room for progress toward federation if Arabs and Jews find they can live together in harmony but in present state of tension provides for their segregation which British officials with long experience in Palestine Govt believes essential. Proposed provincial boundaries give Jews best land in Palestine, practically all citrus and industry, most of the coast line and Haifa port. Jewish legitimate demands including large measure of control of immigration and opportunity to develop national home, have been met with exception of Jerusalem and Negev. Christian interests must be taken into full account in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and disposition of Negev is remaining undetermined until its potentialities can be ascertained. I am not convinced that plan has been made so attractive to the Arabs but British are willing to negotiate with them on basis our agreement and as reported in my telegram No. 6913 of July 22 they want to convene appropriate representatives in London at earliest possible date. [Grady]

HARRIMAN

[In telegram 6956, July 24, 1946, 2 p. m., the Embassy in London transmitted a message from Mr. Grady to Mr. Henderson stating in part: "We have considered every phase of problem and see no practical alternatives to our recommendations. Moreover I seriously doubt under all circumstances that British would be willing to renegotiate on basis some alternatives. They have been most reasonable and completely cooperative." (867N.01/7-2446)]

867N.01/7-2446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 24, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received July 25—9:07 p. m.]

6970. From Grady. Secret and Personal to Secretary. Following is complete text of agreement reached unanimously with British Committee:⁷

"1. The British and United States Delegations have now examined as a whole the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry and have arrived at a common viewpoint on the broad principles of a policy for carrying out these recommendations. The following summary of these general principles is submitted for consideration by the two Governments.

⁷The Department files contain a version of the agreement printed (but not released) by the British Government entitled "Palestine: Statement of Policy", dated July 26, 1946. The British version differs from the one in this telegram primarily in minor matters of punctuation, capitalization, and the like. Footnotes will indicate how the versions differ in a substantive sense. The agreement is known as the Grady-Morrison Plan, the Morrison Plan, or the Provincial Autonomy Plan.

DISPLACED PERSONS AND THE POSITION OF EUROPEAN JEWS

2. There are two aspects to this problem—(I) re-settlement in Europe and (II) emigration to countries outside Europe.

The Anglo-American Committee recognized that the overwhelming majority of displaced persons, including a considerable number of Jews, will continue to live in Europe. One of our objectives should, therefore, be to create conditions favourable to the re-settlement of a substantial number of displaced persons in Europe.

3. The only areas in Europe in which our two Governments can directly control these conditions are the British and United States zones of Germany and Austria.

In these areas, they are prepared to assist native Jews to resettle once more in German and Austrian communities. All available means are being used to eradicate anti-Semitism. Concentration camp survivors receive special treatment as to rations, financial assistance, housing and employment. Moreover, both American and British authorities are pressing for an early decision on plans, at present under quadripartite examination, for the restitution of property confiscated by the Nazis. We recommend that all further practicable steps should be taken to make possible the resettlement of displaced persons in those zones.

4. Italy and the four ex-enemy satellite states will be required by the peace treaties to secure to all persons under their jurisdiction human rights and the fundamental freedoms, and it may be hoped that this will promote in these countries conditions favourable to the re-settlement of displaced persons.

5. Elsewhere in Europe our two Governments must rely on action through the United Nations to give practical effect to the provisions on human rights in the Charter. They should support the establishment of a commission for human rights and, also such measures of implementation as the United Nations may adopt to ensure the protection of these rights to the fullest extent practicable. Through their support of the efforts of the United Nations to re-establish political and economic stability in Europe, our Governments will continue to contribute to the restoration of those basic conditions which will make possible the reintegration in Europe of a substantial number of displaced persons, including Jews.

6. Though substantial numbers of displaced persons may be resettled in Europe, new homes must be found elsewhere for many of those, including Jews, whose ties with their former communities have been irreparably broken. As the Anglo-American Committee pointed out, Palestine alone cannot provide for the emigration needs of all Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution. The two Governments should, therefore, proceed at once with measures designed to

aid the re-settlement elsewhere of other Jews and displaced persons. These will include the following:

(a) Continuing support, through the United Nations, for the establishment of the international refugee organization which will be capable of dealing effectively with the problem of refugees and displaced persons as a whole.

(b) Strong support for the appeal to be made at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations calling on all member governments to receive in territories under their control a proportion of the displaced persons in Europe, including Jews. In doing so, it should be emphasised that the United Kingdom Government has already accepted a commitment to promote the re-settlement of about 235,000 Polish troops and civilians and their dependents.

In addition, a large proportion of the refugees admitted during the period of Nazi persecution have remained in the United Kingdom. Of these, approximately 70,000 are Jews. With respect to the United States, 275,000 refugees have been permanently resettled there, including 180,000 Jews. On resumption of the normal flow of immigration to the United States some 53,000 quota and non-quota immigrants from those European countries from which the displaced persons are drawn will be able to enter as permanent residents every year. It may be assumed that in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947, the large majority of these immigrants will be Jews and other displaced persons. The President of the United States is prepared to seek the approval of Congress for special legislation for the entry into the United States of 50,000 displaced persons, including Jews.

(c) Simultaneous, though separate, approaches to the governments of the British Dominions, who should be informed of the action taken and proposed, and should be invited to support the appeal to member governments of the United Nations and to receive a number of displaced persons in territories under their control. Both governments, in their approach, would emphasise the weight of the influence which could be exerted by the example of action by the Dominions, the United Kingdom and the United States, in inducing other United Nations to correspondingly liberal action. The United Kingdom Government would further stress the relations between the settlement of displaced persons and the problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The United States Government would indicate that the arrangements it could undertake for an emergency quota would be favourably influenced if assurances had been given that a number of displaced persons would be re-settled in the British Commonwealth.

(d) Continued active support to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and, through it, to the re-settlement of as many refugees and displaced persons as practicable. Active consideration is already being given to a promising proposal for the transfer of displaced persons to Brazil. The number to be re-settled there is estimated at 200,000 or more. Similar proposals relating to other South American countries are also being explored.

7. We recommend that simultaneously with the announcement of the new policy for Palestine, our two Governments should make a statement on the lines indicated in paragraphs 2-6 above. Arab

opposition to the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine will be much stronger if this movement begins before any indication has been given that steps are being taken to promote the re-settlement of Jews and other displaced persons in Europe and to secure that other countries receive a share of those for whose emigration provision must be made.

8. We accept the principles laid down in recommendation 3 of the report of the Anglo-American Committee, that Palestine as a whole can be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state, that neither of the two communities in Palestine should dominate the other, and that the form of government should be such as to safeguard the interests in the Holy Land of the three great monotheistic religions. We recommend that any form of government adopted should be based on these principles. We also endorse the ultimate objective, set forth in the report, of securing self-government for the inhabitants.

The various alternatives to proceeding with the implementation of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee have been considered. It is our view that some alteration in the present governmental situation in Palestine has to be made and made speedily. To attempt to continue the present situation would involve the imposition of a policy by the exertion of military force and against the resistance of either or both of the two peoples of Palestine.

In the present situation in Palestine the imposition of a system of government by external authority could only be avoided either (*a*) by the termination of the mandate and withdrawal of British troops, which would lead to such internecine warfare by the Jews and Arabs as to make such a course unthinkable, or (*b*) by agreement among the Jews and Arabs themselves, of which there seems to be no present prospect.

Since some degree of compulsion will probably have to be employed it should be employed in setting in motion a system of government based on recommendation 3. The degree of such compulsion may be minimized and perhaps even acquiescence secured by wise and practical implementation of that recommendation.

The crux of the governmental problem in Palestine is to find a constitutional system which while observing the principles of recommendation 3 will best make possible progress towards self-government. The report puts forward no detailed suggestions for this purpose and our main task has therefore been to devise a method for its attainment.

We have considered an instrument of government on unitary binational lines based on parity between the two peoples in its legislative and executive functions, with provision for emergency action by the administering authority in the event of absence of willingness on

the part of the two peoples to participate in the functioning of such a plan, or in the event of a deadlock in such governmental machinery.

In view, however, of the expressed reaction of the two peoples to the report of the Anglo-American Committee, we believe that the following plan is more practicable and that effect could be given to it with less difficulty.

PLAN FOR PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY

9. *Territorial areas.* The plan envisages the division of Palestine into four areas: an Arab province, a Jewish province, a district of Jerusalem and a district of the Negev. The Jewish province will include Eastern Galilee, most of the Plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel, the Beisan area, Haifa, the Plain of Sharon (excluding the town of Jaffa) and a portion of the southern coastal plain. The Jerusalem district will include Jerusalem, Bethlehem and their immediate environs. The Negev district will consist of the uninhabited triangle of waste land in the south of Palestine beyond the present limit of cultivation. The Arab province will include the remainder of Palestine.

The population of these areas will be approximately as follows:

	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Jews</i>
Arab province	815,000	15,000
Jewish province	301,000	451,000
Jerusalem district	96,000	102,000
Negev district	—	—

The provincial boundaries will be purely administrative boundaries, defining the area within which a local legislature is empowered to legislate on certain subjects and a local executive to administer its laws. They will in no sense form frontiers and they will consequently have no significance as regards defence, customs or communications. In our view, however, it is of great importance to make it clear that, once settled, these boundaries will not be susceptible of change except by agreement between the two provinces. We recommend that a provision to this effect be embodied in any trusteeship agreement and in any instrument bringing the plan into operation.⁸

10. *Division of powers.* The provincial governments will have power of legislation and administration within their provincial areas with regard to municipal and village administration, agriculture, fisheries, forest, land registration, land sales, land settlement, land purchase and expropriation, education, public health and other social services, trade and industry, and local roads, irrigation, development

⁸ The British version at this point includes the following sentence: "The details of the boundaries proposed are shown in the map reproduced in Appendix A." The map is printed in British Cmd. 7044, Palestine No. 1 (1947): *Proposals for the Future of Palestine, July, 1946-February, 1947*, after p. 14.

and public works. They will also have power to limit the number and determine the qualifications of persons who may take up permanent residence in their territories, after the date of the introduction of the plan. The provincial governments will be required by the instrument of government which establishes the fundamental law to provide for the guarantee of civil rights and equality before the law for all residents. They shall not, in their legislation or administration, impose obstacles to free inter-territorial transit, trade or commerce.

For the purpose of carrying out these functions the provincial governments will have power to appropriate funds, to levy taxes, excluding customs and excise, to borrow within the province and, with the consent of the central government, to borrow abroad.

Control of foreign exchange and currency shall, for the time being, be a function of the central government. The central government shall also for the time being be responsible for the licensing of imports. It shall allocate licenses equitably between the two provinces after consultation with their representatives. Within two years of the introduction of the provincial autonomy plan (unless a later date is agreed to by the provinces and the central government) a broad allocation of the value of import licenses between the two provinces shall be made from time to time by the central government, in consultation with the provinces. Thereafter the provinces shall have the right to obtain for their residents licenses up to the amount of the allocation and to decide to what classes of goods such licenses shall be allocated. At a date not later than 31 December, 1946, import licensing shall be on a non-discriminatory basis as between sources of supply.

If Palestine becomes a member of the United Nations or any specialized agencies thereof (including the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, or the proposed International Trade Organization) the provincial governments must deal with all relevant matters within their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the obligations of Palestine as a member of these bodies.

There will be reserved to the central government exclusive authority as to defence, foreign relations and customs and excise. In addition there will be reserved initially to the central government exclusive authority as to police, prisons, courts, railway facilities and Haifa harbour, posts and telegraphs, civil aviation, broadcasting and antiquities, though certain of these powers will be transferred in whole or in part to the provincial governments as soon as it becomes practicable. The central government will in addition have power to borrow money, to make financial grants to the provinces, to provide for inter-territorial and international irrigation and development projects, to facilitate inter-territorial and international trade and commerce and communications, and to provide for arterial highways. It will be empowered to examine and verify municipal and provincial accounts, to

prescribe suitable and uniform methods of accounting, to prescribe the uses of any funds granted by it to the provinces, and to examine proposed budgets of provincial expenditures, and to make recommendations with respect to them.

Immigration will be administered by the central government. So far as the provinces are concerned, the central government will authorise the immigration desired by the respective provincial governments, to the extent to which the economic absorptive capacity of the province will not thereby be exceeded. It shall not have power to authorise immigration into either province in excess of any limitations imposed by the provincial government.

All powers not expressly granted to the provincial governments will be reserved to the central government.

11. *Provincial governments.* An elected legislative chamber will be established in each province. During the first 5 years of the plan the presiding officers of those chambers will be appointed by the High Commissioner. Thereafter they will be elected by the chambers from among their members. Bills passed by the legislative chambers will become law only after they have received the assent of the High Commissioner, representing the administering authority, but assent will be denied only if such bills are inconsistent with the instrument of government.

A provincial legislature may provide that any residents of the Jerusalem district designated by it may be represented in the provincial legislature if they so desire.

An executive consisting of a chief minister and a council of ministers will be appointed in each province by the High Commissioner from among the members of legislative chamber after consultation with its leaders.

If a provincial government fails to perform a proper governmental function or exceeds its proper function the High Commissioner will have authority to exercise emergency powers within the province for the performance of that function or to prevent such excess.

12. *The Central government.* The executive and legislative functions of the central government will initially be exercised by a High Commissioner appointed by the administering authority. He will be assisted by a nominated executive council composed of the heads of the major executive departments. Certain of these departments will be headed, as soon as the High Commissioner deems practicable, by Palestinians.

A development planning board will be established by the High Commissioner comprising the heads of the appropriate central executive departments, and representatives of each of the provinces. This board will initiate plans for the general economic development of Palestine and will supervise the implementation of such plans. A tariff board

will also be established on similar lines to advise on customs and excise policy and on the rates of duty to be imposed.

13. *The Jerusalem district.* In the Jerusalem district there will be established a council with powers similar to those of a municipal council. The majority of its members will be elected, but there will be certain members designated by the High Commissioner.

As [*The*] central government, in respect of the Jerusalem district, will have the same powers to limit the number and determine the qualifications of persons who may take up permanent residence in that district as are conferred on the provincial governments in respect of their provinces.

Powers not delegated to the district council will be exercised in the Jerusalem district by the central government.

14. *The Negev district.* The Negev district will be held under direct administration by the central government pending a survey of its development possibilities. Within 5 years and upon the completion of this survey, the administering authority shall submit to the appropriate organ of the United Nations recommendations, arrived at after consultation with the Arab and Jewish provinces, concerning the disposition of the area.

15. *Considerations in the adoption of the provincial plan.* The following are the main advantages of the plan for provincial autonomy:

The plan offers to the Jews an opportunity to exercise a wide measure of control over immigration into one part of Palestine and to forward in the Jewish province the development of the Jewish national home. At the same time it offers to the majority of the Arabs of Palestine their own political institutions in an Arab province and freedom from the fear of further Jewish immigration into that province without their consent. It makes it possible to give practical [effect] to the principles of government enunciated in recommendation 3 of the Anglo-American Committee; and it offers a prospect of development towards self-government of which there is less hope in a unitary Palestine. It provides a means of segregating Jew and Arab to an extent which should substantially reduce the risk of a continuation of widespread violence and disorder in Palestine. In the long term, the plan leaves the way open for constitutional development either towards partition or towards federal unity. The association of representatives of the two provinces in the administration of central subjects may lead ultimately to a fully developed federal constitution. On the contrary, if the centrifugal forces prove too strong, the way is open towards partition. The provincial plan does not prejudice this issue either way. The administering authority will be prepared to hand over the government to the people of the country as soon as the two communities express a common desire to that end and present an agreed scheme which will ensure its stable administration.

In arriving at the provincial autonomy plan as preferable on grounds of practicability to the unitary bi-national plan, we are not unmindful of the fact that there are inherent in it certain difficulties:

(1) The plan calls for immediate decision on the highly controversial matter of the boundaries of the respective provinces. It is one on which feelings on both sides are apt to run high.

(2) The Jewish and Arab populations are so interlaced in the area out of which a Jewish province would have to be created that a very serious minority problem would arise in that province which would not be involved in the proposed Arab province. The argument may be made by the Arabs that if it is proper to submit such a large segment of the Arab population to a majority rule by the Jews in the Jewish province those same considerations would support their own contention that a Palestinian state be set up in which there would be a majority of the Arabs and a minority of the Jews. Under the proposed system, however, there would be effective protection for the Arab minority in the Jewish province.

(3) The proposed boundaries are such that the land and other economic resources in the Jewish area are superior to those in the Arab area. The Jewish area would be well able to support the requisite governmental services of the provincial government. The Arab area would not now be able to support even the present level of services, much less the improved services which the recommendations of the Anglo-American report urge as necessary to raise the Arab standard of living. This difficulty is met by the general power given to the central government to make grants to provinces and by the specific provisions in a later paragraph for meeting the anticipated deficiencies in the budget of the Arab province during the earlier years of the autonomy plan.

After considering the foregoing difficulties, we feel that the provincial autonomy plan is the preferable one for meeting recommendation 3.⁹

HOLY PLACES

16. It will be the duty of the central government to safeguard the Moslem, Jewish and Christian holy places. An inter-denominational council will be set up to advise the central government on all matters relating to the Christian holy places.

LAND POLICY

17. In putting the provincial autonomy plan into effect the administratering authority will rescind the land transfer regulations of 1940. The prohibition or frustration of provisions in leases stipu-

⁹ At this point in the British version appears a Section 15A which reads: "*Further Details of Provincial Autonomy Plan.*—The United States Delegation have submitted a preliminary draft for the heads of an instrument of government to give effect to this Plan. This draft, which is reproduced in Appendix B, gives some further details of the constitution proposed. The draft has not been examined by the two Delegations jointly; but it is a valuable contribution which will serve as a basis for further work on the preparation of the draft constitution."

lating that only members of one race, community or creed may be employed on or in connection with the land leased will be a matter for action by the provincial authorities.

IMMIGRATION

18. Under the provincial autonomy plan immigration will be administered by the central government separately for the Arab province, the Jewish province, and the Jerusalem and Negev districts. In effect immigration into the provinces will be regulated by the provincial governments, subject only to the power of the central government which may impose limitations upon immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of either province. These provisions will probably mean the complete exclusion of Jewish immigrants from the Arab province, but will result, under ordinary circumstances, in immigration into the Jewish province on whatever scale is desired by its government. The grounds on which the central government could curtail the immigration quotas proposed by the provinces will be defined in the instrument of government and in any trusteeship agreement or other instrument approved by the United Nations. The provincial authorities will, therefore, be able to appeal to the United Nations against any decision in respect of immigration which they consider to be in contravention of the terms of such instruments.

On the assumption that our proposals for provincial autonomy are adopted as the policy of our two Governments, we recommend the acceptance of recommendations 2 and 6 of the Anglo-American Committee.

19. We have considered the memorandum embodying the results of the preliminary discussions held in London from 17th to 27th June on recommendation 2 of the Anglo-American report, and we endorse the outline plan for the movement of 100,000 Jews to Palestine.¹⁰ We recommend that this plan be initiated immediately it is decided to put the constitutional proposals into effect.

We recommend that every effort should be made to complete the operation within 12 months of the date on which the emigration begins. We recommend that the necessary immigration certificates should be issued as rapidly as possible. As regards the rate of movement, shipment will proceed at the maximum rate consistent with the clearance of the transit camps in Palestine.

For the purpose of checking illegal immigration any Jews entering Palestine illegally after the plan has been initiated will be counted against the 100,000.

¹⁰ At this point in the British version appears the following: "A summary of this Plan, revised to take account of our conclusions on the questions of policy then left outstanding and to incorporate certain later information, is contained in Appendix C."

THE ARAB PROGRAMME

20. We accept recommendations 5 and 9 of the Anglo-American Committee that the economic and educational standards of the Arabs should be raised, subject to the proviso that the pace at which such development can be undertaken will have to be limited by practical considerations, such as the provision of trained personnel and the capacity of the economy of the area to absorb a large spending programme. A tentative plan has been worked out by Palestine Government which can form the basis of the programme.

(a) *Health and social services.* We endorse the proposals for a health service for the Arabs of a standard similar to that established for the Jews. We also contemplate the establishment of social services ancillary to education and health, e.g. institutions for the care of mothers, children and the old, school feeding, playgrounds, unemployment assistance, the teaching of handicrafts, youth and cultural organizations.

(b) *Education.* The immediate provision of compulsory education for the Arabs is not practicable, but universal primary education could be achieved in 10 years, except as regards girls in the smaller villages. Immediate steps should be taken to improve primary, secondary and university education in the Arab community.

(c) *Economic measures.* Improved facilities for education and for health and other social services will not alone bridge the gap between the standards of living of the two communities; a wide economic advancement must accompany them.

The greatest part of the Arab rural community, which constitutes 66% of the whole Arab population, consists of a peasantry living at about bare subsistence level. There are few village industries and Arab industry in general provides very little employment. Measures to improve Arab economic conditions must be directed primarily to the agricultural population, but should also include measures to promote the development of light industries. The principal measures envisaged are the following:

(I) Agrarian reorganization to rationalize and consolidate land holdings.

(II) Improvement in the use of land: promotion of regional development: prevention of erosion: agricultural research.

(III) Promotion of light industries and development of local crafts and industries.

(IV) Provision of cheap credit.

(V) Expansion of labour organizations.

(VI) Promotion of the cooperative movement.

(d) *Living conditions.* We also recommend the following measures for improving living conditions in the Arab community:

(I) Improvements in housing and promotion of housing schemes.

(II) Survey and town planning with a view to improvement schemes.

(III) Improvement of water supplies.

21. The cost of the foregoing proposals is discussed in later paragraphs.

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

22. We believe that the need for economic development in Palestine should be recognized as merely a part of the broader situation with respect to economic development in the countries of the Middle East. In any statement which is made to the interested parties or to the public, it should be emphasized that our Governments have assisted and welcomed the advent of the states of the Middle East into full political equality. They have observed with interest the examination by those states of their possibilities for economic development, which appear to be great. If it is the desire of any of those states to resort to international agencies for aid by loan or otherwise in exploring and effectuating such projects, as for example in the reclaiming or improvement of great areas by water control and irrigation, they will receive sympathetic support.

Certainly most substantial Palestinian development should be linked with developments in Transjordan and probably in Syria and Lebanon.

We recommend that a survey of the water resources of Palestine and, with the consent of the Government of Transjordan, of water resources common to the two areas should be undertaken as soon as possible by consulting engineers of international repute. They should further be invited, if adequate data for the purpose is available, to draw up an outline project indicating the best use of the water available. This project should be considered, and action on it taken, by the central government in consultation with the development board to which, for this purpose, the Government of Transjordan, and of any other neighboring state affected, would be invited to send representatives.

23. Long term development schemes which are wholly within one province will be financed by borrowing internally or abroad by the provincial government or an appropriate organization in the province. In the event that the borrowing is from abroad it is possible that the loans will have to be guaranteed by the central government. Long-term development schemes which involve both provinces or perhaps neighboring countries will require participation by the central government but it will be desirable for the provincial governments to take as much responsibility as is practicable in day-to-day administration and particularly in finance. The financial support of such projects should ultimately be made the responsibility of the provinces in proportion to the benefits which they derive. Schemes financed by loans

should be self-liquidating and, as such, they can be secured on revenues from the projects, reinforced when necessary by a general charge on provincial revenues.

FINANCE

24. We have considered various estimates of the cost of carrying out the measures set out above. We have also considered the effect on the Palestine budget of introducing the proposed scheme of provincial autonomy. We have based our conclusions on two assumptions; first, that the cost of living index will not rise in Palestine, and, secondly, that there will be no increased expenditure on law and order coupled with loss of revenue due to disorders and non-cooperation.

On the first of the points, it is clear that the programmes envisaged will constitute an inflationary influence, but against this a large part of expenditures will be for imported goods financed with external money. In addition substantial borrowing of savings within Palestine may be assumed and increasing supplies of imported goods at lower prices should become available. Should our assumption be incorrect, it is not possible to estimate the effect on the Palestine budget but cost of living subsidies involving expenditure of up to 4,000,000 pounds might be necessary. Equally, disorders and non-cooperation might add significantly to expenditures and reduce revenues.

25. *The Jewish programme.* According to our studies the total costs of the immigration of the 100,000 Jews can be put at approximately 70,000,000 pounds, made up as follows:

Transitional assistance, 6,000,000 pounds.

Housing, 14,000,000 pounds.

Capital investment to provide employment, 50,000,000 pounds.

Since it is essential to complete the programme as soon as possible, we assume that the whole 70,000,000 pounds will be spent within 2 years. The maximum expectation from reparations available for Palestine is 5,000,000 pounds; from contributions by world Jewry 20,000,000 pounds; and from loans to be raised in Palestine (whether in Palestine pounds or in sterling) 35,000,000 pounds. This would give a total of 60,000,000 for the Jewish programme, leaving a deficit of 10,000,000 pounds, which can be met by self-liquidating loans.

26. The Jewish Agency has publicly accepted responsibility for costs connected with the immigration of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. This financial responsibility should be confirmed, but there would be no need to ask the Agency to agree to any of our specific estimates. In due course the responsibility in question will be transferred to the government of the Jewish province.

Our studies indicate that 10 million pounds of required capital cannot be provided from Jewish sources within the next 2 years. As,

however, this deficiency is for purposes suitable for self-liquidating loans, it can be met by loans under the 250 million dollars credit provided for in paragraph 29.

27. *Financial effects of provincial autonomy.* A rough distribution of existing expenditures and revenues on the basis of the division of responsibility among the central government, the two provinces, and the Jerusalem district indicates that:

(a) The central government will continue to incur more than half of the present expenditures of the Palestine Government. It will have an estimated surplus in the order of perhaps 1,000,000 pounds.

(b) Revenues of the Jewish province will be substantially in excess of expenditures, giving rise to a surplus of 1,400,000 pounds.

(c) Expenditures of the Arab province will be substantially in excess of revenues, giving rise to a deficit of 2,100,000 pounds.

Since expenditures in the programme for the benefit of the Arabs would be concentrated entirely in the Arab province, the deficit of 2,100,000 pounds in that province will be increased by an amount which might run to 1,000,000 pounds annually as an average in the first 5 years.

From this total recurrent deficit of roundly 3,000,000 pounds there may be deducted possibly as much as 1,000,000 pounds representing excess revenues of the central government subject to grants to the province. There will remain currently a net deficit in the neighbourhood of 2,000,000 pounds. The United Kingdom Delegation proposes to recommend to His Majesty's Government to ask Parliament to assume of [*the*] ultimate responsibility for recurring deficits up [to] the time when increased revenues permit it to be met out of Arab provincial or central government funds.

28. *Cost of the Arab program.* We have attempted to estimate the cost of a practicable program, using as a guide the estimate of costs made in a survey by the Palestine Government. That survey was made on the basis of a program spread over the whole of Palestine. The concentration of the program in the Arab area would in any case make it necessary to revise these estimates. We have allowed for this, and also for such limitations as the provision of trained personnel and the capacity of the Arab economy to absorb a large spending program. Allowing for such considerations we think that a spending program of up to 15 million pounds to 20 million pounds over 10 years should be regarded as fully adequate to implement the recommendations for improved education, health, and economic services of the Anglo-American Committee. In addition, 10 million pounds should be provided for credit facilities. There are, however, so many unknown factors in the carrying out of such a program that it would be most unwise to commit ourselves to any public statement as to the amount

of the programs to be undertaken. Of the Arab program 10 million pounds for credit facilities could be secured from local bank credits. Of the remainder of the program, only a small portion would be suitable for the self-liquidating loans dealt with under paragraph 29. Provision of an additional 12,500,000 pounds at this time will, it is believed, care for expenditure sufficient to ensure that the program will be effectively carried forward to the period when means of additional financing may be found. The United States Delegation has therefore agreed, as a part of its contribution to the general program, to propose to the President of the United States that he recommend legislation granting 50,000,000 pounds¹¹ to the Government of Palestine for the purpose of financing development schemes not suitable for self-liquidating loans and for assisting in the meeting of extraordinary expenses during the difficulties of the transitional period.

29. *Capital for development.* A large portion of the capital needed for the self-sustaining projects mentioned in paragraph 22 must come from outside sources. It is possible that Palestine could obtain a loan from the International Bank if she should become a member. The United States Delegation proposes, in the event that¹² finance from other sources such as the International Bank is not available, to recommend that the President seek legislation authorizing the making of loans through an appropriate agency for the development of the Middle East region, including Palestine, up to 250 million pounds.¹³

30. *Public order.*—It is clear that the difficulties of introducing the policy which we have outlined will be greatly enhanced so long as there are in existence armed organizations, Arab and Jewish, determined in the last resort to oppose by force any solution which is not to their liking. We agree that private armies constitute a danger to the peace of the world and ought not to exist, and that attempts to prevent by violence the execution of the policy once it has been put into effect should be resolutely suppressed. We agree that to this end it is necessary that armed organisations which are not prepared to submit themselves to the full control of the central government should be dissolved and that the illegal holding of arms and explosives should be vigorously combatted.

31. *Future procedure.* We recognise that, in view of the existing situation in Palestine, any policy for that country will probably have to be introduced without the willing consent of either community. On the other hand, there is a degree of sustained and determined resistance of either Jews or Arabs beyond which no policy could be

¹¹ The British version reads "dollars", as does the last word in paragraph numbered 29.

¹² At this point in the British version the word "adequate" appears.

¹³ The British version contains a Section 29A which reads: "Details of the financial implications of our proposals are contained in Appendix D."

enforced. An effort to obtain at least a measure of acquiescence from the Arabs and Jews would therefore be an essential preliminary to the introduction of the above proposals. We therefore recommend that, if these proposals are adopted by our two Governments, they should be presented to Arab and Jewish representatives as a basis for negotiations at a conference to be convened by the United Kingdom Government.

32. In accordance with recommendation 4 of the Anglo-American Committee, we propose that the new policy should be embodied in a trusteeship agreement for Palestine. The conference with Arab and Jewish representatives should therefore be convened in time for its results to be available before the opening of the second part of the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. If the results of the conference were such as to suggest that the new policy would meet with a sufficient degree of acceptance in Palestine, the Government of the United Kingdom would proceed to put the plan into effect and would inform the General Assembly that practical considerations required this to be done under the existing mandate, but that they would press on as quickly as possible with a trusteeship agreement and would hope to lay a draft before the General Assembly at its next (1947) session. It would then be possible simultaneously to inaugurate the policy in Palestine and to undertake the consultations provided for in article 79 of the United Nations Charter.

33. We are not able at this stage to make recommendations regarding the course to be adopted if the conference with Arab and Jewish representatives led to the conclusion that the introduction of the policy proposed would be so violently resisted by one or both of the two peoples in Palestine that it could not be enforced. In that situation further consultation between our two Governments would be necessary."

[Grady]
HARRIMAN

867N.01/7-2546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, July 25, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 10:49 a. m.]

6975. From Grady. I have just received the following letter from Dr. Goldmann of the Jewish Agency which he insisted should be sent in to me at the meeting I was attending.

"Referring to my telephone conversation with you this morning, I feel it to be my duty to let you know the following, which Dr. Weizmann and I had intended to tell you had you been able to see us. We

understand from the various press reports of your negotiations with the British, that, whatever agreement the two Governments may reach will be submitted to both Jews and Arabs for discussion and consultation. It may be, therefore, that any agreement reached with regard to the admission of the 100,000 refugees to Palestine may also be included in such consultations, and this, in view of the complicated nature of the Palestine problem, may mean at best a delay of many months. As you know, the Jewish Agency has always held that the question of the 100,000 fates [*certificates?*] to be decided, as recommended by the Enquiry Committee, immediately, and without awaiting the decision on major policy which will require some time for its solution. From the very first days after the publication of the Enquiry Committee's report, President Truman has taken up the same position, and has given expression to his views in various public statements. When the four American members of the Jewish Agency Executive had the privilege of being received by the President on July 2, he was good enough to tell us, in unmistakably clear terms, that he adhered to this view, and that the 100,000 certificates should be granted without waiting for the decision on major policy. In a conversation I had with Mr. Dean Acheson a few days before I left the States, he also agreed to this view. If for one reason or another this position should now be changed, and the agreement reached with the British regarding the admission of the 100,000 should become subject to future consultations—which means that it may be made dependent on Arab consent—I want you to know that a situation will arise which will make it impossible for the Agency to participate in any such negotiations. Jewish public opinion in the United States, and the Zionist movement all over the world, would have to regard such a step as a reversal of the policy of the United States Government. As to the main proposal concerning major policy—as published today in considerable detail in responsible British papers—I would also like you to know that if the reports accurately reflect the character of this proposal, it appears to me wholly unacceptable from our point of view. I felt that you should know this, especially what I have said with regard to the 100,000 certificates, at this—maybe decisive—stage of your negotiations with the British.”

It might interest the Department to know that while we are negotiating the Palestine matter there are here in London not only Dr. Weizmann but Goldmann, Kaplan, Berstein and Gass. I have made formal acknowledgement of this letter. I did not deem it proper for me to see the leaders of either Jews or Arabs while negotiations are going on. Since this letter is at least semi-official from the Jewish Agency and contains manifest misstatements the Department might wish me to follow up my acknowledgement with a letter. Should they¹⁴ wish this, please cable outline of reply they would want me to make.¹⁵ [Grady.]

HARRIMAN

¹⁴ i.e., the Department.

¹⁵ No reply by the Department has been found.

867N.01/7-2646 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*¹⁶TOP SECRET
URGENTLONDON, July 25, 1946—6: 20 p. m.
[Received 8: 43 p. m.]

Personal and Top Secret. The conversations between American and British officials on Palestine and related problems are now almost concluded and agreement has been reached on all matters of substance.¹⁷ I understand that their recommendations have been telegraphed to you. I am sure you will agree that the inhuman crime committed in Jerusalem on 22nd July calls for the strongest action against terrorism but having regard to the sufferings of innocent Jewish victims of Nazism this should not deter us from introducing a policy designed to bring peace to Palestine with the least possible delay. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to give urgent attention to the agreed recommendations of the two delegations and to let us have your views in the next few days. I have had some useful talks with Ambassador Grady and his colleagues, and I should like you to know that the British officials have paid a warm tribute to their energy and cooperative spirit in the discussions here.

867N.01/7-2646 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*TOP SECRET
URGENTLONDON, July 26, 1946.
[Received July 26—8: 11 a. m.]

7030. For the Secretary from Grady. Constitutional proposals are the plan for provincial autonomy. It is not intended that start of movement of 100,000 shall be delayed until these provisions are actually put into effect but as is stated in second sentence of section 19 "we recommend that this plan (that is, outline plan for movement of 100,000 Jews to Palestine) be initiated immediately it is decided to put the constitutional proposals into effect." Paragraph 19 should be read with careful consideration of paragraphs 31, 32 and 33. Since receipt your telegram No. 5633 of July 25, 7 p. m.,¹⁸ I have again con-

¹⁶ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the White House on July 26.¹⁷ Mr. Bevin notified Ambassador Harriman that the British Cabinet approved the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee on July 25 (867N.01/7-2546).¹⁸ Not printed; it stated that because of garbles in Section 19 of telegram 6970, July 24, when first received in the Department, "we still not sure when movement 100,000 to begin. We sincerely hope this movement to start immediately after two Govts have reached over-all agreement. It would place this Govt in almost impossible position if it would agree arrangement whereby transfer would not begin until after full agreement had been reached with Arabs and Jews or, in absence such agreement, until action had been taken by United Nations." (867N.01/7-2446)

sulted Brook and there is not the slightest doubt that the British Government will give the green light on the 100,000 at the earliest possible moment. They do not expect formal approval of the plan from either side but are counting on "a measure of acquiescence from Arabs and Jews" and feel that it has been understood by both our Governments from the beginning that consultation and a measure of acquiescence from both is an essential preliminary to their expressing determination to go ahead with the whole plan including the 100,000. As soon as they have decided to go ahead with the plan they will at once implement the movement of the 100,000. [Grady.]

HARRIMAN

867N.01/7-2646

*Record of Teletype Conference Between Washington and London*¹⁹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1946—1:28 p. m.

[Here follows record of the incoming conversation from London, primarily an amplification of telegram 7030, printed *supra*. The portion here printed is "outgoing" to London.]

What did you do to secure British consent to starting 100,000 immigration immediately instead of starting when plan agreed to?

My view is that plan is all right as basis for negotiation but it commits us to many things and in view of President's repeated statements as to 100,000 immigration we could not agree unless immigration plan started. We would not expect large numbers first few months but unless there is assurance of starting immediately we could not agree and wish you would so advise British officials.

We can appreciate British position. Nevertheless after the stand that the President has taken we do not see how we can enter into any arrangement which would prevent us from continuing to take the position that the 100,000 should move without awaiting for agreement on part of Arabs and Jews. That agreement might be delayed for months or years, and we would have to be silent.

If British have made such commitments to Arabs and Jews it does not seem to me that we are committed to a similar policy. Any arrangement that might be made between us and the British should leave us free to insist on the transfer of the 100,000 beginning at once. We feel that we should be able to announce that we have not abandoned the position taken by the President in this regard.

I understand British position but I feel that President cannot well recede from his position. All parts of program should proceed simultaneously but President's position has been that 100,000 immigration

¹⁹ The participants in Washington were Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Henderson; those in London were Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Grady, and Mr. Pinkerton (on detail from Jerusalem to serve on Mr. Grady's staff).

was to start immediately and he has so stated publicly time and again. Trouble with British plan is immigration never starts unless they get acquiescence of Jews and Arabs.²⁰

[In remainder of outgoing part of conversation, Mr. Byrnes requested that Messrs. Grady, Gaston, and Dorr meet him in Paris on July 29 and stated he would advise Mr. Bevin that there had not been sufficient time to consider the plan and make a recommendation to President Truman.]

867N.01/7-2946 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET

PARIS, July 29, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received July 29—3:47 p. m.]

3701. For the President from Secretary Byrnes.²¹ Suggested statement of policy on Palestine for President Truman to be issued immediately after Prime Minister Attlee's statement for the British Government on Wednesday afternoon. Attlee's statement as wired has been so changed that he is speaking for the British Government only.²²

1. The time has come when we should cease talking about a solution of the Palestine question but determine upon a solution and carry it out with fairness to both Arabs and Jews.

2. The basis for the solution should be found within the framework of the recent unanimous report of the joint Anglo-American inquiry. The British Government has stated that it is anxious to find a permanent solution within the framework of that report which will make possible the immigration of 100,000 Jews to Palestine as rapidly as possible.

3. The British Government has suggested as a basis for negotiation that such a solution would be facilitated by the creation of an Arab province in those parts of Palestine where there are at present few Jews and of a Jewish province in the area where the bulk of Jewish settlement now is. The suggestion contemplates a large degree of autonomy for these provinces. The exact boundaries of the provinces would be determined after consultation with the Jews and Arabs. Under this proposal it is anticipated that subject only to

²⁰ In telegram 7082, July 27, 1946, noon, Ambassador Harriman stated: "Re teletype conversation with Secretary Byrnes last night, I am convinced President can rely on the good faith of British Government to move with the greatest speed in the consultations. . . . British can see the solution of the problem of Jewish immigration only through their provincial plan. . . . I know British are as anxious for speed as we are." (867N.01/7-2746)

²¹ Mr. Byrnes was attending the Paris Peace Conference which met from July 29 to October 15, 1946.

²² Prime Minister Attlee's proposed statement had been transmitted from London in telegram 7083, July 27, noon (not printed).

limited reserved authority in the Central Government Jewish wishes would determine the immigration policy of the Jewish province. A Jerusalem district and a Negeb district will be under the Central Government.

4. Adoption of this policy will impose a heavy financial burden on the Palestine Government. Particularly in carrying out the recommendation made by the Anglo-American Committee for raising the Arab standard of living. I have advised the British Government that, if an immediate and satisfactory solution along the lines of this policy could be found, I would urge that the American Government provide substantial financial assistance to make possible its execution. These grants-in-aid will not exceed \$50,000,000. Until the revenues make it unnecessary, the British Government would meet any deficit in the annual budget of the Palestine Govt. This obligation is not limited.

I have also advised the British Government that I would recommend to the Congress the granting of loans to Palestine and other states in the Near East for sound development projects if for any reason such projects cannot adequately be financed through the International Bank. That, I consider, to be a part of our general policy of furthering the economic development of the whole Near East. A \$250,000,000 self-liquidating loan program is contemplated for the Near East.

5. As a part of a general plan to aid in the resettlement of European displaced people in which the nations of the world are being asked to participate, I will also seek the approval of Congress for special legislation for the entry into the United States of 50,000 displaced persons, including Jews.

6. I want to say an additional word about the immigration into Palestine of 100,000 persecuted Jews from the centers in Germany, Austria and Italy which was one of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The US has been urging the promptest possible beginning of this immigration. It has joined in active preparations for the movement. There are two things which must be remembered. First, we are not the mandatory for Palestine and cannot make a unilateral decision on the matter. Second, every effort should be made to create conditions such that these people will not open a new chapter in their tragic lot by immigrating into a violent and strife-torn Palestine.

The situation as it has developed is such that this immigration can in the judgment of both the United States and Great Britain be peacefully and speedily effected as an immediate part of a general plan such as has now been formulated. That general plan cannot and should not in fairness be finally decided upon by the mandatory without promised discussions with both Jews and Arabs. These discus-

sions have awaited the conference of the United States and United Kingdom delegations which have now been completed. They will be held in London in August and with the cooperation that should be received from all they should be speedily concluded. I ask the prompt and generous cooperation of both Arabs and Jews in discussing and effecting the new proposals.

I am given the personal assurance of Mr. Attlee that these consultations will be expedited to the utmost. I am convinced from what Mr. Attlee tells me that the consultation can be completed and the decision of His Majesty's Government can be reached not later than September 15, and that the immigration will proceed as rapidly as the immigrants can be absorbed. (Plans have been made which will make it possible to initiate the movement and reception of immigrants into Palestine as soon as the decision on policy has been taken.)

I believe that the plan proposed is the best solution of this difficult problem that can now be secured.^{22a}

[BYRNES]

867N.01/7-3046

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1946.

I called on the British Ambassador at the Embassy at my request and informed him that I was making this suggestion to reduce to the minimum the possibility of press speculation. I told the Ambassador that the President had been giving the most careful consideration to the recommendations of the alternates on the Cabinet Committee on Palestine. Since he had received those recommendations yesterday he had had a long meeting of the Cabinet and had consulted members of both houses of Congress. With the greatest reluctance and regret the President had concluded that he could not make the statement supporting the recommendations which had been prepared for him in Paris since he could not carry with him the support necessary to fulfill the proposals²³ which he was called upon to make. I said that under the proposals the important part to be played by the United States, in addition to its moral support, was that the President was to recommend to the Congress legislation admitting an additional 50,000 displaced persons, granting aid to Palestine of \$50,000,000 and loans for the Middle Eastern area development projects up to \$250,000,000 in the event that for any reason loans were not available through the

^{22a} According to a letter of March 24, 1948, from Mr. Grady to Mr. Henderson, Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Grady had jointly drafted the message printed here as telegram 3701, intending it as a "proposed press release for the President". (867N.01/3-2448) The letter was sent to Mr. Henderson while Mr. Grady was serving as Ambassador to India.

²³ Presumably those in telegram 3701, *supra*.

International Bank. In view of the extreme intensity of feeling in centers of Jewish population in this country neither political party would support this program at the present time and the President's statement, therefore, would be wholly personal and most misleading.

I said that the President was recalling Mr. Grady and his associates for consultation and that until this had taken place I would not be able to suggest to the Ambassador what the next step in the program might be. I asked the Ambassador to communicate urgently with Mr. Attlee who was to speak in the House of Commons the next day. I told him that we were also sending word to Mr. Byrnes in Paris²⁴ and the American Embassy in London.²⁵

The Ambassador expressed regret as well as the thought that this development would cause an embarrassing situation for the Prime Minister. He said that he understood fully the considerations which had moved the President to this conclusion since he was thoroughly informed of the discussion of this matter in the American press. I discussed briefly what Mr. Attlee might say and agreed that the less said the better. I told the Ambassador that we were preparing a very short statement for the President²⁶ which would be as non-committal as possible and that I would read it to him after it had been prepared. On my return to the Department I dictated this statement to the Ambassador so that he might send it to Mr. Attlee.

DEAN ACHESON

740.00119 Council/7-3146 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

PARIS, July 31, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received July 31—3:53 p. m.]

3743. Delsec 761. For the President from the Secretary. Reurtel Secdel 546.²⁷ The British are disappointed and do not like our action

²⁴ In telegram 3732 (Secdel 546), July 30, 5 p. m.

²⁵ In telegram 5728, July 30, 5 p. m., to London, repeated to Paris as No. 3734 (Secdel 548).

²⁶ The statement, released by the White House on July 31, read:

"The President has been considering certain recommendations of the Alternates of the Cabinet Committee with regard to Palestine and has decided in view of the complexity of the matter to request Ambassador Grady and his associates to return to Washington to discuss the whole matter with him in detail.

"The President hopes that further discussions will result in decisions which will alleviate the situation of the persecuted Jews in Europe and at the same time contribute to the ultimate solution of the longer term problem of Palestine."

The text of this message was transmitted to Ambassador Harriman in telegram 5727, July 30, 1946, 5 p. m., with an instruction to inform the British Government that the President intended to issue the statement at 2 p. m. on July 31, 1946. The telegram was repeated to Secretary Byrnes in Paris as No. 3733 (Secdel 547).

²⁷ See footnote 24, above.

but the purpose of my message 3712²⁸ was to let you know that if you declined to agree to the proposals it would not embarrass me. Yesterday I advised Wise and Goldmann that my opinion was, in the absence of agreement the British will not agree to the immigration of 100,000 or any part of it, and that they could not look to you to bring about such immigration because there was no way you could force Britain to act. I think it would be wise for the present not to make public any further demand about the 100,000 in order to avoid newspaper conflict with Attlee.

Grady's committee returning immediately.

[BYRNES]

867N.01/7-3146 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, July 31, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received July 31—3:48 p. m.]

3744. Delsec 762. Re Secdel 547 and 548.²⁹ Personal and Secret from Harriman for the Acting Secretary. I delivered to Mr. Attlee personally this morning in Paris letter explaining President's position regarding proposed Palestine plan and public statement he intends to issue today.

Attlee gave immediate thought to what Mr. Morrison³⁰ should say in the House today when he presents the British Govt's position. As to the American position I gather that he will simply state that the President is unable to approve the proposal as a joint Anglo-American plan but that he hoped to hear further from the President on the whole problem. He was confused, however, as to what the British Govt's position regarding the plan should now be. He said that the British Govt's confidence in the success of the plan had been based on the US giving it moral as well as financial support. He has doubts whether the British Govt could force it alone. He emphasized his fear of increased chaos in Palestine. He showed keen disappointment that this plan could not have the support of the US as it was the only one yet devised which in the opinion of the British Govt would make it possible to bring into Palestine promptly the hundred thousand Jews.

²⁸ Dated July 30, not printed. It stated: "I hope you will consider proposal entirely independent of any view I may have expressed because I do not know views people at home." (740.00119 Council/7-3046)

²⁹ See footnotes 26 and 25, p. 674.

³⁰ Herbert S. Morrison, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons.

I explained to him the public reaction to the plan in the US with which the President was confronted. He expressed the hope that the President would give sympathetic consideration to the serious difficulties which confronted the British Govt in Palestine and in the Middle East from Arabs as well as Jews.

Sent Dept as 3744; repeated London as 571.

CAFFERY

867N.01/8-246: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, August 2, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 8:25 p. m.]

1308. Azzam Pasha has expressed to Ireland³¹ unalterable opposition of League and Arab states to federal solution and partition for Palestine. He categorically denied statement in press attributed to League spokesman London that League did not oppose federalism.

Azzam Pasha characterized federal scheme as form of partition, as impractical and as foreshadowing Jewish state. Immigration into Jewish provinces as proposed could lead only to over-population there and further Zionist insistence on territorial aggrandisement. Both federal scheme and partition would destroy prospects of independent Palestine within Arab League. Arabs would oppose either scheme by every means possible. Suggested grant to Arabs for development purposes was labeled as Jewish American attempt to buy **Arab acquiescence in American schemes for Palestine** which Arabs would reject even if sum offered were thousand times figure mentioned in press. He was unusually bitter, possibly due to strain of Ramadan fasting, toward American policy and declared any proposals now supported by America would be regarded by Arabs as designed to placate American Jewish opinion.

Arab states, with possible exception Iraq, accepting British invitation to London conference on Palestine. They consider invitation is answer to Arab note to Britain drafted at Bludan. According to Azzam Pasha, Arabs maintain 1939 view and will reply that they cannot sit down in conference if Jews are present.³² Kamel Bey, Under Secretary FonAff informed me however Egypt's note of acceptance contained no conditions. Local representatives Arab states met Thursday to consider procedure and delegates to London conference.

³¹ Philip W. Ireland, Attaché at the American Embassy in Egypt.

³² Telegram 7246, August 3, 5 p. m., from London, reported advice from a Foreign Office spokesman that the British would have to conduct two conferences simultaneously because of the refusal of the Arabs to sit at the same table with the Jews (867N.01/8-346).

Iraq has requested special session League to consider Palestine but no meeting planned before regular session Beirut October, although Arab FonMins probably convene here early September.

Repeated London 70; copies to Arab capitals.

LYON

867N.01/8-746 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*³³

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1946—5 p. m.

Personal for Prime Minister Attlee from President Truman. I regret that I was not able promptly to give you a definite reply to your telegram of July 25 asking for my views with regard to the recommendations of the American and British groups concerning Palestine. Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Harriman have, I believe, discussed the matter with you and have explained that I do not feel myself able in present circumstances to accept the plan proposed as a joint Anglo-American plan.

The whole matter is being carefully reviewed in Washington and I hope in the not too distant future to give you a more definite reply as to our position.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/8-946 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*³⁴

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 9 August, 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. Thank you for your message³⁵ which was passed to me by your Embassy yesterday morning.

2. I feel bound to express my great disappointment that you have not yet been able to accept the plan worked out with so much goodwill by the American and British experts as the best solution to this very difficult question. Meanwhile it has been necessary for us to make arrangements for the proposed conference with Jews and Arabs at the end of this month and I think that it may be useful to you to know what our present intentions are.

3. We have given very careful consideration to the plan of the American and British experts. We are convinced that this plan is in all the circumstances the best that can be devised and the most likely to lead to a settlement in Palestine. We believe further that

³³ Sent to London as Department's telegram 5877. The message was repeated to the Secretary of State in telegram 3955 (Sedel 631), August 8, 6 p. m., to Paris.

³⁴ Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador on August 9.

³⁵ Of August 7, *supra*.

it may be possible as part of this plan to introduce a substantial number of refugees from Europe into Palestine in the near future without disturbing the peace of the whole Middle East and imposing on us a military commitment which we are quite unable to discharge. We doubt whether there is any alternative plan which would offer the same prospect.

4. It is accordingly our intention, as was stated by the Government in the recent Parliamentary debate, to present the plan of the experts as the basis for negotiation at the conference. Given the support of your Government, we should be able to put the plan forward without modification. If however you continue to feel that you cannot accept the proposals as a joint Anglo-American plan and we have therefore to carry it into effect with our own resources alone, we shall present it to the Conference in a modified form. As we said in the debate to which I have referred, these modifications will relate particularly to the tempo and extent of Jewish immigration and Arab development.

5. I need hardly add that we shall give careful consideration to any suggestions you may have to make but I thought it only right that you should know our present intentions.

6. You will, I am sure, realise that we have to deal with the actual situation with all its difficulties and dangers. The lives of British, Jews and Arabs are imperilled and I more than hope that you may see your way clear to assist us in a final and permanent solution.

867N.01/8-946: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, August 9, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received August 9—3: 51 p. m.]

7361. Reference Embassy's 7358 of August 9.³⁶ Beeley, one of the officials in Eastern Dept of Foreign Office, immediately responsible for Palestine affairs told us this afternoon about the latest efforts being made by the British Govt to put an effective stop to illegal immigration into Palestine. The British Government, Beeley said, has very recently made representations to a number of European governments with a view to securing their cooperation in preventing the departure from ports under their control of ships carrying illegal immigrants to Palestine. Beeley stated that the countries to which representations have been made include Rumania, France, Italy and Belgium. No replies have yet been received by the Foreign Office from any of these countries he added. Beeley said he did not think any representations on this subject had been made to the Russians in Moscow but he explained that on more than one occasion the British have protested,

³⁶ Not printed.

both to the Rumanian Government and to the Russian authorities on the Control Commission in Bucharest, against the sailing from Rumania of ships with illegal immigrants for Palestine.

A few days ago, Beeley continued, the British asked both the Rumanian authorities and the Russian member of the Control Council in Bucharest to prevent the sailing of a vessel now waiting in Constanza harbor to take aboard immigrants for Palestine.³⁷

Stories are printed under banner headlines in this evening's London papers describing the new British move to arrest the flow of illegal immigrants to Palestine.

Sent Dept as 7361; to Jerusalem as 55, to Paris for Secdel as 599.

GALLMAN

867N.01/8-1246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1946—5 p. m.

5973. Section I. Premature leaks from London re contents recommendations incorporated in Morrison Plan gave groups in this country opposed to plan opportunity mobilize so much public sentiment against it that Cabinet Committee and President felt they could not agree accept recommendations at least until they had studied and discussed them in detail. Alternates of Cabinet Committee, American members of Anglo-American Committee, the Cabinet Committee, other members of Cabinet and various interested persons and groups have participated in the discussions. During discussions, it has become clear that it would be unwise for President to give his formal support to Plan in its present form. President feels that in view opposition to Plan, he would not be able to prevail on Congress to agree to financial contributions for its implementation nor to rally sufficient public support to warrant undertaking by this Govt to give plan in its present form moral backing.

Section II. We have now been informed in confidence by Dr. Goldmann,³⁸ acting behalf of Jewish Agency that on Aug 5, 1946, Executive of that Agency adopted following resolution:

"1) The Executive of the Jewish Agency regards the Brit proposals based on the Report of the Committee of Six and as announced

³⁷ On August 12, 1946, the British Government released a statement that immigrants arriving illegally in Palestine would no longer be allowed to land there but would be removed to Cyprus or elsewhere pending a decision on their future. The statement was transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Lord Inverchapel on the day of its release (867N.01/8-1246).

³⁸ In a conversation with the Acting Secretary of State on August 7; memorandum of conversation not printed.

by Mr. Morrison in the House of Commons as unacceptable as a basis of discussion.

"2) The Executive is prepared to discuss a proposal for the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine.

"3) As immediate steps for the implementation of Paragraph 2 the Executive puts forward the following demands:—

"a) the immediate grant of 100,000 certificates and the immediate beginning of the transportation of the 100,000 to Palestine;

"b) the grant of immediate full autonomy (in appointing its administration and in the economic field) to that area of Palestine to be designated to become a Jewish State;

"c) the grant of the right of control of immigration to the administration of that area in Palestine designated to be a Jewish State."

Section III. In discussing this resolution, Dr. Goldmann has orally stated substantially as follows:

A. Executive and most of American Jewry object to Plan primarily because it calls for indefinite continuance Brit control of Jewish area, provides for boundaries which are unacceptable, does not give sufficient degree self-govt for area allotted to Jews, and does not provide for immediate control by Jews of immigration into Jewish area.

B. Executive would be willing accept plan which:

1. would provide for immediate partitioning of Palestine into three areas: Jewish, Arab and the holy places; the Jewish area roughly to include territory assigned to Jews by Peel Report,⁵⁹ plus the Negeb; Arab area to include remainder except holy places. (Executive would be willing, however, to negotiate with regard to Galilee);

2. would provide for termination Mandate so far as Jewish area concerned and for setting up of independent Jewish state within set period of not more than two or three years;

3. would permit Jews to set up their own administration and to enjoy considerable home rule in economic matters pending establishment independent Jewish state;

4. would permit Jews, immediately upon adoption of Plan, have full control immigration into their area.

C. He could guarantee support for such a plan on part of Agency and of majority Jews and friends of Zionism in US.

D. If such a plan were carried out, Executive would be willing consider Brit Govt as ally of Jewish State and would support granting to Great Britain of such military establishments in Jewish State as Great Britain might require.

E. In his opinion, Jewish State would be willing to participate in confederation of Near Eastern states, including Arab states, for purpose cooperation and under such conditions as should remove fear of Arabs that Jewish state might serve as spearhead for introducing external influences into Near East.

F. In his opinion, more moderate Arabs could be induced not to oppose such a plan. If it should be decided add Arab area to Trans-

⁵⁹ British Cmd. 5479: *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, July 1937.

Jordan, support of King Abdullah might be obtained since Trans-Jordan might, with addition of some 800,000 Arabs, become viable state.

G. In his opinion, Jewish State could be set up and recognized as independent by Great Britain without detailed review by United Nations in same manner as Trans-Jordan has been set up; ⁴⁰ naturally when Jewish State would apply for admission to UN it would be subject to scrutiny given all applicants for admission that organization.

H. Immediately upon reaching decision adopt plan immigration 100,000 Jews should commence.

I. Dr. Weizmann was authorized by Executive discuss plan with Brit Govt and Executive hoped without loss of time two Govts might be willing accept it as basis for coming negotiations Brit with Arabs and Jews and that American Govt would give any solution based on it financial support comparable in extent to that suggested in Morrison plan. It hoped in particular American Govt would find it possible give financial assistance facilitate voluntary migration Arabs from Jewish to Arab area. Jews were prepared give every consideration Arab population and would not bring pressure directly or indirectly upon Arabs to leave Jewish territory.

Section IV. Examination Goldmann plan indicates although Executive states in first paragraph resolution that it rejects Morrison plan as basis for discussion, counter-proposals of Executive as elaborated upon by Goldmann might be regarded as certain alterations and extensions in various provisions Morrison plan rather than outlines of an entirely new plan. Counterproposals, for instance, contemplate short definite rather than indefinite transition period, and extension of authority of local govt during such period. According to Goldmann Jews wish their area during period nominate its own ministers subject approval Mandatory; they desire this area should have authority deal with such matters as imports and exports and borrowing money even though they realize creditors would have to be persons or organizations willing rely upon credit of transitory govt. They also insist area have right fully control its own immigration. Boundaries which they apparently have in mind furthermore are much more liberal to Jews than those defined in Morrison proposals. They admit Negeb might be of problematic value but insist it is of great psychological importance in that it added many square miles Jewish area.

Section V. Brit Govt undoubtedly in better position than we to assess kind of reception which such plan would receive from Arabs. In our view this recent development offers hope that Jewish Agency will realistically join in search for practicable solution. As first step we suggest possibility that Brit Govt might let it be known that coming consultations will not be rigidly bound to consideration one plan and the possibility of early creation of viable state of Jewish portion not precluded. If Brit Govt, following consultations with Arabs and

⁴⁰ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 794 ff.

Jews, reaches decision which this Govt feels can obtain general public approval this country even though not satisfactory to extremists, this Govt will give it moral support and endeavor back it up with appropriate financial assistance.

Section VI. You are authorized discuss matter with Attlee, Bevin or Acting Minister Foreign Affairs. Please impress upon them importance of extreme secrecy.

Sent London 5973 rptd Paris 4037 (Secdel 657) for Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Harriman.⁴¹

ACHESON

867N.01/8-1246 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁴²

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

I appreciate your courtesy in furnishing me information contained urtel Aug. 9.

After further study of recommendations of American and Brit groups and after detailed discussion in which members my cabinet and other advisers participated, I have reluctantly come to conclusion that I can not give formal support to plan in its present form as a joint Anglo-American plan.

The opposition in this country to the plan has become so intense that it is now clear it would be impossible to rally in favor of it sufficient public opinion enable this Govt to give it effective support.

In view critical situation Palestine and of desperate plight of homeless Jews in Europe I believe search for a solution to this difficult problem should continue. I have therefore instructed our Embassy London discuss with you or with appropriate members of Brit Govt certain suggestions which have been made to us and which, I understand, are also being made to you.⁴³

Should it be possible to broaden coming conference sufficiently to consider these suggestions, it is my earnest hope conference may make possible decision by your Govt upon a course for which we can obtain necessary support in this country and in the Congress so we can give effective financial help and moral support.

⁴¹ In telegram 4005 (Delsec S18), from Paris, August 13, 7 p. m., Ambassador Harriman stated: "I gave to Mr. Bevin the substance of your Secdel 657. Although Mr. Bevin indicated he was familiar with the proposals outlined by Dr. Goldmann as they appeared to be the same as those made to the British Government by Dr. Weizmann, he said that he would study the matter and discuss it later." (740.00119 Council/8-1346).

⁴² Sent to London as Department's telegram 5974, with the instruction: "Please transmit following message from President to Attlee." The Department repeated the telegram to Paris for Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Harriman "for presentation to Attlee if he is in Paris."

⁴³ See telegram 5973, *supra*.

867N.01/8-1546 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁴⁴

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 15 August 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. Thank you for your personal message of August 13th [12th]. I have now received from the Foreign Secretary in Paris a copy of the message sent by the State Department to Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Harriman. We are discussing these proposals and it will probably take a few days before we can give our views on them.

867N.01/8-1546 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, August 15, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 3:46 p. m.]

1383. Conference Arab Foreign Ministers Alexandria which ends tonight after official dinner by Egyptian Foreign Minister has run true to expectations. Official communiqué after three sessions stressed complete unity adoption of decision supporting Palestine Arab aspirations, acceptance invitation London conference where Arab position will be governed by Bludan decisions and coordination of Arab policy to [at?] UN in accordance with interest of Arab states lasting peace and humane collaboration between nations. Election chairman Arab delegation to London apparently postponed.

Informal talks with various Ministers indicate that while they completely reject partition in any form and reflect resentment of American participation in Palestine problem they also face future with misgivings and without apparent program other than submission of Palestine to UN should London conference break down as they anticipate it will. Arab Higher Committee members called before Ministers said to be dissatisfied with policies adopted by conference on which Azzam Pasha and Lutfi el-Sayed,⁴⁵ who presided, had restraining influence. Committee reported contemplating direct appeal to populace each Arab country. Local Arab press criticism of Arab League as "do nothing" organization has increased. Jamali⁴⁶ and Faisal while deploring violence agree that something drastic must be done to save Palestine.

Repeated to London. Copies to Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

⁴⁴ Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Minister in Washington (Balfour) on August 15.

⁴⁵ Ahmed Lutfi el-Sayed, Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁶ Fadhil Jamali, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

740.00119 Council/8-1546: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman), at Paris

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1946—3 p. m.

4112. For Harriman. I have discussed with President information contained in your 4034 and 4039 ⁴⁷ which proved most helpful. We have been greatly distressed here at continuing leaks regarding Palestine and have made every effort to maintain most absolute secrecy at this stage. In circumstances we are inclined to believe leaks must have come from Brit sources and from Goldmann himself. Brit must realize of course that sentiment in Congress and among public at large has been aroused to such an extent that most extreme caution must be exercised if we are to obtain Congressional approval to those aspects of plan calling for financial assistance and for admission of additional refugees into this country.

With regard to third paragraph your 4039 ⁴⁸ President has approved and contemplates issuing Friday afternoon a statement which we believe will contain reassurance on question of migration to places other than Palestine and which at same time constitutes most President feels he could say in a positive manner regarding present situation in view of considerations which I mentioned above. Statement of which you should give Brit advance copy reads: ⁴⁹

“Although the President has been exchanging views with Mr. Attlee on the subject, this Government has not presented any plan of its own for the solution of the problem of Palestine. It is the sincere hope of the President, however, that as a result of the proposed conversations between the British Government and Jewish and Arab representatives a fair solution of the problem of Palestine can be found and immediate steps can be taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe. It is clear that no settlement of the Palestine problem can be achieved which will be fully satisfactory to all of the parties concerned and that if this problem is to be solved in a manner which will bring peace and prosperity to Palestine, it must be approached in a spirit of conciliation.

⁴⁷ Telegrams dated August 15 from Paris; neither printed.

⁴⁸ This paragraph stated: “Bevin further said that the Cabinet was considering laying the original plan before the Jews and Arabs in the pending conferences with the statement that they were prepared to receive from both sides counter-proposals. He is fearful that the Arabs will not acquiesce in any plan unless other nations will take some of the Jews from Europe and therefore unless the first proposal of the original plan is approved by the American Government; namely, dealing with the problem of the resettlement of the displaced persons, including Jews on a worldwide basis. He pointed out that no mention had been made in our message of this point and specifically asked me to find out whether the President was prepared to join by recommending to Congress the admission of additional immigration to the United States. He asked that I obtain an urgent reply on this.” (867N.01/8-1546)

⁴⁹ This statement was released by the White House on August 16.

It is also evident that the solution of the Palestine question will not in itself solve the broader problem of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in Europe. The President has been giving this problem his special attention and hopes that arrangements can be entered into which will make it possible for various countries, including the United States, to admit many of these persons as permanent residents. The President on his part is contemplating seeking the approval of Congress for special legislation authorizing the entry into the United States of a fixed number of these persons, including Jews."

Sent Paris for Harriman; repeated London.

ACHESON

867N.01/8-1546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 15, 1946—10 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received August 15—7:08 p. m.]

7552. Personal for the Acting Secretary. At Attlee's request I called on him this afternoon. Hall, Colonial Secretary, was with him. Hall has seen Weizmann, Goldmann and Wise. They discussed with him their plan and attempted to make as a condition of the Jewish Agency's acceptance the British invitation to the consultations that their plan be made the basis of the discussions. Hall explained to them that the British Government could not accept this condition. The British Government would propose the original plan but were fully ready to consider the Jewish Agency proposals and proposals from the Arabs as well. Goldmann and Wise have returned to Paris to consult the other members of the Jewish Agency Executive and will inform the British Government promptly whether they will agree to accept the invitation to the consultations. Hall believes they will accept. Hall told me that the Jewish Agency had evidently been under the misapprehension that the British Government had intended to put forward its plan in a rigid manner for acceptance without deviation; whereas, the British Government was in fact entirely flexible and were prepared to give full consideration to both Jewish and Arab proposals. Hall told me on further development that the Agency's conception of the boundary of the Negeb area runs further north than that of the British. This may prove to be a difficulty in that it encompasses Arab communities of considerable population. Hall wished that this be kept in the strictest confidence as he thought it was unwise to have premature public discussions of this point prior to the consultations.

Mr. Attlee was desirous that the President should know of these developments for his information. He showed equal concern as Bevin had regarding the resettlement plan for the Jews in Europe including Jews on a world-wide basis and expressed the earnest hope that the President would support it. He emphasized the importance that this would have on the Arab reaction at the consultations.

Repeated to Paris, for the Secretary as 629.

HARRIMAN

867N.01/8-1746

The Secretary of State to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, at Paris

PARIS, August 17, 1946.

DEAR DR. WISE: I have been so busy with the work of the Peace Conference that I have not had an opportunity to answer your note⁵⁰ as to seeing Dr. Goldmann about the Palestine matter.

Much as I regret not complying with any request of yours, I feel that I should not hold conferences on this subject.

For the past year President Truman has had personal charge of the Palestine problem. Communications between the British Government and the United States Government have been carried on by the President and Mr. Attlee—not by Mr. Bevin and me.⁵¹

When the Peace Conference convened July 29, Mr. Attlee came to Paris. Just at that time the press carried stories about the meeting of the representatives of our Cabinet Committee and the British Committee. The President requested me to see Mr. Attlee and also to talk with the representatives of our Cabinet Committee. I communicated to the President their views and on the same day advised him of the views expressed by you and Dr. Goldmann on the occasion of your visit with me that morning.

Since that time I have not talked with the President or with any official of the British Government as to the Palestine matter.

As long as the President is handling the matter I feel that I should not confer with the interested parties unless requested to do so by the President. Any interference by me without his request and without knowing what his views are might be harmful instead of helpful.

Tell Dr. Goldmann that I regret I cannot see him upon this matter but I am sure the President will be glad to give consideration to any views Dr. Goldmann submits to him.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

⁵⁰ Not found in Department files.

⁵¹ In a letter of August 17 to Mr. Robert R. Nathan, at Paris, Mr. Byrnes noted: "Whenever the State Department has issued a statement of taking any action of any kind it has been by direction of the President." (867N.01/8-1746)

867N.01/8-1946: Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁵²

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 19 August, 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. I am now in a position to give a fuller reply to your message of the 13th [12th] August.

2. It is, of course, a great disappointment to us that you should feel yourself unable to give support to the plan recommended by the Anglo-American Expert Delegations. The discussion of the summary of this plan which we recently presented to Parliament will form the first item on the agenda at the coming conference. We earnestly hope that, as a result of the conference, some solution will emerge which, even if not fully accepted by either Arabs or Jews, may be possible of implementation without too greatly endangering the peace of Palestine or of the Middle East as a whole. But you will appreciate that any such solution must, as matters stand, be one which we can put into effect with our resources alone.

3. As regards the plan of partition submitted by the Jewish Agency, it is, as I have said, our intention to place the outlines of the provincial autonomy plan before the conference. On various matters, and in particular as regards the boundaries of the provinces and degree of self-Government to be conceded to them, we designedly refrain from committing ourselves in any way when presenting the plan to Parliament. While we are adopting the plan as the initial basis for discussion, we do not propose to take up an immovable position in regard either to the plan itself or to its constituent features in advance of the conference.

4. It is actually open to the Jews-or to the Arabs, if they accept our invitation to attend the conference, to propose alterations in the outline plan as announced, to make recommendations as to its details or to submit counterproposals. All such proposals and recommendations will be given due consideration.

867N.01/8-2046: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman), at Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

4233. For Ambassador Harriman. Goldmann informed us by telephone this morning from Paris substantially as follows:

1. He had had number of useful constructive talks with Bevin and other members Brit Govt but had reached impasse apparently because attitude of Hall.

⁵² Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador on August 19. For a slightly different version of this message, see Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers*, p. 119.

2. In view attitude extreme Zionists in America, particularly Silver group,⁵³ Executive Agency could not agree attend conference called consider proposals other than those looking towards establishment Jewish state following partition.

3. Chief Arab Dept Jewish Agency had had conversations with responsible Arab leaders Cairo who confidentially and informally stated they also agreeable discuss definite partition.

4. Agency had proposed that preliminary to opening formal conferences there should be arranged secret informal conversations between Brit and Jews and Brit and Arabs with idea these preliminary conversations might find mutually agreeable bases for formal conferences. Bevin seemed rather sympathetic to suggestion; Hall opposed preliminary conversations and insisted that only formal conference be held primarily to consider Morrison proposals although prepared consider such other proposals as might be advanced. Goldmann says Arabs also favorable preliminary conversations since fanatical extremists Arab countries would render it difficult for them to begin openly to make compromises.

5. In view critical situation it was extremely important that we informally approach Brit and in some manner indicate we consider preliminary conversations might be useful and that we have concern lest failure arrange such conversations might render holding conference impossible.

We have made no undertakings to Goldmann but have informed him we shall give matter consideration. We hesitate instruct that approach be made Brit Govt since we are not acquainted with atmosphere present informal talks nor with all factors involved. It would appear to us from Goldmann's statements that conference would have better chance of success if preliminary informal conversations could be held which would give Jews and Arabs chance to talk freely and privately. We leave to your discretion whether it might serve useful purpose for you to discuss this matter informally with Bevin or other appropriate Brit officials. Goldmann says final decision may be taken in Cabinet meeting tomorrow.

Repeated to London.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/8-2146 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

PARIS, August 21, 1946—noon.
[Received August 21—10:38 a. m.]

4141. Delsec 835. Personal for the Acting Secretary from Harriman. I called on Bevin yesterday evening to learn the recent developments in the Palestine situation.

⁵³ The group supporting Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, President of the Zionist Organization of America.

He said that the President's statement on resettlement of displaced persons would be of real help in dealing with the Arabs at the consultations.

His immediate difficulty is with the Jewish Agency. As reported in the press he has seen several times in Paris representatives of the Jewish Agency, including Dr. Goldmann and Rabbi Wise. They have demanded that their proposal be accepted by the British Government as the basis for discussions at the proposed consultations. Bevin replied that the British Government intended to submit its proposal but would be glad to consider any amendments or any plan proposed by either the Jews or the Arabs, that if the Jewish Agency accepted the invitation to the consultations the British Govt would work earnestly and patiently to find an acceptable solution. Bevin considers that in his conversations with the Agency Representatives he has met and gone beyond our suggestions contained in Secdel 657⁵⁴ and that the British Govt cannot go any further prior to the consultations. He must give consideration to the reaction of the Arab States, all of whom have already accepted invitation to consultations.

On Sunday he had word from the Jews that they declined to participate except on their terms.

He feels that the Jewish Agency is overplaying its hand and still hopes that they will be more reasonable but in any event that there is no course open to the British Government but to stand on its present position.

In reply to my question, Bevin told me he had confidence that the British Military now have control of the terrorists in Palestine.

Repeated to London as 628.

[HARRIMAN]

740.00119 Council/8-2146 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, August 21, 1946—8:30 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received August 21—2:49 p. m.]

4160. Delsec 837. Personal for the Acting Secretary from Harriman. My message Delsec 835⁵⁵ describing my discussion with Bevin yesterday crossed your 4233 to Paris.⁵⁶

My comments given below on your message are based on yesterday's and other previous conversations with Bevin, Attlee and Hall:

Point 1. Bevin looks upon the Palestine question as his own primary responsibility since it is a major Governmental foreign policy

⁵⁴ This was a repeat of Department's telegram 5973, August 12, to London, p. 679.

⁵⁵ *Supra.*

⁵⁶ Dated August 20, p. 687.

and not a colonial policy. He naturally consults Hall, but I cannot believe that Bevin would be influenced by Hall against his better judgment.

Point 2. In different conversation Bevin, Attlee and Hall have all specifically emphasized that they are not insisting that the Conference should consider the British proposal as a basis for discussion. As previously reported they have stated that the British proposal will be submitted to the Conference and that they are entirely open to any amendments or new plans. As I understand it they are not opposed to the consideration of any proposals for partition and for establishment within a certain time of a Jewish state.

On the other hand, Bevin has made it plain to me that the Jewish Agency must appreciate that he cannot condone or negotiate with extreme Zionists whom he believes have been responsible for the development of terrorist psychology.

Point 3. No comment.

Points 4 and 5. Bevin has not mentioned to me the idea of preliminary conversations. I assume he did not consider the idea as practicable. I see no objections to my asking him about it informally as a matter of information and will do so at the first opportunity.⁵⁷ I hope, however, that the Jewish Agency will not be informed of this.

I am glad to learn that the Department has made no undertakings to Goldmann and I sincerely hope that the Department will find it possible to inform Goldmann that it cannot involve itself in the Jewish Agency's negotiations with the British Government regarding conditions precedent to the conference beyond the steps taken last week.

Repeated London as 631.

HARRIMAN

867N.01/8-2946 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1946—6 p. m.

6364. We have discussed *informally* with Brit Embassy desire of American Council for Judaism (anti-Zionist) as stated in letter addressed to me by its President, Lessing J. Rosenwald, that Jewish representation in proposed London talks should not be confined to Agency. We learned Embassy had received information from FonOff similar to that contained fourth paragraph your 7875 Aug 29⁵⁸ indi-

⁵⁷ In telegram 4194, August 23, 4 p. m., from Paris (Delsec 846), Mr. Harriman reported that Mr. Bevin had informed the Jewish representatives that the British Government was unwilling to approach the Arab states regarding preliminary conversations. Mr. Bevin felt that since the Arabs had agreed to accept the British invitation to the Conference, he was unwilling to risk a refusal on their part to attend if further suggestions were made prior to the Conference. (740.00119 Council/8-2346)

⁵⁸ Not printed.

cating Brit Govt is at least contemplating inviting other Jewish groups although apparently final decision this respect not yet reached. With Embassy's approval we informed Rosenwald orally of this.

Dept's decision that this Govt should not participate in forthcoming conversations was communicated to you in our 5572 July 23. We have received inquiries from press regarding possibility that Govt might send observers but after consideration of matter in light of present circumstances we are stating decision has been reached to have no observers present, although Dept will of course follow developments closely.

Sent London, repeated Paris for Harriman.

ACHESON

867N.01/9-546 : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and
Consular Officers*⁵⁹

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1946.

At press conference Sept 5 President was asked whether he would like to say what he had told Brit on Palestine problem some time ago. President replied that all had been made public. When correspondent pointed out President's reply to Attlee had never been made public President said substance had been made public, adding that what he was trying to do was get 100,000 Jews into Palestine and he was still interested in it.

Correspondent remarked that it had never been officially stated that our Govt had turned down Grady-Morrison plan and he inquired whether we rejected it, to which President said it was still under consideration. Asked whether he would go along with \$300,000,000 loan in Grady-Morrison plan, President replied that was still under consideration and he would rather not make any statement until whole program had been decided. Correspondent inquired whether we were going send any observers to Anglo-Arab-Jewish conference London, to which President replied in negative stating we were not interested in it. Asked if what he had said about Palestine meant discussions were still under way between American and Brit Govts President replied in affirmative stating discussions were still going on London.⁶⁰

CLAYTON

⁵⁹ At London, Paris, Moscow, Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, and Jerusalem.

⁶⁰ For full transcript of President Truman's press conference of September 5, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946*, p. 423.

867N.01/9-546

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilson)*⁶¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Jewish Agency
Mr. Henderson—NEA
Mr. Merriam—NE
Mr. Wilson—NE

Subject: Refusal of Jewish Agency to Participate in London Conference.

Mr. Epstein called at the request of Dr. Goldmann, of the Agency Executive, to inform the Department that the Executive had reluctantly decided that it could not accept the invitation of the British Government to the proposed conference on Palestine under the conditions proposed. The decision had been unanimous and had included Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Goldmann. In order not to embarrass the British Government the Agency was not making the decision public, and Mr. Epstein requested that this information be kept confidential. He said that the decision had only been reached after the most serious consideration, but that the terms imposed by the British for the Agency's attendance were not acceptable. The most serious obstacle in this connection was the insistence of the British on putting forward the Morrison-Grady plan as the basis for discussion.

In the light of the well-known position of the Zionist movement with regard to a Jewish state, it was impossible for the leaders of that movement to participate in a conference on any other basis than that of a Jewish state in at least a part of Palestine. The Zionist movement, Mr. Epstein said, was a democratic movement and its leaders had to follow the desires of the rank and file. Constitutionally they could not enter into negotiations on any other basis than that of a Jewish state without the consent of the movement through a Zionist congress. In fact, the decision of the Executive to accept partition as a basis for entering into the negotiations represented a very marked modification from the official Zionist position as enunciated in the Biltmore program.⁶² For the sake of entering into negotiations with the British which would give some hope of a settlement in Palestine, the Executive had been willing to proceed on the basis of partition, but

⁶¹ A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) by Mr. Henderson on the same date. In his covering memorandum Mr. Henderson noted that the decision of the Jewish Agency not to participate in the forthcoming talks in London regarding Palestine "is a most serious development, as it is not likely that a satisfactory settlement can result from a conference between the British and the Arabs only." (867N.01/9-546)

⁶² Program adopted by the Extraordinary Conference of American Zionists at the Biltmore Hotel, New York City, on May 11, 1942, calling for the establishment of the whole of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth.

it was entirely unwilling to enter into negotiations with regard to the Morrison-Grady scheme. Their objections to this latter scheme were chiefly in connection with its failure to give the Jews sufficient assurances regarding immigration and autonomy in economic matters.

In other words, Mr. Epstein continued, the Agency was unwilling to be placed in a position where it might have to compromise between the Morrison-Grady proposals on the one hand and its own partition plan on the other. This would inevitably result if the Morrison-Grady plan were to be considered first.

Mr. Wilson inquired whether it would be correct to say that the Agency Executive had now accepted partition as the solution for Palestine which it favored. Mr. Epstein replied in the affirmative, pointing out that the decision to do so had been taken with only one member of the Executive voting against, and with three members abstaining. (This apparently referred to the meeting of the Agency Executive in Paris last month when the Morrison-Grady scheme was rejected but the decision was taken to negotiate with the British regarding partition under certain conditions.)

Mr. Epstein said that the situation was extremely serious, both from the standpoint of reaching a settlement in Palestine and from the standpoint of the future course that the Zionist movement would take. He very much feared that as a result of these developments the extremists would take over in Palestine as well as in the American Zionist organization. He could not foresee what course events would take and he had no specific request to make of the Department. Dr. Goldmann and Dr. Weizmann were conferring with regard to possible future action and it might be that he would have some word soon as to what might develop. Meanwhile Dr. Goldmann was maintaining a very tenuous contact with the British Government and it was to be hoped that this contact would not be broken.

Mr. Henderson thanked Mr. Epstein for this full account of the present position and said that he would inform Acting Secretary Clayton.

_____ // William L Clayton

867N.01/9-1246

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1946.

Rabbi Wise and certain other Zionists are urging that you should issue at once a statement in favor of partition in Palestine. It is apparently the idea of certain relatively moderate elements among the Zionists that if the American Government does this, the Jewish Agency may be able to persuade the British Government to accept partition as the basis for the present London talks on Palestine, thereby enabling the Agency to participate in the talks with a view

to working out an eventual settlement of the problem. These elements also hope that a statement of this kind will strengthen them against the more extreme and anti-Administration Zionists who insist on all of Palestine being converted into an independent Jewish state.

Upon consideration of this matter we do not feel that it would be advisable for you to issue such a statement at this time, for the following reasons:

1. We do not believe that any statement at all should be issued by this Government during the course of the present conversations. The situation in London is very delicate and without full knowledge of all the complicated elements in the situation we might do more harm than good by intervening at this time. This is evidently the view of such observers on the spot as Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Harri-man. In this connection you may wish to bear in mind the recommendation of Secretary Byrnes at the time the decision was taken not to take part in the British announcement of the Morrison-Grady proposals, to the effect that you might wish to avoid making any further public statements with regard to Palestine, and specifically with regard to the 100,000 Jews, for the time being. Ambassador Harri-man also, in a recent telegram, expressed the view after talking to Prime Minister Attlee, Foreign Secretary Bevin and other British officials, that in the circumstances we should not involve ourselves in the matter beyond the steps which we have already taken.

2. If we yield to the pressure of highly organized Zionist groups just now and make statements calculated to give support to their policies of the moment, we shall merely be encouraging them to make fresh demands and to apply pressure in the future whenever they conceive it to be in their interest for this Government to make further statements on their behalf. In any event, we do not believe that, without sacrificing the public interests, we shall be able to go far and fast enough in rendering them support to keep them satisfied very long. It seems to us that it would be wiser to make it clear to them now in ~~the~~ most friendly manner that the Government itself must determine when it is in the interests of the United States to make statements with regard to Palestine and that in the present instance, the Government is of the opinion that it is in the best interests of the United States and for that matter of the Zionists themselves for it to remain silent.

3. Any statement by this Government approving partition would mean that we had gone contrary to the recommendations both of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and of the experts who drew up the Morrison-Grady scheme. This would undoubtedly give rise to the impression that we are adopting a policy on an important matter in order to satisfy a particular Zionist group.

4. The attitude of the Arab world toward the United States has become progressively hostile in the last few months. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff, who feel that the United States has a vital security interest in the Middle East, have urged that we take no action with regard to Palestine which might orient the peoples of the entire area away from the Western Powers. The Arabs have always been fundamentally opposed to the partition of Palestine and their adverse reaction to a statement by us favoring that solution would be intensified by the knowledge that we have taken such a position only after it had been adhered to by certain Zionist leaders.

It may be, however, that after considering the matter you may find that for other reasons it would be preferable for you to make another statement on the subject. We have accordingly prepared the attached draft, which in our opinion represents the most that should be said at this time.

W. L. CLAYTON

[Annex]

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

As I pointed out last week, the American Government is not being represented at the present conversations in London relative to the future of Palestine. We are, however, deeply interested in the outcome of these conversations and hope that they will point the way to a settlement which may bring peace and prosperity to the people of Palestine. We also hope that before the conversations are concluded, representatives of the Jews, as well as of the Palestinian Arabs, may find it possible to participate.

In this regard, I am sure that the work of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., and of the British and American group in which the alternates of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems participated under the chairmanship of Ambassador Henry F. Grady, will prove of real assistance to those who are now endeavoring to work out an equitable solution to the problem. I have already made it clear that this Government has not put forward any concrete proposals in connection with the present conversations, nor is it committed to any single plan with regard to the future of Palestine. The United States would, however, be prepared to give its support to any concrete proposals calling for the eventual establishment of an independent state or of independent states in Palestine, provided such proposals would be in keeping with the basic principles of the Mandate for Palestine and would have a sufficient degree of acceptance among those most directly concerned to give good grounds for the hope that they could be successfully put into effect.

867N.01/9-1746 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 17, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received September 17—11:51 a. m.]

8214. Following report of yesterday's private meeting Palestine conference ⁶³ has been communicated Embassy verbally by Secretary British delegation.

Bevin and Hall attended. Former delivered Govt's commentary drafted over week-end on Arab statements (Embs 8153, Sept 13 ⁶⁴). He said Govt's plan was carefully considered and took into account international aspects. Any solution must take into account absence common ground between Arabs and Jews. Answer seemed to lie in separation of two communities. Bevin wished make clear to Arabs that further immigration cannot be dismissed from problem because plight Jews and displaced persons in general makes immigration essential. Bevin gave following as five essential elements to any solution :

1. There are 600,000 Jews in Palestine who will insist on their political rights not only as individuals but as community.
2. There can be no settlement which does not admit further Jewish immigration.
3. Palestine cannot remain indefinitely under tutelage but must progress towards independence.
4. Therefore some institutions must be set up which will enable both peoples in Palestine to govern themselves more and more.
5. Tension in Palestine for last 10 years must be ended.

General discussion followed Bevin's commentary. British inquired regarding Arab counter-proposals and asked whether they would take into account five points above.

Arabs said they would like to consider Bevin's commentary and that they would comment upon it in day or two. When Arabs are ready next meeting will be arranged possibly Thursday.^{64a}

Secretary British delegation said it was uncertain whether Arabs would merely comment next meeting or would comment and then present Arab counter-proposals. British are not inclined to rush matters.

GALLMAN

⁶³ The Conference on Palestine had opened on September 10 at Lancaster House, London, with a speech by Prime Minister Attlee to the Arab delegations, replied to by the Syrian delegate as spokesman for the Arabs the following day. At a private session Foreign Minister Bevin had emphasized the common interests of the United Kingdom and the Arabs to preserve the peace in the Middle East, had spelled out certain conditions to this end, and had proposed to table the Morrison plan as basis for discussions. (867N.01/9-1046, /9-1146)

⁶⁴ Not printed; it reported on two lengthy sessions on September 12 during which each of the Arab delegates had made long statements expressing dislike of the Morrison plan (867N.01/9-1346).

^{64a} September 19.

S67X.01/9-2046 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, September 20, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received September 21—1:42 a. m.]

8333. Armstrong, Secretary British Delegation Palestine Conference, gave Embassy today in strict confidence following résumé of recent Jewish Agency approaches to British Government regarding participation Conference.

On September 14 Dr. Goldmann saw Bevin and Hall together. He stated that Jewish Agency was now prepared to attend Conference to state its views. Regarding Jewish Agency representation, he was told that no members of the Executive now detained or liable to detention would be received at conference. Goldmann said that Jews would not insist on this point but they would like invitations extended to a number of American Jews outside Jewish Agency. To this last British replied that a number of difficulties would be involved but no decision was taken. At Goldmann's suggestion an agreed communiqué was drafted stating that on September 17 Jewish Agency would begin to participate to state its views.

On September 16 Goldmann requested that the communiqué should be held up in order for him to consult with his Jewish Agency colleagues overseas. On September 19, according British source, Goldmann and Locker⁶⁵ saw Bevin and Hall and asked British to permit members of the Executive now detained to form a part of Jewish Agency delegation. Shertok was mentioned particularly. Bevin and Hall said that they considered this request contrary to position which they understood was agreed September 14 and that British could not receive this category of delegate. Bevin said there would be no objection to Jewish Agency asking American Jews other than members of Jewish Agency to attend Conference as observers.

Locker is flying Palestine today to put British position, including British *intransigence* re delegates, before Action Committee which will meet Sunday.

Goldmann called at Embassy today and gave much the same account of his negotiations except that, according to him no agreement was reached on September 14 re Jewish Agency representation. He understood that British were prepared to consider a specific list of suggested Jewish Agency delegates. It was surprise to him to learn September 19 that British would make no exception. He said that personally he was doubtful that Action Committee would approve participation without at least one or two such figures as Shertok. In eleventh hour

⁶⁵ Berl Locker, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency.

effort to remove British on this point he said that he was sending today to Hall a tentative list of 35 Jewish Agency delegates including Shertok and Ben-Gurion, with thought that while British might delete certain names the principle of a representative Jewish Agency delegation would be assured. Goldmann recalled that in 1939 British had released Arabs to attend conference and said that present British *intransigence* re detained members Executive made him wonder whether British desired solution. If Action Committee refuses to attend Goldmann said that he would return to United States at once.

At Conference today consideration was given to Arabs counter-proposals (Embassy's 8281 to Department repeated Jerusalem 67, September 19⁶⁶) which were handed British late yesterday. Substance counter-proposals is still secret.

Sent Department 8333; repeated Jerusalem 68.

GALLMAN

867N.01/9-2346: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 23, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received September 25—2:27 a. m.]

8349. Embassy's 8333, September 20. Following substance six Arab counter-proposals⁶⁷ handed British September 19 as made available to Embassy by Armstrong, Secretary British delegation Palestine Conference.

1. Mandate should be terminated and independent Palestine declared as "unitary state".

2. Democratic government should be established in accordance constitution to be laid down by elected constituent assembly.

3. Provisions should be made guaranteeing Jews all essential rights and safeguards normally enjoyed by minorities.

4. Jewish immigration should stop immediately and future immigration should be left entirely to future government of Palestine.

5. Friendly relations between Palestine as independent state and Great Britain should be established by treaty of alliance.

6. Guarantees should be given in a suitable instrument for sanctity of holy places, including free access without distinction religion or language.

At Conference meeting September 20 (Embassy's 8333, September 20) Arabs agreed British suggestion that committee of Conference, including one representative each delegation, Sir Norman Brook for

⁶⁶ Not printed.

⁶⁷ For text of the formal constitutional proposals submitted by the delegations of the Arab States to the Palestine Conference on September 30, 1946, see British Cmd. 7044, Palestine No. 1 (1947), p. 9.

British and Secretary General Arab League, should meet to examine informally practical application Arab counter-proposals which are stated in broad terms. British made clear that at this stage there is no question of accepting Arab counter-proposals as basis for discussion.

First committee meeting held September 21 and second today. In British opinion such meetings may occupy remainder this week. Armstrong states there is nothing new re Jewish Agency participation (Embassy's 8333, September 20).

GALLMAN

867N.01/9-2746

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1946.

1) When departing for San Francisco last week, Mr. Henderson instructed his office to endeavor to arrange that Mr. Wadsworth, our Minister to Syria and Lebanon who is now in the Department for consultation, call on the President and on you.

Mr. Wadsworth's call on the President was arranged for yesterday. Unfortunately, you were unable to receive him before that time. We had thought that you might wish to comment on his proposed remarks to the President.

A copy of his "Outline of Remarks" is, therefore, now attached for your information; and it is supplemented by his memorandum of his conversation with Mr. Truman.⁶⁸

2) The conversation dealt primarily and in interesting fashion with several aspects of the Palestine problem, the major theme being that, as an international problem, it could appropriately be dealt with on the international plane at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. Wadsworth gathered the impression that, if the matter were to be so considered, the President would wish: (a) That the pressing problem of the European Jewish refugees be kept in the forefront of our thinking; and (b) That, in any solution of the Palestine problem itself, it be recognized that, while there could be no Jewish State, Jews in Palestine could be guaranteed protection under some local autonomy arrangement under the control of a power which would be responsible as well for defense, foreign affairs and finance.

[The remainder of this memorandum deals with the request by the Syrian Government for assistance by the United States Government in engaging census experts.]

⁶⁸ Neither found in Department files.

867N.01/10-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

LONDON, October 2, 1946.

[Received October 2—12:46 p. m.]

8572. Following is text communiqué issued this afternoon by Secretariat Palestine Conference:

"A full meeting of the Palestine Conference was held at Lancaster House this morning. The Conference received a report from the Joint Committee which has been studying the proposals put forward by the Arab delegations. The British delegation indicated that His Majesty's Government would wish to have further time in which to give full consideration to these proposals and suggested that at this stage the Conference should be adjourned for an interval.

His Majesty's Government would have wished and the Arab delegations shared this view that the interval should be short in view of the great urgency of reaching a settlement of the Palestine problem. It was recognized, however, that the timetable already arranged for other international meetings would prevent the early resumption of the discussions. Many of the delegates will have to leave London for New York in about two weeks time in order to represent their governments at the General Assembly of the United Nations. Thereafter, the British Foreign Secretary will be occupied for a time with important meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. In these circumstances, it was agreed that the earliest practicable date on which the Conference could be resumed was 16th December 1946. It was accordingly agreed that the Conference should stand adjourned until that date.⁶⁹]

GALLMAN

867N.01/10-346 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to the British Embassy*⁶⁹

LONDON, 2 October, 1946.

The British and Arab delegations participating in the London Conference on Palestine met on 2nd October after an interval during which the Arab proposals had been examined in a joint committee. This committee was appointed to elucidate the meaning and implications of the Arab proposals. This they succeeded in doing and the revised draft was accordingly presented to the full Conference as the Arab plan.

2. As the British delegation were not in a position to state the views of His Majesty's Government on the Arab plan they asked for an

⁶⁹ Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador on October 3 on instructions from the British Foreign Office to communicate the message to the Acting Secretary of State.

adjournment. The Arab delegations agreed to this and to the terms of a communiqué which has been issued to the press (text in my immediately following telegram.⁷⁰)

3. Among the reasons stated by the British delegation for their need to consider the problem further before declaring their attitude to the Arab proposals were the facts that they had not yet heard the Jewish point of view and the prospect now offered that the Jewish Agency might send a delegation to London. In deference to Arab wishes, however, this consideration was not included in the communiqué.

4. Together with the Colonial Secretary, I received Dr. Weizmann with some of his colleagues including two from Palestine on 1st October. It was again explained to them that His Majesty's Government could not agree to release the detained Zionist leaders as the price of Jewish participation in the Conference. We were prepared, however, to examine with them the possibility of a truce in Palestine as a result of which the Jewish Agency would cooperate with the Administration in the restoration and maintenance of law and order, thus enabling the detainees to be released. It was agreed that the Jewish representatives would meet the Colonial Secretary again to discuss this matter and that when the position had been clarified in this respect they would resume contact with me on the broader issue.

867N.01/10-346 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁷¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1946—1 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

I deeply regret that it has been found necessary to postpone further meetings of the Palestine Conference in London until Dec 16 and I sincerely hope that it will be found possible in the interim to begin moving on a large scale the 100,000 displaced Jews in Europe who are awaiting admission to Palestine.

In view of the deep sympathy of the American people for these unfortunate victims of Nazi persecution in Europe and of the hopes in this country that a fair and workable solution of the Palestine problem be reached as soon as possible I find it necessary to make a further statement at once on the subject. Attached hereto is a copy of the statement which I am planning to issue tomorrow Oct 4:

“I have learned with deep regret that the meetings of the Palestine Conference in London have been adjourned and are not to be resumed

⁷⁰ Telegram not printed; for text of communiqué, see *supra*.

⁷¹ Sent to London as Department's telegram 6959, with the instruction: "Please deliver at earliest possible moment following message from the President to the Prime Minister." The telegram was repeated to the Secretary of State in Paris as No. 5257 (Secdel 1037).

until Dec 16, 1946. In the light of this situation it is appropriate to examine the record of the Administration's efforts in this field, efforts which have been supported in and out of Congress by members of both political parties, and to state my views on the situation as it now exists.

It will be recalled that when Mr. Earl Harrison⁷² reported on Sep 29, 1945 concerning the condition of displaced persons in Europe, I immediately urged that steps be taken to relieve the situation of these persons to the extent at least of admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine. In response to this suggestion the British Government invited the Government of the United States to cooperate in setting up a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, an invitation which this Government was happy to accept in the hope that its participation would help to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe and would assist in finding a solution for the difficult and complex problem of Palestine itself. The urgency with which this Government regarded the matter is reflected in the fact that a 120-day limit was set for the completion of the Committee's task.

The unanimous report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was made on April 20, 1946, and I was gratified to note that among the recommendations contained in the Report was an endorsement of my previous suggestion that 100,000 Jews be admitted into Palestine. The Administration immediately concerned itself with devising ways and means for transporting the 100,000 and caring for them upon their arrival. With this in mind, experts were sent to London in June 1946 to work out provisionally the actual travel arrangements. The British Government cooperated with this group, but made it clear that in its view the report must be considered as a whole and that the issue of the 100,000 could not be considered separately.

On June 11 I announced the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems, composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Treasury, to assist me in considering the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The Alternates of this Cabinet Committee, headed by Ambassador Henry F. Grady, departed for London on July 10, 1946 to discuss with British Government representatives how the Report might best be implemented. The Alternates submitted on July 24, 1946 a report, commonly referred to as the Morrison plan, advocating a scheme of provincial autonomy which might lead ultimately to a bi-national state or to partition. However, opposition to this plan developed among members of the major political parties in the United States—both in the Congress and throughout the country. In accordance with the principle which I have consistently tried to follow, of having a maximum degree of unity within the country and between the parties on major elements of American foreign policy, I could not give my support to this plan.

I have, nevertheless, maintained my deep interest in the matter and

⁷² Earl G. Harrison, United States Representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. His report on displaced persons, with special attention to the problems and needs of Jewish refugees among the displaced persons in Germany and Austria, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 30, 1945, p. 456.

have repeatedly made known and have urged that steps be taken at the earliest possible moment to admit 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.

In the meantime, this Government was informed of the efforts of the British Government to bring to London representatives of the Arabs and Jews, with a view to finding a solution to this distressing problem. I expressed the hope that as a result of these conversations a fair solution of the Palestine problem could be found. While all the parties invited had not found themselves able to attend, I had hoped that there was still a possibility that representatives of the Jewish Agency might take part. If so, the prospect for an agreed and constructive settlement would have been enhanced.

The British Government presented to the Conference the so-called Morrison plan for provincial autonomy and stated that the Conference was open to other proposals. Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by means of the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine. It proposed furthermore the immediate issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants. This proposal received widespread attention in the United States, both in the press and in public forums. From the discussion which has ensued it is my belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States. I cannot believe that the gap between the proposals which have been put forward is too great to be bridged by men of reason and goodwill. To such a solution our Government could give its support.

In the light of the situation which has now developed I wish to state my views as succinctly as possible:

1. In view of the fact that winter will come on before the Conference can be resumed I believe and urge that substantial immigration into Palestine cannot await a solution to the Palestine problem and that it should begin at once. Preparations for this movement have already been made by this Government and it is ready to lend its immediate assistance.

2. I state again, as I have on previous occasions, that the immigration laws of other countries, including the United States, should be liberalized with a view to the admission of displaced persons. I am prepared to make such a recommendation to the Congress and to continue as energetically as possible collaboration with other countries on the whole problem of displaced persons.

3. Furthermore, should a workable solution for Palestine be devised, I would be willing to recommend to the Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of that country.

In the light of the terrible ordeal which the Jewish people of Europe endured during the recent war and the crisis now existing, I cannot believe that a program of immediate action along the lines suggested above could not be worked out with the cooperation of all people concerned. The Administration will continue to do everything it can to this end.[""]

867N.01/10-446: Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁷³CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

LONDON, [undated.]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received from Mr. Gallman a copy of your proposed statement on Palestine. The Foreign Secretary is in Paris and I should like to have time to consult him. You are, I am sure, aware that we are in consultation with members of the Jewish Agency at the present time. I would, therefore, earnestly request you to postpone making your statement at least for the time necessary for me to communicate with Mr. Bevin.

Yours sincerely,

C. R. ATTLEE

867N.01/10-446: Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁷⁴

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1946—10 a. m.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I am very sorry indeed that I cannot comply with the request you made of me in your message yesterday⁷⁵ to postpone making the statement on Palestine. For reasons which have been fully explained to the Ambassador here and by Mr. Byrnes to Mr. Bevin, it is imperative that I make my position clear today.⁷⁶

867N.01/10-1046: Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁷⁷TOP SECRET
URGENT

LONDON, 4 October, 1946—10:35 p. m.

[Received 11:17 p. m.]

Personal and Top Secret.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: When just on midnight last night I received the text of your proposed statement on Palestine, I asked you at least to postpone its issue for a few hours in order that I might communicate with Mr. Bevin in Paris. He has been handling the difficult negotiations with Jews and Arabs to arrive at a solution of this very complicated problem.

⁷³ Received from London as Embassy's telegram 8605, October 4, 1946, 1 a. m., with the following introductory paragraph by the Chargé: "For the Acting Secretary. I have just seen Prime Minister and given him President's message (your 6959, October 3). Prime Minister prepared following reply, which he asks to be delivered to the President as promptly as possible." The Prime Minister's message was delivered to the White House at 9:35 p. m.

⁷⁴ Sent to London as Department's telegram 6988, with the instruction: "Please deliver the following message to the Prime Minister urgently from the President."

⁷⁵ *Supra.*

⁷⁶ The President's statement was released by the White House on October 4.

⁷⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House.

I have received with great regret your letter refusing even a few hours grace to the Prime Minister of the country which has the actual responsibility for the government of Palestine in order that he might acquaint you with the actual situation and the probable results of your action. These may well include the frustration of the patient efforts to achieve a settlement and the loss of still more lives in Palestine.

I am astonished that you did not wait to acquaint yourself with the reasons for the suspension of the conference with the Arabs. You do not seem to have been informed that so far from negotiations having been broken off, conversations with leading Zionists with a view to their entering the conference were proceeding with good prospects of success.

I shall await with interest to learn what were the imperative reasons which compelled this precipitancy.

Yours sincerely,

C. R. ATTLEE

867N.01/10-546 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, October 5, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received October 5—1:02 p. m.]

8653. Embassy's 8596, October 3.⁷⁸ Goldmann today confirmed Foreign Office version Jewish Agency discussions with British Government and stated that at yesterday's meeting with Colonial Secretary, Jewish Agency proposed temporary agreement between now and resumption Conference embracing following three points:

1. Immigration into Palestine to be resumed immediately on basis total 15,000 for next 3 months including approximately 4,000 now Cyprus.
2. Immediate release Jewish Agency detainees.
3. General searches for arms cease.

Jewish Agency representatives also suggested immediate removal of Barker,⁷⁹ whose life is in constant danger.

In return for above, Jewish Agency offered full and active cooperation in preserving security along lines to be worked out by British and Jewish experts. Jewish Agency stated that with legal immigration resumed, illegal immigration would practically disappear. Jewish Agency representatives stressed fact that without renewed immigration, they could not guarantee general Jewish cooperation in preservation of the peace.

⁷⁸ Not printed.

⁷⁹ Lt.-Gen. Sir Evelyn Barker, British General Officer Commanding in Palestine.

Colonial Secretary Hall suggested that subcommittee could be formed to consider above proposals. At meeting next Tuesday afternoon, Jewish Agency representatives will endeavor to formulate with British terms of reference of this subcommittee.

Goldmann said that if British had not adjourned Palestine Conference until December, Jewish Agency representatives were planning to suggest such an adjournment themselves because Conference was getting nowhere.

Goldmann asked Department be informed that while in Paris he had no conversations with Soviet representatives regarding Palestine. Sent Department 8653, repeated Jerusalem 76.

GALLMAN

867N.01/10-446 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*⁸⁰

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

If my statement of October 4, 1946, was embarrassing to you, I very much regret it. My feeling was that the announcement of the adjournment until December 16 of the discussions with the Arabs had brought such depression to the Jewish displaced persons in Europe and to millions of American citizens concerned with the fate of these unfortunate people that I could not even for a single day postpone making clear the continued interest of this Government in their welfare.

It is now well over a year since I first brought to your attention the recommendations of Mr. Earl Harrison in regard to the European displaced Jews. Since that time, this Government has steadfastly adhered to the view that nothing would contribute more to the alleviation of the plight of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution than the immediate transfer of a substantial number of them from Europe to Palestine. It was in line with this attitude that, following the unanimous recommendation made by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that the entry into Palestine of at least 100,000 displaced Jews be authorized at the earliest possible moment, I made it clear that the American Government would finance the transportation of these immigrants from Europe to Palestine. In the succeeding months, this matter was the subject of frequent communications between our Governments, but no decision was reached.

⁸⁰ Sent to London as Department's telegram 7109, with the instruction: "President desires you to arrange for immediate delivery to PriMin Attlee of following reply to latter's personal and Topsec message of Oct. 4 re Palestine." The message was repeated to the Secretary of State in Paris as telegram 5438 (Secdel 1092).

During the course of the recent discussions which your Government was conducting with the representatives of the Arab States, this Government had followed a policy of refraining from public statements with respect to Palestine which might complicate the negotiations. We did so in spite of recurring requests from many quarters that we make known unequivocally our attitude toward the matters under discussion in London. When, however, it was learned that the conference with the Arabs had been postponed until the month of December without a decision as to concrete steps which might be taken either to alleviate the situation of the Jewish survivors in Europe or to resolve the pressing problems of Palestine itself, I considered that it was incumbent on me to express regret at this outcome and again to call attention to the urgency of this matter.

The failure to reach an agreement which would permit their entry to Palestine has had a most distressing effect upon the morale of the European displaced Jews, who have seen nearly a year and a half pass since their liberation with no decision as to their future. Their feeling of depression and frustration was, of course, intensified by the approach of their annual Day of Atonement, when they are accustomed to give contemplation to the lot of the Jewish people. I am sure that you will agree that it would be most unfair to these unfortunate persons to let them enter upon still another winter without any definite word as to what disposition is to be made of them and specifically as to whether they are to be allowed to proceed to Palestine, where so many of them wish ardently to go. I felt that this Government owed it to these people to leave them in no doubt, at this particular season with all its traditional associations, as to its continuing interest in their future and its desire that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate their plight.

We realize that Great Britain is responsible for the administration of Palestine under the terms of the Mandate which your Government received after the end of the first World War. We believe, however, that one of the primary purposes of the Mandate was to foster the development of the Jewish National Home, a development which has commanded international sympathy and in which the Government of the United States has traditionally maintained a deep and abiding interest. In our view the development of the Jewish National Home has no meaning in the absence of Jewish immigration and settlement on the land as contemplated in the Mandate. We therefore feel that the implementation of the Mandate, as well as the humanitarian considerations mentioned above, call for immediate and substantial immigration into Palestine.

In stating these views we, of course, are fully appreciative of the many difficult problems which Great Britain faces in connection with the discharge of its responsibilities under the Mandate. It was a

matter of considerable regret to us to observe that the recent conversations in London did not apparently result in a situation in which some, at least, of these difficulties might have been lessened. We felt, however, that the matter of the transfer of the displaced Jews was so urgent that it could not await the outcome of negotiations which promised to be of a protracted character.

This Government, as has already been made clear, stands ready to do all in its power to initiate immediate measures for the transfer of the 100,000 Jewish displaced persons to Palestine. Believe me, Mr. Prime Minister, I appreciate the difficulty of the situation of your Government in the matter of opening Palestine to increased Jewish immigration. I am concerned, however, that further postponement of decisions which would permit displaced European Jews to begin entering Palestine in substantial numbers is sure to render still more difficult the solution of a problem in which my Government as well as your Government has so deep an interest.

867N.01/10-1546

*The King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud) to
President Truman*⁸¹

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In my desire to safeguard and strengthen in every way possible the friendship which binds our two countries together and which existed between the late President Roosevelt and which was renewed with Your Excellency, I reiterate my feelings on every occasion when this friendship between the United States on the one hand, and my country and the other Arab countries on the other hand, is endangered, so that all obstacles in the way of that friendship may be removed.

On previous occasions I wrote to the late President Roosevelt and to Your Excellency, and explained the situation in Palestine: How the natural rights of the Arabs therein go back thousands of years and how the Jews are only aggressors, seeking to perpetrate a monstrous injustice, at the beginning, speaking in the name of humanitarianism, but later openly proclaiming their aggressiveness by force and violence as is not unknown to Your Excellency and the American people. Moreover, the designs of the Jews are not limited to Palestine only, but include the neighboring Arab countries within their scope, not even excluding our holy cities.

I was therefore astonished at the latest announcement issued in your name in support of the Jews in Palestine and its demand that

⁸¹ Transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the Saudi Arabian Minister in his note of October 15, 1946, requesting that the message be communicated to President Truman.

floodgates of immigration be opened in such a way as to alter the basic situation in Palestine in contradiction to previous promises. My astonishment was even greater because the statement ascribed to Your Excellency contradicts the Declaration which the American Legation in Jeddah requested our Foreign Office to publish in the Government's official paper *Omm Al-Qura* in the name of the White House, on August 16, 1946, in which it was stated that the Government of the United States had not made any proposals for the solution of the Palestine problem, and in which you expressed your hope that it would be solved through the conversations between the British Government and the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, on the one hand, and between the British Government and the third party on the other, and in which you expressed the readiness of the United States to assist the displaced persons among whom are Jews. Hence, my great astonishment when I read your Excellency's statement and my incredulity that it could have come from you, because it contradicts previous promises made by the Government of the United States and statements made from the White House.

I am confident that the American people who spent their blood and their money freely to resist aggression, could not possibly support Zionist aggression against a friendly Arab country which has committed no crime except to believe firmly in those principles of justice and equality, for which the United Nations, including the United States, fought, and for which both your predecessor and you exerted great efforts.

My desire to preserve the friendship of the Arabs and the East towards the United States of America has obliged me to expound to Your Excellency the injustice which would be visited upon the Arabs by any assistance to Zionist aggression.

I am certain that Your Excellency and the American people cannot support right, justice, and equity and fight for them in the rest of the world while denying them to the Arabs in their country, Palestine, which they have inherited from their ancestors from Ancient Times.

With Greetings,

ABDUL AZIZ

867N.01/10-1846 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, October 18, 1946—10 p. m.

[Received October 18—7:46 p. m.]

8951. Embs 8747 October 10.⁸² Jewish Agency and British sub-committee met Thursday and this afternoon. According Foreign Office full meeting was held attended by Weizmann and Creech

⁸² Not printed.

Jones⁸³ at which latter announced that British could make no concession re increased rate Jewish immigration during adjournment Palestine Conference because immigration was under discussion at Conference and this question of major policy *sub judice* could not be prejudged.

JA representatives replied that failing any [gesture?] from British re immigration it would not be worth while for JA representatives to make any promises re checking disorders. Jews in Palestine would not obey any JA representatives instructions even if given.

Present series of JA-British talks is now terminated without any undertaking either side.

JA representatives stated that Kaplan⁸⁴ would fly to Palestine to report to Inner Zionist Council which meets next Wednesday. JA would consider what further action Jews can take in present circumstances against disorders.

Creech Jones stated that sympathetic consideration would be given to release of detained JA leaders in Latrun and that position [refugees?] detained Cyprus would also be considered sympathetically. According Beeley, Foreign Office, latter reference refers to using balance 1500 quota beginning November 15 for Cyprus Jews after 800 to 900 illegal Jews now Palestine are accommodated. Similar use might be made of quota beginning December 15 in spite of recommendations of Palestine Government officials that relatives of Jews already in Palestine who have been long waiting for quota numbers should be given priority over "illegals".

A brief communiqué saying only that talks have been concluded and that their results (not stated) will be communicated to Inner Zionist Council will be issued within a few hours.

Repeated Jerusalem 82.

GALLMAN

501.BB Palestine/10-2146

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*⁸⁵

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1946.

DEAR DEAN: In accordance with our various conversations on the subject, we have been preparing a number of suggestions as to the course of action which this Government might follow regarding Palestine in the light of the President's statement of October 4. The mat-

⁸³ Arthur Creech Jones, whose appointment as successor to Mr. Hall as British Secretary of State for the Colonies was announced on October 5, 1946.

⁸⁴ Eliezer Kaplan, Treasurer of the Executive of the Jewish Agency.

⁸⁵ Marginal notation by Mr. Acheson: "Hold".

ter, as you know, is of particular importance at this time because of the necessity for instructing our Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.⁸⁶

At the moment our Delegation has no instructions on Palestine, a situation which should be remedied because the question may arise in some manner during the sessions. Congressman Bloom, who is one of our Delegates, has discussed with the President the advisability of our raising the question in the Assembly and the Congressman will probably make some proposal to Senator Austin.⁸⁷

We have prepared three alternative position papers for our Delegation which are attached as Exhibits A, B and C.⁸⁸ The portion of each paper marked "Recommendations" gives the essence of each proposal.

The first paper directs the American Delegation *not to raise* the Palestine problem but, if the problem is raised by another delegation, to state our policy: entry of the 100,000 now, liberal immigration and unrestricted land sales, and support of a workable solution as suggested in the President's statement.

Our lack of a detailed program for a solution and our present unwillingness to assume military and administrative responsibility in Palestine make it necessary for us seriously to consider the advisability of refraining from raising the problem in the General Assembly. Such a course, however, might be criticized as being contrary to this Government's expressed interest in the settlement of the problem.

The second paper directs the Delegation *to introduce* a strong resolution calling for entry of the 100,000, early partition of the country with a resulting independent Jewish state along the general lines of the Jewish Agency plan, and a high degree of provincial autonomy under trusteeship in the interim. This course of action would be a demonstration of our determination to press vigorously for a settlement along the lines of the present Zionist program.

⁸⁶ The Department had concerned itself with the possible reference of the Palestine question to the United Nations at least as far back as December 1945. On the 13th of that month, William I. Cargo of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs had prepared three memoranda setting forth the following proposed positions: "The position of the United States should be that it neither seeks, nor seeks to prevent, discussion of Palestine by the Assembly"; "The United States should *not* propose that the Palestine problem be specifically placed within the terms of reference of a temporary trusteeship body"; and "No plan for settlement of the Palestine problem should be offered by the United States in the forthcoming General Assembly" (USGA/Gen/21, 21b, 21c, 501.BB Palestine/12-1345). A 12-page draft paper on possible courses of action by the United States in the General Assembly on the Palestine problem was prepared on September 26, 1946, by working group consisting of officers of NEA, SPA and CCP and George Wadsworth, then detailed to the Department as NEA liaison officer to the American delegation (501.BB Palestine/9-2746).

⁸⁷ Warren R. Austin, Chairman of the United States delegation to the General Assembly.

⁸⁸ None printed.

On the other hand, if our Delegation introduces a resolution of this type, there is serious doubt as to whether we would be successful in obtaining its passage by the General Assembly, in the face of almost certain opposition of the British and of the Arab and Moslem states, and of the possible opposition of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, vigorous advocacy of this extreme program will cause a serious deterioration in our over-all relations with the British and with the Arab and Moslem World. Accomplishment of the objectives of the program, which could only be achieved in collaboration with the British, would have these repercussions in the Near East:

Our cultural position, built up with painstaking effort over the past 100 years, as well as our commercial and economic interests, including oil concessions and aviation and telecommunications rights, would be seriously threatened. Already the almost childlike confidence which these people have hitherto displayed toward the United States is giving way to suspicion and dislike, a development which may lead the Arab and Moslem World to look elsewhere than toward the West for support. The growing hostility toward us among the Arabs may result in acts of violence against American property and persons. It will be recalled that already Arab terrorists have bombed our Legation in Lebanon and attempted the bombing of the American University of Beirut. The Arab States might well withdraw from the United Nations and sever diplomatic relations with us.

The third position paper directs the Delegation to introduce a resolution calling not for partition specifically, but for a solution which would seek to bridge the gap between the British plan for provincial autonomy and the Jewish Agency's proposal of partition. We believe that the President had such a solution in mind when he issued his statement of October 4. This resolution would also provide for the immediate entry of the 100,000. While this is a modification in the plan put forward by the Zionists, it might still appeal to them as something which possibly could be achieved. Implementation of this more moderate plan might be administratively practicable; it points toward the early independence desired by both Jews and Arabs; and in taking the emphasis off partition, it becomes more acceptable to Great Britain and somewhat less objectionable to the Arabs. In our opinion, however, an attempt to implement the plan outlined in this resolution will have effects almost as adverse upon our standing and interests in the Arab and Moslem World as those resulting from the execution of the plan set forth in Exhibit B.

We believe that if either of the alternatives proposed in Exhibits B or C is decided upon we should first outline the substance of the two

resolutions to the British Ambassador and tell him in a friendly way that in view of the failure of the various interested parties to come to an agreement and of the extreme urgency of the matter, our Government is considering the advisability of taking the problem without delay to the United Nations.

After giving the British Government an opportunity to comment on these proposed courses of action, we should then discuss the matter with representative Zionist leaders such as Rabbis Wise and Silver and Dr. Goldmann. We could advise them of the nature of the resolutions and stress our desire to assist in working out some kind of a solution which would be in line with the views expressed by the President. They should be given a clear understanding that though this Government is prepared to do all that it properly can to persuade the British and Arabs to agree to a settlement, it believes that it would not be in the interest of any of the parties concerned, including the Zionists themselves, for us unilaterally to exert political or economic pressure in order to attain our objectives, such as for instance to refuse to implement the British loan. We should state that we are willing, however, to demonstrate our conviction of the justice of our position by placing it before the highest international authority, the United Nations.

The Zionist leaders may feel that it would be preferable for us not to introduce either resolution at the General Assembly. On the other hand, they may decide that the presentation of the more moderate resolution would yield the best results in the circumstances.

If such a conversation with the Zionists is held, it should be made plain to them that we must, of course, take into consideration all the factors of the international situation of the moment in making decisions as to what action we might be able to take with regard to Palestine and associated problems, and that they should not construe anything said to them now as in any way binding upon the policies and actions of this Government in the future.

In view of the urgency of this matter I would appreciate learning your reaction to the foregoing as soon as possible. In case it is decided that it would be unwise at this time to resort to any means other than persuasion in order to prevail upon the British to cooperate with us in finding a solution acceptable to this Government, we feel that in the not distant future we should tell the Zionists frankly the extent to which this Government is prepared to go. Otherwise the President, the Secretary and the Department will continue to be charged with lack of sincerity or "doublecrossing".

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

867N.01/10-1546 : Telegram

*President Truman to the King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud)*⁸⁹

US URGENT NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1946.

YOUR MAJESTY: I have just received the letter with regard to Palestine which Your Majesty was good enough to transmit to me through the Saudi Arabian Legation under date of October 15, 1946, and have given careful consideration to the views expressed therein.

I am particularly appreciative of the frank manner in which you expressed yourself in your letter. Your frankness is entirely in keeping with the friendly relations which have long existed between our two countries, and with the personal friendship between Your Majesty and my distinguished predecessor; a friendship which I hope to retain and strengthen. It is precisely the cordial relations between our countries and Your Majesty's own friendly attitude which encourages me to invite your attention to some of the considerations which have prompted my Government to follow the course it has been pursuing with respect to the matter of Palestine and of the displaced Jews in Europe.

I feel certain that Your Majesty will readily agree that the tragic situation of the surviving victims of Nazi persecution in Europe presents a problem of such magnitude and poignancy that it cannot be ignored by people of good will or humanitarian instincts. This problem is worldwide. It seems to me that all of us have a common responsibility for working out a solution which would permit those unfortunates who must leave Europe to find new homes where they may dwell in peace and security.

Among the survivors in the displaced persons centers in Europe are numbers of Jews, whose plight is particularly tragic in as much as they represent the pitiful remnants of millions who were deliberately selected by the Nazi leaders for annihilation. Many of these persons look to Palestine as a haven where they hope among people of their

⁸⁹ Sent to the Legation in Jidda as Department's telegram 266, with the instruction: "Please transmit urgently through appropriate channels following message from President to King in reply to King's message of Oct 15 on Palestine and confirm immediately by telegram receipt of message and hour of delivery. Message will be made public here in near future since King's letter was made public by Saudi Arabian Govt."

In telegram 322, October 28, 1946, from Jidda, the Minister reported that the President's message had been delivered to the King by the Legation's interpreter, Mohammed Effendi, presumably on the evening of October 26. According to the interpreter, the King was extremely vexed, observing that the President had expressed an obviously hostile point of view and that his communication was not based on logical grounds. The King stated further that the United States had nothing to do with the Palestine question, a matter which should be settled by the British, who had enticed American involvement in order to prejudice Saudi Arabian friendship with the United States. He concluded that if the United States desired to preserve its relations with the Arabs, it should give up its interest in the Palestine question (867N.01/10-2846).

own faith to find refuge, to begin to lead peaceful and useful lives, and to assist in the further development of the Jewish National Home.

The Government and people of the United States have given support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in Palestine ever since the termination of the first World War, which resulted in the freeing of a large area of the Near East, including Palestine, and the establishment of a number of independent states which are now members of the United Nations. The United States, which contributed its blood and resources to the winning of that war, could not divest itself of a certain responsibility for the manner in which the freed territories were disposed of, or for the fate of the peoples liberated at that time. It took the position, to which it still adheres, that these peoples should be prepared for self-government and also that a national home for the Jewish people should be established in Palestine. I am happy to note that most of the liberated peoples are now citizens of independent countries. The Jewish National Home, however, has not as yet been fully developed.

It is only natural, therefore, that my Government should favor at this time the entry into Palestine of considerable numbers of displaced Jews in Europe, not only that they may find shelter there, but also that they may contribute their talents and energies to the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home.

It was entirely in keeping with the traditional policies of this Government that over a year ago I began to correspond with the Prime Minister of Great Britain in an effort to expedite the solving of the urgent problem of the Jewish survivors in the displaced persons camps by the transfer of a substantial number of them to Palestine. It was my belief, to which I still adhere, and which is widely shared by the people of this country, that nothing would contribute more effectively to the alleviation of the plight of these Jewish survivors than the authorization of the immediate entry of at least 100,000 of them to Palestine. No decision with respect to this proposal has been reached, but my Government is still hopeful that it may be possible to proceed along the lines which I outlined to the Prime Minister.

At the same time there should, of course, be a concerted effort to open the gates of other lands, including the United States, to those unfortunate persons, who are now entering upon their second winter of homelessness subsequent to the termination of hostilities. I, for my part, have made it known that I am prepared to ask the Congress of the United States, whose cooperation must be enlisted under our Constitution, for special legislation admitting to this country additional numbers of these persons, over and above the immigration quotas fixed by our laws. My Government, moreover, has been actively exploring, in conjunction with other governments, the possibilities of settlement in different countries outside Europe for those

displaced persons who are obliged to emigrate from that continent. In this connection it has been most heartening to us to note the statements of various Arab leaders as to the willingness of their countries to share in this humanitarian project by taking a certain number of these persons into their own lands.

I sincerely believe that it will prove possible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the refugee problem along the lines which I have mentioned above.

With regard to the possibility envisaged by Your Majesty that force and violence may be used by Jews in aggressive schemes against the neighboring Arab countries, I can assure you that this Government stands opposed to aggression of any kind or to the employment of terrorism for political purposes. I may add, moreover, that I am convinced that responsible Jewish leaders do not contemplate a policy of aggression against the Arab countries adjacent to Palestine.

I cannot agree with Your Majesty that my statement of Oct 4^{89a} is in any way inconsistent with the position taken in the statement issued on my behalf on Aug 16.⁹⁰ In the latter statement the hope was expressed that as a result of the proposed conversations between the British Government and the Jewish and Arab representatives a fair solution of the problem of Palestine could be found and immediate steps could be taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe. Unfortunately, these hopes have not been realized. The conversations between the British Government and the Arab representatives have, I understand, been adjourned until December without a solution having been found for the problem of Palestine or without any steps having been taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe.

In this situation it seemed incumbent upon me to state as frankly as possible the urgency of the matter and my views both as to the direction in which a solution based on reason and good will might be reached and the immediate steps which should be taken. This I did in my statement of October 4.

I am at a loss to understand why Your Majesty seems to feel that this statement was in contradiction to previous promises or statements made by this Government. It may be well to recall here that in the past this Government, in outlining its attitude on Palestine, has given assurances that it would not take any action which might prove hostile to the Arab people, and also that in its view there should be no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I do not consider that my urging of the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into Palestine or my statements with

^{89a} See footnote 76, p. 704.

⁹⁰ See telegram 4112, August 15, to Paris, p. 684.

regard to the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people. My feelings with regard to the Arabs when I made these statements were, and are at the present time, of the most friendly character. I deplore any kind of conflict between Arabs and Jews, and am convinced that if both peoples approach the problems before them in a spirit of conciliation and moderation these problems can be solved to the lasting benefit of all concerned.

I furthermore do not feel that my statements in any way represent a failure on the part of this Government to live up to its assurance that in its view there should be no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. During the current year there have been a number of consultations with both Arabs and Jews.

Mindful of the great interest which your country, as well as my own, has in the settlement of the various matters which I have set forth above, I take this opportunity to express my earnest hope that Your Majesty, who occupies a position of such eminence in the Arab world, will use the great influence which you possess to assist in the finding in the immediate future of a just and lasting solution. I am anxious to do all that I can to aid in the matter and I can assure Your Majesty that the Government and people of the United States are continuing to be solicitous of the interests and welfare of the Arabs upon whose historic friendship they place great value.

I also take this occasion to convey to Your Majesty my warm personal greetings and my best wishes for the continued health and welfare of Your Majesty and your people.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/11-246

*The King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud) to
President Truman*⁹¹

[Translation]

Your Excellency:

I have received with deep appreciation, your message of October 25, 1946 which you sent to me through the American Legation.

I value Your Excellency's friendship and that of the American people to me personally, to my country and to the rest of the Arab countries. In appreciation of the humanitarian spirit which you have shown, I have not objected to any humanitarian assistance which Your Excellency or the United States may give to the displaced Jews,

⁹¹ Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Saudi Arabian Chargé in his note of November 2, 1946, asking that the message be communicated to President Truman.

provided that such assistance is not designed to condemn a people living peacefully in their land. But the Zionist Jews have used this humanitarian appeal as an excuse for attaining their own ends of aggression against Palestine:—these aims being to conquer Palestine and by achieving a majority to make it Jewish, to establish a Jewish state in it, to expel its original inhabitants, to use Palestine as a base for aggression against the neighboring Arab states, and to fulfill (other aspects of) their aggressive programs.

The humanitarian and democratic principles on which the foundations of life in the United States have been built are incompatible with enforcement on a peaceful people, living securely in their country, of foreign elements to conquer and expel the native people from their country. In the attainment of their objectives these foreign elements have confused world public opinion by appealing to the principles of humanity and mercy while at the same time resorting to force.

When the first World War was declared not more than 50,000 Jews lived in Palestine. The Arabs took up the fight on the side of Great Britain, its ally the United States and the other Allies. With the Allies, they fought in support of Arab rights and in support of the principles enunciated by President Wilson—particularly the right of self-determination. Nevertheless Great Britain adopted the Balfour Declaration and in its might embarked upon a policy of admitting Jews into Palestine, in spite of the desires of its preponderantly Arab population and in contradiction to all democratic and human principles. The Arabs protested and rebelled, but they were ever faced with a greater force than they could muster until they were obliged to acquiesce against their wishes.

When this last World War commenced the forces of the enemy were combined and directed against Great Britain. Great Britain stood alone and demonstrated a power and steadfastness which have won for her the admiration of the whole world. Her faith and courage did truly save the world from a grave danger. In those dark days the enemies of Great Britain promised the Arabs to do away with Zionism. Sensing the gravity of England's position at that time, I stood firm by her. I advised all the Arabs to remain quiet and assured them that Britain and her Allies would never betray those principles of humanity and democracy which they entered the war to uphold. The Arabs heeded my counsel and gave whatever assistance to Great Britain and her Allies they could, until victory was attained.

And now in the name of humanity it is proposed to force on the Arab majority of Palestine a people alien to them, to make these new people the majority, thereby rendering the existing majority a minority. Your Excellency will agree with me in the belief that no people on earth would willingly admit into their country a foreign group desiring to become a majority and to establish its rule over that

country. And the United States itself will not permit the admission into the United States of that number of Jews which it has proposed for entry into Palestine, as such a measure would be contrary to its laws established for its protection and the safeguarding of its interests.

In your message, Your Excellency mentioned that the United States stands opposed to all forms of aggression or intimidation for the attainment of political objectives, if such measures have been applied by the Jews. You also expressed your conviction that responsible Jewish leaders do not contemplate the pursuit of an antagonistic policy toward the neighboring Arab states. In this connection I would call Your Excellency's attention to the fact that it was the British Government which made the Balfour Declaration, and transported the Jewish immigrants into Palestine under the protection of its bayonets. It was the British Government which gave and still gives shelter to their leaders and accords them its benevolent kindness and care. In spite of all this the British forces in Palestine are being seared by Zionist fire day and night, and the Jewish leaders have been unable to prevent these terroristic attacks. If, therefore, the British Government (the benefactor of the Jews) with all the means at its disposal is unable to prevent the terrorism of the Jews, how can the Arabs feel safe with or trust the Jews either now or in the future!

I believe that after reviewing all the facts Your Excellency will agree with me that the Arabs of Palestine, who form today the majority in their country, can never feel secure after the admission of the Jews into their midst nor can they feel assured about the future of the neighboring states.

Your Excellency also mentioned that you were unable to understand my feeling that your last declaration was inconsistent with previous promises and declarations made by the Government of the United States. Your Excellency also mentioned the assurances which I had received that the United States would not undertake any action modifying the basic situation in Palestine without consulting the two parties. I am confident that Your Excellency does neither intend to break a promise which you have made, nor desire to embark on an act of aggression against the Arabs. For these reasons I take the liberty to express to Your Excellency quite frankly that by an act which renders the Arab majority of Palestine a minority, the basic situation would be changed. This is the fundamental basis of the whole problem. For the principles of democracy dictate that when a majority exists in a country, the government of that country shall be by the majority, and not the minority. And should the Arabs forego the right conferred upon them by their numerical superiority, they would inevitably have to forego their privilege of their own form of government. What change can be considered more fundamental! And would the American people acquiesce in the admission into the United

States of foreign elements in sufficient numbers to bring about a new majority? Would such an act be considered consonant with the principles of humanity and democracy?

I am confident that Your Excellency does not intend to antagonize the Arabs, but desires their good and welfare. I also believe that the American people will not agree to acts which are contrary to democratic and human principles. Relying on your desire for frankness and candidness in our relations I am prepared to do my best to remove all sources of misunderstanding by explaining the facts not only for the sake of truth and justice but also to strengthen the bonds of friendship between Your Excellency, the American people and myself.

I trust that Your Excellency will rest assured that my desire to defend the Arabs and their interests is no less than my desire to defend the reputation of the United States, throughout the Moslem and Arab worlds, and the entire world as well. Therefore you will find me extremely eager to persist in my efforts to convince Your Excellency and the American people of the democratic and human principles involved, which the United Nations, Your Excellency and the American people all seek to implement. For this reason I trust that Your Excellency will review the present situation in an effort to find a just solution of the problem—a solution which will ensure life for those displaced persons without threatening a peaceful people living securely in their country.

Kindly accept our salutations.

ABDUL-AZIZ

867N.01/11-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, November 2, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received November 2—7: 50 a. m.]

4050. In our 2235, July 20, commenting on lecture given in Moscow regarding Palestine, we observed that USSR appears to be sliding over to Arab side of fence. This lecture which was not for export but was designed for guidance of those Soviet citizens interested in Palestine problem, received publication in Soviet press in much watered-down form. Fact that *Pravda* has now published openly pro-Arab and anti-Zionist article, reported in our 4047, November 2,⁹² represents further movement of Soviet policy toward undisguised support of Arab cause.

Pravda article went beyond Palestine problem in its championing of Arab cause, it sought to play on all Arab resentment against American policy toward Palestine. It is significant that in this connection Indian Muslims were mentioned. Article also revealed expected Soviet nervousness over possibility of Arab-Turkish bloc.

⁹² Not printed.

By way of conclusion we would reiterate at this time observations contained in final paragraph of our 3083 [3003] August 2.⁹³

Repeat London as 411.

DURBROW

867N.001/11-546 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 5, 1946.

[Received November 5—3: 20 p. m.]

9294. Colonial Secretary in statement to House of Commons today said that British Govt has decided to release Jewish leaders detained in Palestine and that following communiqué would be issued in Jerusalem today:

“In view of condemnation of terrorism embodied in resolutions announced at meeting October 29 of Inner Zionist Council which is accepted as an earnest of intention of Jewish Agency and representative of Jewish institutions in Palestine to disassociate themselves entirely from campaign of violence and to do their utmost to root out this evil, British Govt have concurred in the release by Palestine Govt of detained Jewish leaders.”

Colonial Secretary said that he was sure House would share his hope that this action would lead to an improvement in the security situation in Palestine or help to restore conditions in which progress can be made towards the general settlement which is so urgently necessary.

Colonial Secretary then said that release has also been approved of Palestinian Arabs who have been undergoing detention and that following announcement was being made this afternoon by the Palestine High Commissioner:

“British Govt have now fully considered representations made to them by Arab delegates to Palestine Conference on subject of Palestinian Arabs detained in the Seychelles. In light of these representations and as a gesture of goodwill at this time when important decisions on future of Palestine are in the balance, they have decided

⁹³ Not printed; this paragraph stated: “We have reported indications that USSR favors an Arab state in Palestine and opposes Zionist demands. In these circumstances, would appear that Kremlin might be in better position to pursue its policies if we should make a decision on Palestine which would further antagonize Arabs against US. Arab resentment against US and UK will not be localized. It will mean Muslim resentment against US and UK, from North Africa through Levant, Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan to India and possibly on to Indonesia. If such a situation is created, USSR would probably seize upon and exploit it to the full in an endeavor to achieve a major political victory, alongside which Soviet gains in Azerbaijan would appear puny. Such a development might largely nullify our support of Turkish integrity because it would mean political outflanking of that country.” (867N.01/8-246)

to release these detainees and to permit their return to Palestine along with two other Arabs formerly detained in the Seychelles but already released on health grounds. In addition an amnesty is being granted by the Palestine Govt to certain other Arabs."

GALLMAN

867N.01/11-646

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William J. Porter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1946.

Participants: Dr. Goldmann of the Executive of the Jewish Agency
Mr. Henderson, NEA
Mr. Porter, NE

Dr. Goldmann called on Mr. Henderson at 4:45 p. m. He told Mr. Henderson that his reason for coming was to inquire about the meaning of the Secretary's announcement, as published in the press, to the effect that the Secretary was taking over the handling of the Palestine matter and would discuss it with Mr. Bevin in New York when an opportunity offered. Mr. Henderson replied that he did not think there was any particular significance to be attached to the statement although people had tried to read various things into it. He said when the Secretary was in Paris efforts were made to prevent discussions from going on at two different levels, that is, between the President and Mr. Attlee on the one hand, Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin on the other. Mr. Henderson thought that the feeling was that such a procedure would only lead to confusion. While the Secretary was in Paris therefore the matter had been handled by the President. Now that the Secretary had returned, and Mr. Bevin had come to New York, Mr. Henderson believed that the President and the Secretary had decided to take advantage of the opportunity of personal contact provided by Mr. Bevin's visit.

Dr. Goldmann added that he was very glad that the Secretary was taking the matter over; that the Secretary had worked with Mr. Bevin on a good many subjects and they had generally managed to reach an agreement; that this was a heaven-sent opportunity to get something done before the World Zionist Congress convened at Basle on December 9. Dr. Goldmann said that as the matter now stands the Congress would convene in a "vacuum" unless Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin could come to some arrangement. Dr. Goldmann added that all the essential people were in New York, the Arab Delegations, important members of the Jewish Agency, and top-ranking British and American officials. He said that if the World Congress convened with matters standing as they are now, it would give the extremists, led by Dr. Silver, a great opportunity to embarrass Dr. Wise and other moderates by demanding what they had gained by their policy of

moderation and their Partition proposal. He said that the extremists could do a great deal of damage in certain circumstances.

Dr. Goldmann said that if an agreement could be reached informally in New York they could keep matters in line in Basle very easily even though a formal settlement might have to await the reconvening of the conference in London later in December.

[Here follow three paragraphs giving Dr. Goldmann's account of factionalism in the Zionist movement and an intended organization of the main branches of the Jewish Agency outside of Palestine.]

Dr. Goldmann thanked Mr. Henderson for the time he had given him and said that he was going to New York immediately with a view to seeing his colleagues and talk over with them the possibilities which he envisaged as resulting from Mr. Bevin's visit to this country and Mr. Byrnes' taking over the handling of the Palestine problem.

867N.01/11-2246

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1946.

Lord Inverchapel called at his request. He said that he had been spending some time in New York, chiefly talking with Mr. Bevin about Palestine. He had urged Mr. Bevin to see some of the Jews interested in this subject. Mr. Bevin had had two interviews with Rabbi Silver. Lord Inverchapel was hoping that he would see Ben-Gurion.⁹⁴ Mr. Bevin has already also had talks with Goldmann in London. The first interview with Rabbi Silver was not very successful. The second one resulted in much freer conversation between the two men. Lord Inverchapel was present at both interviews. Without attempting to differentiate between the interviews, Lord Inverchapel gave me the following summary of the conversations:

Mr. Bevin led off by stating that he was most anxious to work out a permanent settlement in Palestine. He said that if his effort in this direction should fail, he would give up the Mandate. In doing so, he would first ask the United States Government to take over the Mandate. If that Government was not willing to do so, he would inform the United Nations that the British Government was giving it up and was placing the entire matter before the United Nations for its action.

Rabbi Silver was much agitated at this statement, which Lord Inverchapel said both he and Rabbi Silver were convinced was entirely sincere and was not a bargaining statement. Rabbi Silver stated that this would be a disaster; that the British could not give up the Mandate; and that to do so would produce chaos. Mr. Bevin insisted upon this point and said that he had discussed it with both Mr. Attlee and Mr. Churchill,⁹⁵ who agreed.

⁹⁴ David Ben-Gurion, Zionist leader.

⁹⁵ Winston S. Churchill, former British Prime Minister and Leader of the opposition Conservative Party.

Rabbi Silver then came out for a partition. He stated that he personally did not believe in partition, but that he was willing to sink his personal views in favor of it on the ground that it gave up "territory for status."

Mr. Bevin replied that in his view there was nothing in the Mandate which permitted the Mandatory to agree to partition, and that therefore such a proposal must be laid before the United Nations, the successor of the League of Nations for its approval. If this were done, he expected that there would be strong opposition and that the necessary vote of approval could not be obtained. Mr. Bevin said that he was not opposed to partition in principle except for the legal reasons given above.

Rabbi Silver said that in his opinion the opposition could not be effective if both the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to the proposal. Rabbi Silver strongly urged that prior to the meeting in Basle Mr. Bevin should "give him the word," which meant that Mr. Bevin would agree to the principle of partition. Rabbi Silver stated that if this could be done before the convention in Basle, he would obtain the support of the Zionist Organization for such a settlement. Rabbi Silver repeated the assertions previously made by Mr. Goldmann that representatives of the Jewish Agency had received from Sidki Pasha⁹⁶ and Azzam Pasha intimations that, if the United States and the United Kingdom agreed upon partition as a settlement, the Arab opposition would not be over-serious. Mr. Bevin said that he had heard these statements made before, but nothing which had come to the attention of the Foreign Office justified the belief that the Arabs mentioned held this view.

So far as my notes go, this appears to be the end of Lord Inverchapel's summary of the interviews between Mr. Bevin and Rabbi Silver.

Lord Inverchapel went on to say that Mr. Bevin is moving rapidly toward acceptance of partition as the solution. His difficulty is that he believes that he cannot espouse it unless he knows with definiteness the attitude of the United States. He wants to know how far, if at all, the United States will support his proposing and putting through such a solution. Lord Inverchapel said that on one or more occasions during the interview Rabbi Silver had stated that the United States Government was committed to the solution of partition. Under cross examination he somewhat changed his statement and said that the United States Government would support partition. Lord Inverchapel asked me whether he would be justified in encouraging Mr. Bevin to believe that the United States Government would support partition.

I asked why Mr. Bevin did not talk this out with Secretary Byrnes and get a statement of our position which would not be in the vague field of encouragement but would have the authority of the President and the Secretary. He said that Mr. Bevin intended to do this on

⁹⁶ Ismail Sidki Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister.

Tuesday or more probably Wednesday of next week, at which time he would have word from London of the Cabinet position on the paper which had been referred to the Cabinet. In the meantime Lord Inverchapel asked for my judgment as to the attitude of this Government.

I told him that so far as I was able to help him my statements would be rooted in the President's public statement of October 4. I pointed out that in that statement, referring to the Morrison-Grady proposals, the President had said:

"However, opposition to this plan developed among members of the major political parties in the United States—both in the Congress and throughout the country. In accordance with the principle which I have consistently tried to follow, of having a maximum degree of unity within the country and between the parties on major elements of American foreign policy, I could not give my support to this plan."

The Statement then went on, referring to the Jewish Agency proposal for partition, as follows:

"Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by means of the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine. It proposed furthermore the immediate issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants. This proposal received widespread attention in the United States, both in the press and in public forums. From the discussion which has ensued it is my belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States. I cannot believe that the gap between the proposals which have been put forward is too great to be bridged by men of reason and goodwill. To such a solution our Government could give its support."

Finally the President, in his conclusions, stated:

"Furthermore, should a workable solution for Palestine be devised, I would be willing to recommend to the Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of that country."

I said that it seemed to me both from the words of the statement and from my recollection of the discussion at the time it was issued that the President was stating, not that he put forward the solution of partition, but that it would command the support of public opinion in the United States; that he did not believe the gap between that proposal and the Morrison proposal was too great to be bridged; and that to such a solution (that is, one which was worked out to bridge this gap) the Government of the United States both could give its support and the President himself would be willing to recommend to the Congress the necessary action.

Lord Inverchapel then asked me what the judgment of the Department was as to the degree of opposition of the Arabs to a plan of par-

tion. I told him that I did not have enough knowledge myself to make my opinion of any value, but that I would talk to the officers of our Near Eastern office and would give Lord Inverchapel a summary of our views sometime tomorrow.⁹⁷

He then said that he had done some computing on a proposal to approve partition. Cadogan⁹⁸ had stated that if everyone voted, it would take 19 votes to defeat such approval. He did not believe that there would be more than 12 such votes, including the U.S.S.R., the satellites, the Arab states, France and India among the number. Since, however, there would undoubtedly be abstentions, it could not be stated that the vote in the Assembly would be in favor of approval. I did not gather from any of Lord Inverchapel's remarks that Mr. Bevin was contemplating action at the present session of the Assembly. In fact, he told me that everyone wished to postpone the resumption of the London talks on Palestine until sometime in January—the Arab states because they had nothing to gain by resumption, the Jews because they wished to complete the Basle Conference which began [*begins*] on December 9 before the talks resumed, and the British because they were so burdened with international meetings that they wished further time to prepare.

DEAN ACHESON

867N.01/12-246

*The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)*⁹⁹

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] December 2, 1946.

DEAR ERNEST: Referring to your letter of November 29 as to the Palestine matter,¹ I note your statement that His Majesty's Govern-

⁹⁷ The following day, Mr. Acheson notified Lord Inverchapel of the Department's best estimate of the situation as follows: All Arab countries would oppose partition, but with varying degrees of sincerity and intensity; we did not anticipate military action although some terrorist acts might endanger British and American representatives; anti-Jewish riots might take place in Baghdad and possibly in Cairo and Alexandria; demonstrations before the Legations would take place; the Arabs might threaten to leave the United Nations but would probably not do so. Mr. Acheson noted further: "An important factor will be the degree of determination with which such a solution is put forward and carried through and the degree of solidity of front between the British and ourselves. If British representatives in that area undertake to place the responsibility for partition upon the United States or if United States businessmen or governmental representatives take a secretly critical attitude toward the British, this will be the crack into which the opposition will insert its wedge and will give encouragement to violence, demonstrations, and delays." Lord Inverchapel stated that the views expressed by Mr. Acheson accorded entirely with his own. (867N.01/11-2346)

⁹⁸ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Representative at the United Nations.

⁹⁹ Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin were attending the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met at New York City from November 4 to December 12, 1946.

¹ Not found in Department files.

ment will study most carefully all suggestions submitted at the Conference.

The Jewish leaders, with whom I have recently conferred, regardless of views formerly held by them, now regard the partition proposal as the most practical long-term solution. My opinion is that before agreeing to attend the Conference in January, they would want to be assured specifically that the partition proposal favored by them would be fully considered by [His Majesty's Government.]

I wish that you would let me know whether the British Government is prepared to give serious consideration to alternative proposals offered by the conferees.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

867N.01/12-246

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, 2 December, 1946.

DEAR JAMES: Thank you for your letter of December 2nd about the Palestine Conference.

I am very pleased to have the opportunity of assuring you that all proposals made by the Arab, Jewish and British Delegations at the Conference will be given equal status on the Conference Agenda. His Majesty's Government do not regard themselves as committed in advance to their own proposals. Nor, of course, are they prepared to commit themselves in advance to any other proposals.

His Majesty's Government will be ready to consider every possibility of reaching an agreed settlement, and will study most carefully all suggestions submitted to the Conference.²

Yours sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN

867N.01/12-646 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Basel (Sholes)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1946—1 p. m.

68. For Lehrs³ from Henderson. Re Deptel 63 Nov 22.⁴ During scheduled sessions World Zionist Congress Dec 9 through 23 and in

² On December 7, the Department released a statement by Secretary Byrnes announcing that he had had several conferences in New York with Mr. Bevin about the Palestine situation. Mr. Byrnes stated that "In September His Majesty's Government invited the United States to send an observer to the conference. At that time we could not see our way clear to accept the invitation. Mr. Bevin has orally renewed the invitation of his Government and in view of the assurances contained in his letter [of December 2], the United States Government feels that the leaders of the Jews and Arabs should attend the conference. If they do, the United States will accept the invitation to have an observer at that conference." For full text of Secretary Byrnes' statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 15, 1946, p. 1105.

³ John A. Lehrs, Vice Consul at Basel.

⁴ Not printed.

resolutions adopted, Dept expects present differences policy re solution Palestine problem between coalition group headed by Weizmann, Wise and Goldmann and anti-Administration group headed by Silver and Ben-Gurion may be resolved. Coalition group consisting principally representatives and adherents Jewish Agency has advocated creation viable state in control own immigration and economic policies in adequate area Palestine instead whole of Palestine. Anti-Administration group which has recently included many members Zionist Organization of America has criticized Administration for not insisting on creation Jewish state in whole of Palestine, at least until it is apparent concessions will result in acceptable agreement. ZOA representation at Congress will include Silver and Sack.

Zionist groups have refused up to now participate conference London to which Brit invited Jewish and Arab representatives but discussions took place between Brit and Arabs in Sept and Oct. Discussions, which were inconclusive, were postponed until Dec 16 with almost certain prospects now further postponement until Jan⁵ due present preoccupation Arab leaders with UN matters and possibility World Zionist Congress decision re participation in discussions when renewed. Meanwhile Jewish leaders both groups have been attempting obtain promise from Bevin that Brit will consider Agency partition plan as basis for discussions Jan. They state if such promise given they may be able to persuade Congress authorize participation in discussions.

Refer President's statement Oct 4 and letter Oct 25 to Ibn Saud, Radio Bulletins No. 238 and 258, respectively, for summary recent official American statements.

Pre-Congress estimates indicate delegates total 375 of whom 70 are anti-Administration, 300 are coalition and 5 independent, although some coalition may vote against Administration on policy and principally on organizational matters.

Congress will probably discuss following publicly: (1) Whether accept, reject or advocate change in existing regime in Palestine to federation, partition or provincial autonomy. (2) Whether attend London talks and what policy. (3) Whether Palestine problem should be presented to UN. (4) Vote of confidence in present Administration. (5) Economic questions such as financing legal and illegal immigration to Palestine, financing overall Jewish Agency program including absorption 100,000 immigrants and Jordan Valley authority project. (6) Attitude towards Arabs. (7) Extension non-Zionist representation in Jewish Agency Executive.

⁵ According to telegram 9985, December 7, 1946, from London, British Foreign Office statement published on December 7 announced postponement of the Palestine Conference to an unspecified date in January. The postponement was said to have been made on Mr. Bevin's direct instructions. (867N.01/12-746).

Congress will probably discuss following privately: (1) Attitude toward terrorism. (2) Expansion program for illegal immigration and settlement illegal immigrants in forbidden zones.

Confirming telephone conversation with Sholes and Lehrs latter is authorized attend public sessions as deemed desirable by him as informal observer. His telegraphic reports through Consulate should be marked for attention NEA to expedite handling and within 2 weeks following close session Lehrs should submit comprehensive report despatch form accompanied by appropriate documents.

Sent Basel, reptd Bern. [Henderson.]

ACHESON

867N.01/12-1346

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State*⁶

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND AMIR FAISAL, FOREIGN MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA, DECEMBER 13, 1946

There were present at the interview with the President the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson; His Royal Highness Amir Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia; Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, Minister of Saudi Arabia; and Sheikh Ali Alireza.

After exchange of courtesies between the President and Amir Faisal, the latter said that there were one or two matters which he had been directed by His Majesty King Ibn Saud to bring to the attention of the President. He stated that it was well known in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Arab world that the President's feelings toward his country and the other Arab countries were of deep friendship, a desire to assist them with their problems, and that the President was actuated by principles of justice and fairness. He wished to appeal to these feelings of the President in a situation which was causing His Majesty deep concern.

He stated that the desire of the Zionists to bring large numbers of Jews to Palestine in order to take away from the Arabs lands upon which they had lived for many centuries could not be defended as being in accordance with fairness or justice. The President stated that it was not his purpose in any sense to advocate taking from any person or people what belonged to them or to deal in any way unfairly or unjustly. He was concerned in urging a settlement of the situation in Palestine which would be just to all concerned and would make for peace in the Near East. The President added that in his correspondence with King Ibn Saud he had endeavored to make this position clear. The Amir would understand that the President had not yet had

⁶ Transmitted to President Truman by Mr. Acheson in a memorandum of December 13.

an opportunity to reply to the last communication from the King on account of the great pressure of critical domestic and international matters which had pressed upon him.

The Amir continued that the proposals of the Zionists did not make for peace in the Near East. He said that he wished to bring two matters to the attention of the President.

First. A great deal of false and misleading propaganda had been put forth by the Zionists, which had misled many people in the United States. The President stated that he was not moved or influenced by propaganda. He thought that the plight of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in Europe, the great majority of which were being cared for by the United States, must appeal to all men of good will. They could not continue indefinitely in their present situation. All must join in the effort to alleviate their situation. The President was taking steps with the Congress to receive a considerable number of these people in the United States. Plans were being made for others to go to South America. The President had spoken with General Smuts,⁷ who was willing to cooperate by receiving others in South Africa. Some of these people, the President added, desired to go to and he thought could well be received in Palestine.

The Amir said that many of the people coming to Palestine were bad people, as was shown by the acts of terrorism which were occurring in Palestine. The President replied to this that no one was more opposed to acts of terrorism, violence, and lawlessness than he. But he could not believe that the pitiful remains of the Jews were such people as had been described by the Amir. There were in all groups of people some who were bad. He was not speaking for these, but for the oppressed who had suffered so cruelly before and during the war and who were now seeking homes.

The Amir said that this brought him to his second point, which was that the central difficulty in the Palestine matter was the desire of the Zionists to establish a Jewish state in either a whole or a part of Palestine. The Arabs were prepared to live peacefully with and cooperate with Jews who were in the Near East. They were not prepared to accept the establishment of political Jewish communities or states. In particular any proposal of continuing immigration until the present Arab majority in Palestine was turned into a minority they believed to be unjust and to be disturbing to the peace.

The Amir continued that the Arabs had made a proposal to the effect that Palestine as a whole should now be given its independence and that the country so constituted should decide its own wishes as to immigration; that, until it was so established and could make that decision, immigration should cease.

⁷ Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

The President expressed his pleasure at the Amir's statement that Jews and Arabs could live peacefully together. He stated that the very purpose of the meeting in London was to consider various proposals which had been or might be put forward to this end. He did not wish to go into them at this time. At the London meeting the proposals of the British Government, the proposals of the Arab states, and the proposals of the Jewish Agency could be considered. He believed, and had said many times, that the matter could be solved by men who had good will and desire to solve it. He stressed again the plight of the displaced persons and the necessity of all peoples' receding from rigid positions in order to aid in finding a solution.

The Amir, in taking his departure, urged the President to give this matter his deepest consideration, because the Amir regarded it as a matter of the most profound consequence to the Arab peoples.

S67N.01/12-1646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, December 16, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received 10:13 p. m.]

1963. Mytel 1901, December 5.⁸ Secretary General of Arab League has now handed me note dated December 7 incorporating Arab League's declaration on Palestine based on decision League Council December 2 and requesting me to transmit it to Secretary of State. Text of declaration follows.

"The Council of the League of Arab States now in session has discussed American intervention in Palestine affairs in recent months and the disturbing effects of the various declarations and statements made by the President of the U.S. as well as the efforts the President is exerting with the British Govt in this direction, and has decided to draw the attention of the Govt of the US of America to the great anxiety these declarations and efforts are causing throughout the Arab States and the Moslem world and their adverse effects on the excellent relations which the govts of member states of the Arab League are desirous of maintaining between them and the US Govt.

The Council has also discussed the efforts now being exerted in the regions under American occupation in Europe in an endeavour to encourage and facilitate Zionist immigration into Palestine and requests the US Govt to take measures necessary to ensure that an end is put to such acts, which are capable of no other interpretation

⁸ Not printed; it reported information from the Iraqi Foreign Minister that the Arab League's decision to protest against President Truman's interference in Palestine arose from a desire to relieve American pressure on the British (890B.00/12-546). In airgram A-540, December 3, 1946, the Ambassador advised that the League had recommended that its member states instruct the heads of their delegations at the United Nations to inform President Truman and members of his Cabinet that the Arab states were disturbed and distressed at the President's continuous interference in the affairs of Palestine (890B.00/12-346).

than taking sides with one of the parties to the dispute between the Arabs and the Jews, a dispute which is still under examination and study in the hope of reaching an honorable and just settlement, leading to the elimination of the causes of the present extremely difficult situation, thus paving the way to a reign of calm and tranquility and consolidating the foundations of peace, so dear to the hearts of all nations, led by the US with all the high principles which it champions."

If Dept perceives no objection I intend informally to acknowledge note and inform Secretary General that it has been forwarded.

Please instruct. Full text of note by pouch.

TUCK

867N.01/12-2746

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1946.

Subject: United States Policy Regarding Palestine

The Palestine question and the related question of the future of the Jewish DP's form an open sore, the infection from which tends to spread rather than to become localized. Moreover, the almost world-wide feeling of insecurity felt by Jews, results in something like a cosmic Jewish urge with respect to Palestine. But the development of our Palestine policy up to this time in regard to these questions and pressures, however well-intentioned, has not contributed anything concrete to their solution, and seems unlikely to do so in its present form. Not only is our Palestine policy of no real assistance to the Jews (whatever it may afford them in the way of moral encouragement), it keeps us constantly on the edge of embroilment with the British and the Arabs. Therefore, it is desirable to reconsider our policy in order to see whether it cannot be improved.

The main defects appear to be these:

1. We advocate and press for the admission of 100,000 Jewish DP's into Palestine. By so doing we have pleased the Jews. But they now probably realize that it is unlikely that we are going either to force these Jews upon Palestine by direct action, or to exert decisive pressure upon the British to do so. Since the British remain adamant against all Jewish immigration save for a trickle (1,500 a month), in the absence of an overall solution for Palestine, most Jews have now

⁹ Transmitted by Mr. Henderson to Mr. Acheson with an undated memorandum which stated: "I feel that you should read the attached memo from Mr. Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern Division. Of course we have practically been forced by political pressure and sentiment in the U.S. in direction of a 'viable Jewish state'. I must confess that when I view our policy in light of principles avowed by us I become uneasy." The files do not disclose the reaction of Mr. Acheson.

completely rationalized illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine, which they assert is as legal, or as justified, as the Boston Tea Party. This is a situation from which no good can be expected.

Moreover, the 100,000 figure has lost meaning. Originally, at the time of the Harrison report, this was the approximate number of Jews in DP camps in the American and British zones in Europe for whom the Jewish Agency requested certificates in June 1945. The number is now probably over 250,000, which is certainly too many for Palestine over a short period of time, even neglecting political considerations. An examination of the DP and political situations as a whole might indicate more or less than 100,000 but there is no longer, in the absence of a re-assessment, any persuasive reason to rest on a particular figure.

2. Our position on a political settlement for Palestine is qualified and to some extent indefinite. While it has given some satisfaction to the more moderate "viable state" Zionists, it does not go as far as they would like. It is definitely out of line with the Biltmore program which envisages a Jewish state in all of Palestine, and even more out of line with the Revisionist program which includes Transjordan. Therefore, our policy is only moderately satisfactory to the Zionists.

3. Our policy, while not meeting the demands of the Zionists, is disliked and feared by the Arabs; it already handicaps and may eventually jeopardize our political and other interests in the Arab world.

It seems true to say that our policy has gradually taken form, though it is still somewhat indefinite, as the result of the pressures that have been applied to us from various directions. We go as far as we can to please the Zionists and other Jews without making the Arabs and the British too angry.

The main point which it is desired to make in this memorandum is that our policy, as it stands, is one of expediency, not one of principle. Time after time we have been maneuvered into acceptance of more or less specific propositions: 100,000 immigrants; a compromise between the Goldmann and British Government schemes, and we have then had the task—not always easy—of finding principles to justify them.

In the formulation of any policy which is really worth while, the procedure must be the exact opposite. We ought to proceed from principle to the specific, not vice versa. Operating a policy of expediency is an uncomfortable and dangerous business which we ought to get out of with all speed possible.

What should our Palestine policy, based on principle, be? First let the main premises be stated. These seem to be:

(1) Palestine is an A Mandate. As such, it was to be prepared for independence. Were it not for the complication of the Jewish National Home, it would be independent today, as all the other A mandates have become. Arabs and Jews live there and must, sooner or later, come to some sort of a political agreement based on a minimum of mutual confidence and give-and-take, if they are to govern Palestine.

(2) The Jewish National Home was and is a new concept, undefined. The British statesmen who worked out the Balfour Declaration thought that the Jewish National Home would probably develop into a Jewish state, but they underestimated or misjudged the Arab reaction (Balfour did not realize that Arabs lived in Palestine).

(3) The Jews could run Palestine if it were full of Jews; the Arabs if it were full of Arabs.

(4) The Jewish DP problem, as well as the almost universal Jewish feeling of insecurity, presses powerfully and perhaps irresistibly upon Palestine in both the human and political sense.

(5) The reception accorded by Arabs, Jews, or both, to the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, to the Grady Mission plan—indeed, to all schemes and plans proposed by third parties—strongly indicates that no third-party plan has any chance of success, unless imposed and maintained by force.

The foregoing, taken together with the considerations mentioned earlier, plus certain general considerations which are in all of our minds, appears to lead to a set of principles which could appropriately constitute our Palestine policy.

The following is an attempt to state them :

(1) The mandate (or trusteeship) for Palestine should be replaced as soon as possible by independence. The form which Palestinian independence takes should be decided by free agreement between interested Arabs and Jews within and without Palestine, and must conform to United Nations principles. Questions relating to representation of Arabs and Jews for the purpose of the negotiations should be decided by the General Assembly of the United Nations after considering the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council, which will be formulated after hearings. The area of the Holy Places should be placed under a trusteeship administered by the British Government. Immigration and land ownership policies will be determined by the political entity or entities created as the result of the Arab-Jewish negotiations, subject to guarantees agreed upon between Arabs and Jews and approved by the General Assembly of UN on the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council.

(2) The United States will support any political arrangement for Palestine agreed to as the result of the negotiations between Arabs and Jews and approved by the United Nations.

(3) Until the security system of the United Nations is able to provide, directly or indirectly, for the general security of the Near Eastern area, and possibly by virtue and under the authority of that system when in operation, Great Britain should have control, under trusteeship, of an adequate area or adequate areas and facilities in Palestine for the purpose of providing regional security, such areas and facilities to be demarcated and specified by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Military Staff Committee (?).

(4) Pending agreement between Arabs and Jews on the future of Palestine, the existing mandate should be replaced by a trusteeship under the United Nations, administered by Great Britain. Detailed immigration and land settlement policy should be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations after considering the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, which will consider the

views and claims of those interested, including the recommendations of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and the International Refugee Organization.

The foregoing is merely in the nature of a suggestion. The important thing is for us to adopt a policy of principle and general procedure which will be approved as fair and reasonable by the general public in this and other countries, and to break away from a policy of attempting to thread a way between the specific projects and plans of the contending pressure groups. A policy of principle and procedure would also be a move in the direction of getting world responsibility and handling for the world problems, which the Palestine and Jewish problems are.

The reasoning in this memorandum is capable of development at various points and can be expanded, if you think it of sufficient interest, along such lines as you may desire. Also, if you think it worthwhile, an estimate can be made as to the probable reactions of the Arabs and Jews to the suggested modification of our policy, and, more fundamental, an assessment can be made of what there would be in it for both Arabs and Jews.

GORDON P. MERRIAM

867N.01/12-2746

*Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*¹⁰

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1946.

According to Lehrs, Basel, the World Zionist Congress passed the following resolutions, summarized below:

(1) Rejecting Morrison-Grady proposals even as basis for discussion.

(2) Denouncing existing British regime in Palestine as contrary to civilized concepts of law and order.

(3) Condemning present British immigration policy and pledging support of Zionist movement to all Jews seeking salvation in Palestine.

(4) Expressing solidarity with Jews detained in Cyprus.

(5) Expressing admiration of the firm stand of Jews in Palestine in opposing White Paper policy and confidence in their continued fortitude and discipline.

(6) Demanding Palestine be established as Jewish commonwealth and open to Jewish immigration.

(7) Rejecting White Paper policy as a violation of Jewish historic rights acknowledged in Balfour Declaration and Mandate.

¹⁰ Addressed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) and to Messrs. Merriam and Wilson.

(8) Affirming necessity and moral compulsion of Jews in Palestine resisting present British policy there and promising them support of Zionist movement in struggle for right to immigration, settlement and self-defense.

(9) Instructing Executive persevere in exploring possibility of Jewish-Arab understanding.

(10) Disapproving terrorism as means of political warfare.

(11) Declining United Nations Trusteeship as possible successor to present mandate and declaring Jewish statehood as only acceptable regime should mandate terminate.

(12) Expressing appreciation to American President, Congress and people for advocacy of admission to Palestine of Jewish refugees and support of Zionist cause.

(13) Resolving that in existing circumstances Zionist movement cannot participate in London conference but that if change should take place in situation Council shall consider and decide re participation.

(14) Expressing gratitude to World Christian Committee and others for promoting sympathy of non-Jewish world to Zionist movement.

(15) Repudiating activities of Hebrew Committee for National Liberation, American League for Free Palestine, Palestine Emergency Committee and similar unauthorized bodies.

(16) Protesting deportation Jews from Palestine to tropical Africa.

(17) Claiming share German reparations.

867N.01/12-3046 : Telegram

The Consul General at Basel (Sholes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BASEL, December 30, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received 10:25 p. m.]

105. For Henderson from Lehrs. Supplementing Contel 104 29th.¹¹ Final results of Zionist Congress can be summarized as follows, according to strictly confidential information obtained from Epstein and others:

Opposition led by Silver which defeated Weizmann's policy in Congress proved incapable to propose constructive alternative acceptable to majority of General Council. In endeavor to overcome deadlock Weizmann's supporters, including Ben-Gurion, Brodetsky,¹² Gold-

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Prof. Selig Brodetsky, Member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, London Section.

mann and Shertok succeeded having General Council elect an Executive in which 13 of 19 members support partition plan and favor attending London Conference. Further they had General Council appoint a special political committee of 16 members with power to decide when and if necessary change in "existing circumstances" has occurred enabling Executive attend London Conference under provisions of Congress resolution reported in Contel 101 24th.¹³ Proportion of members in committee accepting partition and London Conference said to be similar to that in Executive. To achieve all this against Silver's stubborn opposition they compromised with him by dropping demand for Weizmann's inspection [*reelection?*]. Committee tentatively scheduled meet Paris in about fortnight. Meantime Brodetsky will endeavor see Bevin about January 3 to suggest a British gesture satisfying committee that change in "existing circumstances" has occurred thereby enabling it authorize Executive attend London Conference. Epstein says release of immigrants detained Cyprus would suffice. He also said members of Executive assigned Palestine determined to shrink from no measures to suppress terrorism.

Members of Executive, Brodetsky and Goldmann, assigned London and Shertok to Washington, latter expecting arrive there accompanied by Epstein about January 15 and confer with Department. Silver flying today from Amsterdam to New York.

Sent Department, repeated to London. [Lehrs.]

SHOLES

[In despatch 517, January 16, 1947, the Consul General at Basel reported on the 22nd World Zionist Congress which opened on December 9, 1946, adjourned on December 24, leaving its unfinished business to the General Zionist Council, and concluded on December 29 with the election by the Council of a new Executive of the Zionist Organization. Dr. Weizmann stood for reelection as President of the Executive on a platform of participation in the London Conference to discuss partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state within it. He was defeated by the group led by Rabbi Silver who demanded a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine. Dr. Weizmann's supporters succeeded in electing a new Executive in which the majority favored his partition proposals. The position of President of the Executive, however, remained unfilled. (867N.01/1-1647)]

¹³ Not printed; the resolution was the same as No. 13 in Mr. Wilkins's memorandum of December 27, *supra*.

SAUDI ARABIA

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PRESERVATION OF THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF SAUDI ARABIA; THE QUESTION OF FINANCIAL AND OTHER AID¹

711.90F/1-1946: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1946—4 p. m.

108. For Eddy.² Reurtel 21, Jan 12, 11 a. m.³ It is suggested that in your discretion you reply to the King⁴ along following lines:

1. Preservation of integrity and security of Saudi Arabia is one of basic objectives of US in Near East. Our policy in this respect, of which Brit Govt is fully aware, is in keeping with our commitments to UNO of which SAG is member. We are determined to give full support to this organization and to maintain principles for which it stands.

2. Article I of the Charter of the United Nations para 1 (which you may quote to him) makes it clear that one of the purposes of UNO is to suppress acts of aggression of the character to which King

¹ For previous documentation on these matters, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 845 ff.

² Col. William A Eddy, Minister to Saudi Arabia. The Minister was at Cairo en route to the Department for consultation.

³ Not printed. According to Telegram 451, December 31, 1945, the King had informed Minister Eddy on December 29 that he feared aggression from the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Trans-Jordan and was concerned lest the British avert their eyes from threats on his frontiers. He asked that the United States inform the British that the integrity, security, and defense of Saudi Arabia were of great concern to the United States and that the United States would not acquiesce in aggression against his realm. He also asked that the United States request the British to prevent hostile acts on his frontiers (890F.00/12-3145).

In telegram 21, Minister Eddy reported that he understood it to be the King's position that the British had declared that they would protect him against foreign aggression and that he should refuse the United States Army mission which had been offered last spring. The King, however, preferred to be strong enough in his own right to be able to defend himself if necessary. He hoped that the Minister would ask the United States Government whether in an emergency after British diplomatic efforts had failed, it would either send military aid to reinforce his own insufficient defenses, such as airplanes, or would take the lead in securing prompt and effective intervention by military forces of the United Nations Organization. The King said he would be more at ease if he could have the assurance of United States intervention, because the United Nations Organization might be too slow in acting.

The Department had replied to the earlier telegram in telegram 3 of January 4, 1946, 2 p. m., (711.90F/1-446), which had been along the lines of the reply herein sent to the later telegram 21.

⁴ Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.

refers. In case Govt of Saudi Arabia should be the victim of aggression or should feel that it is seriously threatened with aggression and should bring its case before UNO, USG will live up meticulously to obligations which it assumed when it signed Charter.

3. In view of information which you have already conveyed, this Govt has been giving special attention to recent developments in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Trans-Jordan but has been able to find no evidence that any aggression is being planned at this time against Saudi Arabia. We believe that Great Britain like ourselves would be very much averse to the outbreak of armed conflict in the Arab world at the present time and that Great Britain like US would make every proper and appropriate effort to prevent such an outbreak in case one would appear likely.

4. We are convinced that no economic rivalries which might exist between US and UK in the Near East are of a nature which would cause either country to engage in activities which would be contrary to the basic principles contained in UNO Charter.

Sent Cairo as Dept's no. 108. Repeated Jidda as Dept's no. 19.⁵

ACHESON

890F.24/3-846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1946—8 p. m.

66. SAG interested obtaining \$300,000 worth of surplus trucks and spares in Cairo, and in addition, has presented note to Dept⁶ asking help in getting 300 trucks, in excellent condition, for urgent needs. Legation, Washington, has been told that it should handle any future purchase of new trucks in US through commercial channels and is beginning to do so.

However, Dept and surplus authorities here believe many good trucks can be obtained by SAG from surpluses now in Cairo. Credit of half million dollars for 5 years, 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ percent service charge repayable 20 percent each Jan. 1 in dollars and unpaid balance callable at any time in riyals can be extended by FLC apart from Eximbank loans.⁷

⁵ In telegram 77, March 21, 1946, Minister Eddy reported from Jidda that in a private audience at Riyadh he had orally transmitted to the King the contents of this telegram, and that the King had expressed appreciation of the message and had shown genuine satisfaction at learning of the U. S. interest in Saudi Arabian security and territorial integrity (890F.00/3-2146).

⁶ Dated March 4, not printed.

⁷ This refers to the approval on January 3, 1946, by the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of a \$25,000,000 line of credit to Saudi Arabia: see telegram 2, January 4, 1946, to Jidda, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 999.

Asad al-Faqih⁸ and USG favor handling matter in Egypt. Will you ask SAG if it approves this procedure? If yes, King should issue decree authorizing negotiation and purchase up to half million dollars US surplus material in Cairo by SAG Minister to Egypt or by SAG Purchasing Commission now reported to be in Egypt. Sanger⁹ will take proposed contract to Cairo with him next week.

Demand for best conditioned US surpluses so great no time should be lost if SAG is to obtain suitable equipment. SAG Minister Cairo and/or purchasing commission there must have not only authority to buy but also its own qualified technical assistance to inspect and select equipment desired, because sales are made as is, where is, with no continuing USG liability.

Dept feels that half million dollars mentioned above should be top limit of additional credit for SAG purchases of surplus. If more material is desired and located it should be bought with SAG dollar resources, other than Eximbank advances.¹⁰

Sent Jidda, repeated Cairo for Ramsey.

BYRNES

S90F.51/3-2146: Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, March 21, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 6:01 p. m.]

76. King told me at Riyadh that conditions attached to Export-Import Bank loan proposal are not acceptable to him and that he could not submit to bank control of funds borrowed. He proposed a flat 10 million dollar loan with no restrictions as to use repayable in 5 years in 5 installments from oil royalties.

In audience with King and also in private conversations with Amir Faisal¹¹ I made clear my personal opinion that Export-Import Bank would not make any such loan though I would transmit proposal to Dept for official reply. It was clear to me that King does not expect affirmative reply but made the proposal only to prevent open break in negotiations. He repeated frequently that a loan is less important than preventing the appearance of a break in negotiations. SAG will seek to borrow commercially.

⁸ Saudi Arabian Minister in the United States.

⁹ Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

¹⁰ Fred W. Ramsey, Central Field Commissioner in the Middle East for the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, set forth the formal proposal of the United States Government on the sale of surplus property to the Saudi Arabian Government in a letter of May 22, 1946, to the Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleiman. The proposal called for a line of credit of \$2,000,000 for purchases made prior to January 1, 1948, and made no provision for interest or service charges. These terms were accepted by the Finance Minister on May 25 (S90F.24/4-347).

¹¹ Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Amir Faisal recommends confidentially and I concur that Export-Import Bank loan be permitted to die quietly without obituary. Improvement in Saudi economic conditions, prospect of greater royalties can be cited as reasons for postponement of action.

King objected to three conditions of Export-Import Bank loan:

(1) Sweeping mortgage of any and all oil royalties present and future which he said would put his person and kingdom in receivership and reflect upon his trustworthiness.

(2) Control or veto of purchases and projects in effect permitting a bank to dictate what his people could eat or wear.

(3) The service charge which payable separately and at distinct times from the principal is in effect interest. His religion forbids this though he could pay costs required if expenses were added to and included in price of purchases.

I told the King that inclusive mortgage of all royalties which he interpreted as infringement of his sovereignty is merely conventional banking language common to similar transactions of Export-Import Bank everywhere. I also reminded King that service charge had been anticipated in my conversations with him and his Ministers and had been clearly stated in draft summary delivered in early January without any intimation to my Govt that it would prove an obstacle. Discussion, however, proved useless as King had made his decision and would not reconsider. He did not seem concerned about success or failure of a loan but only anxious to prevent any misunderstanding with US Govt with whom his "relations have been and will always remain most friendly".

Full report follows by pouch.

EDDY

890F.51/3-1746: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1946—9 p. m.

80. In letter submitted to Dept in Feb 1945, Lebkicher of Aramco stated that provided US Govt was willing to undertake program of assisting SAG financially in meeting expected deficits in its budget, Aramco was willing to forego recovery of its advances to SAG so long as US Govt was supplying funds toward meeting ordinary SAG budget expenditures. (Your 75, Mar 17, 1946¹²). In letter dated Mar 12, 1946 to James MacPherson of Aramco, Terry Duce¹³ interpreted this commitment to mean that collection by Aramco is secondary to repayment of US Govt, and stated "We do not want to be accused

¹² Not printed; it inquired whether the United States Government would have any objection to the Saudi Arabian Government's making payments on its debt to Aramco (890F.51/3-1746).

¹³ James Terry Duce, vice president and director of Aramco.

under any circumstances of being paid directly or indirectly from funds advanced by or otherwise repayable to US Govt." It was deemed unnecessary to place specific provision against prior payment of Aramco claims in loan agreement because understanding with Company precluded acceptance by it of any payments which might be offered by SAG.

Dept does not feel that payment by SAG of installments on Aramco debt at this time would be wise or would improve SAG credit standing. Credit rating with US Govt far more important to SAG than credit rating with Aramco. Also Eximbank advances carry 3 percent service charge. Aramco advances are interest free. If SAG has unexpected revenues, it should reduce drawings against Eximbank line of credit and save interest on unnecessary borrowings, or better still, establish reserve fund for purchase of silver for return to Treasury under terms of lend-lease silver agreement.

[Here follows a paragraph suggesting that the Saudi Arabian Government consider procuring its riyal needs by the exchange of gold in the Saudi Arabian market rather than by the purchase of silver in the United States for minting new riyals.]

SAG cannot be considered to have surplus dollars until it has made provision for meeting its obligations to US Govt. If at some later date it should become clear that SAG will be able to meet all obligations on schedule, Dept might withdraw objections to payments by SAG to Aramco, but would certainly point out to SAG advisability of liquidating interest bearing obligations first.

BYRNES

890F.51/4-1546 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1946—7 p. m.

106. From the Secretary of the Treasury. Legtel 102, Apr 15, 1946.¹⁴ 1. Please advise the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance that the Treasury is not in a position to enter into commitments involving the future sale of gold. The Treasury's current selling price for gold is 35 dollars per fine ounce plus one-quarter of one percent plus usual Mint charges. Saudi Government requests for the purchase of gold should be directed through the Legation to the Secretary of the Treasury at the time each purchase is desired as heretofore.

2. The Mint anticipates that its facilities will be available to meet such minting requirements as the Saudi Government may have during

¹⁴ Not printed; it transmitted the Minister of Finance's inquiries as to whether the United States would be willing to sell up to \$2,000,000 of gold to Saudi Arabia during 1946 and would mint silver for his country (890F.51/4-1546).

1946. Upon being advised of details of the Saudi program, the Mint can furnish estimates of the cost of minting. The silver would have to be provided by the Saudi Government.¹⁵

ACHESON

S90F.51/4-2246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands)

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1946—5 p. m.

114. Legs 110, Apr 22.¹⁶ Saudi Minister called at Dept Apr 24 to ascertain possibility modification certain provisions draft loan agreement. He was told that any modifications would have to be passed upon by Bank's Board of Directors, and that Dept could not speak for Bank. However, it was informal opinion of Dept financial officers present that:

1. Article VII was never intended to preclude uncontrolled expenditure of oil royalties in excess of amounts due Bank in any given year. Par 2 Art VII meant only that SAG must not pledge oil royalties as security for loans from third parties without Bank's approval.

2. It was not impossible that some satisfactory arrangement for handling interest payments could be worked out.

3. If loan for consumers' goods small and limited to purchase one or two commodities, Bank's supervisory activities under Article III would be minimum. For example, if agreement limited to financing 40,000 tons wheat and 300 trucks, entire loan contract could be reworded and be very simple. However, Bank would probably not be prepared to modify supervisory provisions on capital goods and technical services for development projects. Such provisions standard for development projects all countries. Bank loans money for only such development work as it believes sound and useful.

4. Minister informed that developments since draft agreement approved by Bank in January made it doubtful Bank would now offer loan for general financial assistance in amount originally offered. Oil royalties of at least \$12,000,000 now appeared assured for year 1946, against \$6,000,000 estimate used in estimating \$11,000,000 deficit on which original offer based. Instead of estimated deficits for years 1947 and after, surpluses appeared probable due to greatly increased royalty probabilities. Depts original estimates upon which

¹⁵ On October 3, 1946, the Saudi Arabian Minister sent two notes to the Acting Secretary of State requesting the minting of \$1,000,000 worth of fine gold discs and of more than 50,000,000 riyal and girsh coins (890F.515/10-346). In reply, on November 5, the Acting Secretary stated that the manufacture of the discs and coins was under way and delivery might be anticipated within 2 weeks (890F.515/10-2946).

¹⁶ Not printed; it reported that commercial banks were unwilling to make a loan to the Saudi Arabian Government and mentioned the possibility that the Government might wish to reopen discussions with the Export-Import Bank on conditions for a loan (890F.51/4-2246).

it based its recommendations to Bank which Bank accepted were considered to provide liberally for SAG essential requirements, and unless SAG could provide proof of larger essential requirements, Dept would probably not now be able recommend more than \$5,000,000 loan for year 1946, particularly in view greatly increased demands on limited Bank resources for war-devastated countries. Although no budgetary assistance now appeared necessary after 1946, needs could be reexamined from time to time. Offer of \$5,000,000 for development purposes would probably still stand, however.

5. Also explained that to avoid competition with new World Bank, Eximbank might not now be able to offer interest as low as 3 per cent, although Dept hopeful original interest offer could be maintained if loan concluded in near future.

6. In summary, Minister given to understand that Dept and Bank would probably give favorable consideration to request for loan of about \$5,000,000 for procurement one or two major SAG requirements during 1946 such as wheat or trucks. Entirely new agreement might be drafted, terms of which might be much simpler than those of draft agreement. Bank might be willing to consider special arrangements for handling interest. Shorter repayment period such as 5 years would probably be welcomed if SAG desired, and would simplify interest problem. Portions of original agreement relating to \$5,000,000 line of credit for development might be used for separate agreement, with royalty pledge provisions modified, supervisory provisions unchanged, special interest arrangements to be attempted. Interest basis might have to be higher than 3 per cent, but of course no higher than applicable to other countries under similar circumstances. All information subject to confirmation by Bank. Minister should discuss any definite proposals SAG might have directly with Bank officials.

7. You may inform MinFinance also Aramco.

ACHESON

S90F.796/6-2046

*The Legation in Saudi Arabia to the Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs*¹⁸

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 50

JIDDA, May 29, 1946.

The Legation of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and has the honor to refer to the Acting Foreign Minister's Note No. 11/1/9/156, of January 2, 1946, in reply to this Legation's

¹⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 243, June 20, 1946, from Jidda; received July 2.

Note No. 287, of December 20, 1945,¹⁹ concerning bilateral civil air rights and the use of the Dhahran airfield by American commercial aircraft.

The Transcontinental and Western Air Co. (TWA) has indicated its desire to begin air services from Cairo to Bombay via Dhahran beginning on June 17, 1946. For the time being, this route will be flown in direct line from Cairo to Dhahran over routes already approved by His Majesty's Government for American military airplanes. The Ministry will recall that TWA is the aviation company chosen, insofar as the American Government is concerned, to operate air line travel in this area of the Middle East.

The Legation requests that the approval of His Majesty's Government for TWA to fly this route will be notified to it at the earliest practicable date,²⁰ and takes this occasion to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its high consideration.

890F.20/6-2846

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the *aide-mémoire* dated June 28, 1946 (reference 188/ /46)²¹ referring to the Department's memorandum of June 14, 1946²² concerning the Saudi Arabian Government's request for a British military mission to assist in the training of the Saudi Arabian army. On the basis of the information imparted in the *aide-mémoire*, the Department perceives no objection to the British Government's acceding to the request of the Saudi Arabian Government.

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1946.

¹⁹ Neither printed, but see bracketed notes, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 983 and 997.

²⁰ The Ministry's note No. 11/1/9/198 of June 14 agreed to the inauguration of TWA service at Dhahran but requested that TWA first send a representative to discuss the project and to conclude an operating agreement (890F.796/6-2046). An 8-point agreement was signed on July 4, 1946, by Amir Faisal and a TWA official, which authorized TWA to engage in transportation by air of persons, property, and mail between the United States and Dhahran, via intermediate points, for a period of 2 years (811.79690F/7-446). A further agreement, dated September 28, 1946, was entered into by the Saudi Arabian Government and TWA calling for creation of a Government-owned Saudi Arabian Airlines to be managed and operated by TWA for a period of 5 years. The airline was to provide air transport services within Saudi Arabia and between Saudi Arabia and other countries. The agreement was signed by Amir Mansour, the Minister of Defense, the following day. (890F.796/9-3046)

²¹ Not printed; it stated that the British Government, in reply to a request by the Saudi Arabian Government for a military mission, contemplated a mission of 45 persons, including 3 British and 16 Indian officers, to assist in forming a general staff, to give arms training, and to supervise an officers' school. The cost of the mission was to be borne by the British Government which would also pay for the minimum military equipment required. (890F.20/6-2846)

²² Not printed; it raised various questions about the nature of the mission, in reply to a British Embassy memorandum of June 7, not printed (890F.20/6-746).

890F.51/7-1046 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Childs)*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1946—7 p. m.

185. At request of Saudi Minister, Eximbank on Jul 9 provided him with draft of a letter which he might submit to Bank as formal request for \$10 million credit. Letter sets forth terms which are known to be acceptable to Bank's Board Directors, but to avoid any appearance that Bank is dictating terms, Bank desires SAG to take initiative in requesting these terms. Minister has cabled entire text to Jidda for clearance. Summary important portions for your info follows:

1. SAG requests credit of \$10 million for purchase currently required materials in U.S. Types of materials required are cereals and grains, sugar, textiles, agricultural tools or machinery, automotive equipment, office equipment and supplies. (Estimated dollar values of requirements in each category to be provided in letter for Bank's info but purchases in each category will not necessarily be limited to amounts estimated).

2. Credit to be available until Jun 15, 1948.

3. Initial advance of \$2 million to provide working fund. Further advances in amount of \$1 million or multiples thereof upon SAG request accompanied by evidence that expenditure of funds previously advanced have been made for materials listed above.

4. For each advance of \$1 million Bank will take 10 notes of SAG, each in amount of \$120,000, maturing successively on Dec 31 of each of the 10 years from 1948 thru 1957.

5. Without limiting its general liability as maker of notes, SAG will conclude agreement with Aramco whereby company will, as notes come due, pay directly to Bank, out of oil royalties due SAG, \$1,200,000 in dollars on Dec 31, 1948 and same date each 9 immediately following years.

6. SAG to have privilege of prepaying notes in inverse order of maturity by payment of amount to be mutually determined by Bank and SAG at time of payment but which will in any event provide premium to SAG.²³

7. It is intention of SAG at some time in near future to submit separate proposal on terms and conditions which might govern credit of \$5 million for public works and other developmental projects.

ACHESON

²³ An agreement establishing these terms and conditions of the \$10,000,000 credit was signed by the Saudi Arabian Government and the Export-Import Bank on August 9, 1946 (890F.51/8-946).

S90F.51/9-2746

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1946.

Subject: United States Policy Toward Saudi Arabia

It is my understanding that Mr. Martin, President of the Export-Import Bank will be talking with you tomorrow on the subject of a possible \$15,000,000 development loan to Saudi Arabia. The question of assisting Saudi Arabia with its transportation system and particularly the question of developing railroads or highways in that country is expected to come up in this connection.²⁴

As you know, our policy toward Saudi Arabia is to provide such assistance as may be necessary and feasible to strengthen and maintain that country as a sovereign state free of internal and external disturbances which might threaten its stability. Because Saudi Arabia at present has no railroads and almost no highways, the immediate development of its transportation situation appears justified.

The engineering firm of International Bechtel Brothers-McCone which has studied the relative merits of railroad *vs.* roads favors the road as do the economic officers of the Department and the Export-Import Bank. However, King Ibn Saud is very strongly in favor of the railroad.

It is the opinion of this Office that sufficient information has not been provided to make a final decision on this matter, and we strongly support the idea of having the Export-Import Bank finance an adequate survey of these two possibilities for developing transportation in Saudi Arabia. The final decision should weigh political and military as well as economic factors involved in this case.

H[ENRY] S. V[ILLARD]

²⁴ In a memorandum of September 13 to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs (McGuire), Mr. Sanger had noted that preliminary surveys of eight projects had been prepared by International Bechtel Brothers-McCone for the Saudi Arabian Government. They involved the water supply of Jidda, electrification of Mecca and of Riyadh, construction of a cement plant, the harbor of Jidda, irrigation and water conservation, hospitals at Riyadh and Taif, and railway and highway transportation. The initial costs of the eight projects were estimated at \$56,505,000, the major elements of which were \$32,418,000 for the railway and \$13,075,000 for highways. (890F.51/9-1346)

890F.77/10-146: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, October 1, 1946—5 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

[Received October 2—noon]

1641. For Loy Henderson.²⁵ General Giles, Regional Director TWA, has requested me to transmit the following Top Secret message which King Ibn Saud has asked him to deliver urgently to President Truman.

In consenting to forward this message which I consider important, I wish to make it clear that it is not my intention to poach on the preserves of our Minister to Saudi Arabia. Giles has assured me that he would have given the message immediately to Childs at Jidda but for the fact that the latter was absent in the Yemen.²⁶ The gist of the passage as given verbally by King Ibn Saud to Giles at Riyadh on September 28, 1946 is as follows:

The King first informed Giles that the message he wished delivered to President Truman was of the utmost secrecy and urgency and that not even Prince Faisal or his Saudi Arabian Minister in Washington were aware of it. The King said that he had pledged his word to his people to build a railway from the east coast of Saudi Arabia to Riyadh²⁷ which he wished his people to operate. This railway would serve to bring into the country oil equipment and supplies and would aid in developing the hinterland. The King said that a road alone would not serve the country effectively as motor transport was constantly in need of repair and is therefore of limited use. He added that he intended to fulfill this pledge to his people at whatever cost and he looked for assistance to President Truman and the American people as his only true friends. The King said that British interests were both selfish and restrictive in character and that he believed that the British were secretly friendly to the Jews. The King expressed to Giles his great hope and faith in the US and declared that he would always remain our friend although on occasion his pronouncements in regard to the Palestine question²⁸ might indicate otherwise.

²⁵ Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

²⁶ Minister Childs had left Jidda to present his letters of credence to the Imam of the Yemen; see despatch 69, September 17, from Jidda, p. 925.

²⁷ The Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance had left Jidda en route to the United States on July 29. On August 6, Minister Childs had advised the Department in airgram A-86, 1946, that one of the principal purposes of this visit was understood to be the raising of a loan of \$50,000,000 to finance construction of a railway from Damman to Riyadh. (890F.51/8-646) Abdullah Suleiman discussed the question of the railroad with President Truman on August 14 (Memorandum of Conversation by R. D. Muir, Acting Chief of Protocol, filed under 890F.002/8-1446) and with Acting Secretary of State Acheson on October 10 (Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Sanger, filed under 890F.77/10-1046).

²⁸ For documentation on this question, see pp. 576 ff.

King Ibn Saud stated that he would exhaust every means at his disposal in the hope of obtaining American assistance for this proposed railway construction project but if American help was not forthcoming, he would not hesitate to seek British assistance which he believed the British would gladly offer. Failing either American or British help, he would be obliged to seek recourse to some other powerful nation (presumably Russia).

The King concluded the interview by reiterating his firm intention to build this railway which he said would be the "crowning glory" of his reign.

This message has not been repeated to Jidda.

TUCK

890F.77/10-346 : Telegram

*President Truman to the King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz)*²⁹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

The message which Your Majesty asked General Giles to transmit to me has been received and studied with great interest. I am highly gratified by your expression of friendship for myself and the American people.

I note that you have pledged your word to your people to build a railroad from the east coast of Saudi Arabia to Riyadh to bring in supplies and oil equipment and to aid in the development of the hinterland, and that you feel a highway would not serve your country effectively. The question of such a railroad is under active discussion at this moment between your able Minister of Finance and high economic officials of this Government, particularly the President of the Export-Import Bank, and will receive our very careful consideration. I assure your Majesty that the problem is being approached with a maximum of sympathy and that every effort is being made to work out a solution which will be satisfactory to you. I shall send you a more complete answer to your message as soon as the matter has been studied in further detail.³⁰

²⁹ Sent to the Legation at Jidda as Department's telegram 244 with the instruction: "For transmittal to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud from President Truman". The telegram was repeated to Cairo with the addition of the following sentence: "Please repeat your 1641 Oct 1 to Jidda."

³⁰ The King's reply to this message, dated October 6, 1946, and transmitted to the Department in Legation's telegram 294, October 6, expressed his thanks and gratefulness to President Truman for his "considerable attention" to the King's plan (890F.77/10-646).

890F.51/10-2246 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1946—3 p. m.

259. In a letter to Suleiman,³¹ Ex-Im Bank expressed willingness to advance not to exceed \$15 million for US costs of sound economic development projects in Saudi Arabia, which might include such projects as water supply and electric power for Riyadh and Jidda, hospitals at Jidda and Taif, irrigation and transportation. Final decision as to projects depends upon presentation of detailed proposals such as might be developed for Saudi Govt by US firms.

In response to urgent plea by Suleiman and special message from Ibn Saud to Pres Truman seeking immediate commitment for construction of railroad from Persian Gulf to Riyadh, Bank proposed to amend terms of existing \$10 million credit agreement to permit financing of study by American engineering firm of relative merits of highway *vs* railroad transportation in Arabia. Key paragraph of letter reads

"If, after examination of the studies herein proposed, it becomes clear that a railroad is equal or superior to a highway in point of relative economic advantage and feasibility, I am sure that we could readily come to an agreement. If, on the other hand, we should come to the conclusion that there is a decided advantage in favor of a highway, I am confident that His Majesty would wish to give serious consideration to such a conclusion. We may, however, envisage the possibility that the construction of a railroad would be found to be feasible and economically sound, although perhaps less so than a highway, in which event we would, of course, be prepared to give consideration to such other factors as His Majesty deems important in reaching a final conclusion."

In any event, extent of Eximbank financing for railroad would have to fall within limit of \$15 million total for all development projects. Text of letter being forwarded by air.

Suleiman accepted proposal for further study of highway railroad question. Expected that combination of firms including Bechtel-McCone, Morrisson Knudson and Sverdrup and Parcell will make study at cost of not to exceed \$150,000. Study group tentatively scheduled to leave San Francisco by air on Nov. 6.³²

Sent Jidda, repeated Dhahran via Bahrein.

BYRNES

³¹ Dated October 4, 1946, not printed; the letter was signed by William McC. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank.

³² In telegram 306, November 29, the Department informed Jidda that Bechtel-McCone had sent an "Engineer Mission" of seven persons to Saudi Arabia to study the matter further. The Department noted: "Political and military considerations may be involved in final decision, and Dept desires you keep in touch with survey party and be prepared formulate political views if needed." (890F.77/11-2946)

SYRIA AND LEBANON

POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE EVACUATION OF FRENCH AND BRITISH TROOPS FROM SYRIA AND LEBANON¹

S90D.01/1-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, January 2, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received 11:08 p. m.]

13. In reviewing Levant State troop withdrawal question with US, Baxter of FonOff said that evacuation of Syria had presented no particular problems to British and French military representatives and that discussions on this subject initiated on December 21 had been continued on December 28. Evacuation from Lebanon on other hand had given rise to series of difficulties, some of which had been so important as to necessitate reference to Paris and London for reconsideration.

One of these problems concerned composition of force to remain in Lebanon until UNO able to take over.² British military representatives, acting under their instructions, had taken position that force would be Anglo-French. French interpreted agreement to mean that there would be a period before assumption of responsibility by UNO when French would be in sole occupation. Owing to loose wording of agreement it was obvious that there had been a real misunderstanding on both sides on this point but actually much more than a question of interpretation was involved because British felt that as a practical matter the leaving of a comparatively small French force alone in Lebanon would be risky business from security viewpoint since trouble might very possibly recur which French could not handle without reinforcements. Such a situation would present

¹ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1160-1188, *passim*.

² The Anglo-French agreement regarding the withdrawal of British and French troops from the Levant, signed at London on December 13, 1945, stated in part: "The programme of evacuation will be drawn up in such a way that it will ensure the maintenance in the Levant of sufficient forces to guarantee security until such time as the United Nations Organisation has decided on the organisation of collective security in this zone." For draft text of agreement, see *ibid.*, p. 1176.

explosive possibilities not only in Lebanon but in Near East generally. However, solution of this problem should not necessarily hold up preceding evacuation steps in Syria and it might be cleared up automatically if UNO action could be speeded. Presumably Levant State governments would not lose opportunity to seek to apply such accelerating pressure.

A second and more immediate problem was manner in which proportional withdrawal of French and British troops would be calculated. British had taken position that withdrawal would be on global basis of total French and British troop strength in both Syria and Lebanon. (Baxter estimated these at about 21,000 British and 8,000 French.) In discussing withdrawal from Syria, where French estimated to have 1,000 or so troops as compared about 10,000 British, French had suggested withdrawing their contingent into Lebanon and complete withdrawal of British elsewhere. Although not sharing French view, British now inclined to feel that their own original instructions may have been somewhat too rigid and they have just suggested to French that all French and British forces in Syria be withdrawn entirely from Levant States as soon as possible, possibly within about 3 months, and that status of troops in Lebanon be left as it is for the moment, while pressing for early action by UNO. If UNO action delayed, further consideration would then have to be given to troop reduction in Lebanon. Baxter saw key to this problem in speed with which UNO prepared to act.

Baxter emphasized all this now very much in talking stage between FonOff and French Embassy here and that insufficient time yet to ascertain French reaction.

Regarding discussion of these matters with Syrians and Lebanese, Baxter observed that such action was of course envisaged by Anglo-French agreement of December 13 and he assumed such talks might begin following initiation of Franco-British military negotiations. He said he saw no reason why such four-party discussion should interfere with long-term question of assumption of security responsibility by UNO.³

Sent to Department as 13; repeated to Beirut as 1; repeated to Paris as 2.

WINANT

³ In telegram 5, January 2, 1946, 3 p. m., the Chargé in Beirut reported that the Anglo-French military conversations had practically broken down, the British especially being pessimistic unless London and Paris clarified the terms of the Anglo-French agreement (890D.01/1-246). At a further meeting, lasting about 2 hours on January 4, the British and French reached agreement on troop withdrawal from Syria (except for the question of withdrawal from the Mezzé airport). In telegram 9, January 4, 3 p. m., the Chargé noted that the agreement "represented merely paper work as no decision was made as to what place troops would be withdrawn to." (890D.01/1-446)

890D.01/12-1845 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1946—6 p. m.

60. If favorable opportunity presents itself you may wish to inform M. Bidault⁴ or some other appropriate Foreign Ministry official that Dept's views re Anglo-French Levant agreement are those contained in first three paragraphs of Dept's 5975, Dec. 20, 9 p. m.⁵ As stated in Dept's 6069, Dec. 28, 7 p. m.,⁶ these views were made clear, at Mr. Bevin's⁷ request, to Brit Govt which has indicated that substance thereof was communicated to French.

Oral communication received from Brit Emb here quotes Mr. Bevin as stating in fact that our views enabled Brit "to represent very forcibly to French Govt objections which would be felt in America to the phrase 'the leading role' (contained in first draft agreement shown Dept) and as a result we were able eventually to induce French Govt to agree to revised wording which is not open to similar objection".

Sent Paris. Repeated London and Beirut for Damascus.

BYRNES

890D.01/1-746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, January 7, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received January 8—1 : 16 a. m.]

175. Reference Embtel No. 13 dated Jan. 2. Questioned today regarding status of Levant State troop withdrawal negotiations between British and French, Henderson of Eastern Dept said that both parties were still maintaining their positions and that further complicating factor had arisen in form of disagreement regarding consideration to be given security situation following troop withdrawal. British took position that security consideration should be considered first and plans then made accordingly for withdrawal, whereas France took view that security discussions should follow those on withdrawal. British thought this was "putting the cart before the horse" and suspected that what French had in mind was to complicate negotiations in order to delay withdrawal until UNO takes over in anticipation that UNO will be favorably disposed to offering French maintenance

⁴ Georges Bidault, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ This was a repeat of telegram 413 to Beirut, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1184.

⁶ This was a repeat of telegram 420 to Beirut, *ibid.*, p. 1187.

⁷ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

of bases in Lebanon and that such a solution would be welcome to Lebanese. Henderson said he thought French were deluding themselves on both grounds but that they seemed to persist in that attitude. He added that present situation is that British proposals are still before French and next move is up to Paris.⁸

Sent Dept 175; repeated Beirut as 3; Paris as 16.

WINANT

501.BB/1-1146: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*⁹

SECRET

LONDON, January 11, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received 5:31 p. m.]

348. DelUN 44. In conversations with chairman and members of Syrian and Lebanese delegations Wadsworth¹⁰ is informed that their govts are seriously considering proposing to General Assembly that it give urgent consideration to question of withdrawal of French (and British) troops from Levant territory, especially in light of situation created by Anglo-French agreements of Dec 13.

Highlights of Syro-Lebanese argument were: Anglo-French accord although of highest interest to Levant States was concluded without their being given any prior notification.¹¹

In general, the accord recalls its precursors of 1904 and World War I period by seemingly dividing Near East into British and French zones of influence, a policy clearly contrary to principles of United Nations Charter.

In particular Britain and France by seemingly charging themselves with responsibility for Near Eastern security infringe on sovereignty of Levant States and on recognized functions of UNO.

Not only is no clear provision made for withdrawal of foreign troops but accord seems clearly intended to provide procedure for exactly the contrary, i.e. for maintaining French troops in Lebanon indefinitely.

⁸ In telegram 14, January 8, 9 a. m., the Chargé in Beirut advised that the Anglo-French military conversations had broken down (890E.01/1-846). The deadlock, according to the British Foreign Office, was apparently caused by the French contention that only the British were required to withdraw from Lebanon. (Telegram 491, January 15, 6 a. m., from London, 890D.01/1-1546)

⁹ Secretary Byrnes was in London as Chairman of the United States delegation at the First Session of the First Meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which took place in London January 10-February 14, 1946.

¹⁰ George Wadsworth, Minister to Syria and Lebanon; at this time detailed as a political adviser to the United States delegation at the United Nations meeting in London.

¹¹ The Lebanese and Syrian Governments set forth their formal views on the Anglo-French agreement in notes presented to the British Legations at Beirut and at Damascus on January 9. The notes, while welcoming the principle of troop evacuation, raised objections to other aspects of the agreement. (Telegram 25, January 10, from Beirut, and telegram 8, January 11, from Damascus, filed under 890E.01/1-1046 and 890D.01/1-1146, respectively.)

Already situation in Levant shows disturbing signs of building up to crisis similar to that of last May, with French provocations and intrigues continuing.

Wadsworth's informants added that they would welcome any comment Dept or this delegation might be willing to offer as to propriety of their proposing that General Assembly consider placing questions on current agenda for discussion and possible reference to Security Council.

Delegation would welcome Dept's comment including indication as to whether it proposes to communicate to British and French Govts formal expression of its views on Anglo-French agreements in question.

BYRNES

890D.01/1-1146: Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, January 11, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received January 12—3:46 p. m.]

27. Today I called on Acting ForMin (PriMin)¹² at his request.

Chief subject of discussion was AP report, dated January 9, from New York which in substance stated that spokesman of Department had characterized as "inexact" information received from Cairo to effect that Syrian and Lebanese delegates to UNO had received "assurances" of US dissatisfaction with Anglo-French Levant agreement.

The *New York Times'* Washington correspondent was reported as stating that Levant Governments had asked Department's views on accord, and that Department had replied that it had no comment as it was not party thereto. Spokesman was quoted as saying "US Government had given no assurances".

PriMin requested that I ascertain from Department facts of case, and desired that I make known that his Government was under criticism for not having taken more energetic steps towards securing US support in connection with Lebanese position on Anglo-French Levant agreement.

I pointed out that position of United States Government with regard to Lebanese independence was well known, and that our recognition had been unconditional.¹³ PriMin replied that he was aware of this, and was grateful, but in view of current state of public opinion reports of nature described created uneasiness, at a time when above all he wished to maintain calm (i.e. during UNO meeting). While he did

¹² Sami Solh.

¹³ For documentation on recognition of the independence of Syria and Lebanon by the United States, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 774 ff.

not specifically say that he desired a reply suitable for publication, he gave impression that such would be welcome.

I inquired whether report which I had received yesterday to effect that further French troops were en route to Lebanon was true. He replied in affirmative, adding that French had informed him that these consisted of replacements, and that for some 200 en route 400 would be withdrawn. I commented on fact that French had informed Lebanese in advance, and added that this would seem to represent concession to Lebanese point of view. He replied that this was immaterial. Government saw no need for replacements since evacuation was agreed upon, and that secondly French were replacing the "blind and sick" with trained airforce technicians.

He then inquired regarding my reaction to Lebanese note to French and British (reLegtel 25 of January 10¹⁴). I replied that I found it clear exposition of Lebanese viewpoint, and had telegraphed Washington summary thereof.

As I left, Russian Minister Solod entered, and I presume that he was being questioned on same point.

PriMin was obviously worried, and while this may be partially due to his fear of public criticism of his Government, it was quite apparent that he was concerned with current uneasiness, and was trying to secure every possible support for Lebanon's international position, thereby keeping situation in hand during UNO session.

Repeated to Paris as 12; to London (for Wadsworth) as 13. Sent to Department as 27.

MATTISON

890D.01/1-1146 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

DAMASCUS, January 16, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received January 17—10:44 a. m.]

11. Deptel 413, December 20 to Beirut.¹⁵ PriMin¹⁶ stated to me this morning that though he understood that we did not support Anglo-French agreement on Levant he felt we were being noticeably reticent in commenting on its undesirable features. His uneasiness had increased, he said, when he saw in Secretary Byrnes' speech¹⁷ a statement to effect that we must not expect that each and every prob-

¹⁴ Not printed, but see footnote 11, p. 754.

¹⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1184.

¹⁶ Saadallah Jabri.

¹⁷ Delivered on January 14, 1946, before the General Assembly of the United Nations at London; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 27, 1946, p. 87, or United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings*, p. 111.

lem can be presented to and solved by UNO. Also, the possible application to Syria of that portion of Secretary's speech dealing with arrangements for security organizations troubled him.

Did first of above statements mean Syria's problems might not be considered, he inquired. As for the second statement, he hoped British and French would not be permitted to make arrangements between themselves concerning Levant security as everyone knew what would happen then. Any assurances we might be in a position to give on these points would relieve his mind considerably.¹⁸

Sent Dept as 11; repeated London for Minister Wadsworth.

PORTER

501.BB/1-1646: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1946—8 p. m.

503. UNDel 68. Reurtel 348 Jan 11, 4 p. m., DelUN 44. In the absence of circumstances calling for an official expression of this Govt's position regarding Anglo-Levant Agreements Dept does not contemplate at least for present communicating its views to French and Brit Govts on any more formal basis than has already been done. We have authorized Legations at Beirut and Damascus to inform Lebanese and Syrian Govts that we were not parties to negotiations which led to conclusion of these agreements and that this Govt had not given its approval thereto; we have told Brit informally of our views regarding them; and we have authorized Emb at Paris to bring our views to attention of French Govt on appropriate occasion. (See Dept's 413 Dec 20 9 pm and 420 Dec 28 7 pm to Beirut,¹⁹ and 60 Jan 5, 6 pm. to Paris, all repeated to London.)

Benard, First Sec French Emb, called Jan 9 to inquire re press report from Cairo that US would support Syria and Lebanon if they presented their case to UNO. He was told that Dept had not been asked for such assurances and would not give them if requested; that we recently told Iran, in reply to similar request for advance assurance of support before UNO, that we did not consider it in keeping with spirit of UNO to give such assurances in advance in any case to be brought before that body.²⁰ We added that for same reason we frankly objected to provision of Franco-Brit Agreement in which Britain and France gave each other guarantees in advance regarding

¹⁸ In telegram 7, January 25, 1946, the Department instructed the Chargé to reassure the Syrian Prime Minister regarding U.S. policy along the lines outlined in Department's telegram 18, January 18, 1946, 8 p. m., to Beirut, printed on p. 758.

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1184 and 1187.

²⁰ See telegram 4, January 2, to Tehran, p. 292.

sympathetic attitude which each would take vis-à-vis other in case which might be brought before UNO concerning Middle East. Benard was also informed that we did not like provision of Agreement which contains assurances of their "intention of doing nothing to supplant the interests or responsibilities of the other in the Middle East". In reply to these observations Benard remarked that he knew that our policy had been clear in this respect since our 1924 Treaty with France.

Dept has taken the position that each member of UNO should be free to decide for itself whether it should present any complaint which it may have to UNO now or later, although Dept naturally hopes that UNO would not be compelled at this organizational juncture to face a problem of this kind.

Sent to UNdel London. Repeated Paris, and Beirut for Damascus.

ACHESON

890D.01/1-1146 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1946—8 p. m.

18. You may inform PriMin that as indicated in last paragraph Dept's 503 Jan 16 to London (repeated Beirut as Dept's 95 [15] our position is that each member of UNO should be free to decide for itself whether it should present to UNO now or later any complaint which it may have. Naturally we hope that UNO will not be compelled at this organizational juncture to face a problem of this kind. We have adhered to position that we should not endeavor directly or indirectly to influence Lebanon's decision, and we have consequently abstained from "assurances" quoted in press reports, referred to in Legtel 27 Jan 11.

You may reiterate to PriMin Dept's assurances of this Govt's firmly continued adherence to its policy regarding the full and unconditional independence of Lebanon.

Sent Beirut. Repeated to Paris and London (for Wadsworth).

ACHESON

890E.01/1-2246 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, January 22, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received January 22—5:20 p. m.]

42. I today saw Acting ForMin (PriMin) and verbally informed him of substance of Deptel 18 of Jan 18. He seemed to be grateful

therefor, but it was evident that he had hoped for more formal "assurance". I was careful to point out reasons given by Dept as to why US Govt refrained from such assurances.

He then expressed hope that Lebanese would have support of US should question come to decisive state before UNO. I repeated that assurances in this respect could not be given in advance.

He appeared to understand our reasoning, and was obviously gratified when informed that I had been authorized to reiterate US Govt's policy of full and unconditional recognition of Lebanese independence.

ReLegtel 15 of Jan. 8.²² I took occasion to inquire whether PriMin cared to comment on the alleged Russian assurances regarding Lebanese independence and Anglo-French agreement. He said, frankly enough, that no formal assurance had been given, but that he had seen no reason for denying something that was to Lebanon's advantage.

Actually Russian Minister Solod had talked to him on an informal basis and had taken much the same line as I had in my talk with ForMin (reDeptel 413 of December 20 and Legtel 430 of December 24). However, he continued, Russians were not adverse to employing "trial balloons" and it was possible that Lebanon might yet receive some type of formal assurance.

Sent to Dept as 42; repeated to London for Wadsworth as 15; to Paris as 13 and to Moscow as 2.

MATTISON

890D.01/2-446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, February 4, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received February 5—6:40 a. m.]

548. My 446, January 28.²³ In addition to my talks with Bidault we have also made occasion to impress on Chauvel, Ostrorog and other ranking Foreign Office officials our views on Franco-British agreement on Levant as set forth in Dept's 5975, December 20.²⁴ While I believe that French now understand our position they do not of

²² Not printed; it cited an unconfirmed report of January 5 by the Reuters correspondent at Cairo that Soviet Minister Solod had informed the Lebanese Government that the Soviet Union maintained its decision to recognize the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and that it would support the Lebanese Government should that Government oppose the Anglo-French agreement (890E.01/1-846).

²³ Not printed; it reported a statement by the French Foreign Minister that he was now free to take a less rigid position regarding the Levant since the resignation of the de Gaulle government but that he was unwilling to acquire the reputation of having presided at the funeral of France in that area (751.00/1-2846). The deGaulle government resigned on January 20.

²⁴ This was a repeat of telegram 413 to Beirut, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1184.

course agree entirely with all our views on this subject. Therefore following summary of French position as expressed by officials mentioned above may be useful to Dept as an indication of French thought on this subject.

Foreign Office states that it has realized for some time that France can no longer maintain a special privileged position in Levant and that arrangements for withdrawal of French forces were necessary before a satisfactory settlement of whole Levant problem could be reached. (French are frank to say that they regret very much this withdrawal.) It was for this reason that Franco-British agreement of December 13 which bound two powers to withdrawal of military forces from Levant was signed. French take view that this agreement constitutes a basic and real step forward in solution of Levant problem. French maintain that despite decision to withdraw troops French Govt is nonetheless in "a delicate position vis-à-vis French public opinion and cannot afford to give French public impression that it is gratuitously abandoning all French interests in area". Should it order immediate withdrawal of all troops from Levant particularly when British are still maintaining forces in other Arab states and have not even reached agreement in principle to withdraw them French Govt "would risk a serious reaction from French public particularly in view of traditional French suspicions of British motives in Middle East and probable interpretation of this action by French people as a voluntary abandonment of all French interests in Middle East." (In connection with foregoing French officials are perhaps even more suspicious of British motives and of desire of British Colonial Office to replace France in Levant and Mideast).

French observe that December 13 agreement providing for withdrawal of troops from Syria into Lebanon and subsequent withdrawal from Lebanon when UNO has organized collective security in that area will be infinitely more acceptable to French people since UNO aspect raises question from national to international level and French public opinion will probably not react unfavorably.

With foregoing factors in mind French state that they do not see necessity for immediate evacuation of French and British troops from Levant until collective security has been organized in that area thru UNO. They believe that a premature withdrawal would jeopardize Christian population and they argue that since foreign troops are stationed in many countries in world they fail to see why, when French and British have agreed to withdrawal troops, Syrians and Lebanese should complicate matters by pressing for immediate withdrawal.

Foreign Office admits that France in past has made serious errors in Levant but feels that these past errors are no reason for present

French Govt to abandon legitimate French interests in area or to have France placed in a less favored position in this area than other foreign nations such as US and England. In this connection French feel very strongly about closing of French schools by Syrians²⁵ and they believe that until Syrians permit French schools to operate in Syria on same basis and under same conditions as other foreign schools there is no reason for French troops to be withdrawn. They point out that such action would be impossible to explain to French public which has long taken pride in "the predominance of French culture in the Levant". For foregoing reasons French believe that Syrians should be made to understand that while French realize they cannot maintain a special position in Levant no French Govt can permit Syria and Lebanon to place France in a position of inferiority vis-à-vis other foreign countries which have interests in area.

While it is obvious that there are some Frenchmen who would like to perpetuate France's former position of special privilege in Levant, foregoing represents a brief summary of French views as expressed by Foreign Office and it may be helpful in understanding present French approach to this problem.

Sent Department 548, repeated Beirut 2, London 109.

CAFFERY

501.BC/2-746 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, February 7, 1946—10 a. m.

US URGENT

[Received February 7—8 : 59 a. m.]

1492. DelUN 248. Supplementing DelUN 233, February 5.²⁶ Following is summary of conversation between Hamid Bey Frangié,

²⁵ In despatch 389, January 11, 1946, from Damascus, the Chargé, in reporting that the French schools in Syria had not reopened at the beginning of the new school year, stated: "The position taken by the Syrian Ministry of Education here is that during the course of the year 1944, all foreign schools were requested to supply certain statistical information to the Ministry, and all complied, with the exception of French schools. To a second request for this information sent to these schools, a curt reply came from the French Delegation at Damascus stating that the French institutions to which these inquiries had been addressed were under the protection of the Delegation to which in future all such inquiries should be sent. As a result, the Syrian authorities have adopted the point of view that these French schools were more political than educational in nature, and that since the bombardment of May last terminated the direct political relations of the Syrian and French Governments any French schools desiring to open their doors anew must comply with the regulations prescribed by the Syrian Government." (890D.42/1-1146).

²⁶ Not printed; it reported that the Chief Delegates of Syria and Lebanon at the United Nations (Faris el-Khouri and Hamid Frangié) had filed with the Secretary General a joint communication requesting that the Security Council adopt a decision recommending total and simultaneous evacuation of foreign troops from Syrian and Lebanese territories (501.BB/2-546). For text of the letter, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1*, p. 82.

Lebanese Foreign Minister, and Mr. George Wadsworth on February 4 regarding decision of Lebanese and Syrian delegations to submit Levant "dispute" to Security Council.

Hamid Bey recalled that early in December the two Governments had learned that Anglo-French agreement to withdraw British and French troops from Levant had been reached in principle. Agreement was signed in London on December 13 and text sent to two Levant Governments. Neither had been consulted and agreement was fundamentally unacceptable on many counts, notably as a seeming return to sphere-of-influence policy in Near East and in making final withdrawal of troops conditional upon adoption by SC (Security Council) of regional security measures.

Hamid Bey added that shortly after General Beynet²⁷ returned from Paris to Beirut about December 20 he had informed President Khouri that Anglo-French agreement envisaged more extensive discussions with Levant Governments for general settlement of outstanding questions than was indicated by narrow reading of text.

Shortly after Lebanese delegation arrived London for GA (General Assembly) informal word was received from Ostrorog, Beynet's chief assistant, suggesting desirability of establishing direct contact with French GA delegation. Such contact not then made. It was gathered in conversations with FO officials, especially Cadogan,²⁸ and cables from Beirut that British-French military conversations in Beirut in December were without result. Syrian and Lebanese delegations concluded French only playing for time. Therefore, heads of the two delegations had stated their case in GA debate on PreCo, (Preparatory Commission) report on January 19.²⁹

It was suggested about January 30 to Lebanese Delegate Joseph Salem by French Deputy Gorse who came especially from Paris that contact between French and Lebanese delegations would be profitable. Only result was brief corridor conversation between Hamid Bey and Bidault which was unsatisfactory to former since no indication was given that new French Government would fix even tentative date for withdrawal of troops.

Hamid Bey, therefore, suggested through Gorse that Ostrorog (then in Paris) come to London which he did on February 2. Their conversations that evening were unsatisfactory. Ostrorog urged delay in presenting Syrian-Lebanese petition to SC on ground confidence could be placed in new French Government's intention but was unable to offer assurances on early action and only suggested

²⁷ Paul-Etienne Beynet, French Delegate General in Syria and Lebanon.

²⁸ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and British Representative at the United Nations.

²⁹ For texts, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 247, 253.

that specific date for departure of French troops should be subject of Anglo-French-Syrian-Lebanese conversations taking place after GA meeting either in London or Paris or, if neutral ground desired, in Switzerland. At second meeting, February 2, same ground covered. Hamid Bey was firm no agreement to enter formal negotiations possible unless French prepared first to give written unconditional assurances that French troops would be actually withdrawn by specified early date. Ostrorog replied such date must be contingent upon such time as UNO had decided upon organization of collective security in this zone. This the language of December 13 Anglo-French agreement.

Between above two conversations Hamid Bey saw Cadogan but unable obtain assurances that FO prepared to press French to meet Levant views. Cadogan commented that Levant States were being "disobliging" in basing their complaint in part on December 13 Anglo-French accord.

At conferences night of February 3 and morning February 4 between members of Syrian and Lebanese delegations it was decided to present case by joint communication to SC. Such action appeared to them to be their only hope and was in accordance with their Governments' instructions. Hamid Bey stated that not to do so would have left their Governments in extremely awkward position vis-à-vis their parliaments and peoples.³⁰

Hamid Bey said that he realized he could not expect advance assurances that US would support Syrian-Lebanese case but felt he was not unjustified in believing that in fact such would be the case in view of consistent sympathetic support given Levant States in their efforts to obtain and consolidate full independence.

Wadsworth lunched February 4 with Syrian Minister. Bevin was guest of honor. To mention that Levant States had apparently decided to submit their case to SC, Bevin commented along following lines: He seemed to feel mistake was being made and if he were given 2 or 3 days could in view of change of French Government, find satisfactory basis for quadrilateral negotiations. He said he would be glad to send telegram "today" ordering British troops out of Levant. Generally indicated that he thought French were being treated pretty badly all around in matter. He mentioned France's historic position dating back to the Crusades. Wadsworth ventured to reply that in view of many historians this was a distorted claim, notably because both strictly French Crusades had been signally defeated by Moslems and because Vatican-recognized right of France

³⁰ The French view of these developments was brought to the attention of Charles E. Bohlen, Adviser to the United States delegation at the London session of the United Nations, on February 6 by Count Ostrorog (IO files, USSC 46/13 Conv 7).

to protect Christians in East never recognized by Ottomans and never exercised except with respect to foreign pilgrims who had no Consul of their own nationality. Bevin's reply was non-committal with implication that American position would be more realistic were United States prepared to share practical responsibilities in area.

STETTINIUS

501.BB/2-846 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET
URGENT

LONDON, February 8, 1946—8 a. m.

[Received 11:37 a. m.]

1553. This is DelUN 245. DelUN 233, February 5,³¹ and 248, February 6.³² Following is submitted regarding the dispute brought by Syria and Lebanon which may come before Security Council meeting February 9 or 11.

In conversation with me Bidault and Massigli³³ yesterday evening (DelUN 253, February 7³⁴) indicated apparent willingness that Syrian and Lebanese presentations of the case should be heard promptly by Security Council and that the French should then and probably without making answer to such presentations express willingness to engage in quadrilateral negotiations, case to remain on agenda with parties undertaking to keep Security Council informed of progress of negotiations.

In another conversation at same hour, Faris [el-]Khouri gave Wadsworth informally to understand that Syrians and Lebanese would probably be prepared to state their case very simply, without recriminations based on past incidents, and would not oppose direct negotiations with British and French on condition that, as regards withdrawal of troops, negotiations proceed on principle of *pari passu* withdrawal from Lebanon and Syria in such way as to be completed simultaneously by British and French troops and at earliest date consistent with technical considerations.

Khouri indicated that by phrase "to state case very simply" he had in mind setting forth that troops were those of Allied powers whose arrival in 1941 and presence during war years had been welcomed and facilitated by Syrians and Lebanese in prosecution of common cause against Axis; that, with victory of Allied armies, continuing presence of any of such troops was no longer necessary and in

³¹ Not printed, but see footnote 26, p. 761.

³² *Supra*.

³³ René Massigli, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom and member of the French delegation at the United Nations.

³⁴ Not printed.

fact constituted infringement on sovereignty of fully independent Levant States; and consequently that Syria and Lebanon, fully cognizant of their responsibilities for maintenance of security within their territories and fully competent to meet such responsibilities, had formally requested "total and simultaneous withdrawal".

Khouri indicated in conclusion that by phrase "earliest date consistent with technical considerations" he had in mind (but would not necessarily elaborate the point publicly unless constrained thereto by French rebuttal) that removal should not be conditioned on political expediency or possible future UN consideration of collective regional security but on the contrary would be begun immediately and completed with all reasonable technical expedition (e.g. within a maximum of next 6 months) by both powers.

I consider it preferable to avoid a full-dress debate of this dispute during the current London sittings of SC. I have in mind, unless Department is of different view, informally working to that end along the lines of the outcome in the Iranian case.³⁵ It seems possible that we might be successful in obtaining advance agreement among delegations principally concerned that Syria and Lebanon's case be heard, that France and the UK indicate readiness to negotiate, that Syria and Lebanon do the same; and that SC then adopt a resolution taking cognizance of the statements, noting readiness of parties to negotiate without delay, and requesting the parties to keep SC informed on progress of negotiations and results achieved, the matter meantime to remain on the agenda.

The Secretary General's suggestion this morning that SC's remaining sittings here be today, possibly Saturday, February 9 then daily as required beginning Monday, February 11 through Friday, February 15 makes likely the raising of this question February 11 or possibly 9, if the Indonesian discussion is not extended.

STETTINIUS

501.BB/2-846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT

1385. UNdel 191. Reurtel 1553, Feb 8, DelUN 245. The general policy of this Govt is to support the rapid withdrawal of foreign

³⁵ In that case the Security Council reached unanimous agreement on a resolution which took cognizance of the readiness of the Soviet Union and Iran to seek a solution of their dispute by bilateral negotiation, requested the parties to report the results, and retained the right of the Council to request information at any time as to the progress of the negotiations; see telegram 1166, January 30, from London, p. 325.

troops from the territory of any member of the United Nations occupied during the war if the local govt presses for their departure. It was in accordance with this policy that we addressed a note to the Soviet and British Govts in Nov 1945³⁶ suggesting the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran, in view of the expressed desires of the Iranian Govt. Syria and Lebanon merit no less support than Iran in this respect. Moreover we would not wish to take a strong stand where Soviet forces are primarily involved and to remain silent in a case where Soviet forces are not concerned. You should therefore make clear at an appropriate occasion during the public discussion the sympathy of the American Govt for the Syrian and Lebanese request.

With regard to your suggestion that it would be desirable to avoid a full-dress debate of this dispute during the current session of SC, we do not wish to take any action which would deprive Syrian and Lebanese Govts of a full opportunity to present their case or would prevent any other govt from expressing its views with regard to the matter. We perceive no objection to an arrangement along the lines suggested in the penultimate paragraph of your telegram under reference provided it can be effected without pressure being brought on any of the interested parties.

BYRNES

501.BB/2-1446 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, February 14, 1946—1 a. m.

US URGENT

[Received 12:24 p. m.]

1839. This is DelUN 324. I appreciate helpful directions regarding Levant "dispute" sent me in UNdel 191.³⁷

Informal conversations are continuing between French, British, Syrian and Lebanese representatives here in hope that mutually agreeable formula for "negotiations" may be found prior to presentation of case to SC. Our general impression is:

That French, who particularly wish negotiations to take place in Paris, are making every effort to reach common accord short of agreeing that negotiations have as major objective the fixing of a time limit for withdrawal of their troops;

³⁶ See Department's telegrams 2386 to Moscow and 10209 to London, both dated November 23, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 448 and 450, respectively.

³⁷ *Supra*.

That if this latter is clearly recognized Syrians may agree to some formula for negotiations providing that matter remain of continuing concern to SC;

That Lebanese have come to view negotiations under aegis of SC as such important forward step that they would accept less precise formula to assure them; and

That British, now showing growing concern lest Russians make further propaganda capital out of SC public discussion of dispute, are anxious that Syrians and Lebanese agree to French formula that negotiations may be undertaken on understanding suggested by French that neither French nor British Government interprets their December 13 accord as implying an intention to maintain troops in Levant in event that SC not take decisions regarding collective security in that zone.

Indication of this British apprehension is following remark said by Faris el-Khoury to have been made to him by Bevin last evening: "I am not at all pleased with the way your conversations are going. I want the matter settled. You should agree with the French peacefully. I don't want the Soviets to make it a new means for attacking us. I am tired of that sort of thing. My Ministers met for 3 hours today; they are insisting that I withdraw our troops."

Today, according to the French, there was a further and disquieting development. The French tell us that the day before yesterday night they had agreed with the Lebanese on a statement to be made by Bidault which would be acceptable as a basis for negotiation and thus permit the Council to dispose of the case. The French statement contained the interpretation of the December 13th accord set forth above, and indicated that "the problem is conditioned by certain difficulties of a technical nature". The Lebanese delegation found this acceptable but said they would have to clear it with the Syrians. This morning the Lebanese informed the French that to their great regret the Syrians could not accept this and consequently felt themselves impelled to make a vigorous presentation of their complaints against French action in Syria and would contend that the Council should take jurisdiction of the matter. The French told the Lebanese to inform the Syrians that obviously in that case Bidault would have to make a defense in case. The situation is therefore that while the Lebanese and the French and British had agreed on a basis of negotiation which would be acceptable the Syrians will not accept it, and in the circumstances, while regretting this decision, the Lebanese feel they must stand by the Syrians.

We understand that Bevin is seeing chief Syrian delegate Khoury today.

501.BB/2-1446 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

1568. UNdel 216. For Stettinius from the Secretary. Urtel 1839, February 14, DelUN 324. We have noted that French are making every effort to reach common accord short of agreeing that negotiations have as major objective the fixing of a time limit for withdrawal of their troops. Dept feels that if there seems to be impasse in efforts to obtain consent of all parties to negotiation and if the Syrians and Lebanese continue to insist that such an objective be agreed upon as a prerequisite to the commencement of negotiations, you should support them. Likewise Syrians desire that matter remain of continuing concern to Security Council even though negotiations are agreed upon should also be supported. (Urtel 1553, February 8, DelUN 245.)

Should it be impossible to obtain a satisfactory basis upon which negotiations may be carried out between the parties, Dept feels that matter should be classified as "dispute" as distinguished from a "situation" on basis of information thus far received.

Also, in the event that it is impossible to obtain a satisfactory basis for negotiations and the SC must make recommendations, it is suggested that you support the setting of a reasonable time limit for the evacuation of the foreign troops in Syrian and Lebanese territories.

BYRNES

890D.01/2-1846 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

DAMASCUS, February 18, 1946—noon.

[Received February 19—10:24 a. m.]

39. Prime Minister requested me to call on him this morning. He spoke bitterly and pessimistically concerning outcome of Security Council deliberations on Levant question.³⁸ He stated that it would have been better had the Americans presented no proposition, and that among great powers only Russian policy seemed clear and precise. At this point I reminded him of that part of Mr. Stettinius' statement which outlined US policy as supporting the speedy evacuation of foreign troops from United Nations territory adding that Mr. Stettinius had made specific mention of American support for Syrian and Lebanese desires in that respect. He agreed that this was precise enough but regretted that our proposal "did not enjoy

³⁸ For an account of the deliberations of the Security Council on the Syrian-Lebanese question, which took place from February 14 to 16, see telegram 962, March 1, to Paris, p. 775, and bracketed note, p. 776.

the same quality". He particularly objected to lack of time limit for evacuation and said that failure to confine character of negotiations to technical matters would be used by French in attempt to extract privileges from Syria as *quid pro quo* of evacuation. I urged him to await return of his delegation before adopting too pessimistical viewpoint.

Though there has been insufficient time to complete survey of Syrian opinion, it is becoming evident that so far as local Arabs are concerned, only power to change [*emerge*] from deliberations with increased prestige is Soviet Union.

Sent Dept as 39, repeated London for Wadsworth UNdel.

PORTER

890D.01/2-2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 23, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

2243. From Wadsworth. 1. Lebanese Foreign Minister Frangié reviewed for me yesterday his discussions with French and British here following Security Council's consideration of Levant "dispute" substantially as follows:

On February 18 he received Ostrorog who reiterated Bidault's undertaking to negotiate on basis American resolution and suggested early negotiations in Paris. He replied he was wholly prepared to negotiate but that it might add to difficulty of inducing Syrians to do so were French to insist on Paris as venue. Could not negotiations be held in London, he asked, if only to expedite matters and because all parties were present?

On February 19 he and chief Syrian delegate Khouri met with Bevin who stated he wished to clear up case promptly through quadrilateral negotiation, that this was also Bidault's wish and that as for British "they would talk only regarding military questions". Bevin added that Syrians and Lebanese would do well not to object to Paris as venue. He replied substantially as to Ostrorog. Khouri, however, while recognizing that all parties were bound to negotiate, said he could not agree without further instructions from Damascus.

On February 20 in discussion with Massigli, he was told that French wished discussions to include other questions related to withdrawal of troops. He replied that, once agreement on withdrawal was concluded, he perceived no objection to discussion of other matters; were this agreed he would immediately ask Beirut to authorize his negotiating in Paris. Massigli undertook to consult Paris.

On February 21, Massigli telephoned that Paris had replied it was willing to negotiate with respect to military questions only.

Same day he received telegram from Beirut informing him of similar proposal made there by Beynet and saying that, while Syrian Government had not consented to his going to Paris to talk in name of both states, he might go himself in personal capacity. He replied that present opportunity should not be missed and recommended official acceptance of French invitation irrespective of Syrian action, British having meanwhile told him they were prepared to open military discussions with French promptly.

On February 22 he received another telegram from Beirut authorizing Paris visit to make official contact provided Syrian delegation also go. He proposed to reply that Syrian delegation has no authorization to go but that he, nevertheless, wishes to do so "to conduct negotiations regarding withdrawal of troops exclusively", adding "if and when agreement is reached on major lines, it can be accepted and signed by the four countries".⁸⁹

2. In subsequent conversation, February 22, with Khouri he confirmed to me the foregoing outline of recent developments and said he was prepared either to enter into quadrilateral negotiations here or to see Frangié carry out his plan of conducting French-Lebanese negotiations in Paris.

He stressed that at conversation of February 19 with Bevin, latter had undertaken to discuss only question of withdrawal of troops and to ascertain from French what if any other questions they wished to include. He had as yet received no such list, but was encouraged by Massigli's reply to Frangié.

On balance he preferred Frangié's plan both because it was still difficult for Syrians to negotiate with French other than through Syrian Minister in Paris and because, now that British and French had apparently agreed to withdraw completely from Syria at early date, major question remaining at issue was withdrawal from Lebanon, details of which Lebanese could best discuss alone with French.

(Note: In connection with reported Anglo-French agreement as to early complete withdrawal from Syria, Embassy is reporting con-

⁸⁹ The Chargé in Lebanon, in telegram 103, February 23, transmitted to the Department the text of a communiqué issued by the Lebanese Government on February 23, which stated:

"Following the declarations made by the British Foreign Secretary Mr. Ernest Bevin and the French Foreign Minister Mr. Georges Bidault to the effect that they considered their countries bound by Mr. Stettinius' proposal before the Security Council to open negotiations for the withdrawal of foreign troops regrouped in Lebanon, the French Government has suggested to the Lebanese and Syrian Governments that the negotiations be held in Paris without delay.

"The Lebanese Government in agreement with the Syrian Government has decided to accept the invitation.

"Accordingly the Lebanese Government has instructed its delegation in London to proceed to Paris and to open negotiations for a speedy withdrawal of foreign troops in accordance with the declaration referred to above." (890E.01/2-2446)

firmatory statement made February 22 by head of British Foreign Office, Eastern Department.)

Khouri concluded substantially as follows: "The Lebanese plan is a good one. It should please our Government which does not want to negotiate about our country. Bevin has said our country must be evacuated entirely as a first step in withdrawal from the two countries. I prefer to postpone our participation in negotiation until that is done."

He too had received telegram that morning from his Government; he would give me its four principal points and his reply to each:

First, it asked his view as to whether negotiations should be undertaken. In reply he reiterated his opinion that Syria was bound to do so by article 33 of the United Nations Charter.

Second, it asked his view as to Paris as venue. He replied that French are most insistent thereon and Bevin advises it but that he had put off answering pending receipt of promised note from Bevin regarding subjects of negotiations.

Third, it insisted that there be no negotiations anywhere with any French who had been responsible for use of force against Syria last May. He replied that this could be avoided by negotiating elsewhere than in Levant, adding that Ostrorog had assured him it was not French intention to have Beynet participate.

Lastly, it asked that should Lebanese delegation remain to negotiate in London, he also remain to participate. He reiterated that he was awaiting Bevin's reply but believed it unwise to risk losing substance, i.e. withdrawal of troops, by hesitating over details of place or form.

In conclusion, Khouri said he hoped Department might share his views, first as to advisability of Lebanese negotiating now alone with French in Paris, it being understood that Anglo-French military discussions will be begun at same time, and, second, that it would be wiser for Syrians to defer their participation in negotiations pending complete military withdrawal from Syria. If so, he suggested that Department might instruct our Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut and Damascus to indicate to Prime Ministers (both Acting Ministers of Foreign Affairs) that it believed the suggested action would be in keeping with spirit of American resolution to Security Council.⁴⁰

3. I have air passage to Cairo February 27.

Sent to Department as 2243; repeated to Beirut as 13, to Paris as 147. [Wadsworth.]

WINANT

⁴⁰ By telegram 1803, February 26, 7 p. m., to London (repeated to Damascus and Beirut), the Secretary of State informed Mr. Wadsworth: "While views expressed by Faris al-Khoury regarding negotiations with French and British as set forth in your 2243, Feb 23, from London seem sound, questions raised by him in penultimate paragraph thereof are mainly of procedural nature concerning which Dept does not feel it necessary or wise to advise Syrian and Lebanese Govts. Dept does of course hope that Syrians will be as cooperative as possible in arranging details of negotiations in order not to jeopardize their successful outcome." (890D.01/2-2346).

890D.01/2-2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 23, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 11:35 p. m.]

2245. In discussing situation re prospective four-party negotiations on troop withdrawal from Levant States Baxter, head of Eastern Dept Foreign Office, told us that question is obscure and no decision reached as yet on time or place. Re possibility of introducing other items into discussion he said there was no doubt that French were hoping to expand agenda to include such matters as schools but he indicated that this too remained up in the air.

Asked where in circumstances matter now stands, Baxter said that as far as British are concerned plan is to approach French immediately on military angle of question and to urge that evacuation of Syria be completed as soon as possible and that April 30 had been mentioned as final date. Re Lebanon British also intend urging earliest possible evacuation but French so far have indicated reluctance to consider final date for completion of withdrawal. In view of way matter was left by Security Council, however, British intend strongly to press French to fix final evacuation date for Lebanon and if they fail, to proceed with fixing a date for completion of British withdrawal. Baxter added that all this was, of course, subject to change in the course of negotiation but that it represented the way Mr. Bevin's mind is running at present, and he observed that this sequence of discussions is in accordance with the December 13 agreement which had envisaged that agreement on military level should be completed between British and French before consulting with Syrians and Lebanese.

Sent to Dept as 2245; repeated to Beirut as 14, to Paris as 148.

WINANT

890D.01/2-1846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1946—10 p. m.

1786. For Wadsworth from Henderson. I have learned from returning members of American delegation that US resolution on Syrian-Lebanese demand for withdrawal of foreign troops was actually introduced in Feb 16 meeting of Security Council at specific

request of Faris al-Khoury contained in a penciled note to you during the session, but that when Khoury spoke subsequent thereto he did not indicate any support or satisfaction with the American resolution. I understand that this was due to further instructions he received from Syrian Govt during intermission.

You, of course, are familiar with these events and in view of rather bitter criticism of our position made to Porter by Jabri (Damascus 39, Feb 18) we feel strongly that it is incumbent on Khoury to inform Jabri as soon as possible of true facts regarding US position at Security Council, of which you know all details. If Khoury is unwilling to do this himself, then we consider you upon your return to Levant should explain situation to Jabri making it clear to him that US position was in full conformity with policy which this Govt has adopted throughout in support of Syrian and Lebanese desire for withdrawal of foreign troops from their territory.

Sent to London, repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut. [Henderson]

BYRNES

[Part of the Syrian delegation at the UN meeting at London returned to Damascus on February 27. The following morning, Nazem al-Kudsi, Syrian Minister to the United States and member of the delegation, informed Mr. Porter that he had already given to the Prime Minister complete details of the American position including the fact "that American proposal was presented as result of note which Kudsi drafted and Khoury signed. Kudsi told Jabri that had Americans not made proposal, weak and unsatisfactory Dutch proposal would have been urged by Bevin." (telegram 41, February 28, from Damascus, filed under 890D.01/2-2846). On April 13, Mr. Porter reported in despatch 422: "The pessimistic and critical reaction of Premier Jabri to the American proposal, as reported earlier, resulted, he informed us in rather embarrassed fashion some days later, from the fact that Faris Bey had completely neglected to keep the Government informed on developments in London . . ." (890D.00/4-1346.)

890D.01/2-2646 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, February 26, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received February 26—5: 14 p. m.]

2324. When taking leave of Frangié and Khouri today Wadsworth was informed that Lebanese delegation consisting of Frangié, Riad Solh and Joseph Salem will proceed to Paris February 28 to open

negotiations with the French regarding withdrawal of troops from Levant.

Khourri asserted that French here have never extended invitation to Syrian delegation to visit Paris at this time. However, British having said they wish Syrian rep to participate in quadrilateral negotiations, preferably following Anglo-French military experts' discussions which are opening in Paris today, and Syrian Govt having accepted in principle, Khourri is remaining in London to await developments. Other members of Syrian delegation have left for Damascus. You are probably aware that on February 24 British Minister Shone handed *aide-mémoires* to Syrian and Lebanese Govt. Text as telegraphed Frangié makes following four points:

(1). Pursuant to British acceptance of majority view of Security Council, British Govt is sending military rep to Paris "to discuss with the French the best means of withdrawing our troops as soon as possible and fixing the date when the evacuation will be completed".

(2). "This resolution alone must determine their (i.e. British Govt's) future action".

(3). British Govt considers itself no longer bound by assurances of December 15 "that they had no intention of withdrawing British troops from either Syria or Lebanon in such way as to leave the French there alone".

(4). British Govt hope to be able to arrange with the French for a simultaneous withdrawal but if that is not possible British forces will be withdrawn in any case.

Khourri concluded by saying that he hoped American Govt, like Security Council, would keep matter of continuing interest and, if negotiations lag, reaffirm to French Govt its concern lest any undue delay in adjustment (notably in fixing outside time limit for complete withdrawal) have disturbing repercussions in Levant and other Arab countries.⁴¹

Sent Dept as 2324 repeated Paris as 156 and Beirut as 15.

GALLMAN

⁴¹ In connection with this paragraph, the Department suggested, in telegram 1918, March 1, to London (repeated to Paris and to Beirut for Damascus), that the Chargé inform Mr. Khourri "that Dept will indeed continue to interest itself in withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon and is informing American Amb in Paris of its continued concern that a satisfactory arrangement be speedily agreed to." (890D.01/2-2646)

890D.01/2-2646 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)*⁴²

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

962. In connection with Anglo-French conversations now being carried on in Paris re withdrawal of foreign troops from Levant States and proposed quadrilateral conversations on same subject Dept assumes you are informed of details of discussions on this subject in Security Council meeting in London. You will recall that subject was first raised in Feb 14 meeting entire session of which was devoted to discussion of procedural aspects of Syrian-Lebanese case, principal point in debate being whether question was a "dispute" or a "situation". While question was not decided, US was prepared to support Syrian-Lebanese contention that it was a dispute. Both sessions on Feb 15 were devoted to presentation of case by Lebanese and Syrian representatives and replies by French and British in which other members, especially Vyshinsky, participated. Stettinius made following important statement:

"In regard to the substance of the question that is before the Council I would like to make clear briefly the views of my Government.

"The general policy of the United States is to support and encourage the rapid withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of any member of the United Nations occupied during the war if the Government of that member state desires their departure.

"This general position of my Government has been made plain on a number of occasions. In conformity with this general policy I wish to express the hope of the United States Government that the desires of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that the foreign troops in their territory should depart at the earliest practicable moment shall be met by means of a mutually satisfactory agreement to that effect."

During morning session of 16th Stettinius offered following resolution:

"The Security Council takes note of the statements made by the four parties and by the other members of the Council; expresses its

⁴² In a memorandum to Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, on March 1, Benjamin V. Cohen, the Counselor of the Department, stated:

"I have signed for the Secretary the telegram to Paris regarding the Anglo-French conversations concerning Syria and Lebanon. While I have no doubt that the case presented to the Council involved a dispute, I have serious doubt whether it was established that Britain was a party to the dispute in view of the fact that the Syrians and Lebanese admitted that they did not wish British troops withdrawn before the French troops were withdrawn.

"The Syrians and Lebanese, however, refused to admit expressly when questioned by Bevin that the British were not parties to the dispute, merely indicating that the record could speak for itself. This had a profoundly disturbing effect on Bevin and I have no doubt is the reason why the British no longer feel bound to defer their withdrawal until it can be simultaneous with the French withdrawal." (890D.01/3-146)

confidence that the foreign troops in Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawn as soon as practicable and that negotiations to that end will be undertaken by the parties without delay, and requests the parties to inform the Security Council of the results of the negotiations.”⁴³

During afternoon session Mexican and Egyptian resolutions were defeated,⁴⁴ whereupon Vyshinsky proposed three amendments to US resolution, which also failed. Original US resolution then received seven votes. Failure of USSR to vote affirmatively however defeated motion. French and Brit representatives then stated that although not voting on US proposal (they had announced their intention of abstaining from voting without admitting that they were parties to a dispute) they approved it and intended to act as if it had been passed.

In light of foregoing Dept desires you to keep in close touch with French Foreign Ministry and British Embassy on current developments and to lose no opportunity to impress upon Bidault and other French officials importance which Dept attaches to early withdrawal of all foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon.

Sent Paris, repeated London and Beirut for Damascus.

BYRNES

[The Security Council discussed the complaint against the presence of French and British troops in Syria and Lebanon at five successive meetings from February 14 to 16. The record of these meetings is published in United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, No. 1*, pp. 272, 283, 296, 318, and 336. The United Nations has given its account of the deliberations in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47*, p. 341. The Soviet vote against the United States resolution represented the first instance of the exercise of the veto in the history of the Security Council. Apparently, the Council took no formal action to remove the Syrian-Lebanese question from its agenda but it engaged in no further discussion on the matter after February 16. The “Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 17 January to 15 July 1946” noted, however, that the Council was “no longer seized” of the question (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Supplement No. 1*, p. 56).]

⁴³ For full text of Mr. Stettinius' statement, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, No. 1*, p. 300.

⁴⁴ A Netherlands resolution on the matter was withdrawn.

890D.01/3-446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, March 4, 1946—6 p. m.

NIACT

[Received March 4—4:33 p. m.]

1043. Dept's 962 of March 1. British Embassy, Paris, states agreement was reached Saturday ^{44a} between British and French Military Delegation re evacuation of Syria. As indicated in their communiqué, to be issued today, evacuation of British and French troops from Syria will begin March 11 and be completed April 30. Bulk of British troops will be deployed into Iraq, Indian troops to be repatriated, a few hundred to be deployed into Lebanon. French troops remaining in Syria will retire to Lebanon.

Discussions re evacuation of Lebanon are continuing. According to British Embassy, French propose Beirut be evacuated and British troops be grouped south of Beirut and French troops, north. British delegates question practicability of this because of importance of Beirut as leave center headquarters and base for subsequent evacuations.

British state French have accepted principle of eventual complete evacuation of Lebanon but contend evacuation must be gradual and cannot be completed in less than a year because of problem involved in dismantling long-established French bases and transportation of large military stocks. This problem does not exist for British who are prepared to evacuate within short period. French are insisting that at least a token force of British troops remain until French evacuation completed. French have requested transit facilities for 1,000 troops in Suez area for men to be forwarded to Madagascar and Indo-China.

No Syrian delegates are expected to arrive in Paris. Lebanese delegates remaining here have no authority to discuss other than details of evacuation and British feel no political discussions will take place in Paris at this time.

Sent to Washington as 1043; repeated to Beirut as 5; repeated to London as 180.

CAFFERY

^{44a} March 2.

890D.01/3-546 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison)*⁴⁵

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1946—6 p. m.

81. If you are asked by authorities of Levant States re attitude this Govt in case simultaneous withdrawal Brit and French troops cannot be arranged, you may say that in our view, while complete withdrawal all Brit and French troops greatly to be preferred, we would look with favor on any withdrawal in view our basic attitude regarding continued presence of foreign troops in territory of members of United Nations. Consequently we feel that British withdrawal regardless of French action, and vice versa, would be in line with the policy which we have publicly enunciated.

Sent Beirut, repeated Damascus, Paris and London.

BYRNES

890D.01/3-946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, March 9, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

[Received 12:14 p. m.]

1134. Mytel 1043, March 4. British Embassy, Paris, reports agreement reached with French re withdrawal from Lebanon. British and French will immediately evacuate 1,000 troops each⁴⁶ and final British evacuation to be completed by June 30. French evacuation and redeployment to be in three stages: first, involving partial evacuation of Beirut, regrouping of troops in Tripoli area and discharge of certain auxiliary forces, to be completed June 30; second stage, completion of evacuation of Beirut and withdrawal of further troops from Lebanon, to be completed by end August; third stage, final evacuation of French troops from Tripoli, to be completed by April 1, 1947.

Before issuing communiqué on agreement, French and British decided Lebanese should first be informed by means of joint note. French draft of this note is now under consideration in London. British Embassy here feels FonOff may object to paragraph in proposed note explaining reasons for delay in final French evacuation

⁴⁵ In an undated, informal note to Under Secretary of State Acheson, Mr. Henderson stated: "This telegram is being sent at the urgent informal request of the British Govt which feels that its decision to withdraw troop[s] from Syria and Lebanon regardless of what the French do is being unfairly criticized by the Syrians and Lebanese."

⁴⁶ In telegram 2726, March 7, 7 p. m., the Chargé in London had reported information from the Foreign Office that the purpose of the withdrawal of the 1,000 British and French troops was to avoid increasing the number of French troops in Lebanon following their withdrawal from Syria (890D.01/3-746).

since this might be taken as indicating British approval and support of French thesis (which is that extensive French installations and military stocks cannot be evacuated in less than year).

According to British, French are extremely unhappy re whole agreement and somewhat resentful over British refusal to maintain at least token force in Lebanon until French evacuation completed.

Sent to Washington as 1134; repeated to London as 190; repeated to Beirut as 6.

CAFFERY

890E.01/3-1946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, March 19, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received March 19—4:40 p. m.]

1325. Ostrorog (who has just returned to Paris from a brief trip to the Levant where he went to explain the French position to the Lebanese) tells me that the Lebanese reply to the French note concerning the evacuation of Lebanon has not as yet been received. He said that the FonOff understands the desire of the Lebanese to have the evacuation of French troops completed at the earliest possible date but for practical reasons, including the acute shortage of shipping, it is impossible for the French to evacuate Lebanon as soon as the English do. Nonetheless, he said that Foreign Ministry hopes that arrangements can be made with the Lebanese which will permit the French to have completed their evacuation by end of next December. He added that the French still hope the British will leave a token force in Lebanon until French evacuation is completed.

When asked when the French intend to discuss with the Lebanese such questions as a consular convention, French business and educational institutions, etc., Ostrorog replied that the French naturally attached great importance to satisfactory agreements on these subjects but added that until satisfactory agreement had been reached on the evacuation of troops it would be a great error for the French to mix the two questions. "Should we bring up questions relating to such French interests in Lebanon during the military discussions on evacuation, the Lebanese would quite naturally interpret such a move as an attempt by us to blackmail them into granting wider concessions in return for the removal of French troops. This is the last thing the French wish to have happen", and added that "at this time the most important thing is to conclude a satisfactory agreement on evacuation with no strings attached to it."

Referring to possible future negotiations relating to French cultural, educational and business interests in the Levant States, Ostrorog said in confidence that the FonOff felt that before the French

discuss such questions with the Levant States it would be wise for them to have informal and unofficial exchanges of views with Great Britain and the US with a view to ascertaining the views of ourselves and the British so that the French would not find themselves pursuing an independent course. He said that in such event the French Embassies in London and Washington would probably be empowered to have such informal conversations.⁴⁷

Sent Dept 1325; repeated Beirut 8, London 211.

CAFFERY

890E.01/3-2346: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, March 23, 1946—12 a. m.

[Received 1:20 p. m.]

152. Lebanese Foreign Office yesterday gave me copy of note dated March 20 from French Govt to Lebanese Legation in Paris re date for final evacuation of French troops from Lebanon. Text will be forwarded by airmail.

This note after reviewing negotiations between French and British military experts, in which French experts set date of April 1947 for final evacuation, states that subsequent negotiations with Lebanese delegation explored ways by which Lebanese help in evacuation and advance date thereof. As a result of French Govt requests Lebanese collaboration notably as follows:

(1) That Lebanese *gendarmerie*, police and administrative organization would place workers at disposition of French commander for transportation and embarkment of material.

(2) That Lebanese army would furnish materials and special equipment, as well as guards for installations.

(3) That a joint Franco-Lebanese *état-major*⁴⁸ be established to aid French and Lebanese commanders in task of evacuation.

⁴⁷ In commenting on the last two paragraphs of this telegram, the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) informed the Division of Commercial Policy in a memorandum of March 26: ". . . the French appear to be adopting a much more conciliatory and cooperative attitude in their approach to the matter of regularizing their relations with the Levant States through the eventual negotiation of conventions relating to cultural, educational and commercial interests. From the final paragraph it would appear that we may receive at any time from the French a suggestion that we concert with them and the British in negotiations relating to cultural, educational and business matters.

We doubt very much whether we want to present a common front with the French and the British on these matters, but in view of this welcome evidence of a desire on the part of the French to cooperate with us and Great Britain, it occurs to us that we shall have to have an answer ready for the French and that it might be well for us to inform the French of the treaty which we propose to negotiate with Lebanon." (890E.01/3-1946) For information on the proposed treaty, see footnote 71, p. 790.

⁴⁸ General Staff.

Note continues that, on basis of full and efficient collaboration, and subject to Lebanese Govt's approval of plan, French combatant troops would leave Lebanon by August 31, with no more than 30 officers and 300 technicians left to assume control of transport of material. This remaining contingent to leave Lebanon by end of year.

Note concludes by stating that in response to wish of Lebanese Govt French desire to assure withdrawal of majority of combatant troops before June 30, projected Franco Lebanese *état-major* to be charged with proposing to French commander the measures to facilitate realization of such program.⁴⁹

In meantime French aircraft carrier *Dixmude* has arrived, and is scheduled to depart tomorrow with approximately 1,100 French troops.

Sent Dept as 152; repeated Paris as 24; paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

[French and British troops completed their departure from Syria on April 15. A three-day celebration at Damascus was attended by representatives of all Arab states, except Yemen, and of the Arab League. "Keynote theme in official circles has been that after five centuries of foreign domination Syria, now most truly independent of Arab states, may again contribute in full measure to realization of Arab aspirations." (890D.01/4-2446, 4-1946)

The evacuation of Lebanon was also carried out on schedule. The British Command (British Troops, North Levant) was liquidated as of June 30. The disposition of fixed installations and the settlement of claims became the responsibility of the newly-created British Liquidation Staff, North Levant, which was expected to complete its work in 3 months. French forces, numbering 7,500 in March were reduced to 2,600 as of June 30 (890E.01/7-546). The Franco-Lebanese General Staff announced, in a communiqué, that the Commanding General of French forces and the last of his military units would depart on August 30, leaving behind a liquidation staff (851.24590D/8-2846). The withdrawal of this staff was announced on December 24.

⁴⁹ The French proposals to the Lebanese Government were formalized in a letter of March 23 from Mr. Bidault to Mr. Frangié and were accepted by the latter in his reply of the same day. The French and British Representatives at the United Nations sent letters dated April 30 and May 1, respectively, to the President of the Security Council, setting forth the arrangements for the withdrawal of French and British troops from Syria and Lebanon. In a letter of May 9, Mr. Frangié informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the satisfaction of his Government with the Franco-Lebanese accord. On May 19, Premier Jabri telegraphed the President of the Security Council that foreign troops had been evacuated from Syria. The texts of the six messages are published in the "Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 17 January to 15 July 1946", pp. 107-113.

The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies met on December 30 for the first time since total withdrawal of foreign troops. In opening the session, Prime Minister Riad Solh "expressed appreciation of execution by 'interested powers' of undertakings to withdraw troops. 'I wish to make it clear,' he said, 'that those undertakings were carried out without the slightest default.'" (890E.032/12-3146)]

REQUEST BY THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FOR A UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION TO TRAIN SYRIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES⁵⁰

890D.20 Missions/5-846

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁵¹

[WASHINGTON,] May 20, 1946.

You may recall that several months ago the Syrian Government requested us to send a military training mission to Syria. At the Under Secretary's direction, we inquired as to the British and French attitudes. The British were lukewarm and thought that a military mission from a small neutral might be the answer. The French said they would regard our sending a mission to Syria as an "unfriendly act."

The matter has simmered along⁵² as we had some hope that when enabling legislation should be passed, the French attitude might have changed.

The necessary legislation has now been passed by the House and may be passed by the Senate in the near future. The British have come to us again,⁵³ this time on a different tack, and urged us to send a mission to Syria, on the ground that a strong power should undertake the job. The French, when asked whether their attitude had changed, replied that while they would not regard an American mission as an "unfriendly act," still they would "not regard it as a friendly act". In addition to citing the sensitiveness of Paris on this matter, they argued that if any of the western Great Powers should undertake such a mission, Soviet Russia would demand similar or compensatory privileges in Syria.

⁵⁰ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1199.

⁵¹ Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews).

⁵² In telegram No. 1, January 2, 1946, the Legation in Damascus had reported receipt of a note from the Syrian Foreign Office dated December 26, 1945, which suggested that, since the U.S. Government due to "legal difficulties" had not been able to comply with previous Syrian request for a military mission, the War Department in Washington be requested to supply the Syrian Legation with names of qualified officers willing to undertake such work with the Syrian Government. Such officers would be granted proper military rank in the Syrian Army and would wear Syrian uniforms. (890D.20Mission/1-246)

⁵³ In a note of May 8, not printed.

A new aspect of the question has arisen in view of the fact that Syria, having received no reply from us, has approached the Swedes for a mission; and the French have told the Swedes that France would not object to a Swedish mission.

In view of the foregoing, plus the fact that an American military mission to Syria might find itself in an embarrassing if not impossible position if the United States should, as seems quite likely, become involved in the Palestine question⁵⁴ in a manner displeasing to Syria, we propose to reply to the Syrians that there are several rather serious obstacles in the way of furnishing an American military mission; that we nevertheless strongly desire Syria to have the assistance it needs to train its new army; and that, accordingly, we will be glad to support the request Syria is understood to have made to Sweden for such assistance. We would also inform the British and the French of our reply to the Syrians.

I should be glad to know whether you concur in the proposed line of action.

A more detailed memorandum giving the background of this question is attached.⁵⁵

LOY W. HENDERSON

[In telegram 248, June 10, 1946, 7 p. m., the Department informed the Legation in Beirut that it had given careful and sympathetic consideration to the Syrian request but regretted that "due to various obstacles of legal and technical nature", it would "not be practicable for US Govt to provide desired military mission or to assist in obtaining American reserve officers for such mission". The Department stated it would "be glad to support, if Syrian Govt so desires, request which Syria is understood to have made to Sweden for such assistance". (890D.20 Mission /6-1046)

Notes embodying the substance of telegram 248 were sent to the Syrian Legation and to the French and British Embassies on June 10.]

DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES NOT TO OBJECT TO THE ABOLITION OF THE MIXED COURTS SYSTEM BY SYRIA AND LEBANON⁵⁶

890D.05/3-2546

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In communicating its views upon the subject of the Syrian Mixed Courts in an *Aide-Mémoire* dated the 10th November, 1945,⁵⁷ the

⁵⁴ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 576 ff.

⁵⁵ Memorandum of May 20 by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Satterthwaite), not printed.

⁵⁶ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1189 ff.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1197.

State Department invited the Foreign Office's further observations. It has been impracticable to furnish these observations at an earlier date, owing to the recent preoccupation of His Majesty's Government with negotiations for the withdrawal of French and British troops from the Levant States.⁵⁸ A recent British case of some importance has, however, now made it necessary to take up the matter on a limited basis with the Syrian Government.

2. The gist of the Foreign Office's instructions to His Majesty's Minister at Beirut was communicated before despatch to the United States and French Embassies in London. The French Embassy asked that Mr. Shone's instructions should be held up, until they had had time to refer to Paris. The French Embassy have now stated that the French Government do not object to the appointment of "neutral" judges to take the place of French, to work off all cases pending before the Mixed Courts without prejudice to the final settlement of the general question, in which of course France and the United States together with the United Kingdom and other nations are interested, but add that they are about to communicate to the Foreign Office a general memorandum concerning the protection of foreign interests in the Levant States, which will include consideration of how the work hitherto performed by the Mixed Courts should be carried on.

3. To refer specifically to the State Department's memorandum of the 10th November last, Mr. Bevin⁵⁹ agrees that the Mixed Courts Régime must be held to have expired with the Mandate, on the basis of articles 5 and 6 of the latter. He takes the view, however, that His Majesty's Government and other Governments which possessed capitulatory rights under the Turkish régime hold in theory a means of pressure on the Syrian Government in the fact that those rights revive in full on the termination of the Mandate; and further that it would hardly be reasonable to forego these rights, unless the Mixed Courts Régime were replaced by some system satisfactory to British interests. Mr. Bevin is therefore inclined to consider that paragraphs 4-6 of the State Department's memorandum of the 10th November represent an unduly conservative view of the degree of pressure which the Powers can justifiably exercise. He is, however, not prepared to claim a revival of capitulatory rights, but would rather propose to invoke these rights to secure reasonable legal treatment for foreigners.

4. As the State Department are aware, the draft Bill for the abolition of the Mixed Courts at present under consideration by the Syrian authorities is believed to provide for a special tribunal presided over by "a magistrate of international repute from amongst those registered

⁵⁸ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 751 ff.

⁵⁹ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

with the International Court at the Hague" to deal with Commercial Cases involving the nationals of those countries which enjoyed capitulatory rights under the Turkish régime. Mr. Bevin considers this a step in the right direction (provided the proposal is one which is likely to be accepted by the Chamber), but thinks that there are strong reasons for pressing for an extension of this arrangement to cover civil cases also.

5. In this connection the provisions of the Montreux Convention of 1937 abolishing capitulations in Egypt⁶⁰ may be recalled. The Egyptian Government undertook to maintain the Mixed Courts for a transitional period of twelve years. They were to deal with all *civil* and commercial cases between foreigners or between foreigners and natives, subject to the proviso that any of the High Contracting Parties who possessed Consular Courts in Egypt might, on so notifying the Egyptian Government when ratifying the Convention, retain such courts for the purpose of jurisdiction in matters of personal status in all cases in which the applicable law was the national law of the High Contracting Party concerned. The term foreigners was defined so as to include nationals of such non-capitulatory powers as might be specified by decree.

6. In the present case, Mr. Bevin considers that the protection of British interests requires a guarantee that, under Syrian law as applied by Syrian courts, foreigners who [are?] also non-Mohammedans shall, in matters of personal status (i.e. marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.), be dealt with on the basis of their own national law or at least on Western principles. In the Egyptian case referred to above the Mixed Courts were to deal with all matters of personal status affecting foreigners, subject to the proviso mentioned in the preceding paragraph; and by a Declaration annexed to the Montreux Convention the Egyptian Government undertook that, even when the Mixed Courts came to an end on the termination of the transitional period of twelve years (i.e. in 1949), the ordinary Egyptian Courts on taking over would continue to decide such matters in accordance with the foreigner's own national law.

7. His Majesty's Embassy will be glad to transmit to the Foreign Office any further observations which, after consideration of this memorandum, the State Department may wish to offer.⁶¹

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1946.

⁶⁰ For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. II, pp. 615 ff.

⁶¹ The Department replied in a memorandum of April 23 which took note of the views of the British Government and summarized the Department's discussions with the French Government. The memorandum concluded with the suggestion that "when the French Government has made known its views, the three Governments may wish to join in discussion for the purpose of arriving at a common approach to the Syrian Government." (890D.05/3-2546)

890D.05/2-2846 : Airgram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1946.

A-533. In note dated Mar 13⁶² French Embassy suggested that American, Brit and French Govts consult re attitude which they should assume towards Syria, Lebanon concerning special juridical rights deriving from agreements with Ottoman Empire which these Govts have in Levant following termination of mandate. Note observed that Levant Govts cannot abrogate unilaterally conventions defining status of foreigners, but that changes which they may desire to make in present system might be subject of negotiations and an agreement with Three Powers principally interested. Note asked our views and expressed hope that three Govts can reach agreement and present common attitude to Syria Lebanon.

On Mar 19 French Embassy requested our views⁶³ urgently in view of reports from Damascus that Syrian Parliament was about to modify Mixed Courts system. In reply⁶⁴ we outlined our views substantially as stated in our *aide-mémoire* to Brit Embassy of Nov 10, 1945.⁶⁵ We also informed French of Brit approach to us and that we awaited Brit reply referred to in Embassy's 2409 Feb. 28.⁶⁶ We added that we would be glad to join discussions with French and Brit. French Embassy later stated it would like to commence these tripartite conversations soon in Paris, London or Washington using our views as basis for discussion without committing selves to acceptance.

Sent London as A-533, repeated Beirut as A-30, to Paris as A-385.

ACHESON

890D.05/5-1446 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1946—5 p. m.

185. Brit Govt has informed Dept⁶⁷ it is unfavorable at present to joint Franco-British-American representations to Syrian Govt re

⁶² Not printed; in handing the note to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) on March 14, the French Minister (Lacoste) stated that a similar note had been presented to the British Government by the French Embassy in London (890D.01/3-1346).

⁶³ This was done by Mr. Lacoste in discussion with officers of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (890D.05/3-2046).

⁶⁴ By memorandum of March 19, handed to Mr. Lacoste the same day.

⁶⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1197.

⁶⁶ Not printed; the reference is to the anticipated British reply to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of November 10, 1945.

⁶⁷ In memorandum of April 29, not printed. The Department replied in a memorandum on June 19, which summarized this telegram (No. 185) as well as the reply from Beirut, *infra*.

Mixed Courts in belief such representations would likely produce an "uncooperative reaction". At same time Brit Govt states it would welcome any support which Dept might be prepared to accord proposal it has already placed before Syrian Govt for appointment of neutral judges.

It is suggested that you inform Syrian Govt and your Brit colleague that although this Govt does not feel it can properly request amendment of Syrian law to enable appointment other foreign judges to replace French judges in Syrian courts, it would nevertheless welcome independent action by Syrian Govt in that sense as a temporary measure. With regard to more permanent arrangements, Dept is inclined to adhere to position outlined in its note of November 9 [10], 1945 to Brit Embassy, and would be glad to know if you concur.

Dept would appreciate being informed of status of any pending American cases.

Please keep Dept currently informed re Syrian and Lebanese thinking or contemplated action re Mixed Courts problem.

ACHESON

890D.05/5-2946 : Telegram

*The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

BEIRUT, May 29, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received May 30—4:55 p. m.]

253. ReDeptel 185, May 14. 1. New Lebanese Prime Minister Munla, who was Minister of Justice in preceding Cabinet, told me informally May 24 that in his personal view, while Lebanese Government would wish at some later time to consider proposing to Parliament legislation designed to remodel Lebanon's judicial system in keeping with regime of full independence, he perceived no immediate need, as in the case of Syria, for action designed to dispense with Mixed Courts jurisdiction, anomalous though that jurisdiction might be in light of Lebanon's present political relationships and high calibre of Lebanese judges.

2. Some 10 days earlier, Legal Counselor Besley of British Embassy, Cairo, had discussed with me, before proceeding to Damascus for informal conversations with Syrian authorities, the continuing awkward situation in Syria where cases pending before Syrian Mixed Courts at time of French bombardment of Damascus a year ago could not, in absence of any functioning competent jurisdiction, receive any hearing whatsoever.

Besley said that, should he find Syrian authorities unwilling to proceed along lines of earlier British suggestion, now concurred in

by French, that Mixed Courts be reestablished with neutral judges replacing former French judges, he was disposed to suggest that Syrian Government consider setting up special *ad hoc* jurisdiction to try all pending mixed cases, its bench to be composed of Syrian judges who had formerly sat on Mixed Courts bench assisted by foreign judges to be appointed by Syrian Government from among candidates suggested at that Government's request by International Court of Justice; such special court to continue use of French language.

If Syrian authorities were found to be disposed to proceed along lines of this suggestion for settlement of pending cases, and if appropriate assurances (along lines similar to those suggested in Deptel 88, March 8⁶⁸) regarding hearing of personal status cases of non-Moslem British subjects could be obtained, Besley seemed to believe that British Government might properly agree that all new cases be brought before ordinary Syrian courts, appropriate legislation to be voted by Syrian Parliament. I commented that I believed Department would not be unfavorably disposed towards arrangements along such lines.

I was later informed by officer of British Legation that Besley had had friendly but inconclusive meeting with Syrian Prime Minister and had recommended that, in view of expressed American and French interest, British Foreign Office consider further consultation with Washington and Paris.

3. On May 27, I had occasion to enquire informally of Syrian Prime Minister Jabri whether he had found Besley's approach helpful. His reply was a much conditioned affirmative. He was willing that a special bench be administratively constituted to try pending mixed cases. His Minister of Justice might well arrange that Syrian judges who served on former Mixed Courts constitute such bench; many of them had studied in European law schools; all knew French. But he could not consider appointing foreign judges to sit with them. Nor could he include any provision, indicative of such administrative intention, in the bill which his Minister of Justice had prepared and which if approved by Parliament, as he had no reason to doubt, would provide that jurisdiction in all pending mixed cases should lie henceforth solely with the regular Syrian courts.

This was first indication I or British here had had that such a bill had actually been drafted. Yesterday morning Damascus newspapers carried what purported to be its text.

Although I have since learned from Prime Minister that this text was copy of earlier draft and is not to be introduced without consider-

⁶⁸ Not printed.

able modification and addition (notably to provide for jurisdiction in new cases) following summary is of interest as indicating trend of official thinking on subject:

Preamble, after referring to great power recognition of independence of Syria "member of UNO founded on principle of equality of sovereignty" and to fact that "question of Mixed Courts has not yet been settled", states that it is not proper that pending cases therein "should remain suspended". Operative clauses provide that all such cases shall be referred to equivalent Syrian courts and that cases not so referred within 3 months shall be dropped.

4. I mentioned in same conversation with Jabri our 1928 exchange of notes with Persia providing that in matters of personal status non-Moslem American citizens in Persia would be governed by their own national law which would be applied by Persian civil courts.⁶⁹ Jabri saw no objection to giving similar assurance and said matter would be studied if I would supply him with copy of American-Persian exchange of notes.

5. In conversation yesterday with President Faris [el-] Khoury of Syrian Parliament, he queried informally necessity in latter connection of making exception in Syria for non-Moslem Americans. British Consul, Damascus, however, expressed personal view that his Government would prefer to maintain such exception on ground that British Moslems would prefer in any Moslem country to have personal status cases adjudged by Sharia rather than civil courts.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 6 giving summary of three cases pending before the Syrian Mixed Courts known to involve American interests.]

WADSWORTH

S90D.05/9-1946

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁷⁰

H.M.G. and the Syrian Government are now ready to exchange notes providing for the termination of cases before the mixed courts on the basis of the existing pleading, in French, by a special panel of Syrian judges with mixed court experience. The application to British subjects in Syria of their national law in all cases of personal status would be provided for thereunder.

The United States and French Embassies in London were informed of this before final instructions were sent to H.M. Minister in Beirut

⁶⁹ For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1928, vol. III, pp. 734 ff.

⁷⁰ Handed to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Bromley) on September 19, 1946.

and the French have now asked us to defer the conclusion of an agreement pending Anglo-United States-French consultation in Washington as to the nature of the guarantees we should seek regarding the status of foreigners in Syria. They consider the guarantees secured by the British very limited and state that the U.S. Government are themselves negotiating with the Syrian and Lebanese Legations in Washington,⁷¹ and are engaged in planning "a new judicial regime" in both countries.

H.M.G. do not want to delay the conclusion of the agreement with Syria indefinitely, and before taking further action have instructed the British Embassy in Washington to enquire of the State Department

(a) Whether they see any objection to the proposed agreement.

(b) What is the scope of the arrangement they are negotiating, and in particular whether it would provide any wider guarantees for foreigners than the British agreement.⁷²

The French Embassy in London are thought to have suggested that the French Embassy in Washington might discuss the question with the State Department at the same time.

890E.05/12-546 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Kuniholm) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT, December 5, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 3 : 51 p. m.]

651. ReLegtels 404, August 7, 572, October 21 and 629, November 16 and Deptel 512, October 25.⁷³ Director General Foreign Office requests me to transmit to Department herewith a formal request for the abrogation by exchange of letters, of jurisdiction of Mixed Courts to be effective as of end of this calendar year. Fouad Ammoun states

⁷¹ The negotiations concerned a draft treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with Lebanon. A draft treaty had been informally discussed by Mr. Wadsworth with Lebanese officials in 1945. On July 25, 1946, he formally handed a revised draft treaty to the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, pursuant to Department's instruction of July 3. Protracted negotiations took place thereafter at Beirut and Washington but they did not eventuate in the signing of a treaty.

⁷² At their conversation of September 19, Mr. Bromley indicated that as the matter was of some urgency, he would appreciate an oral reply to the two inquiries. Mr. Merriam replied "with reference to (a) that we saw no objection to the proposed agreement. Regarding (b), Mr. Merriam said that there had been no change in our position . . . and that the subject had been dormant since it was last discussed with the British Embassy". (Memorandum of Conversation, September 21, 1946, by Mr. Colquitt of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, filed under 890D.05/9-2146)

⁷³ None printed.

that British Legation has already exchanged letters to this effect,⁷⁴ and French Legation has given its assent in principle.

According to Foreign Office the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies is prepared, unilaterally, to abolish jurisdiction of Mixed Courts by law to be passed next week, and has only been persuaded by Foreign Office to desist in such action pending an attempt to secure US assent to exchange of letters. In any event, says Ammoun, Parliament will not vote funds for Mixed Courts beyond end of this year.

I have taken opportunity to remind Foreign Office that we were prepared long ago to agree to abolish regime of Mixed Courts, and that if no action in the premises had been taken to date it was simply because treaty negotiations had proceeded so slowly.

KUNIHOLM

890E.05/12-546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Lebanon (Lane)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1946—6 p. m.

596. Legtels 629, Nov. 16,⁷⁵ and 651, Dec. 5. Re notes exchanged Nov. 13 between FonOff and BritLeg on abolition Mixed Courts.

Dept prepared accept extension jurisdiction Lebanese National Courts and considers views agreed upon above notes acceptable as practical solution questions treated therein. At same time Dept requests assurance from Lebanese Govt. that in matters of personal status non-Moslem American citizens in Lebanon will be governed by their own national law which would be applied by Lebanese Civil Courts. However, as stated in Deptel 512, Oct. 25,⁷⁶ Dept unwilling consider abrogation capitulatory jurisdiction separate from treaty.⁷⁷

Leg authorized advise FonOff accordingly.

BYRNES

⁷⁴ In telegram 629, November 16, 1946, 10 a. m., the Chargé in Lebanon reported information from the Lebanese Foreign Office that the exchange had taken place on November 13, subject to confirmation from London. The British agreed to the abolition of the Mixed Courts and suggested that cases pending before these courts should be heard in the Lebanese national courts, the judges to be Lebanese magistrates with experience in the Mixed Courts. The Lebanese Government accepted this suggestion. (890E.05/11-1646) The agreement was formalized in an exchange of notes at Beirut on January 22, 1947. An exchange of similar import between the British and Syrian Governments took place at Damascus on November 1 and 2, 1946. The texts of the two sets of exchanges are published as British Cmd. Nos. 7154 and 7140, respectively.

⁷⁵ Not printed; but see footnote 74, above.

⁷⁶ Not printed.

⁷⁷ See footnote 71, p. 790.

890E.05/12-2646 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Lane) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BEIRUT, December 26, 1946—11 p. m.
[Received December 26—2:05 p. m.]

680. On December 23 I told FonMin Pharaon and Director [General] Ammoun substance of Deptel 596, December 17, and left *aide-mémoire*.

Pharaon emphasized Lebanon desire to proceed properly on Mixed Courts matter not unilaterally as Syria did and his particular concern that US be completely satisfied. Ammoun said *aide-mémoire* instead of exchange of notes covered situation fully and expressed gratification this reply was received before termination Mixed Courts end December. Pharaon said Lebanon will accept for treaty any text on Mixed Courts US suggests.

Repeated London as 47.

LANE

[On December 31, 1946, Beirut reported that in addresses before the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies the previous day, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Justice stated that "abolition of Mixed Courts effective December 31 would end 'last vestige of special privileges reserved to foreign powers in this country'. Russia had renounced privileges enjoyed since Ottoman Empire. 'France, Britain and United States have welcomed the abolition in a spirit of friendship and with confidence in our ideals of justice.'" (Airgram A-299, filed under 890E.032/12-3146)]

**INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN ENTERING INTO AGREEMENTS
WITH LEBANON AND SYRIA REGARDING SURPLUS PROPERTY**

[Under the terms of an agreement signed at Beirut on February 1, 1946, the United States made available to Lebanon a credit of \$5,000,000 to purchase American surplus property. Lebanon was to make payment in United States dollars in ten equal, semi-annual installments beginning March 1, 1947. The interest rate was fixed at 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ %. The United States, however, might require payment of all or any portion of the unpaid balance in Syrian pounds, to be used by the United States Government for ordinary operating and other expenses, including the financing of studies, research, instruction, library operation, and other educational activities (890E.51/1-3146).

These arrangements were modified at the suggestion of the United States in a supplemental agreement, signed at Beirut on August 7. This agreement authorized payments in local currency, beginning

November 1, 1946, for purchases of property by the American Legation and improvements and rehabilitation of its real property (despatch 1311, August 23, 1946, from Beirut, filed under 890E.24/8-2346).

Toward the close of January 1946, the United States offered an agreement to Syria similar to that of February 1 with Lebanon. The Syrian Government did not accept the agreement since the basic law of Syria prohibited the incurring of debt. The United States and Syria, however, entered into various contracts under which the latter purchased American surplus property for United States dollars (telegram 825, May 13, 1946, 3 p. m., from Cairo, filed under 883.24/5-1346).]

**CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND LEBANON**

[For text of the agreement, signed at Beirut on August 11, 1946, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1632, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2987.]

TRANS-JORDAN

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO TRANS-JORDAN BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

8901.01/2-1346

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1946.

Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor of the British Embassy, called me by telephone this afternoon. He said that on the basis of such documents as were in the Embassy, the Embassy had come to the conclusion that the British Government had no intention of submitting to the United Nations the matter of the recognition of the independence of Trans-Jordan.¹ The British Embassy was of the opinion that the British Government had taken the position that it was free to recognize the independence of Trans-Jordan without seeking the approval of the United Nations. The status of Trans-Jordan—so far as the United Nations was concerned—might be decided when Trans-Jordan applied for membership to that body.

Mr. Wright said that the British Government in the opinion of the Embassy envisaged three steps: (1) the recognition of the independence of Trans-Jordan; (2) the conclusion of a treaty between Trans-Jordan and Great Britain and (3) the application by Trans-Jordan for membership into the United Nations. The Embassy, however, was planning to ask the British Government informally whether its conclusions in this regard were correct.

Mr. Wright continued that before submitting the inquiry to the British Government it would be helpful for him to know what in my opinion the position of the United States might be with regard to the kind of treaty which Great Britain would enter into with Trans-Jordan. He understood that the Department in general did not look with favor upon the conclusion of treaties which would grant a great power a special position in the territory of a small power. He would

¹ The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bevin, in an address before the Eleventh Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on January 17, 1946, at London, had stated: "Regarding the future of Transjordan, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to take steps in the near future for establishing this territory as a sovereign independent State and for recognizing its status as such." (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings*, p. 167)

like to know what kind of special privileges would be objectionable to the American Government. What stipulations in the agreement between Great Britain and Iraq,² for instance, would the United States dislike seeing in agreement between Great Britain and Trans-Jordan? Was he correct in understanding that we would not like to have the British diplomatic representative in Trans-Jordan given a position of precedence over other diplomatic representatives?

I told Mr. Wright that I had no instructions in this matter and therefore I was not in a position to tell him with precision what the policy of the American Government might be. I believed, however, that my Government would look with disfavor upon any agreement between Great Britain and Trans-Jordan which would give the British diplomatic representative automatically precedence over the American diplomatic representative. Furthermore, I was inclined to believe that my Government would not regard with approval clauses which would obligate the Government of Trans-Jordan to give preference to British nationals in selecting foreign advisers. In my opinion, the Government of the United States would react unfavorably to the inclusions of any provisions which would discriminate against the United States in economic, commercial and cultural matters. Mr. Wright asked whether the United States would be likely to object to an agreement under which Great Britain would be permitted to maintain troops or perhaps a base in Trans-Jordan territory. I said that he had posed a rather difficult question; one which could not be answered without considerable study since it involved a variety of factors. It was possible, however, that if Trans-Jordan, without any pressure and of its own free will, should express a desire for the stationing of British troops in its territory and should enter into an agreement with Great Britain providing for the quartering of such troops in barracks, in bases, or otherwise, the United States Government would not register objection. Our position in general was that in the absence of an understanding, freely entered into, voluntarily given, foreign troops should not remain in the territory of an independent country against the will of that country.³

Mr. Wright said that he hoped to get more information from his Government with regard to its plans with respect to Trans-Jordan within a few days and that he would pass it on to me.⁴

² The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of June 30, 1930.

³ Mr. Henderson sent a copy of this memorandum to the Secretary of State on March 4. In a marginal notation on the transmitting memorandum, Mr. Byrnes indicated his agreement with Mr. Henderson's views.

⁴ On March 15, the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Tandy) informed the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) of informal word from London that the treaty would not contain provisions giving a preferred position to the British representative to the Trans-Jordan Government or giving a preference for British advisers to that Government (890i.01/2-1346).

8901.01/2-2646

*Memorandum by Mrs. Christina P. Grant of the Division of
Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1946.

A. *General Political.* Our policy toward Trans-Jordan has been based upon two principles: (1) recognition of the responsibility of Great Britain for the administration of the Palestine mandate, of which Trans-Jordan forms a part, under the terms of the mandate from the League of Nations, to which administration the United States consented in the American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924; and (2) the specific rights guaranteed the United States in Trans-Jordan, under this same convention of December 3, 1924, and indirectly confirmed by the Anglo-Trans-Jordan Agreement of February 20, 1928.

Trans-Jordan was accorded a special position within the Palestine Mandate after April 1923, when the British Government recognized the existence of an "independent Government" (not however an independent state) in Trans-Jordan. The Government thus created was consented to by the League of Nations, and its independent status was tacitly accepted by the United States when the Convention of 1924 was signed with the British Government. The terms of this Convention applied specifically to Trans-Jordan as well as to Palestine.

Trans-Jordan is a class "A" mandate. When it was established as an "independent Government" in 1923 it was specifically exempted from the provisions of the Palestine Mandate dealing with the Holy Places and the Jewish National Home. Relations between the United Kingdom and Trans-Jordan are governed largely by an agreement signed on February 20, 1928, supplemented on June 2, 1934. This agreement delegates to the Amir of Trans-Jordan the powers of legislation and administration entrusted to Great Britain as the Mandatory Power for Palestine, reserving to British "advice", or control, certain matters such as foreign relations, financial and fiscal policy, jurisdiction over foreigners and freedom of conscience.

United States rights, as specified in the American-British Convention of December 3, 1924, include guarantees of vested American property rights in Trans-Jordan, the right of United States nationals freely to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic, and religious institutions there, and all the general rights and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals. Extradition and consular rights, guaranteed under treaties and conventions between the United States and Great Britain, are likewise extended to Trans-Jordan. Article 7 of this Convention provides that the rights of the United States and its

nationals as stated in the Convention shall not be affected by any modification of the terms of the Mandate to which the United States does not give its assent.

A new situation has been created by the declared intention of the British Government to "take steps in the near future" with a view to establishing Trans-Jordan as a fully independent and sovereign state. This decision, welcomed by most Arab States, has been attacked by the Zionists.

The strategic position of Trans-Jordan, as an interior section of the land bridge connecting the Mediterranean and the Mesopotamian-Persian Gulf area, gives the United States a definite interest in the political fate of this purely Arab Country. The fact that any future pipe-line connecting oil fields of Saudi Arabia with a Mediterranean port must pass either through or at least close to the territory of Trans-Jordan makes the security and general stability of that country of vital concern to commercial interests in the United States.⁵

In the past the Government of the United States has taken the position that it is not empowered, under the articles of the American-British Convention of December 3, 1924, to prevent the modification of the terms of any of the mandates. Under their provisions, however, this government can decline to recognize the validity of the application to American interests of any modification of the mandates unless such modification has been assented to by the Government of the United States. Moreover the question arises whether, as a signatory of the United Nations Charter, the United States should take some action with respect to the declared intention of the British Government to establish Trans-Jordan as an independent state.

In formulating the policy of this Government the following considerations have been taken into account :

1. Trans-Jordan is at present, and *de jure*, an autonomous and independent part of a class "A" mandate. It was, furthermore, specifically exempted from the provisions of the Palestine Mandate dealing with the Jewish National Home.

2. There is a basic difference in the categories of mandates under the former League of Nations; the underlying purpose of a class "A" mandate being the ultimate achievement of complete independence, which should not be delayed if it is feasible (Art. 22, sect. 4, of the Covenant of the League of Nations).

3. Syria and Lebanon, the two Levant States that jointly formed a class "A" mandate after 1920, achieved their independence without recourse to the League of Nations. They were recognized as independent by France during the war when the Council of the League of Nations was inoperative. Their independence was subsequently recognized by the United States.

⁵ For documentation on the negotiation of a pipeline agreement between the United States and the Government of Trans-Jordan, see pp. 18-30, *passim*.

4. The United States would be reluctant to take any position which might convey the impression that the United States is opposed to independence for any country or class "A" mandate when such country or mandate should be ready for independence.

5. The United States could not take any obstructive position with respect to the proposed independence of Trans-Jordan without jeopardizing its relations with the whole Arab world.

6. The United States would automatically resume the right to exercise the capitulatory privileges formerly conceded by the Ottoman Government, upon termination of the Mandate, under Article 8 thereof. The United States would be extremely reluctant to resume these capitulatory rights, however, since such a retrogressive step would be contrary to the spirit of our present policy.

In view of the above considerations, it is our present policy, subject to the approval of the Secretary, to recognize the independence of Trans-Jordan, as in the case of the Levant States, on securing a satisfactory assurance of the continuation of the rights guaranteed the United States under the American-British Convention of 1924. Formal termination of the mandate with respect to Trans-Jordan would be generally recognized upon the admission of the latter into the United Nations⁶ as a fully independent country. The United States would, however, view with concern any treaty between the British Government and an independent Trans-Jordanian Government that would accord the British Government or its nationals any special position or privileges in Trans-Jordan.

[The independence of Trans-Jordan was recognized formally by the United Kingdom in a treaty of alliance entered into at London with Amir Abdullah on March 22, 1946 (British Cmd. 6779, Trans-Jordan No. 1 (1946): *Treaty of Alliance between . . . the United Kingdom and . . . the Amir of Trans-Jordan*). On April 9, Senator Francis J. Myers, in a letter to Secretary Byrnes, cited Senate debate of the previous week on Trans-Jordan and requested "all the necessary information as to the steps which the Department has taken or contemplates in connection with Great Britain's action in Trans-Jordan which, as the consensus of opinion in the Senate debate indicated, is considered to be a violation of the Anglo-American Convention of 1924." Mr. Byrnes' reply of April 23 concluded: "After a careful study of the matter, the Department has found nothing which would justify it in taking the position that the recent steps taken by Great Britain with regard to Trans-Jordan violate any treaties existing be-

⁶ With respect to the favorable attitude of the United States toward admission of Trans-Jordan into the United Nations, see telegram 3373, July 11, to Paris, and Under Secretary of State Acheson's communication of July 15 to President Truman, volume I, documentation on Policy of the United States favoring early admission of states eligible for membership in the United Nations.

tween Great Britain and the United States, including the Convention of December 3, 1924, or deprive the United States of any rights or interests which the United States may have with respect to Trans-Jordan. The Department considers, however, that it would be premature for this government to take any decision at the present time with respect to the question of its recognition of Trans-Jordan as an independent state." (741.90i/4-946). The full text of Mr. Byrnes' reply is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 5, 1946, page 765. On May 20, the Department authorized the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to attend the ceremonies at Amman on May 25 when Abdullah was to be crowned King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan, provided that he made "it clear to all concerned that US Govt has not reached any decision as to recognition of Trans-Jordan." (890i001/5-1746)

The United States extended *de jure* recognition to the Government of Trans-Jordan on January 31, 1949.]

8901.01/6-1046

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

It may be of interest to the State Department to learn that His Majesty's Embassy recently brought to the attention of the Foreign Office certain criticism of His Majesty's Government's action in recognising the independence of Transjordan and have received from the Foreign Office the following reply.

2. In general His Majesty's Government take the view that these criticisms are answered by the fact that (a) their intention to grant independence to Transjordan was announced at an early session of the United Nations Assembly in London, where it was not challenged by any delegate, and (b) that the final assembly of the League of Nations passed a resolution approving and welcoming this action.

3. The Foreign Office have read with interest Mr. Byrnes' letter to Senator Myers of the 23rd April on this subject, which has anticipated the various points they proposed to raise in reply and which, in their opinion, needs no amplification as a comprehensive and objective review of the matter at issue.

4. The Foreign Office consider, however, that it may be useful to recall the full text of the resolution concerning mandates passed by the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva in April, which reads as follows:

"The Assembly . . . recalls the role of the League in assisting Iraq to progress from its status as a Mandate to a condition of complete independence, and welcomes the termination of the mandated status

of Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan, which have, since the last session of the Assembly, become independent members of the world community."

5. In the light of the above and of the welcome given by the United Nations Assembly in January to the announcement of His Majesty's Government's intention to recognise Transjordan as an independent State, (the U.S. Delegate at the United Nations Assembly voting in favour of this resolution), His Majesty's Government feel that, in so far as general international approval is required for setting up Transjordan as an independent State, such approval has in fact been manifestly given.

6. There remains the question of Zionist interests. Upon this point, His Majesty's Government feel bound to reiterate that the clauses of the Palestine Mandate relating to the establishment of a Jewish national home were, with the approval of the League of Nations, never applied in Transjordan. His Majesty's Government have therefore never considered themselves under any obligation to apply them there, nor indeed as having any power to do so unilaterally.

7. The Foreign Office further point out that the Jewish Agency⁷ have no internationally recognised status in relation to Transjordan and that His Majesty's Government were under no obligation to consult the Agency nor to secure its consent to the grant of Transjordan independence. Under the new dispensation, there is nothing to prevent Zionist interests from negotiating freely with the independent Transjordan Government to achieve their aims in Transjordan. The only innovation introduced by the treaty in this particular is the removal of the theoretical possibility that Jews might have been settled in Transjordan without the consent of the Transjordan Government and against the wishes of the inhabitants of the territory.

WASHINGTON, 10 June, 1946.

⁷ For Palestine.

TURKEY

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD DEMANDS OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE REVISION OF THE TURKISH STRAITS REGIME AND OTHER MATTERS AFFECTING TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS¹

501.BC/12-1945

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*²

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1945.

USGA/Gen/26

25. THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

I. THE PROBLEM OF THE STRAITS

If the question of the Straits is brought before the General Assembly by the Turkish Delegation, the Delegate of the United States should take the position that while the General Assembly or Security Council of the United Nations might discuss the general principles of the problem, the technical aspects should not be considered. As in the Montreux Conference of 1936, when experts worked for six weeks to draw up a new Convention of the Straits, the technical aspects require the consideration of a special international conference of experts.

II. PROPOSED POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

The Delegate of the United States should indicate that the United States has already proposed a set of principles looking toward settlement of the problem of the Turkish Straits by means of an international conference in 1946, in accordance with the terms of the Montreux Convention. No further initiative need be taken at this time by the United States, although the problem may be raised for discussion by either Great Britain or the Soviet Union at the meeting of the Soviet, British and American Foreign Ministers in December, 1945. However, it is possible that the Turkish Delegation in the General

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1219-1293. For additional documentation on the Straits question, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. I, pp. 1010 ff. and *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 1420 ff. See also Department of State, Near Eastern Series No. 5: *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947).

² Paper prepared for the U. S. delegation at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in London. The drafting officer was Harry N. Howard of the Division of International Organization Affairs.

Assembly or the Security Council may raise the larger and broader political question of its relations with the Soviet Union by declaring that a threat to the security of Turkey exists in the Soviet demands upon Turkey. In this event, the Delegate of the United States should urge settlement through friendly negotiations within the framework of the United Nations, under Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter.

III. ESSENTIAL FACTS CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF THE STRAITS

Implications for the United Nations Organization

Nevertheless, in view of the United States principles for revision of the Montreux Convention, and of the character of the demands of the Soviet Government for revision of the regime of the Straits and for territorial adjustments in Kars and Ardahan, as well as the Soviet desire for a pro-Soviet orientation of Turkey, the United States may have to take a position in the General Assembly and Security Council to prevent the development of a threat to peace in Turkish-Soviet relations. Indeed, the set of issues involved in Turco-Soviet relations might prove to be the first real test of the United Nations Organization. If the Soviet Union persisted to the point of aggressive action against Turkey on some minor pretext, such action would be recognized as aggression, the United Nations would be entirely discredited if it took no action looking toward settlement, and chaos would result.

The Soviet Demands

The Montreux Convention (1936), which re-established Turkish control over the Straits, governs the use of these waters. On March 19, 1945 the Soviet Government denounced its treaty of neutrality and nonaggression with Turkey as out-of-date and unsuited to present-day conditions and indicated the necessity for a new political treaty.³ In response to Turkish requests, the Soviet Government indicated, in June 1945, that it was willing to negotiate a new treaty with Turkey, provided certain prerequisites were fulfilled: 1) Revision of the Soviet-Turkish frontier in the region of Kars and Ardahan; 2) Revision of the Montreux Convention in such a way as to give "real" guarantees to the Soviet Union, with occupation of bases and possible joint control of the Straits in war time. The Turkish Government stated Turkey's sovereignty and territorial integrity would be violated by any of these concessions to the U.S.S.R. and consequently the Soviet points offered no basis for discussion.⁴

³ See telegram 835, March 21, 1945, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1219.

⁴ See telegram 817, June 18, 1945, 3 p. m., from Ankara, *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. I, p. 1020.

The Interest of the United States

The United States has a basic interest in the preservation of commercial freedom in the Turkish Straits, which the Montreux Convention, to which the United States was not a party, guaranteed. Similarly there is every indication at present that the Soviet Union and other Black Sea powers desire to preserve this principle. The United States also has a general interest in seeing that any new regime of the Straits fits within the framework of the United Nations, although in this regard there are definite implications affecting the status of the Panama Canal and similar waterways of international concern. The United States has an interest in the continuance of a genuinely independent Turkey, friendly to the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States desires that any treaty arrangements between Turkey and the Soviet Union should accord with the principles, purposes and provisions of the United Nations.

*The United States Proposals November 2, 1945*⁵

In accordance with the decision at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed that the Montreux Convention should be revised. The United States presented the Turkish Government, on November 2, 1945, a note embodying its suggestions for revision, including the calling of a Conference on the Straits in 1946. The United States also stated that, if invited, it would be willing to send representatives to such a Conference. As a basis for an equitable solution of the question of the Straits the following principles were proposed:

1. The Straits to be opened to the commercial vessels of all nations at all times;
2. The Straits to be opened to the transit of the warships of the Black Sea powers at all times;
3. Except for an agreed limited tonnage in times of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers, or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations;
4. Certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the United Nations Organization for the League of Nations.

While the Turkish Government has welcomed American interest in the problem of the Straits, along with that of Great Britain, it has been inclined to scrutinize the American proposals very closely. Although willing to see the Montreux Convention revised, the Turkish

⁵ Based on telegram 1049, October 30, 1945, 3 p. m., to Ankara, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1265.

Government does not want to become a Soviet satellite, and in rejecting the other Soviet demands as contrary to Turkish independence, has turned to Great Britain and the United States for protection under the principles of the United Nations. The British Government has questioned the idea of excluding the passage of non-Black Sea warships into the Black Sea, but is otherwise favorably inclined toward the American proposals. The Soviet Government has expressed the view informally that the American proposals do not essentially change the Montreux Convention and declared that it must have something more than "paper" guarantees in the region of the Straits. It is probably more interested in closing off the last beach-head of the Western World in this region through the conclusion of a treaty with Turkey which would bring that country into line with other states in the "Soviet security zone". Once this is done it would offer a framework into which the USSR could fit control of the Straits.

740.00119 Council/12-2945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1946—8 p. m.

1. Your 1639, Dec 29.⁶ Problems connected with Turkey were not on the agenda of the Three Power Conference in Moscow⁷ and there were no talks on these problems between us and Russians. Bevin⁸ however did ask Molotov⁹ what the Russians intended to do with regard to these problems. He was not satisfied with reply and so far as can be ascertained the conversation resulted in no change in situation. You may in your discretion inform Turks that we did not discuss problems connected with Turkey at Moscow. It is believed it would [be] preferable not to refer to conversation which took place between Molotov and Bevin since British Ambassador¹⁰ will probably give Turks such information in this respect as British Govt may desire Turks to have.

An outline of the discussions which took place with regard to Iran is being forwarded to you in a subsequent telegram.¹¹ In view of delicacy of this situation it would be preferable for you to limit your comments to Turks with regard to this matter to a confidential statement to effect that you understand that we had a number of conversations with Russians on subject of Iran, that we made it clear to

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ For documentation on the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, December 16-26, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 560 ff.

⁸ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁹ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

¹⁰ Sir Maurice D. Peterson, at Ankara.

¹¹ Not printed. For additional documentation on Iran, see pp. 289 ff; see also *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 359 ff.

Russians that we regarded developments there of extreme importance not only because of the special commitments taken by the British, the Russians and ourselves with regard to Iran but also because of the basic principle involved. You may add that we were not able to reach any solution of Iranian problem but that we are continuing to work for a satisfactory solution.

Sent Ankara, repeated Tehran, London and Moscow.¹²

BYRNES

867.014/1-346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, January 3, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received January 4—11:25 a. m.]

8. Deptel 1210, Dec. 21 [29], 9 p. m.¹³ In conversation yesterday with Secretary General, Foreign Office,¹⁴ I gave him orally summary of views US Government as expressed by Acting Secretary to Turkish Ambassador, Washington.¹⁵ Foreign Office had not yet received report from Turkish Ambassador.

Erkin expressed sincere appreciation for US views. He said there may be some nations which would give way to resentment or defeatism in despair of effective UNO action, but Turkey is not one of these nations. It is true that failure Moscow Conference to reach settlement of Iranian problem was blow to Turkey's hopes for cooperation among Big Three in behalf of principles of UNO, and this failure has caused widespread disappointment. Nevertheless Turkish Govt appreciates that at Moscow US and UK made supreme effort to draw USSR back into world cooperation and were prepared to pay heavy price. Whether this effort was successful only time will tell. In any case Turkey places its full hope and confidence in UNO and in good faith and determination of US, which took initiative in establishing UNO, to make it effective instrument for prevention aggression.

He said that while patience is beginning to wear out in Turkey as result of continuous pressure to which they have been subjected by USSR since last March, Turkish authorities are firmly resolved to prevent any incident or manifestation of aggressive character in Turkey. He said that if there is further Soviet pressure, and he expects this, there will undoubtedly be strong articles in reply in Turkish press and patriotic demonstrations throughout republic as have recently taken place since territorial demands were advanced for Soviet

¹² As Nos. 3, 17, and 6, respectively.

¹³ Not printed; it gave a partial summary of memorandum of conversation, December 29, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1287.

¹⁴ Feridun Cemal Erkin.

¹⁵ Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur.

Georgia but these would not take on hostile or provocative character. In reply to my specific question he said he was confident there would be no manifestation against Armenians.

Erkin said he attached particular importance to view of US Government (paragraph 5 Deptel 1210) that general questions involved in Turco-Soviet relations extend beyond Turk territory into sphere of world peace and security and for assurance that in this sphere US Government takes deepest interest. He said Turk Government fully shares US view.

WILSON

867.014/1-446: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, January 4, 1946.

[Received January 5—9:05 p. m.]

18. Radio Ankara yesterday broadcast in several languages, including English, historical review of present day Soviet Georgia and invited listeners to verify its facts "in any encyclopedia or history book". Contrasting this review with "fairy tale put out by the Georgian scholars"¹⁷ Radio Ankara concluded with statement "Facts remain that country known as Georgia has never counted within its borders even small part of territories which lie behind frontiers of Turkey today".

Sent Department as 18, repeated to London as 5 and Moscow as 2.

WILSON

761.67/1-946: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, January 9, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received January 10—1:30 p. m.]

42. Speaking to me yesterday of Turk-Soviet relations, Prime Minister¹⁸ said he believed Soviet Govt has been misled by its agents in Turkey. He thinks latter reported Turkey ripe for softening up and that external pressure by press and radio from Moscow, drumming up Armenian and Georgian claims, etc., plus pressure from Yitlin [*within*] through setting up new Communist newspapers and spreading Communist propaganda, would result in disintegrating regime and preparing way for "friendly" Govt. What surprises him is that Soviets who ought to know Turkey better should have made such mistake. Result of their activities has been that Turks have become completely united against Soviet demands.

¹⁷ For claim of Georgian professors, see telegram 1604, December 22, 1945, from Ankara, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1285, and footnote 6 thereto.

¹⁸ Sükrü Saraçoğlu.

He said that Soviet tactics against Turkey having been thrown off balance by reaction here, USSR is uncertain for moment just what to try next. Saraçoğlu believes they will bide time until after UNO meeting before seriously opening up against Turkey. What is certain, however, he said, is that they will not abandon their aims regarding Turkey but will only postpone action until they judge favorable opportunity presents itself.

Saraçoğlu said there was no question that events in Iran and particularly failure efforts to reach satisfactory settlement Iranian problem at Moscow had caused deep concern and pessimism in Turkey as to outlook for international cooperation in behalf of principles United Nations.

Sent Dept, repeated Moscow as 6 and London as 13.

WILSON

761.67/1-1046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, January 10, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received January 11—3:30 a. m.]

49. Erkin, Secretary General, Foreign Office, has informed me of telegram received from Turkish Ambassador, London,¹⁹ regarding latter's recent conversation with Attlee²⁰ and Bevin.

Conversation with Attlee was in conference [*connection*] with Ambassador's first call on Prime Minister and consisted largely of "monologue" in which Acikalin recited at length Turkey's position vis-à-vis Soviet territorial and other demands. Attlee listened attentively and "expressed full approval" of Turkey's attitude.

Conversation with Bevin followed latter's return from Moscow. Bevin said that in one of his talks with Stalin he had raised Turk question. He has expressed frank interest in knowing what Russians' intentions were regarding Turkey. He had pointed out that Soviet attitude towards Turkey was forcing latter to maintain large army, thereby interfering with economic development of country. Stalin's reply had been that if Turkey wished to maintain large army that was for Turkey to decide. Bevin had then stated to Stalin that "defense of Turkey" was "of vital interest" to UK.²¹

¹⁹ Cevat Acikalin.

²⁰ Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.

²¹ In telegram 416, January 14, 8 p. m., to London, the Department asked for confirmation of this statement (761.67/1-1046), and in telegram 778, January 22, 7 p. m., from London, the Embassy reported: "Foreign Office official said that on December 31 Bevin had informed the Turkish Ambassador in London of his remarks to Stalin, namely, that 'His Majesty's Govt is allied with Turkey and therefore has a very vital interest in the dispute'. Bevin rptd the above to Hasan Saka in London on January 11." (761.67/1-2246) The Turkish Foreign Minister had arrived on January 4 for talks with Messrs. Bevin and Byrnes and to attend UN meetings.

Erkin went on to say that he had informed President İnönü and the Prime Minister of views expressed by Acting Secretary Acheson to Turk Ambassador, Washington (Deptel 1210, Dec 29²² and Embtel 8, January 3) in particular that it was view US that general questions involved in present Turco-Soviet relations extend beyond Turk territory into sphere of world peace and security in which US has deepest interest. President and Prime Minister attach great importance to this statement.

Erkin added that Govt was feeling somewhat better, for moment at least, regarding position of Turkey. This was due to Bevin's statement to Stalin, to statement regarding views of US as expressed to Turk Ambassador and to fact that Soviet "war of nerves" had not only failed to weaken morale in Turkey but on contrary had strengthened and united Turks as had seldom occurred in their history.

Talks I have had in last 48 hours with other members of Govt and well-informed Turks confirm impression given by Erkin that for moment, at least, Turks are feeling a bit relieved.

Sent Dept, London as 18 and Moscow as 7.

WILSON

767.68119/1-946 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1946—9 p. m.

28. Urtel 34 received Jan. 9.²³ Report that Secretary took new Straits proposals to London is without any foundation. Question remains as reported to you and we know of no reason to expect any developments during London meeting. Dept is not contemplating taking any further initiative in the matter at present. Our proposals to Turkey suggested that international conference to revise Montreux Convention seemed advisable and that we would attend such conference if invited. Initiative in calling such a conference may be taken under existing convention by any States signatory thereto.

Sent to Ankara. Repeated to London and Moscow.²⁴

[ACHESON]

761.67/1-1546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, January 15, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 9:11 p. m.]

73. Erkin tells me that on January 12 Soviet Ambassador²⁵ sent brusquely worded note protesting against recent Turk press articles

²² Not printed; it gave a partial summary of memorandum of conversation, December 29, 1945, *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. VIII, p. 1287.

²³ Not printed.

²⁴ As Nos. 296 and 59, respectively.

²⁵ Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

critical of USSR, particularly headlines on one article reading "Machiavelism now Molotovism" and another "Stalin is doing what Hitler did" (text following latter headline reproduced recent London *Daily* (?) article).

Erkin said fortunately 2 or 3 days before Soviet note was received, Prime Minister had sent word to Turk press requesting them be careful to avoid giving offense to Soviet Union. He said that Turk reply to Soviet note had mentioned this initiative and that it had been taken prior to receipt of Soviet protest; that Turk Govt regretted statements in Turk press which might seem personally offensive to Soviet leaders; that recent articles critical of USSR should be viewed in light of feeling created in Turkey by prominence given by Soviet press and radio to article by Georgian professors claiming large part of Turk territory; and that Turk Govt hoped that Turk initiative in seeking to eliminate articles objectionable to USSR would find its counterpart in action by Soviet Govt to eliminate from Govt press and radio articles and comments injurious to Turkey.

I have confirmed from other sources that Prime Minister took initiative with Turk journalists early last week. It is moreover a fact that since then one [tone?] of articles in Turk press regarding Russia has changed markedly and there has been little if anything which could be regarded as strongly critical.

Sent Dept 73; repeated Moscow 9; London 20.

WILSON

761.67/1-1846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, January 18, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received 11:47 p. m.]

638. For Acheson and Henderson²⁶ from the Secretary: The following is a memorandum of a conversation I had with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on January 17.

"I received Mr. Hasan Saka, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Mr. Saka brought up the apprehension now felt by the Turkish Govt with regard to the recent claims of the Soviet Union for Turkish territory and the bases in the Dardanelles. He said there had been no official demand for these claims on the part of the Soviet Govt but that the Soviet Govt had informed the Turkish Govt that new conditions should be considered in connection with the renewal of the treaty of 1921 denounced by the Soviet Union about 6 months ago. When the Soviet Govt as [was] asked what these new conditions would be, it was indicated to the Turkish Govt that there should be a return of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan and that the Soviet Govt desired to discuss bases in the Dardanelles.

²⁶ Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, and Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

I inquired of the FonMin as to the character of the people in the eastern provinces. The Minister pointed out that the people in Kars and Ardahan were Turkish, spoke Turkish, were entirely satisfied with the democracy of the Turkish Govt and there was no such situation as obtained in Azerbaijan where the inhabitants were of different racial stock from the capital and country of which they were a part and where there had been previous claims for better treatment than they had been receiving from the Central Govt of Persia.

I then asked what the military status of Turkey was at the present time. Mr. Saka said that while he could not say exactly the military establishment was probably around a million men, as the Govt had been unable to demobilize and in the present situation would probably have to increase rather than reduce the standing army. Mr. Saka went on to say that while the character of the Turkish people as a whole was to be patient, if the Soviet Govt used any pretext to bring about the seizure of the eastern provinces or any other Turkish territory, the Turkish people would meet such a situation with firm resolution and he was sure the result would be armed conflict. He said further that he could give me every assurance that the Turkish Govt would give no occasion whatever for provocation in the present situation but that the Govt and people in Turkey were firmly resolved to resist any attempt to take their territory by force.

I then said that in my opinion we should be grateful that the UNO was now set up and had begun functioning and I felt that this should go a long way toward quieting the apprehensions of the Turkish Govt as the UNO was now prepared to deal with situations of this kind if it developed further.

The Turkish FonMin expressed his deep appreciation to me for the interest the US Govt had taken in this affair and also for the information which we had furnished to the Turkish Govt through Mr. Wilson, the US Ambassador at Ankara, with respect to the recent conversations in Moscow."

Sent to Dept as 638 repeated Ankara as 8.

[BYRNES]

761.67/1-2246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, January 22, 1946—noon.

[Received 11 : 57 p. m.]

91. According to Secretary General FonOff Soviets are trying new line against Turkey. He recounts following: A few days ago Bulgarian Minister Antonoff gave dinner inviting Acting FonMin Sümer.²⁷ After dinner Antonoff took Sümer aside and in conversation expressed hope for an improvement in Turco-Soviet relations. He said he believed cause of difficulties was Soviet lack of confidence in present Turkish Government and expressed opinion that if Saraçoğlu were replaced as Head of Government there would be no further

²⁷ Nurullah Esat Sümer, Turkish Minister of Finance.

difficulties. Sümer replied that existing situation had been created by Soviet demands on Turkey and these demands reveal clearly that aims USSR go far beyond any change in Turk Government.

Erkin said when he read Sümer's memo of conversation he felt there were some things which remained to be said to Antonoff. He therefore called him in to discuss a routine matter and after discussion asked whether in fact Antonoff had made statement to Sümer regarding change in Turk Government. Antonoff embarrassed admitted he had, but said he had done so only as expression personal view because important to Bulgaria to see improvement in Turco-Soviet relations. Erkin told him that if this statement had been made on behalf of Soviets it could be regarded as item of information; but it was inadmissible that any foreign diplomat should express his own opinion that a change in Turkish Government was advisable. This was interference in Turkey's internal affairs which would not be permitted. Furthermore, any one familiar with Turkish scene knew that whatever criticism of government might have existed in Turkey had been stilled in face external threat and government's position was stronger than ever. Antonoff reiterated he had expressed this personal view only because it was so important to Bulgaria to have better relations between Turkey and USSR. Erkin remarked to me that Antonoff is of course stooge for Soviet Ambassador and this seems new line which Soviets are trying in effort weaken Turkey internally.

Recent moderation in Russian press and radio attitude to Turkey fits into picture. Erkin guesses that after Soviets have tried this awhile and found they are getting nowhere they will revert to old line aggressive press and radio attacks.

Sent Department as 91; repeated Moscow as 10, London as 22 and Sofia as 3.

WILSON

761.67/1-2546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, January 25, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

940. Foreign Office official today told us that Bevin had been primed to persuade the Turkish Foreign Minister not to raise the Turkish-Russian dispute before UNO at present time. However, to surprise of Foreign Office Hasan Saka did not broach subject. Foreign Office is of opinion that Turks are waiting to see what happens to Soviet-Iranian dispute.

Sent Dept as 940, repeated to Ankara as 12, to Moscow as 32.

WINANT

761.67/1-3146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, January 31, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received February 1—2:24 p. m.]

142. Deptel 96, Jan 29, giving paraphrase of London's 779, Jan 22 to Dept.²⁸ See my 8, Jan 3, reporting similar conversation with Erkin. I have said to Saka that general questions involved in Turko-Soviet relations extend beyond Turk territory into sphere of world peace and security in which US Govt has deepest interest. I have also told Saka that in my judgment Turkey was following sound course in remaining calm and firm and in being careful to prevent any incident or manifestation which might see in nature of provocation of USSR.

Sent Dept 142, repeated London 34.

WILSON

761.67/2-146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, February 1, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received February 2—12:31 a. m.]

144. A further development has taken place concerning matter reported in my 91, January 22. Bulgarian Minister Antonoff called on Acting FonMin Sümer a few days ago and said he had informed Soviet Ambassador of Sümer's remark that Soviet aims regarding Turkey went far beyond any change in Turkish Government and that what Soviets desired was that Turkey break its alliance with British. Vinogradov stated this was untrue and USSR did not desire Turkey to break British alliance. Antonoff went on to say, ostensibly expressing his own opinion, that recent abatement Soviet press and radio attacks on Turkey with its counterpart in calmer tone Turkish press towards USSR had created "serene" atmosphere in which it should be possible to reach a settlement of difficulties between two countries and he urged initiative be taken in this direction. Sümer replied that Turkey asks nothing better than to settle existing difficulties with Russia but that any settlement would have to be on basis of full equality of two states, requiring abandonment by USSR of claims of last June for eastern territories and bases on Straits. Antonoff said "you can forget about Kars and Ardahan" but what was important from Soviet point of view was "agreement with Turkey regarding Straits". He evaded question whether this meant bases. Antonoff remarked that

²⁸ Neither printed; the Ambassador was asked to confirm whether he had said to Saka "that the US Govt is vitally interested in the 'dispute' between Turkey and Russia and considers Turkey's attitude entirely right". (761.67/1-2246)

Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov was, of course, authorized discuss this matter with Turkish Government and he expressed hope Turks would have discussions with Ambassador. Sümer replied he would be glad to see Vinogradov whenever latter wishes.

Erkin, who recounted foregoing to me, said Turkish Government while skeptical attaches importance to this development and it will be interesting to see whether Vinogradov follows it up. Erkin's interpretation is that Soviets recognize their campaign to soften up Turkey, undertaken on erroneous advice from Soviet agents, has failed and that they must try new tack. What Soviets want is direct arrangement with Turkey concerning Straits which would in effect give USSR control of Straits. Line of thought of Turkish Government is as follows: Straits question is an international one; at Potsdam Three Great Powers agreed upon procedure whereby each would approach Turkish Government separately with proposals for revision of Montreux Convention; US and UK have followed this procedure but USSR has not yet done so; if USSR now wishes to submit proposals to Turkish Government, latter will consider them and if they appear to offer hope of satisfactory settlement will suggest Russia initiate procedure in accordance with Montreux Convention for holding international conference to which US would be invited for revision of Convention.

Sent Department 144, repeated Moscow 13, London 36, and Sofia 4.

WILSON

761.67/2-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, February 2, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received 10:21 p. m.]

161. I had long talk yesterday with Soviet Ambassador. Following points seem of interest:

1. He said he was not satisfied with attitude Turkish press and that while no further attacks on Soviet personalities have appeared, articles disagreeable to USSR are still being published. It is a fact that in past few days Moscow radio as well as Turkish press have again been saying unpleasant things. Erkin has also mentioned this to me, saying that Soviet radio "broke the truce" and that Turkish press responded in kind. He said Foreign Office has constantly been trying to tone Turkish press down and succeeded until Moscow radio turned loose again. He said they can keep the press here quiet if Moscow radio will behave.

2. Reviewing relations between Turkey and Russia, I ventured opinion that only question between two countries which is of real importance to USSR is test of Straits. Vinogradov disagreed saying

question of Kars and Ardahan is very important to USSR and recalled that Molotov said to Sarper²⁹ last June that, if Turkey desired treaty of alliance with USSR, this territorial question would have to be settled (Turks say they never asked treaty of alliance). I remarked it seemed to have been settled by treaty. Vinogradov replied treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed when Russia was weak. Said that treaty which settled this frontier between Turkey and Russia was treaty of Moscow of March 16, 1921. Vinogradov said this was only an extension of Brest-Litovsk treaty, repeated that Russia was weak at that time and that treaty should be redrawn in view changed conditions. He said USSR had made new treaty with Poland rectifying previously agreed frontier between two countries and there was no reason same thing should not be done regarding Turkey (this is at variance with statement made by Antonoff reported in my 144, February 1, but may have been made with view to ultimate bargaining position). I mentioned communication made by USSR (and British) to Turkish Govt on August 10, 1941³⁰ to effect that Soviet Govt was prepared scrupulously to observe territorial integrity of Turkish Republic. Ambassador replied this declaration had been made at time Soviet and British troops were entering Iran and was intended only as assurance that specific operation in Iran did not endanger Turkish territorial integrity. I stated that declaration was general in nature and nothing in it warranted restricted interpretation such as he mentioned. He insisted declaration should be read in context of events at that time and that in effect it no longer had application.

3. He then spoke of reports that purpose of visit Iraqi delegation under Nuri-al-Said (now due here February 7) is to negotiate "mutual assistance" pact with Turkey which would later be extended to include all countries of Arab League. He said that Nuri was known to be protagonist of this idea and has been working on it since his visit to Turkey with Iraqi Regent last September, and indicated his belief that British are behind this move and that it is aimed at USSR.

Sent Dept as 161; repeated London as 37, and Moscow as 16.

WILSON

767.68119/2-1246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, February 12, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received February 13—6 p. m.]

189. Deptel 121, February 6.³¹ I believe Turks consider (1) that US proposal for revision Montreux Convention is in general accept-

²⁹ Selim Sarper, Turkish Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

³⁰ See telegram 1489, August 13, 1941, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 324.

³¹ Not printed; it asked for comment on whether Turks considered British had adopted U. S. proposals (761.67/2-146).

able to UK and (2) that British note November 21 constitutes in effect UK action in accordance procedure agreed upon at Potsdam.³²

Regarding (1), it will be recalled that British Ambassador said to me (Embtel 1412, November 3³³) he thought our proposal satisfactory with exception certain unessential points. He doubtless expressed similar views to Turks. At any rate, it is clear to me Turks consider British hold such views.

As regards (2), it is my impression that while Turks at first regarded British note of November 21 as simply a reply to Turk request for expression of UK views on US note and that it would later be followed by detailed proposals from British, they came to accept viewpoint that November 21 note constitutes all that UK considers advisable to put in writing under existing circumstances and that it therefore may be regarded for practical purposes as UK proposal under Potsdam procedure. I think it not unlikely Turks have been told something of this sort by British. In this connection, Department will recall British were opposed last October to our proposal to submit to Turks suggestions for revision Straits Convention, feeling it inadvisable to raise another controversial matter with USSR. Same line of reasoning might well lead them to feel it inadvisable to make detailed exposition of views. Furthermore, they could feel with good reason that a detailed note which in substance adopted our proposals would commit them while at same time permitting Soviets to raise ante from that point.

WILSON

761.67/2-1346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, February 13, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received February 14—6:55 a. m.]

195. Acting Foreign Minister Sümer has told me of long conversation he had with Soviet Ambassador on February 4 at reception British Embassy. Vinogradov led off by asking for "friendly help" in modulating tone Turkish press regarding USSR. He recalled Turkish Government used good offices this end only recently but Moscow radio "broke the truce". He said Government would be glad to make new effort in this sense and hoped Soviet Government would do likewise. Two days later, Turkish Government sent Acting Director Press Bureau to Istanbul where he met with leading editors and requested them "lay off Russia." Result is that for past week

³² See telegram 1475, November 21, 1945, 5 p. m., from Ankara, and British Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, November 22, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1280 and 1281, respectively.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 1271.

there has in fact been no disagreeable comment concerning USSR in Turkish press and Moscow radio has also refrained from anything unpleasant regarding Turkey. This is, as Sümer said, to be "a new truce". Vinogradov then said, "Why don't you make a little effort to improve our relations?" Sümer replied Turkish Government would make great effort but this would have to be on basis respect Turkish independence and sovereignty. He then inquired whether USSR maintains requests of last June for eastern provinces and bases in Straits. Vinogradov replied territorial question while important was not as important as that of Straits which was "vital". Sümer asked exactly what Soviet requirements were concerning Straits. Vinogradov replied it is question of security for USSR which must have "adequate guarantee". Sümer said there could be no better guarantee than a sovereign friendly Turkey at Straits. Ambassador replied Turkey was weak and could not defend Straits and Soviet security requires use of bases if necessity arises. Sümer said conception of Soviet bases in Straits is obviously incompatible with Turkish sovereignty. He then suggested that since territorial question was not of first importance, USSR might withdraw request for eastern provinces. Vinogradov replied Soviet Government was obligated by constitution to defend interests of various Soviet Republics, that request for eastern provinces had been made on behalf of Armenian representative and Soviet Government, therefore, could not withdraw request. At close conversation Vinogradov remarked, "We waited long time regarding arrangement we wanted with Poland and finally got it; we can wait regarding Turkey".

In other words, Sümer said to me, we are back where we were before Antonoff put out his feelers (Embtels 91, January 22, and 144, February 1); USSR stands pat on demands for territories and bases and believes time works in their favor.

Sent Dept as 195, repeated Moscow as 19 and London as 42.

WILSON

761.67/2-2846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, February 28, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received 7:23 p. m.]

248. With reference to statement by Bevin during his foreign policy survey in House Commons February 21³⁴ that frontier between Turkey and Russia was drawn by Stalin himself, Ali Fuat Pasha, present

³⁴ In telegram 254, March 1, 3 p. m., from Ankara, Ambassador Wilson reported that the Bevin statement had greatly reassured Turkish Government circles, who regarded the reference to Turkey as an event of outstanding international significance (741.67/3-146).

Minister Communications who was special Ambassador to Russia during period when Moscow treaty of March 16, 1921 was negotiated, tells me following: Negotiations concerning frontier struck snag at two points, Batum and area lying southeast of Kars. In view of deadlock Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin proposed delegations meet with Stalin who was then Commissar for Nationalities and far more influential than Chicherin. This was done and it was in detailed negotiations with Stalin that frontier between Turkey, Soviet Republics of Georgia and Erivan was finally drawn. Stalin insisted on retaining Batum and agreed that if Turkey would sacrifice Batum Russia would sacrifice area near Kars. Frontier was settled on this basis.

Sent Dept as 248 ; repeated London 46 and Moscow 24.

WILSON

867.00/3-146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, March 1, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received 9:05 p. m.]

255. Acting Foreign Minister Sümer tells me following regarding talk with Soviet Ambassador February 25: Vinogradov referred to Turkish section Bevin's February 21 address House Commons, remarking, "I suppose this is result of Hasan Saka's activities in London". Sümer replied, "Not at all, it is straightforward statement of Turkish situation and Turk-British relations". Ambassador said speech seemed to line up UK and Turkey against USSR. Sümer pointed out Bevin expressed hope treaty of friendship would be renewed between USSR and Turkey and this would contribute to confidence between three countries.

Vinogradov said if Turkey wanted treaty of alliance with USSR Molotov last June stated conditions for such treaty. Sümer stated Turkey never requested treaty of alliance, does not want such treaty, but does want friendly and confident relations with USSR and to that end would be glad have new treaty friendship on lines that of 1925. Vinogradov then made interesting statement: He spoke of Molotov's request for eastern provinces, said Armenia needed these, and if Turkey would grant request, "Turkey can be more than compensated elsewhere." Sümer replied, "Turkey will neither cede territories nor annex territories" (Vinogradov did not specify just what territories he was offering Turkey).

Ambassador then said USSR had only two questions to settle with Turkey, one was eastern provinces and other was Straits. Sümer said Turkey's position had been made sufficiently clear as regards territorial question and that as regards Straits procedure had been

adopted at Potsdam which US and UK had followed by presenting their views regarding Montreux Convention to Turkey and he asked why USSR doesn't do same thing. Vinogradov again referred to Molotov's requests last June. At end of talk Vinogradov said he would like further conversation with Sümer but could not go to Turkish Foreign Office and had to look to chance meeting like present one (a diplomatic luncheon). Sümer said he lived nearly opposite Soviet Embassy and door his house would always be open. Vinogradov replied, "I shall accept your invitation to call on you to discuss these matters further". "That," remarked Sümer to me, "is way Soviets always twist everything."

Sent Dept as 255, repeated London as 49 and Moscow as 27.

WILSON

761.67/3-1146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

ANKARA, March 11, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

303. Prime Minister at recent press conference urged journalists continue restrained and moderate attitude toward Russia. News-men protested, pointing out Russian radio again attacking Turkey. Prime Minister said nevertheless papers should refrain from any anti-Russian campaign, adding Churchill and others taking care of situation and silence would benefit Turkey.

WILSON

761.67/3-1846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, March 18, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received March 18—5:12 p. m.]

341. Information re Soviet military dispositions in Rumania and Bulgaria received from member US group, ACC Rumania, who recently visited Istanbul, seems important. While Dept undoubtedly has this information, I summarize it as follows:

(1) For past 2 weeks, heavy troop movements southward by rail from Bessarabia to Dobruja, thence into Bulgaria. Heavy concentration troops in Dobruja and northeast Bulgaria. Among these are fresh troops from Russia with large portion armor.

(2) Railroad from Bessarabia to Ploesti widened to Russian gauge and sidings and loading platforms established at Ploesti for transferring shipments to standard gauge Rumanian cars.

(3) Large ammunition dumps located at many points, notably Craiova and Ploesti.

(4) A flight of about 202-engined [*20 2-engined?*] fighter planes, which passed near Constanza about 10 days ago, now located at Plovdiv, which is HQ for Russian air forces, Bulgaria.

(5) All 60 odd hospitals in Bucharest area instructed be fully equipped with medicines, bandages, etc., by 1st April and all convalescents evacuated that date.

Foregoing information coupled with reports of Soviet troop movements in Iran toward Turkish frontier would indicate that USSR may shortly be in position to strike at Turkey if and when this should appear advisable from viewpoint Soviet interests.

Soviet objective regarding Turkey as I have reported to Dept is to break present Turkish Government, install "friendly" government, resulting in closing Turkish gap in Soviet security belt from Baltic to Black Sea, giving USSR physical control of Straits and putting end to Western influence in Turkey. In short, domination of Turkey.

Present Soviet military dispositions raise question whether they have decided to use force to achieve this objective. I have held belief that USSR would use indirect methods of aggression against Turkey, such as employment Armenian and Kurdish "fronts" in Eastern Provinces, rather than take risks involved in open war. It has even seemed to me Soviets stand to gain by postponing action against Turkey, letting time work in their favor. They are now consolidating position in Iran which means Eastern prong of pincers has closed on Turkey. After Greek elections, British Socialist Government can hardly withstand pressure to withdraw troops from Greece, which will open door to civil war, intervention by Tito and Company, and creation of "friendly" government in Greece, thus closing Western prong of pincers and isolating Turkey from British help through Mediterranean. To embark on war against Turkey would mean that Soviet rulers have taken fundamental decision to break with policy of cooperation with Western democracies. This would be very grave decision fraught with heavy risks. Only signs of which I am aware that might indicate such decision has been taken are these troop movements³⁶ (which of course we have seen before in past months) and recent curtailment activities foreign correspondents in Moscow.

However, this may be, it seems to me this latest military information at least makes it necessary to reconsider earlier views as to Soviet tactics against Turkey and not rule out possibility, however illogical it may seem, of use of force by Russia against Turkey any time after April 15, approximate date when roads will be dry enough for large movements.

Sent Dept as 341, repeated Moscow as 34.

WILSON

³⁶ In telegram 345, March 19, 7 p. m., from Ankara, the Ambassador reported a conversation with Prime Minister Saraçoğlu, who did not believe the troop movements foreshadowed an open attack on Turkey by the Soviet Union and regarded them as continuation of a "war of nerves". (761.67/3-1946)

761.67/3-2046 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*RESTRICTED
PRIORITYANKARA, March 20, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received March 21—1:30 a. m.]

348. Press has played up Britanova despatch from Washington to effect US has given assurances to Iran and Turkey that US will stand by their side against foreign aggression violating principles UNO; that State Department officials insist US will not give any nation blank check which could be used to provoke Russia; that US attitude was communicated Turkey several weeks ago in series interviews between Washington and Ankara officials; Iran informed of US policy by US Ambassador Tehran; and that US foreign policy entirely based on obligations UNO and avoids special assurances going beyond those limits.

Erkin has just phoned me to say correspondents are pressing Foreign Office hard on Turkish angle and he must say something. He asked if I knew anything about this report. I said nothing but that I had noted in recent press conference Secretary said he could make no statement on subject of giving Iran assurances. I suggested there was lots of confusion in press just now and least said better. Erkin said he always had in mind what Acting Secretary stated to Turkish Ambassador end December as well as Secretary's great speech February 28, and he wanted to be careful not to say anything which could be interpreted as either confirmation or denial. He would therefore simply say that as this report originated in US inquiries had better be addressed there.

As consequence Department will probably be asked questions.

WILSON

711.00/3-2346

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, March 23, 1946.
[Received April 10.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I acknowledge receipt on March 18 of your secret letter of February 27, 1946,³⁷ enclosing a Foreign Policy and Information statement on Turkey and inviting my comments and recommendations.

[Here follows discussion of various items in the statement.]

There is one fundamental point in which I feel the wording of the statement does not express entirely my own views. In IIA, Page 7,

³⁷ Not printed.

present Soviet objectives towards Turkey are stated to be "(1) Revision of the régime of the Straits which would give the USSR a dominant position in regulating the passage of warships through the Straits," et cetera. Under section III, Summary of Issues and Trends in Turkey, paragraph B, Page 8, it is stated that the question of the Straits is "probably the fundamental question in Russo-Turkish relations". As I have tried to point out to the Department various times, the question of the Straits, so far as Russo-Turkish relations are concerned, and particularly so far as the Soviet conception of such relations is involved, is, in my opinion, a secondary matter, in fact, merely a façade behind which resides the real Soviet objective towards Turkey. The development of air power during the past war has greatly limited the value of the Straits from the strategic viewpoint. The Straits were in fact controlled during the war by air power based on the Greek Islands. The real Soviet objective towards Turkey is not a revision of the régime of the Straits, but actual domination of Turkey. In the vast security belt of the Soviet Union which extends from the Baltic to the Black Sea, composed of vassal states, Turkey constitutes the sole gap. Turkey maintains an independent foreign policy and in particular looks to the western democracies for guidance and assistance. This the Soviet Union is unwilling to tolerate. The Soviet objective, therefore, is to break down this present independent Turkish Government and to establish in its place a vassal or "friendly" régime in Turkey, which will complete the security chain of subservient countries on Russia's western and southern frontiers and put an end completely to western influence in Turkey. The accomplishment of this objective would, incidentally, give actual physical control of the Straits to Russia, but this, as pointed out, is not the primary Soviet aim. If, in fact, the main Soviet objective towards Turkey were to obtain a favorable revision of the régime of the Straits, all that the Soviet Union would have to do would be to signify acceptance in principle of our proposal of November 2, 1945, for revision of the Montreux Convention. Our proposal, granting the Black Sea powers a privileged position at the Straits, contains in essence the desiderata for which Russia has struggled at the Straits since the time of Peter the Great. The fact that the Soviet Union has declined to follow the procedure agreed upon at Potsdam and to present its views to the Turkish Government concerning revision of the Montreux Convention, but has instead insisted upon "a positive guarantee" in the form of bases in the Straits, indicates clearly that revision of the international convention governing passage of the Straits is of little importance to the USSR. To force Turkey, however, to grant bases in the Straits would be tantamount to the disappearance of Turkey as an independent power and

would place Turkey in the same position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, et cetera, et cetera.

On Page 1 of the statement there appear the words, "Our support of Turkey . . .", but nowhere is this phrase defined. Presumably, we intend to give Turkey all possible support in and through the UNO, which would appear to cover every contingency except one: armed attack by the Soviet Union. In the event of such an attack, the use of the Soviet veto might effectively block any "legal" intervention by the UNO. What do we do then? If we have an answer ready it is of course Top Secret and therefore not to be mentioned in this document; but without such an answer any statement of our Turkish policy is incomplete.³⁸

Respectfully yours,

EDWIN C. WILSON

701.6711/4-1246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, April 12, 1946—noon.

[Received 9:04 p. m.]

423. Following reflections occur to me regarding *Missouri* visit: ³⁹

(1) It was probably one of most remarkable demonstrations of friendliness on part of govt and people of a foreign country towards US Naval officers and men that has ever occurred in connection with US Naval visit.

(2) This demonstration can be mainly explained by hope engendered in Turk Govt and people by recent developments US foreign policy, culminating in *Missouri* visit, that US has now established independent policy in Near and Middle East based on defense of its own interests in this region, these interests being understood as maintenance peace and security through support of principles UNO.

(3) Translated into specific terms applying to Turkey, foregoing means to Turks that US has now decided that its own interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by USSR to destroy Turk independence and integrity. This because if USSR allowed to destroy Turk independence and set up "friendly" regime here, nothing could then prevent Soviets from ascending to Suez, and once this occurs another world conflict becomes inevitable.

³⁸ On July 18 the Secretary informed Ambassador Wilson that his comments had been used in revising the statement on Turkey and asked for comment on the revision (711.00/3-2346).

³⁹ The Department of State issued a press release on March 6 stating that the U.S.S. *Missouri* would return to Istanbul with full honors the remains of the Turkish Ambassador, Mehmet Münir Ertegin, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps at Washington until his death on November 11, 1944; for text of press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 17, 1946, p. 447. The *Missouri* sailed from New York on March 21.

(4) There are already indications that effects *Missouri* visit are being felt beyond Turk frontiers. Reliable reports are that ecumenical patriarchate interprets visit as clear indication US influence will now be exerted in this region and feels encouraged thereby in its efforts to resist extension Soviet influence within Orthodox Church. Also reported in Bulgarian circles Istanbul that visit will undoubtedly strengthen position Bulgarian opposition. *Missouri* visit is thus apt to take on character of one of those imponderable events influence of which extends far beyond immediate theater in which it occurs.

Sent Dept as 423, repeated Moscow as 47, London as 76.

WILSON

711.67/5-446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, May 4, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received May 5—6 : 42 a. m.]

507. Secretary General Foreign Office tells me Turkish Ambassador Paris⁴⁰ reported 2 days ago that when he was presented with others to Secretary Byrnes,⁴¹ latter took him by arm, led him aside and spoke to him in most friendly manner. Secretary said that in past US had perhaps not known Turkey and Turkey's problems very well but now US was well posted concerning Turkey, takes great interest in problems affecting Turkey, and has real and sincere friendship for Turkey. Erkin said Turkish Government was deeply touched and grateful for what Secretary Byrnes had said.

WILSON

761.67/5-746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, May 7, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received May 8—6 a. m.]

516. Secretary General Foreign Office who represented Turkey at recent liquidation meeting League of Nations, says that while USSR was not present at Geneva its shadow darkened atmosphere throughout meeting. Heads all delegations, except, of course, Soviet satellites, expressed views to him to effect their countries eager cooperate restoration normal peace time activities but hamstrung by Soviet policies and attitudes. They all asked Erkin what Turkey would do

⁴⁰ Numan R. Menemencioglu.

⁴¹ Mr. Byrnes was in Paris attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was held April 25—May 15, 1946.

if attacked by USSR.⁴² He replied Turkey would fight. Some delegates expressed scepticism, pointing out Turkey was small country with small army, and could not hope resist. Erkin replied that if Turkey doomed disappear as result Soviet aggression chances for rebirth independent Turkey much greater if she resists and goes down honorably rather than disappear as result attempting appeasement and becoming Soviet satellite.

Erkin said he felt his conversations at Geneva helpful in making clear Turkey's position to representatives other countries.

Sent Dept, repeated Moscow as 55.

WILSON

867.00/6-1046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, June 10, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received June 11—2:10 a. m.]

649. British Ambassador⁴³ tells me in strict confidence that few days before Bevin delivered recent address House Commons on foreign policy a report was received from new British Ambassador Moscow⁴⁴ of conversation with Stalin. While latter did not refer specifically to Turkey as had Molotov (Embassy's telegram 626, June 3⁴⁵), he spoke of necessity for Russia to have complete freedom movement its ships from and to Black Sea. Peterson mentioned Potsdam agreement looking to revision Montreux Convention. Stalin replied freedom of passage through Straits of little value unless Russia had base somewhere in Mediterranean.

British Ambassador here believes receipt in London of foregoing report explains passage in Bevin's speech concerning independence of Turkey as well as statement that Britain operates its shipping in Baltic without having base there.

WILSON

761.67/6-1746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, June 17, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received June 17—3:44 p. m.]

1907. Embassy's 1899, June 17;⁴⁶ pouched to London. Political offensives by USSR against Turkey having made little or no progress

⁴² In telegram 1053, April 5, 6 p. m., from Moscow (vol. vi, p. 732), Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith reported a conversation with Generalissimo Stalin who disclaimed any intention to attack Turkey.

⁴³ Sir David V. Kelly.

⁴⁴ Sir Maurice D. Peterson, formerly at Ankara.

⁴⁵ Not printed; it reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Molotov, who repeated that his Government was dissatisfied with Turkey (761.67/6-346).

⁴⁶ Not printed.

on Armenian and Georgian issues, a new offensive appears to be opening on another front—Turkish Kurds. Initial salvo was fired by *Trud*.

If, as seems indicated, USSR follows up *Trud* article with propaganda campaign for autonomous Kurdistan, Kremlin can scarcely expect to make much more progress towards inducing creation of autonomous Kurdistan than it has in bringing about “return” of Turkish Armenia and Georgia to their Soviet motherlands.

Firstly, according to our understanding, Turkish Kurds have been removed from frontier to interior. USSR will therefore find it difficult, if not impossible, to make contact with and arm Turkish Kurds. Secondly, even were USSR able to do this, Soviet experience with Iranian Kurds would seem to indicate that these individualistic feuding nomads are not wholly dependable instruments of Soviet policy. Kremlin doubtless realizes that, if it is out to establish genuine Kurdistan, incitement of Turkish Kurds should practically follow rounded development of Kurdistan movement in Iran and Iraq.

If foregoing is so, then Turkish Kurdistan campaign will not be designed to achieve its pretended aims. Its objectives will be:

- (1). Renewing war of nerves against Turkey on new front; and
- (2). Raising smoke screen over issues at CFM which may embarrass USSR.

With regard to second point, timing of *Trud* article to coincide with opening of CFM repeats now familiar pattern. It will be remembered that USSR launched propaganda offensives regarding Armenian, Georgian, Greek, Egyptian, Indonesian and other “grievances” to coincide with previous FM and UN meetings. These propaganda offensives, like present one, were at least in part aimed at defending Soviet position by tactics of confusion, irrelevancy and obscurantism.

Department please repeat to Paris as Moscow’s 189 and to Ankara as No. 34.

Passed to London as 286.

SMITH

S67.00/6-2646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, June 26, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

702. Embtel 688, June 22.⁴⁷ Secretary General Foreign Office read me memorandum prepared by Prime Minister of his conversation with

⁴⁷ Not printed.

Soviet Ambassador few days ago at reception during visit President [of] Lebanon.⁴⁸ Following principal points interest:

(1) Ambassador asked what significance visit Lebanese President. Prime Minister replied solely visit courtesy. Ambassador asked whether he could inform his Govt no discussion concerning anything like political treaty. Saraçoğlu assured him he could, adding only matters discussed were of technical administrative nature such as optants and properties nationals one country in other.

(2) Referring Paris Conference, Ambassador said two questions particular importance under discussion: Italian reparations and Trieste. He thought agreement could be reached on first but Trieste most difficult and imperative be given to Yugoslavia.

(3) Saraçoğlu asked if any intention discuss Turkey at Paris. Ambassador replied no. Molotov sent agenda of conference and Turkey not mentioned; if USSR had planned discussion Turkey on margin conference, he sure to have been informed.

(4) Prime Minister then spoke of Soviet demands on Turkey June 1945 for eastern provinces and bases in Straits. He said Turkish Govt had refrained from publicly giving confirmation to reports such demands made, in order not to worsen already difficult relations between two countries and also to make it easier for USSR to withdraw demands. Turkish Govt hopes Soviets will in fact find way to make announcement that such demands have never been made, as otherwise Turkish Govt may be obliged before much longer as duty to Turkish public opinion to admit existence these demands. Vinogradov argued vehemently this should not be done, then went on urge President Inonu and Prime Minister make effort reach understanding with USSR. Prime Minister replied Turkey obviously could not reach understanding on basis ceding eastern provinces and granting bases in Straits. Ambassador said Turkey should recognize that USSR for security reasons more deeply concerned regarding Straits than any other power, needing base there in time war, and if Turkey recognizing this would enter discussion with USSR question of eastern provinces could be disregarded. Prime Minister without replying directly to this said there could be no possibility discussion so long Russia maintains demands for territories and bases. He urged Ambassador press his Govt withdraw these demands. Vinogradov replied he would do what he could but had no hope his Govt would agree.

(5) During foregoing discussion Ambassador said he saw no reason USSR should not have bases in Straits since "US now has air bases in Turkey". Prime Minister said US of course had no air bases but only rights under civil aviation agreement similar to agreements existing among practically all other countries to operate commercial air service.

⁴⁸ Bechara el-Khourî.

(6) Regarding discussion mentioned paragraph 4 above, Erkin said his interpretation was that Soviets trying lead Turkey into bilateral talks concerning Straits, hoping thereby to cause misunderstanding and friction between Turkey, UK and US and exploit resulting situation.

Sent Dept as 702; repeated Moscow 66, London 104, Paris 27.

WILSON

667.68119/8-746

*The Soviet Chargé (Orekhov) to the Acting Secretary of State*⁴⁹

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1946.

[Translation]

SIR: By direction of the Soviet Government I have the honor to communicate to you the following:

As is known, the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on the question of the Montreux Convention adopted a resolution, whereby the three Governments declared that the said Convention should be revised, since it does not correspond to present conditions. At the same time the three Governments agreed that this question was to be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish Government. In accordance with this, the Soviet Government on August 7 of this year addressed to the Turkish Government a note which is transcribed below:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. has the honor to inform the Turkish Government of the following:

"Events which occurred during the past war clearly indicated that the regime of the Black Sea Straits, established by the Straits Convention, signed in 1936 at Montreux, does not meet the interests of the safety of the Black Sea Powers and does not insure conditions under which the use of these Straits for purposes inimical to the Black Sea Powers would be prevented.

"It will suffice to mention a series of incidents during this war, when the Axis Powers directed their warships and auxiliary craft through the Straits into the Black Sea and out of the Black Sea, which in its turn gave rise to the corresponding steps and protests registered by the Soviet Government with the Turkish Government.

⁴⁹ Handed to Acting Secretary Acheson by Soviet Chargé Orekhov August 7, 1946, 5:30 p. m. The text of this note was sent to the Secretary of State, who was in Paris attending the Paris Peace Conference, in Department's telegram 3966, August 8, 8 p. m., repeated as 567 to Ankara, 5931 to London, and 1454 to Moscow. The note was summarized in telegram 987, August 9, 7 p. m., to Athens and repeated as 530 to Bucharest and 251 to Sofia. In telegram MA 50681, August 12, from Moscow to the War Department in response to Department's telegram 1454, it was stated: "We do not believe that an attack on Turkey will be made at present, although the possibility of such action exists." (Lot 58-D799, Box 5567, folder "Turkish Straits")

“On July 9, 1941 the German command sent the German patrol boat *Seefalke* through the Straits into the Black Sea, which was a gross violation of the Straits Convention and called forth a protest to the Turkish Government on the part of the Soviet Government.

“In August, 1941, Turkish authorities gave the Italian auxiliary war vessel *Tarvizio* permission to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea which likewise called forth a representation on the part of the Soviet Government, calling to the attention of the Turkish Government the fact that the passage of the Italian auxiliary vessel into the Black Sea would appear to be a violation of the Straits Convention.

“On November 4, 1942, the Soviet Government again called to the attention of the Turkish Government the fact that Germany planned to send to the Black Sea through the Straits auxiliary warships under the guise of merchant vessels with a total displacement of 140,000 tons. These vessels were intended for the transfer of military forces and war materials of the Axis countries into the Black Sea. In its representation, the Soviet Government emphasized the fact that ‘the admission of the aforementioned vessels through the Straits into the Black Sea would be an obvious violation of the Convention regarding the regime of the Straits concluded in Montreux, inasmuch as these vessels are left at the disposal of the German Government and are in reality auxiliary warships[’].

“In June, 1944, the Soviet Government registered a protest against the fact that toward the end of May and early in June of 1944 there took place a series of passages through the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean Sea of German warships and auxiliary warships of varying tonnage of the *Ems* (8 vessels) and *Kriegstransport* (5 vessels) types, which had taken part in the naval operations in the Black Sea.

“It is obvious from the aforementioned facts that at the time of the past war with Germany and her allies, the Straits Convention did not prevent the enemy powers from using the Straits for military purposes against the U.S.S.R. and other allied powers, with the Turkish Government not being able to escape the responsibility for this situation.

“In view of this, the Soviet Government suggested to the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers—Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which took place in July and August 1945, to discuss the question that the regime of the Straits, established by the Montreux Convention, does not conform to present conditions and that it is necessary to establish a new regime of the Straits. As is known, the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers adopted a resolution consisting of the following:

a) The three Governments declared that the Convention regarding the Straits, concluded in Montreux, should be revised, as it does not meet the conditions of the present time;

b) The three Governments agreed that as the proper course the said question would be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish Government.

“The Soviet Government is also acquainted with the contents of the note of November 2, 1945 of the Government of the United States of

America⁵⁰ and with the note of the British Government of November 21, 1945⁵¹ addressed to the Government of Turkey on this question.

“For its own part, the Soviet Government proposes to establish for the Straits a new regime, proceeding from the following principles:

“1) The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.

“2) The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.

“3) Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea Powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.

“4) The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.

“5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers.

“The Soviet Government is informing the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain regarding the present declaration.”

The Soviet Union has directed me to bring this to the knowledge of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept [etc.]

FEDOR OREKHOV

767.68119/8-846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, August 8, 1946—9 p. m.

[Received August 9—1:07 a. m.]

844. This message sent possible time-saver and as precaution there has not been delivery Washington, London of below-mentioned Soviet note.

Turk Foreign Minister has asked Bursley⁵² to come in tomorrow afternoon.

Latter saw British Ambassador railway station tonight. There follows summary Ambassador statements in necessarily hurried conversation.

⁵⁰ See telegram 1049, October 30, 1945, to Ankara, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1265.

⁵¹ See *aide-mémoire*, November 22, 1945, from the British Embassy, *ibid.*, p. 1281.

⁵² Herbert S. Bursley, Counselor of Embassy in Turkey.

1. Foreign Minister today informed British Ambassador that Soviets have presented note to Turks on Straits question, raising four points.

2. Most important of which is statement, possibly ambiguous, regarding joint Soviet-Turk responsibility for Straits which seems bring up idea of bases but which does not seem, according to British Ambassador, to have alarmed Turks unduly.

3. Encouragement seems to have been taken from fact Soviets told Foreign Office they were presenting similar note Washington-London.

4. Turks do not intend to raise technicalities, such as that second power has not supported Soviet proposals and intend reply in about 10 days after ascertaining views United States and British Governments.

5. British Ambassador undertook see me Istanbul ⁵³ tomorrow.

6. British Ambassador has telegraphed London report conversation Foreign Minister. Former says has no knowledge basis recent AP Konlon's story Straits.

More specific report and comments will follow as soon as possible.

Sent to Department: repeated to London as 114, to Moscow as 76.

WILSON

767.68119/8-746

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 9, 1946.

Subject: Comments on Soviet Proposals of August 7, 1946 for a Revised Régime of the Straits.

1. While the Soviet proposals incorporated the American *traffic* regulations for the Straits, they depart as widely as possible from the American idea that the Montreux Convention should be revised under the aegis of the United Nations. The Soviet proposals ignore the existence of the United Nations and do not admit the interest of any except Black Sea Powers in the régime of the Straits. Thus France, Great Britain, Greece and Yugoslavia—Montreux signatories—as well as the US (not a signatory), would, by the Russian standard, be excluded from any interest in the Straits.

2. The position taken in the American note of November 2, 1945 was largely influenced by State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee Paper No. 169 of July 30, 1945, which states:

“a) The United States would agree to a revision of the Montreux Convention substantially along the lines suggested by the State De-

⁵³ Ambassador Wilson was temporarily in the hospital at Istanbul.

partment in its recent memorandum on this subject (Note: The substance of this memorandum is in the US note to Turkey of November 2, 1945) ;

“b) The United States should support the demilitarization of the Straits and, failing that, should oppose any proposals granting a nation other than Turkey bases or other rights for direct or indirect military control of the Straits.”

In view of the above and aside from our support of the United Nations system, a change in the régime of the Straits along the lines of the Russian proposal would cause grave concern in the War and Navy Departments.

3. The Soviet Government cites certain instances to establish the fact that the Montreux Convention of 1936 “does not meet the interests of the safety of the Black Sea Powers and does not insure conditions under which the use of these Straits for purposes inimical to the Black Sea Powers would be prevented.” The instances cited (July 9, 1941, August 1941, November 4, 1942, and June 1944) did in fact take place but now that the smoke of war has cleared away there is a great deal to be said on the side of the Turks regarding them. The vessels referred to were, so far as the outcome of the war is concerned, inconsequential, a number of them were borderline cases so far as the Montreux definition of war vessels is concerned, and all were disguised as merchant vessels. (In this connection, the Montreux Convention does not recognize as a warship any surface vessel of under 100 tons. The *Ems* class boats to which the Soviet note refers were 40 to 50 tons. The *Kriegstransport* or *Mannheim* class boats were about 800 tons but according to Ambassador Steinhardt’s telegram no. 1083, June 15, 1944,⁵⁴ “neither type of vessel was specifically covered by the Montreux Convention”. The wartime test of the Montreux Convention showed that it is out of date in respect to war vessel definitions: in 1936 there were no landing barges, LST’s, floating piers, etc.)

In 1941 and 1942 the Turks were in an extremely difficult position, and Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu, a famous international lawyer, insisted on a strict juridical interpretation of questions arising under the Montreux Convention. One of the Turkish defenses against the German threat in 1941 was “correctness”, and Numan was careful during this period to favor neither side. The Soviet, British and American governments protested to Numan in regard to specific Axis vessels when there was evidence or a presumption that they were War vessels disguised as merchantmen in order to keep Axis traffic at a minimum. Numan examined each protest in the light of the terms of the Montreux Convention and acted in accordance with these terms. In 1941 he halted certain Italian vessels; in 1942 he prevented passage of Vichy French vessels.

⁵⁴ Not printed.

The utility of the Numan policy to the Allies had diminished by June 1944, when an instance arose in which it was proved that the Turkish authorities had been lax in their first inspection of certain German "merchant" vessels. A second inspection of the vessels at Allied request revealed guns secreted below decks. Allied protests on this occasion caused the Turkish Government to remove Numan from office. Even in this case, however, Allied protests had to rest largely on the "spirit" and not the letter of the Montreux Convention.

In general the Turks in the period of Axis ascendancy were stiffly correct, favoring neither side; as Allied fortunes mounted the Turks interpreted the Montreux Convention more and more to favor the Allies. When German troops were cleared from the Greek islands, thus making possible the use of the Straits as a supply route to the Soviet Union, the Turkish Government greeted the first Allied ships with an enthusiastic communiqué welcoming their use of the Straits in the Allied cause.

4. Ankara's 844 of August 8 indicates that the Turks are not particularly alarmed by the Russian note of August 7 and that they expect to reply in about ten days "after receiving the views of the US and Britain." The following thoughts appear relevant:

a) The Potsdam agreement stated that each of the three Powers would communicate its views on the Straits question, separately, to the Turkish Government. It did not provide for the reconciliation of these views if they were at variance. Consequently, the Turks in their reply may defend themselves against Soviet allegations regarding their poor custodianship of the Montreux Convention and state their own views regarding what the régime of the Straits should be in the future.

b) Taking into account our interest in the United Nations system, and the probable views of the War and Navy departments, the US should stand upon the position it took on November 2, 1945.

c) The British position will probably be the same as that of the US, because one of the larger issues is whether the United Nations should allow the Soviet Union to force upon Turkey a strictly regional régime of the Straits including joint Soviet-Turkish defense, thus removing from the UN system the Black Sea and its littoral. In this connection, our defense arrangements for the Pacific will have a bearing and may tend to weaken our position of November 2, 1945.

Recommendations: It is suggested that the US should reply to a Turkish request for our views by stating simply that we stand by our November 2, 1945 note. Informally the Turks might be told that the US would not favor any régime of the Straits not fully consonant with the principles of UN, and that the US has noted that Points 4 and 5 of the Soviet proposals omit any reference to the United Nations, and propose the organization of "joint means of defense"

(i.e. bilateral arrangements) "to prevent the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers."

If the Turks seek our advice regarding their next step, we can hardly withhold it in the light of the Potsdam conversations and our November 2, 1945 note. Our informal advice might be that the Turks in a friendly manner should inform the USSR of Turkish views regarding the future régime of the Straits. This might gain time and allow some of the Paris smoke to clear away.⁵⁵ With more time, the UN defense pattern may emerge more clearly, thus drawing some of the foundation from under the Soviet demand for bilateral defense of the Straits.

The possibility exists that the Turks may consider the Soviet note as a demand for revision within the terms of Article 29 of the Montreux Convention which provides an opportunity to revise the Convention every five years (i.e. in 1946). If the Turks decide on this course it is likely to cause a strong Soviet reaction and to increase the tension between the Soviet Union and the Western powers in a confusing side arena. Turkish motivation might be that they have lived in suspense long enough and that Soviet-Turkish relations should be cleared up before the world without delay. On the other hand, there is a grave question whether the United States and Great Britain would gain in Paris and in UN by taking on the Soviet Union and its Black Sea satellites at a conference in the next few months to revise the Montreux Convention.

767.68119/8-946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, August 9, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 6:11 p. m.]

846. British Ambassador arrived [in Istanbul] from Ankara this morning; just came see me here where I have been laid up hospital few days. He saw Foreign Minister yesterday who read him note received that morning from Soviet Embassy of which following is summary: Begins with long catalog, alleged Turks' violations Montreux Convention permitting transit Straits during war by Italian, German warships; refers in detail to Potsdam Agreement regarding revision Montreux Convention and then proposes revision as follows: 1. Straits to be always open passage merchant vessels all countries; 2. always open warships Black Sea powers; 3. non-Black Sea warships not to pass Straits except in cases specially agreed upon; 4. establishment of Straits regime as natural maritime route to be

⁵⁵ The Paris Peace Conference was in session between July 27 and October 17. For documentation, see volumes III and IV.

within competence Turkey and other Black Sea powers but particularly Turkey and Russia, who should assure by their common means, defense of Straits.

Note added similar communication being made London and Washington.

Kelly said Saka remarked fourth point was obviously nub of matter and followed familiar Soviet line of bases in Straits. Saka said while technically under convention Soviet request revision should be supported by two other powers, Turkey would not stand on technicalities but would be prepared agree to conference for revision provided Turkish sovereignty independence respected.

Foreign Minister said would not reply to Soviet note until consulted US and UK and received their views. Also said he attached great importance to US participating conference.

Bursley telephoned me he has been asked call on Foreign Minister 4:00 o'clock this afternoon. He will telephone Department and advise me.

Sent Dept as 846, Moscow as 78, London as 114, Paris as 35.

WILSON

767.68119/8-1046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, August 10, 1946—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received 6:40 p. m.]

853. Assuming Department has text Soviet note we are not cabling it unless instructed.

There follows Bursley report yesterday's conversation Foreign Office.

Foreign Minister read note; first reading last paragraph. Said (1) charges regarding German and Italian vessels untrue; (2) point 4 excludes non-Black Sea powers from voice Straits control; (3) points 4 and 5 represent USSR views whereas first three more or less represent United States and United Kingdom views; (4) point 5 refers clearly to two countries and hides idea of bases. He asked rhetorically what non-Black Sea power such as United States or United Kingdom would attack Straits and where else in world were international waterways controlled as Soviets propose for Straits.

Questioned his ideas regarding conference, Saka said (1) note did not mention; (2) doubted possible prior end Paris Conference; (3) might depend replies Turkey received from United States, United Kingdom and Turkish reply to Soviets; (4) thought United States should be invited accordance willingness expressed our note November 2; (5) there seemed to be Soviet intention if conference [held] have only Black Sea powers.

Prior replying USSR note, Foreign Minister hopes receive early indication British and our views. Minister said Turks have own answer charges regarding wartime violations. At Berlin three powers agreed to revision Montreux Convention, not to new regime. Therefore note contrary spirit Berlin decision.

Saka has asked Soviet Embassy whether USSR intends publish note but has not had reply. Apparently he does not wish start publicity but also does not wish it published elsewhere earlier and have his Govt seemingly caught napping.⁵⁶ He would appreciate our views regarding publication.

Immediately following Erkin, Secretary General, told Bursley as his own views and representing trend thinking but not final decisions Turkish Government:

After receipt our views and British they would draft reply to Soviets embodying:

(a) Answer charges violation Montreux Convention.

(b) Invite attention lacunae between note and provisions Convention if there had not been Convention-required notifications. Erkin remarked about only way Convention observed was regarding date notification. Note provisions scarcely revisions but proposals new regime. Incidentally other Foreign Office source August 10 said very unclear whether Soviet note was (1) proposed revision Montreux; (2) individual approach to Turkey such as United States and British approaches, or (3) entirely new proposition.

(c) Turkey does not oppose Convention revision within framework Convention. Proposals put non-Black Sea powers outside negotiations.

(d) Turkey ready discuss first three points under proper circumstances.

(e) Points 4 and 5 inadmissible because 4 shuts out other powers (Secretary General also feels this very like Soviet Danube ideas). Point 5 contrary sovereignty security Turkey. Security in future should be assured not by bilateral agreements but by United Nations to which Turkey firmly attached.

Erkin reiterated Foreign Office would greatly appreciate our views and British.

While difficult divine, appraise feelings such astute Turks, Bursley found Saka smoking. Saka intense only when discussing points 4 and 5. He gave impression of man who had expected worst, somewhat relieved Soviet note (which delivered by Soviet Chargé about 10 a. m. August 8 Turkish time) less formidable blow than expected. Erkin, more forceful and precise than Foreign Minister, did not seem overly concerned but possibly taking matter more seriously.

To Department as 853, London 117, Paris as 38 and Moscow as 80.

WILSON

⁵⁶ The Soviet note was published on August 13 in both Ankara and Moscow.

761.67/8-1246 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, August 12, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received August 12—1:05 p. m.]

3159. Understand that during his recent conversation with Masaryk⁵⁷ and other Czechs Stalin gratuitously and out of context stated three times that USSR had no intention of attacking Turkey. Sent to Ankara as 43.

DURBROW

767.68119/8-1246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, August 12, 1946—4 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received 7:36 p. m.]

856. Embtel 853, August 10. From Bursley's report conversation Foreign Minister and Secretary General I believe Turks somewhat more concerned over Soviet note than impression gathered by British Ambassador indicated. This perhaps explained by fact Bursley saw them 24 hours later and they had more time to study note. After considering note I can appreciate their concern.

Following occurs to me:

1. Potsdam agreement provided three powers approach Turkish Government for revision Montreux Convention. US note November 2 last followed this procedure and proposed revision. Soviet note, however, proposes not revision but new regime on fundamentally different basis.

2. New regime would be established by Black Sea powers only, thus eliminating all other powers (it is in line Soviet policy Danube navigation). Defense Straits would be sole Turco-Russian responsibility, excluding other powers and UNO. Acceptance such proposal would mean end Turkish independence.

3. USSR is party Montreux Convention but note makes no pretense follow procedure article 29 for revision. Fact note delivered day before August 9⁵⁸ probably indicates only Soviet attempt confuse procedures as well as issues.

4. USSR of course cannot hope obtain acceptance proposal in entirety. Probably represents familiar technique staking out exaggerated claims with hope compromise and cash in to some extent.

⁵⁷ Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁸ A request for revision of the treaty had to be notified in detail to signatories 3 months prior to November 9 (the date the treaty went into force) after the lapse of a 5-year period; thus, August 9 was 3 months prior to the second 5-year period of the Convention, beginning in 1936.

In this connection worth recalling US note November 2 went about extreme limit concessions to Black Sea powers possible within framework Montreux Convention. In fact it gave Russia everything that country has sought regarding Straits regime from time Peter Great until Molotov demand June 1945. If USSR can get its note accepted with ours as basis discussion international conference, it will have nothing to lose (since our proposals are matter of record and Turkey and UK accepted in principle) and can hope gain at least something from mutual concession necessary reach agreement conference. Under these circumstances would seem better have no conference than one on basis points 4 and 5 Soviet note.

5. Turkish Government of course alive these dangers will undoubtedly reject points 4 and 5. Government consistently maintained policy national pact 1920 re Straits, namely so long Turkish sovereignty security safeguarded willing consider with other maritime nations any regime for use Straits.

6. Turkish Government has asked our views before replying Soviet note. I suggest reply might include statement our position same as set out our note November 2, namely we prepared if invited participate international conference to revise Montreux Convention, revision of course to be within framework convention. I should like to be authorized add that if Turkey, as we understand its case, finds it impossible accept points 4 and 5 Soviet note as basis discussion, we should understand Turkish position since we ourselves could not agree to such proposals.

7. Since Soviets communicated note to US, I suggest we also address comments directly to them, stating inability accept points 4 and 5 although prepared attend conference consider points 1 to 3 which fall within framework Montreux Convention and hence within provisions Potsdam agreement.

8. At risk appearing repetitious, I venture recall views I have expressed Department that USSR not interested in revision Montreux Convention on merits but seeking make use Straits question in order destroy Turkish independence, establish "friendly" regime Turkey, thereby closing one remaining gap in chain Soviet satellite states from Baltic to Black Sea.

9. It strikes me maintenance Turkish independence has become vital interest US. If Turkey falls under Soviet control last barrier removed in way Soviet advance to Persian Gulf and Suez and temptation would be more than human nature could withstand. Once this happens fat is in fire again. Fortunately Turks are tough obstinate people, determined defend their position. They represent great asset in struggle maintain peace, stability Middle East and we should not permit this asset to be frittered away.

I shall be able travel within 3 or 4 days and shall go Ankara await Department's reply.

Sent Department as 856, Paris for Usdel as 39, Moscow as 81, London as 118.

WILSON

767.68119/8-1246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1946—7 p. m.

577. Dept giving close study to Soviet note Aug 7 and appreciates helpful comments urtels 853 Aug 10 and 856 Aug 12. In view magnitude issues involved Dept has requested War and Navy comment⁵⁹ and is awaiting this and outcome Secstate's conversations with Bevin in Paris (see London's 63 Aug 13 to Ankara⁶⁰) before instructing you re US views.

Sent Ankara 577, rptd Paris 4062, London 6012, and Moscow 1481.

ACHESON

767.68119/8-1546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ANKARA, August 15, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received August 16—8:30 a. m.]

874. When I saw Secretary General FonOff this morning he read me draft proposed reply Soviet note on Straits.⁶¹ He made clear this draft not yet approved by Government and represented mainly his own views. However, from my experience when Erkin drafts paper on foreign relations it generally represents views Turkish Government. Furthermore in later conversation FonMin he referred this draft as expressing his views.

Draft discusses at length and reviews facts Soviet complaints violations Montreux Convention during war. Gist of reply is complaints are not directed against legal basis convention but against technical provisions relating to specification naval auxiliaries, et cetera, which permitted frauds by Axis powers notwithstanding entire good faith Turkish Government. Turkey can not admit that complaints this nature be pretext for rejection convention as whole or for calling into

⁵⁹ Department's letters dated August 13 not printed.

⁶⁰ Sent as telegram 7418 to the Department, not printed.

⁶¹ In telegram 871, August 15, 2 p. m., from Ankara, the Ambassador reported that the Turkish Foreign Minister had stated that final approval of the reply to the Soviet note would be held up pending expression of U. S. views (767.68119/8-1546).

question responsibility Turkish Government. Draft points out these minor infractions due fraud did not endanger security USSR and Turkey proved good faith as guardian Straits.

Draft then states Turkish supposition date of note means USSR requesting revision Montreux Convention and points out provisions article 29 USSR failed comply with but indicates Turk Government, considering also views American Government regarding revision Straits regime, does not intend raise difficulties regarding holding international conference comprising all signatories Montreux Convention less Japan to consider requests revision regularly formulated in accord terms Montreux Convention.

As to matters substance, draft states first three Soviet points more or less similar US proposals for revision Montreux Convention concerning which Turk Government indicates agreeable in principle consider them as basis discussion at international conference with presence US. This, however, would not be case points 4 and 5. [Point] 4 proposal new regime on new bases drawn up only by Turkey and Black Sea powers excluding others. This would mean abolition Montreux Convention which remains in effect by its terms until 1956 and ignores rights other signatories. Turkey could not consent to this and even less agree to discussion in conference in which such powers not represented. Point 5 means nothing less than organization defense Straits against menace from Mediterranean by Turkey and USSR. This gives rise grave objections from international and national points of view. From national viewpoint acceptance would mean grave prejudice to security and sovereignty Turkey respect of which is condition *sine qua non* of Turkish participation in conference for revision Montreux Convention. Such proposal would suppress role of equilibrium and liaison played by Turkey at Straits and reduce Turkey to position tributary state basing so-called security Black Sea powers on annihilation Turkish security. From international viewpoint Turkey finds difficult understand apprehension Soviets which motivated proposed new security system. Turkey cosignatory with USSR San Francisco charter believes new conception security is that all states under guarantee forces UNO of which USSR and Turkey are members. Consequently in case Russia fears attack on Straits, Turkey believes question should be referred to UNO to which organization Turkey remains strongly attached.

Draft ends with statement copy note being sent signatories Montreux Convention as well as US who Turkey hopes will attend any conference for revision Montreux Convention.

To make certain I inquired whether correct interpretation foregoing in sense Turkey declines conference at which points 4 and 5

would serve as basis discussion. Erkin said this was correct interpretation draft and he was convinced it represented views Turkish Government. He stated attitude National Assembly yesterday when PriMin referred to Soviet note made it clear Turkey could never agree participate in conference at which such points affecting Turkey's sovereignty and independence might be subjects discussion. In later conversation with PriMin we [*he?*] repeated this note.

Repeated Paris 50, Moscow 92, London 129.

WILSON

740.00119 Council/8-1546 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

4122. Secdel 676. For Secretary Byrnes only. State War Navy Depts at highest levels, after series of meetings, agreed upon a memorandum re Turkey and the Soviet Union. This memo was presented to President in person today by Secretaries of War and Navy and myself. Also present were top ranking officers of army and navy.

President approved policy recommended in the memo and stated he was prepared to pursue it "to the end". President specifically asked for any comments which you may care to make.

It was agreed with President that draft reply to Turkish Govt's inquiry as to our attitude toward Soviet proposals re the Straits should be prepared at once and sent to you for comment and to him for approval before despatch to Ankara.

Draft reply will follow in subsequent telegram. President planning leave Washington Aug 16—2:30 PM so any comment re memo should reach him before that hour.

Memo reads as follows:

"In our opinion, the primary objective of the Soviet Union is to obtain control of Turkey.

We believe that if the Soviet Union succeeds in introducing into Turkey armed forces with the ostensible purpose of enforcing the joint control of the Straits, the Soviet Union will use these forces in order to obtain control over Turkey.

If the Soviet Union succeeds in its objective obtaining control over Turkey it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining control over Greece and over the whole Near and Middle East.

It is our experience that when the Soviet Union obtains predominance in an area, American and, in fact, all Western influences and contacts are gradually eliminated from that area. In our opinion, therefore, the establishment by the Soviet Union of bases in the Dar-

danelles or the introduction of Soviet armed forces into Turkey on some other pretext would, in the natural course of events, result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East, including the Eastern Mediterranean, falling under Soviet control and in those areas being cut off from the Western world.

When we refer to the Near and Middle East, we have in mind the territory lying between the Mediterranean and India. When the Soviet Union has once obtained full mastery of this territory, which is strategically important from the point of view of resources, including oil, and from the point of view of communications, it will be in a much stronger position to obtain its objectives in India and China.

We, therefore, feel that it is in the vital interests of the United States that the Soviet Union should not by force or through threat of force succeed in its unilateral plans with regard to the Dardanelles and Turkey. If Turkey under pressure should agree to the Soviet proposals, any case which we might later present in opposition to the Soviet plan before the United Nations or to the world public would be materially weakened; but the Turkish Government insists that it has faith in the United Nations system and that it will resist by force Soviet efforts to secure bases in Turkish territory even if Turkey has to fight alone. While this may be the present Turkish position, we are frankly doubtful whether Turkey will continue to adhere to this determination without assurance of support from the United States.

It is unfortunate that the Soviet Union, ignoring the United Nations and Montreux concept of Straits control, has made a formal proposal to Turkey for bilateral agreement regarding the joint defense of the Straits because it is always extremely difficult to persuade the Soviet Union, once formally committed on a subject, to retreat. Experience has shown such a retreat cannot be brought about by skillful argument or the appeal to reason. The only thing which will deter the Russians will be the conviction that the United States is prepared, if necessary, to meet aggression with force of arms. There is a strong possibility that if the Soviet Union is given clearly and unequivocally to understand that the United States will firmly and with determination support Turkey in case Turkey is made the object of Soviet measures threatening the independence, sovereignty or territorial interests of Turkey the Soviet Union will pause and will not push the matter further at this time.

In our opinion therefore the time has come when we must decide that we shall resist with all means at our disposal any Soviet aggression and in particular, because the case of Turkey would be so clear, any Soviet aggression against Turkey. In carrying out this policy our words and acts will only carry conviction to the Soviet Union if they are formulated against the background of an inner conviction and determination on our part that we cannot permit Turkey to become the object of Soviet aggression. Threats or provocations should have no part in the implementation of this policy which will require in the first instance frank discussions with the principal nations involved and strong support of Turkey in the United Nations, should that become necessary.

In our judgment the best hope of preserving peace is that the conviction should be carried to the U.S.S.R., Turkey and all other powers that in case the United Nations is unsuccessful in stopping Soviet aggression, the United States would not hesitate to join other nations in meeting armed aggression by the force of American arms."^{61a}

ACHESON

767.68119/8-1546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

ANKARA, August 15, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received August 16—8:21 a. m.]

875. British Ambassador read me text British reply to Turkish Government request for views concerning Soviet note on Straits, which he gave Foreign Minister yesterday.

British state points 1 to 3 Soviet note in general accord with US proposals concerning which UK in agreement. Points 4 and 5, however, raise grave objections. Point 4 would exclude UK and all other non-Black Sea signatories from responsibility future Straits regime and also exclude US. Point 5 means establishment some sort Soviet base in Straits. Both proposals not acceptable to UK and presumably not to Turkey. As to Turkish reply, British suggest it might be to effect they have noted Soviet proposal for modification Montreux Convention; Turkey would be prepared attend international conference discuss amendments convention if all parties concerned agree; certain of Soviet proposals completely at variance with expressed views of some governments and Turkish agreement to participate in conference does not mean Turkey would be prepared support all proposals put forward by Soviets; Turkey would, however, consider in conjunction with other powers any appropriate modification Montreux Convention. British point out reply on such lines would be noncontroversial, would avoid involving Turkey in direct discussion with USSR on questions of substance and would uphold position that question of modifying international convention must be on basis international conference all interested parties.

[To] Paris as 51. Department repeat to London and Moscow if desired.

WILSON

^{61a} The Secretary of State directed that a copy of telegram 4122 be sent to Ambassador Wilson because he felt it "highly important" for the Ambassador to have the telegram as background (letter of August 17 to Ambassador Wilson from H. Freeman Matthews, Political Adviser to Secretary Marshall at the Paris Peace Conference, Ankara Post Files, Lot 57-F72, 800 Political Affairs). Mr. Matthews' communication noted also that "It seems to us obviously necessary that you should be fully informed of the seriousness with which the question of Turkey's integrity is regarded in the highest quarters."

767.68119/8-1646

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1946.

Following our meeting with you yesterday, we carried out your instructions to inform Secretary Byrnes of the recommendations which have been made to you and of the views which you expressed, stating that you would appreciate any comments he might have. We also submitted to the Secretary a proposed communication to the Turkish Government setting forth your views. As you will see from the attached telegram,⁶² the Secretary heartily concurs in your decision and has made some suggestions for incorporation in the communication to the Turkish Government in the general direction of strengthening it. He has also in another attached telegram⁶³ sent us a copy of the British communication to Turkey.

If you approve of the attached communication to the Turkish Government we shall send it immediately.⁶⁴ We propose, if you approve, to send a note to the Soviet Government acknowledging the copy of their note to the Turkish Government and expressing in somewhat different form the views of this Government in regard to their proposal. It seems advisable some time next week to make public our communication to the Soviet Government, or at least its substance. We do not propose to publish our note to Turkey.

Does this course meet with your approval?⁶⁵

DEAN ACHESON

767.68119/8-1246 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey
(Wilson)*⁶⁶

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1946—1 p. m.

589. In your reply to the Turkish inquiry referred to in your 856 Aug 12 (rptd Paris as Ankara's 39, to Moscow as Ankara's 81 and to London as Ankara's 118) you may state as follows:

"The Govt of the United States firmly adheres to the position taken in the note addressed by the American Embassy in Ankara to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 2, 1945. In accordance with that position it cannot agree that the regime of the

⁶² Telegram 4051, August 16, from Paris, not printed.

⁶³ Telegram 4049, August 16, from Paris, not printed.

⁶⁴ See *infra*.

⁶⁵ Notation by President Truman: "Approved Harry S. Truman".

⁶⁶ Initialed also by President Truman. Draft of this telegram was sent to the Secretary of State in telegram 4133 (Secdel 677), August 15, 7 p. m., to Paris, with suggestion that he make any comments he wished (740.00119 Council/8-1546).

Straits is a matter of concern only to the Black Sea Powers. Furthermore, the Government of the United States cannot agree to the proposal that Turkey and the Soviet Union organize joint means of defense of the Straits. The Government of the United States believes that the regime for the Straits should be based upon, and administered in accordance with, the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and will insist this course be followed. As indicated in the note of the Embassy under reference, the Government of the United States would be pleased to participate in a conference called for the purpose of revising the Montreux Convention."

In delivering the reply to the Turkish Government you may state orally that you have been informed that your Government's reply was formulated only after full consideration had been given to the matter at the highest levels. You may add that your Government is of the opinion that, in view of the extreme delicacy of the situation, it would be appropriate for the Turkish Government in replying to the Soviet Government to assume a reasonable, but firm, attitude. In agreeing to participate in a conference the Turkish Government may wish to make it clear that by such action it does not indicate willingness to agree to the Soviet proposals but merely willingness to discuss with the Soviet Union and other interested governments any specific amendments to the Montreux Convention.

Sent Ankara as Dept's 589; rptd to Paris for the Secretary Secdel 686 as Dept's no. 4147, rptd Moscow as Dept's no. 1505, rptd London as Dept's 6090.

ACHESON

767.68119/8-1746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, August 17, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received August 18—9: 46 p. m.]

886. I had talk this morning with new Prime Minister Peker. He made favorable impression, forceful personality, knows what he wants, frank, direct in manner, at same time giving impression more imagination and subtlety than opposition critics led one to believe.

He said he was awaiting our reply on Soviet notes concerning Straits with great interest. Turkey would like nothing better than friendliest possible relations with Russia, but Russia shows no signs reciprocating this desire. He repeated what Foreign Minister had told me, namely, that while prepared discuss at international conference revision Montreux Convention with other signatories and US, Turkey obviously could not admit as basis discussion points 4 and 5 Soviet note.

Speaking internal political situation Prime Minister said he is determined, despite obstacles such as political inexperience and diffi-

culties from opposition, to make definite progress on sound, stable basis towards democracy. He said there will be no turning back on this road as there was in 1930. He remarked Turkey's political life can no longer be built around one dominating personality like Ataturk and Inonu, but henceforth must develop towards fuller participation people. He said this was conception of President Inonu himself. He said there will be squalls and perhaps even storms on way to greater political democracy but his Government is determined persist in this direction.

Regarding economic questions he professed hope achieve lower prices, saying there could be no miracles performed but he believed some progress could be made this direction. He mentioned intention his Government facilitate participation private capital in economic development. Also stressed intention remove wartime controls on business and trade.

Prime Minister said he attached great importance to increasing friendship, understanding with US. Said US playing by far outstanding international role today in maintenance peace security. He appreciates Turkey is but slightly and often unfavorably known in US and intends, as soon as can get clear from immediate pressing problems, to give attention to making Turkey better known in US.

WILSON

740.00119 Council/8-1746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

4196. Secdel 698. Draft reply we are proposing send to Soviet Emb note of Aug 7 set forth in Section Two this telegram. We feel we should be frank in making our position known to Soviet Govt at once particularly since we have given our views to Turks. In view importance of matter we would like to have your comments before final action is taken. It also occurred to us you might care discuss document with Attlee or Bevin. We are not showing it Brit Emb Washington although we have informed it our intentions. We are planning hand note to Soviet Chargé, inform him it is our intention make it public in near future and ask him inquire whether his Govt would object if we should publish Soviet note to us simultaneously. President before departure approved this course of action.

[Here follows text of proposed note; for note handed to the Soviet Chargé by Acting Secretary of State Acheson on August 19, see page 847. The text was telegraphed to Moscow, Ankara, London, and Paris on August 19.]

ACHESON

767.68119/8-1746 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, August 17, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received August 17—11 a. m.]

4078. Secret for Ambassador Wilson⁶⁷ from the Secretary: I think that the Turkish Government would have to express willingness to attend an international conference on the revision of the Montreux Convention. However, if, as indicated in your telegram 871 to Department,⁶⁸ the Turkish Government stated in its acceptance that it could not consider any proposal which would liquidate an international treaty (point 4) which by its terms remains in effect for 10 years more and replace it by a new agreement excluding present signatories of existing treaty (with the exception of Japan), and if the Turkish Government also stated that it could not seriously consider point 5 on grounds that it is a direct threat to Turkish sovereignty and independence, the US Government would understand and sympathize since under similar circumstances we would take the same position. You are authorized to convey the foregoing to the Turkish Government.

Department please relay to Ankara as 23 from Paris.

[BYRNES]

767.68119/8-1846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, August 18, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received 11:12 p. m.]

888. I delivered to Foreign Minister this afternoon text of reply given Deptel 589, August 16, and made oral communication authorized therein.

Minister expressed appreciation, said glad observe US held same views as Turkey re points 4 and 5 Soviet note. Participation US any conference revise Montreux Convention essential Turkish viewpoint. Saka said Turk reply to Soviets will accord entirely with US suggestions. He said reply, draft of which had been read to me (Embtel 874, August 15), would not attempt to limit points to be discussed at conference, although it would state Turk Govt's views regarding points 4 and 5 Soviet note.

He thinks it necessary do this so that if and when conference convenes there can be no doubt regarding Turk position on those points. Reply will indicate Turk willingness participate in conference with interested govts, including US, to discuss proposals for amendment Montreux Convention.

⁶⁷ See last paragraph regarding relay to Ankara.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

Minister said reply should be ready about August 21 or 22; it will be necessary obtain approval Assembly before sending to Moscow. He plans publish text day or two after delivery to Soviet Govt.

Sent Dept, Paris for the Secretary as 54, Moscow as 97, London as 132.

WILSON

767.68119/8-746

The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé (Orekhov)

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1946.

SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your note of August 7, 1946 which sets forth the text of the note addressed on the same day by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the Republic of Turkey and express the appreciation of this Government for the courtesy of the Soviet Government in making this information available.

It will be recalled that the American Embassy in Moscow made available to the Soviet Government in November 1945 a copy of the note which the American Embassy in Ankara delivered to the Turkish Government on November 2, 1945.^{68a}

This Government has given careful study to the views expressed by the Soviet Government in its note to the Turkish Government. It would appear from a comparison of this Government's note of November 2, 1945 with the Soviet note to the Turkish Government of August 7, 1946 that the views of the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union, while not in entire accord, are in general agreement with regard to the three following proposals set forth in the Soviet note:

1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.
2. The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.

The fourth proposal set forth in the Soviet note does not appear to envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention as suggested in our note to the Turkish Government of November 2, 1945, but rather the establishment of a new regime which would be confined to Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. It is the view of this Government that the regime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United

^{68a} See p. 803. See also telegram 1049, Oct. 30, 1945, to Ankara, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1265.

States. This Government cannot, therefore, agree with the Soviet view that the establishment of the regime of the Straits should come under the competence of the Black Sea powers to the exclusion of other powers.

The fifth proposal set forth in the note of the Soviet Government was that Turkey and the Soviet Union should organize joint means of defense of the Straits. It is the firm opinion of this Government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations.

It is observed that the note of the Soviet Government contains no reference to the United Nations. The position of the Government of the United States is that the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the United Nations and should function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations.

The Government of the United States reaffirms its willingness to participate in a conference called to revise the Montreux Convention.

Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

767.68119/8-1946: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

ANKARA, August 19, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received August 20—12:31 a. m.]

893. Most urgent telegram relayed from Paris as 23, August 17⁶⁹ just received.

You will have noted from my 888, August 18 to Dept, repeated Paris for the Secretary as 54, and my 892, August 19,⁷⁰ repeated Paris for the Secretary as 57, that Turkish Foreign Office since receipt our reply and British reply is working on line of omitting from its proposed note to Soviets any categoric rejection of points 4 and 5 of Soviet note in sense which could lead to assumption that Turkey would not attend international conference if these points were to be considered as forming basis of discussion. Turkish draft according to my latest information will, while stating objections to points 4 and 5, not give appearance of trying to limit points which might be discussed at conference and will make clear Turkish willingness to attend an international conference on revision Montreux Convention.

⁶⁹ See last paragraph of telegram 4078, August 17, from Paris, p. 846.

⁷⁰ Latter not printed; it reported Turkish wish to refrain from action which might cause difficulties for the U.S. and British Governments in dealing with the Soviet Union (767.68119/8-1146).

In view information given me this morning by Secretary General, Foreign Office, my 892 to Dept and 57 to Paris, I am of opinion that if I now convey to Turkish Govt content of relay from Paris 23 Turkish Govt will stiffen attitude and so draft reply as to indicate that while Turkey is willing attend international conference for revision Montreux Convention it will not attend conference if points 4 and 5 of Soviet note are to be discussed.

In view foregoing please telegraph me immediately whether you wish telegram from Paris 23 to be conveyed to Turkish Govt.

My own judgment is that under all circumstances better leave things as they are and not convey telegram. My present information is Turkish note to Soviets will be delivered to Soviet Embassy here Wednesday or Thursday. If I find note is to be delivered before Thursday morning 10 a. m., Turkish time, I shall suggest to Foreign Minister to delay delivery until that date and hour on off chance I might receive some further word from my Govt.⁷¹

Sent Dept; to Paris for the Secretary as 58.

WILSON

767.68119/8-2046

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1946.

The British Ambassador⁷² called at his request. He said that he had come to ask a question relating to our note to the Turks and the Soviet Union about the Straits. He said that two of our officers had had conversations with two of the British officers, referring to Mr. Loy Henderson, who had talked with Mr. Balfour,⁷³ and to Mr. Matthews⁷⁴ who had talked with someone in Paris. Both officers had stated that the United States took a very serious view of the situation and had used an expression, which escapes me for the moment, but which was something to the effect that the United States was prepared to see this matter through to the end. He said this had created quite a bit of excitement in London, and he was calling on me to ask whether this was an indication that the United States was prepared to resort to war if necessary to maintain its position.

I said that I thought that I understood what our officers had had in mind and perhaps the Ambassador could get a better view of the situation if I gave him some of the background. The view of the

⁷¹ In telegram 4115, Delsec 833, August 20, from Paris, Secretary Byrnes expressed agreement with the Ambassador's views to refrain from conveying to Turkish Government contents of telegram 23 from Paris (740.00119 Council/8-2046).

⁷² Lord Inverchapel.

⁷³ John Balfour, British Minister in Washington.

⁷⁴ H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

Department, which was shared by the War and Navy Departments and had been laid before the President and approved by him was that this was a most serious matter and that the United States should not get into the matter at all unless it realized fully the seriousness of it and was prepared to conduct itself in a manner appropriate to that realization. We thought, in the first place, that if this were not true, the United States might easily mislead other people into taking positions which would cause the very trouble which we wished to avoid, thereby inadvertently getting us into a position for which we would not be adequately prepared. We thought, in the second place, that if we thoroughly appreciated the seriousness of the step which we were taking, we and the others involved in this matter would conduct ourselves with restraint and seriousness, doing everything in our power to bring about a peaceful solution of the matter, and that this attitude would of itself be communicated by our very acts to the Soviet Union. I said that, of course, the Ambassador appreciated that not only constitutionally but as a matter of the actual operation of government in the United States no one could commit the United States to entering military operations and that in the long run the state of public opinion and the state of Congressional opinion were the dominant factors. It was with this in mind that we had talked with the press this afternoon for the purpose of impressing the seriousness of the matter upon them and urging them to treat the matter with solemnity and restraint. I thought that all the officials of the Government who were dealing with the matter understood all the possible consequences and were acting with all the care and thought that this understanding brought to them.

The Ambassador said that he had believed before he came to see me that I would say very much what I had said to him, but that some people in the Embassy and London were taking a slightly more excited view of the matter.

DEAN ACHESON

767.68119/8-2246

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Soviet Chargé in the United Kingdom*⁷⁵

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of August 8th in which you communicated to me the text of a note which the Soviet

⁷⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on August 22. The note was handed to the Soviet Chargé in London on August 21 and published on November 22

Government had delivered to the Turkish Government on the 7th August concerning the future of the Montreux Convention. The Soviet Government will already be aware from the communication addressed to the Soviet Government by H. M. Ambassador in Moscow on the 23rd November 1945, that His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that a revision of the Montreux Convention is desirable and that they would, if the Soviet Government or the Turkish Government desired to call a Conference for the revision of the Convention, to ready be ready to take part in its work. His Majesty's Government have consequently given careful consideration to the proposals which the Soviet Government have now put forward for the new Regime which they consider should be established in the Straits. Before, however, they comment on the proposals put forward by the Soviet Government, His Majesty's Government wish to point out that the agreements reached regarding this question at the Potsdam Conference, as recorded in Section XVI of the Protocol of the Conference, were that as a next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. It was not, as is suggested in the second paragraph of the note under reply, agreed at Potsdam that the matter should be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish Government. As regards the proposals now put forward by the Soviet Government, His Majesty's Government note that there is no mention in these proposals of the United Nations. His Majesty's Government desire to place it on record that in any modification of the Montreux Convention the Regime should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Subject to this His Majesty's Government wish to offer no comments at the present stage upon the first three proposals made by the Soviet Government. As regards the fourth proposal, however, His Majesty's Government would point out that it has for long been internationally recognised that the Regime of the Straits is the concern of other states besides the Black Sea powers. His Majesty's Government cannot therefore agree with the Soviet view that the future Regime should be the concern of the Black Sea powers and Turkey alone. As regards the fifth proposal that Turkey and the Soviet Union should organise the defence of the Straits by joint means, His Majesty's Government consider that Turkey, as the territorial power concerned, should continue to be responsible for the defence and control of the Straits. In conclusion, His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear once again that they would be ready to attend an international conference to discuss a revision of the 1936 Convention if all the interested parties agree.

767.68119/8-2146 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*SECRET
PRIORITYANKARA, August 21, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received August 22—10 a. m.]

908. I have just read final draft Turkish note in reply to Soviets on Straits. It seems to me excellent job and is as Dept suggested, both reasonable and firm. In general it follows lines draft summary of which I telegraphed my 874, August 15 to Dept, 50 to Paris. A few phrases have been modified which otherwise might have been open to interpretation that Turkey was unwilling attend conference unless it was agreed beforehand points 4 and 5 of Soviet note would not be discussed. At insistence of Cabinet a statement has been inserted regarding point 5 of Soviet note to following effect: That from national viewpoint Soviet proposal is incompatible with inalienable sovereign rights of Turkey and with its security which cannot be made subject to restriction. Essence of Turkish observations regarding points 4 and 5 Soviet note is that they state firmly Turkish objections thereto but do not give impression that Turkey would be unwilling to attend a conference unless these points were barred beforehand from discussion.

Note makes clear Turkey's willingness attend international conference with other signatory states and US to discuss specified amendments to Montreux Convention.

Note will probably be delivered to Soviet Embassy tomorrow morning and published Turkish press morning August 24.

Repeated Paris for Secdel as 62, London as 135, Moscow as 100.

WILSON

767.68119/8-2246 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*SECRET
PRIORITYANKARA, August 22, 1946—2 p. m.
[Received 7:35 p. m.]

912. Re Embtel 911.⁷⁶ "To return to practical ends which Govt of Soviet Union would appear wish attain through note August 7, Govt of Republic takes it that it is question putting into application of [*the*] procedure for quinquennial revision provided for in article 29 of Montreux Convention. Choice of date for giving notice, as well as

⁷⁶ Not printed; it reported that the Turkish Foreign Office had given the American Embassy an official copy of the Turkish note of August 22 to the Soviet Union. (767.68119/8-2246) The note was 17 pages long, 10 of which refuted Soviet charges of violation of the Montreux Convention. Substantive questions were treated in the remainder, quoted in telegram 912. The note was handed to the Soviet Chargé on August 22 and published on August 24. Bracketed insertions and corrections in this telegram are based on the complete text of the note printed in *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, p. 50.

indication of actions of proposed amendments would seem militate in favor such interpretation. If such is indeed intention of Soviet Govt, request for revision formulated ought, in order be admissible, fulfill certain conditions provided for in above-mentioned article 29 of convention. Principally necessary that request be supported by one or two contracting parties depending upon what articles of convention [it] is [a] question of modifying. Then request, thus supported, must be notified to all contracting parties 3 months before expiration current 5 years. Govt of Republic, which had noted desire for revision expressed Soviet Govt and which moreover desires satisfy wish expressed by American public opinion concerning use of maritime passages, does not intend, insofar as it is concerned, create any difficulty as regards placing in application, with agreement of signatories Montreux Convention and USA and through international conference including above-mentioned powers, of every demand for revision provided for by convention and examination of proposed amendments in concert with said powers.

As regards basic part of question raised, Govt of Republic cognizant five principles constituting Soviet amendments. It observes that three first points take up in more or less identical terms suggestions presented Nov 2, 1945 by Govt USA for adaptation [*readaptation*] Montreux Convention to present conditions. In reply then made to American suggestions, Turk Govt stated *inter alia* 'that it pertained to international conference of signatories provided for by structure itself of Montreux Convention to determine best way conciliate principle freedom of passage through Straits for merchant and war vessels with rights of sovereignty and security of Turkey.'⁷⁷

[']That once it had been informed of full viewpoints three powers represented at Potsdam regarding Straits question it would not fail proceed to thorough study of problem, study after which it would hasten convey its point of view to three above-mentioned powers; that it was nonetheless at moment permitted to say that Turk Govt received favorably American suggestions which, under certain conditions and reservations, were worthy being taken as basis for discussion, that as regards participation USA Govt in proposed conference, Turk Govt regarded it not only as realization warm desire but also as imperative international necessity.'

Same answer applies at present to 31st [three first] propositions contained in Soviet note.

It is not the same case with propositions contained in points 4 and 5 of said note which require more thorough consideration. As regards point 4 in particular, Soviet note seems foresee new Straits

⁷⁷ For Prime Minister Saraçoğlu's statement at press conference, December 5, 1945, see telegram 1541, December 6, 1945, from Ankara, *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1282.

regime set up on new basis and in development of which only Turkey and powers bordering Black Sea would participate to exclusion of all others. Such concert [*concept*] seems in first place set aside remainder of duration of Montreux Convention which is scheduled exist at least until 1956 and procedure for revision which excludes by definition setting up of new regime general economy of which would depart from Montreux regime. It seems moreover desire ignore interests of other powers signatory to convention which have equal right participate negotiations and signature revised text [and] which make evident in most definite manner their desire to take part these negotiations.

As for 5th principle set forth in Soviet note, Govt of Republic states that this proposition aims at nothing less than organizing security of Straits against any aggression coming from Mediterranean by means of establishment combined Turk-Soviet defense.

From national point of view, Soviet proposition not compatible with inalienable rights sovereignty of Turkey nor with its security which brooks no restriction. Moreover, from international point of view same proposition raises as well gravest objection.

Acceptance of Soviet thesis would result suppression role of factor of equilibrium and liaison played by Turkey in Straits and to build so-called security of Black Sea powers upon annihilation security of Turkey. Turk Govt experiences many difficulties understand Soviet apprehensions which new security system set forth in August 7 note would remove. Govt of Republic considers that Turkey is herself interested defend by all her means the country against all aggression no matter whence it comes. History gives no example of war in which Turkey has been involved without Turk nation having accomplished its duty to country. Thus up to Turkey take all measures necessary insure security of country against every danger which may come from abroad. If Turkey had not been in position defend by its own means the sovereign rights which it exercises over Straits it would not have escaped during greatest war history has known, fate of its neighbors which were all attacked or occupied. Moreover, to desire further to strengthen form of defense having already been proven, at very moment when all nations of world are competing in order to bring their contribution to greater [*create an*] era of peace and security, would be to deny existence and aims of United Nations Charter and would show toward these same nations, of which ideal is to preserve future generations from scourge of war, a mistrust of which Turk Govt is unable to understand cause.

Surest guarantee for security Soviet Union in Black Sea resides, not in search for privileged strategic position in Straits, position incom-

patible with dignity of sovereign [rights of an independent country, but in the restoration of friendly and trusting relations with a strong Turkey, which, as far as it is concerned, is determined to dedicate itself with all its strength to the inauguration of this happy era, but whose efforts in this direction must be seconded by an equal good will coming from its northern neighbor. Moreover, beyond this important guarantee furnished by Turkey herself, the Turkish Government, as co-signatory with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the San Francisco Charter, believes that it has the right to think that, in the new concept of] war, security of each country is under guarantee of international forces placed in service of UNO by UN of which Soviet Union as well as Turkey are members.

Consequently even in wholly improbable case where Soviet Union feared attack on its Black Sea positions as result of aggression coming from Mediterranean through Straits, Turk Govt considers that there would be reason for it to rely on efficacy of UNO to which Turkey as far as it is concerned remains firmly attached.

Copy of this note has been sent to signatories of Montreux Convention as well as to USA delegate [*Government*] which Turkey would be happy see participate international conference for revision Montreux Convention."

Department repeat to Paris if desired.

WILSON

767.68119/8-2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, August 23, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received August 24—6: 03 a. m.]

917. Now that US, Turkish and UK replies have been sent to Soviet note on Straits, question arises as to further developments this problem.

Following occurred to me: We have nothing whatsoever to gain and risk losing something if international conference is convened for revision Montreux Convention. Our interest would seem to lie in maintenance *status quo* during next 5-year period Montreux Convention. If this reasoning is sound, we and British should avoid taking initiative to convene such a conference and leave any initiative in this sense to Soviet Union. As regards Turkish position, I am informed by Secretary General, Foreign Office, that at Cabinet meeting to consider Turkish reply opinion was unanimous that Turkey's interests would be best served if no conference to revise convention is held.

While British, Turks and ourselves are, of course, committed to attend conference for revision Montreux if such conference should take

place, there is no reason we should facilitate action looking to convening conference. Our notes have effect of returning problem to Soviet door and it would seem wise to leave it there for present at least.⁷⁸

WILSON

767.68119/8-2646: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, August 26, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received August 26—2:13 p. m.]

926. In conversation this morning with Secretary General, Foreign Office, he read me excerpts from telegram from Turkish Ambassador, Paris, reporting conversation with Secretary General, Quai d'Orsay, as follows: When French Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow presented French note on Straits to Dekanozov,⁷⁹ latter said he failed to understand French point of view. Chargé replied France, as signatory Montreux Convention, could recognize changes in Straits regime only if agreed to by all states party to Convention. Dekanozov stated, in effect, Montreux Convention no longer in force since Turkish violations during war destroyed its validity and it was now a question not of modifying non-existing convention but of establishing a new regime. USSR in sending its note to Turkey had acted accordance with Potsdam Agreement rather than on basis provisions Montreux Convention. French Chargé reiterated France regards Montreux Convention as in force and can be modified only by appropriate action interested powers.

Erkin said foregoing views expressed by Dekanozov may give indication line Soviets intend to follow.

Repeated Paris for Secdel as 71.

WILSON

767.68119/8-2846

The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Acting Secretary of the Navy (Kenney) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 28 August 1946.

(SC) A14-7/EF70

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have received a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (copy attached) containing their views as to the military implications in the existing international situation concerning the Turkish Straits. You will note that these views, in which we

⁷⁸ The Department replied in telegram 623, August 29, 4 p. m., that it agreed and did not contemplate taking initiative to convene a conference for revision of the Montreux Convention (767.68119/8-2346).

⁷⁹ Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

concur fully, are in general accord with those expressed when the Acting Secretaries of State and War and the Secretary of the Navy met with the President on August 15 to discuss the Turkish situation.

Sincerely yours,

W. JOHN KENNEY

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 23 August 1946.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the military implications in the existing international situation concerning the Turkish Straits, and request that these views be furnished the Secretary of State.

The methods and weapons of modern war are such that possession by the Soviets of military base rights in the Dardanelles would not provide for the effective defense of traffic through these Straits unless such rights were extended to include military dominance of the area for several hundred miles in all directions. Furthermore, traffic clearing the Dardanelles must still pass through the island-studded Aegean which is flanked by Greece and Turkey and controlled by Crete. The same logic which would justify Soviet participation in the defense of the Dardanelles would also tend to justify further Soviet military penetration through the Aegean.

Soviet participation in defense of the Turkish Straits would project Soviet military power into an area vital to the Turks. Even though Soviet military privileges and forces within Turkey were nominal, the Soviets have a tremendous capability to reinforce in days or hours a bridgehead within the country. This situation, involving Soviet immediate military dominance of Turkey, would be obvious to all Turks. It is believed this situation would so soften the Turkish attitude toward Russia as to soon result in reducing Turkey to a satellite Soviet State.

Strategically Turkey is the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. She is one of the few national entities and the only nation now possessing, according to best available information, a firm resolution to oppose the apparent Soviet policy of expansion in the area. While lacking an effective navy and air force, Turkey possesses a rugged and considerable ground army which, particularly if properly equipped and supported, is capable of offering material resistance, even to the Soviets, if the nation is attacked.

If Russia attains military dominance of Turkey by political concessions, her military threat is projected so that there is grave doubt that, in case of a major world crisis, the Middle East and Eastern

Mediterranean could be considered militarily tenable for the non-Soviet powers. Furthermore, the faith and political reliance in the major non-Soviet powers of the Middle Eastern peoples and nations on the periphery of the "iron curtain" is a considerable although intangible factor in U.S. security. This faith and reliance will be gravely affected if not dissipated by success of the Soviets in their present political venture in the direction of the Turkish Straits. The logical result is a further weakening of the present stand of those nations, including Great Britain, peripheral to the "iron curtain", against Soviet pressure and expansionist policy.

From the military standpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff view with concern the present world situation. In spite of the written word of the United Nations' Charter, many and major indications point to a calculated Soviet policy of expanding Soviet *de facto* geographical and political control. Such a Soviet policy has the most serious impact on the vital interests of the United States.

It is recognized that under present circumstances:

a. Successful opposition of Soviet efforts against Turkey rests primarily on the continuation of the will of the Turkish government and people to take a firm stand against Russian demands.

b. The U.S. people are not well informed concerning the situation which is the subject of this paper and that any useful action, in the interests of U.S. security, is in the end dependent upon their comprehension and support.

c. Britain's immediate security interest in the situation is even more acute than that of the United States.

In light of the foregoing it is suggested that the military situation of Turkey would be greatly improved if the United States would give:

a. Encouragement to the Turkish purchase from the United States of such nonmilitary materials and supplies as will enable a strengthening of Turkey's economic and military position.

b. Permission to Turkey to purchase from the United States arms, military aircraft and other military equipment in order to strengthen the defensive ability of her armed forces as outlined in SWNCC 202/2/

c. Consideration to the advisability of supplying selected U.S. technicians, including officers, for the purpose of assisting the Turks.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

(JCS 1704—Approved as amended 23 August 1946)⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Secretary Byrnes commented favorably on this paper in telegram 4787, September 24 (Delsec 986), from Paris, p. 223.

767.68119/8-1646

The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Bonnet)

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of France and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Embassy's Note No. 513, of August 16, 1946,⁸¹ setting forth the views of the French Government on the question of the revision of the Straits Convention. The Department has not failed to take note of the position of the French Government in this matter, and is in full agreement with the latter's view that the problem is one which should be settled at an international conference of all interested powers.

The Ambassador will recall that the Government of the United States, on November 2, 1945, signified its willingness to participate in such a conference; and that this willingness was reaffirmed in the American note to the Soviet Embassy on August 19, 1946, a copy of which was sent to the Embassy of France.

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1946.

767.68119/9-946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, September 9, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received 10: 15 p. m.]

965. I asked Foreign Minister today if he had any info to indicate line Soviets may now take concerning Straits question. Saka said he had no info whatsoever. In his view Soviets have three courses open to them:

1. To attack Turkey. This he regards most unlikely as USSR, in his judgment, unready for war at present and undesirous run risk general conflict.

2. Take steps convoke international conference revision Montreux Convention. Soviets, while realizing their points 4 and 5 would be ruled out, might conceivably consider it advantageous have conference revise Convention sense note last November which would give them preferred position at Straits. However, by accepting such convention Soviets would be estopped from raising claims such as their points 4 and 5. For this reason Saka believes unlikely USSR will take initiative convoke conference.

3. Allow question remain in *status quo* until more favorable time for pressing essential Soviet claim against Turkey. Foreign Minister believes this most likely course USSR will follow.

Sent Department; repeated London 140, Paris as 76, Department relay to Moscow as Ankara's 106.

WILSON

⁸¹ Not printed.

767.68119/9-2646 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State*SECRET
PRIORITYANKARA, September 26, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received September 27—10 a. m.]

1034. Shortly after midnight September 24, Soviet Chargé presented new Straits note consisting 12 pages. In handing me French text noon today, Erkin said on basis his preliminary study tone seemed softer than of previous note, Soviets possibly less insistent point 4 but insisting point 5. Several references to Montreux in note although calling for at least preliminary direct negotiations between Turks and Soviets. The Turks did not consider reply especially urgent matter since Soviets had taken month to reply Turk note. Before replying Turks most desirous have British and our views. Secretary General also gave British Embassy copy note.

This telegram drafted prior our study of note.

We are studying, translating note and will report fully with comments as soon as possible.³²

It would be helpful to us here to know whether Department and Paris have text of note.

To Paris as 91, to Bern as 4 for Ambassador Wilson with message from Erkin that he does not regard matter sufficiently urgent for Wilson return here ahead of schedule.

BURSLEY

767.68119/9-2646 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State*SECRET
PRIORITYANKARA, September 26, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received September 27—3:56 p. m.]

1035. There follows translation Soviet note on Straits:

“The Soviet Govt has carefully studied the note of the Turkish Govt dated August 22, which was the response to the note of the USSR Govt of August 7 of this year on the subject of the regime of the Straits of the Black Sea (*Détroits de la Mer Noire*).

In its note of August 7 the Soviet Govt took up a number of cases on the use of the Straits, in the course of the last war, by the states at war with the USSR and its allies. It was at that time a question only of cases which have been the object of representations and specific protests to the Turkish Govt by the Soviet Govt during the years 1941-1942 and 1944, which does not at all include the cases of the use of the Straits by Germany and Italy for the passage of their warships

³² For text of translated note, see telegram 1035, September 26, 6 p. m., *infra*. The note was published in Moscow on September 28.

and their auxiliary warships into the Black Sea and in the opposite direction. It is sufficient to mention the repeated passage through the Straits of German fast pinnaces (*péniches*) in 1942 and 1943, as well as other similar acts.

The Turkish Govt has given its explanations on this subject. However, these explanations have not denied the statements set forth in the Soviet note of August 7 as far as the concrete facts are concerned. The reference contained in the note of the Turkish Govt and according to which Turkey undertook, upon the demand of the Govt of Great Britain, measures against the passage through the Straits of German vessels destined for servicing the German fleet and for the transportation of German troops while recognizing that the passage of certain of these ships through the Straits had been authorized prior to the said protest on the part of Great Britain only confirms the justice of statement of the Soviet Government that, during the last war, the Straits Convention did not prevent the enemy powers from using the Straits for purposes of the war against the Allied states.

Consequently the Soviet Government considers it necessary to record also the fact that, during the war, the Turkish Government ceased to furnish the belligerent states with reports on the movement of vessels in the Straits although Turkey was required to do this in accordance with article 24 of the Convention.

In its note of August 22, the Turkish Government indicates certain circumstances which in its opinion rendered control in the Straits difficult. Thus it is pointed out that in the *Naval Annual* there are no names of warships and auxiliary war vessels which illegally passed the Straits during the war. However, the Turkish Government certainly is not unaware that official annuals containing the complete list of warships and [of auxiliary ships, do not exist] especially during wartime. The note of the Turkish Government also states that, in accordance with the Convention, the only form of control of vessels passing through the Straits is the sanitary control but it is known on the other hand that the Turkish authorities, by their notices to mariners dated February 25 and May 6, 1941 and June 27, 1942, established for transit vessels compulsory stops and the use of Turkish pilots in the Straits. The customs authorities also carried out control of vessels in transit. If these control measures were, however, insufficient, one is nevertheless obliged to record that, during the course of the war, the Turkish Government did not once raise the question of whether it was necessary to strengthen the measure[s] for the control of the passage of vessels through the Straits.

In the note of the Turkish Government it is stated that during the Second World War the Soviet Government made no declaration to

the Government of the Turkish Republic concerning the existence of the threat to the security of the USSR in the Black Sea region. From this, the said note draws the conclusion that Turkey discharged during the war the task of guardian of the Straits and that the Axis countries, in view of the attitude taken by Turkey, did not decide to infringe the regime established in the Straits.

The Soviet Government does not consider this point of view justified and draws the attention of the Turkish Government to the fact that the repeated representations which the USSR made to Turkey on the subject of the passage of enemy vessels through the Straits during the war prove the contrary. As to the extent of the above-mentioned threat, it is sufficient to recall the fact that the Soviet High Command, having in mind the repeated cases of free passage of enemy warships and auxiliary war vessels through the Straits during the war, found itself obliged to withdraw an important number of military effectives from the principal sectors of the war theater for the defense of the Black Sea region.

All the foregoing confirms that the Straits regime established by the Montreux Convention does not respond to the security interests of the Black Sea powers and does not assure conditions in which it will be possible to forestall the use of the Straits for purposes hostile to the Black Sea powers. The explanations given by the Turkish Government have not overcome, according to the Soviet Government, the above stated conclusion. These explanations moreover do not furnish the reason why the Government of Turkey should be relieved of the responsibility which rests upon it for the violation of the Straits regime during the war.

In the note of August 7, the Soviet Government expressed an opinion on the subject of the five principles which it proposes to advance as a basis of the establishment of the new regime in the Straits. To judge from the Turkish note of August 22, the Government of Turkey has nothing against the taking as a basis of discussion the first three points of the Soviet proposals, namely :

1. The Straits shall always be open to the passage of merchant vessels of all countries.
2. The Straits shall always be open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
3. The passage of warships of powers non-riparian of the Black Sea through the Straits is not allowed, except in cases especially provided for.

(There is no paragraph here in the French text—the text continues.)

The Soviet Government expresses its satisfaction with the fact that the Turkish Government is ready to accept as a basis the three above-mentioned principles although it pointed out that it had in view the making later on of certain reservations.

The Government of Turkey made known its own opinion with regard to the proposals of the USSR embodied in points 4 and 5 of the Soviet note of August 7.

In point 4, the Soviet Government proposed to recognize that the establishment of the regime of the Straits should be a matter within the competence of Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. Since the Turkish Government has indicated a certain distrust regarding the proposal, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell longer on this question.

In accord with this, the Soviet Government desires before all to invite the attention of the Turkish Government to the special situation of the Black Sea as a closed sea. Such a situation means that the Straits of the Black Sea represent a seaway leading only to the shores of a limited number of powers, namely: to the shores of several Black Sea powers. Therefore, it is entirely natural that the Soviet Union and the other Black Sea powers are the most interested in the regulation of the regime of the Straits of the Black Sea and, accordingly, their situation in this matter cannot be compared with that of the other powers. The destination of these Straits, leading to the Black Sea which is a closed sea, differs from that of world seaways such as, for example, Gibraltar or the Suez Canal, giving access not to a limited number of states, and which, as is known, are seaways of world importance. With regard to such international seaways, it is indeed necessary to establish an international control with the participation of the powers most interested which, moreover, has not yet been realized. With regard to the Straits of the Black Sea leading into the Black Sea which is a closed sea, it seems proper in this case to establish such a regime of the Straits which above all would meet the special situation and the security of Turkey, the USSR and the other Black Sea powers.

It is the Montreux Conference of which the insufficiency in this matter is evident, which established a preferential position for the Black Sea powers with regard to the Straits regime. On the other hand, the Turkish Government has agreed to recognize as a basis the first three points of the Soviet proposals of last August 7, in which the special situation of the Black Sea powers in the Straits was recognized in a much more definitive way than in the Montreux Convention. In these proposals, it is stated, on the one hand, the Straits shall be open to the passage of merchant vessels of all countries and, on the other hand, only warships of the Black Sea powers shall have access to the Straits, whereas the passage through the Straits of warships of countries not on the shores of the Black Sea is not allowed, with the exception of special cases. As is known, these principles, bringing into relief the position of the Black Sea powers in the Straits in relation with that

of the other countries, have been fully recognized by the whole world, although they are not duly reflected in the Convention in force, adopted at Montreux.

With reference to the matter under consideration, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to recall that the special position of the Black Sea powers in the Straits was further recognized in the Soviet-Turkish treaty which was signed March 16, 1921.

In article 5 of this treaty the following is stated: 'In order to assure the opening of the Straits and free passage through these Straits for commercial relations between all peoples, the two contracting parties are agreed to entrust a special conference of delegates of the littoral countries with the definitive drafting of the international statute on the Black Sea and Straits, provided that the decisions which it shall take shall not impair the absolute sovereignty of Turkey, and their [*her*] capital Constantinople.'

Thus the Turkish-Soviet treaty of 1921 is based on the recognition of the necessity of confiding the drafting of the international statute of the Black Sea and Straits, to a conference, composed only of the representatives of riparian countries. There is an analogous article in the treaty concluded between Turkey and the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics on October 13, 1921, as well as in the treaty concluded between Turkey and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on May [*January*] 21, 1922. The insertion in the above-mentioned treaties of the article containing the principle of the establishment of the Straits regime by the riparian countries of the Black Sea, indicates the great importance attributed to this principle by the said countries, including Turkey.

All this demonstrates that the proposal of the Soviet Government set forth in point 4 of its note of August 7 is in full accord with the above-mentioned treaties signed by Turkey. The subsequent postponement of the putting into force of the procedure regarding the establishment of the statute of the Black Sea and of the Straits, contemplated by these treaties, cannot be justified.

On the other hand, the experience of the last war proved that the principle of the establishment of the regime of the Straits which was recognized in these treaties by Turkey as well as by the Soviet Union really meets the legitimate interests of the Black Sea powers and is not at all in conflict with the interests of other countries interested in the stability of general peace and the security of nations.

The Turkish Government also opposes point 5 of the Soviet note of August 7 in which it is contemplated that Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and best able to assure freedom of commercial navigation and security in the Straits, assure defense of the Straits by joint defense means in order to prevent the usage of the Straits by other states for purposes hostile to the Black Sea powers.

The Turkish Government states that the said Soviet proposal is incompatible with the sovereign rights of Turkey and would destroy her security. The Turkish Government reached this conclusion long before hearing several concrete considerations of the Soviet Government on this subject and without even having made an attempt to put under joint study the pertinent proposals of the USSR.

In declining *en bloc* all possibility of joint study with the Soviet Union of this important problem, indissolubly linked with the security interests of the USSR and the other Black Sea powers, the Turkish Govt is in complete contradiction with its own declarations regarding its desire to reestablish friendly relations with the USSR based on confidence by considering it possible to give voice to such suspicions which had no basis at all and which moreover are incompatible with the dignity of the Soviet Union.

Despite the point of view expressed in the Turkish note, the Soviet Govt is of the opinion that only the means of Turkey and the Soviet Union combined can assure the freedom of commercial navigation as well as the security of the Straits. Accordingly the Soviet Govt believes that the application of the above-mentioned Soviet proposal should not prejudice the sovereignty of Turkey and should at the same time meet still better the interests of its security, since the joint measures of Turkey and the Soviet Union can assure the safeguarding of the Straits in much fuller measure than those of Turkey alone.

The refusal of Turkey to assume [*assure?*] the defence of the Straits jointly with the Soviet Union deprives the Black Sea powers of the possibility of guaranteeing the necessary security in this region.

During the last war the Axis countries used the Black Sea for their military operations against the USSR, to which contributed the fact that they were able to send into the Black Sea certain warships and auxiliary war vessels. There is also well remembered such a fact as the sudden passage through the Straits to the Black Sea in 1914 of the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* which upon entering the Black Sea attacked the Russian fleet and the Black Sea ports. All this is taken into consideration in the proposal for the common Soviet-Turkish defense of the Straits having for purpose the assuring of a strong defense of the Straits in the interest of Turkey as well as in that of those of the other Black Sea powers, which cannot be fully assured by Turkey alone. On the other hand, if Turkey, after having declined the proposal of the USSR, were to set about taking (*s'était mise à effectuer*) military measures in the Straits by common accord with several powers non-riparian of the Black Sea, they [*this*] obviously would be in contradiction with the security interests of the Black Sea powers. It would be unjust to forget that the Soviet Black Sea shores, extending 2100 kilometers, give access to the most important regions of the country, wherefore the necessity for assuring their security with di-

rect participation of the Soviet Union in the defense of the Straits has its origin in the vital interests of the USSR. All this explains the reason why the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the defense of the Straits should be carried out by the joint efforts of Turkey and the Soviet Union and have for its objective the assuring of the security of all the Black Sea states.

Regarding the reference of the Turkish Government to the UNO, the Soviet Government believes it necessary to state that its proposal set forth in the note of August 7 is entirely in conformity with the principles and objectives of that organization. This proposal assures not only the general interests of international commerce but creates also the conditions for the maintenance of the security of the Black Sea powers and thereby even contributes to the consolidation of general peace.

The Soviet Government believes it necessary to note that the remarks of the Turkish Government, relating to the procedure for the revision of the Montreux Convention, does [*do*] not take into account the decisions of the Three Power Conference at Berlin that the Straits Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as not meeting present conditions. With regard to the Conference of the Straits regime, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that the calling of this Conference should be preceded by as fully possible a discussion of this question through direct *pourparlers* between Governments, as was envisaged by that same decision.⁸³

Can Department repeat to Paris and also get to Ambassador Wilson who probably in Zurich.⁸³

BURSLEY

767.68119/9-2746: Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

ANKARA, September 27, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received October 3—12: 15 p. m.]

1040. While most implications Soviet Straits note obvious, following observations may interest Dept:

Soviet arguments re alleged violations Montreux Convention during last war are not considered by Erkin to be very persuasive.

Note implies that Turks in conditionally accepting first three points previous Soviet note accepted also idea that Black Sea powers do have especial rights in Straits. Soviets seem claim authorship three points

⁸³ Repeated to Paris on September 28 with request to forward copy to Bern for Ambassador Wilson in Zurich.

(perhaps to enforce their case for Turkish-Soviet negotiations) although US first advanced them.

As only partially related Straits question, Soviet observations regarding necessity of international control other international seaways may be attempt establish arguments later re Panama Canal as well as seaways mentioned.

Perhaps strongest point in note, although specious, is reference to Turkish treaties with Soviets March 16, 1921, with Transcaucasian Republics October 13, 1921 and with Ukraine January 21, 1922.

Queries: Did we or other nations ever file protests against Straits provisions these treaties? Does not Montreux supersede those treaties on Straits question?

British Embassy informed by Erkin that he considered amusing reference to Turkish rejection of point 5 in previous note as against dignity USSR.

While note refers previous Turkish expression desire for friendly relations, Soviets not only express no such desire, but, on contrary, couple Turkish expression with supposed affront to Soviet dignity.

Invocation case *Goeben* [and] *Breslau* seems far-fetched but possibly indicative of the at least superficial thoroughness with which Soviets drag in arguments.

Mention of Turks possibly taking military measures Straits with non-riverain power may refer to an eventual possibility but more likely refers to recent Soviet charges that British assisting Turks there. In this relation, at least, some of alleged activities such as radar obviously purely defensive.

In general it seems Soviets have had to resort to relatively minor points to support claim insufficiency Montreux.

As previously reported, Turks most anxious to receive Dept's views soonest.

To Paris as 93, to London as 147, to Bern for Wilson as 6.

BURSLEY

767.68119/9-3046 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, September 30, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received October 1—9:40 a. m.]

1052. Course conversation another matter today Fuad Jarim, high FonOff official (who believed represent Erkin views but perhaps put the[m] more strongly) stated Soviet note while milder than [expected?] still insists points 4 and 5; note vague as to Soviet conference intentions and re direct conversations or negotiations between

Turks and Soviets even in Russian text which has been checked. He said Turkey will have neither conversations nor negotiations with Soviets re Straits note on direct basis. This consistent comments Press Bureau and Anatolian Agency officials that direct talks would be fatal trap. They think Potsdam contemplated procedure followed by US, UK, that is, submission of views by note rather than Soviet interpretation. Moreover Jarim said Turkey can not discuss points 4 and 5 even should there be conference for revision Montreux.

Jarim attitude also consistent Turk long standing attitude re separate negotiations with Soviets and in general with desire which Turks would hope to fulfill of avoiding any discussion points 4 and 5.

He asked me request Department expedite expression on its view Soviet note which desired connection drafting Turk reply.

No further comments have occurred to me beyond Ambassador Wilson's telegram 856^{83a} on first note still most pertinent and mytel 1040^{83b} unless Soviets addressed no notes US or UK in which event they may be endeavoring compel Turks to carry ball alone.

Sent to London as 149, to Paris as 95, to Bern for Wilson as 7.

BURSLEY

740.00119 Council/9-3046 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1946—9 p. m.

5192. For McDermott⁸⁴ from White.⁸⁵ UP late today carried following:

"Wash—Turkey has asked US and Brit for advice on how to ans Russia's new demands for joint control Dardanelles, hi adm source sed. Source sed State Dept wld seek opinion Army-Navy leaders before replying to Turkey, probably sometime this week."

In answer deluge questions, following given for attribution Dept spokesman:

"The Department is informed of the Soviet note to the Turkish Government by the broadcast from Moscow and through a translation furnished the American Embassy at Ankara by the Turkish Foreign Office. Although no specific request has been received for the views of this Government, it is not improbable that following procedures heretofore followed, should this Government think it advisable to amplify its views as expressed in its note of August 19 to the Soviet Government, it would make them available to the Soviet, Turkish and

^{83a} Dated August 12, p. 836.

^{83b} *Supra.*

⁸⁴ Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

⁸⁵ Lincoln White, Executive Assistant to Mr. McDermott.

British Governments. Although no plans to this effect have been made, in the normal course the matter would be considered in regular meetings of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.

Repeated to Ankara.⁸⁶ [White.]

ACHESON

767.68119/10-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, October 2, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received October 2—7:53 a. m.]

8547. Embassy has received from FonOff translation of second Soviet note to Turkey on Straits. Williams, Acting Head of Southern Department, states Turks have requested views British Government on note before replying Moscow. Before British send their observations to Ankara, Williams says FonOff desires an exchange of views with Department on Soviet note. British Embassy, accordingly, will be instructed to discuss matter with Department.⁸⁷

In commenting on note, which is still being studied in FonOff, Williams said he thought it was "extraordinarily mild" and that its despatch was in line with the Potsdam Agreement.

Repeated Ankara as 72.

GALLMAN

767.68119/10-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, October 2, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received October 3—3:45 p. m.]

1060. Erkin sent for me this afternoon and said :

New Soviet note, while milder, is purposely obscure on number more difficult aspects. Moreover, behind this, Moscow radio and Soviet propagandists in Turkey seeking spread impression Turkey, in previously rejecting Soviet proposals *en bloc*, without awaiting see what these were, rejected opportunity friendship with Russia and prefers lean upon Anglo-Saxons.

⁸⁶ As telegram 675. In airgram A-236, October 2, from Ankara, the Chargé stated that this telegram arrived "most opportunely just prior to the conversation I had with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office, to whom I made known its contents. I also informed the British Ambassador." (767.68119/10-246)

⁸⁷ The British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, exchanged information with Acting Secretary Acheson on October 3 (767.68119/10-346).

Turkish note now being drafted will take position preliminary conversations Turkey Soviets already accomplished by exchange notes and earlier conversations (those between Soviet Ambassador and high Turkish officials in Ankara before first Soviet note). Will refute Soviet claims and allegations, including Soviet assertion that Black Sea is closed sea.

Turkey willing enter conference on basis discussing first three points which should satisfy all legitimate Soviet aspirations. On point 4, Turks will insist that if there is conference, it should be general, rather than of Black Sea powers alone. On point 5, note will state that Russian proposal invites Turks share their sovereignty, which they cannot do.

Note will be brief and endeavor wind up correspondence on subject, leaving further discussions or negotiations possible eventual conference.

Prime Minister approved this general line night September 30. Prime Minister will return here October 10 for Cabinet meeting, at which time approval Turkish note expected. Foreign Office hopes have US Government views prior that date.

Moreover, Erkin says our support occasion first note very much appreciated and hopes we will again give our support.

Erkin expects show me Friday evening draft Turkish note and have me take down substance, but not text (presumably because will not yet have had Cabinet clearance) for information US Government. Immediately thereafter, I will telegraph Department [and] Paris substance note, omitting London, Bern unless otherwise instructed.

To Paris as 99, to Bern for Wilson as 9, to Department as 1060.

BURSLEY

767.68119/10-346 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, October 3, 1946—9 p. m.

[Received October 4—3: 51 a. m.]

1066. British Ambassador on instruction saw Erkin today stating:

On account important issues involved, views British Govt available only next week after Bevin consults Secretary. It is advisable for Turk Govt have US-UK views before replying but if they must proceed it is suggested they avoid curt reply to moderate Soviet Straits note and especially refrain from categorical refusal discuss points 4 and 5 in an international conference. Latter not because British in disagreement objections those points but because of use Soviets might make of refusal Turks to go to international conference which would discuss them. Idea is that while those fully familiar with matter would understand, world opinion and [also?] opinion in UK-US, with Soviets getting in first word, might react adversely to Turks' refusal. Unfortunately worded note might cause Soviets take unilateral action.

Erkin told Ambassador his first draft about 25 pages (seems reply now planned won't be short). Draft to be shown British Ambassador and me won't be ready until Saturday.

Secretary General told British Ambassador he might be able draft so as accept attend international conference basis first three points. Ambassador said to him that would seem take care first four points since international conference would mean attendance more than Black Sea powers. Erkin seemed less clear how avoid rejection outright point 5. Ambassador said it was largely question language and Turks should follow more or less line previous Turk note.

On question time reply Erkin indicated ability delay day or two.

To Dept as 1066, to Paris as 100.

BURSLEY

740.00119 Council/10-346 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1946—7 p. m.

5301. Secdel 1051. For the Secretary from Acheson. Before we were aware of Soviet note to Turkey Navy Dept told us informally that *Randolph* was planning make Mediterranean cruise and asked for suggestions on itinerary. Our tentative list included Izmir, at which no American warship had called since War, Piraeus, Beirut, Port Said and Jidda. (Urdelsec 1026 Oct 3.)⁸⁸ Yesterday Navy again informally inquired re matter and we took position we still saw no objection to such a visit. It has been our thought that since there would probably be American warships in Mediterranean for indefinite period in future it might be well for various Eastern Mediterranean ports to become accustomed to visits American naval vessels so that eventually such visits would be regarded as routine matter rather than as diplomatic or political gestures. We have not felt that receipt by Turkey of a Soviet note should cause any change our tentative plans which may call not only for visit Izmir but for anchorage of several days in small southwestern Turkish port of Marmaris, east of Rhodes. If, however, in your opinion it would be unwise for American naval vessels visit any Turkish ports at this time we shall make your views known to the Navy which is displaying every desire to cooperate with us. Izmir is considerable distance from mouth Dardanelles. We would of course consult Turkey before making final decision to call at Turkish port.

ACHESON

⁸⁸ Not printed; the Secretary asked for information and quoted a press report. He felt the timing of a naval visit might be questionable. (740.00119 Council/10-346)

767.68119/10-446 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Bursley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, October 4, 1946.

[Received October 5—2:35 a. m.]

1075. Reply my query tonight re last paragraph Soviet note, Erkin said language diabolically vague. He thinks object make Turks believe there will be conference but what Soviets really seek is negotiations with Turks which if agreement reached really decides outcome conference; if Turks Soviets failed reach accord Soviets would say no use holding conference. Under this interpretation he thinks matters little (mytel 1067⁸⁹) whether language relates conference under point 4 or general one.

Re timing Turk reply, he said still planned after meeting Cabinet. He made no mention additional day or two (last paragraph mytel 1066⁹⁰) but said his present draft note was that to be presented Cabinet unless we or British had suggestions.

BURSLEY

767.68119/10-546 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Bursley)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1946—4 p. m.

U.S. URGENT

684. We are today telegraphing to Secretary⁹¹ draft text of note we propose sending Sov Govt re its Sep 24 note to Turkey. Summary is as follows:

1. After studying Soviet note we still adhere to position taken our note Aug 19 to USSR.

2. We have understood Potsdam agreement as recognizing that US, Britain and USSR each have interest in Straits regime and any changes which may be made in it. Furthermore, we told Sovgovt in our note Aug 19 that we considered regime of interest to US and other non-Black Sea powers as well as to riparian states. Yet we observe that in its latest note Sovgovt apparently maintains position taken its note Aug 7 to Turkey that "establishment regime of Straits should come under competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers". We do not consider that Potsdam protocol envisaged that direct conversations with Turkey by one of the three powers should have effect of prejudicing participation of other two in revision of Straits regime. Rather, we consider agreement contemplated merely exchange of views as preliminary to conference of all interested states, including US, to consider revision of Montreux. As stated in Aug 19 note, US Govt ready to participate such conference.

⁸⁹ October 3, 10 p. m., not printed.

⁹⁰ October 3, 9 p. m., p. 870.

⁹¹ Telegram 5323 (Secdel 1061) October 5, 4 p. m., to Secretary Byrnes at Paris, not printed.

3. We reiterate our view that Turkey should be primarily responsible for Straits' defense and that if attack on Straits is threatened, it will be matter for Security Council. *End summary.*

If Secretary and President approve, this note will be delivered at Moscow, following which copies will be handed missions all Montreux signatories here and it will then be released to press.

Foregoing is for your background info only, although you may of course tell Turk Fonoff our position re Straits is unchanged. We do not propose to send any advice or comments to Turks pending receipt of substance their draft reply to Sov note⁹² and of reply from Secretary.⁹³

ACHESON

767.68119/10-846

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*⁹⁴

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1946.

You will recall that on September 24 the Soviet Government delivered a new note to the Turkish Government with regard to the régime of the Straits. A copy of this note is attached.⁹⁵ It reiterates the points previously made, emphasizing that the future régime of the Straits should be determined only by the Black Sea Powers and that a joint Turko-Soviet arrangement for the defense of the Straits should be made.

As you will also recall, we sent a note to the Soviet Government on August 19 (copy attached)⁹⁶ stating our disagreement with these same proposals as they were advanced in the Soviet note of August 7 to Turkey. It is the feeling of the State, War and Navy departments that there should be no change in our position in this regard.

The underlying draft telegram to our Embassy at Moscow contains a further note to the Government of the Soviet Union. As you will see, it reiterates the stand previously taken. It has been approved by Secretary Byrnes and by the Secretaries of War and Navy. If you approve, we propose to dispatch it immediately to Moscow and at the

⁹² Telegram 1078, October 5, 7 p. m., from Ankara (sent as No. 104 to Paris for the Secretary), summarized the Turkish draft reply, which consisted of 5,000 words, one-third of which refuted charges that Turkey failed in its Straits duties during the war. For text of note delivered to the Soviet Union, see p. 880.

⁹³ In telegram 5019, October 7, 3 p. m., from Paris (Delsec 1035), Secretary Byrnes gave his approval to the draft U. S. note to the Soviet Union; he stated he had discussed the matter with the British Foreign Secretary and that the British draft was similar to the American in substance (740.00119 Council/10-746).

⁹⁴ Marginal notation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jernegan): "The original of this memorandum was seen by the President on October 8, 1946. He approved the draft telegram to which it refers, and the telegram was sent as the Dept's. No. 1785 of Oct. 8 to Moscow. J.D.J." Telegram 1785 is printed *infra*.

⁹⁵ See telegram 1035, September 26, 6 p. m., from Ankara, p. 860.

⁹⁶ See note to the Soviet Chargé, August 19, p. 847.

same time inform the Turkish Government of our action. We will then transmit copies to all the signatories of the Montreux Convention and make the note public.

Our reason for following this procedure in sending the note direct to the Soviet Government is that the substance of our views seems directed more to the USSR than to Turkey. Further, we think it better to avoid the impression that we are secretly egging on the Turks and using them as a go-between. The reason for proposing publication of the note is that the press is deeply interested and if the views expressed by us are not published they will be the subject of intense and undoubtedly inaccurate speculation.

DEAN ACHESON

767.68119/10-846 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Smith)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1946—noon.

U.S. URGENT NIACT

1785. Deliver following note to Fonoff immediately and notify Dept as soon as you have done so:⁹⁷

“I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Govt has studied carefully the contents of the note of the Soviet Union to Turkey of Sep 24 relating to the regime of the Straits.

In pursuance of its policy of making clear to all interested parties its views on matters relating to the Straits, my Govt has instructed me to inform you that after examining the note referred to above it continues to adhere to the position outlined in its note of Aug 19, 1946 to the Soviet Govt.

It will be recalled that in the Protocol of the proceedings of the Potsdam Conference, signed by the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States, the three Govts recognized that the Convention on the Straits concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions. It was further agreed in the Protocol that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Govts and the Turkish Govt.

It has been the understanding of my Govt that the three Govts., in agreeing with one another that the regime of the Straits should be brought into accord with present-day conditions by means of a revision of the Montreux Convention, mutually recognized that all three signatories of the Protocol have an interest in the regime of the Straits and in any changes which might be made in that regime. My Govt furthermore informed the Soviet Govt in its note of Aug 19, that in its view the regime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United States. The Soviet Govt, nevertheless, in its note of Sep 24, apparently continues to take the position set forth in its note of Aug 7

⁹⁷ The note was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office on the morning of October 9 (767.68119/10-946).

to Turkey that 'the establishment of a regime of the Straits . . . should come under the competence of Turkey and the other Black Sea powers'. My Govt does not consider that it was contemplated at the Potsdam Conference that the direct conversations which might take place between any one of the three signatory govts and the Turkish Govt with regard to the regime of the Convention of the Straits concluded at Montreux should have the effect of prejudicing the participation of the other two signatory powers in the revision of the regime of the Straits. On the contrary, my Govt considers that the Potsdam Agreement definitely contemplated only an exchange of views with the Turkish Govt as a useful preliminary to a conference of all of the interested powers, including the United States, to consider the revision of the Montreux Convention. As stated in its note of Aug 19, my Govt stands ready to participate in such a conference.

My Govt also feels that it would be lacking in frankness if it should fail to point out again at this time, in the most friendly spirit, that in its opinion the Govt of Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits and that should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations."

ACHESON

767.68119/10-546 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Bursley)*⁹⁸

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

685. Note to Sovgovt as summarized Deptel 684 Oct 5 being telegraphed Moscow today will probably be presented tomorrow. Inform Turk Govt in confidence of our action and of substance of note. Turks will receive full text in few days when it is given all Montreux signatories. It will then be released to press.

We should like also give press text Turkish reply Soviet note Sep 24 unless Turks object its publication. (Dept feels publication advisable to counteract effect on public opinion of superficially plausible arguments put forward in Soviet note.) Please ask Turk Govt let us have full final text soon as possible and inform us when it will be released in Turkey.⁹⁹

You may tell Turks that on basis summary transmitted urtel 1078¹ Dept has no comment to make on their draft reply Soviet note Sep 24 other than to note with approval what appears from summary to be its non-provocative and temperate tone. As far as we can judge it seems to cover situation satisfactorily.

ACHESON

⁹⁸ The substance of this telegram was sent to Secretary Byrnes in telegram 5380 (Secdel 1077), October 8, 8 p. m., to Paris.

⁹⁹ Telegram 1086, October 8, 9 p. m., from Ankara, reported that the Turkish note probably would be released on October 18 or 19 (767.68119/10-846).

¹ See footnote 92, p. 873.

767.68119/11-2646

*The British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Peterson) to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Dekanozov)*²

I have been instructed by my Government to inform the Soviet Government that the following are their views on the note dated September 24th from the Soviet Government to the Turkish Government on the subject of the Straits.

The Potsdam Agreement laid it down that as the next step this matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. But it is the view of my Government that this "next step" has been completed by the exchange of views which have now taken place between these Governments. My Government therefore see no need for, or purpose in, continuing direct correspondence on the subject.

While my Government's attitude towards proposals 4 and 5 of the Soviet note of August 8th^{2a} remain as stated in the British note of August 21st, my Government remain ready to attend a conference of the four Powers (namely the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) and all other signatories of the Montreux Convention, excepting Japan, to consider the revision of that Convention.

767.68119/10-1146

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jernegan)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1946.

Participants: Turkish Ambassador
Mr. Henderson (NEA)
Mr. Merriam (NE)³
Mr. Jernegan (NE)

The Turkish Ambassador called at his request and opened the conversation by saying that he was very pleased with the latest American note to the USSR in connection with the Soviet note of September 24 to Turkey. He was glad to see that it was short and to the point. He remarked that he had suggested to his own government that its reply to the Soviet note of September 24^{3a} should be brief and avoid lengthy debate of the points raised in the Soviet note. He felt that the Russians might be trying to draw Turkey into a public controversy which

² Handed on October 9 by the British Ambassador to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2704, November 26, 1946, from London, after publication on November 22.

^{2a} See footnote 49, p. 827.

³ Gordon P. Merriam, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

^{3a} See telegram 1035, September 26, 6 p. m. from Ankara, p. 860.

might result in dividing public opinion in Turkey itself and in other countries with regard to the merits of the case. Having already answered most of the Russians' arguments in its note of August 22 to the USSR, the Ambassador believed that his Government need give only a very brief answer to the new arguments raised in the latest Soviet communication and content itself with rejecting the Soviet's Points 4 and 5 while at the same time expressing willingness to attend the conference of the Montreux powers, plus the U.S., to discuss the other three Soviet points.

Mr. Henderson agreed that the Ambassador's views had merit with regard to the avoidance of public controversy but at the same time expressed the opinion that it was desirable for some answer to be made to various Russian arguments to prevent public opinion from receiving the impression that there was no answer. He pointed out that the American note did not attempt to rebut the various arguments advanced in the Russian note of September 24, since we felt this was more properly the responsibility of the Turkish Government.

767.68119/10-1146

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jernegan)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Francis Lacoste, French Minister
 Mr. Henderson (NEA)
 Mr. Merriam (NE)
 Mr. Jernegan (NE)

Mr. Lacoste called at his request to ask for background information on the current position with regard to the Straits in connection with the Soviet note to Turkey of September 24 and the American note delivered at Moscow on October 9, copy of which latter he had received from the Department on October 10. Mr. Henderson briefly summarized the contents of the Soviet note, pointing out that it was substantially a reiteration of the views expressed in the first Soviet note of August 7. He emphasized that our note had not attempted to discuss the various Soviet charges against Turkish administration of the Straits nor to go into the other specific assertions or arguments made by the Russian Government. We had in mind, he said, only to make clear the American position with respect to the broader questions in which we felt American interest was involved and on which we could properly express an independent view.

Mr. Lacoste asked whether we had been in consultation with the British and the Turks. Mr. Henderson replied that we had had only rather casual, informal consultation with the British and none at all

with the Turks. Turkey had asked our advice in the premises, but we had thought it preferable to address such observations as we had direct to the Soviet Government rather than to give secret counsel to Turkey. Accordingly, we had confined ourselves to giving the Turks a copy of our note at the same time that copies were given the other signatories of the Montreux Convention.

Mr. Lacoste asked if we knew what the British would say to the Turks on this subject, and was told that we were not at all sure. Mention was made of the press reports from London on October 10. Quoting a British Foreign Office spokesman to the effect that the British Government did not favor continuation of the exchanges between Turkey and the USSR, Mr. Henderson remarked that we had previously had informal indications from the British that they would advise Turkey *not* to refuse flatly any further consideration of the Soviet Points 4 and 5, regarding establishment of a régime of the Straits by the Black Sea powers alone and joint defense of the Straits by Russia and Turkey.

In reply to a query as to the nature of the answer Turkey would make to the latest Russian note, Mr. Henderson said that we had no exact information and were not sure that a final decision had been taken in Ankara as yet. He felt certain, however, that the Turks would not and could not accept either Point 4 or Point 5 of the Soviet proposals.

In the course of the conversation Mr. Henderson took occasion to emphasize that the U.S. Government had not given Turkey any advice as to whether or not the Turkish Government should continue to exchange views with the USSR regarding Points 4 and 5. He said we felt that Point 5 in particular so directly involved Turkish sovereignty and integrity that the question of conversations on this subject could only be decided by the Turkish Government itself. We would interpose no objection if the Turks decided to leave the way open for a further Soviet communication on this subject. However, Mr. Henderson personally felt that such exchanges could lead to nothing, since he did not see how Turkey could possibly accede to the Russian proposals on Points 4 and 5. Mr. Lacoste indicated that he felt the same way.

767.68119/10-1546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, October 15, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 9:14 p. m.]

1101. Secretary General Foreign Office has shown me final draft Turkish reply to Soviet note on Straits. Some improvements have been made in draft which Saka gave me Sunday. It strikes me as first class job, non-provocative, well-reasoned and convincing. Prime

Minister and President have approved it and therefore little chance of further change when Cabinet considers it October 17. Time schedule for delivery to Soviet Embassy and publication remains as reported mytel 1094, October 14.⁴

Erkin tells me Soviet agents very active throughout country spreading stories in coffee houses that difficulties between Turkey and Russia could easily be arranged by direct conversations between two countries which Soviets have proposed but Turkey being prevented from holding such conversations by imperialist reactionary US and UK. This campaign being subtly abetted in extreme left-wing press by such pro-Soviet people as Rüstü Aras.⁵ Erkin considers second Soviet note with its sharpening of issue as regards direct conversations as cleverer and more insidious than first note. Turkish Government has reliable information Litvinov⁶ drafted second note, having been resurrected by Soviet Government for this purpose. Turkish Government absolutely opposed to direct conversation with Soviets, being convinced they could only lead to confusion and misunderstanding adding grist to Soviet propaganda mill. Erkin believes that Soviets, in trying to bring Turkey into direct talks, plan to prepare way for proposal for regional understanding of Black Sea powers concerning Straits, rather than demand for bases. It would become extremely awkward and difficult for Turkey to avoid being drawn into discussions on regional basis if once Turkey should make initial error consenting to direct conversations with USSR. It is for this reason both he and Foreign Minister are bewildered over British suggestion and publication statement by British Foreign Office spokesman that Turkey should have direct talks with Soviets. Saka tells me Turkish Government went back at British vigorously on this point and believes convinced them, at least he says British have dropped matter.

WILSON

767.68119/10-1946

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
No. 1187

ANKARA, October 19, 1946.
[Received November 20.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram No. 1117 of October 19, 1946,⁷ and to transmit herewith a copy of the French text of the Turkish reply to the second Soviet Straits note, as fur-

⁴ Not printed; it set October 21 as date of publication (767.68119/10-1446).

⁵ Former Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

⁶ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, who retired in August as Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷ Not printed; it transmitted the text of the Turkish reply of October 18 to the Soviet Union which was somewhat garbled in transmission.

nished by the Anatolian Agency. The Agency text has been compared with the note as received from the Foreign Office and minor discrepancies corrected. An informal translation made by the Embassy is also forwarded herewith.⁸

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
WARWICK PERKINS
First Secretary of Embassy

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Turkish Foreign Office to the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Turkey

The Government of the Turkish Republic has taken cognizance of the note of the Soviet Government dated September 24, 1946, in reply to the Turkish note of August 22,^{8a} regarding the eventual revision of the Montreux Convention. It hastens to set forth, hereunder, the views and reflections which the meticulous examination of the above-mentioned document has permitted it to reach.

In its first part, the Soviet note takes up again the theme of the alleged use of the Straits by ships belonging to the countries of the Axis and, replying to the refutation applied against this subject in the Turkish note of August 22, it cites the cases of passage in 1942 and 1943 of German rapid pinnaces, in order to deduce from them, once again, the justice of the Soviet allegation.

In its August 22 note in reply, the Government of the Republic furnished to the Soviet Government the most complete explanations on the subject of the perfect correctness with which Turkey was able, during the extremely difficult period of the Second World War, to acquit itself of the task which it assumed because of the Montreux Convention. It clearly set forth that the few cases of fraudulent passage which had caused the Soviet objections arose essentially from the lacunae of Annex II of the Convention treating of definitions, specifications, as well as of calculation of tonnages; that the Annex in question for this reason admitted of the necessity of an adaptation to present conditions and concepts; and that, moreover, if the Soviet Government nonetheless considered that it could raise complaints concerning the execution of the Montreux Convention, the Government of the Republic would undertake to show, if necessary, before an arbitral court, the good faith and the loyalty with which it had conducted itself in order to assure with perfection the execution of the Convention confided to its care. Therefore, the Government of the Republic is of the opinion that, given the definite position taken by the two parties as regards the appreciation of the substance and the reality

⁸ The note, dated October 18, was published on October 21.

^{8a} See footnote 76, p. 852.

of the facts, it would be desirable to consider discussion on diplomatic grounds to be exhausted, the Turkish Government holding itself at the disposition of the Soviet Government to have recourse to arbitration. As regards particularly the case of the German pinnaces of which the passage through the Straits seems to be emphasized as a violation of the terms of the Convention, let it be sufficient to observe that the pinnaces in question were constructed in shipyards on the Danube under German control, and their presence in the Black Sea was consequently completely independent of the will of the Government of the Republic. Moreover, if the ships in question were able to pass through the Straits, it is also because they did not present any of the characteristics belonging to auxiliary war vessels or war vessels.

Along these lines, the Soviet note points out that, during the war, the Turkish Government ceased to present to the belligerent states reports on the movement of ships in the Straits, as it should have done according to the terms of Article 24 of the Montreux Convention.

It is appropriate to set forth, first of all, as regards this subject, that the reports in question ought, according to the terms of Article 24, to be presented not to the belligerent states, but to the powers signatory of the Montreux Convention, as well as to the Secretariat General of the League of Nations. As regards their non-presentation, it suffices to observe that the Turkish Government, taking, on the one hand, into consideration the principle of refusal of passage for warships of the belligerents, and foreseeing that, on the other hand, no neutral power would consider, during the hostilities, sending warships through the Straits, considered that the contents of the Annual Report to be furnished to the signatory powers and to the Secretariat General of the League of Nations would, because of this, be deprived of their most important information. As regards the statistics concerning commercial movements to be included in the report, the Turkish Government considered that this movement, reduced to ridiculous proportions because of the hostilities, could not, if it were made public, but influence unfavorably the war efforts of the Allied countries, without, moreover, any counterpart of usefulness. It therefore decided to stop sending the report while continuing to compile it regularly. Moreover, it brought this fact to the attention of the Secretariat General of the League of Nations and of the Powers signatory of the Montreux Convention, in February, 1942 for the report of the year 1941, and in February, 1943 for that of the year 1942. The hostilities having ended in 1945, the Annual Reports referring to the years 1941-44 were sent to the interested states on January 29, 1946. It is useful to emphasize here that no power signatory of the Montreux Convention ever raised objections concerning this attitude of the Turkish Government. Let it be equally permitted to add that another consideration of special nature, which decided the Government of the Republic

lic to enter upon this course, was present in the discovery that, during the years under reference, the powers bordering the Black Sea, including the USSR, did not think it necessary to conform to the obligation, set forth in Article 18, Paragraph B, of the Montreux Convention, to advise the Turkish Government on January 1st and July 1st of each year, of the total tonnage of their fleets in the Black Sea. Now, the figures to be furnished because of this obligation, were to be the basis of the information in the Annual Report to be presented by the Turkish Government. This abstention of Moscow during the war period was perfectly understandable and it never occurred to Turkey to address a complaint to the Soviet Government because of it. The Government of the Republic hopes likewise that the cessation of the sending of the Annual Reports during the same period, for the reasons set forth above, will no longer be considered by the USSR, as having prejudiced its security in the Black Sea.

The Soviet note then passes to the discussion of the grounds of certain other arguments included in the Turkish note of August 22nd as proofs of the circumstances which made difficult the control of the Straits. Notably it denies the probative character of the official annuals of war fleets, forcedly incomplete in the war period. Moreover, as reply to the Turkish argument drawn from the fact that the only kind of control to which ships in transit could be submitted, according to the Convention, was limited to a sanitary control, the Soviet note recalls the establishment, by the Turkish Government, of obligatory stops and of recourse to pilots in the Straits, as well as the surveillance by the Turkish customs authorities of ships in transit. The note adds finally that if the totality of these control measures was considered insufficient, on the other hand, not once during the war, did the Turkish Government inform the contracting powers of the need to strengthen them.

The Turkish Government has already strongly set forth and emphasizes once again that the essential difficulty in differentiating, between warships or commercial vessels, as regards ships in transit, rested in the imperfection of Annex II of the Convention. All the other arguments advanced by the Turkish note of August 22nd have no other end than to corroborate this elementary and patent truth, and to illustrate by facts and examples the conscious and considered correctness with which the Turkish authorities applied themselves, having resource to all the sources which could, more or less, carry authority in the matter, to discovering the true character of the ships requesting passage through the Straits. It is in this light that the recourse to the official annual should be considered. As regards the establishment of obligatory stops and the recourse to pilots, it is clear that these measures had no other end than to protect ships in transit against the risk of running into the nets installed at the entrance of

the Straits. They could not, in the presence of the contractual conditions, involve any purpose of control; they do not therefore have any connection with the subject under reference. Likewise, the allegation according to which the customs authorities exercised surveillance on ships in transit is completely lacking in foundation, for the good reason that because of the stipulations of the Montreux Convention, the surveillance in question could never take on the character of a customs visit and was limited to a simple precautionary measure destined to prevent attempts at smuggling. Finally the reproach addressed to Turkey of not having asked of the contracting powers the strengthening of the measures for control of ships in transit also cannot be admitted, for it does not take into consideration either the procedure established for the revision of the Montreux Convention, above all during a war in which the signatory powers were divided between the two opposing camps, nor the fact that the question of the control today described as being imperfect, was not the object, during the war, of any request of the contracting powers who could feel the need to see bettered the conditions relative to this formality.

All the facts developed above, adding themselves to the explanations already furnished, confirm the correctness and the vigilance of which the Government of the Republic gave proof in the accomplishment of its historic task in the Straits, correction and vigilance thanks to which the USSR was able, during the entire length of the war, to remain in the Black Sea, sheltered from every Axis attack coming from the Mediterranean. This truth, which everybody possessing objectivity is pleased to recognize, cannot be covered up by isolated facts and special arguments. It also suffices to refute the allegation regarding the movements of troops which, according to the Soviet note, were alleged to have as their basis the supposed free passage through the Straits of war ships belonging to the Axis countries. In effect, the note affirms that this free use of the Straits by the Axis obliged the Soviet Government to withdraw an important number of military effectives from the principal sectors of the theater of war to assign them to the defense of the Black Sea region. Such would not seem to be, in the opinion of the Turkish Government, the real motive of the troop movements thus brought about. Judged in retrospect in the light of developments of the war and on the purely military plane, the despatch of troops to the Black Sea region presents no connection with the attitude of Turkey in the Straits, and this for the following reasons:

1. The real threat to the security of the Soviet Black Sea shores came from the occupation of a large part of the shore of that Sea by the German Armies, from the German possession of the Rumanian and Bulgarian fleets and from the presence of German and Italian ships sent to Black Sea ports by rail or through the Danube.

2. The despatch of troops to the Black Sea region is explained by the obligation to face the German offensive unleashed from the beginning of hostilities, and above all commencing in the spring of the year 1942, along the shore of that Sea. This same offensive was also the origin of the uneasiness felt in Turkey from the point of its eventual development and of the measures of defense which this country had to take on the Turkish shores of the Black Sea.

The reading of the present note, as well as the reading of that dated August 22nd, which it complements, is sufficient to determine what really should be amended in the Montreux Convention, in order to give the Black Sea powers all judicious and adequate satisfaction. In the first place, Annex II should be revised, account having been taken of present conditions and technical concepts. In the second place, the provisions of the Montreux Convention relative to the role and to the intervention of the League of Nations should give way to the system established by the United Nations Organization, in its task of preserving the peace of the world. Finally, Japan should be removed from the list of contracting powers, while the United States of America should be a signatory in the revised text. It is within this framework that the Government of the Republic would envisage an eventual revision of the Montreux Convention and if, deferring to the requests which have been addressed to it, it has been able to give its consent to be represented at a conference charged with the revision of the dispositions regarding passage through the Straits, one should see in this gesture only the manifestation of a laudable spirit of international cooperation in regard to any initiative which could reconcile the rights of sovereignty and the exigencies of the security of Turkey with the general interest. In consequence, and basing itself on the explanations and the reasoning formulated in the two Notes mentioned above, the Government of the Republic reiterates once more its intention to make no difficulty for the application, with the consent of the Contracting Powers of the Montreux Convention and of the United States of America, and at an international conference uniting the said Powers, of any request for revision specified by the Convention. But it can not admit unfounded complaints tending to justify this revision on the basis of an alleged responsibility on its part, born of pretended violations of the regime of the Straits in the course of the Second World War.

The Turkish Government has also studied with the greatest interest the complementary explanations furnished on the subject of point four of the Soviet Note. It thanks the Government of the USSR for the kindness shown in this respect, with the object of assuring a perfect understanding of this point whose delicate character can not escape attention.

It results from these explanations that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the establishment of the regime of the Straits should,

for the following reasons fall within the exclusive competence of Turkey and of the other riverain Powers of the Black Sea :

1. The Black Sea, as a closed sea, is said to have a special situation. The Straits are said to represent, because of this, a maritime route leading only to the coasts of a limited number of Powers in the Black Sea and to differ in consequence from the maritime routes of world importance such as Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. It is therefore natural that the riverain States of this sea are those most interested in the regulation of the regime of the Straits.

2. The Montreux Conference has already established a preferential regime in favor of the riverain Powers. In addition, in accepting the three first points of the Soviet proposals as a basis of discussion, Turkey has recognized for the Black Sea Powers "a much more definitive preferential regime".

3. The special situation of the Black Sea was also recognized by Turkey in Article 5 of the Turco-Soviet Treaty dated March 16, 1921, which establishes the agreement of the two Contracting Parties to entrust the elaboration of the international statute of the Black Sea and of the Straits, on the basis of the principle of free navigation, to a conference uniting the representatives of the riverain countries of the Black Sea. Invoking the authority of this Article, the Soviet Note declares that the regulatory procedure thus envisaged, which meets the legitimate interests of the riverain Powers of the Black Sea without being inconsistent in any way with the interests of other countries, should be applied without further delay.

The Government of the Republic permits itself to develop below the replies which are called forth by the points summarized above :

1. In the opinion of the Soviet Government the Black Sea, as a closed sea, is said to have a special situation which limits interest in it to the riverain Powers alone.

Without wishing to introduce into this debate the authority of the doctrine which, moreover, seems to be unanimous in considering the Black Sea as an open sea, the Turkish Government limits itself simply to the observation that all the regulations of an international character which have appeared thus far, in each case with the participation of Russia, on the subject of the Straits have admitted more or less severe restrictions on the freedom of passage of riverain and non-riverain states only as exceptions freely agreed to by Turkey, in common accord with the other interested powers, in the general interest. It is the exceptional character of the closure which explains the efforts made towards the middle of the 19th century by the Government of the Czar to have this same rule set up as a general principle of European public law. To cite only examples from the most recent conventions, in support of the point of view developed above, it suffices to refer to the acts of Lausanne and Montreux which, breaking with the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire sanctioned by international treaties, a rule in virtue of which it was forbidden at all times for foreign powers to enter the Straits while the Porte was at peace, have admitted the principle of the freedom of passage through the Straits, which includes equally the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. The exceptions made by the conventions mentioned above to the principle of freedom

in favor of the riverain powers of the Black Sea prove, not the possibility of excluding the non-riverain powers from negotiations looking toward the amendment of certain provisions of the regime at present in force, but the necessity of basing the revision on the agreement and the consent of all the powers interested in a reasonable regulation of this problem. To depart from these general limits of competence would mean nothing less than the negation of the fundamental principle of the law of nations, according to which a Power can be released from the obligations of a treaty, or modify its stipulations only by the assent of the contracting parties. In consequence, since the point under discussion has reference to the regime of passage through the Turkish Straits and since the Montreux Convention places upon the signatory Powers the obligation of proceeding to a modification of the provisions of this document only in an international conference uniting the contracting States and in accordance with a procedure foreseen by the text of the convention itself, it follows that the Soviet point of view is difficult to reconcile with the principles of international public law.

Without doubt Turkey is the first power to recognize the vital interest which free navigation through the Straits has for the riverain countries of the Black Sea. This is, moreover, the reason why she has without difficulty consented to be represented at a conference of revision. But she can not fail to recognize the interest which the other Powers also have in an equitable regulation of the same problem. Turkey has a clear consciousness of her status as a Power of the Black Sea. But she cannot forget that she is also a Mediterranean country. Charged by a particularly delicate geographic situation, with assuring the liaison between two worlds separated by the restricted space of the Straits, she is conscious of the obligation which this situation imposes on her with respect to the two seas which bathe her. The Turkish Government can therefore not consider the question of the Black Sea and of the Straits as a problem interesting the riverain Powers of this sea alone.

2. The Turkish Government agrees with the Government of the USSR that the Montreux Convention, going still further than the Lausanne Convention concerning the regime of the Straits, has established for the benefit of the riverain states of the Black Sea a sharply defined system of preference. It is equally clear that in adopting as a basis of discussion at the international conference foreseen for the revision of the Montreux Convention, the three principles suggested by the Government of the United States of America, and taken up again later by the Soviet Government, the Turkish, British and American Governments in a spirit of conciliation have consented to take into consideration the possibilities of giving greater satisfaction to the Soviet desiderata. It seems to the Turkish Government that, in these conditions, the argument advanced in the Soviet Note serves rather to emphasize the complete good will with which the requests of the USSR have been received by the Governments principally interested in the revision of the regime of the Straits; but it in no way removes the right and the interest which the same Powers as well as the other signatories of the Montreux Convention can have in seeing the procedure of revision begin and end under the happiest auspices, in the interest naturally not only of the Black Sea Powers, destined to derive a considerable profit from the new concessions fore-

seen in their favor, but also of all the States entitled to make their voices heard and to defend their interests in the course of the important meetings in prospect.

3. Considered from the strictly legal point of view, Article 5 of the Turco-Soviet Treaty signed at Moscow on March 16, 1921 expresses an undertaking. In actual fact, the two Contracting Parties disposed of it otherwise, and manifested their act of will in an absolutely opposite sense, in the first place, by their effective participation in the negotiations undertaken at Lausanne on the subject of the regime of the Straits within a considerably enlarged international framework. It is true that in the course of the discussion engaged in on this subject, Mr. Chicherin, First Soviet Delegate, who defended with ardor and eloquence the system of closure of the Straits, did not hesitate to announce his intention of "proposing to the Black Sea Powers the calling of a conference to establish the reciprocal conditions of an effective security of the shores of this sea." This project, nevertheless, encountered the almost unanimous objection of the Delegations present at the Conference. It results from the declarations made on this subject that the Soviet point of view appeared not to take into account the views of the other riverain Powers, whose representatives in effect denied to the USSR the right to speak in their name and added that their ideas on the maintenance of the peace of the world and the security of their territories on the shores of the Black Sea differed substantially from those of the Soviet Government. Moreover, the same declaration made it apparent that the Soviet proposal excluded the principle of international law according to which the passage between two seas should be considered as an international route; that it would give to the USSR, if it were adopted by the Conference, an exceptional and unjustly advantageous position in the Black Sea; and that the Soviet argument according to which the opening of the Straits to warships would be to the advantage of the strongest naval power lost all its force and value in the presence of the contrary argument according to which the closing of the Black Sea would put the other riverain States at the mercy of the maritime power which possessed the strongest land forces, in other words, at the mercy of the USSR itself.

The same change in the attitude of Turkey and of the USSR toward the subject of the framework of elaboration of the regime of the Straits appeared, in the second place, in the participation of authorized representatives of the two countries in the conference which established the Montreux regime, the fruit of long and laborious discussions, in the course of which the eminent Soviet Delegate Mr. Maxim Litvinov, distinguished himself by the great competency with which he defended and carried to victory the points of view of his Government. It is not in vain that at the last plenary session of the Conference, he rejoiced in the excellent results obtained. It is also not in vain that in speaking at the closing session of the Conference, he addressed to his audience this moving appeal: "The Conference has had to understand that in place of the old imperialist Russia which sought to use the Black Sea as a base for its participation in the imperialist struggle of the great Powers and for the realization of new territorial conquests, there is today a new Soviet and socialist state which occupies the largest part of the Black Sea and one of whose first acts was to renounce completely all imperialist objectives, and

which subsequently has invariably and systematically pursued a policy of peace, jealous not only of its own security, but also of that of all states near or far . . .⁹ All those who have participated in the conference will go away satisfied and there will be no one discontented."

These words, just as well as realistic, which do honor to the Government from which they emanate, words which the Government of the Republic is glad to recall and which still sound in the ears of those who had the privilege of hearing them, have moreover the merit of proving that the Government of the Turkish Republic, initiator of the meeting at Montreux, and the Soviet Government were in 1936 no longer at the point where, in 1921, they envisaged for the regulation of the question of the Straits a conference limited to the Black Sea Powers only. There is no doubt that the terms on which an understanding between states is based, cease to be in force from the day when a subsequent accord of the parties replaces the former undertaking by new arrangements duly signed and ratified. This is the case, especially, with relation to the framework of elaboration of the regime of the Straits. The preceding explanations and the citations demonstrate clearly that the controversy that the Soviet Note has raised by invoking Article 5 of the Treaty of Moscow has today only a historic character. In any case, the facts set forth above are there to prove that the historic argument advanced by the Government of the USSR no longer appears of a nature to serve as a solid base for the thesis which it maintains.

The same explanations and citations also prove the fact that the Soviet formula directed toward the elaboration of a regime of the Straits by the riverains of the Black Sea alone does not seem, contrary to the opinion expressed in the Note of September 24, to satisfy any of the non-riverain countries whose interests in the Straits are involved.

The same reasoning and the same conclusions are equally valid in refuting the Soviet demonstration based on the authority of an article, drafted in the same manner as the said Article 5 and appearing in the treaty of October 13, 1921 concluded between Turkey and the Trans-Caucasian Republics, as well as in the treaty of January 21, 1922 concluded between Turkey and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

In its Note dated August 22, the Turkish Government was intent on setting forth the reasons of a contractual character which were opposed to the revision of the regime of the Straits except within the framework and according to the procedure foreseen by the Montreux Convention. In the presence of the complementary explanations obligingly advanced in the Soviet Note of September 24 on the subject of point four, the Turkish Government has felt bound to develop, in its turn, the manner in which it views the new commentaries furnished by the above mentioned Note. The Government of the Republic would consequently be grateful to the Government of the USSR if it would consider the explanations of the present note as supplementing those furnished on the same subject in the previous Note.

⁹ Omission indicated in the original text.

With regard to point five of the Soviet Note of August 7, which recommends a mixed system of Turco-Soviet defense in the Straits, the Government of the USSR states that the Turkish Government considers this proposition as incompatible with the rights of sovereignty and the security of Turkey and that it arrives at this conclusion without having previously examined the concrete considerations of the Soviet Government on this subject. In doing this, the Note adds, and in formulating suspicions which are baseless and incompatible with the dignity of the Soviet Union, the Turkish Government finds itself in full contradiction with its own declarations concerning the restoration of friendly relations, marked by mutual confidence with the USSR. The Soviet Government believes that the application of its proposal could be realized not only without the slightest prejudice to the sovereignty of Turkey, but with an appreciable augmentation of its security.

The Turkish Government cannot share the opinion according to which it has opposed the discussion of point five, which it regards as incompatible with the rights of sovereignty and the security of Turkey, without previously having examined the concrete suggestions of the Soviet Government on this subject. It is first of all necessary to underline here that the Government of the Republic has never failed to receive with interest and good will the *démarches* of foreign powers with which it has relations. In this connection, the Turkish Government wishes particularly to recall that, raised for the first time at Moscow in 1939 in the course of the Saraçoğlu-Molotov conversations, the question of a joint defense of the Straits by the Turkish and Soviet Governments was also taken up, later, by the Government of the USSR, in an aggravated form, in the course of a conversation with the Turkish representative at Moscow. It is because this subject has been justly considered as injuring the rights, through the respect of which a nation is and remains independent, that it has encountered the opposition of Turkey. The entire question of the Straits has continued, likewise to be, by means of the extensive correspondence recently exchanged on this subject between Ankara and Moscow, the subject of a substantial examination of the respective positions of Turkey and the USSR. It is therefore unjust to accuse the Turkish Government of avoiding the opening of friendly conversations with the USSR with the object of clarifying point 5. The principle of freedom of passage through the Straits is, according to principles universally recognized, limited by the right of the riverain state to guard the security and defense of its territory, and can not in any way diminish the right and duty that State has to see to its preservation. The right to defend itself against all aggression is, beyond denial, for an independent State which respects itself the most essential attribute of its sovereignty. The acceptance by Turkey of a joint defense of the Straits would

mean no less than the sharing of her sovereignty with a foreign power. The Government of the Republic, in its note of August 22, has given to the Soviet Government all the necessary assurances with regard to its firm intention to defend, as in the past, Turkish territory against all aggression and had indicated to it its desire to see established between Turkey and the USSR cordial and confident relations. It is happy to repeat again the same assurances. It does not lose sight of the fact that the Soviet coasts on the Black Sea have a length of 2100 kilometers, but it also does not forget that the Turkish coasts of the Black Sea are almost as long. If the principle of the closing of the Straits to the Powers non-riverain of the Black Sea, a principle which, in itself, already constitutes a very important guarantee for the security of the USSR, is not sufficient to eliminate Soviet apprehensions completely, it is in order for that country to have recourse, in the event of an attack against the Black Sea, to the most perfect solution which mankind has yet found to repel aggression, that is the joint defense by national forces and the forces of the United Nations Organization charged with preventing all aggression, from wherever it comes.

Apart from these reflections, the Turkish Government cannot understand how the right of defense of the Soviet Union can be exercised in Turkey, in defiance of the rights of sovereignty of this country. The Turkish Government cannot resist recalling here the vehement terms in which Mr. Chicherin protested at the Lausanne Conference, against the proposal to take from Turkey the control of the passage of the Straits and opposed what he rightly called "a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and independence of Turkey". It cannot conceive that the rejection by Turkey of this same demand for control now proposed by the Soviet Union, should be considered by that Power as incompatible with its dignity, since, in the opinion of the Government of the Republic, it is on the contrary to the honor, the dignity and the very existence of Turkey, as an independent nation, which are involved.

The Soviet note recalls, in support of its thesis, the passage of the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* through the Straits in 1914. This reference to two vessels purchased by the Ottoman Government has no relation either to the subject under discussion or to the enforcement of the Montreux Convention and seems rather a question of international law relating to the propriety of the acquisition by neutrals of belligerent vessels taking refuge in their territorial waters.

In the same way, the allusion made in the Soviet note to the subject of the adoption of supposed military measures in the Straits, by joint accord with certain Powers non-riverain of the Black Sea is not understood in Turkey, since it relates to facts lacking any foundation. In consequence it is outside this discussion.

In its note of August 22, the Turkish Government, after having emphasized that the most certain guarantee of the security of the USSR in the Black Sea rested not in the seeking of a privileged strategic position in the Straits, a position incompatible with the dignity and the sovereignty of an independent country, but in the restoration of relations of trust with a strong Turkey, ardently desirous of contributing to that healthy task, but whose activity in this respect has unfortunately been restricted by lack of efforts on a parallel plane, added that in addition to this first class guarantee furnished by Turkey, the USSR should, in the wholly improbable case of an attack in the Straits, also count upon the efficacy of the United Nations Organization of which she as well as Turkey are members.

After having recalled this reference the Soviet Government states in its note that its proposal No. 5 is entirely in conformity with the principles and objectives of the said Organization. In emphasizing the importance of the United Nations Organization in a question which is properly of the utmost interest to the USSR, the Turkish Government precisely wished to refer to the First Article of the Charter, relative to objectives and to principles, an article according to the terms of which the new international organization should, henceforth, answer for the security of everyone, placed under the guarantee of the international forces put at the service of the Organization. It also wished to allude to the undertaking solemnly assumed by the members of the Organization, by virtue of Article 2 of the said Charter relative to principles "to refrain in their international relations, from the threat or use of force, against either the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations".

Putting aside any considerations as to the necessity of allowing every country to defend itself in its own way against outside aggression, the Government of the Republic has difficulty in understanding how, in an age when all the peoples avid for tranquillity and peace, are in the position of having placed their hopes in the guarantees of security flowing from the work of San Francisco, a proposal disregarding the existence of the new Organization and the guarantees of collective security which it provides, can be compatible with the objectives and the principles thereof. It also asks itself how this same proposal which, to establish security at home, believes it possible to wipe out the security and sovereignty of a neighbor, can be reconciled with the obligation to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of others. The Government of the Republic is thus obliged to repeat again that point 5 of the Soviet note of August 7 is incompatible with the inalienable rights of sovereignty of Turkey and with her security which permits of no restriction.

Basing itself upon the long explanations furnished above, the Turkish Government is convinced that it has established tangible proof of its good will and of its spirit of conciliation in agreeing to participate in a conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention. It appeals to the Soviet Government to ask it to study, in its turn, the reflections which its proposals evoke, with the same objectivity and the same good will.

Finally, to reply briefly to the Soviet reproach to the Turkish Government that it confines itself to conditions of admissibility of the procedure for the revision of the Montreux Convention, without taking the Potsdam decisions into account, this Government must first of all state that the decisions in question, which by a free manifestation of its will it has consented to take into consideration, contemplated only the attempting by means of conversations of an endeavor at conciliation of the respective points of view of the three Powers represented at the said conference, within the framework of the rights of sovereignty of Turkey, in a manner to prepare the ground for the convocation of the conference for revision. They are symptomatic of the interest which these same Powers attach to the question of the Straits, but they cannot replace the Montreux Convention which, alone, binds the signatory states. Moreover, the Government of the Republic believes it useful to point out that, to its knowledge, the decision to which the Soviet note refers envisaged direct conversations between the Turkish Government, on the one hand, and each of the three Powers represented at Potsdam on the other hand, on the subject of the eventual revision of the Montreux Convention. Now, in the opinion of the Turkish Government the preliminary preparatory work desired by the Potsdam conference is now virtually completed, thanks, in the first place, to the communications made by the Governments of the United States of America and of Great Britain to Ankara and, then, to the exchanges of notes which have taken place concerning the same subject between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Government of the Republic consequently believes that the contacts thus accomplished have definitely and sufficiently clarified the respective positions of Turkey and of the three Powers concerned with respect to the question of the Straits. Under these circumstances, the Turkish Government cannot avoid expressing its doubts as to the usefulness and the advisability of continuing to follow, in the future, the same procedure of exchange of views by means of correspondence. It considers the ground sufficiently prepared in order that the procedure of revision can be usefully begun (*déclenches*). The Turkish Government, insofar as it is concerned, while maintaining its attitude defined in the present note as well as in that of August 22, concerning points 4 and 5 of the Soviet demands,

declares itself ready to attend a conference at which are assembled the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France as well as the other states signatories of the Montreux Convention, except Japan, in order to proceed with negotiations for the revision of the above mentioned convention.

This note would certainly be incomplete if it closed without a fervent homage rendered to the organism which crystallizes all the hopes of peoples towards a future of peace. The Government of the Republic wishes, once more, to express its profound faith in the future of the United Nations Organization, the support of universal order based on concord, equity and mutual respect, framework of efficacious institutions in the service of living cooperation. It bases the greatest hopes on this constellation which has assumed the task of inculcating in everyone the necessity of collaboration between the peoples and of a law which governs them, and of orienting the community of nations towards a rich development of solidarity and interdependence, thus creating a work of high civilization, regenerator of stability and general prosperity. The Government of the Republic firmly hopes to find itself with its great neighbor of the North in this field of serenity, in the effulgence and radiance of international collaboration, dispenser of benefits for all the peoples of good will.

A copy of the Soviet note of September 24 has been transmitted by the Turkish Government to the Governments of Great Britain and of the United States of America.

A copy of the present note has been sent to the signatories of the Montreux Convention—except Japan—and to the Government of the United States of America.

ANKARA, October 18, 1946.

867.00/10-2146

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*¹⁰

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1946.

There is attached a draft statement of policy on Turkey which represents the present thinking of NEA in this regard. It is partially based upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of August 23¹¹ which you have seen, and incorporates all main points made in that memorandum. In line with the wish expressed in one of your telegrams from Paris, we have not attempted to go into detail regarding the means of implementing our suggested policy but have confined our statements in this respect to general outlines.

¹⁰ Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State with the handwritten notation: "Army & Navy wants a policy from us."

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 857.

If you concur in the attached memorandum, I suggest that it be sent to the Secretaries of War and Navy for their consideration and adoption as an agreed statement of the Government's policy. This would be of great assistance to the Department by furnishing a definite basis for further practical action. It would also serve to demonstrate to the War and Navy Departments our identity of views with respect to the Turkish situation.

With reference to the section of the statement dealing with arms, I should mention that we have heard the Turks are about to present a request to us for arms which, presumably, the British cannot or will not supply them. We do not know what the Turks want, but we are concerned lest a refusal on our part to let them have any combat equipment in any circumstances, even though the need should be clear and the British should not be able to deliver it, might be interpreted as an indication of a lack of determination to back our policies to the hilt.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

[Annex]

*Memorandum on Turkey Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*¹²

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1946.

Events of the past year have brought to the fore the vital importance of Turkey in the international picture. It is one of the few nations peripheral to the Soviet Union which is not under effective control of the USSR, but there are unmistakable signs that the Soviet Government plans to add Turkey to its group of satellites. These signs include a persistent campaign by the Soviet press and radio against the Turkish Government, Soviet assertions that various portions of eastern Turkey must be incorporated in the Soviet Union, denunciation by the USSR of the Turko-Soviet treaty of friendship of 1925, and the Soviet notes of August 7 and September 24, 1946 to Turkey in which the Soviet Government insisted upon an arrangement for joint Turko-Soviet defense of the Black Sea Straits.

It is the considered opinion of the United States Government that these moves on the part of the Soviet Union are designed to weaken Turkey with the objective of bringing it under the direct influence of the USSR and enabling the Soviet Union to use Turkey both as a defense against possible outside attack from the Mediterranean and as a springboard for political and military expansion by the USSR into the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East.

¹² Drafted by the Assistant Chief of the Division, John D. Jernegan. Approved by Secretary Byrnes and Under Secretary Acheson. Copy transmitted by Mr. Henderson in his letter of November 7 to Ambassador Wilson (not printed); he stated therein that the memorandum would soon be sent to the Secretaries of War and Navy "as a statement of the Government's policy". (711.00/11-746)

It is further the view of the United States Government that the successful execution of this Soviet policy would have the most serious consequences. Strategically, Turkey is the most important factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. By its geographical position, Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. A Russian-dominated Turkey would open the floodgates for a Soviet advance into Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, all of which are at present still relatively free from Russian activities and direct Russian pressure because of their relative remoteness from the sphere of Soviet dominance. It would also dangerously, perhaps fatally, expose Greece and Iran, two countries whose governments are already having the greatest difficulty in standing up to the Soviet Union and its agents. None of the nations mentioned has a government or social order so stable and united as Turkey, and none could be expected to stand against Soviet pressure after Turkey had gone down.

From the purely military point of view, it is the opinion of the War and Navy Departments that if the Soviet Union attained military dominance of Turkey (as would be the case if it were permitted to share in the defense of the Straits), there would be grave doubt whether the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East could be considered tenable for the non-Soviet powers. Political consequences might be even more far-reaching. Because Turkey is so obviously a key point and is so obviously under powerful Soviet pressure, all other nations, large and small, which fear the spreading power of the USSR are watching the current diplomatic struggle with the most intense concern. Any weakening which resulted in even partial attainment of the Soviet objectives in Turkey would have a disastrous effect upon these nations, influencing them to come to terms with the Soviets and abandon support of the United States in its efforts to see that the principles of the United Nations are upheld throughout the world. Such a development would produce a considerable weakening in the comprehensive security situation of the United States.

Fortunately, Turkey appears to be itself firmly determined to resist present and future Soviet pressure. From all information, the Turkish Government and people are united with regard to foreign policy. There does not exist in Turkey the cleavage of public opinion which makes it difficult for Greece, Iran, China and others to defend their positions. Furthermore, alone among Near and Middle Eastern states, Turkey possesses a relatively effective military force which could render difficult the task of an aggressor, even if it were the Soviet Union.

Despite these favorable conditions, it is obvious that Turkey cannot stand in the face of the USSR if left entirely alone. Turkey lacks the economic and industrial resources, to say nothing of the population, necessary to oppose a major power. Its economic structure is still shaken by the war. The unrelenting war of nerves being waged against it forces the maintenance of a large military force which is a dangerous drain on the nation's economic strength. On the strictly military side, Turkey is unable to produce for itself the modern weapons and equipment required for defense under present-day conditions.

It is, therefore, the policy of the United States Government to give positive support to Turkey. This policy should be implemented along the following main lines:

1. *Diplomatic.* The United States should maintain the firm, though reasonable, position it has already taken with regard to the Straits. If and when occasion arises it should adopt a similarly firm stand with regard to other issues, such as the Soviet desire to annex parts of eastern Turkey. The Turks, the Soviets and the world at large should be left in no doubt whatsoever as to our stand with regard to such questions.

2. *Moral.* The United States Government should continue to make clear to the American people the essential elements of the situation, explaining carefully the moral as well as political and strategic bases of our policy. At the same time, we should make sure that the Turkish Government and people also fully understand our position and are confirmed in their belief that we are determined to see the high principles of the United Nations maintained with regard to Turkey. We must especially avoid any action which, reasonable or expedient though it might seem to us, would give the Turks the impression that we were weakening in our support or deviating from our principles.

3. *Economic.* A beginning in economic assistance has been made through the authorization of a \$25,000,000 Export-Import Bank credit and by assistance in the purchase of vessels to rehabilitate the Turkish merchant marine. This beginning must be followed up by all available means, probably including additional financial credits but not limited to this form of assistance.

4. *Military.* For the present it seems preferable for Great Britain to assume the obligation of providing military equipment and munitions whenever necessary to insure proper maintenance and development of the Turkish military forces. This follows because of the treaty relationship between the two countries and because the world in general has become accustomed to the fact that Turkey receives arms from Britain from time to time. If a case should arise where Britain is not in a position to furnish the necessary arms and military equipment, the United States government is prepared to consider the possibility of furnishing such supplies to Great Britain for delivery to the Turks. In a very exceptional case we might consider furnishing certain supplies direct.

It is not inconsistent with United States policy, however, to provide technical military advice, military instructions, etc., whenever requested by the Turks.

767.68119/11-146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, November 1, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 5:05 p. m.]

1154. British Ambassador told me last night informed by Peterson at Moscow Soviets have replied to recent British note on Straits in sense Soviets do not consider discussions with Turks as ended and do not consider opportune convoke international conference.

WILSON

767.68119/11-1346 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*¹³

SECRET

ANKARA, November 13, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received 11:58 p. m.]

1188. Secretary General Foreign Office said to me he was not surprised Soviets so far replied only to British on Straits. He thinks possible they will reply to US in couple months, then to Turks later, in other words, matter of tactics to keep question alive.

Erkin said would not be surprised if Soviets seek discussion on Straits with new Turk Ambassador¹⁴ when he arrives Moscow (now in Ankara for consultation). Erkin's guess is Soviets may propose regional agreement of Black Sea powers within framework UN for defense Straits. While such proposal might at first glance seem reasonable, Erkin said it would of course be only mask for real Soviet objective re Turkey. In case such proposal made Turkey's position would be control and defense Straits of interest to Mediterranean and other powers besides Black Sea powers. In any case Ambassador Akdur instructed if proposals re Straits made he should reserve position and seek instructions.¹⁵

WILSON

¹³ Repeated by the Department as telegram Secdel 1152, November 14, 11 a. m. to New York for the Secretary of State who was attending the Third Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met in New York November 4-December 11.

¹⁴ Fair Akdur, formerly Minister to Bulgaria.

¹⁵ In telegram 1194, November 16, from Ankara, Ambassador Wilson reported that the Turkish press, commenting on the Soviet note to the British, had stated the only way the Straits regime could be modified was by international conference (767.68119/11-1646).

701.6761/11-2546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, November 25, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 3:05 p. m.]

1209. New Turkish Ambassador Moscow leaves today for his post. Erkin tells me Akdur's mission discussed at conference 2 days ago with President Inonu, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Akdur and Erkin. President stated instructions were simply to work for improvement relations between two countries, nothing else. He is not to take any initiative re Straits and, if Soviets raise question, he is simply to report what they say without engaging in any discussion.

Erkin said foregoing had been decided in view intimidation received from Soviet Chargé d'Affaires here that Soviets expecting new Turkish Ambassador take some initiative in discussing Straits. Turkish Government see trap and are determined avoid it.

WILSON

761.67/12-3046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, December 30, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 6:51 p. m.]

1293. In conversation with Erkin reported my 1292, December 30,¹⁶ he made further statements of interest as follows:

With possibility in mind that Soviets having given way on Iran and perhaps on Greece might soon be prepared consider reasonable settlement with Turkey, he is turning over in mind formula to have ready for such eventuality. He says if Soviets should show reasonable attitude, he believes Turkey should make every effort satisfy within limitations Turk sovereignty and independence any legitimate Soviet request. On possibility Soviets may feel or assert they feel genuine apprehension grounds security as affected by Turk defense Straits, he believes best way attempt deal with matter would be by meeting squarely problem of defense Straits rather than beat about bush on secondary issues such as passage through Straits. With this in mind, he is giving thought to what he termed regional agreement between USA, UK, USSR and Turkey for defense Straits in time war.

Erkin went on say if no change Soviet attitude re Turkey and Soviet pressure continues, future looks dreary indeed for Turkey. Economic

¹⁶ Not printed.

burden maintaining large military establishment against Soviet threats creating very serious problems for Turkey. There is no doubt widespread discontent over economic situation exists among Turk people and this creates political difficulties for Government. Unless he said some real settlement can be made soon thereby relieving Turkey of Soviet pressure, Turkey will be obliged to appeal to USA for economic aid as country cannot continue carry this burden alone indefinitely.

WILSON

[In reply to a Turkish inquiry reported in telegram 2, January 2, 1947, from Ankara, the Department's telegram 14, January 10, 1947, stated that the Straits question did not arise at recent meetings either of the Council of Foreign Ministers or of the United Nations General Assembly (767.68119/1-247).]

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN FINDING WAYS AND MEANS
TO AID TURKEY¹⁷

867.51/1-2346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, January 23, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 8:19 p. m.]

98. In conversation with Acting Foreign Minister who is [Minister of] Finance,¹⁸ he asked my personal opinion as to advisability of Turkish Govt instructing Foreign Minister Hasan Saka to discuss with Secretary Byrnes in London¹⁹ question of credit which Turkey is seeking from Eximbank. I replied that I was confident Secretary would not be prepared to discuss this matter in any detail in London but I could see no harm in Saka's mentioning Turkey's interest in matter to Secretary if he so desired. I gather Saka will be asked to do this. Sümer said encouraging reports had recently been received from Turkish Ambassador, Washington,²⁰ regarding progress dis-

¹⁷ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1293-1311 ff. Regarding a mission of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to Turkey, see UNRRA press release of May 18, Department of State *Bulletin*, June 2, 1946, p. 960.

¹⁸ Nurullah Esat Sümer.

¹⁹ Secretary of State Byrnes was in London attending meetings of the United Nations, held January 10-February 14, 1946.

²⁰ Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur.

cussions for this credit indicating particularly likelihood obtaining assistance in financing purchases of equipment for Turkish state railways and steamship lines.

Sent Dept as 98; repeated London as 25.

WILSON

867.24/1-2846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

ANKARA, January 28, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received January 29—4:15 a. m.]

119. 1. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs advises me Turkey has urgent need of 3,000 trucks, 1,000 automobiles and 45 [*sic*] tires and and has requested my intervention in obtaining quotas for these amounts for Turkey. While I appreciate that supply situation continues tight for these commodities, I feel this request has merit.

a. Number of nonmilitary trucks in operation does not exceed 7,000 including imports since 1940 totaling 2,763; therefore two-thirds of trucks in operation are over 6 years old and in very poor condition due to overloading and excessive use. Three thousand new trucks will provide for little more than replacement for trucks which will have to be withdrawn from service during year. Economic life of country depends on motor and rail transport systems which are heavily overburdened at present and any breakdown or reduction in service will have serious consequences.

b. Virtually no passenger cars have been imported since 1940. In recent months Ministry of Commerce has been refusing import permits for cars considering them as luxury items but we understand has now reversed its position. Total number of cars estimated at 1,500 consisting principally of official cars and taxis as operation of private cars is permitted only in exceptional cases. Additional new cars are needed to replace those which will no longer be serviceable for, and to provide for, expanding official needs. However, need for trucks is far greater than for automobiles.

c. Imports of trucks and passenger tires since 1940 are reported at 67,431 units or an average of less than 10,000 per annum for trucks alone. This represents far lower standard than maintained in Middle East where essential trucks have been supplied with slightly under 3 tires per vehicle per annum since 1940 (MESC monthly letter October 1945). There are no stocks to draw on and life of tires limited by overloading and poor roads. Unless 1946 tire quota increased substantially over quotas for previous 2 years considerable number of trucks will have to be withdrawn from service.

2. Urge that these factors be presented to supply authorities and that requirements as presented by Acting Foreign Minister be met in so far as consistent with more urgent requirements elsewhere. Please keep me advised of developments.

WILSON

867.24/1-2846 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1946—5 p. m.

URGENT

92. Confidential from McCabe²¹ and Cramer²² for Ambassador and Moore²³. This is your authority to advise Turks all Lend Lease stores originally intended for Turkey now held in Middle East stockpile or Basra can be forwarded to Turkey provided they will arrange and pay for transportation from present sites. Any obligation to U. S. arising out of these items will be settled in overall negotiations on same basis as items that have arrived in Turkey prior to 1944, and be sure Turks understand this policy.

Sent to Ankara as 92, repeated to Cairo as 159, repeated to London as 933. [McCabe and Cramer.]

BYRNES

867.24/2-1646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, February 16, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received 9:11 p. m.]

212. After signature aviation agreement with Turkey,²⁴ I informed Soviet Ambassador²⁵ thereof before public announcement was made in order if possible to obviate usual suspicions about anything concerning Turkey. In conversation with him yesterday he said, "I hear you signed another agreement in connection with aviation accord whereby you will sell \$10,000,000 worth of war material in Cairo to Turk Government." I explained nature and functions of FLC and told him that few days ago representatives of FLC were in Ankara negotiating agreement with Turk Government whereby latter could purchase on credit surplus equipment in Cairo.²⁶ I explained this

²¹ Thomas B. McCabe, Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

²² Ambrose C. Cramer, Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State.

²³ C. Robert Moore, Acting Special Representative, Foreign Economic Administration, at Ankara.

²⁴ Air transport agreement between the United States and Turkey, signed at Ankara, February 12, 1946; 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2285. For press release issued by the Department on February 15, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 24, 1946, p. 306.

²⁵ Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

²⁶ Agreement to grant Turkey a credit of \$10,000,000 to purchase U. S.-owned surplus material in the Middle East was reached on February 27, 1946. Details of the negotiations were reported in despatch 661, March 13, from Ankara (867.24/3-1346). The agreement was approved by the Turkish grand national assembly on May 8 (867.24/5-1846). A supplemental agreement was signed December 6 at Ankara and reported in despatch 1282, December 13 (867.24/12-1346).

was not combat material, but such surplus as RR and construction equipment, commissary supplies, vehicles, etc. I also explained that other countries in Middle East had already sent purchasing commissions to Cairo. I made clear there has been no connection between air agreement which had been under negotiation for months and this arrangement for purchase surplus stocks. Vinogradov appeared satisfied.

It occurs to me, however, that if Turk Government accepts offer submitted to them in accord Deptel 92, January 28, to take delivery of goods Lend-Leased to Turkey, but held up in Cairo since spring of 1944, such goods may include small amount combat material, arrival of which in Turkey may excite Soviet suspicions unless circumstances explained to them beforehand. I shall therefore, if and when Turks accept offer, explain circumstances to Soviet Ambassador.

Sent Dept as 212; repeated Moscow as 20.

WILSON

867.51/2-1446 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1946—8 p. m.

202. Urtel 199, Feb. 14.²⁷ For Amb concerning Turkish request Eximbank loan. Because it seems possible Turkish Amb here may have been mistaken as to real attitude of Bank to his request for loan—following for your info and discreet use. At time of request loan \$500 million, Turkish reps were informed (a) amount much larger than Bank would be able to lend Turkey in view funds available and other commitments, (b) credits would be advanced only on specific detailed projects, (c) Turkish very favorable gold and dollar asset position June '45 aggregate 270 million dollars would be considered, (d) preliminary examination of request and supporting document would only take relatively short time. Conversation friendly and believe Turk reps understand that amount of requests for loans from many countries make loan on scale requested by Turkey out of question. Conversations in no way at stalemate. Should be understood Eximbank unable to meet needs of devastated countries and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should be in position to lend for development when in operation.

As examination proceeds preliminary thinking indicates about 25 million as scale of total credit to Turkey in 1946 and 1947, some or all

²⁷ Not printed; in this telegram, Ambassador Wilson said he had explained again to the Minister of Finance "that it is practice Exim Bank to make loans only for specific projects supported by detailed information and not to extend global credits." (867.51/2-1446)

of this may be in form of 5-year exporter credits such as recently requested to cover export of approximately \$7 million railway shop and miscellaneous equipment. Doubtful Washington visit Turkish personage serve useful purpose re loan.

BYRNES

867.24/3-146 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1946—7 p. m.

480. Embtel 604, Mar. 1.²⁸ No suitable press comment for official announcement exists which can be used counter Soviet intimations US helping arm Turks.

Agreement concluded for sales to Turks on 10-year credit noncombat material intended civilian purposes. Negotiating with USSR for similar noncombat material on 30-year credit basis, difference being credit ceiling Turks 10 million dollars, USSR 100 million dollars. Comparable dollar term credit arrangements for noncombat material concluded also with Iran, Philippines, Lebanon and Ethiopia and will be offered other countries. Dept does not feel these arrangements suitable official announcement this time but would not object your setting record straight Moscow in bulletin or otherwise basis of foregoing. Sent Moscow—repeated Ankara as Dept. 223.

BYRNES

867.51/3-2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

ANKARA, March 29, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received March 30—9:45 a. m.]

380. ReDeptel 202, March 7. Information Turkish loan conversations much appreciated. If total credit for 1946 and 1947 may not exceed 25 million dollars (less 7 million railway shop credit) and predicted short terms apply they will be severe shock to Turks.

I fully appreciate heavy demands on Eximbank that many factors must be weighed in connection with all applications and possibility Turkey's ultimate recourse to International Bank. But before final decision on Turkish loan policy Department may wish give appropriate consideration to following:

1. Position Turkey vis-à-vis Russia remains critical. Relatively unfavorable loan treatment of Turkey now likely to be misinterpreted

²⁸ Not printed.

especially in view recent public announcement that billion dollar loan to Russia has been recommended by National Advisory Council.²⁹

2. Turkey feels that its wartime policy was definitely beneficial to United Nations of which it is one, that it is to cooperate in Bretton Woods and UNRRA and although not devastated by enemy its financial needs for certain economic readjustments are vital. Regardless of conditions prompting our action, failure to treat Turkey more favorable than, for example, Finland, close Nazi associate during war, will not be understood by Turks.

3. There is some urgency with regard to projects requiring early credits, notably those in fields of agriculture, minerals development, transportation and communications, all affecting widely general economy of true [*the*] country.

4. Foreign exchange and gold are subject to numerous obligations. Responsible official Central Bank states confidentially that total dollar exchange on March 13 was only 17 million dollars of which 3 million held behalf National Bank Yugoslavia. Much of gold holdings in excess of those normally required for currency backing and governmental obligations are regarded by Turks as essential to maintain highly liquid financial position while Russian situation remains threatening and substantial holdings are required in view inherent weakness domestic eco position, gold also required Bretton Woods fund and Interbank obligations.

WILSON

867.24/5-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

ANKARA, May 2, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received May 3—2:51 a. m.]

499. Embassy's telegram 489, May 1.³⁰ I presented proposed Lend-Lease settlement³¹ to Foreign Minister this morning. We went over question in some detail. Saka said he fully shared desire reach settlement soon as possible and hoped to set an example so far as Turkey

²⁹ For statement by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, February 21, 1946, on the foreign loan policy of the United States, transmitted to Congress by President Truman on March 1, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 10, 1946, pp. 380 and 381. This did not mention the Soviet Union. See also note from the Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union, February 21, vol. vi, p. 828. This stated that the Department considered such a credit among a number of outstanding economic questions.

³⁰ Not printed.

³¹ Since March 29, the Department had been in communication with the Embassy in Turkey on this subject; details not printed.

is concerned. He said proposal would be studied immediately by government experts.

I expect see Prime Minister ³² and Minister Finance shortly regarding this matter.

WILSON

867.24/5-246

*The American Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Saka)*³³

No. 705

ANKARA, May 2, 1946.

EXCELLENCY: During a recent conversation, I had the honor to advise Your Excellency that my Government was preparing a draft agreement for the purpose of settling lend-lease and financial claims of our respective Governments each against the other arising out of World War II.³⁴ I have now received this proposed agreement, which I take pleasure in submitting to Your Excellency herewith for the consideration of the Turkish Government.

As Your Excellency is aware, very substantial quantities of lend-lease supplies were furnished to Turkey by my Government under the Act of March 11, 1941. However, under the proposed agreement, no payment is being requested for lend-lease combat supplies and equipment valued at many millions of dollars, and representing approximately 90 per cent of all lend-lease supplies received by the Government of Turkey. The cash payment is requested for only a limited number of categories of lend-lease supplies, mainly civilian in type, which have a substantial postwar utility to the Turkish economy, and which represent only a portion of civilian type supplies furnished to the Government of Turkey under the Act of March 11, 1941.

The desire of the Government of the United States, as I am sure Your Excellency will recognize in examining the proposed agreement, is to make complete and final settlement of all financial claims arising out of World War II. My Government attaches importance to the early settlement of such claims, and it has proposed terms which it considers reasonable to the Turkish Government. I am hopeful, therefore, that this proposed agreement which I am now presenting may commend itself to the favorable consideration of Your Excellency's Government.

I am happy to take this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

EDWIN C. WILSON

³² Sükrü Saraçoğlu.

³³ Copy transmitted to the Department in covering despatch 776, May 2, 1946, from Ankara; received May 24.

³⁴ Draft not printed.

867.24/5-446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, May 4, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received May 6—3 a. m.]

510. Prime Minister lunched alone with me today and we discussed Lend-Lease settlement.

He said he found our proposal fair and reasonable; he wanted to settle quickly and have Turkey first country to make settlement with US. He did not intend to haggle over price, but if I had authority to lower figure he would be grateful. However, he did not want me to refer matter back to Washington as he desired avoid anything which might give impression to our Govt that Turkey failed appreciate generous spirit animating us in making this proposal. I told him that as settlement was for cash not credit, I would set round figure of \$4,500,000. He accepted. He said he will try to have bill authorizing settlement this figure approved by National Assembly in week or 10 days when we can sign agreement.³⁵

I think there may be some questions raised regarding phraseology certain clauses our draft after Turk Treasury experts study it, but main thing is that Prime Minister has now accepted figure mentioned above.

WILSON

867.51/5-2346

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*³⁶

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1946.

Participants: The Turkish Ambassador

Mr. Henderson—NEA

Mr. Jones—NE

The Turkish Ambassador called this afternoon at his request, having indicated that he desired the latest information regarding the proposed loan to Turkey.

Mr. Henderson said that he regretted that it had not been possible to give the Turkish Ambassador a definite reply at an earlier date and that as a matter of fact he could not give a *definite* reply. He explained that a variety of changes have taken place in the economic

³⁵ See Department of State press release of May 8, 1946, on the agreement with Turkey for final settlement of Lend-Lease, signed at Ankara, May 7, Department of State *Bulletin*, May 19, 1946, p. 868. For text of agreement, see 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1809. Bills to approve the settlement and to authorize payment of 6,000,000 Turkish pounds on account of the Turkish contribution to UNRRA were passed by the National Assembly on May 8; the agreement went into effect May 25 and was published the same day in the Turkish *Official Gazette*.

³⁶ Memorandum drafted by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones).

and financial divisions of the Department which had greatly delayed work in progress. He cited, as an example, the transfer of Mr. Collado to the American Directorship of the International Bank.³⁷

Mr. Henderson said that he had talked only this morning with Mr. Luthringer³⁸ regarding the proposed loan to Turkey and that although he had no authority to do so, he was in a position to indicate to the Ambassador that chances were fairly good for a \$25,000,000 loan to Turkey. Mr. Henderson said that the Department had done its best to increase this figure to approximately \$50,000,000 but that the Department had been unsuccessful in its efforts because of the Bank's shortage of funds and previous commitments.

The Turkish Ambassador expressed his thanks and asked whether he was at liberty to report that a loan for \$25,000,000 was likely and that an increase to \$50,000,000 was possible.

Mr. Henderson said that this would convey an erroneous impression. The chances were good for a \$25,000,000 loan, but he could not hold out any hope of an increase beyond this figure.

The Turkish Ambassador then asked whether he might report that a loan of \$25,000,000 was likely but that he (the Turkish Ambassador) was endeavoring to have it increased to \$50,000,000.

Mr. Henderson said that there would be no objection to his putting the matter to his Government in this way.

As a matter of information the Turkish Ambassador said that while in New York recently he had lunched with a number of high officials of the Chase National Bank, which is the principal correspondent in the United States of the Turkish National Bank. He said that these bankers had told him that because of the political situation they doubted very much whether any commercial loans could be floated for Turkey in the United States at this time either long or short term. The Ambassador said that he was bringing this to Mr. Henderson's attention because in an earlier conversation Mr. Henderson indicated that Turkey had not suffered the ravages of war and consequently was in a better position to seek private financing than countries like Greece and Poland which had suffered so much destruction.

Mr. Henderson said that he would take note of the fact that the Export-Import Bank was the only source of credit now open to Turkey in the United States.

The Ambassador expressed his thanks for the interview and took his departure.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

³⁷ Emilio G. Collado had been Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy and Deputy on Financial Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton).

³⁸ George F. Luthringer, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy.

867.51/6-1746

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1946.

The Turkish Ambassador called on Mr. Henderson today at 3 p. m. by appointment. Anticipating that he would wish to talk about the proposed loan to Turkey, Mr. Henderson had earlier in the day asked Mr. Luthringer to be present.

The Turkish Ambassador opened the conversation by stating that his plan to go to Mexico to present his credentials had been somewhat altered by instructions from Ankara to return there in the near future on consultation. The Ambassador said that if there was any possibility that the loan to Turkey would be granted during the next two weeks he would delay his departure until early July. He said that if there was no chance of the loan going through in this period he would depart earlier.

Mr. Luthringer explained that technical questions had delayed consideration of the loan to Turkey but that matters have now progressed to a point which might permit a decision on the matter before the Ambassador's departure. He said that the next step was to obtain the approval of the National Advisory Council. If and when this was obtained Mr. Luthringer thought that the Bank might act promptly.

The Ambassador expressed his thanks and said that on the strength of Mr. Luthringer's picture of the situation he thought that he would delay his departure until early July. The Ambassador said that the application of the Turkish Government had embraced a number of separate projects and that he now wondered, in the light of the size of the loan which was under consideration, whether the Bank would specify to the Turkish Government the particular project for which the loan should be employed or whether the Turkish Government would be free to decide which of its several projects would receive the benefit of the loan.

Mr. Luthringer said that he did not think that the Turkish Government, in the event a loan was granted, would have any difficulties with the ExImBank on this score.

The Turkish Ambassador then tried to elicit from Mr. Luthringer a statement regarding the interest rate which would be charged. Mr. Luthringer explained that there were several categories of ExImBank loans and credits, each of which had different periods and different interest rates. The Turkish Ambassador appeared entirely satisfied, however, when he was told that in the event a loan was granted the Turkish Government would receive equal treatment to that given any other country *for the category of loan involved.*

After Mr. Luthringer took his departure the Ambassador again mentioned to Mr. Henderson, as he had done on previous occasions, the difficult position in which the Turkish Government finds itself with regard to this loan. He said that he hoped that we would do anything we could to ease this situation. Mr. Henderson said that we were keeping this aspect of the question very much in mind.

The Ambassador, consulting notes, then asked whether there was anything Mr. Henderson could tell him regarding the prospect for a larger loan in the future. Mr. Henderson said that the Department could give the Ambassador no assurance of any kind in this connection. He explained to the Ambassador that the trend in the Department was away from Export-Import Bank loans for development. The United States being the largest contributor to the International Bank greatly desired to see the Bank a going concern which would handle all such loans on a world basis. Mr. Henderson quoted the proponents of this theory as believing that if the United States through the ExImBank were to compete with the International Bank in making such loans, the US might be open to the charge that it was employing its economic resources in order to gain political ends.

The Turkish Ambassador said that he could understand this point of view and, expressing his thanks, took his departure.

867.51/6-146 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1946—7 p. m.

472. Urtel 621.³⁹ Careful consideration indicates limit of Eximbank credit \$25 million, but no assurance of that amount. It would include loans referred to as exporter credits. These are discounted without recourse by exporter at Bank and hence are really credits by Eximbank to borrowing government granted at government's request for projects government considers essential. Role of Am supplier secondary. Loans are not granted without authorization of borrowing government which has decision regarding identity of project to be financed and of supplying firm. These are foreign government obligations to Bank and could not be excluded. Impression that Bank has \$200 million free funds erroneous. Regret embarrassment, but review of files shows repeated statements to Turkish representatives that loan on large scale impossible. When application filed with Bank Turkish representatives told that use by Turkey of foreign exchange in development program should be considered in connection with the loan application. Use of portion of these assets would permit substantial development.

³⁹ Not printed; it reported a request by the Turkish Government for reconsideration of their application for a loan exceeding \$25,000,000 (867.51/6-146).

Airport credit arranged prior to application and probably would not be included in total. If Turkey buys surplus ships credit by Maritime Commission possible for three quarters of purchase price. Few, if any, ships now available are adapted to Turkish needs. Some ships useful to Turkey may be classified as surplus in coming months. Expect other nations also will be interested in these ships.

Assume Turkish loan application will be kept in active file, if desired, but see no likelihood of large, if any, additional credit. Believe further embarrassment likely if Turkish Govt receives impression large Eximbank credit will be available at later date. Hence Dept will not ask Bank to send letter to Turks types suggested urtel 621 and Bank has indicated that it would refuse to send such a letter. Dept has requested Bank to send letter indicating that in view of heavy demands for reconstruction and development the relatively favorable economic situation of Turkey and limited lending power of Bank \$25 million is maximum possible, and suggesting that International Bank is especially designed to handle loans for development plans of Turkish type. Suggest you point out that International Bank for Reconstruction and Development now in process of organization the important future source of development loans.

ACHESON

867.51/6-2746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

ANKARA, June 27, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received 6:20 p. m.]

704. Embtel 621, June 1.⁴⁰ I conveyed yesterday to Secretary General, Foreign Office, substance Deptel 472, June 21, as reply to request he made of me June 1. He will inform Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. He said Govt will of course be greatly disappointed, but will seek what comfort it can from probability airport credit will not be included in 25 million credit and that ships can be obtained from Maritime Commission on credit for 75 percent purchase price.

Erkin asked my confidential opinion whether failure obtain more satisfactory results due to faulty presentation. I said confident this was not case and in my judgment factors involved in Bank's decision are (1) Bank's limited lending power, (2) urgent need credits war ravaged countries for recovery purposes, (3) Turkey's relatively favorable economic and foreign exchange position, (4) establishment international banks whose function to consider development loans.

WILSON

⁴⁰ See footnote 39, p. 909.

867.51/7-146 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)*RESTRICTED
URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1946—8 p. m.

492. 1. Embstels 719 and 720, July 1.⁴¹ No foundation for AP despatch re \$100 million loan. Despatch apparently result irresponsible misinterpretation of interview with Dept.

2. With approval National Advisory Council, Eximbank approved today participation up to \$25 million in exporter credits for Turkey. Total amount of exports this credit will finance depends on private credits which may be advanced by exporters or private banks.

ACHESON

867.51/7-846 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)*RESTRICTED
U.S. URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1946—11 a. m.

497. 1. Embtel 741, July 8.⁴² Para 2 Deptel 492 stated Eximbank and NAC had approved \$25 million exporter credits for Turkey. \$19 million figure apparently garbled.

2. Embtel 738, July 5.⁴² Fact that loan will be in form "exporter credits" will still leave Turkish Govt free decide projects to be financed under loan, and no projects will be financed under loan without approval Turkish Govt. Term "exporter credit" means that Eximbank will participate up to \$25 million in financing projects put forward jointly by Turkish Govt and US suppliers, or put forward by US suppliers with approval Turkish Govt. In any event, since Turkish Govt notes or Turkish guarantee would be required before Bank would make advances under credit, no advances could be made without Turkish Govt's approval.

ACHESON

867.51/8-1646 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1946—2 p. m.

612. Urtel 880 Aug 16.⁴² Turk Embassy advised Eximbank approval exporter credits \$25 million.⁴³ Bank informed by Turk Govt

⁴¹ Neither printed.⁴² Not printed.⁴³ The Chairman of the Export-Import Bank addressed a letter to the Turkish Ambassador on July 12.

division among Ministries as follows: Economy and Affiliated Institutions 15, Communications and Transport 5, Customs and Monopolies 4, Public Works 1. Details period of time interest rate to be determined project by project. Turks were told interest likely to average about three and half per cent.

ACHESON

867.51/10-2846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, October 28, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received 11:26 p. m.]

1147. Considering severe curtailment of Exim Bank loan to Turkey due shortage funds, and in view apparent present availability \$50,000,000 Exim Bank funds once earmarked for Czechoslovakia, are prospects favorable for additional \$25,000,000 loan Turkey as recommended mytel No. 621 dated June 1,⁴⁵ provided it employed for specific and approved projects? This would be in line Secretary's statements press conference October 22 on future loans and would appear confirm our desire for strong Turkey which now in difficult period of adjusting economy to post-war conditions and still burdened with heavy expense maintaining large armed forces.

Since devaluation date and freeing of foreign exchange for many long-needed imports, Turkey's gold and exchange reserves have been used at rapid rate. An original large industrialization program must be drastically cut. However, status of several programs important to national economy necessitates financing of early stages prior to final receipt of foreign exchange from increased exports. Projects especially in fields of improvement railways and harbors after severe war time decline amount and condition of equipment, modernization of communications, especially for international operations, road construction, development of coal and other minerals, (Petroleum Attaché, Cairo, is recommending \$3,000,000 loan for petroleum exploitation) and probably program for technical advance agriculture might well employ such funds for benefit Turkish national defense and economy. Turks have not yet raised subject after sharp and widespread disappointment over receipt relatively small part their original application.

If prospects granting such additional loan favorable, I shall appreciate instructions re procedure Turk Government should follow in making application, detailed data it should submit with application, and any action I should take.

WILSON

⁴⁵ See footnote 39, p. 909.

S60.24/11-546

Memorandum by the British Embassy in Greece to the American Embassy in Greece

TOP SECRET

ATHENS, 5 November, 1946.

On October 15th the Minister of Defense, Mr. Alexander, discussed with Mr. Byrnes, at the latter's request, the strength of the Turkish and Greek forces and the state of their efficiency. Mr. Byrnes explained that the United States Government were anxious about their deficiencies as they thought these two countries might become outposts of some importance, and that both the United States Government and His Majesty's Government should do what they could to help them to be at least in a sufficient state of readiness. The question was how best to do this. Mr. Byrnes felt that it would be best for the United States not to supply military equipment because of the danger of other powers being able to bring a charge of aggressive intentions on her part. He felt, however, that as His Majesty's Government are in alliance with Greece and Turkey, it would be possible for them to supply the equipment without such criticism arising. On the other hand the United States Government were prepared to do everything they possibly could to help the two countries economically. There had been requests from Turkey for a credit in America, he thought, for the purchase of aeroplanes, but up to the present it had been the general policy of the United States not to supply military equipment to Middle East countries. Meanwhile the United States Government were looking round to see whether they could supply things of a more general character such as trucks, although they had not much left. There was also the question of applications from the two countries for credits from the International Bank, and Mr. Byrnes felt from the way the Greeks had presented their case so far that they wanted help and advice on these matters. He was consequently arranging for an Economic Mission to visit Greece consisting of three well qualified economists to look into the whole economic position and to see how far America could help. They were already arranging to give the Greeks credits for supply of ships, mostly of the smaller coastal type.

2. Mr. Alexander then gave Mr. Byrnes a general picture of the state of Turkish forces, using information supplied by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. As regards the Navy, Mr. Alexander gave Mr. Byrnes a picture of the strength of both Greece and Turkey and said that in any action in which both were involved they would be of considerable assistance to each other provided the Turks could be brought into a greater state of efficiency and that political diversions in the Greek fleet could be ruled out.

3. Mr. Byrnes appeared to consider that it might be possible for the United States to supply some additional aeroplanes to Turkey in excess

of those being supplied by His Majesty's Government, but said he hoped that the latter should be able to do something more in the way of training the Turkish Air Force.

4. Towards the end of the discussion Mr. Byrnes said that he felt a little more reassured because obviously His Majesty's Government had a good deal more knowledge of the military situation in Greece and Turkey than the United States authorities, and that he hoped they would agree that the best way of tackling the situation now would be for them to undertake the supply of military, naval and air force equipment that the two countries required, and that the United States should help with nonmilitary and general economic assistance.

5. Mr. Byrnes said he hoped we should be able to leave the expanded Greek Army in a good state of training and enquired whether we could not consider leaving behind as much equipment as possible when we withdrew our forces.

6. Mr. Alexander replied that His Majesty's Government had already been helping Greece and Turkey in this matter to the best of their ability, and no doubt economic assistance to both countries would be very valuable, but he was sure that Mr. Byrnes would recognise that the United Kingdom had already shouldered a very large burden in the case of Greece and big expenditure in the case of Turkey. Naturally, their general position being as it is, they wished to reduce their expenditure in those directions as much as possible. Mr. Alexander undertook to communicate further information to the United States Government in regard to the assistance which might be given to Greece and Turkey in the military field after a further review of the problem by the Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Committee.

7. The question of United States assistance for Greece and Turkey was subsequently discussed further with the Director of Near East Affairs at the State Department by His Majesty's Embassy in Washington on October 30th. Mr. Henderson stated that he had just had a discussion with Mr. Byrnes on the subject, and confirmed that inasmuch as Turkey and Greece were of strategic importance to the United States, the United States Government was closely interested in Turkish and Greek affairs.

8. Mr. Henderson expressed great interest in receiving the information which Mr. Alexander had undertaken to give regarding British Military assistance to these two countries. The understanding that His Majesty's Government would be primarily responsible for this did not mean that the United States Government would not be glad to examine the possibility of helping in this field if His Majesty's Government were unable to supply the essential requirements. He also said he hoped that our information would include an analysis of the present state of Turkish and Greek armed forces, particularly the latter. He had for example heard that there was considerable dis-

affection in the Greek Army. While it was obvious that the Greek Army could not prevent a full scale invasion from the North, it would be interesting to know to what extent it was capable of maintaining order on and of preventing infiltration over the frontier of Greece.

9. As regards United States economic assistance, Turkey had received a 25 million dollars loan from the Export Import Bank, tied, as was required by the Bank's Charter, to certain specific projects. Turkey had asked for a much larger sum than this, but it was not known by what means they could obtain further credits, except from the World Bank. Greece had received a similar 25,000,000 dollars loan from the Export Import Bank. In addition they had received a credit for the purchase of surplus property which has now been increased to 45,000,000 dollars. The Greek Minister of Marine was now in the United States, negotiating a separate transaction for purchase of up to 60,000,000 dollars worth of surplus United States merchant vessels. He was acting on behalf of private Greek ship-owners whose power of attorney he held. There would be an initial cash payment of 25%, payment of balance being guaranteed by the Greek Government. Mr. Henderson went on to confirm that an American Economic Mission would shortly visit Greece to examine the whole economic position and to suggest how she might best be assisted. The Mission, which plans to stay for a few months, would keep in close touch with the British Economic experts there. It was improbable that any further loans to Greece would be made until the Mission returned. Meanwhile the State Department were considering what would happen in the case of Greece when U.N.R.R.A. shipments come to an end. It was obvious that financial assistance would be required but it was not clear how the United States Government could provide this. One alternative was to obtain a grant-in-aid from Congress; another was to arrange for an interest-bearing loan.

10. Finally, Mr. Henderson said that in general the State Department would welcome any suggestions that His Majesty's Government might have in regard to economic assistance to Turkey and Greece, and that, as indicated above, if there were gaps in what the latter could supply, the United States Government would be glad to consider the possibility of providing this type of assistance as well.

867.51/11-846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, November 8, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received 1:01 p. m.]

1174. Prime Minister ⁴⁶ spoke to me yesterday with great earnestness regarding desire obtain additional Eximbank credit. He said

⁴⁶ Recep Peker formed a new Turkish Government on August 7.

25,000,000 already granted entirely earmarked essential purposes and number other projects vital to Turkish economy require additional funds, such as communications, transport needs, agricultural and mineral development. He hopes very much we can help and said additional credit at present time would be great material and moral assistance to Turkish Govt and people.

WILSON

867.24/11-846

The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1946.

DEAR ED: Since the return of the Secretary, there have been a number of conferences with regard to the policy which we should pursue concerning the delicate question of the providing of arms and military supplies to Turkey.

On the one hand, we are concerned lest Turkey should obtain the impression that our support of Turkish territorial integrity and independence is limited to words, in case we categorically turn down all Turkish requests for arms and military equipment. On the other hand, we also have concern lest, in case we supply arms and military equipment to Turkey, the impression be obtained in the United States and elsewhere that we are carrying on a provocative policy with regard to the Soviet Union and are fanning the embers of a possible Soviet-Turkish war.

The decision has finally been made that since Great Britain is by treaty an ally of Turkey and has in the past been supplying Turkey with arms and military equipment it would be preferable for Turkey to continue to obtain such supplies from Great Britain rather than from the United States. The Secretary discussed this matter with Mr. Bevin while in Paris and the Foreign Minister agreed that it might be wise at this juncture for Turkey to look to Great Britain rather than to the United States for arms and military equipment.

The Secretary, on his part, informed Mr. Bevin that we would try to aid Turkey in other ways; that in particular we would endeavor to assist in strengthening Turkey's economic position.

We are hoping, therefore, that you will find it possible to discourage the Turks from asking us for arms and military equipment and to let them know that it would be preferable for them to address requests of this kind to the British Government. You might also pass the word along to the military and naval attachés of the Embassy so that they will adopt the same attitude when approached by the Turks on the subject.

In case the Turks should ask the British for arms and military equipment which the latter are not able to furnish but which we are in a position to provide, we might be prepared to furnish such supplies to Great Britain for delivery to the Turks. It might even be possible, if this indirect method of furnishing arms and military equipment should not in certain instances be feasible, to consider furnishing certain supplies direct. We would prefer, however, not to do so.

We feel sure that in the various discussions which may arise in this connection with appropriate Turkish officials, you will be able to make it clear that our reluctance to furnish arms and military equipment direct is not due to any unwillingness on our part openly to support Turkey in its efforts to retain its independence and territorial integrity but rather to our feeling that in the world situation the wiser course would be for the Turks to look to the British.

It may be of interest to you in this connection to know that the Secretary is planning to discuss with Mr. Bevin in New York the recent Turkish request that we assist in the modernization of the Turkish warship *Yavuz*⁴⁷ and to inquire whether the British could not undertake this work instead of us. You may receive a telegram on this subject before this letter reaches you.

Any comments or suggestions which you may care to offer with regard to our decision in this important matter would be appreciated.

With kindest personal regards,

DEAN ACHESON

867.51/11-1046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

ANKARA, November 10, 1946—noon.

[Received 3 p. m.]

1180. Mytel 1174, November 8. In view Prime Minister's request for additional credits Turkish Navy's request for credits to recondition battleship *Yavuz* (mytel 1157, November 1⁴⁸) and indications we shall probably be asked consider credits for modernizing Turkey's military defenses, I wish to revise recommendations in my 1157 that we accede to request re *Yavuz* and in my 1147, October 28, re additional credits. I believe that, before reaching decision on these matters, consideration should be given to such factors as (a) value and utility of reconditioned battleship in relation to other elements Turkey's defenses for which credits may be needed (this may require

⁴⁷ In telegram 1157, November 1, 1946, 1 p. m., from Ankara, Ambassador Wilson had recommended that "as practical demonstration our support reasonable position Turks on Straits question, we accede this request." (867.51/11-146)

⁴⁸ See footnote 47, above.

study and advice by General Staff), (b) Turkey's essential economic development projects (this may require expert economic study and advice) and (c) independent assessment of extent to which Turkey's assets and revenues could contribute to financing above needs (Lawson⁴⁹ has already begun study of this point and is exchanging views informally with British colleague).

What strikes me about these various requests for financial aid is that they lack coordination and planning. Consideration of Turkey's essential needs in fields economic development and national defense in light of whatever credits we and British may be able to furnish with resultant establishment priorities would seem important if Turkey is to derive maximum benefit from outside assistance.

I should appreciate Department's views.⁵⁰

WILSON

867.24/11-1246

*The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Henderson) to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1946.

DEAR ED: Since the enclosed letter from Dean to you⁵¹ was drafted, I understand we have heard that the Secretary, in his talks with Bevin, has been somewhat more favorable towards our doing something for the Turkish Navy. It is my understanding that some of the officers of the Navy have gone so far as to suggest that we might sell a cruiser to the Turkish Government rather than to undertake the expense of renovating an old battleship. There is also some talk to the effect that it might be a mistake for Turkey to go into debt deeply for naval or other armaments at a time when it should use its resources to strengthen the economic life of the country.

I had a talk yesterday with Captain Trammell⁵² and was somewhat disturbed at his pessimistic outlook with regard to Turkish economy. It would be too bad if the strain upon Turkey of maintaining and moving large armed forces should result in economic collapse. On the other hand, I imagine any Turkish Government would have difficulty in selling the idea of a reduction of Turkey's military expenses at a time when the country is under such strong external pressure.

⁴⁹ Edward B. Lawson, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs in Turkey.

⁵⁰ In telegram 750, November 13, 7 p. m., to Ankara, the Department expressed full agreement with the Ambassador's views, reported that the Navy Department has suspended action on the *Yavuz* case, said Turkey's economic development and problems of national defense were under active consideration in Washington, and requested an appraisal of Turkey's heavy burden of military expenditures (867.51/11-1046).

⁵¹ Of November 8, p. 916.

⁵² Capt. Webb Trammell, former Naval Attaché and Naval Attaché for Air in Turkey.

We are hoping that we will get another \$25,000,000 from the Export-Import Bank for Turkey. Upon receipt of your telegram on the subject the other day, the Secretary asked Mr. Clayton⁵³ to take the matter up personally with the National Advisory Council. We do not know yet, however, whether, because of lack of funds, the Bank will be able to find another \$25,000,000. I think, however, that the chances are good. Unfortunately, \$50,000,000 will not carry Turkey very far so long as expenses in connection with defense are so enormous.

Sincerely yours,

LOY W. HENDERSON

195.2/11-1346 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1946—5 p. m.

749. National Advisory Council Nov 6 approved action advising Maritime Commission that NAC no objection Commission consider extension approx \$5 million credit Turkey for purchase six ships.

ACHESON

867.51/11-1046 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1946—8 p. m.

756. It appears Lawson already exchanging views with Brit colleague on Turk economic problems further reurtel 1180 Nov 10. Brit Emb here last week relayed to Dept suggestion originating Brit Amb Ankara that such informal talks might be helpful in clarifying US and UK present and long range plans for economic assistance to Turkey. If following specific points have not already been covered Dept suggests they be considered:

1. Recapitulation of present US and Brit aid and assistance given since end of war.
2. Present condition of Turk economy.
3. Further assistance needed.
4. Form such assistance should take.
5. Effects of lira devaluation on present and future economic and financial position.
6. Compilation of all economic projects now under way or being initiated which require foreign purchases or foreign financial assistance, including projects on which Turk Govt has approached private firms abroad.

⁵³ William L. Clayton, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Lawson should report in detail on his talks. Foregoing will greatly help Dept work out details of program of economic aid to Turk now under active study as mentioned Deptel 750 Nov 13.⁵⁴

ACHESON

867.24/12-746

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, December 7, 1946.
[Received December 27.]

DEAR DEAN: I received yesterday your top secret letter of November 8, 1946, regarding policy in the matter of providing arms and military supplies to Turkey.

I am in full accord with the reasoning which led to the decision taken. In fact, my thinking has been along the same lines and I expressed similar views to the Secretary when I saw him in Paris early last October. Great Britain is a treaty ally of Turkey and has been supplying arms to Turkey in the past, and it would be normal for Britain to continue doing so. It would in general be prudent for us to channel any military supplies we may furnish to Turkey through the British, unless there should be special circumstances making it desirable to furnish supplies directly.

Certain points occur to me in this matter:

(1) I am in the dark as to specific requests for military supplies made of the United States by Turkey, with the exception of the Turk Navy's requests for reconditioning the *Yavuz* and a number of cruisers and destroyers, and for the completion of a Navy Yard. It would be helpful to me to be informed of any other requests made of our Government to furnish other military matériel to Turkey. It would also be helpful to know whether we in fact are going to furnish such matériel, or part thereof, through the British.

(2) In my telegram 1180, November 10, I spoke of the advisability of study and coordination in the matter of Turkey's requests for assistance in strengthening her national defenses. For example, the relative value to Turkey of incurring the expense of reconditioning the *Yavuz*, as compared with the purchase of, say, new airplanes or tanks, or motorized equipment, etc., might be considered at General Staff levels in the United States and Britain, and friendly advice given

⁵⁴ See footnote 50, p. 918. In response to the Department's request, the Embassy in Turkey sent reports in telegram 1208, November 23, 2 p. m., and in despatches 1275, December 9, and 1276, December 10, none printed. These gave an account of conversations between members of the American and British Embassies at Ankara in regard to the Turkish economic situation. (867.51/11-2346, 12-946, and 12-1046)

the Turks. Presumably whatever Turkey will get in the way of military supplies will cost them something, and this something will reduce by that much whatever financial assistance Turkey might look for from the United States and Britain as regards economic development of the country. Projects for economic development, such as improvement of communications and transport, of course have a direct military value as well. In other words, we could be helpful to the Turks by indicating in friendly fashion how they can best spend the limited funds to be placed at their disposal to strengthen the country's military defenses.

(3) Your letter states that the Secretary has informed Mr. Bevin that we would in particular endeavor to assist in strengthening Turkey's economic position. It would be helpful to me to know exactly what we have in mind in this regard. The Department's 784, November 29,⁵⁵ in reply to suggestions from the Embassy that the Export-Import Bank credit of twenty-five million dollars be increased by an additional amount for economic development, informed us that it was very uncertain whether additional credits could be provided. However, the Department's 750, November 13,⁵⁶ had stated that in connection with the active consideration being given in Washington to Turkey's economic development and problems of national defense, the Embassy's current appraisal of the condition of Turkey's economy was urgently needed. We sent a long telegram in reply, 1208, November 23, and a detailed report will go forward by air mail shortly.⁵⁷ Specifically, what I am wondering is, now that the decision has been taken to strengthen Turkey's economic position, just how are we going to do it if a further Export-Import Bank loan is out of the question? Is Turkey's only chance for help now to turn to the new International Bank, or have we some other way of being of direct assistance to Turkey?

I will undertake, as you request, to see that, at a later date when appropriate occasion presents itself, the Turks understand that we are not in a position to furnish them arms and military equipment directly and why we believe it would be preferable for them to make such requests to the British. Before doing so, however, I should like to be in a position to say that I understand they will in fact get the arms, etc., (or part thereof) which they requested of us, from the British; and also that they will in fact get some positive form of support from us for Turkey's economic position. Otherwise, I fear that the Turks may become discouraged at our attitude, and inclined to feel that our support of their independence is limited to statements of general principle.

With best regards,

EDWIN C. WILSON

⁵⁵ Not printed; it asked the Ambassador to suggest to Turkey the "taking up of matter of financing of essential projects with Int Bank". (867.51/11-8-46)

⁵⁶ See footnote 50, p. 918.

⁵⁷ See footnote 54, p. 920.

867.24/12-746

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, December 7, 1946.

[Received December 30.]

DEAR LOY: I received yesterday your top secret letter of November 7⁵⁸ with its attached memorandum on Turkey of October 21, 1946,⁵⁹ as well as Dean Acheson's letter of November 8 and your further letter of November 12.

I enclose herewith copy of a letter I have addressed to Dean under today's date⁶⁰ in reply to his letter of November 8. This covers some of the points which occur to me in connection with this important question of assisting Turkey as regards military equipment as well as economic development.

As concerns the Turkish economic situation, you have our views in our telegram no. 1208, November 23.⁶¹ A more detailed report on which Ed Lawson is working will go forward by air mail.⁶¹ While the burden on Turkey of maintaining relatively large armed forces is of course a heavy one, nevertheless we do not see signs of anything in the nature of economic collapse. The question, however, arises of the extent to which Turkey can safely incur further charges for foreign loan services, and this question is considered and our views given in telegram no. 1208. Briefly, we feel that Turkey could on a sound basis absorb further loans of moderate size—by which we mean about \$50-\$60,000,000.

As I see it we have taken our decision on policy. What are we going to do now to make the policy effective? Specifically, 1) What requests are before us for furnishing arms to Turkey (we here have knowledge only of the Turk Navy's requests), and what if anything will we furnish Turkey through British channels? 2) How are we going to aid Turkey's economy, now that a further Export-Import Bank loan appears to be out? If we in general do not furnish military supplies, and if we cannot increase the Bank credit, it is difficult to see how we are going to implement the policy stated in the memorandum "to give positive support to Turkey".

I think it would be very helpful if Turkey's needs for arms and military equipment could be studied by the U. S. and U. K. General Staffs and friendly advice given the Turks so that they would get the most in defense value for their money, whoever furnishes the arms.

Yours very sincerely,

EDWIN C. WILSON

⁵⁸ Not printed, but see footnote 12, p. 894.

⁵⁹ *Ante*, p. 894.

⁶⁰ *Supra*.

⁶¹ See footnote 54, p. 920.

867.51/12-1246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1946—6 p. m.

804. For Ambassador from Henderson: My letter and memo Nov 7⁶² represent in very broad terms what we would like to accomplish whereas Deptel 784⁶³ referring specifically to additional Eximbank loan illustrates practical difficulties confronting us particularly in dealing with independent agencies. (Embtel 1249 Dec 10⁶⁴) We still hope that Eximbank will alter attitude re additional loan. In any event we are continuing to explore possibilities for effective economic aid. Your suggestions will be welcomed.⁶⁵ [Henderson.]

ACHESON

⁶² See footnote 12, p. 894.

⁶³ See footnote 55, p. 921.

⁶⁴ Not printed; it asked for clarification, as in the letter of December 7, *supra*.

⁶⁵ In telegram 1256, December 16, 1 p. m., from Ankara, the Ambassador said he hoped the information sent "will be helpful to Department in considering question of economic aid to Turkey". (867.51/12-1646)

YEMEN

UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF YEMEN; ESTABLISHMENT OF FORMAL TREATY AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YEMEN¹

711.90J/3-446

President Truman to the King of Yemen (the Imam Yehya bin Mohamed Hamid-ud-din)

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: Mindful of the many centuries during which Your Majesty's ancestors have been Imams of the Yemen, and of the independence which Your Kingdom has enjoyed under Your Majesty's rule, I take pleasure in informing Your Majesty that the Government of the United States recognizes the absolute and complete independence of the Yemen and by this letter makes known its intent to accord you and Your Majesty's Government the privileges of such recognition and to endeavor to promote friendly relations between our two countries.²

I was happy to receive Your Majesty's esteemed telegram of December 2, 1945,³ expressing approval of the suggestions contained in my telegram of November 19, 1945,⁴ in regard to a Special Diplomatic Mission of the United States⁵ to engage in conversations with Your Majesty concerning an agreement of commerce and friendship and other matters of mutual interest. As reported in my telegram of November 2, 1945,⁶ I have selected the Honorable William A. Eddy,⁷ in whom I repose special trust and confidence, to be my representative with the personal rank of Minister for conducting these conversations with Your Majesty and such duly authorized representatives as you may appoint.

I hereby make known to Your Majesty that I have empowered Mr. William A. Eddy to conclude such an agreement on my behalf with

¹ For previous documentation on the establishment of treaty and diplomatic relations with Yemen, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 1312 ff.

² The Department of State had announced on February 12, 1946, that the United States Government was planning to enter into relations with the Government of Yemen; see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 24, 1946, p. 297.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 1318.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1317.

⁵ For the membership of the Special Diplomatic Mission of the United States to the Kingdom of Yemen, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 17, 1946, p. 446.

⁶ Not found in Department files; internal evidence suggests that the reference should be to President Truman's telegram of November 19, 1945.

⁷ Mr. Eddy was United States Minister to Saudi Arabia.

Your Majesty's Government, and that the agreement will be considered in force on the date Mr. Eddy and Your Majesty's duly authorized representative effect an exchange of acceptances of the agreement.⁸

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey my sincere respects and my wishes for the continued good health of Your Majesty and their Royal Highnesses, Your Majesty's sons.

May God have Your Majesty in His safe and holy keeping.

Your Good Friend,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

WASHINGTON, [March 4, 1946.]

123, J. Rives Childs

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

JIDDA, September 17, 1946.

No. 69

[Received September 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that, upon receipt of the letter from President Truman⁹ accrediting me to His Majesty, the King of Yemen, I sent a telegram to the Deputy Foreign Minister of Yemen, a copy of which is enclosed,¹⁰ requesting permission to visit Yemen in the month of September to present my letter. I received, on September 16th, a reply from the Deputy Foreign Minister, a translation of which is enclosed.¹¹ The Department will observe that the Yemen reply is framed in the usual circumlocutory style of that isolated Government. The Department will also find, I believe, of particular interest the reference in the reply welcoming my visit to the effect that:

"His Majesty agrees that Your Excellency will take care of the interests of your Government toward His Majesty's Government in a special and not official capacity, because the circumstances have caused a delay in exchanging consular representation in an official capacity."

Both I and Second Secretary Harlan B. Clark were somewhat puzzled by this reference, even in the light of the well-known Yemen compunction against the establishment of normal diplomatic relations involving the exchange of representatives. I, therefore, took occasion to consult with Haj Hamdi Belkacem, French Chargé d'Affaires, who

⁸ Minister Eddy concluded a provisional agreement with the Government of Yemen on May 4, 1946, covering diplomatic and consular representation, juridical protection, and commerce and navigation. The agreement was effected at Sana'a by an exchange of notes with Abdul Karim Mutahhar, Yemeni Deputy Foreign Minister; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1535, or Department of State *Bulletin*, July 21, 1946, p. 94. Documentation on the negotiations of the agreement is found in the files of the Department of State under file No. 711.90J.

⁹ Dated August 24, 1946, not printed.

¹⁰ Dated September 10, not printed.

¹¹ Not printed.

accompanied the French Minister to Sana'a last May when the latter presented his letter of credence. Haj Hamdi exhibited no surprise at the Yemen reply and stated that, when the French Minister arrived in Sana'a, the Yemen Foreign Minister was most particular in explaining that the acceptance of the French Minister's letter was by way of exception and did not involve the establishment of normal diplomatic relations which would include the right of the French Government to appoint permanent representatives in Yemen. It was only when that was made fully clear and accepted by the French Minister that the way was paved for the acceptance by the Imam of the letter of credence. (see Legation's despatch No. 242 of June 20th).¹² This point having been clarified as a result of my conversation with Haj Hamdi, I dispatched a telegram to the Deputy Foreign Minister, of which a copy is enclosed,¹³ expressive of my purpose to arrive in Hodeidah on or about September 22nd, for the purpose of proceeding to Sana'a.¹⁴

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

[For further information on the visits of Ministers Eddy and Childs to The Yemen in 1946, see Richard H. Sanger, *The Arabian Peninsula* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1954), pages 248-273.]

¹² Not printed.

¹³ Dated September 16, not printed.

¹⁴ Minister Childs presented his letters of credence as first United States Minister to Yemen on September 30, 1946; for text of the statement released by the Department on October 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 13, 1946, p. 690.

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