LANGUAGE POLICIES, ATTITUDES, AND BELIEFS IN KYRGYZSTAN

DOI:10.18136/PE.2023.840

Doctoral (PhD) Dissertation

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Veszprém, 2022

DECLARATION

This thesis, written under the direction of the candidate's dissertation committee and approved by the members of the committee, has been presented to and accepted by the Faculty of Modern Philology and Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The content and research methodologies presented in this work represent the work of the candidate alone, and the references are explicit and complete.

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Language Policies, Attitudes, and Beliefs in Kyrgyzstan

Submitted to the Faculty of the Modern Philology and Social Sciences
of the University of Pannonia in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the branch of Applied Linguistics
by Askarbek Mambetaliev

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Name of Reviewer: ………...................................… yes / no ....

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Name of Reviewer: ………...................................… yes / no ....

(reviewer)

The PhD candidate has achieved …....…… % at the public discussion.

Veszprém, ………………… ....………...............……

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The grade of the PhD Diploma ……………….................… (…….%)

Veszprém, ………………… ....

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ABSTRACT

The aspects of the de jure or overt language policy attract many researchers, which is reasonable given the importance of legislation in nation-building. Scholars also pay attention to the de facto and covert language policies, which include informal and non-written aspects of language policy that can shed light on practical problems on the grassroots level. In the selected context, relying upon only one aspect would lead to an incomplete understanding of the subject since there is usually a gap between Kyrgyzstan's de jure and de facto language policies. Therefore, this thesis approached the topic considering both aspects. Such an inclusive study produces thick material for analysis and increases the validity of conclusions by triangulating data from different sources. This study aimed to answer the following research questions: 1. What LP has been implemented in Kyrgyzstan? 2. How has LP affected the target group? 3. What language attitudes and beliefs currently prevail in the target group? The first research question was assessed using Tollefson's historical-structural approach based on analyzing legislative documents, historical materials, university websites, and dissertation catalogs. These methods helped identify the reasons that significantly contributed to the failure of constructing the Soviet identity in Kyrgyzstan. The reasons included covert, implicit, and vague policies, which have driven the de jure and de facto language policies in different directions. Hopefully, the findings of this thesis will shed some light in these directions by raising awareness among leaders and people about the sources of the problem. The second and third questions required in-depth interviews and surveys since many answers to these questions are only sometimes available online. They can only be studied through direct access to primary sources. Data from 850 participants, including 82 in the pilot study and ten expert interviews, show that previous language policies have created many problems that participants must overcome. These problems lie in the participants' divergent perceptions of their identities and mutually exclusive beliefs in decisive aspects of nation-building, often resulting in discrimination based on their demographic characteristics. Further research on the effect of faculties' international experience and students' English skills on forming language beliefs would provide a leap forward. Meanwhile, the findings and results of this study, which have been identified based on a broad spectrum of theories and methodologies in previous publications in English, Russian, Kyrgyz, and other languages of the researcher, can serve as a source of information for researchers, curriculum developers, and language managers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Dr. István Csernicskó, my academic advisor, for his continuous support throughout my study. My gratitude extends to the faculties in the Doctoral School of Multilingualism at the University of Pannonia for their generous sharing of knowledge with me. I also thank the reviewers of this dissertation, Dr. Viktória Ferenc and Dr. Sándor Czeglédi, for their comments and suggestions.

I am grateful to the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship for the funding opportunity to carry out this study. I thank the ELTE University in Budapest, the Central Eurasia Studies Society in Washington, D.C., and the State Language Policy Agency under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic for their awards for my research activities.

I am also grateful to the reviewers and editors of the International Journal of Applied Linguistics, the Hungarian Journal of Applied Linguistics, and the Journal of Sustainable Multilingualism for publishing my articles.

I appreciate the careful proofreading of my former academic advisers, Dr. Stuart DeLorme, Dr. Stan Nussbaum, and Dr. Daniel Hoskins.

Finally, I thank my family for being a source of strength and encouragement.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MoP	Monolingual Policy
BiP	Bilingual Policy
MuP	Multilingual Policy
CoP	Covert Policy
VaP	Vague Policy
IGT	Intergenerational Transmission
IEL	Interethnic Language
FamL	The language used at home or with family members
PubL	The language used on campus or in public spaces
LinID	Linguistic Identity
RegID	Regional Identity
EthID	Ethnic Identity
RelID	Religious Identity
RRR	Relative Risk Ratio
KASSR	Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
KSSR	Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic
KR	Kyrgyz Republic

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Classical studies have investigated language policy (LP) from the perspectives of status planning, acquisition planning, and corpus planning. They also viewed it as a subject of policy planning through selection, officialization, nationalization, standardization, prescription, acquisition, codification, and graphization and as a subject of cultivation planning through revitalization, maintenance, spread, inter-lingual communication, reacquisition, foreign language, implementation, modernization, renovation, elaboration (e.g., Ferguson, 1968; Neustupný, 1974). The rise of critical research viewpoints by the 1980s questioned the traditional approaches, finding them theoretically and methodologically adrift (Cooper, 1989; Schiffman, 1996; Tollefson, 1991). An increased interest in issues such as language endangerment and language ecology led to new theoretical directions. It highlighted the role of LP in identity construction, language maintenance, and revitalization (e.g., Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1996; Grenoble & Whaley, 1998; Nettle & Romaine, 2000; DeLorme, 1999; Hinton & Hale, 2001; Hornberger, 2015). The latter implies that the results of LP can be observed only after a considerable period, often in the coming generations (Nahir, 1998).

The next question discussed was about policymakers (e.g., Cooper, 1989). The context was when the leading authors presented LP as a nation-building tool. They argued that the end point of LP is a (re)creation of a new identity or nation. Language planners were defined as "an organized body enjoying legal or moral authority, such as a government agency, commission, or academy" (Nahir, 1998, p. 351). They also could promote various LP models, including the attempt "to kill a language; letting a language die; unsupported coexistence; partial support of specific language functions; adoption as an official language" (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1992, p. 153). The question led to the realization that citizens also manage language policy because many national constitutions refer to them as the source of power. Indeed, LP can only be implemented with bottom-up support (McCarty, 2015) because policy processes interact with demographic, linguistic, social-psychological, political, and religious factors (Appel & Muysken, 1987). Spolsky (2005, p. 2163) wrote: "There are comparatively few cases where language management has produced its intended results." Spolsky & Shohamy (1999, p. 50) noted that "language policies are intended for all who are subject to the control of the policy-making institution or person." For this reason, bottom-up aspects of LP, including the problems of language attitudes, beliefs, rights, ecology, ideology, and identity, have become attractive to

many researchers during the last decade (e.g., Canagarajah, 2002; Hult & Johnson, 2013; Hornberger, 2015; Tollefson, 2015).

This millennium began with renewed attention to the topic, adding that LP is not only macro-level (government) decrees but can also involve micro-level decisions, including family, school, and religion (Spolsky, 2004; Liddicoat & Baldauf, 2008). The latest studies have established that LP is grounded in language management (LM), attitudes, and beliefs (Schiffman, 2002; Spolsky, 2004, 2009; McKenzie, 2010). It comprises laws and people's attitudes and beliefs towards those laws (Spolsky, 2005a). It is "not only the policies adopted at the national level but also how people react to them" (Polese, 2011, p. 40).

However, citizens may have contrasting perceptions of the role of language in constructing identity (aka nation). Some value ethnic identity above all other (sub) identities, including linguistic identity, while others emphasize their religious, regional, political, or other identities (Kitinov, 2020). For some citizens, belonging to a community is more important than belonging to a country since some communities exist within certain geographical borders, while others have no such boundaries (Gorter & Cenoz, 2012). Some people put a higher priority on the notion of citizenship (Kohn, 1982), while others focus on ethnicity (Polese, 2011), and some others consider both important (Miller, 2000; Canovan, 1996). In some countries, citizens identify with one language, though the state promotes a multilingual policy, as in Luxembourg's case (Horner & Weber, 2010). In other countries, heuristic self-identification must often be clarified, as in current India, where citizens often cannot simultaneously identify with their mother tongue and English (LaDousa et al., 2022). There is also a type of identity in which a part of the same ethnic group believes that the language of another ethnic group can be its native language (Munday, 2009; Csernicskó & Fedinec, 2016; Tulum & Zubalov, 2022). In such cases, individuals may belong to two different communities, ethnic and linguistic, have more complex kinship attachments, and gain linguistic citizenship across groups (Edwards, 2006). Such was the case in the Soviet Union, where it was "difficult to separate ethnicity and language" (Das, 2011, p. 53).

LP should address not only *overt policies* or explicit mention of language rights of any or all linguistic groups but also *covert policies* or "no mention of any language in any legal document" (Schiffman, n.d., para. 1). Ambiguous language in official documents often leads to confusion in heuristic self-identification in postcolonial societies (LaDousa et al., 2022). There are also cases where the language of the former empire is deliberately not mentioned or mentioned very little but is not considered a covert policy. For example, India's 2020 National Education Policy insists on learning the native language and hardly mentions English despite

its importance in the educational system. Such an approach may not represent a covert promotion of the language of the former empire, as with the Russian language in the Soviet Union; it can be considered as the promotion of the native language.

Some authors have found that socio-psychological aspects of LP can cover such dimensions of mental health as an implicit bias, which is "an unconscious association, belief, or attitude toward any social group" (Cherry, 2020, para. 1). This additional dimension seems to overlap with an earlier idea proposed by Dörnyei & Al-Hoorie (2017) about "the role of unconscious motives in the study of English and languages other than English (LOTEs)." Others exposed hidden ideologies accompanying sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic processes (Lin, 2015).

Therefore, assets that can maintain a successful LP should include *healthy* language attitudes, *tolerable* beliefs, and *acceptable* behaviors (Spolsky, 1998). For example, the common belief that some languages cannot fulfill a broad spectrum of functions is unhealthy and *stereotypical* (Garrett, 2010, p. 10).

Previous studies also examined relationships between LP and language practice (Spolsky, 2004). Describing policy (what people should do) and practice (what people commonly do), Spolsky & Shohamy (1999, p. 39) warned that "if policymakers ignore the existing general language practices, their policies may have no effect." Spolsky (2004, pp. 205-206) elucidated that neither the number of speakers nor physical isolation nor linguicentric ideological commitment will guarantee language maintenance nor can prevent language shift in the modern world. The success of language activists is impossible without political power and the proper attention of ethnic and religious forces. It can be achieved only by an ideologically supported movement willing to leave many of the comforts of modern life to preserve the minority language.

Johnson (2013) states language beliefs, practices, and management are often correlated. However, a similar relationship between language beliefs and management might not exist (Hollebeke et al., 2022). A mismatch between official policy and actual practice may serve as an underlying ideology constructed in the interest of a specific group (Kroskrity, 2010). The lack of correlation between citizens' language beliefs and governmental language management demonstrates the existence of a gap between top-down and bottom-up policies (Mambetaliev, 2019). When LP is not in tune with the values of linguistic culture (Schiffman, 2002), it can face severe trouble leading to social tensions (Chen, 1999). It is dangerous for politically unstable countries with ideologically inconsistent policies (Johnson, 2013). However, some authors highlight some advantages of the mismatch in some domains. For example, Abongdia

& Foncha (2014) stated that in universities where global languages are more frequently represented on billboards than officially promoted national languages, the mismatch could provoke a zeal to support their languages among minority students.

All the arguments mentioned above suggest that an inclusive LP should start with a study of bottom-up attitudes (Tollefson, 1991; Haugen, 1959) which requires drawing from different academic fields (Spolsky, 2005a; Zhangtai, 2005). It is crucial to understand how individuals and communities are coerced into language issues and power relationships in policy-making processes (Tollefson, 2015) because LP processes are subject to negotiation, in which finding a 'common language' that satisfies all parties is essential in community development (Wright, 1996).

LP processes interact with "a host of non-linguistic factors," and a "simple cause-and-effect approach using only language-related data is unlikely to produce useful accounts of language policy" (Spolsky, 2005b, p. 2153) because "myriad factors" can withhold language policies from affecting language practices (Spolsky & Shohamy, 1999, p. 262). In contrast to simple linear systems, slight changes in LP may imply dramatic outcomes, while big ones have only minor effects (Civico, 2021). Therefore, it is essential to consider even insignificant details of policy drafts before outputting them for public discussion.

The topic still seeks a well-approved theoretical base (Civico, 2021). A recently announced book by Gazolla et al. (Accepted/In press) promises "to create an accessible and inter-disciplinary overview of LPP as a coherent discipline." Meanwhile, some scholars consider LP a part of sociolinguistics (e.g., Fishman, García), while others argue LP is a branch of applied linguistics (e.g., Spolsky, Bianco). Some researchers still use different definitions for various components of LP. According to Cooper (1989), language planning is "deliberate efforts to influence the behavior of others concerning the acquisition, structure, or functional allocations of their language codes." Kaplan & Baldauf (1997, p. xi) defined it as "a body of ideas, laws, regulations, rules, and practices intended to achieve the planned language change in the societies, group or system." McCarty (2011, p. 8) described the topic as "a complex sociocultural process [and] modes of human interaction, negotiation, and production mediated by relations of power." In his earlier book, Spolsky (2004, p. 5) distinguished three components of LP of a speech community as the community's language practices (the habitual pattern of selecting among the varieties that make up the community's linguistic repertoire), the community's language beliefs or ideology (beliefs about language and language use) and efforts to modify or influence that practice (by any language intervention or management).

As LP is probing various methodologies (Civico, 2021), it does not insist on one approach or another, allowing new methods and procedures to be used and introduced (Ricento, 2000a). It has already moved from large-scale censuses to other methods since some studies warned of the risk of relying merely on statistics in some contexts (Landau & Keller-Heinkelle, 2012) because of the gap between de jure and de facto policies (Mambetaliev, 2019). The "use of censuses for political purposes is not a novelty" and is widespread worldwide (Durcok, 2015, p. 57). In some cultures, written policies may have less authority than oral traditions (Schiffman, 1996). In such situations, the influence of official LP on language practices is not guaranteed because their language authorities consider that a country can be built on unifying myths, such as common origin, citizenship, values, and history (Johnson, 2013; Akyildiz, 2019, p. iv). When this is the case, "the nature of their language policy must be derived from a study of their language practice or beliefs" (Spolsky, 2005b, p. 2153). In some contexts, a better understanding of language issues in a community requires the study of personal histories and cultural practices (Young, 2017). In his seminal book on language attitudes, Garrett (2010, p. 37) distinguished three main approaches to studying attitudes, including content analysis (or social treatment of language varieties), direct measures (large-scale surveys), and indirect measures (or speaker evaluation paradigm or matched-guise technique). Considering these issues, many publications apply multiple and mixed methods. Publications in the last decade included studies using various methods of sociological and textual nature (Hornberger, 2015; Hult & Johnson, 2015). They explored the top-down components of the LP by analyzing legal texts and interviews with experts to describe various types of LP, including covert and overt (Schiffman, 1996). Considering all previously discussed ideas, the last report by Spolsky (2019) can guide further research that sees LP as a system containing language attitudes, beliefs, and management. In this view, LP interacts with top-down and bottom-up factors, including the likelihood of extralinguistic force majeure, such as genocide, conquest, natural disasters, and other tragedies. Further, he adds that LP involves advocates (without power) and managers (with authority) at the top-down policy level and contains people's desire to develop their language repertoires at the bottom-up or personal level.

These issues in this study have been examined by Landry & Bourhis (1997), Huskey (1995), Korth (2005), Landau & Kellner-Heinkele (2001), Munday (2009), and Mambetaliev (2019). A summary of their findings suggests that the LP in the target community of this research has been separate from the ideologies that have occurred in larger contexts since the last century. The ideology of "one nation, one language," which dominated Europe until the late second half of the previous century (Haugen, 1949; Weinreich, 1953; Ferguson, 1958;

Neustupný, 1968), has not been found alien to a considerable part of the participants of this study about their perceptions on identity construction and nation-building. Spolsky (2005, p. 2155) noted, "French Revolution and German romanticism held a view of nationalism that assumed that a single unifying language was the best definition and protector of nationhood." In contrast, Lenin's declared ideology of international socialism claimed multilingualism (Lenin, 1914; Lenin, 1917), which also found many followers among the participants. An examination of previous literature indicates that Lenin's ideology was an effective tactic to retain non-Russian ethnic groups in the realm of the USSR (Swanenberg et al., 2013; Grenoble, 2003). Later, Soviet imperialism, which took over in the 1950s, implied the complete fusion of national languages with the Russian language (Schiffman, 2002; Grenoble, 2003). It resulted in the extinction of several minority languages and eventually ended the idea of building the Soviet identity (Marshall, 1992).

Finally, the country's location on the ancient Silk Road, which served as a business, cultural, and linguistic exchange between East and West before the Arabic, Turkomongolian, and Russian intervention into Central Asia, appears to be again becoming an important factor influencing the linguistic ecology of the region. Ongoing discussions suggest that attempts to add English to the national curriculum in current constitutions and increasing contact with the English-speaking world may replace the traditional language equilibrium with balanced multilingualism.

1.2. Rationale

A decade ago, Johnson (2013) called attention to the role of LP in nation-building in developing and newly emerging countries. Stavans & Jessner-Schmid (2022, p. 9) once again reminded the scholarly community that, despite the growing number of language issues in Asia, Africa, and South America, "the center of gravity of research remains geographically constrained to North America and Europe." In addition, Ehlert (2008, p. 3) warned that the field needs knowledge from local researchers, as numerous publications by outsider authors have a superficial understanding of the details of language issues and often "present misleading information by missing out some important facts, such as socio-historical and socio-cultural aspects." Indeed, LP has become one of the most controversial ideas in recent years throughout post-Soviet space. Dozens of articles on official (written) LP problems have already been published in the media and reports of international organizations. Several country studies synthesize authoritative secondary sources. However, authors are guided by constitutions and laws that few people read rather than studying 'realpolitik' on the grass-roots level. In addition,

most existing publications are based on the subjective opinions of individual authors. Schiffman (1996, 2002) wrote extensively and authentically about these aspects of the topic in the Soviet Union. Another critical aspect is the shallow involvement of international researchers in discussing the country's problems. Most of them still view the former Soviet republics through publications of Russian authors who have specific opinions on former Soviet countries (Korth, 2005). In addition, a temporary stay of outsider authors in the country limits their vision of problems from diachronic and cultural perspectives. Besides, many international projects draw conclusions based on official statistics, which are often inaccurate (Landau & Keller-Heinkelle, 2012) because of financial and human factors (Mambetaliev, 2004). As leading authors suggest, the official policy must fully reflect the local community's problems (Schiffman, 1996).

Language activists in Kyrgyzstan often lament that the LP policies are not based on quality research but are monopolized by the government (Bekmurzaev, 2020, p. 28). This thesis could not find and use a wide range of views on LP promoted by local authors due to the small number of publications on their part. A search in the National Library's primary dissertation catalog showed that no doctoral dissertation on the bottom-up aspects of LP in Kyrgyzstan had been defended in any language by the time of data collection for this study. A Google search with the words "language policy in the Kyrgyz language" (without quotation marks) also did not find a link to a thesis or a book. The seminal research by Korth (2005) remains a single book that explored this dimension of language problems based on her observations and interviews with 30 participants. Other notable publications are brief reports, including articles by Huskey (1995), Munday (2009), and Landau & Keller-Heinkele, 2012).

Meanwhile, a poorly studied (and consequently planned) LP is stuck in socio-psychological problems. People often comment anonymously on how they were/are crushed for their national, linguistic, and regional identity. However, few have approached them to learn from first-hand sources about their complaints, perceptions of their transforming identities, attitudes, and beliefs about languages or LP models, how the modern generation understands problems, and whether they know them.

There is a need to study how young people in emerging nations perceive LP and how it can be related to their current and future perceptions of identity. Investigations of the sociopsychological aspects in a particular community, i.e., a region, a town, a neighborhood in a city, a school, a university, or an organization, can enhance understanding of the problem. Otherwise, a generalization of the interview results or personal observations obtained in one region, where citizens can speak Russian, to the entire country may exclude rural citizens who can speak only Kyrgyz. Artoni & Longo (2021, p. 197) are precise when they write that one of

the most important concerns of many authors is focusing on cities and the exclusion of rural areas. The conclusion of whistleblowers only from one region, a city, or a language variety can give biased information about the overall picture of Kyrgyzstan, where the role of regionalism reaches a level that can lead to the fragmentation of most Turkic nations (Akyildiz, 2019). The regional factor often serves political purposes and becomes the subject of bargaining in inter- and intranational political games. For example, from the beginning of language planning within the Soviet Union, the authorities were guided by the opinion of representatives of the intelligentsia of one region, which was closer to the decision-making center. Therefore, they are single-handedly assigned the status of "literary" to a regional dialect far different from most variations of Turkic languages than other regional dialects.

Today, some speak of the purity of one region's language and the filthiness of another. Such conversations are not limited to linguistic purity but can also be alluded to in various dimensions, including genetic, cultural, or other imagined purity. In addition to the regionalism factor, the Soviet Union added another dimension of exclusion: urban Kyrgyz and peripheral Kyrgyz. Kyrgyz experts confirm this problem when they point to the need for studies exploring differences in language issues between center and periphery, urban and rural populations (Bekmurzaev, 2020). Given these characteristics of the Kyrgyz society, opinions from all regions, L1, and religions should help avoid bias. It is time to explore the topic inclusively and provide readers with information about problems concerning their community or groups belonging to a particular social category or stratum.

Additionally, the articles, which are often based on online materials and currently prevail in Kyrgyzstan, remain the personal subjective opinions of the individual authors. Articles based on polls in specific population subsets are the opinions of many people from concrete communities.

The target group for this study was undergraduate students in Bishkek. The study also relied on deep face-to-face recorded interviews with experts and former colleagues with whom the author had stronger emotional ties and more extended contact. It attempts to draw attention to the unmentioned covert language policies and the sociopsychological traces of century-old language management in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, we hope this thesis will contribute to the field in Kyrgyzstan's context, as some colleagues lament that there is a lack of research on local LP problems (Smagulova, 2021; Bekmurzaev, 2020). The bottom-up aspects can only be analyzed with a rigorous study of top-down aspects. Therefore, exploring the LP of post-Soviet societies from its different sides, from top-down and bottom-up perspectives, can explain language problems more reliably than approaching the problem from only one side because it has already

become known that the problems of LP are not only related to government decisions and written pieces of information, but also to unwritten aspects of culture such as customs and traditional values that have been instilled for centuries and passed from generation to generation.

Thus, using statistical and content analysis, the study examined LP in Kyrgyzstan and its influence on participants' sociopsychological characteristics. In doing so, the study drew on ideas from previous publications that explored issues and perspectives of nation-building, language beliefs, language revival, intergenerational transmission, interethnic language, and attitudes toward dominant/minority languages. The author hopes the dissertation will shed some light on vaguely emerging issues in the study of LP and contribute to discussions among academic circles and decision-makers.

1.3. Research Aims

The purpose of this study was to identify and describe (1) the LP models and methods implemented in Kyrgyzstan; (2) the impact of the LP on current undergraduate students in prominent public universities; (3) the language attitudes and beliefs currently prevail among students.

1.4. Research Questions

The central thesis of this study was that there has always been a difference between the declared and actual language policies implemented in Kyrgyzstan. It also hypothesized that the policies have significantly affected post-Soviet undergraduate students' linguistic perceptions, values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. The following questions assessed the acceptability of this thesis and hypothesis: 1. What LP has been implemented in Kyrgyzstan? 2. How has LP affected the target group? 3. What language attitudes and beliefs currently prevail in the target group?

1.5. Significance

The LP is a cause or pretext for conflicts or wars in various countries. However, in some nations, an open discussion of LP remains a sensitive or taboo topic for fear of external interference or domestic grievances. Discussing the pitfalls of LP and preventing conflicts is better than letting the problem provoke a military operation, as in Ukraine, for example. Understanding complex and covert sociolinguistic issues in countries such as Kyrgyzstan allows governments, activists, and international actors to understand better how local practices function (Mambetaliev, 2021a). This thesis aims to draw attention to the importance of LP for

various stakeholders in Kyrgyzstan through scientific coverage of the problem. The researcher hopes the results will be helpful to politicians and scholars involved in LP worldwide.

1.6. Limitations

Although it is unlikely that students from the provinces currently enrolled in Bishkek universities and students studying at peripheral universities are very different, the thesis would be more wide-ranging if the researcher could also collect data from universities in remote provinces. In addition, more interviews would compensate for the need for a deeper assessment of the previous LP by Kyrgyz-speaking authors. Finally, a longitudinal quantitative study of campuses, including the Soviet period and the early independence years, would add more understanding about developing linguistic identities, attitudes, and beliefs among undergraduate students.

1.7. Dissertation Outline

Chapter 1 introduces the study by presenting the background, the problem statement, the purpose, the research questions, the significance, and the limitations.

Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature. It also provides an overview of the context in which language issues in Kyrgyzstan evolved.

Chapter 3 clarifies the design, methods, instruments, participants, data collection, and analysis. It describes the steps to develop the research instrument, data collection methods, and the choice of data analysis techniques.

Chapter 4 analyzes legislative documents and historical materials, expert interviews, and survey questionnaires.

Chapter 5 is a discussion of the results and findings. It is followed by suggestions for implementation, further research, limitations, and conclusions.

Chapter 6 is the conclusion, including a summary of findings and results, suggestions for implementation and further research, limitations, and conclusions.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE

This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the topic and background information on LP in the selected context. It describes principal theoretical approaches in LP, attitudes, and beliefs. The definitions, descriptions, concepts, and perspectives discussed in this chapter provide the analytical framework to guide the formal study of attitudes and beliefs regarding LP models in the selected context. This framework will guide the discussion of the methods, findings, and subsequent analyses.

2.1. LP and Nation Building

Most scholars agree that LP is a negotiation process driven by national (or ethnic) ideology or claims of identity, the role of international languages, the country's sociolinguistic situation, and the notions of language rights (Spolsky, 2004). It is an ideological undertaking that can function as a tool for liberation, oppression, inclusion, or exclusion (Fishman, 2006a; Tollefson, 1991).

LP "exists within a complex set of social, political, economic, religious, demographic, educational, and cultural factors that make up the full ecology of human life" (Spolsky, 2004, p. ix). The political sociology of language is based on the relationships between the state, the nation, and citizenship. A compelling LP requires carefully examining all available aspects of sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic issues of the society in question, considering different language combinations.

Alongside the national flag and government, authorities can construct identities aligned with the national language (Fishman, 1968). Language plays a principal role in developing individual, and group identity (Kymlicka, 2007; Wu, 2020) since "the feeling of belonging to one nation or ethnic group is often based on a common language" (Korth, 2005, p. 14). According to Stalin (1950), "only when people used their language could they achieve significant progress in cultural, political, and economic development" (as cited in Tsung, 2014, p. 24). From this perspective, identity is viewed as a product of ideological activity prearranged through policymakers' deliberate and institutionally organized actions (Blommaert, 2006; Nahir, 1984). Therefore, developing or restoring national identities is a heated topic among language planners in emerging nations (Spolsky, 2004). Often the solution to various problems that are associated with LP depends on the depth and quality of understanding of the role and functions of LP in identity construction (Hornberger, 2015), exposition of hidden ideologies that accompany socio- and psycholinguistic processes (Lin, 2015), the decrease of the gap

between top-down and bottom-up aspects of LP (Mambetaliev, 2019), and suggestions of ideas on how and why those gaps can/should be filled (Baker, 1992).

However, there are also views that current conditions make the construction of nation-states based on language unlikely since language projections on national identity no longer work (Blommaert, 2013). Laitin (1998) states that national identity is temporary and can be changed during the same generation. According to Young (2017), identity is not inherent in a person. It is "inheres and in actions...as we change activities, we change identities, too. He believes that "language identities may change due to massive movements and various contacts among people. Following the same line, Brubaker (1996) writes that the change in national identity depends on the political and institutional structure. In line with such ideas, identity is described as a fragile substance subjected to social pressures (Lambert, 1973), which can be claimed, attributed (Blommaert, 2006), constructed (Schlyter, 2006), or even based on genealogies (Ubiria, 2015). Therefore, language is just one of the contributing factors to identity construction (Armstrong, 1982) and is insignificant for nation-building (Hobsbawm, 2000; Brass, 1994; Ricento, 2006a).

In the era of globalization, when "international law has expanded into every area of human activity, and as the distances between states shrunk," international organizations are also found to affect local language ecology, consequently, the LP (Varennes, 2012, pp. 149-151).

LP involves language planning, which is "deliberate efforts to influence the behavior of others concerning the acquisition, structure, or functional allocations of their language codes" (Cooper, 1989, p. 183). There are various opinions on what LP and language planning mean for each other, considering LP a subsume or outcome of language planning and vice versa (Dushyanthi, 2021). Originally, language planning denoted a set of bottom-up activities, including “the activity of preparing normative spelling, grammar, and vocabulary for the guidance of writers and speakers” (Haugen, 1959, p. 8). Since then, this idea has evolved into different components and procedures (often criticized by different theorists), which can be briefly formulated as a sequence of the following activities: gathering facts for the identification of problems, writing policy with the specification of goals, analysis of costs and benefits, implementation of policy, and evaluation of the policy (Bianco, 2015, p. 70).

LP also includes planning at the family, and individual levels since the construction of identity refer not only to societal dimensions but also to individual ones. In this sense, linguistic identity can denote or distinguish between speakers of one or more languages (Zicheng, 2020). Additionally, some individuals from ethnic minorities with a strong emotional attachment to

their kin states may have a dual identity; that is, they may be proud of their country of citizenship and desire to preserve their ethnic, linguistic, and cultural originality (Ma, 2004).

Debates on language acquisition arising from the difference between linguistic and cognitive theories and generative and usage-based approaches are still intense and sometimes mutually exclusive (Mambetaliev, 2021b). The idea of linguistic competition in the psycholinguistic system, which Jessner (2012) called the dynamic model of multilingualism (DMM), can also serve metaphorically for sociolinguistic systems since the increase in the number of official languages causes competition between them for state resources.

The policymaking process involves a broad range of linguistic and extralinguistic spheres. A version offered by Parsons (1995), in the edition of Spolsky & Shohamy (1999, p. 49) can be presented as the following cycle: Problem - Problem definition - Identifying alternative solutions - Evaluation of options - Selection of policy option - Implementation - Evaluation - Problem. Further, Spolsky & Shohamy (p. 39) formulated a template/statement for making a policy as follows,

> *A specified group (e.g., all native speakers of L, anyone who finishes secondary education, and any applicant for a position in the Diplomatic Service) should use/acquire/have the ability to read/speak/write/understand a specific variety (or specific varieties, or even, specific features of a variety) of L (any named language) for any one or more defined role or function (e.g., as citizens, for employment, for community use).*

Status and corpus planning are interdependent, as status planning is a function of society, while corpus planning is a duty of linguists and authors (Hornberger, 2006). As such, in many societies, unidirectional top-down decisions may not work. For example, in some post-Soviet countries, the perceived inferiority of the corpus of the national language compared to the Russian language prompted the authorities to officially [and quickly] raise the status of the state language, which caused negative consequences (Kulyk, 2011). In many cases, the granting of state, national, or official status in the constitution is followed by a clarifying statement concerning minority languages. Many language planners take this clarifying statement from a previous constitution (Spolsky, 2005b). In other cases, the constitutional provision of status or function to languages is confusing, leading to conflicts (Mambetaliev, 2019). In some countries, governments usually favor the languages of dominant groups, which impose their language upon others (Romanie, 2006). Having leverage over the government's decision-making, some

groups can elevate the status of their dialects or languages. Languages can be planned so that dialects may grow into separate languages over time through the divergence or convergence of languages (Adler, 2021). Some authorities give time for public discussion, while others unilaterally set deadlines for implementation (Fishman, 2006a). According to McDermott (2017), the status and function of languages are tied to ideologies of globalization, local hierarchies, and the legacy of the past. Manuel (2022) noted that the allocation of status provides greater chances to improve the societal functions of language. Kulyk (2011) mentioned that linguistic beliefs about the status and corpus of a language interact with each other and affect the prestige of a language. Gil (2021) added that the sustainability of language status depends on the language's competitiveness in the linguistic market.

2.2. LP Models and Methods

The literature classifies LP models as promotive versus tolerance and egalitarian versus restricted (Schiffman, 1996). Spolsky (2004) distinguished LP into the following competing models: (a) selecting the most common language for efficient communication and (b) respecting linguistic diversity. While civic nationalists advocate for a model of LP that promotes the majority language, liberal nationalists call for considering the language rights of minorities (Stilz, 2009). Supporters of the former model (a) emphasize the communicative function of the language and its role in uniting citizens around the nation-state (Bolshakov & Farukshin, 2022). They also believe that a monolingual society is easier to manage because it strengthens citizens' loyalty to the state and prevents conflicts (Wright, 2012). Supporters of the latter model (b) argue for the preservation of languages, referring to the value of each language and arguing that the ban on the language creates the ground for conflicts (Bolshakov & Farukshin, 2022).

Effective language planning and identity construction consider the factors influencing language attitudes and beliefs, which are fundamental aspects of LP and nation-building. Based on the study of these aspects, it is determined which activities should be undertaken and in what sequence. The monolingual ideology supposes one language can be associated with national identity while others are marginalized. Bi- or trilingual ideology supposes two or three languages can be associated with national identity while others are marginalized. Multilingual ideology supposes no language can be associated with the national identity (Spolsky, 2004, p. 60).

While some societies value multilingualism and pluralism, others prefer monolingualism and monism, believing that melting "otherness" into "oneness" is natural.

However, multilingualism is a norm in most parts of the world, while monolingualism is an exception (Clyne, 2011). An example of official multilingualism is the European Union, where 24 languages are recognized as official. An example of monism is the current dominant trend in Russia and some other post-Soviet countries (Sakwa, 2015). The “melting pot” ideology is still the most potent nation-building force in the United States (Dr. Sándor Czeglédi, University of Pannonia, personal conversation, February 2023).

There are also nations where a hybrid model of LP is supported. In such countries, language managers "[n]ame in their constitution or their laws a single national or official language, but then modify the intolerance by proclaiming protection for one or more minority languages" (Spolsky, 2005b, p. 2158). Some examples of successful functioning of official bi- and multilingual LP are South Africa, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Aruba, Singapore, Malaysia, Mauritius, and India, to name a few. Examples of struggling countries where bilingual LP is causing frequent conflicts are Canada, Belgium, Ukraine, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.

The vast regions of the world have had a historical multilingual experience, "whereas Europe had a primarily monolingual, nation-based tradition until the establishment of the European Union (EU)" (Stavans & Jessner-Schmid, 2022, p. 8). According to Rutten (2019, p. 2), the invention of the (linguistic) nationalist model of LP has a pan-European origin, accompanied by cultural nationalism, national language policies, and standard language ideology. The notion of monoglossia, or "one language, one nation," was a dominant ideology throughout the nineteenth century. Coulman (1985, p. 41) writes that many people in Germany were "convinced that a nation without a language is lacking tongue and brain" (as cited in Korth, 2005, p. 15).

Followers of the monolingual model define 'success' for minorities as 'integration' into the majority culture at the expense of minority languages (and often accepted by minorities) by supporting the idea that majority languages facilitate ascending mobility, greater incomes (Ricento, 2000b) and effective operation of state institutions (Patten, 2009). It may work well in countries where governments consider LP a top-down system comprising language control and language institutions (Wu, 2020). In such scenarios, the state or official language status is usually given to the most popular and standardized language variation rather than the lesser-known one (Vari & Tamburelli, 2020).

In some contexts, the overt monolingual model is not necessarily 'bad.' For example, rigid language planning with the artificial rise of one language over others might work when non-linguistic identity markers confidently overlap other markers. These markers can be political or religious ideologies that unite people under a common motivation. For example, the

idea of building the state of Israel, where Jews would keep their ethnicity and speak their common language, inspired Jews, many of whom did not even speak Hebrew. However, they sacrificed their career dreams in their languages and obeyed the Hebrew-only policy (Shohamy, 2017).

In the formal education system, models can be described as dominant language-medium teaching with a minority language as a subject, minority language- and dominant language-medium teaching with both minority and dominant languages as subjects, and minority language-medium teaching with dominant language as a subject. Gorter & Cenoz (2012, pp. 186, 187) distinguished the following language management models: a) no minority language teaching at all; b) minority language as a subject, the dominant language as a medium of instruction; c) both the minority language and the dominant language as a medium of instruction; d) the minority language as a medium of instruction, the dominant language as a subject.

A model of LP for one country may not work in another country because its success or failure depends on the linguistic culture of a language group (Schiffman, 2002), as in India in the 1950s. Most people thought English should be removed. After exploring the experiences of many countries, the Soviet LP model "on the surface seemed egalitarian and multilingual." However, its importation brought a fatal error because it was "ill-equipped for Indian circumstances" (Schiffman, 1996, p. 165). Similarly, Switzerland's LP model might not work in Kyrgyzstan because ethnic groups in Switzerland live in regional monolingualism, while in Kyrgyzstan, they live in intermingled communities (Koenig, 2003).

Scholarship has yet to see how taking both sides of the ideology, i.e., awareness of the importance of multilingualism and the absolute subtraction of bilingualism (Henderson, 2015), may lead teachers to the tension "between their commitments to additive multilingualism and the pressures to engage in practices mediated by language ideologies of monolingualism and subtractive assimilation" (Razfar, 2012).

Bilingualism can be additive or subtractive in the learner's language repertoire (Lambert, 1973). Additive bilingualism is usually applied to members of the majority group who are learning a minority language. Subtractive bilingualism often occurs among minorities forced to abandon their ethnic language. Community leaders treat bilingualism according to their view of it as a uniting factor (Alsaawi, 2020) or a dividing factor (Turkiston, 2019).

Some societies have suspicious attitudes toward bilinguals. In the last century, ideologies in some nations attempted to associate bilingualism "with inferior intelligence and lack of patriotism" (Spolsky, 2005b, p. 2157). The study of Anglo and Latino attitudes toward

making English the official language of the U.S. concluded that "patriotism significantly increases Anglo support for English-Only policies but exerts little impact on Latino attitudes in this regard" (Gershon & Pantoja, 2010). Tarbox (2016, p. 12) states that "bilingualism often naturally happens, but only when the titular language is secure and dominant in public."

In some countries, bilingualism is not a problem. For example, the Finnish government has maintained the official Swedish status, which is perceived positively by most Finnish citizens (Palviainen & Huhta, 2015). Taiwan is another country planning to enforce BiP with English by 2030 (Ferrer & Lin, 2021). A recent study of the problems of bilingualism in the Tibetan context also gives hope that if balancing between diversity and unity is achieved, bilingualism can assist "learners in becoming creative in more than one language and across a spectrum of literature and cultures" (Wang, 2022, p. 60).

However, in some other countries, bilingualism is a problem (Karakale, 2022). In most post-colonial societies long coexistence of two languages has led to "bilingualism with diglossia" (Fishman, 2006b). McDermott (2017) lamented that despite many discussions about the importance of language for ethnic identity, most ethnic Kyrgyz believed that bilingualism in Russian and Kyrgyz was ideal. Therefore, Russian has become the de facto language of the country's capital city. This situation was the fate of many small republics of the former Soviet Union. For example, a recent report on LP in Moldova found that in Transnistria, Moldova, 72% of respondents consider Russian as their mother tongue (Tulum & Zubalov, 2022, p. 1562). In many developing countries, retaining the former lingua franca offers numerous benefits. However, such countries must raise the status of other languages so that speakers of those languages can take part in economic life (Kumwenda & Kretzer, 2021). According to Bolshakov & Farukshin (2022), the official status of the Russian language was withdrawn in most ex-Soviet countries because the coexistence of the Russian language with other languages has led to a decrease in the functionality of ethnic minority languages and their role as a marker of ethnic identity and a reduction in the number of speakers and schools of national minority languages. Therefore, some studies considered the coexistence of two competing languages with asymmetric bilingualism as a step toward language shift (Templin et al., 2016).

Based on her experience in bilingual settings in Kyrgyzstan, Korth (2005, p. 14) noted that post-Soviet societies must decide "whether one of the local languages will become state languages, or whether all local languages and the colonial language will function side by side." A more apparent difference between symbolic, statutory, and working meanings of the state and official languages (Cooper, 1989, p. 100) might alleviate the tension caused by language competition in some communities in post-Soviet countries. Ferdinand & Komlosi (2016)

reported that the Kyrgyz language might go extinct in Bishkek unless an effective language policy is implemented in the city. Another study in Sardinia, where the Sardinian language was suffering the process of language shift, found that Sardinian teachers expressed "[p]ositive beliefs about the coexistence of Sardinian with other languages" (Mura, 2019, p. 11). The literature describes voluntary and forced language shifts and ethnic assimilation cases in bilingual situations. In the first case, people switch to the dominant language guided by some motivations (both instrumental and integrative). In the second case, the dominant group can eventually replace the local language (Shabaev, 2020; Bolshakov & Farukshin, 2022).

Ferguson (1964) distinguished two variants of the same language: the prestigious variant (H-variant) and the less prestigious variant (L-variant). These definitions can also be applied to two separate languages. Subordinate languages or non-standard varieties usually have less prestige. If two such languages carry distinct functions, that kind of bilingualism is called diglossia (Ferguson, 1964, p. 429). Once diglossia is established, attempts to regulate it will face resistance from society (Ferguson, 1964, p. 4). If two languages have almost equal status (as in Canada, for example), they are in conflict, and the society is defined as dyadic (Spolsky & Shohamy, 1999, p. 10).

Children in bilingual contexts may possess mixed feelings about their languages depending on situations; they may feel proud of their native languages in some circumstances and "shy away from speaking their native language in other cases" (Esteron, 2020, p. 96).

In some countries, linguistic diversity is seen as a potential source of instability (Kellner-Heinkele & Landau, 2012). However, in most cases, the so-called language conflicts are not about language but about social inequalities (Romaine, 2010). Language conflicts can be prevented through quality media and civic education policies (Bolshakov & Farukshin, 2022).

Multilingualism is not bilingualism (Stavans & Jessner-Schmid, 2022), and managing more than two languages requires more sociolinguistic resources (Jessner, 2012) than handling bilingualism. It also requires more individual investments since multilingualism refers to individual and societal factors (Jessner et al., 2016).

Language ecology paradigms promote preservation and diversification (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1996; Hornberger, 2006). From this perspective, "a loss of any language is the loss of a rich resource of knowledge" (Gorter & Cenoz, 2012, p. 192). A country that appreciates linguistic diversity is wealthier than one that denies diversity (Romaine, 2006). In contrast to the conception of language diversity as a curse of Babylon, as preached by O'Connell (The Irish Times, 2019), many scholars in LP "find in language a source of novel delights and

subtle experience" (Haugen, 1973, p. 47) perceiving every language as "God's special gift to mankind" (Egele, 2022, p. 1) and equally worthy of attention. From this perspective, language managers must escape the errors of the past when one language was viewed as superior to another (Pasquale & Bierma, 2011).

There is still no universally accepted best type of LP. Today, many people praise the European Union's multilingual LP. However, multilingualism is an ideologically loaded terminology like many other -isms. Therefore, despite the consented LP that poses much rhetoric advocating multilingualism, the question of language in the EU is sensitive, as Philipson (2016, p. 13) expresses, "It touches existential national nerves." In his view, "The Commission's website typically has all texts in English, fewer in French, and even fewer in other languages" (p. 14). However, it should be noted that the Commission's website has significantly improved since the publication of this remark, and most information is currently available in other official languages.

Tollefson (1991, p. 16) noted that language planning under the state's patronage is "a mechanism by which dominant groups establish hegemony in language use." However, the language of a dominant group can become a common language without a written regulation (e.g., Japan). The Constitution of the USA does not even overtly enshrine a language as *primus inter pares*, which Schiffman calls "the murkiest of language policies" (1996, p. 1). However, the de facto status of English is undeniable in this country, which is the apparent fact that the language can win without government interference. The success of these languages is an example of the fact that the constitution or other written regulations are not the only driving force of language management. A dominant language can "establish hegemony in language use" (Tollefson, 1991, p. 16) and win without written LP (Schiffman, 2002). Its success increases, especially in regions with ethnically heterogeneous communities (Agadjanian & Nedoluzhko, 2022).

According to Schiffman, the absence of written regulation of a language's status does not mean there is no policy toward that language since the language's status may purposefully not be mentioned. In his understanding, "the regulation of the status and corpus of the H-variety is a prime example of overt policy, while the non-regulation of L-variety languages is an example of a covert policy" (Schiffman, 1996, p. 156). A covert LP may allow for an ambiguous interpretation of laws (Csernicskó & Fedinec, 2016). It can also promote a predetermined language to the level of a means of interethnic communication (Schiffman, 1996).

In China, the state advocates language equality among the languages of officially recognized ethnic groups. However, it actively promotes Putonghua as the primary national

language (Tsung, 2014, p. 24). Lenin did not assign any status to the Russian language, being convinced of the Russian language's potential to dominate other languages in the future (Lenin, 1914; Lenin, 1917). It was also a tactic to keep non-Russian ethnic groups in a crumbling empire (Swanenberg et al., 2013; Grenoble, 2003). It was a time when Turkic peoples were in a profound social and economic crisis after Gengizkhan's empire (Sinor, 2021), which was successfully used by the Kremlin "to assimilate to Russian since incentives to do this were built in" (Schiffman, 1996, p. 165). Schiffman (2002, para. 5) described the LP of Russia and the early Soviet Union as "tolerant and promotive of linguistic differences, and Soviet citizenship was thus not contingent on knowledge of Russian." However, describing the later policy of Russia, he added that the old covert and plain Russifying tendency, and paternalistic leadership of Russians reasserted itself.

It is now clear what the declared "equality" in the first constitution of the Soviet Union was hiding. Throughout history, Russian tsars openly carried out the Russification of non-Russian peoples (Ornstein, 1959). The Russification of Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Finns, launched in 1881, was notable for its outright imposition of the Russian language and culture on these peoples (BBC, 2021).

According to Grin (1992, p. 71), "a small variation in the initial condition leads to drastic changes in the stable eventually equilibrium attained." In the Soviet case, the declared "friendship" and "brotherhood" in the constitution promoted the assimilation of minority languages. It was later manifested in everyday life and the media, which implicitly viewed minority cultures as "primitive and irrelevant to the country's development" (Khanolainen et al., p. 3). For example, the number of German speakers in the USSR dropped from 95% (the total number of Germans was 1,238,000) in 1926 to 48.7% (the total number of Germans was 2,038,000) in 1989. At the end of the twentieth century, German immigrants in the republics of the Soviet Union almost wholly lost the distinct markers of their identity (Riehl, 2017). This classic LP continued in post-Soviet Russia, where less than 1% of schools had non-Russian languages as the medium of instruction in the previous decade (Suleimanov, 2019). Recently, the Russian government passed a law to make studying the Russian language compulsory in its national republics and optional for studying the languages of local people (Russian Parliament, 2018).

Language death occurs when a language gives up functions or is spoken only by the elderly (Spolsky, 2004). It is facilitated by the promotion of only one language, family and school policies that teach how to speak a dominant language, as they think that the dominant language may be helpful in children's career development, a weak desire to preserve native

culture and ancestral heritage, ridicule, and insults for knowing or not knowing the language (Galon et al., 2020). Negative attitudes toward native languages precede language death. Other contributors to language shift include rural-urban shift, no effort by parents to transmit their native language to their children, identity-related issues, prestige and mediocrity, a difference in technological knowledge, and intermarriage (Egele, 2022, p. 3-4).

The long existence of asymmetric bilingualism signals a societal problem, leading to the exclusion of minority languages (Mambetaliev, 2020b). Prolonged discriminatory propaganda about language status, function, and potential will eventually throw a language from a public space to a private one (Stephen, 2013). The lack of qualified teachers, textbooks, and infrastructure to teach the target language hinders revitalization efforts (Rivers, 2005). Aitchison & Carter (1987, p. 246) reported that "there was anything wrong with the dead language itself: its essential structure was no better and no worse than that of any other language." When speakers of major international languages move to other countries and refuse to learn local languages, as was the case in Israel with repatriates from Russia (Spolsky & Shohamy, 1999), they create additional problems in the local government's revitalization efforts. Some scholars consider "the death of a minority language might be a good thing, as it contributes to social stability and ethnic equality" (Tsung, 2014, p. 49).

Fishman (1991) believed that language death can only be prevented by bringing back essential language functions. Language revitalization is essential for building a nation. Revitalizing a language means increasing the number of active users and strengthening its presence in a particular society (Eichhorn, 2022). The healthiest language can function in many domains (Fishman, 1991). The actual state of language vitality consists of the level of intergenerational language transmission, the number and proportion of speakers within the community, language use in education and office work, and language attitudes (Baker & Wright, 2017; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000). Therefore, it is necessary to create conditions that facilitate language use and increase the prestige of the state language to motivate speakers to learn it, which is also "linked to economic indicators"(Korth, 2005, p. 20). Without expanding the functional role of the language in various key domains, its official symbolic status is not helpful in revitalization efforts (DeLorme, 1999).

Language revitalization "is a social movement, and brings benefits to society as well as to individuals" (Grenoble, 2021, p. 6). An impetus for revitalization is the need for identity or belonging to a community. Motivation for revitalization includes the awareness of the benefits of being bilingual, desiring to reconnect with the roots, believing in the importance of passing the language to the next generation, building community and social change, gaining new

knowledge and culture, feeling the need for healing from the consequences of colonialism, wanting to recover self-esteem, physical, mental, and cognitive well-being. As a sociological process, revitalization requires investments that determine future pay-offs.

The leaders of any country should be interested in the cultural and economic well-being of their citizens belonging to different socio-demographic categories. Studying revitalization from this perspective in the case of a minority language in Japan, Henrich (2021) concluded that maintaining and revitalizing minority languages brings both socio-psychological and economic benefits as new products are launched, new services are offered, and new jobs are created. All this contributes to what he calls "welfare linguistics."

According to Mejías et al. (2003, p. 148-149), "if the group uses its heritage language in public domains for communicative purposes, this generally indicates that language is being maintained." Therefore, most authors agree that before planning a language's status, its vitality (health) should be assessed (De Bres, 2011; Hutchings et al., 2017). Fishman's Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS) accesses language health as an 8-level hierarchical structure in which Level 1 represents the safest language, and Level 8 represents the most endangered language. Other levels in between represent the corresponding success of language as one ascends the scale.

Language maintenance and promotion models of the 19th-20th century consisted of having the Bible in the local language, a grammar textbook, a dictionary, and teaching a language as a subject. Later, this model was replaced with the right to mother tongue education, and today activists offer many resources through the Internet and TV channels (Gorter & Cenoz, 2012).

According to Ong & Ting (2022, p. 347), "stronger belief in the patrimony dimension of ethnicity, where the language is a marker of ethnic group membership," can contribute to preserving and maintaining the language in question. When minority language speakers are under pressure from dominant language speakers, the initial step towards revitalizing the threatened language should be to make some speakers aware of the advantages of multilingualism and the different functions of the native language and the dominant language (Wurm, 2002).

Studies show that the integration of languages into the education system is the most effective strategy for language revitalization and maintenance (Shee, 2018). In some contexts, it can supersede "parental strategies in language exposure, use and policies" and "constitutes an insuperable condition fostering efficient language maintenance" (Wolf-Farré & Cantone, 2022). Gorter & Cenoz (2012, p. 186) believe that "a strong, fully fledged policy for a minority

language can be successful." The efforts to revitalize Basque and Welsh by employing high-prestige domains and developing elaborate teaching systems that covered the early stages of education until tertiary education were fruitful (Mambetaliev, 2012; Eichhorn, 2022). In addition, some authors believe that Kazakhstan's trilingual LP successfully revitalized the Kazakh language (Smagulova, 2021; Turgaleyeva, Kakimzhanova, Tolymkhanova, 2022). According to Spolsky (2004), one of the most successful or "anomalous" (as he put it) cases of revitalization occurred with Hebrew, which, without exaggeration, was resurrected from the dead. In half a century, it "emerged as a revitalized, revernacularized, restandardized, secularized, and modernized language that is now the dominant language of Israel" (p. 191). He believes that the success of Hebrew was due to "a strong language and nationalist movement" (p. 193). Language revitalization projects should seek to expand the use of the chosen language in public and private domains, conduct a continuous assessment of progress, work on changing broader attitudes in support of the selected language, and provide a targeted information and dissemination strategy (Trinick et al., 2020). In addition, the systematic expansion of the function of the selected language and the creation of conditions stimulating learning it as a second language in various spheres of life increase the chance of a language for success (Hornberger, 2006). Finally, providing learners with adequate exposure to the language also leads to effective revitalization (Wright, 1996).

The attitudes of minority language speakers toward their language and the dominant language speakers toward the threatened language determine the outcome of revitalization efforts (Wurm, 2002). However, attitude change is a complex issue that requires the joint work of the environment and the interlocutors (Grosjean, 2006).

In most postcolonial societies, "legislation alone cannot cause language shift, nor can it cause a language's societal status" (Korth, 2005, p. 20). Even though some languages can achieve new functions through top-down planning status, if they are not ready in terms of corpora to perform these functions most efficiently, they will be faced with the task of corpus planning (Chen, 1999). Therefore, raising the status of a language requires the availability of the language's corpus on a sufficient level. For example, in the case of Hebrew, a massive number of texts were available in the language when it was not spoken. In addition, Hebrew was occasionally used as a lingua franca by some Jews who had no other common language (Spolsky, 1996).

Language revival and revitalization proved to be a long process. For example, the revival of Hebrew took one generation to become a spoken language (Nahir, 1988). A hasty revitalization policy can cause protests, as happened in Ukraine, where Hungarians criticized

Ukrainian authorities for making rash decisions that were problematic to implement quickly (Csernicskó et al., 2020). And the eastern regions of Ukraine were utterly covered by separatist forces, which the Kremlin used as one of the main pretexts for invading Ukraine (Moser, 2019). In Kazakhstan, the situation is similar, but the use of the Kazakh language in various fields has improved significantly (Turgaleyeva et al., 2022). In some Arab countries, the effect of colonial rule remains more potent than the political ideology (Spolsky, 2004).

Sallabank & King (2021) suggest that revitalization needs a strategic plan, including what should be achieved and why. The plan should include evaluation and revision activities involving the assessment of feelings, attitudes, ideologies, and compromises. Language revitalization projects sometimes succeed in one country (e.g., Hebrew in Israel, Bahasa in Malaysia and Indonesia, Kiswahili in Tanzania, French in Quebec, and Catalan in Catalonia) and fail in another (Quechua in Peru, Gaelic in Ireland, and Māori in New Zealand). Language revitalization and maintenance depend on status, demography, and institutional support (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977). Language revitalization at the macro-level relies on the quality of planning and the state of balance between top-down and bottom-up language revitalization strategies (established through explicitly linking macro, meso, and micro-level strategies). For some countries, an optimum solution to preserve a threatened language would be the abstract language dynamics model, which supposes that "the state wants to maximize the number of bilingual speakers at minimal costs" (Templin et al., 2016, p. 4).

Apart from all that has been said, one should not ignore the fact that the ability of state language policies to produce desired outcomes is severely limited by social, political, and economic constraints (Romanie, 2006, p. 456). For instance, Grenoble and Whaley (1998, p. 52) argue that economics "may be the single strongest force influencing the fate of endangered languages." The consideration of the language as an ethnic attribute makes it possible to convert the economics of the language into the language of statistics and use the language-as-currency analogy. In this analogy, language is an element of human capital that first requires investment and "at a later stage yield monetary returns in the form of higher labor income" (Grin & Vaillancourt, 2007, p. 16).

According to Spolsky (2005, p. 2153), "[m]any language purists consider borrowing a word from another language to be the first stage of language loss." As a result, they often thwart language revitalization efforts, as was the case with the project in New Zealand, which aimed to revive the Māori language from the brink of extinction. Thanks to the project, some young people started learning it, albeit code-switching, even code-mixing, as beginners usually do. However, the purists started criticizing them for their "impure language," as if they were owners

of the language. Their negative remarks worried some learners, negatively affecting their motivation (Trinick et al., 2020). In other cases, such pseudo-patriots can destroy the desire to learn their language, thus preventing its revival. Concerning this problem, Sallabank & King (2021, p. 33) reminds us that "the language you revitalize will not be the same as it was in the past, and that is completely normal." According to Garrett (2010, p. 12), code-switching and mixing can be a social identity marker; some creole languages even have official status, as in Papua New Guinea. Another impediment to the revitalization of national languages is impatient nationalism and demand for a rapid language shift that leads to the discontent of minorities (Csernicskó et al., 2020; Mambetaliev, 2020a).

Maintaining and revitalizing languages that have found themselves in a difficult situation is a concern at the international level. Several legislation acts were adopted after WW2, including the UN charter (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1988), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (1996), the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).

Previous studies reported about two modes of language transmission: (1) vertical, i.e., transmission from parents to their children, and (2) horizontal, i.e. (adults) learning the second language and becoming bilingual" (Templin et al., 2016). Baker (2001) added that older children play an essential role in vertical and horizontal transmission (as described in Schwartz, 2010). Vertical transmission depends primarily on the family language environment and only then on the education system (Bolshakov & Farukshin, 2022). A successful minority language transmission depends on the input of both parents (De Houwer, 2007). If a language is "passed on to children in the home," it can be considered vital or healthy (Spolsky, 2004, p. 192). Children need to be 'instilled' with the required language attitudes to communicate, and when they grow up, they will be able to transmit the language to their children (Nahir, 1988). During childhood, parents' languages influence their children's future language repertoire and cultural orientation (Dewaele et al., 2020). It should be evident that although a person is born with the ability to learn any language, family LP sets the course for further developing a child's language beliefs and language repertoire (Batley et al., 1993, p. 10). According to Metz (2018, p. 1), "[p]arental beliefs drive student language beliefs more than race, ethnicity, or home language."

In turn, family LP is influenced by language ideology in public places. In societies where the ideology is towards respect for minority languages, mothers can be catalysts for a firm family LP in terms of using all available languages of family members. And in societies where monolingualism is promoted, and the interests of linguistic minorities are not considered, mothers can become catalysts for divergent language ideologies for their children, who will grow up with complexities that instill in them hesitant decisions about language use (Liu & Wang, 2022, p. 657).

The decision of parents to pass on a language to children can be influenced by their language abilities, market rewards (employment opportunities), and social outcomes such as mixed marriages (Caminal et al., 2018). Active and persistent promotion of the state LP also strengthens the desire of parents to pass on the state language to their children (Turgaleyeva et al., 2022). When a minority language loses prestige, parents find better pastures for their children, ceasing the transmission of the native language. According to Ong & Ting (2022), "mixed marriage is a potent condition for language shift."

In previous literature, some authors have noted that parents may express in their responses in surveys or interviews a strong belief in the importance of passing on their native language to their children even though their adult children do not speak their native language. Such results may come from parents who do not know how to convey the native language to their children, or their beliefs and behaviors differ (Yu, 2010). In his study of the Frisian language, Fishman (1991) found that intermarriage between Frisian- and Dutch-speaking speakers hindered the intergenerational transmission of the Frisian language because the children tended to speak Dutch rather than Frisian. In such cases, efforts must be directed toward changing the speakers' attitudes (Rovira, 2015) since language transmission is conditional on attitudes toward language and language choice (Bourhis, 1992; Yildirim, 2020). Language choice also depends on an individual's demographic characteristics and the context surrounding him or her.

Marini & Genereux (2010) and Collins, Brown & Newman (1989) wrote that children learn more from their environment than from the formal education system. Related to this, discussing the pattern of intergenerational transmission of the Catalan language in an asymmetric bilingual society, some researchers noted that "the behavior of the speakers of the stronger language is as relevant as the behavior of the speakers of the weaker language" (Caminal et al., 2018, p. 5).

Education is essential in creating conditions that facilitate language use (Korth, 2005). Therefore, education should be vital in status planning (Bourdieu, 1991). According to Ion

(2013), the education system is the principal builder of national identity. Spolsky (2005b, p. 2155) considers the school a vital domain for LP where the medium of instruction actively participates in "developing the language competence of young people." Baker (2001, 2003) distinguishes teaching 'in' a minority language as the medium of instruction and 'of' the minority language as a subject. While the aim of the former is multilingualism, the latter intends to shift a child's language from their home language to the dominant one. Thus, teaching a minority language can contribute to revitalizing a language or to moving from it.

Supporting the minority language in the educational sphere can cultivate positive attitudes towards the dominant language on the part of minorities. For example, since the inclusion of the Basque language in the educational system, children have not stopped using Spanish in their leisure time. A recent study found that attitudes toward Basque, Spanish, and English are "highly positive for all three languages, as considered from both a monolingual and a multilingual perspective" (Bier & Lasagabaster, 2022). Many studies confirm that mother tongue education is essential for scholastic achievement (Mbude-Shale, 2013; Esteron, 2020). Scholars point to a significant positive correlation between proficiency in a mother tongue and a sense of ethnic identity (Guanglun, 2015). Studies also report that children's proficiency in their mother tongue is a powerful predictor of their success in acquiring a second language (Cummins, 2001). The inclusion of a minority language as an MoI has proven to be effective in revitalization projects. For these reasons, UNESCO and UNICEF advocate for the rights of children to access mother tongue education (Mambetaliev, 2012; UNESCO, 2007). Therefore, some education systems offer elementary school education in children's home language and then introduce a standard language.

Some education systems start teaching in the dominant language (not children's home language), assuming pupils can learn in the dominant language as successfully as in their mother tongue (Spolsky, 2004). In such systems, children lack the freedom to choose their mother tongue as the medium of education because they must follow the top-down curriculum (Philipson, 2014). In this regard, Pérez-Milans (2013) asked rightfully: "Why must some groups bear the cost of learning a new language to participate in school while others are exempt from such costs?" (As cited in Tollefson, 2015, p. 142). Therefore, "the first task of the language education policy should be (but seldom is) to find a way to overcome this gap" (Spolsky, 2004, p. 47). Allowing children to choose their mother tongue as the language of instruction "would redistribute power from the privileged few to the masses" (Brock-Utne & Holmarsdottir, 2004). In some societies, sociocultural and religious orientation positively affects the preservation of the native language (Extra & Yagmur, 2010).

In some cultures, minorities believe that ethnicity is not inherited through language but by birth, blood, descent, observing customs, or eating certain foods (Ong & Ting, 2022). In her study, Wang (1916) presented an example of such a perception of ethnicity when Canadian-born Chinese adolescents only retained the beliefs and values of Chinese culture but lacked proficiency in the Chinese language. In such cultures, sociopsychological factors lead to the extinction of minority languages. In other cases, despite their strong attachment to their native language, some parents take a subtractive approach to passing on the language to their children (Hadis et al., 2022). Parents often select dominant languages for their children to look for better opportunities (Mbude-Shale, 2013). However, children from ethnic minorities lose the ability to communicate in their mother tongue within 2-3 years of entering school (Cummins, 2001).

2.3. Language Attitudes, Beliefs, and Ideologies

LP cannot be learned without considering language attitudes, beliefs, and practices (Tollefson, 2015; Moor & Wiley, 2015; Oss et al., 2022). Studying young people's language attitudes can reveal how they construct their identity (Esteron, 2020). Attitudes towards a language, legislation, policy, and ethnicity may affect language status, language users, language planning, language revitalization, and language death (Palviainen & Huhta, 2015). Attitudes play a vital role in the achievement or breakdown of LPP (Baker, 1992) and the determination of how languages can spread (McKenzie, 2010; Labov, 1984). "Attitudes are learned and one's personal experience and social environment play a role in shaping them" (Bier & Lasagabaster, 2022).

Language attitude is an expression of feelings towards a language (Richards et al., 1992) and is determined by salient beliefs (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). It contains cognitive, affective, and conative dimensions (Agheyisi & Fishman, 1970; Baker, 1992). The cognitive dimension refers to the learner's thoughts, values, and beliefs about a language (Matsuda, 2000), the affective dimension describes the learner's feelings and emotions towards a language (Choi & Troudi, 2006), and the conative dimension means the learner's actions related to a language (Baker, 1992; Matsuda, 2000). Individuals may have ambivalent attitudes when uncertainty, inconsistency, or conflict occurs between these components (McKenzie, 2010). Some attitudes are not always coherent and can even be contradictory (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005).

Language attitude is vital in language acquisition (Edwards, 2006) and is formed during language acquisition (Baker, 1992). It influences learning outcomes (Laitin et al., 2019), including language learning (Gardner & Lambert, 1972). If a person does not like a language community, it will be challenging to succeed in learning the language of that community

(Gardner, 1991; McKenzie, 2010). In addition, "students' attitudes are determined by their own experiences of language use" (Tódor & Dégi, 2016). Language attitudes may resist change (Palviainen & Huhta, 2015) but can be changed from situation to situation (Korth, 2005). For example, learning a language changes attitudes toward the speakers of that language (Shohamy, 2016; Byram, 2004). Attitudes toward languages and regions are determined by demographic, linguistic, social-psychological, political, and religious factors (Pavlenko, 2008). According to Spolsky (2009), language belief and ideology mean the same thing. He (2004, p. 5) uses language ideology in a broader sense, "whatever the community beliefs about language(s) and language use." For him, language ideology is one of the central parts of LP (Spolsky, 2004), whereas, for Shohamy (2006), LP is an expression of veiled ideologies. Most authors interchange language attitudes, beliefs, and ideologies (Spolsky, 2004; Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994; Ajsic & McGroarty, 2015). Language beliefs and ideologies increasingly draw the attention of LP researchers, although only two decades ago, it was an ambiguous topic (Blommaert, 2006). Language ideology has long been overlooked as an area "with no apparent bounds" and, as such, defined in a wide range of phrasings. Some authors have described it as a set of beliefs about language, others as beliefs about the role of language, others as a link between social attitudes and forms of conversation (Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994), still others as a system of beliefs that serve as a link between language and social relationships. Woolard (1998) defined it as a belief system shared by community members and an implicit interpretation, they may make of discourse cases.

Ideologies that view speech communities as limited entities, as opposed to ideologies that emphasize the heteroglossical nature of human existence, usually interact in modeling language politics that touches on issues of center and periphery. In this regard, some forces close to the decision-making centers may wish to impose a common language on the periphery or covertly promote one language as a means of interethnic communication (Schiffman, 1996). In such attempts, it is usually the minorities who are victimized and subjected to different, sometimes conflicting, ideologies, norms, and practices. However, although the center often dictates or tries to impose norms and standards on the periphery, "the core-periphery relationship is never fixed, but instead constantly renegotiated and mutually constitutive" (Pietikäinen & Kelly-Holmes, 2013, p. 2).

Learning additional languages is not reprimanded in most modern cultures. For example, most Germans in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan during Soviet times were well-integrated with the local population and fluent in the Kyrgyz and Kazakh languages (Mambetaliev, 2018a). However, history knows other cases when state propaganda introduced

a negative attitude towards other languages in some countries into the minds of the dominant majority. For example, the German government before WW2 convinced most Germans of the superiority of German over the languages of neighboring countries, especially the languages of the Slavic peoples (Judson, 2011). Similarly, after studying the LPP in Russia and ex-Soviet countries, Schiffman (2002, Section 3) concluded that "Russians tend to be most retentive of language, while other groups vary." In her study of language attitudes in Kyrgyzstan, Korth (2005, p. 1) found that Russians usually showed little interest in local languages, and some even advised her not to learn Kyrgyz, considering it a "wild" language. DeLorme (1999, p. 286) described a case where one of his interlocutors considered learning the Kazakh language "a humiliating capitulation to the new political status quo in which Kazakhs, not Russians, were in political control." A leader of one of the famous political parties in Russia published a guidebook starting with the phrase, "We are not slaves and must speak our language, which is Russian!" (Zhirinovsky, 2020, para. 1).

Depending on the type of language attitudes, "some people are more likely to be promoted and accepted whereas others suffer exclusion, lose promotion chances or even experience prejudice" (Przygoński, 2020, p. 286). Inadequate language attitudes can lead to segregation between ethnic groups and separatist sentiments. Negative attitudes make it difficult for the government to convince the need to study the state language. Describing the situation in Kazakhstan, DeLorme (1999, p. 286) suggests that promoting languages as resources and implementing effective public policy might motivate some Russians to view their acquisition of the Kazakh language "not as acquiescence to Kazakh domination but as a means of improving their livelihood and enriching their linguistic repertoires."

Different beliefs can yield different social outcomes, including additive and subtractive bilingualism, semilingualism, and monolingualism. The reverse is also possible; different models of LP can cause positive or negative attitudes toward native culture and target language (Eliss, 2004).

Language ideologies influence and come across the implementation of language policies (Canagarajah & Stanley, 2015). Language ideologies mediate language policies (Razfar, 2012). Therefore, linguistic and cultural diversity is contingent on whether assimilationist (monolingual) or pluralist (multilingual) ideologies (Jong, 2013) dominate in society. Countries can be classified as maintaining ideologies of monolingualism, bilingualism, and multilingualism in line with attitudes toward national identity (Spolsky, 2004). Unlike monoglossia or subtractive language ideology, additive pluralist ideology aims at biliteracy and bilingualism (Henderson, 2015).

Although the language beliefs of citizens often do not align with official language policies (Spolsky, 2004), their ideologies at the grassroots level may influence the government's LP (Spolsky, 2009) because language ideology is the foundation for policies (Ajsic & McGroarty, 2015). Language ideology "explores the different interactions and facets of language beliefs and use in cultural contexts" (Horner & Bradley, 2019). Some communities do not have a formal LP, so "the nature of their LP must be derived from a study of their language practice or beliefs" (Spolsky, 2004, p. 8).

Sawin (2019) observed two types of language ideologies regarding language use among Americans in the former Yugoslavia which he refers to as dogmatic ideology (using the "right" language) and pragmatic ideology (using the "heart" language, or mother tongue, or any available local language variety). In addition, Evans & Hornberger (2005) distinguished approaches that attempt to eliminate or subtract languages from the linguistic repertoire of a society. Such ideologies are called subtractive ideologies in sociolinguistics and emphasize dominant language acquisition.

According to (Ajsic & McGroarty, 2015, p. 182), "[e]arly foci in language attitudes and the role of language ideologies in the construction and reproduction of (ethnic) nationalist identities remain pivotal" (see also Fitzsimmons-Doolan, 2011; Fleischer, 2007). Considering conflicting local ideologies, the implementation process of LP is also a work on implementing an ideology. Language ideologies can rapidly escalate in heavily politicized but not settled contexts where ethnic and language identities do not coincide (Csernicskó & Fedinec, 2016). In such situations, a hurried decision to align with extreme human rights or nationalistic language ideologies may lead to further confusion. Therefore, language ideology is "a much-needed bridge between linguistic and social theory" (Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994, p. 72).

The hidden agenda of colonial language policies may enclose such chauvinistic ideologies as economic exploitation and increasing political power. The function of the dominant colonial language is often deliberately or naively misinterpreted by analysts serving the dominant group (Ricento, 2000a). For example, most of the last century in America associated bilingualism with lower intelligence. This ideology was supported when the immigration flood in America was high. Immigrants were 'handicapped' with their languages and were expected to learn English to increase their intelligence. Many studies concluded with a negative correlation between bilingualism and low intelligence. Similar notions continued until the 1960s, when the first publications, such as the study of Peal and Lambert (1962/1972), pointed to an opposite view that the correlation is relatively positive (Edwards, 2006).

The government has various methods to promote different ideologies. For example, through the representation of languages on national banknotes, since "banknotes participate in the official language practices constituting the linguistic landscape (LL) and as such mediate language ideologies" (Csernicskó & Beregszászi, 2019, p. 269). In addition, given that money is one of the main items that most often catch every citizen's eye in everyday life, how languages are represented on national banknotes can serve as an intense (subconscious) promotion of the values of languages (Sebba, 2013). For example, the Soviet Union was created on the promise of linguistic equality and the policy of "indigenization." However, on its banknotes, Russian was placed in the center, surrounded by all other national languages printed with smaller fonts.

Almost a century of promotion of the Russian language using the demographic advantage in the national republics about the equality of languages firmly established in the minds of many citizens of the USSR a positive attitude toward Russian, even if the native language suffered from the competition with it. A recent survey in war-torn Ukraine proved this, where most respondents did not trust Russia but still had a positive attitude toward the Russian language (Zeller, 2022). A superficial look at the former Soviet republics can reveal that frequent ethnic conflicts occur in regions with two competing languages - Russian and national. For example, Ukraine is divided into eastern Russian-speaking and western Ukrainian-speaking parts (Barrington, 2013), Kazakhstan is divided into Russian-speaking and Kazakh-speaking citizens (DeLorme, 2009), Moldova is divided into the Republic of Moldova and the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (Tulum & Zubalov, 2022, p. 1567), Georgia divided into Russian-speaking and Georgian-speaking regions (Artoni & Longo, 2021. p. 188). Barrington (2013) wrote that those Ukrainians and Kazakhs who accept the label of "Russian speaker" think differently about their identity than those who do not. Artoni & Longo (2021, p. 188) reported that "[a]mong the Georgian population if for some Russian remains the language of the colonizer, for others it is regarded as the language of progress."

Although the center cannot effectively control remote subjects, ideologies in (post) colonial settings are bi-directional and flow between the center and periphery. They can be linked to other ideologies and influence the development of language policies (Ricento, 2000a). Hornberger (2002) highlighted the challenge of implementation efforts considering conflicting local ideologies, namely, the priority to learn the dominant or national language. One of the great strengths of Hornberger's (2002) work was the ethnographic component, in which she produced a rich set of data in the linguistic community for her dissertation. Meticulous observation and a thick description of a linguistic community from which she could carefully conclude language behaviors and attitudes (DeLorme, personal communication, July 25, 2021).

2.4. The Impact of Demographic Factors

Gender is the factor that draws different conclusions about the effect on language attitudes. According to Spolsky (1989) and Gardner & Lambert (1972), women are more favorable to learning additional languages than men. Martínez-Rivas & Lasagabaster (2022) found that men favor vernacular norms, while women select prestigious languages and standard varieties over local language(s) or dialects in public places. Lai (2007), Gomleksiz (2010), Kesgin & Mehmet (2015), Eshghinejad (2016), Abu-Snoubar (2017), Paradewari & Mbato (2018), and Ulysse & Masaeed (2022) found that women have more positive attitudes toward global languages than men. In contrast, Açıkgöz (1992), Saranraj et al. (2016), Abbas et al. (2020, p. 194), and Orfan & Weijer (2020) reported that language attitudes toward English were gender independent among their participants. Abbas et al. (2020, p. 194) found no difference in the attitudes of men and women toward their native language among the Punjabi ethnic group in Pakistan.

In contrast, Wilson's study of the role of gender in language maintenance among Spanish-speaking communities in the USA found that women were more contributive to heritage language maintenance than men (Wilson, 2012). Siebetcheu (2022) suggested that the role of women can be effective in preserving and spreading low-prestige languages and dialects, as in the case of Italian dialects among immigrants from Cameroon. He found that Italian dialects had spread successfully through contact with Italian women in mixed families and their children. Some studies found a difference between men's and women's attitudes toward native languages. Ellis (1994), Gal (1998), Milroy & Milroy (1998), and Wang & Ladegaard (2008) explained the difference by referring to situations where women have less access to education (or contact with prestige language speakers) than men. Such was the case in Harvey's (1994) study, which found that women were monolingual in a local language while men were bilingual in Spanish. Spolsky (1998, p. 38) insisted that the source of difference is not biological but rather social. He also explained the difference between Jewish and Arab communities through the influence of religion and access to education.

The region where a person was born and raised is a vital identity factor in a person's life. A desire to return to their native region, even if this region is not in the kin state, is a natural desire of human beings. For example, 64% of Hungarian students from Ukrainian Transcarpathia studying in Hungary expressed a desire to return home after their studies (Ferenc, 2013, p. 134). Awareness of one's socio-demographic identity often influences people's attitudes toward languages (Llamas & Stockwell, 2020). Sometimes administrative

units are a result of a re-territorialization policy (Mambetaliev, 2021a; Goble, 2019). Over time, citizens in these units can develop their form of "the lexica-grammar of the variety as it could be written down, rather than its pattern of pronunciation" (Llamas & Stockwell, 2020, p. 148). Although dialectical lexica are the core element of language (Jumaeva, 2018), the speakers of standardized varieties of the same language sometimes look down on regional dialects. In some diglossic linguistic communities, overt policies often ignore spoken repertoires, considering them as 'broken' or 'impure' (Schiffman, 1996). Dialects may have "a low overt prestige, at the same time, [they may have] a higher covert prestige, tied to solidarity, local identities, and cultural heritage" (Swanenberg, 2019, p. 96). Neglecting and rejecting regional dialects may threaten national identity and unity (Parapatics, 2020).

Darden (2013) considers that national identity is created through the mass schooling of the first literate generation. Once a generation's literacy level passes a 50 percent threshold, the community will have durable national loyalties.

In many parts of the world, rural attitudes differ from those of cosmopolitan cities (Gajalakshmi, 2013). Most inhabitants in remote villages are inclined to see their future with a profession connected to their local economy (Chohan & Rana, 2016). There are varying degrees of involvement and interest of urban and rural parents in the learning of languages by their children (Murthy & Yeo, 2018; Veguilla, 2004). Historical memory and socioeconomic factors also influence the difference in attitudes between regions. While in some post-Soviet countries, internal migrants from provinces often receive a frosty reception in their country's capital city, traditional rural citizens find it irritating that some of their urbanized compatriots do not speak their heritage language (Kellner-Heinkele & Landau, 2012). Often, "people located at linguistic (and other) borders exhibit the rather fluid nature of identities" (Cramer, 2010, p. 253). For example, citizens in the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan traditionally have been in contact with Iranian and Turkic peoples, which influenced their identity and language. Some Kyrgyz 'purists' see their differences negatively, insisting on the further standardization of the Kyrgyz language. Avelar and Carvalho (2012a) found that the study of linguistics and contact with linguists influenced students' perceptions of the Portuguese language and its varieties. Namely, students who had studied linguistics for more than three semesters did not see a need to standardize the written form of Portuguese. However, other students with little or no background in linguistics agreed that standardization was necessary.

Dialects are both the product and the source of divergent tendencies. Fishman (2006a) and Vari & Tamburelli (2020) believe that standardization increases positive attitudes toward a language by raising its prestige since standardization broadens communicative domains of

language use, including in educational and governmental spheres. The smaller the distance between the standard and its vernaculars, the more positive the attitudes of the speakers. However, standardization is not a natural language development but the intervention of people of a particular group. As such, the standard language is artificial compared to other language variations. The choice of a dialect for standardization can be both a historical accident and a deliberate 'language planning' project of the government (Llamas & Stockwell, 2020). The higher the level of standardization of a vernacular language, the wider the usage of that language since standardization eliminates the community's "doubts on whether their standard can be considered a fully-fledged language," as the case in Luxemburg, where the standard German is preferred to Luxemburgish German, including in the educational system since the former is more standardized than the latter.

Ethnicity is another factor that can influence language attitudes and beliefs (Edwards, 2009). It implies that language and ethnicity are fluid categories subject to change depending on language attitudes and contexts. In addition to the economic components of motivation, language accommodation (convergence to or divergence from a language or language group) also depends on our subjective attitudes and beliefs ("we like others whom we think like ourselves," Edwards, 2009, p. 31). Furthermore, the relationship ultimately leads to the need to draft or modify an LP as "a product of the interaction of two discrepant trends: the need for identity and the need for communication" (Chotaeva, 2002, p. 20).

There are different opinions about the influence of religion on language. An increase in religiosity led to a decline in the Irish language (Orman, 2008). However, many other modern European nations appeared thanks to the Bible in their native languages (Moronval, 2021). Korean Protestants in China have maintained their language and culture through their high religiosity (Tsung, 2014). In contrast, with Kurdish Muslims in Armenia and Punjabi Sikhs in Malaysia, religion did not contribute to rapprochement with relatives in other countries (Schulze, 2017). These examples suggest that an attachment to an ethnolinguistic identity varies depending on a branch of religion. Many foundational authors noticed the impact of religion on language (e.g., Haugen, 1959; Ferguson, 1968, 1982; Spolsky, 2004, 2009). Religion affects people's language attitudes and beliefs (Alsohaibani, 2017). It "may serve to provide very important foci of identity which prevent identification with classes, estates, neighborhoods, and the status of citizenship" (Rex & Singh, 2003, p. 110). Studies point to the effect of religion on the alphabet, language divergence, or convergence (Edwards, 2009, p. 36), and language maintenance and shift depending on the goals of religious institutions to sustain language or promote religion (Ding & Goh, 2020; Alsohaibani, 2017). Language and religion may substitute

for each other, and "it is difficult to separate several national identities from their religious matrices" (Safran, 2008, p. i). The priority of religion as a value over language in identity matters can hinder the preservation of the language. When religion becomes a more critical identity marker than language, society can gradually lose its language. It can be seen in the example of the Irish language, whose everyday use ceased to be a cultural value in the last century, giving this role to religion. As a result, this language is on the verge of extinction today (Orman, 2008).

However, the impact of religion on language maintenance or shift seems to differ from one religion to another. In many Asian societies, "languages are often related to religious issues" and "considered as a means for the attainment of a higher goal, be it the community's prosperity, fame, and precedence in its human environment, the upkeep of a religious system" (Moronval, 2021). A study of the Punjabi Sikh community in Malaysia concluded that Punjabi Sikhs were not concerned about their language shift to English, explaining that they can use English to understand their religion. As a result of such a language attitude, the young generation of Malaysian Punjabi Sikhs is close to a complete language shift to English (Kaur & David, 2019). Another study among Yemeni students emphasized instrumental reasons but had the lowest interest in integrative reasons for learning English. The most deficient attention on integrativeness was explained by the Yemenis' negative attitudes toward the Westerners, considering them colonialists (Al-Tamimi & Shuaib, 2009). Sometimes, religious feelings may be more vital than belonging to an ethnic group. For example, the Kurdish minority in Armenia does not identify with Muslim Kurds in Iraq or elsewhere but as an independent non-Muslim ethnic group belonging to the Yezidi confession (Schulze, 2017). Likewise, the post-Soviet Kyrgyz elite, who have quickly re-oriented themselves from communism to Islam, tend to "reduce Russian loans in favor of native or Arabic-Persian words" (Johansson, 2010).

Several studies have shared their findings on the influence of academic majors on language attitudes (e.g., Gu, 2002; Oxford & Nyikos, 1989). They reported that students in basic sciences, engineering, and health studies positively viewed the domain-specific language in their chosen field. In contrast, liberal arts students were interested in achieving advanced language competence and more focused on the social and financial benefits of the language (Yin, 2008). Furthermore, certain professions require some proficiency in specific languages, without which they cannot work. For example, medicine, science, and technology need professional English because there is an internationally recognized English register for these disciplines (Schiffman, 1996).

2.5. Beliefs about Dominant and Minority Languages

Bourdieu (2005) used the terms "the power of language" and "symbolic capital," which define "the positioning of the individual or ethnic group in the social and economic markets" (as cited by Tsung, 2014, p. 37). Based on this idea, Tsung presented the language hierarchy in China as (1) national, (2) regional and (3) local. In this hierarchy, Putonghua is a super language, while minority languages are considered supplementary (Tsung, 2014, p. 39). Graddol (1997) illustrated the language hierarchy as a pyramid, ranking at the top the main languages (English and French), then the regional languages (UN languages), then the national languages (over 80 languages serving 180 nation-states), then the official languages (600 languages), and then he put the local vernaculars (all other languages) on the bottom. De Swaan (2001) classified languages as peripheral, central, super-central, and hyper-central depending on the language's communicative value (Q-value), which he represents as $Q = Pi * Ci$, where Pi – the number of competent speakers in the language i, Ci – the centrality of language i in a constellation or sub-constellation. This formula was inferred from rivalry and accommodation between political sociology and the political economy of languages.

Unique attitudes have developed toward English since it became the de facto international lingua franca (Baker & Hüttner, 2019). Many countries today face a dilemma: preference for English for practical reasons and legislative support for the national language to preserve cultural integrity (Mordaunt & Williams, 2022). Some studies view English as a tool contributing to global culture without replacing indigenous languages (Pennycook, 2003). A recent study in Kazakhstan reported an improvement in understanding the Kazakh language among ethnic Russians after introducing a trilingual LP that included English (Turgaleyeva, Kakimzhanova, & Tolymkhanova, 2022). However, some other authors criticize the existing LP model in Kazakhstan, which implies the promotion of Kazakh, Russian, and English, as they believe that due to the additional workload, students pay less attention to learning the state language (Neuendorf, 2019).

A recent publication by Italian scientists reported that English and Russian are not in competition in Tbilisi, Georgia. Based on their interviews with Russian and English teachers, they concluded that "[n]o competition can be sensed between the two languages and among those who teach these languages" (Artoni & Longo, 2021, p. 195).

Studies reported that attitudes depend on students' historical memories, religious affiliation, and target language. For example, a study in Yemen found that students in Yemen showed a greater emphasis on instrumental reasons and less attention on integrative reasons for

learning English (Al-Tamimi & Shuib, 2009). Dörnyei and Al-Hoorie (2017) argued that intrinsic motivation might also decrease in students of English when language learning becomes a routine (Artoni & Longo, 2021, p. 198).

In Kyrgyzstan, it is believed that the educational system does not yet provide the desired outcomes in teaching languages, so one should not expect good results in English (Ferdinand & Komlósi, 2016). As a result, a tiny percentage of the Kyrgyz population claims to have some English (OECD, 2007).

Some authors believe that the English language should not be seen as a competitor of national languages but as a resource contributing to the revival of minor languages (Mambetaliev, 2020b; Kiyizbaeva, 2019). They propose to balance the existing language competition between the national and Russian languages in Central Asia and the Caucasus by adding English as the third regional official language. They suggest that official recognition of English as a medium of instruction in these regions might prevent the ongoing language shift from native languages to the Russian language and develop a balanced trilingual identity. In this approach, the English language would raise awareness of oneself and the world to a new level, strengthen national identity and give the motivation to build new countries focused on the whole world and not just on the former USSR (Mambetaliev, 2020b). In this regard, Kazakhstan's Trinity LP can serve as an example in which English is the language of integration with the global economy (Nazarbayev, 2007).

In several Asian countries, governments propagated English as a tool to empower their own identities. For example, in Japan, Hashimoto promoted the idea of "deconstruction of English," which implied learning English to promote Japanese culture to the rest of the world. Likewise, the South Korean government appealed to their proverb, "To win, know your enemy better." Most parents in the Philippines "would rather have their children taught in Filipino and English than in the vernacular language" because they consider English the language for success (Esteron, 2020, p. 90). The Malaysian Prime Minister said, "True nationalism means doing everything for the country, even if it means learning the English language" (Tsui & Tollefson, 2007, p. 16). A study found that Afghan students' language attitudes toward learning English differ in involvement in learning English and access to the Internet (Orfan & Weijer, 2020).

There are also more rational explanations that disapprove of incorporation into educational programs. For example, some authors believe that due to the lack of native English speakers, adding another language to the curriculum is unlikely to produce positive results (Ferdinand & Komlósi, 2016).

The linguistic imperialism model, as defined by Philipson (2016), argued that "English poses threats not only to indigenous languages in developing countries but to smaller European languages as well" (as cited in Ricento, 2006b, p. 16). His rhetoric has strengthened since the time when he first discussed the role of English in European integration and globalization with the challenging question of whether it was advancing "as a *lingua franca* or rather as a *lingua frankensteinia"* (Phillipson, 2008). There have been documented cases where geopolitical games have also hit English as an enemy language (Asia+, 2008). In Russia, linguaphobia frankly resulted in a lot of taking a weird tone when the leader of a famous political fraction announced on the main central TV program, "English is stupid... We should cancel English in schools... I hate German [because] it is the language of war, militarism, fascism!" (Russia-1, 2016).

In the scientific sphere, using languages other than English has become an increasing concern in some countries (Ammon, 2001). According to Torres-Purroy & Mas-Alcolea (2022), "[t]he natural sciences have been found to be more English monolingual, while the social sciences and the humanities tend to be more multilingual." They also summarized the reasons for the increasing use of English in the global scholarship community, "the infringement of non-English speakers' linguistic rights, their unequal opportunities vis-à-vis English L1 speakers, the potential disappearance from the science of other languages (Ammon, 2001) and the underdevelopment of the scientific variety in languages other than English (Gunnarsson, 2001)."

According to Young (2017), it is vital to support local language varieties because language creates community and solidarity between community members. Attitudes vary on the respondent's belonging – minorities' attitudes towards LP may differ from titular nationalities. Attitudes of dominant language speakers toward minority languages can affect the feelings of minority language speakers (Dolowy-Rybińska & Hornsby, 2021). Not knowing the language of the titular nationality is often met with an unwelcoming attitude (Osepashvili & Tsuladze, 2013).

The society comprises members with assimilationist and pluralist attitudes and those in between (Razfar, 2012). Some have both attitudes concurrently, representing a dialectical relationship in a unity of opposites (Bourdieu, 1991). The coexistence of assimilationist and pluralist views creates sociopsychological tension (Henderson, 2015).

Language planning in some regions has a transnational dimension, which can cause conflicting attitudes and sentiments at the highest level of the power structure. For example, when an ethnic minority in Indonesia asked the South Korean authorities to help them switch

to the Korean script, the Indonesian authorities were not happy. In contrast, Korean enthusiasts willingly welcomed the wishes of the Indonesian minority. This issue is currently being discussed between the two countries' governments (Wicherkiewicz, 2021).

When authorities assign a massively active role to the official language while utterly limiting the use of minority languages, the attitudes of the majority and minority can be contrastingly different (Mambetaliev, 2021d). Imposing a language in a multiethnic state without a good base can provoke a protest reaction, as happened in 1978 in Tbilisi when the Georgians rebelled against the policy of the Soviet leaders to elevate the status of Russian as the 'second mother tongue' (Solchanyk, 1982). In East Asian countries, some individuals resist the intervention of English; others view it as democratization, access to the global market, and a tool to promote national culture to the rest of the world (Tsui & Tollefson, 2007).

A study of high school students in the San Francisco area concluded that "the key characteristics that predict language ideology are parents' language ideology and students' awareness that they speak more than one variety of English" (Metz, 2018). In this regard, Gorter & Cenoz (2012, p. 194) urged "to convince dominant groups of the usefulness and benefits of multilingual education."

Language is nested within culture, and "having a particular accent or mannerisms could have repercussions for both how we perceived ourselves and how others perceived us" (Savva & Nygaard, 2021, p. 169). Community leaders can support minority languages and dialects by cultivating civilized attitudes towards languages and dialects among citizens. Appropriate use of minority languages can increase trust capital in communities and be cost-effective in the long-term (The Human Rights Council of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 2020).

According to Schiffman (1996, p. 7), "the fact that a language is diglossic is in actuality a feature of the linguistic culture of the area where that language is used, rather than of the language, or the overt LP." For example, a study at a Portuguese university found that most students believe in the potential of minority languages to express identity in the same way that German and French do in the EU space (Avelar & Carvalho, 2012b). In contrast, many in Kyrgyzstan believe that the media and pop culture in a global language is better quality (Korth, 2005).

Two surveys among Germans were conducted in 2016 and 2017 to learn their attitudes toward a German dialect called low German. The questions asked were what respondents thought about the value (appealing and beautiful) and structure (logical and systematic) of the law German and standard German. The attitudes were almost appreciative of both varieties, though they were consistently higher towards the standard German. At the same time, 39

percent of the respondents considered low German a language, not a dialect. About 63 percent of those who considered LG a language, not a dialect, were among those for whom LG was their mother tongue (Adler, 2021). Another study in Luxembourg found that attitudes toward standard German speakers were remarkably positive in contrast to its vernaculars. (Vari & Tamburelli, 2020).

Some authorities apply subtle ways of favoring a particular language (Kinzler et al. 2007). They instigate attitudes and beliefs toward specific languages using mythologized ideologies, such as purity, beauty, superiority, and correctness, the validity of which cannot be proven empirically (Schiffman, 1996; McKenzie, 2010; Ferguson, 1959). Due to such political practices, minority language speakers frequently face prejudices (Dragojevic et al., 2021) though it is well-known that linguistic discrimination causes psychological injury (Halliday, 1968). In some societies where two or more languages compete, language authorities focus on the dominant languages and ignore the rest. Some people think limiting communication in their societies to fewer dominant languages can protect the state language from minority languages. On the contrary, such a practice may alienate minorities from the state language in favor of its main competitor (Mambetaliev, 2021c).

Although opinions of pure and impure language have been maintained in every society, such statements are disputed. Purism's social meaning and strategic use are not transparent (Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994). Even in large cosmopolitan cities, the so-called 'peripheral students' are often victims of discrimination by linguistic and cultural purists (Savva & Nygaard, 2021, p. 165). In his interview, Young (2017) talked about negative attitudes toward varieties of English in East Asia, where he saw quite a struggle among people who speak varieties of English, such as Singlish, Manglish, and Konglish. Singapore's government even had a policy 'Speak good English!' However, it was unpopular among people. A study among students in Portugal showed that those who had no experience in linguistics viewed European Portuguese as purer than its other varieties and valued learning the language in its written form rather than its regional diversity (Avelar & Carvalho, 2012a). Foley (2014) argues that a linguistic minority may adopt the ideology of linguistic purism to preserve identity in the face of challenges from the linguistic majority. Some individuals may be active followers of linguistic purity and critique those who switch codes or mix languages but may be practitioners of language mixing (Lovestrand, 2021). Extreme passions for purity expressed in various remarks can destroy the desire to learn the language and lead to "failure in language learning, [which] fosters negative attitudes" (Batley et al., 1993, p. 6).

2.6. Language Beliefs in Emerging Nations

Among Central Asian nations, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are viewed as strong keepers of their national languages. In these countries, the languages of the titular nationalities play the primary means of communication for many ethnic groups. According to leading authors, such sustained expansion of the function of language as a means of interethnic communication enhances the successful development of language (Hornberger, 2006). Some even hope that the experiences of these countries might have a domino effect on neighboring countries (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997).

However, in other ex-Soviet countries, the function of interethnic language is officially assigned to the Russian language. Moreover, many believe that this is how it should be. In a recent report from Moldova, most respondents (70.4%) perceived the Russian language as a means of inter-ethnic communication in their region (Tulum & Zubalov, 2022, p. 1566). In the ex-Soviet nations, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus granted the Russian language official status of interethnic language (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2004). A similar policy was also carried out in Kazakhstan until recently, where authorities attempted to promote the use of Kazakh while declaring Russian as the language of interethnic communication (Fierman, 1998). Some Kazakh authors associate the Russian language with "political stability and national unity" (Wu & Mukhamedzhanova, 2022, p. 46), perhaps given the large proportion of Russian-speaking citizens who stand firm in defending the position of the Russian language. However, such a policy did not produce the desired results in a country where a significant population spoke a language other than Kazakh (Baimyrza, 2021). In Kazakhstan, raising the status of the Russian language undermines the motives of Russified Kazakhs to relearn their native language, as "knowledge of Russian will enable them to will get them along just fine in most domains of daily life" (DeLorme, 1999, p. 277).

Describing the students of one of the Russian universities, where the communists trained the future leaders of the national republics, Polivanov (1927) characterized the students of Kazakh nationality as not using their language at all in the process of thinking. Moreover, they were not interested in studying it. Dr. Avazov (2018) wrote about a similar phenomenon among Turkic Muslims in Central Asia who were subjected to civilization through Russification (Anderson & Silver, 1983). In defense of those who underwent Russification, arguments are made that people were forced to obey the Kremlin out of fear since, among the generation of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz of that time, the consequences of the *Urkun* (the escape of Kyrgyz to China from the punitive army of Russia for their protests against the recruitment campaign for

the WWI) in 1916 (Jantzen, 2009) and the *Jut* (famine arranged by the Kremlin) among Kazakhs in the 1930s (Kindler & Klohr, 2018) were still fresh in their recent memory.

Several authors discussed the issues of the standard national language and the means of interethnic communication from different perspectives. Historical experience suggests that languages can "become "currencies" that have different "exchange rates" in different spheres of human interaction in the "communication market" at different times, in different places, and for different purposes" (Stavans & Jessner-Schmid, 2022, p. 7). The political economy of languages assumes that people learn the language with a higher communicative value (Q-value) given a chance. The Q-value depends on the number of speakers.

According to (Koenig, 2003, p. 104), "post-colonial identity politics cannot be reduced to politics of recognition but are closely linked with struggles over access to power and economic resources in post-colonial societies." Processes of change in such societies involve economic liberalization, political independence, settler-governed post-colonial societies (farmers, entrepreneurs, workers from the big cities), incorporation into the world system, and new processes of class struggle (Rex & Singh, 2003, pp. 110-113).

It is a natural process that "children of one social class when exposed to children of a higher social class tend to absorb the values and attitudes of the higher status children" (Busch, 2020, p. para. 47). However, in bilingual societies, some children can be proud of their L1, and some can be shy, indicating a consequence of past harmful covert ideologies and policies (Esterone, 2020). Continued oppressive ideologies may develop stereotypes or implicit bias toward language groups. Cherry (2020) described how implicit biases, operating on an unconscious level, affect the workplace, school, healthcare, and legal settings. The local community's negative attitudes and beliefs may lead to a language shift, as in Sardinia, where teachers were positively inclined toward multilingualism and considered the Sardinian language part of their identity. However, they perceived it as a language that lacks instrumental value, is hardly utilizable in the job market, and is insufficient for the role to be a medium of instruction (Mura, 2019). In some other cases, despite the stigmatization, non-standard varieties often endure because of the 'language loyalty' of the speakers (Garrett et al., 2003).

Linguistic varieties can have different levels of prestige depending on the socioeconomic status of the speech community with which they are associated. Korth (2005) described cases where the status of people relied on the level of language prestige. The dominant language within a given society was usually the prestigious form, especially if it was codified, and was traditionally regarded as the "best" and "correct" language (Milroy & Milroy, 1999).

Grosjean (1984, p. 140) reported cases where minority members refused to speak stigmatized language in public in the presence of dominant monolinguals. He noticed that non-dominant language speakers sometimes downgrade their language more than speakers of the dominant language do about the non-dominant language. Gal (1979) reported that "bilinguals speaking Hungarian to one another will always switch over to German when a monolingual German speaker comes towards them" (as cited in Grosjean, 1984, p. 139). Speakers' language attitudes may impact the prestige or stigmatization of their language (Llamas & Stockwell, 2020; Romaine, 2006). Korth (2005, p. 9) continued that "the social stigma attributed to the language of the colonized can have an enormous influence on a speaker's self-esteem and thus create a feeling of cultural inferiority among speakers of a language group." Korth (2005) found that some Soviet minorities hid fluency in their native language, considering non-competence in their native language a characteristic of modernity or urbanity and hoping to raise their status by speaking in the dominant group's language. For example, during the Soviet era, communication in Russian with their loved ones was considered a sign of urbanity among the Kyrgyz. On the contrary, speaking the Kyrgyz language was seen as backwardness or ruralness (Korth, 2005). "The rural Kyrgyz, or even the urban Kyrgyz, who had a less than perfect grasp of the Russian language or spoke it with an accent, were oftentimes looked down upon and seen as backwards" (Tarbox, 2016, p. 13). Of course, the dominant group cannot but be involved in the emergence and development of such attitudes.

People in some ex-Soviet countries believe that information in Russian is more truthful than information in their languages (Korth, 2005). Studies of students' language preferences in these societies show that most participants consider the literature in their native language less suitable for scientific research than the literature in Russian (Gul, 2019). Ex-Soviet minorities highly evaluate the structural and functional superiority of the Russian language while putting down their heritage language on shallow levels. There is a famous statement in Kyrgyz, "only through Russian you can become a person" (Korth, 2005, p.143). The same can be applied to varieties of the same language as "speakers of low prestige varieties themselves often ascribe low status to members of their linguistic communities (Kinzler & DeJesus, 2013). Sometimes, they may exaggerate it, reflecting what has been termed as 'the minority group reaction' by Lambert et al. (1960) and 'linguistic insecurity' by Labov (1966). Decena (2014) called both the titular nationality and minorities, to go through the process of decolonizing of mind.

Two other studies on minorities in Russia (Buryats, Karelians, and Mari El) reported that although the native language is considered a characteristic feature of identity, the tendency to abandon it in these ethnic groups is intense. Most of the participants believed that they had

the same opportunities as the dominant group and felt no oppression while having native languages in the phase of going extinct. Such a skewed perception stemmed from the lack of awareness of one's ethnicity - the legacy of a long oppressive ideology, the vector of which is always directed towards mono-ethnicity, monolingualism, and mono-confessionalism (Khanolainen, Nesterova, & Semenova, 2020; Khilkhanova & Khilkhanov, 2004). Based on her experience in bilingual settings in Kyrgyzstan, Korth (2005, p. 14) noted that post-Soviet societies must decide "whether one of the local languages will become state languages, or whether all local languages and the colonial language will function side by side."

2.7. Research Context

Interpretations of Kyrgyzstan's history often vary according to authors' demographic background. Some authors ignore the fact that a dozen non-Kyrgyz and non-Muslim politicians and professionals, including Jews (Barshai, 2021) and others, contributed to establishing the Kyrgyz Republic as an individual political entity (e.g., Kamensky, Belotsky, Yudahin, Amosov, Barthold, to name a few). On the other hand, many people worldwide have received information about Kyrgyzstan and its languages from sources in Russian, which is often biased. For example, Korth (2005, p. 1) writes, "[m]y Russian friends in Switzerland had advised me not to learn Kyrgyz, because they esteemed it a 'wild' language." In addition, some contradictions stem from geopolitical agendas between nations located on different parts of the world (Ingram, 1980).

According to Barthold (1927), a Russian historian of Jewish origin, before the empire of Genghis Khan, there was a political entity in Siberia, which he called the *Kyrgyz Khaganate*. When this entity disintegrated, the Kyrgyz began to migrate en masse to the south (Drompp, 2002). The migration ceased by the 17th-18th century and the Kyrgyz became a part of the *Kokand Khanate* in Central Asia (Ferdinand & Komlosi, 2016). However, some parts of the Kyrgyz were not happy with the khanate and continuously requested the Russian Emperor to incorporate their lands (Sinor, 2021; Kasymbekov, 2018). After several such requests, the northern part of Kyrgyzstan was annexed to Russia in 1876 with the help of *manaps* (the Kyrgyz elites) who collaborated with the Kremlin (Akiyama, 2015). The total population of Kyrgyz at that time was hardly half a million (AKIpress, 2022). According to Akiyama (2015), "Russian imperial rule would not have been possible, had it not been for the collaboration of such elites." The dominant ideology of the Turkic peoples of that time degraded the whole of Central Asia and deprived it of its independence. The blatant social injustice, accompanied by the spiritual and economic crisis, reached intolerable levels. It was a time, figuratively speaking, when the

cries of the oppressed reached God's ears. Therefore, a *Flagellum Dei* (God's scourge), as Michael Blodgett (2007) named the appearance of Attila the Hun in the Roman Empire, was necessary. In Central Asia, this scourge was the punitive army of the Russian Empire.

Following the annexation and on the eve of World War I, impoverished Russian peasants began migrating to Kyrgyzstan en masse to colonize the valley lands of the semi-nomadic Kyrgyz (Sinor, 2021). These events, coupled with the mobilization campaign among the Kyrgyz for World War I, provoked strong protests from some part of the Kyrgyz, who formed the *Turkestani National Liberation Movement* (Paksoy, 1991), which the Bolsheviks labeled *the Basmachi* (translated as *Raiders*). Using the protest mood, some radical Islamist leaders organized provocations to attack Slavic settlements, against which the Kremlin imposed a massacre of the Kyrgyz in 1916 which is remembered in Kyrgyzstan as *Urkun* (BBC, 2021). The Basmachi movement was supported by Great Britain, a participant in the *Great Game*, as the confrontation between Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia was called in the 19th century (Ingram, 1980). The fact that the Basmachi movement continued to operate almost until the outbreak of World War II and even tried to attract *German migrants* in Kyrgyzstan to its activities (Jantzen, 2009) indicates that not all Kyrgyz were happy with the presence of Russians. Those who did not want to join Russia emigrated to China, Afghanistan, and Turkey. When the Bolsheviks came to power, some of them returned because Lenin offered *international socialism* (propagated as social justice, equality, and freedom) to the Kyrgyz (Mambetaliev, 2018a). In this connection, it is complementary to note that most of the ex-Soviet countries have removed Lenin's memorial. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan has preserved most of them, believing post-Soviet propaganda that "the [Russian] Tsar wanted to kill everyone. We were saved by Lenin" (Putz, 2016).

When the Bolsheviks organized several Soviet Socialist Republics in Central Asia, some other ethnic groups famous in Eurasia, such as *Kipchaks* and *Sarts*, were "forgotten" and dissolved among modern nations of Central Asia (Mambetaliev, 2018a). These newly created republics out of former Turkestan formally had the right to quit the USSR, as Article 17 of the Constitution of the USSR stated: "Every Union Republic is reserved the right freely secede from the USSR." (Beard, 1996). Although Lenin announced equality of all languages (Schlyter, 2006) and promised to establish the brotherhood of peoples through international socialism (Lenin, 1914), some subjects of Russia declared their independence as soon as they caught a chance during the civil war in Russia (i.e., Finland and the Baltic countries). Others opted to construct new identities called today Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.

However, currently, they are faced with the choice to restore Turkestan or to be satellites of large non-Turkic countries.

Kyrgyzstan underwent a significant sociolinguistic transformation due to massive resettlement campaigns from Russia during World War II, which significantly changed the ethnic composition of the country. In addition, it accompanied a language change, sometimes a nationality change (Anderson & Silver, 1983), among some resettled ethnicities. However, the number of Slavic groups that emigrated the following year after Kyrgyzstan gained independence was several times higher than the number of emigrants between other ethnic groups compared to previous years. The Russians, who constituted 56% percent of Bishkek City in the census of 1989 (Huskey, 1995). According to NSCKR (2022), Kyrgyzstan's population has reached 7,000,000, including approximately 2,500,000 urban and 4,500,000 rural citizens. Non-Kyrgyz ethnicities include Russians (5%), Turkic groups (18%), and non-Turkic ethnicities (3%). Some ethnic groups have independent kin-states, while others are national republics within the Russian Federation.

The century-long identity construction affected identity claims strongly. The concept of "the Kyrgyz Citizen" ("Kyrgyz Jarany"), was proposed only recently by the government of Kyrgyzstan in 2020 (Ministry of Culture, 2020). The goal of the concept is the development of a single country (national) identity. However, the terms 'nation,' 'nationality,' 'ethnicity,' and 'citizenship' are translated differently in the extensive online dictionary 'El-Sozduk.' For example, the words "nation" and "nationality" are translated as one word, "ulut." The word "ethnicity" is not translated, nor is it translated in the same way as "nation" and "nationality." In some dictionaries, it is translated as "origin" ("tek" in Kyrgyz). In the Kyrgyz language, only recently, a new term, "jaran," with an arbitrary meaning related to "citizen or nationality" in English, was introduced. Often in the media, the word "ethnic Kyrgyz" denotes the descendants of those Kyrgyz who did not want to join Russia and the USSR and moved to other countries and are now returning (Ministry of Labor, 2022). Only after independence did the promotion of the concept of "Kyrgyzstani" begin, roughly meaning belonging to a country (or nation), regardless of ethnicity. However, in many countries, everyone with the Kyrgyz passport is called Kyrgyz because the country's official name is the Kyrgyz Republic. However, among Kyrgyz, there is still no clear understanding of the difference between terminologies related to national and ethnic identities. Until recently, the Kyrgyz passport did not have a column for ethnicity, but under pressure from some ethnic Kyrgyz, the government added a column for ethnicity. Now every citizen of Kyrgyzstan can write in this column any nationality, even a non-existing one. A vague understanding of terminologies related to ethnicity and nationality

is a characteristic not only of ordinary people but also of well-known politicians (e.g., Kyrgyz Today, 2017).

Another essential characteristic of modern Kyrgyzstan is the regional features of culture and language. Until recently, some regions also differed in tribal identity, which the Kyrgyz assimilated after the collapse of the Genghis Khan Empire (Mambetaliev, 2013). In Soviet times, the Kyrgyz were usually divided into southern and northern Kyrgyz. The southern region has traditionally been home to ethnic groups of Turkic and Persian origin. Before the formation of the USSR, the north part of Kyrgyzstan was inhabited by Kyrgyz, Dungans, Russians, Ukrainians, and German Mennonites. After the construction of the USSR, the Kremlin resettled several ethnic groups from the Caucasus.

The status of the Human Development Index of Kyrgyzstan is evaluated as medium (UNDP, 2016). The number of university graduates in 2021 was about 36,000 (NSCKR, 2022). More than half of undergraduate students in universities were girls in 2014 (Abdirazakova, 2014). In the report of ADB, the country "has a high level of enrollment in education and near gender parity at the primary level. This changes at the secondary level where the number of girls graduating significantly outnumbers that of boys" (Brody, 2019).

The Kyrgyz language belongs to the *Kipchak* branch of the Turkic language family. It is the state language of the Kyrgyz Republic and "the official language in Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous prefecture" (Tsung, 2014, p. 32) in China. The modern Kyrgyz language is usually divided into northern (Talas, Chui, Ysyk-Köl, Naryn) and southern (Batken, Osh, Jalal-Abad) dialects (Nuralieva, 2010). Dialects are the result of language contact with neighboring nations and of assimilation with various ethnic groups who spoke Turkic, Mongolian, Semitic, and Persian languages before the Soviet era (Yildirim, 2020; Mambetaliev, 2013).

In official documents, the term *literary language* also denotes the standardized version of the modern Kyrgyz language (Jumaeva, 2018). In some ways, it resembles the processes of transformation of the received pronunciation of English, which came from southeast England and has become regionless today since it is spoken and broadcasted throughout the country (Chambers & Trudgill, 1998). However, unlike English, the literary Kyrgyz is still associated with the northern Kyrgyz, which is contrary to the assertion by Llamas & Stockwell (2020), who suggest that a standardized language variety may drop its regional associations. This artificially created status of the 'literary Kyrgyz' has been a triggering source of "a feeling of cultural inferiority" among the Kyrgyz from other regions because they are often ridiculed for their regional dialects and accents in some northern regions (Korth, 2005, p. 129).

The linguistic and geographical distances between the modern Kyrgyz language and other Turkic languages in Central Asia, Turkey, Caucasus, and Eastern Europe do not correlate (see also Johansson, 2010). The Kyrgyz language was much closer to other Central Asian Turkic languages in the 19th century than today (Kokaisl, 2013; Abduvaliev, 2017; Kasymbekov, 2018). Some scholars associate an original written form of the Kyrgyz language with the *Yeniseian runic inscriptions*. Others insert that the written Kyrgyz language in modern history "had its beginning in the early 1920s" (Korth, 2005, p. 88). After the migration to Central Asia, the Kyrgyz joined the *Chagatai* writing system (Grenoble, 2003), the literary style of Central Asia before the Soviet Union (Johansson, 2010; Korth, 2005). According to László Szimonisz, the system was still used in Iran in 1965 (Lindsay & Demir, 2015). Note that printed materials in the Kyrgyz language before the Russian expansion to Central Asia included the epic *Manas*, which was published in 1861 by György Almásy and his Kyrgyz colleagues, who later in 1911 also published fragments of another Kyrgyz epic, *Semetei*, in the magazine *Keleti Szemle* in Budapest (Vasi Múzeumi Arcképcsarnok, 2011). The epic Manas consists of about half a million lines in poetic style, making it "20 times longer than Homer's Odyssey and The Iliad combined" (Levine, 1995). Another book written by a scientist who lived in Kyrgyzstan in the 11th century is called *Kutadgu Bilig* ('Spiritual Knowledge'). The book is written in the medieval Turkic language (Balagunlu, 1070).

After the formation of the USSR, the Kyrgyz language was assigned Arabic, Latin, and then Cyrillic scripts in the listed order. Although alphabets can be adapted to any language (Borbone, 2005), proponents of the Latin alphabet argue that the Cyrillic alphabet does not fully meet some needs of the Kyrgyz language as much as the Latin alphabet does. They also point to the fact that the current alphabet separates the Kyrgyz from most Turkic-speaking people (Shamshiev, 2017); and that current Cyrillic Kyrgyz has contributed to the loss of several vowels (which are preserved in the Kazakh language by mixing Cyrillic and Latin alphabets) and is often lagging in software updates for modern electronic devices (Mambetaliev, 2009). There are even some exotic ideas, including the option of switching to the ancient runic script of the Yeniseian Kyrgyz (Atahanov, 2019).

The Bolsheviks perceived LP as a top-down system (Wu, 2020, p. 254) and believed that Lenin's doctrine of international socialism could be better achieved through national languages (Pavlenko, 2013). Therefore, they used national leaders to eliminate illiteracy and standardize notable language variations (Ferdinand & Komlosi, 2016). Thus, for the chiefs of the Kyrgyz SSR, "the Russian language and the Communist Party were the twin sources of their power and legitimacy" (Huskie, 1995, p. 4).

Lenin (1925) proposed that "educating students separately according to their native language facilitates internationalism and prevents nationalist tendencies" (as cited in Korth, 2005, p. 92). Therefore, some believed that the LP of the Bolsheviks was oriented toward promoting the language use of minority languages (Grenoble, 2003). However, as the Bolsheviks strengthened their power, language advocates were killed off and replaced by a generation with a tribalist mentality rather than a national one (Huskey, 1995). From a diachronic perspective, in the post-Stalin era, every leader of the Soviet Union took a similar behavior in the LP: "[L]ike Lenin, they maintained flexibility during the early years of their regimes. Like Stalin, they promoted Russian values and the use of the Russian language in the later years as they gained political power and prestige" (Das, 2011, p. 45).

In the late 1930s, the Kremlin's true intentions for LP began to emerge when Russian was made compulsory for instruction in all national republics (Marshall, 1992). In the 1940s, the Latin alphabet of the Kyrgyz language was replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet (Chotaeva, 2002). Before the Bolsheviks, "language did not play a significant role in group identity" due to the mutual intelligibility of various Turkic dialects (Korth, 2005, p. 65). Later, the language was used to manipulate and divide Turkic peoples (Grenoble, 2003). Huskey (1995, p. 3) puts it as this: "the Bolsheviks hoped to enhance the legitimacy of the new regime, especially among local elites, and to deepen the cultural divisions between the Turkic peoples of Central Asia." Therefore, Kremlin's aim, besides spreading the Soviet ideology, was to "conquer the Turkic peoples of Central Asia by declaring their (mutually intelligible) languages to be separate" (Schiffman, 2002, Section 4).

The construction of the Soviet Kyrgyzstan identity was accompanied by an increased focus on eliminating illiteracy (Schlyter, 2006) and developing textbooks in the "literary" language (IKSU, 2021). In addition, first research on the northern Kyrgyz dialect in 1938 was published by Dr. Batmanov, a Russian, and the first Russian-Kyrgyz dictionary was authored in 1940 by Dr. Yudahin, a Jew.

However, on the eve of World War II, the Kremlin's rhetoric began to change from a liberal LP toward direct Russification (Korth, 2005, p. 69). The Kremlin started harsh persecution of nationalists in the republics (Bolshakov & Farukshin, 2022). Therefore, Kyrgyz linguists had to slow down the open promotion of the Kyrgyz language (BBC, 2021). Meanwhile, the war began, and national questions were postponed to the back burner.

According to Korth (2005, p. 1), "[l]anguage contact between Russian and Kyrgyz speakers in the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic and present-day Kyrgyzstan has historically been a source of conflict." Often the conflict was triggered by the covert policy of the Kremlin,

which eliminated the "first generation of Kyrgyz intellectuals" (Huskey, 1995, p. 4). Therefore, since the 1940s, no effort was made to plan the status and corpus of the Kyrgyz language. Instead, the development of the Kyrgyz language was halted, and a policy of direct Russification was enforced (Korth, 2005).

According to Schiffman (1996, p. 165), "non-Russian minorities living in another non-Russian republic generally had no guarantees for their language." When Stalin massively resettled several ethnic minorities from Russia to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian language became common among ethnic groups (Dotton, 2016, p. 26). DeLorme (1999) confirms these characteristics of the resettlers when he writes that a few decades later, most relocated people began to consider Russian their primary language of communication. Thus, the Kyrgyz language for non-Kyrgyz performed only a symbolic role, while the Russian language de facto became the only language for inter-ethnic communication. As a result, any citizen of the Soviet Union had the opportunity to live in Kyrgyzstan without knowing the Kyrgyz language.

The after-war period was characterized by socioeconomic development and bilingualism in Kyrgyzstan. Propagandists in some Soviet republics spread the slogan "Russian is our second mother tongue" (Dzhusupov, 2005, p. 11). Although Kyrgyzstan was a country with a high level of linguistic tolerance (Orusbaev et al., 2008), the language relations became asymmetric (Huskey, 1995). Bilingualism took a course in the direction of subtractive bilingualism, which did not cause concern for most communists. On the contrary, Russians were exempted from the compulsory study of the Kyrgyz language in schools in 1956 (Huskey, 1995). The decree on compulsory studying Russian passed smoothly while learning the Kyrgyz language became private (Korth, 2005). The Kyrgyz language was not taught in non-Kyrgyz schools in Kyrgyzstan during 1959-1989 (Grenoble, 2003). Asymmetric bilingualism became widespread when non-Russians learned Russian and Russians did not learn non-Russian languages (Smagulova, 2008). According to Tarbox (2016, p. 11), "Russians viewed the Kyrgyz culture as backwards and, as such, did not want to assimilate to the cultural differences." However, the Kyrgyz did not protest, since the Kremlin controlled the language through phone calls to its high-ranking local agents (Ishemkulov, 2021). Nevertheless, the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz SSR initiated a new law in 1989 to support the Kyrgyz language, which provoked protests from the Russian population (Huskie, 1995).

This situation is reminiscent of the Catalan language in Spain, where "all native Catalan speakers are fully bilingual (high proficiency in both Catalan and Spanish), whereas only a fraction of native Spanish speakers is proficient in Catalan" (Caminal et al., 2018, p. 5).

The idea of "convergence and fusion of peoples" to create a single identity (i.e., 'Soviet man') became a famous phrase in publications (Schiffman, 2002, p. 1; Grenoble, 2003, p. 42). It included bringing the corpus of national languages into an appropriate state and merging them with the Russian language (Schlyter, 2006; Derbisheva, 2022). It should be noted that the idea that the lexifier would be able to assimilate and unite citizens into one monolithic society was inherent not only in Soviet nationalism but also in other cultures. For example, in the postcolonial societies of the Caribbean, it was still alive until recently (Forteau-Jaikaransingh, 2022). Nevertheless, those Kyrgyz who did not speak Russian well were not perceived as intellectuals (Gul, 2019). Therefore, many Kyrgyz parents enrolled their children in Russian schools, interpreted in publications as a "love for the Russian language" (Korth, 2005, p. 93). The situation reached the point where the titular nationalities were reticent to use their native languages in public places "in fear of being reprimanded by Russians for doing so" (DeLorme, 1999, p. 17). The Russian language became the prestigious language and the Kyrgyz language not prestigious one among scholars as well. In some sciences, most dissertations were written exclusively in Russian (Orusbaev, 1990). Asymmetric bilingualism began in the mid-1930s when ethnic Russians living in Kyrgyzstan were no longer encouraged to acquire the Kyrgyz language. However, their Kyrgyz counterparts were expected to master Russian. "By the 1950s, only approximately 1% of ethnic Russians living in Kyrgyzstan were fluent in Kyrgyz while, by 1989, 54% of the ethnic Kyrgyz population claimed fluency in Russian as a second language" (Tarbox, 2016, p. 10).

Furthermore, patriotic propaganda gradually began to push national and linguistic issues into the background. As a result, the Russian language became dominant in the real politics of the entire Soviet Union (Shelestyuk, 2021). Despite these facts, some researchers who know the situation from secondary sources believe that national language advocates in post-Soviet countries stigmatize bilingualism because of negative historical memories (Pavlenko, 2011, p. 52).

The ever-deteriorating situation of the Kyrgyz language reached a critical point (Solchanyk, 1982) and forced the authorities of the KSSR to initiate "proper maintenance for the Kyrgyz language" in the constitution of 1978. The next decade was accompanied by growing nationalistic movements that demanded the sovereignty of the republic and the elimination of Russian dominance. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan announced a new LP in October 1988 and called it "National and Russian bilingualism" (Huskey, 1995, p. 5). The following year, the Supreme Council of KSSR proposed a draft of 'The Law on the State Language' on September 23, 1989. The law stated

that the Kyrgyz language had been limited "due to distortion of Lenin's national language policy" and needed further development. However, it caused a flurry of emotions among those who supported it and those dissatisfied (Huskey, 1995). Article 8 of the 1989 language law caused organized riots in Kyrgyz enterprises as it required "Russian managers and specialists" to use the state language to the extent necessary to carry out their professional duties" (Huskey, 1995, p. 7). The fiercest confrontation to changes in LP came from Russian-dominated plants, whose directors formed a stronghold of political orthodoxy throughout the Soviet Union. According to a language planning committee member, "many respected members from other nationalities did everything possible to prevent the adoption of the language law" (Huskey, 1995, p. 6).

Thus, ethnic Russians had two salient moments when they overtly demonstrated their rejection of the Kyrgyz language – in the early and later years of Soviet rule. The first incident occurred during the rooting policy of the 1920s, when according to Schlyter (2006), most Russian employees in the Central Asian republics were urged to learn the majority native language used at work. However, due to the solid negative attitudes openly demonstrated by Russian workers and the lack of efficient educational opportunities, this policy never showed positive results. The second protest was against the language law of 1989. Many ethnic Russians from all over Central Asia met in Bishkek to express their discontent against the law. However, the law was approved by the Supreme Council of the KSSR, which caused a massive emigration of ethnic Russians (Drompp, 2002; Ferdinand & Komlosi, 2016).

The initially conceived but not legalized idea of creating a Soviet person with Russian began to crumble by the end of the 1980s, a sign of which was the explicit granting of the status of the state language in several union republics. Therefore, the Supreme Council of the USSR hastily, on April 24, 1990, adopted a law "which defines the legal status of the Russian language as the official language of the USSR" (Mechkovskaya, 1992, p. 79). However, this law lasted only one year, as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

American and European authors who had collected data from their field trips in the early years of independence described the situation as competition on an unequal basis, denoting the weakened position of the Kyrgyz language due to the domination of Russian in critical domains of life (Korth, 2005; Landau & Kellner-Heinkele, 2001; Wright, 1999). When Huskey (1995, p. 4) visited Kyrgyzstan for his field study in the early years of independence, he found that "only three of Frunze's 69 schools used Kyrgyz as the primary language of instruction." He also discovered that only four percent of books in the national library were in Kyrgyz, and only nine percent of the state agency's film inventory was dubbed in Kyrgyz.

After the collapse of the USSR, "Kyrgyz parents began to view their ancestral language as a language of opportunity as well as a language of folklore" (Huskie, 1995, p. 12). As a result, during the late Soviet and early Soviet years, the number of schools in which the Kyrgyz language was the medium of instruction increased by about 10%. In contrast, the number of schools where the medium of instruction was the Russian language decreased by approximately 30% (Huskie, 1995, p. 13).

An analysis of reports from foreign researchers found that the lexica of Kyrgyz nationalists in those years was harsher than it is today. Ethnic consciousness and concerns about native languages flourished by the end of the Soviet Union (Das, 2011, p. 51). For example, when the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University was launched in 1993, some nationalists reacted to the event as "a continuation of 70 years of Russian "bloodsucking" (Huskie, 1995, p.14).

Materials from the media of those years describe the euphoria of ethnic Kyrgyz people of suddenly gaining independence. Many boasted of their sovereignty as if they had conquered it by their efforts. However, the euphoria began to fade with the coming to power of people who grew up on the Soviet ideology, received scientific degrees in Russia, and spoke and wrote mainly in Russian. In addition, the transition to Russian in some ex-Soviet countries was advanced to the extent that a significant part of the titular nationalities did not speak their native language (DeLorme, 1999). Many locals taught that "one was not considered 'to be a person/to be somebody' unless he or she was literate in Russian" (DeLorme, 1999, p. 17). As a result, most Soviet-educated Kyrgyz leaders often perceived themselves as members of an inferior ethnic group and downgraded the Kyrgyz language (Korth, 2005). According to Grosjean (1984, p. 122), "[T]hese attitudes originate within dominant language group but are slowly adopted by the minority group, so that in the end its members feel they are speaking an "impoverished" language." They believed that the capacity of the Kyrgyz language was not enough to replace the Russian language (Mediaplov News Agency, 2020) and Russian became a second language. At the same time, Kyrgyz was the language of communication only for 10.7% of people for whom it was not their mother tongue (UNICEF, 2014). The history of the Irish language is another example of the psychological damage of propaganda and top-down decisions. Under the influence of the totalitarian religious regime, Irish leader O'Connell urged the Irish to leave their native language and switch to English. This call not only led to the decline of the Irish language almost to the point of moribund but also left severe psychological damage to Irish people, who decades later were embarrassed to speak their native language (The Irish Times, 2019).

Meanwhile, some ethnicities of the Soviet Union had little interest in learning the language of the titular nationality (Chen, 2016). If in Ukraine, for example, Hungarians and Romanians constantly resented the lack of schools in their language (Csernicskó, 2011), then in Kyrgyzstan, not a single case of outrage from non-Russian minorities to open schools in their native language has been reported in open sources. Another legacy of the Soviet Union in the perceptions of ethnic minorities is the ongoing projection of the Soviet system of ethnic group hierarchies into a post-Soviet reality. For example, in Kazakhstan, "Russian-speaking minorities largely accept their status beneath the Kazakh 'elder brother' and do not wish to identify as a 'national minority" (Blackburn, 2019). However, such passivity might still contain an unspoken satisfaction that accumulates over time and explodes at an unexpected moment. For example, violent protests by ethnic Uzbeks in the southern regions that demanded autonomy have occurred twice in the life cycle of the last generation. According to Western experts, this conflict was not adequately prevented, as the authorities calmed with Soviet slogans about people's friendship and activists used project money only with a focus on donor satisfaction (Lottholz, 2018).

Russification especially gripped the capital, where Kyrgyz and non-Russian minorities preferred exclusively Russian schools (Ferdinand & Komlosi, 2016; Korth, 2005). Some foreign visitors noted that "the standard language of Bishkek is, indeed, Russian, despite language laws implying the equality of Kyrgyz and Russian" (McDermott, 2017). The reason might also be related to demographics since, according to the last Soviet census, ethnic Kyrgyz comprised only 22% of Bishkek residents (Jalalabad State University, 2020).

Authorities have continuously declared the necessity of Russian as a means of inter-ethnic communication since independence. Kyrgyzstan is still the only Central Asian republic and the second post-Soviet country after Belarus to have granted the Russian language official status since 2000. President Akaev was the most prominent supporter of the Russian language after independence and reintroduced Russian as the language of interethnic communication in 1996. He even recommended to other former Soviet Republics the extension of the function of the Russian language in all areas of cooperation (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2004). Our prominent writer Chingiz Aitmatov said, "we will save, protect, use, and cultivate the Russian language as one of the greatest values of the Kyrgyz nation" (The Times of Central Asia, 2004). All these factors led the government of Kyrgyzstan to report in May 2008 that educational programs promoting Kyrgyz-Russian bilingualism had failed (Kellner-Heinkele & Landau, 2012). A recent study of pluralism in Kyrgyzstan found that some ethnic groups living in rural areas, such as Chechens and Germans, spoke Kyrgyz well and did not complain about language

discrimination. However, during the Soviet Union, many ethnic minorities, especially the Germans, who at that time numbered about 9,000, were subject to assimilation because, for many of them, the use of their native languages was reduced to communication with relatives (Schulze, 2017; Smagulova, 2008). Currently, their lingua franca is Russian (Baimyrza, 2021). One of the interviewees, who worked as a saleswoman in a rural bazaar, considered herself an Orthodox Russian, although her parents were Germans (Mambetaliev, 2018a). The situation within their titular republics in Russia is also not comforting, as they face the problem of language shift (Bolshakov & Farukshin, 2022). In Kyrgyzstan, a stereotype among rural citizens dictates that the Russian language is an alternative to English (Mambetaliev, 2018b), and their children cannot go abroad without it (Turdueva, 2021). Furthermore, most minorities are not interested in maintaining their native languages and continue the language shift to Russian. For example, recently, when the head of Muslims in Kyrgyzstan issued a decree that allowed only the Kyrgyz and Russian languages in religious services at the Central Mosque (Turkiston, 2019), no ethnic minorities objected to the decision in defense of their native languages. On a similar occasion in Caribbean society, where people tacitly accept the continued legacy of colonialism, Forteau-Jaikaransingh (2022, p. 129) remarked that "the voicelessness of those forced to function entirely in a language that is strange to the one they use most frequently."

The Soviet past also left its influence on linguistic attitudes and language choice. A study found that young Kyrgyz have a fragile attitude towards their native language (Ferdinand & Komlosi, 2016). When asked about their opinions on the use of the Russian and Kyrgyz languages, the researchers informed that "[they] learn Russian as a means of socioeconomic advancement and speak Kyrgyz because of its importance as a marker of their national identity" (McDermott, 2017, p. 36). As a result, Kyrgyz aged 30 and older are bilingual (either simultaneous or sequential), as in other post-Soviet republics (Bowring, 2014).

According to Russian authors, the share of Russian speakers (who can speak, write, and read in Russian fluently) in 2006 was 38% of the population. About 20% of the respondents used Russian to communicate with family and friends. Twenty-seven percent used Russian in public places. The authors described this situation as "despite the dominance of the language of the titular nationality, a fairly large proportion of the population speaks Russian" (Gavrilov et al., 2008, para. 40). A study by international colleagues in 2010 reported that an estimated 75.6% speak Kyrgyz and 43.5% speak Russian (Aminov et al., 2010). In the 2009 census, only 10.2% of the adult population of Kyrgyzstan indicated the Kyrgyz language as their fluently spoken L2. It was marked so mostly among traditional Central Asian ethnic groups. About 2.4% of the country's total population, including 0.1% of the titular nationality, indicated Russian as

their mother tongue. English was spoken fluently by only 1.2% of the country's adult population. More than 90% of the titular nationality and non-Russian minorities over 15 years of age indicated the Russian language as their L2. In comparison, only 1.4% of Russians indicated that they speak a language other than Russian. It should be noted that the authors of the report provided different data on the same page: "36.2% of Russians indicated the Kyrgyz language as their second language" (NSCKR, 2009, p. 20). According to EF EPI (2021) estimates in the last year, Kyrgyzstan was still ranked 101st out of 112 countries in terms of English proficiency.

Although some Russian-speaking Kyrgyz mark the Kyrgyz language as their mother tongue in censuses (Korth, 2005; Demoscope Weekly, 2021), the Kyrgyz-speaking Kyrgyz consider that the identity of the Russian speakers is not complete (Munday, 2009). Flynn & Kosmarskaya (2014) also emphasized the difference in attitudes and identities between the Russified Kyrgyz of Bishkek and the Kyrgyz of the periphery. (It should be noted that an informant of this study was one of the authors, representing a target language group in the field. For this reason, adding another informant-author of a Soviet minority or including more participants from the periphery would likely change some conclusions.) Therefore, they label the Russian speakers as Keergeez to distinguish them from the official name of the Kyrgyz. According to them, the Keergeez are disloyal to the Kyrgyz people since they "don't respect the language" (Munday, 2009, p. 192). The reason for this label has its roots in the resettlement of Slavic peoples in Kyrgyzstan, who quickly took a dominant position in the socio-economic life of the capital. As Huskey (1995, p. 3) puts it, "[t]his large, compact, and monolingual population of Slavs was an additional encouragement for ambitious Kyrgyz in the Chu Valley to neglect their native tongue in favor of Russian." In addition to Russian-speaking monolingual Kyrgyz, there are also bilingual Kyrgyz with balanced bilingualism (proficiency in both languages) and imbalanced bilingualism (one language is dominant or active) bilingualism (Derbisheva, 2022). Most Kyrgyz with imbalanced bilingualism can be called transitional Kyrgyz, as they are either urbanized ex-rural residents or urban Kyrgyz for whom the ancestral language is a second language.

A study involving 3000 individuals (1000 Russians, 1000 Kyrgyz, and 1000 others) showed that among both Russian and Kyrgyz parents, about 50% preferred to raise their children as monolinguals in their ethnic languages. However, 46% favored bilingualism among Kyrgyz parents, and among Russians, 45% preferred multilingualism (Orusbaev et al., 2008). Because most Russians are reluctant to learn the languages of the former Soviet republics, this

45% of parents most likely implied the global languages. The Kyrgyz parents, in contrast, most likely included the Russian language when they responded in favor of bilingualism.

The language of instruction in schools located in the capital and in the regions remains different. In 2008, the total number of Russian-language schools was 8.7% of the total number of monolingual secondary schools. Most of them were in Chui oblast and Bishkek. At the same time, most of the Kyrgyz-language schools were in the regions, with only four Kyrgyz-language schools in the capital (Orusbaev et al., 2008). In 2020, 18% of schools in the country used Russian as MoI (NSCKR, 2021b).

Recent studies claim that language reforms in Kyrgyzstan are going well, national identity is being strengthened, and the Kyrgyz language is becoming the first language (Landau & Kellner-Heinkele, 2012). In addition, they also note that the teaching workload for foreign languages increased more than that given to Russian in the national school curriculum (Ferdinand & Komlosi, 2016). Meanwhile, most Kyrgyz universities are still offering their main programs in the Russian language due to the high demand for Russian by students who come to Bishkek from rural areas (Gul, 2019).

The National Program for the Development of the State Language and the Improvement of the Language Policy in the Kyrgyz Republic (NP) for 2021-2025 was updated in 2020. According to government reports, the following projects were completed under the program: Kyrgyz classes were opened in every Russian-language school, a total of 300 Kyrgyz speaking groups were opened in Russian-speaking kindergartens in Bishkek, and the Kyrgyz language was established as a 4-hour per week in high schools, three smartphone programs were developed to learn the Kyrgyz language, the "Kyrgyztest" was established to test the Kyrgyz language proficiency of state and municipal employees, 1.5 million phrases are entered into Google Translate, 80 thousand articles are published in the Kyrgyz Wikipedia, more than 15 books are published in Braille, and the requirement for applicants to graduate programs to pass the exam in the state language is approved (Kyrgyz National News Agency, 2021).

The dynamics of language development in Kyrgyzstan is perceived ambiguously in Russia. For example, a recent government initiative supporting the Kyrgyz language by providing some preferences to enrollees with an advanced level of Kyrgyz has been called “the beginning of the end” by some Russian politicians (Goble, 2019, p. 1).

The regional identity of the Kyrgyz is often more critical than their civic and ethnic identity (Mambetaliev, 2019). On a regional basis, the Kyrgyz are divided into northerners and southerners according to their place of birth, even if they have lived in another region for most of their lives (Nogaev, personal communication, 2019). Migrants from Russia were mainly

settled in the country's north, so the northerners were more susceptible to Russification than the southerners.

According to the National Research University of Russia, the ethnic composition of the population by region after the collapse of the USSR has changed toward an increase in the titular nationality, including in the capital. In contrast, the number of citizens of non-titular nationality, especially the number of Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans resettled by the Bolsheviks in the central and northern regions of the country, has decreased significantly (Demiscop Weekly, 2012).

Another peculiarity of nation building in Kyrgyzstan is the difference in priority between linguistic and religious identities (Kitinov, 2020). Various religions flourished among Kyrgyz in the Middle Ages, including Christianity, Tengrism, Buddhism, paganism, and other beliefs. However, after the dominance of Islam, Christianity among Kyrgyz disappeared until the resettlement of Orthodox and German Mennonites in the nineteenth century (Jantzen, 2009; Mambetaliev, 2019; Payne, 2022). Currently, the number of citizens of the Orthodox tradition is declining and the Muslim tradition is increasing. The number of mosques in 1990 was 39 which has increased several times by 2019 prevailing the number of schools (Zarif & Muhammadiy, 2015). As a result, interest in the language of the Qur'an is growing (Bulan Institute, 2019). Evangelical Christianity, Tengrianism, Atheism, Agnosticism, and other groups have also been revived. Most evangelical Kyrgyz do not openly declare their faith, so there is no reliable information on their exact number, although some media claimed that they were more than 15,000 active members (Miroshnik, 2014). Due to the prevailing dominance of Islam, many argue that Central Asia would be more attracted to Muslim countries in the global south than to Russia (Luong, 2004).

Publications from the past decade testify to the heated debate by ethnic Kyrgyz, who argue that the Kyrgyz language should be supported to fully meet the country's communicative needs and resolve various contradictions around LP (Kellner-Heinkele & Landau, 2012). Meanwhile, the course of the LP in Kyrgyzstan depends on historical circumstances, popular will, and leadership (Huskey, 1995).

Interest in the English language in Kyrgyzstan has increased significantly since the beginning of independence. The linguistic landscape exposed the growing occurrence of English in business areas of the city (Munday, 2009). It is also facilitated by the growing number of international students in the country's higher education system. For example, more than 35 percent of the country's higher education enrollment in 2022 was made up of international students (NSCKR, 2022). Among students arriving from abroad, there are also

many students from countries where English is an official language. For example, 77% of medical students in Kyrgyzstan came from India and Pakistan (Timofeeva, 2022).

The Russian language has become a political instrument of the Kremlin inside and outside Russia to divert the attention of citizens from pressing socio-economic problems (Taicina, 2015). Private incidents in neighboring countries have often been portrayed as a general trend of discrimination against Russians. The language became an excuse to intervene in the internal problems of other post-Soviet countries, where languages were reviving from the stage of extinction after the USSR.

Russia is actively promoting the traditional positions of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan. To this end, Moscow is continuing the attempts to instill the perception of Russian as the language of the globalized present (Pavlenko, 2013) by supplying textbooks to Kyrgyz schools and exporting various literature to Kyrgyzstan's bookshops (Abdylakimova, 2008). It also uses legal means, for example, as was the law adopted on July 2017, by the Russian Duma, which permits driver licenses of Kyrgyzstan to function in Russia under the condition that it recognizes the Russian language as an official language (Kucera, 2017). In addition, Kyrgyzstan's membership in Russian-led regional programs, the prevalence of Russian-language cadres in the educational system, and the country's dependence on Russia's labor and mineral resources are the guarantors of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan (The World l, 2015).

Various surveys report that Kyrgyz citizens are favorable to the Russian language. A study in 2014 reported that Kyrgyz aged 30 and over were bilingual (Bowring, 2014). A study in 2017 reported that many ethnic Kyrgyz consider the Russian language essential for the job market in the former Soviet space (McDermott, 2017). A survey among 6397 respondents conducted in 2020 showed that 90% of respondents consider it necessary to maintain the official status of the Russian language (24.kg, 2020). Furthermore, another survey involving 1800 voters on the renaming of districts in Bishkek from the Russian language to the Kyrgyz language did not find significant support (AKIPress, 2022).

International representatives also contribute to language choice. For example, a report by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) called the Russian language a "tool for international communication." In addition, it described the Kyrgyz language as "underdeveloped to replace Russian" (Bekmurzaev, 2020, p. 19).

In addition to the Kremlin's interference in Kyrgyzstan's internal LP issues, the Russian language's greater economic power over the Kyrgyz language raised the former's de facto status

and motivated learners to choose the Russian language over the Kyrgyz language (as Lenin had hoped).

According to Huskey (1995), impediments to the spread of the Kyrgyz language included the small number of the Kyrgyz people, competition between the Kyrgyz and Russian languages, the resistance of Slavs, the sycophantism of the Kyrgyzstani leadership, the hostility of institutions and groups, political costs of language change, scarcity of funds, and an insufficient belief of the locals in the capacity of Kyrgyz language to carry out various functions.

The dominance of the Russian language cannot be explained solely by the policies of the Kremlin. In this, the role of the Kyrgyz leaders was also significant. They presented the Soviet ideology as the basis of prosperity for the Kyrgyz people. Most local agents were convinced that socialism was "a project of modernism and development" (Yilmaz, 2015, p. i). Huskey (1995, p. 2) writes about this as follows:

> *The sycophantism of the Kyrgyzstani leadership also played a decisive role, especially in the third quarter of this century. Whereas party officials in some republics defended the titular language against extreme forms of linguistic Russification, recent Communist leaders in Kyrgyzstan sometimes embraced them. The rulers of this remote republic, so dependent on the center for its economic development seemed intent on proving their political loyalty through a fierce devotion to Russian cultural hegemony.*

The official ideology of Kyrgyzstan's authorities regarding the status of the Russian language is the "establishment of friendly relations between Kyrgyzstan and Russia" (Parmanasova, 2012, p. 192) and avoiding antagonization of Russia, "thus threatening civil and international peace" (DeLorme, 1999, p. 5). Another reason for "Kyrgyzstan's continued desire to rely primarily on Russia in terms of economic aid and support, as well as recent Kyrgyz actions to bind the state closer to Russia politically and socially, emphasizes the idea that the Russian language has substantial staying power in Kyrgyzstan" (Tarbox, 2016, p. 38). In addition, the attitude of Kyrgyz politicians towards the Russian language is an indicator of loyalty to the Kremlin. Therefore, each newly elected Kyrgyz president assured the Kremlin that the official status of the Russian language (introduced by the first president of Kyrgyzstan in 2000) will be preserved (EurAsia Daily, 2020; RIA Novosti, 2002, 2017; Echo of Moscow, 2012).

Even though the Kyrgyz language had become marginalized during the last decades, many Kyrgyz parents continued sending their children to Russian schools, especially in the capital city, where most Kyrgyz traditionally used exclusively Russian at home (Ferdinand & Komlosi, 2016; Wurm, 2002). If such a trend was developed in the country's capital during the Soviet era, in the post-Soviet period, it also spread to the periphery. Many Kyrgyzstanis who left for Russia have already changed their citizenship. According to a recent report by American media representatives, 60% of the country's schools teach in Kyrgyz, 18% in Russian, 1.2% in Uzbek, and 28% in two or more languages. The report also informed that to optimize state budget expenditures, the government does not allow the opening of schools if the number of pupils who want to study in a particular language does not exceed ten. In addition, the desire of most parents in such towns to have their children educated in Russian creates a problem for those parents who want their children to be educated in their native language, because they must find a school elsewhere (Kyzyljarova & Igamberdiev, 2022). A Kyrgyz media published another case in a remote district where Russia delivered textbooks in Russian (Sputnik, 2017). Sometime later, parents en masse began sending their children to the Russian school in this district (Turmush, 2022). Parents usually explain their decision with the following phrases: "office work is in Russian," "children will learn the Kyrgyz language anyway," "there was no room for my child in Kyrgyz schools" and "Kyrgyz schools do not provide necessary textbooks," "Teaching quality in Russian schools is better than in Kyrgyz schools," "Russian is needed to find a job in Russia" (Nurlanbekov & Topchubaeva, 2018; Korth, 2005).

The problem of the Kyrgyz language has traditionally been more severe in Kyrgyzstan's capital than in remote regions. McDermott (2017) reported that the Russian language was the predominant language in residential areas of the capital city. It was the principal language on less than 40 percent of residential signs.

Furthermore, the implicit legacy of the past, when speaking in the Kyrgyz language was seen as a sign of inferiority and ruralness, while speaking in the Russian language was accepted as a sign of superiority and education, undermined the motivation to learn the Kyrgyz language. Furthermore, the idea that some ancient philosophers, including Central Asian ones, would be inaccessible to Kyrgyz readers without the intermediary role of the Russian language (Abdylakimova, 2008) motivated scholars to reject local languages and select a dominant language for their research and publications (Gul, 2019). These problems contribute to the belief that some national languages are insufficient for education and science. In addition, the mindset that the Kyrgyz language is the language of the Kyrgyz and the Russian language is the language for all carried an excluding message to the non-Russian minorities of Kyrgyzstan

(e.g., the preamble of the latest constitution). Moreover, the education system that created inequalities by dividing students into language classes reinforced the prestige of the Russian language (Korth, 2005). Besides, the formal character of including the Kyrgyz language in the curriculum of Russian schools (where most textbooks combined the Kyrgyz language and Kyrgyz tradition, thus diverting attention from the language's communicative value), and ineffective pedagogical methods that often carried an imposing tone, tended to develop negative attitudes towards the Kyrgyz language (Korth, 2005, p. 241). In addition, the linguistic distance (Kyrgyz and Russian belong to different language families), low quality and a small amount of literature, and the problems of codification confused learners and complicated the language.

Finally, a small number of TV programs, entertaining content, and software in the Kyrgyz language (though the law "On the State Language" assumed that television and radio programs must produce at least 65% of the content in the Kyrgyz language) led people to other languages. There are no data for recent years for Kyrgyzstan, but demographics seem to dictate a further balance between Kyrgyz and Russian (NSCKR, 2021a).

This chapter discussed literature relevant to the topic and context, which would expect to equip this research with sufficient tools to explore the subject matter under study. It included ideas from local and international authors relevant to the topic.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the research design, conceptual framework, pilot study, and the main study, including data collection, data analysis, participants, instrument, and ethical considerations.

Fortunately, LP allows researchers to approach the subject using various research methods (Ricento, 2000a; Civico, 2021). This study followed the grounded theory approach (Dörnyei, 2007) because research on LP issues in sub-national communities in Kyrgyzstan is not abundant. The research design of the study comprised a pilot phase (including the evaluation and tool-checking procedures), data collection, data cleaning, and data analysis (Table 1). Analyzing the top-down and bottom-up aspects of LP required qualitative and quantitative methods. The top-down components of LP, which imply historical and structural factors (Tollefson, 2015), required the use of interviews and textual analysis, while the bottom-up components (i.e., socio-psychological aspects) necessitated questionnaires (Agheyisi & Fishman, 1970) which are essential in language planning processes (Trinick et al., 2020).

Table 1. Research Design

<table>
<tr><th></th><th>Pilot Phase Products</th><th>Data Collection Products</th><th>Data Cleaning</th><th>Data Analysis Products</th><th></th></tr>
<tr><td>Qualitative</td><td>Ideas, opinions.</td><td>Recorded interviews. Collection of relevant texts and artifacts.</td><td rowspan="2">Updated Data</td><td>Coded transcript, themes.</td><td rowspan="2">Discussion, conclusion, suggestions</td></tr>
<tr><td>Quantitative</td><td>Results of online survey.</td><td>A dataset of cross-sectional offline survey.</td><td>Results of statistical analyses.</td></tr>
</table>

An LP can be compared to an iceberg in which the written policy represents only the visible part, while the unwritten part that controls the language policy is invisible. A model with prevailing visible parts is an overt LP. The larger the invisible part, the more this model is inclined to be a covert LP. The study's conceptual framework (Fig. 1) shows overt and covert, top-down and bottom-up aspects or components of LP. It also includes demographic factors that might affect bottom-up aspects. According to this concept, determining the language policy

models implemented in Kyrgyzstan (RQ1) is the first task. The second task is to establish how the LP affected the participants (RQ2). The third task is learning the language attitudes and beliefs of the participants. The second and third tasks also consider the effect of demographic factors on the participants.

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework



Kyrgyzstan maintains basic official statistics on demographic changes. However, previous studies report the shortcomings of relying solely on statistics (Landau & Keller-Heinkelle, 2012). Unfortunately, many reports, including international projects, rely on existing data. Therefore, this study collected information from primary sources using cross-sectional strategies.

The questionnaire was designed to determine participants' demographic backgrounds and language-related characteristics. It included closed and open questions since it is impossible to get wide-ranging answers using only a closed questionnaire (Spolsky, personal communication, October 12, 2019). Some questions were determined using the adjusted *Q-sorting* method. In this method, the questions are composed of famous statements (Bianco, 2015). Other questions were inferred from suggestions by foundational authors (e.g., Schiffman, 1996; Ricento, 2015; Palviainen & Huhta, 2015; Lin, 2015; Baker, 1992). The questions also used the experience of earlier studies in neighboring countries (i.e., Laitin, 1998; Masanov, 2002; Rivers, 2005; Son, 1999; DeLorme, 1999; Suleimenova et al., 2005). Spolsky's (2004) and Schiffman's (1996) classification of LP models were adopted for operationalizing ideas proposed by the participants of this study. It was also applied to assign definitions to the LP models found in Kyrgyzstan's laws.

Data processing was carried out using the R software, which helped to determine the location and dispersion of the data and calculate frequencies, means, standard deviations, p-values, regressions, associations, and correlations. The software can perform cross-tabulations, including frequencies, percentages, chi-square, correlations, p-values, ANOVA, MANOVA (and their alternatives for non-parametric data), and logistic regressions.

3.1. Pilot Study

The pilot study aimed to explore the issues of the topic. The pilot's first phase involved several interviews. An unstructured interview helped record the following opinions about the LP and its components. On the role of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan, Tansygaeva (40 years old, female, teacher of the Kyrgyz language, personal conversation, August 2021) said: "Our politicians say that Kyrgyzstan is a small country and depends on large countries. Therefore, removing the official status of the Russian language would harm the country." She also noted that learning foreign languages is helpful for educational and career development. Mairamov (55 years old, male, editor of a weekly educational newspaper, personal conversation, August 2021) said: "I was born to learn Kyrgyz, not other languages. Therefore, I do not need other languages." Other interview participants mentioned several aspects of the LP, including the international languages needed for Kyrgyzstan, the language of interethnic communication, the status of languages and how many state or official languages there should be, and dialects of the Kyrgyz language. Based on the information collected, the following questionnaire (Table 2) was created during the pilot phase of the study (a fragment of responses with remarks translated into English is attached as Appendix P).

Table 2. Pilot Study Research Questions

Questions	Type
What language(s), in your opinion, will be the most demanded in Kyrgyzstan?	Open
Can the Kyrgyz L function as an interethnic language?	Closed
How many official languages should Kyrgyzstan have?	Closed
Should authorities assign a status to one of the dialects?	Closed

The survey with the above questions was conducted online among random participants. After data cleaning and normalization procedures, data from 82 participants, including 47 men and 35 women, were selected for further analysis. Some categories of variables were regrouped

to eliminate outliers. For example, the age category was grouped as young or post-Soviet generation (17 participants under the age of 24) and older participants or the Soviet generation (65 participants older than 24 years). Ethnically, the data set included 59 Kyrgyz, 10 Russians, and 13 individuals who represented minority groups. Approximately 14% of the titular nationality and over 95% of the ethnic minorities were *Russkoiazychnye* (Russian speakers). Among those who were *Kyrgyz speakers*, around 15% opted for Russian to answer the questions. The results suggest that the previous LP significantly affected some participants' position and value of the ancestral language.

Pearson's χ^2 test found that *sex* and *age* did not significantly affect the variation of the participants' linguistic identities. Most of the participants from Bishkek indicated Russian as their L1 (76%). In contrast, most of the participants from the regions indicated Kyrgyz as their L1. The percentage of Kyrgyz-speaking participants from the southern region (92%) was higher than from the northern region (65%). Pearson's test found that the differences were significant, $\chi^2(3, 77) = 22.76$, p = 5e-05. The finding suggests that the Russification policy affected rural Kyrgyzstan less than its capital city.

To determine the attitudes toward dialects among participants from different regions, the following question was asked: "Should authorities assign an official status to a dialect?" Participants responded as "No," "Not sure," or "Yes." These answers were coded as 1 - "No", 2 - "Not sure," and 3 - "Yes." This coding allowed to calculate the mean and standard deviation. Cross-tabulation showed that participants from regions, especially from the southern region, were more tolerant of dialects than participants from Bishkek. The summary statistics showed that less than 50% of the participants believed in the ability of the Kyrgyz language to function as an IEL in Kyrgyzstan ($M = 1.98$, $SD = .93$). Cross-tabulation found that almost half of the Kyrgyz, 80% of the Russians, and 54% of other ethnic groups (Misc) did not believe in this capacity of the Kyrgyz language. Among the speakers of the Kyrgyz language, approximately 26% did not believe in the ability of their native language to serve as an IEL. The proportions of the Russian-speaking Kyrgyz and ethnic Russians were similar, i.e., most did not think that the Kyrgyz language can function as an IEL. The difference between speakers of the Kyrgyz and Russian languages was significant, $\chi^2(2, 57) = 11.3$, $p = .003$. The difference between the Kyrgyz, Russian, and Misc groups was also considerable but insignificant, $\chi^2(4, 82) = 9.31$, $p = 0.054$. Cross-tabulation showed that participants believe in the future demand for the Kyrgyz ($n = 42$), Russian ($n = 18$), English ($n = 12$), and Chinese ($n = 5$) languages in Kyrgyzstan.

Pearson's correlation test found a significant correlation between beliefs in the listed languages between different ethnic groups.

Table 3 shows the result of an MLR test that evaluated the likelihood of a belief change depending on sociodemographic factors. The results suggest that an increase in one man (versus woman) in this database increases the belief in English by 7.8 times and in Russian by 3.6 times relative to the Kyrgyz language, keeping other variables constant. (It is also possible to infer that women were more supportive of the Kyrgyz language than men since an increase in the number of women would strengthen the belief in the Kyrgyz language.) An increase per Kyrgyz speaker (relative to the Russian speaker) can significantly decrease the probability of keeping the belief in English (*RRR* < 0.06**). An increase in the number of participants from the South (relative to Bishkek) increases the probability of strengthening the belief in the Russian language significantly (*RRR* = 8.0**).

Table 3. MLR Test Results: Likelihood of Belief Change

Predictor	Category	English	Russian	Ref. Cat.
Sex	Men	7.8**(1.0)	3.6*(.7)	Women
L1	Kyrgyz speaker	.06**(1.3)	2.4(1.1)	Russian speaker
Region	North	2.1***(.6)	2.0*(.9)	Bishkek
	South	.95(.7)	8.0**(.5)	

Note. ***$p<.000$; **$p<.001$;*$p<.05$; McFadden (Pseudo R) = .21.

3.2. Main Study

The main study was an extended version of the pilot study that employed contact and non-contact methods for data collection. It employed textual analysis of legislative documents and historical materials, content analysis of university websites and dissertation catalogs, transcript analysis of expert interviews, and statistical functions to analyze data from survey questionnaires. The results of the pilot study were also used when evaluating the instrument's reliability.

3.2.1. Data Collection Procedures and Ethical Considerations

The data to answer the first question were collected online, in libraries, and through in-depth interviews. With the help of librarians, all available scientific works, archival documents, and laws stored in the specialized departments of the National Library and the National

Academy of Sciences were studied. The author also visited libraries in Hungary, Austria, the USA, and Greece to review the literature and search for alternative data and ideas.

In parallel, visits were made to educational and government institutions for interviews. The researcher's long list of contacts accumulated during his extensive career experience in the education system facilitated the interview process.

The data to answer the second and third questions were collected using the survey questionnaire. Before the surveys, the researcher organized a conference at one of the state universities on the topic "Language Policy and Planning," which was attended by language activists, international PhD students, and faculty members from different institutions. At the conference, an agreement was reached with representatives of universities to survey their students.

At the beginning of each survey session, participants were warned about complete anonymity and data protection. In addition, only volunteers were allowed to participate in the survey (see a translation of the consent agreement in Appendix Q). Some administrators attached assistants who helped to collect data.

Finally, the researcher was awarded a medal for his contribution to the LP study in Kyrgyzstan by the State Agency under the country's President for organizing the conferences and surveys. The author believes that the award is a shared responsibility for the validity and ethics of the study among his former colleagues.

3.2.2. Data Analysis

Tollefson's historical-structural approach was used to analyze the language ideologies, policies, and practices implemented in Kyrgyzstan. Historical documents included banknotes and archival newspapers.

The text analysis method was used to study LP in laws and constitutions. An analysis of the texts of constitutions determined that language-related themes occupy a small part of both the Soviet and post-Soviet constitutions. Therefore, word clouds or plotting the entire document might not highlight language issues. However, copying only relevant articles, paragraphs, or sentences into a separate document to analyze the LP was a reasonable procedure to highlight language issues. To do this, (1) a new document was created, (2) the word "language" was typed into the search field, and (3) all sentences or articles containing the word "language" were copied into a separate document. As a result, a separate document contained ideas related only to language and LP. The document's content can be analyzed using different

methods. For this study, a table was compiled showing the statuses, rights, and functions of languages in various periods when the documents were valid (Tables 5, 6, 7, and Appendix K).

The interview analysis was performed using a table with two columns. The interview transcription was placed in the left column and the codes of different ideas were placed in the right column (Appendix I). Such a system made it possible to find ideas relevant to the corresponding section in transcription using standard MS Office functions. Note that the real names were replaced by pseudonyms.

Besides legal documents, several other materials were considered, including banknotes, newspapers, websites, and dissertation catalogs. First, all banknotes circulated in Kyrgyzstan in the early twentieth century were analyzed. The banknotes emphasized the status of languages with different locations, fonts, and mentions. Then all available newspapers in the archives of the national library were analyzed. Continuously printed since 1924, the first Kyrgyz newspaper was the most informative. The transition from Arabic to Latin, then to Cyrillic, and changing its name following the ideological context most accurately reflected the entire history of Kyrgyzstan's LP. The analysis of websites of universities and PhD dissertations defended in Kyrgyzstan provided the overall language use in the higher education domain.

The analysis of the quantitative data included the following moments. Each record in the dataset was randomly and independently sampled from the population. The sample size for most categories in this study was more extensive than 30, meaning the sample distribution approaches the standard normal distribution (Rice, 1995; Kwak & Kim, 2017).

The pilot study used the MySQLi and the R programs to process and analyze data. The result was presented at the Washington University (USA) conference and published by the Central Eurasian Studies Society. Subsequently, the main study also employed these systems for data analysis. The analysis used statistical functions to calculate summary statistics, proportions, differences, correlations, regressions, and *p-values*. Pearson's χ^2 and correlation tests were used to find associations between variables.

Although some authors suggest using the Kruskal-Wallis, Mann-Whitney, or Wilcoxon tests as alternatives to parametric tests, this study made its best to use the same test wherever possible to apply the same criteria in estimations of significance.

Multivariate normality was assessed with the Shapiro-Wilk normality test. Multivariate outliers were assessed using the Mahalanobis distance test. The homogeneity of variance was checked with Levene's test. When the assumption for parametric texts was not met, non-parametric functions were used. For example, when the DVs were multivariate and normally distributed within each group of IVs, the groups contained the same homogeneity of variances,

and there were no extreme multivariate outliers, MANOVA was used. When the assumptions were not met, a semi-parametric PERMANOVA (permutational analysis of variance) method was used to assess the effect of IVs on combined DVs.

When the result of a MANOVA test found a significant difference, a post hoc test was also performed.

When a belief (outcome variable) was affected by several variables, a multinomial logistic regression (MLR) model was used. The model can assess and predict the likelihood of a change in attitude or belief in the groups in question (Nau, 2020). It does not assume "careful consideration of the sample size and examination for outlying cases," normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity (Starkweather & Moske, 2011), eliminating unnecessary data manipulation. Schwab (2002) suggested "a minimum of 10 cases per independent variable" in a sample size. The model fit was assessed using McFadden's coefficient, which is quite strict and requires the model to yield a result within the 0.2-0.4 limit to be reliable (McFadden, 1979, p. 306). The results of the MLR test were interpreted based on multinomial logit coefficients or relative risk ratios (*RRR*). The Statistical Consulting Group of the University of California explains the interpretation of the *RRR* coefficient as follows:

> *The RRR of a coefficient indicates how the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group compared to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group changes with the variable in question. An RRR > 1 indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group increases as the variable increases. In other words, the comparison outcome is more likely. Conversely, an RRR < 1 indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group decreases as the variable increases (UCLA, 2022).*

3.2.3. Participants

Seven hundred seventy respondents comprised participants, excluding pilot study participants, and including 12 experts in LP, 511 students, and 247 non-students.

Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted to clarify details of the answers to the research questions with LP experts, professors, and representatives of minority groups. Most experts worked in government, headed language departments, and are the authors of

publications on language issues. The interviews were recorded and transcribed (full transcript in Appendix I).

The target group (G1) was random undergraduate students at Bishkek's five most prominent largest universities. These universities have been chosen to represent all regions of the country as much as possible and to ensure that the profile of the average student represents different specialties, including medical, humanities, language, technical, and natural sciences. These universities were the Kyrgyz National University (KNU), the Bishkek Humanitarian University (BHU), the Arabaev Kyrgyz State University (KSU), the Kyrgyz State Medical Academy (KSMA), and the Kyrgyz State Technical University (KTU). Table 4 shows the demographic characteristics of the students that will be used in the statistical operations. Gender, LinID, and RegID are essential variables for this study, so they are included in the table.

Table 4. Students' Demographic Characteristics

		n	%
Gender	Male	140	.27
	Female	371	.73
LinID	Kyrgyz speaker	367	.72
	Russian speaker	136	.27
	Na	8	.01
RegID	Bishkek	111	.22
	North	221	.43
	South	132	.26
	Na	47	.09

Note. N = 511; Age: 20-22; Ethnicity: Kyrgyz (100%).

In the non-student group (G2), 8% were Russians, 8% were representatives of Turkic-speaking peoples, 7% were non-Turkic-speaking peoples, and 6% were representatives of Uzbek nationality. G2 was used to compare the target group (G1) with the most prominent context and to estimate the probability of attitude change depending on the dynamics of enrollment flow, which can be regulated by university LP. As seen in the description, minorities can be considered outliers. Still, they were not removed from the dataset since, according to Horn (2008), over 5% of outliers can be considered a part of society.

3.2.4. Reliability and Validity

It should be noted that, despite the best intentions for objectivity and validity, the nature of the topic has always been interpretative (Ricento, 2015; Hornberger, 2015). However, this study employed the following formulas and functions to ensure maximum reliability and validity of the results based on the estimates of commonly accepted qualitative and quantitative methods (Creswell, 2002; Flick, 2019; Shao & Gao, 2019).

In general, the logic proposed by Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) was used to decide whether the data sets were reliable. The method uses probability theory ($p(a) = p(X \cap Y)$ or $p(b) = p(X \cup Y)$, where $p(a)$ is the result when both X and Y are true, and $p(b)$ is the result when either X or Y is true. In case of contradictions, the reasons were explained in the Discussion Chapter.

This study also used triangulation of results, including data from legislative documents, historical materials, representation of languages on the websites and dissertation catalogs, and survey questionnaires. It is "a worthwhile procedure to enhance the internal validity in qualitative studies" (Meijer et al., 2002). While doing so, it used textual, discourse-analytical, and statistical methods to produce descriptive and reflexive knowledge (Lin, 2015).

Quantitative data collection procedures were standardized, contact with participants was kept to a minimum, and the same research instrument was used across groups.

Before using the research tool, it was sent to the supervisor, discussed face-to-face, reviewed, and revised. The final version of the questionnaire went through proofreading procedures. After creating the database, a basic exploratory factor analysis was performed to eliminate unreliable variables, using built-in software functions. Then the outliers were regrouped and the values of some variables were coded and verified for reliability. Some data measured as a five-point Likert type scale were transformed when a point in a scale received marginally small numbers (Jacoby & Matell, 1971). The internal consistency of the questionnaire was checked using the standard function, cronbach.alpha (data, probs = c(0.025, 0.975), standardized = T). Each variable that reduced the Alpha from the commonly accepted threshold of 0.7 was removed from further analysis. At the end of these procedures, the responses of random participants in the pilot and main studies to identical questions in the survey questionnaires were closely related, confirming the reliability of the instrument.

Thus, this chapter focused on the methodology used in this study. It described the sources of data, the methods and procedures of the pilot, and the main study. It also explained measures taken to ensure the reliability and validity of the study.

CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

This chapter presents results of qualitative and quantitative data. These results answer the following questions: 1. What LP has been implemented in Kyrgyzstan? 2. How has the LP affected the target group? 3. What language attitudes and beliefs currently prevail in the target group?

4.1. Qualitative Data Analysis

4.1.1. LP in Legislative Documents

This section analyzes legislative documents and historical materials to explain the LP of nation-building in Kyrgyzstan from historical-structural perspectives. Whereas the documents include the constitutions of the Soviet Union and the Kyrgyz SSR, historical materials include banknotes, newspaper titles, and websites. In doing so, it provides a comprehensive view of the LP of identity construction in Kyrgyzstan.

The constitutions of the Soviet Union used the word 'language' sparingly. Following the formation of the USSR, the first constitution of the USSR of 1924 mentioned 'language' only twice: 1) to show in which languages the legislative acts had to be published (Article 34), and 2) to list six languages in the design of the coat of arms (Article 70). The mentioned languages were Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, Georgian, Armenian, and Turko-Tatar (i.e., Turkic). The second constitution of the USSR was adopted in 1936, where the word "language" was used nine times (in Articles 40, 110, 121, and 143). It listed the languages of the national republics in which government decrees and other legislative acts had to be published. It also allowed citizens to use their native language in legal proceedings and general education. The third constitution was adopted in 1977, which used the word "language" ten times (Articles 34, 36, 45, 116, 159, 169). It was used to prescribe the publishing of government decrees and other legislative documents in the languages of the national republics. In addition, it was used to describe the equality of citizens and languages, the right to speak any language of the people of the USSR, the right to education in their native language, and the right to use their native language in legal proceedings. However, a textual analysis of the constitutions found no clear statements about the status or function of languages.

Imitating the constitution of the Soviet Union, the laws of the Kyrgyz SSR guaranteed maximum linguistic rights to all ethnic groups but emphasized the unique functions of the Russian and Kyrgyz languages; that is, they supported official bilingualism (Article 19). Every newly approved constitution was based on the text of previous constitutions. Table 5 shows the

symbolic and functional aspects of LP in constructing Soviet and national identities reflected in the legislative documents of the Kyrgyz SSR and the Kyrgyz Republic, including constitutions and language laws. It is based on the frequency of references to the Kyrgyz, Russian, and native languages of minorities. Articles on linguistic rights, inter-ethnic communication, and language use in education were included in the legislative documents. In post-WWII laws, the function of the Russian language was strengthened in the educational domain. The regulations also guaranteed all ethnic minorities the right to use their native language in education, public institutions, and meetings. The earlier constitutions also mentioned the Kyrgyz and Russian languages on the Republic's flag and coat of arms.

The first constitution of Kyrgyzstan, approved by the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz ASSR in 1929, contained an explicit status planning of languages. It assigned the status of the state language to the Kyrgyz and Russian languages. A comparison of the first constitutions approved by the Supreme Councils of the Kyrgyz ASSR and the USSR showed that the status planning by the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan was overt and explicit and by the Supreme Council of the USSR was covert because it did not explicitly mention the status of any language. Although the draft of the 1929 Constitution was approved in Pishpek (currently Bishkek), it was not approved by the Kremlin. The difference between the 1929 and other constitutions of Soviet Kyrgyzstan was when the Kyrgyz ASSR became the Kyrgyz SSR in 1936, and the article referring to status planning was removed. In the third constitution of Kyrgyzstan, approved by the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz SSR in 1978, language planning was still absent from the text. A difference in the text was found in the ideological part of the constitution, which added the phrase "convergence of nations."

Table 5. References to Languages in Legislative Documents of 1929-1978

Topics	Pre-WWII	Post-WWII
Ideology	Socialism, Equality	Convergence*
Status planning	Removed in 1936	Not mentioned
Interethnic communication	Not mentioned	Not mentioned
Acquisition planning	All languages	Russian L*

Note. *Emphasis in the document.

Before the collapse of the USSR in 1989, the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz SSR submitted for public discussion the Law on Language, which included status planning and

corpus planning and prescriptions of functions to languages (Table 6). The analysis of the law showed that it differed significantly from all previous and subsequent laws and constitutions. The primary purpose of the law was to rehabilitate and revitalize the Kyrgyz language as the state language by reducing the dominant role of the Russian language. It returned the state language status to the Kyrgyz language and expanded its functionality. It also added language use in education and science. The main theses of the law also included: The Kyrgyz language is the primary language of instruction in the public education system (Art. 6, 7, 9, 17, 21); all ethnic groups have the right to education in their native language (Art. 25); Russian is the language of inter-ethnic communication; managers at various levels should plan to switch to the state language (Art. 8, 17); the literary version of the Kyrgyz language should be used in the official domain (Art. 35).

Table 6. References to Languages in 1989 Language Law

Topics	References
Status	Kyrgyz language*.
Rights	Native languages. Russian language.
Interethnic	Kyrgyz language. Russian language*.
Education	Native languages. Kyrgyz language*.
Science	Native languages. Russian language. Kyrgyz language*.

Note. *Emphasis in the document.

Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet language laws have repeatedly used the word 'state,' showing the authorities' intention to establish the country's identity as an independent political entity. Table 7 presents Kyrgyzstan's LP after independence. The first constitution after gaining independence (1993) included an article on the state status of the Kyrgyz language and articles guaranteeing the free functioning of all other languages (Articles 5, 15). It was planned to revitalize the Kyrgyz language as the state language of the independent Kyrgyz Republic. The following LP, including the constitution of 2010, laws, and decrees of the government of Kyrgyzstan, introduced official bilingualism, giving state status to the Kyrgyz language (Article 10) and official status to the Russian language (Article 13). The Russian language did not have such status even during the heyday of the USSR. However, the constitution and subsequent laws did not clearly describe the difference between the state and official languages. Therefore, these laws contained vague and confusing terminologies. Besides constitutions, several other

documents were approved to support the state language after independence (Appendix K), including the Concept of the Development of the State Language. The concept described the Kyrgyz language as poorly developed for office work, science, and terminology (Concept, 1998, para. 5). The authors blamed previous lawmakers for their failures in language planning. The following presidential decrees focused on developing bilingualism, creating a testing system, and training civil servants. After the 2010s, the word 'budget' became the most frequently used word in government regulations. The government also emphasized the function of the Russian language as the official and inter-ethnic language.

Table 7. References to Languages since 1991

Topics	1991-2010	2010-2021
Language status	Kyrgyz language	Kyrgyz language, Russian language*
Language rights	Native Ls. Russian L*	Native languages
LP in education	Native languages	Native Ls. Russian L. Foreign language

Note. *More than two mentions.

Thus, the de jure LP of Kyrgyzstan emphasized the Kyrgyz language only about six years since its inception as a political entity in 1929 (Table 8). Innovation in the last post-independent constitutions (2010, 2021) was the government's promise to create conditions for learning one of the foreign languages (Articles 45, 46). The constitution also required presidential candidates to have proficiency in the state language. In addition, these constitutions added the requirement of fluency in the state language for presidential candidates.

Table 8. LP Models in Kyrgyzstan's Constitutions

1929	1936 - 1978	1978 - 1993	1993 - 2010	2010 - 2021
Overt Bilingual LP	Covert LP	Revitalization policy	Bilingual LP	Vague LP

4.1.2. Language Use on Banknotes and Newspapers

The Russian language stood out from the languages of other republics on banknotes issued between two main economic reforms before and after World War II. On the first banknotes of the Soviet Union, the number of words in Russian exceeded the number in other national languages at least 15 times. The Russian language was also different from other

languages by location and font. The Kyrgyz language was represented by the common Turkic language of that time in Arabic script. In the banknotes after the 1960s (Fig. 2), the Kyrgyz language was represented in Cyrillic script. The proportion of the Russian language to the languages of other national republics remained the same as in the previous banknotes. After independence, the Kyrgyz language became the only language of the national currency.

Figure 2. A Banknote of the USSR

Source: https://en.numista.com

The titles of archived newspapers provide information on the position of languages in the language ecology of Kyrgyzstan. The first two newspapers, *Pishpek Listok* (Pishpek Banner) and *Krasnoye Utro* (The Red Morning), were published in Russian. The first newspaper in the Kyrgyz language was published in 1924 in Arabic script (a successor of the Chagatai script, a common written language for Turkic languages of Central Asia before the USSR). As the title suggests (i.e., *Erkin Too*, translated as Free Mountains from the Kyrgyz language), the newly minted Kyrgyz communists promoted their type of LP, believing that "a new dawn has come" (a phrase in a Soviet-era Kyrgyz song) and that the "*Kyrgyz Mountains*" (i.e., Kyrgyzstan) are finally free. The following four republican newspapers: *Batratskaya Pravda* (Worker's Truth) in Russian, *Leninchil Jash* (Leninist Youth) in Kyrgyz, *Qyzyl Kyrgyzstan* (Red Kyrgyzstan) in Kyrgyz, and *Komsomolets Kirgizii* (The Communist Youth of Kirgizia) in Russian were printed concurrently in 1925, 1926, 1928, and 1938. In addition to these republican newspapers, dozens of regional newspapers were published in different languages. After WWII, the number of newspapers increased tenfold and the number of Russian-language newspapers exceeded those in the Kyrgyz language. However, after gaining independence, the trend reversed, and in 2010 there were 127 newspapers in Kyrgyz and 87 newspapers in Russian (NSCKR, 2021d).

Fig. 3 shows the history of the change in fonts and titles of the first newspaper in Kyrgyzstan, which is still being published. The Soviet government in Kyrgyzstan supported the

printing of newspapers in the Russian and Kyrgyz languages separately. The Arabic font of the first newspaper in the Kyrgyz language points to the fact that most Kyrgyz, until the second half of the 1920s, were associated with a common Turkic Muslim identity. Switching to Latin script and changing the name from *Erkin Too* (translated as Free Mountains) to *Qyzyl Qyrgyzstan* (translated as Red Kyrgyzstan) indicates that the Bolsheviks began to form a new identity among those parts of the Kyrgyz that agreed to collaborate with them. The other Kyrgyz leaders understood freedom differently and resisted Russian and Soviet expansionism until World War II. During the period of developed socialism (the 1960s), when the protesting part of Kyrgyzstan was finally defeated or expelled from the republic, the new identity of the *Советтик Кыргызстан* (translated as Soviet Kyrgyzstan) became boldly clear (3rd image). The last image is the post-Soviet name of the same newspaper with a new title *Kyrgyz Tuusu* (translated as the Kyrgyz Flag).

Figure 3. History of a Newspaper Title: Issues of 1924, 1927, 1956, and 1993

Source: http://kyrgyztuusu.kg

4.1.3. Language Use in the Higher Education Domain

An analysis of the representation of languages on university websites showed that the websites of 16 out of 20 top universities did not have information in the Kyrgyz language on the landing page to the same extent as in Russian, showing that they treated information in the Kyrgyz language as a secondary version. International representatives also contributed to LP. A review of eight international organizations and 18 embassies of different states in Bishkek revealed that over 90% of the websites did not provide information in the state language. The exception was the French Embassy, whose first website page was written in Kyrgyz.

Table 9 presents the language use among graduate students in Kyrgyzstan. It is based on the content of the database of PhD theses in the National Library. The collection contained dissertations of Soviet and post-Soviet authors. According to the library manager, a copy of each thesis defended in the country is sent to this database. Almost 99% of the authors were Kyrgyz, as the names on the title pages showed. A calculation of the ratios of languages on different topics showed that the number of theses devoted to language problems was

significantly higher in Kyrgyz than in Russian. However, on all other topics, the authors preferred Russian to Kyrgyz. Dissertations on laws, economics, humanities, and general sciences used Russian at least three times more than Kyrgyz. For the study of health problems, not a single dissertation in the Kyrgyz language was defended. The number of dissertations in Russian was found in the database 6.4 times more than in Kyrgyz.

Table 9. PhD Dissertations Defended in Kyrgyzstan by Languages

Topics	Kyr	Rus	Ratio	Topics	Kyr	Rus	Ratio
Kyrgyz language	109	20	5.5	Soviet literature	6	18	.33
Languages	35	13	2.7	Sciences	202	668	.30
Linguistics	153	169	.91	Law, Economics	4	946	.004
Pedagogy	150	348	.43	Health	0	1500	0
Humanities	90	349	.26	Other	234	1013	.231

4.1.4. Expert Opinions (Interview Transcript)

This section presents the main points extracted from the interview transcription, including expert opinions on top-down policy issues and the linguistic identification of urban and rural Kyrgyz. It also presents attitudes towards the state (Kyrgyz) and minority languages.

According to Professor J, "as an independent country, Kyrgyzstan must have one state language, which should have the first dominant position." However, he emphasized the necessity of different approaches to public officials and ordinary citizens,

> *Kyrgyz-Russian bilingualism is a native language ecology in our society. Introducing English would be helpful, but our relationship with the English world is distant. Lay people can speak one or as many languages as they want; it should be their choice. It is not mandatory for government officials to know English, Russian, or Chinese. However, they must learn the state language or leave public office.*

Businessman O was positive about individual multilingualism, but he believed that society needs a common language.

Honestly, there should be only one language in any country. Therefore, it is necessary to make the state language an interdisciplinary language in all schools and to grant the graduation certificate after passing the final exam in the state language. Then the need for the state language will arise because language motivation depends on language's power as operational and economic leverage.

Professor T thinks that "when the Kyrgyz language achieves a dominant position in the country, the Russian language can be allowed to have an official status." Professor A held a more radical opinion: "the addition of the Russian language to the list of official languages in the constitution humiliates the dignity of the Kyrgyz people."

Professor M believes that "the language purism" of some activists is nonsense:

The subjects of the natural sciences were well adapted to the Russian language. However, some pseudo-patriots, after independence, started translating everything, even the words: "radio" and "television," making textbooks incomprehensible, so to understand them, one had to read them in Russian first. As a result, current students cannot express their thoughts in any language. Why translate terms that have become part of our lexicon? If scientists speak English, that is not a problem since they make up a small percentage of society.

Another Russian-speaking expert, Professor S, suggested stopping pursuing an irrational LP designed primarily to develop the Kyrgyz language and return to bilingualism with the Russian language because, as he thinks, "the Kyrgyz language is not ready for scientific and economic development."

Teacher T said: "I don't need Russian, as Kyrgyz is sufficient for everything I need. However, being a small country, Kyrgyzstan depends on large countries, so the abolition of the Russian language may harm the country."

According to Professor J, "despite joyous moments during the Soviet Union," the past has left many inferiority complexes: "some Kyrgyz believe you are not well educated if you do not speak Russian." "For some unknown reason, when I see even one Slavic-looking person in the auditorium, I switch on to Russian," said Professor K during the interview. According to Professor J, this behavior results from the "brainwashing" of the Soviet era. However, Professor T disagreed with this opinion, arguing that it is a marker of excellent education and politeness. Professor T added: "Our current mentality resembles Russians of the 17th-18th century when

they considered speaking French a marker of educatedness." Professor J noted that "there is no escape from the Russian language because our historical destinies and roots are mixed up."

The interviewees named bilingualism as the LP model and Russification as the method applied in Kyrgyzstan. Most respondents blamed the national leaders for problems with the Kyrgyz language, accusing them of promoting the Russian language at the expense of the Kyrgyz language. Professor T made the following statement on this matter:

> *The contribution of the nascent prewar national leaders played a role in the formation of the Kyrgyz SSR. However, their family language policy had taken its toll on the Kyrgyz language. The Kyrgyz intelligentsia of the 1920s contributed significantly to the growth of Kyrgyzstan. However, most of their spouses were of other nationalities and did not speak Kyrgyz. As a result, their children did not become Kyrgyz. When they grew up, they took the top positions in our society and recognized Russian as the official language, thus undermining the development of the Kyrgyz language.*

Professor J noted that the Russification policy was carried out by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan and continued by post-Soviet presidents. He got emotional when he said, "Our leaders were busy with flattery to the Kremlin. Their constant repetition, 'Russian is our second mother tongue,' completely brainwashed us. Making several languages compete, the current LP continues the Soviet practice." Professor N, who served in the governmental program of LP, agreed with these beliefs when he said:

> *There is a similarity between Kyrgyzstan and India, where the principal enemies of the Indian people were officials and intellectuals who had served colonialism. Kyrgyz, who grew up in Bishkek, was in all central branches of government, but they did not respect their ancestral language.*

Most experts criticized the post-Soviet bilingualism policy and called for intensive promotion of the state language in government structures and public domains. However, some experts believe that laws do not work in the Kyrgyz society, and language issues depend primarily on demography. According to Professor A,

> *Only the demographic advantage is now saving the Kyrgyz language from extinction, and the official policy has nothing to do with it. We have already had the propaganda*

of bilingualism and multilingualism during the Soviet Union. It worked well since propaganda works better in our society than law.

The experts also had different opinions about the urban/rural split among current students based on their languages. Professor N believes that

Urban Kyrgyz are searching for an identity but need to be sufficiently motivated to learn the heritage language. Although there is legislative support for the state language, it is challenging to implement it to increase the number of Kyrgyz speakers because of the weak public demand.

Some noted that students from the southern regions are ridiculed for their dialects. Professor M said:

Regional dialects must be preserved, as no one can change them, as they are closely related to the social environment, the economy, and local customs. However, the state language should be literary because people can only speak the same language when written literature is developed. Unfortunately, some people have involved regional language characteristics in politics to achieve their selfish goals, leading to hostile divisions among people based on dialects.

Professor J noted that "a million urban Kyrgyz are useless for the Kyrgyz language; the rest, 2.5 million rural Kyrgyz, are the keepers of the language. The problem of rural citizens is that they do not speak any other language than Kyrgyz." Therefore, he thinks, "the Kyrgyz language hardly dies out. Still, it may get corrupted and impoverished." Professor T thinks that "the Kyrgyz language is the source of all other Turkic languages. Therefore, the preservation of the Kyrgyz language is the duty of the Kyrgyz people. If we lose our language, then we lose our country." According to Professor A, "most leaders in the higher education sector have adopted both totalitarianism and stagnation of the Brezhnev epoch." He thinks the current LP in education is a barrier to learning the state language:

Instead of helping children gain the state language, the government is imposing on them ancient myths and religious biases, making the language highly loaded with

ideas that even adults do not fully comprehend. Some officially approved textbooks have messed up folklore and religion with language.

Businessman V sees the problem of the state language in the lack of quality teaching materials and electronic content. He thinks that "modern textbooks both for children and adults are dull and not interesting." However, Professor J disagreed with this opinion: "When the first Russian settlers arrived in the 19th century, they had no textbooks. However, they gained the Kyrgyz language because they were motivated to integrate with the local population."

Most experts believe that individual multilingualism is a superb skill. Professor J quoted the proverb, "the more languages you know, the more you are a human being!" Likewise, Consultant J thinks, "the more languages you know, the more educated you are." Professor T believes that "besides Russian, the next generation needs English as a source of information and a connection to the wider world." According to Professor J, "introducing English would be useful, but no one can teach school subjects in English." On this occasion, Professor M suggested introducing teaching in English as a pilot project in some innovative schools.

Some experts consider the Russian language an additional burden on the Kyrgyz people. Businessman O believes that he learned Russian not because he wanted to but because he was influenced by Soviet ideology. He believes that "further expansion of the Russian language is undesirable." However, he was optimistic about "further expansion of English because it can increase foreign investments." According to him, "the Russian language is gradually being replaced by English, Turkish, and Hindi." Other experts consider the Russian language an obstacle to the development of the state language. According to Professor T, "It is hard to hope for rapid development of the Kyrgyz language as long as Russian remains an official language." Professor A thinks that English should not be viewed as the language of one country: "Many in Kyrgyzstan perceive Western Europe as one nation which has one major language, just like the collective West deliberately labeled the Soviet Union as Russia."

Some other interviewees had different opinions about the Russian language. Professor M said: "The official status of the Russian language does not threaten us. It is disappearing in Kyrgyzstan." According to Consultant J, "it is necessary to know the Kyrgyz language because it is our mother tongue. However, we block our opportunities if we are stuck in one language." She thinks that "the Russian language is no danger anymore because Russians have left and Russian schools are being closed." Professor J added: "Only 5% of Kyrgyzstan's population is Russian. They are mainly older women. When they are gone, the Russian language may

disappear." He also noted that "languages must not be viewed as opposing powers." Professor M was also of the same opinion when he said:

If we push the policy of 'Kyrgyzification' too firmly, we can disappear from the international arena as a nation. Newcomers from rural areas cannot speak any language, even the Kyrgyz language. The government has become too Kyrgyzified, speaks only Kyrgyz, and uses religious terminology.

A representative of a non-Russian ethnic minority, Professor Y, stated that there is "no need to learn Kyrgyz because everyone speaks Russian." He believes that

A person can speak the state language perfectly but remain disrespectful of Kyrgyz culture. It would be nice, of course, to know the language simultaneously, but without it, you can also be a patriot. I teach at the university and take part in all affairs. I am remarkably integrated into Kyrgyz society. But it is just that at my age, it is hard to master now.

Businessman O believes that "some people have no formal education, but speak the Kyrgyz language. Therefore, they have access to necessary networks and get rich." Businessman V, an ethnic Russian, agreed with him.

A member of the admissions committee, Teacher S, lamented that the number of applicants who wanted to study the Kyrgyz language had decreased drastically in the past decade due to tests introduced by international projects. Another committee member said: "Many parents do not want to send their children to Kyrgyz schools. They think their children will progress if they send them to Turkish or Russian schools."

Attitudes toward minority languages varied. Professor A believed that "banning minority languages contributes to Russification." Teacher T and Consultant J believed that there should not be any obstacles to developing minority languages, but some minorities may later demand an autonomous republic. Teacher Fedorova said that "supporting minority languages is the government's primary task." Professor A lived in a district inhabited by a large ethnic minority. In his observations, "the community was extremely religious, but their children spoke primarily Russian, and rarely their ancestral language."

4.2. Quantitative Data Analysis

4.2.1. Students' Identity Perceptions, Language Behavior, and Sociolinguistic Values

The perception of the country-level (national) identity was assessed by asking how they understand nationality and citizenship. The responses showed an insufficiency of a common understanding of these terms. Half of the participants skipped the question, which caused difficulty. For example, the word "Kyrgyzstani" was perceived differently. Most participants understood it as someone living in Kyrgyzstan (20%) or born in Kyrgyzstan (14%). Approximately 7% perceived the term as patriotism and ethnicity (9%).

In this study, participants' linguistic identity is an essential factor. However, during data collection, it needed to be clarified. For example, some Russian-speaking Kyrgyz (Russkoiazychnyi Kyrgyz) claimed to have the Kyrgyz language as their first language while choosing the questionnaire in Russian or, having selected the questionnaire in Kyrgyz, filling it out in Russian. Such a language behavior shows that participants' self-identification might differ from their real attachment to a language. When a contradiction between declared and actual L1 was found, the LinID was defined based on responses to the following questions.

Q1. What is your first language or language you can speak and write best?

Q2. What was the language of instruction at your school?

Q3. In what language do you usually count money?

Q4. The language of the selected questionnaire: 1. Kyrgyz; 2. Russian.

Cronbach's α detected that most answers were internally consistent across the questions, confirming the reliability of the questionnaire and the responses (Table 10).

Table 10. Internal Consistency of Key Questions about LinID

Questions	α	*CI*	Questions	α	*CI*
Q1 & Q2	.78	73 - 82	Q2 & Q3	.75	69-79
Q1 & Q3	.75	69 - 80	Q2 & Q4	.71	63 - 74
Q1 & Q4	.71	69 - 78	Q3 & Q4	.71	65 - 74

Note. N = 758. *CI*: 2.5%-97.5%

Pearson's χ^2 test detected that students' LinID did not significantly vary depending on their gender, $\chi^2(2, 503) = 2.77$, $p = .10$. However, it significantly varied depending on their RegID. A post hoc analysis using cross-tabulation showed that most Russian speakers were urban students, while most Kyrgyz speakers were rural students (Table 11).

Table 11. The Association of LinID with RegID

	Categories	Kyrgyz Speakers	Russian Speakers	*n*	*df*	χ^2	*p*	*N*
RegID	Urban (Bishkek)	.45	.56	110	2	66	***	460
	Rural (North)	.81	.19	219				
	Rural (South)	.86	.14	131				

Note. ***p < .000. Na's removed.

Depending on LinID, the language behavior of students at home and on campus varied significantly (Table 12). Around 33% of the students who marked their home language as Kyrgyz used Russian on campus, while only 10% of the students who marked their home language as Russian used Kyrgyz on campus, showing that Russian speakers were more assertive of their L1 than Kyrgyz speakers. More frequent code-switching from Kyrgyz to Russian on campus was found among female students than male students.

Table 12. Students' Language Behavior at Home and on Campus (in Public)

		PubL=Kyrgyz	PubL=Russian	*n*	*df*	χ^2	*p*
FamL	Kyrgyz	.68	.33	394	1	81	***
	Russian	.10	.90	70			

Note. *N* = 464 (with Na's removed).

Table 13 shows that 31% of urban students used Russian primarily at home. However, over half of them claimed to be Russian speakers (Table 12), showing that the same student's home language and LinID may differ on campus. The difference also suggests that members of the same family in Bishkek can have different LinID. The results show that LinID in Bishkek depends more on the language ecology of public spaces than on FLP, showing that families in Bishkek have a weaker influence on their children's language behavior than families in rural Kyrgyzstan.

Table 13. Students' FamL [and PubL] by RegID

RegID	Kyrgyz language	Russian language	n	df	χ^2	p
Urban (Bishkek)	.69 [.31]	.31 [.69]	108 [103]			
Rural (North)	.90 [.65]	.10 [35]	218 [208]	2	35 [58]	***
Rural (South)	.94 [.79]	.06 [.21]	128 [125]			

Note. N = 454 [436]. In brackets are the proportions in public places.

Table 14 shows the results of the GLM test. There were no missing values in this data frame, the observations were independent, the sample size was large, and there was no correlation between the residuals (Durbin-Watson: $DW = 1.93$). Therefore, a GLM was used to examine the relationship between independent variables (demographic factors, language use, and universities) and the outcome variable (LinID), which has two values (Kyrgyz or Russian). Although the effect of gender on LinID was not significant (p = 0.73), the test found male students contributed negatively (-0.14) to the presence of the Kyrgyz language on campus (compared to female students). The effect of the language used on campus (PubL) and RegID was significant, i.e., rural students (especially from the South) increased Kyrgyz speakers on campus (compared to urban students). In addition, the test found that the current language ecology at some universities contributes to the decrease (negative values) in the number of Kyrgyz speakers (relative to the National University).

Table 14. A GLM Test Results: Relationships between Variables

	Category	Est. (Kyrgyz)	SE	z	p	Ref. Cat.
Sex	Male	-.14	.39	-.35	.73	Female
FamL	Kyrgyz	1.75	.46	3.83	***	Russian
PubL	Kyrgyz	2.20	.37	5.93	***	Russian
Region	Rural (North)	.66	.40	1.66	.09	Bishkek (urban)
	Rural (South)	.96	.48	2.01	*	
HEI	Arabaev Univ.	.34	.63	.53	.59	National University
	Medical Academy	-1.72	.49	-3.5	***	
	Humanitarian Univ.	-1.47	.57	-2.6	**	
	Technical University	-.55	.63	-.87	.39	

Note. N = 355; ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; Reference category of OV: LinID = Russian.

Pearson's χ^2 test showed that language discrimination was not based on gender. It was rather based on LinID and RegID (Table 15). Descriptive statistics showed that the highest discrimination occurs against Russian speakers, students from Bishkek, and the South.

Table 15. Students' Linguistic Discrimination Experience

		M	*SD*	χ^2	*df*	*N*
Sex	Male	1.79	.93	1.6	2	511
	Female	1.79	.94			
LinID	Kyrgyz speaker	1.63	.89	42***	2	503
	Russian speaker	2.24	.92			
RegID	Bishkek	1.94	.97	21**	4	464
	North	1.56	.85			
	South	1.91	.98			

Note. ***$p < .0000$. **$p < .0003$; *$p < .05$; Na's removed.

The literature reports that many post-Soviet minorities refrain from using their native language in the presence of Russian speakers, as they consider it "uncultured" to speak their language in such situations. Therefore, participants were asked the following question to test whether this legacy continues to affect students: When you are among non-Kyrgyz, what language do you usually speak to address your relatives?

Pearson's χ^2 test was used to assess the effect of demographic factors on language behavior in this situation. Before using the test, all Na's and languages other than Kyrgyz and Russian were excluded. The effect of gender in this situation was not significant ($p = .6$). About 34% noted that they use the Russian language. However, the effect of LinID and RegID on language use in this situation was significant (Table 16). Cross-tabulation showed that about 22% of Kyrgyz speakers use Russian and about 26% of Russian speakers use Kyrgyz, showing that almost every fifth Kyrgyz speaker feels uncomfortable using their language among Russian speakers. Also, every fifth Russian speaker was inclined to emphasize his or her belonging to the Kyrgyz people using the Kyrgyz language. Regionally, Russian was spoken by 63% of native Bishkek residents, 27% of northerners, and 21% of southerners, showing the difference in language ecology between the country's capital and regions.

Table 16. Students' Language Behavior Among Non-Kyrgyz Encounters

<table>
<tr><th></th><th></th><th>PubL=Kyrgyz</th><th>PubL=Russian</th><th>n</th><th>df</th><th>χ^2</th><th>p</th><th>N</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">LinID</td><td>Kyrgyz</td><td>.78</td><td>.22</td><td>319</td><td rowspan="2">1</td><td rowspan="2">88</td><td rowspan="2">***</td><td rowspan="2">411</td></tr>
<tr><td>Russian</td><td>.26</td><td>.74</td><td>92</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">RegID</td><td>Bishkek</td><td>.37</td><td>.63</td><td>83</td><td rowspan="3">2</td><td rowspan="3">44</td><td rowspan="3">***</td><td rowspan="3">384</td></tr>
<tr><td>North</td><td>.73</td><td>.27</td><td>187</td></tr>
<tr><td>South</td><td>.79</td><td>.21</td><td>114</td></tr>
</table>

Demographic factors were found to affect students' priorities about sociolinguistic values. These priorities were assessed using the following questions. 1. What is more important: an effective language policy or economic well-being? 2. Can a person be a patriot without speaking the state language? 3. Which of the following teams would you choose if simultaneously offered a job with a similar salary: 1. A team of employees entirely of your ethnicity. 2. A team of employees with diverse ethnic backgrounds?

Pearson's χ^2 test found that the effect of gender was not significant across all three questions. However, the impact of LinID and RegID was significant in all questions. Most Russian-speaking and Bishkek students considered economic well-being more important than maintaining an effective LP. They believed patriotism is not associated with the state language. They also preferred multi-ethnic workplaces to mono-ethnic ones. Most Kyrgyz-speaking students and students from the periphery thought the opposite was true. They believed effective LP is more critical than economic well-being and that a person cannot be a patriot without speaking the state language. Most of them also preferred mono-ethnic workplaces to multi-ethnic ones.

4.2.2. Students' Language Attitudes and Beliefs

This section analyzed the association between demographic factors and beliefs about languages. The following is detailed information on the procedures and results of the analysis using statistical functions.

Participants were asked to name four languages they believed would be most required in Kyrgyzstan. After sorting the suggested languages, the following list was created: English, Russian, Kyrgyz, Chinese, German, Turkish, Arabic, Korean, Japanese, French, Spanish, Uzbek, Italian, and Kazakh.

Pearson's correlation test detected a strong correlation between the beliefs of male and female students, ρ(2, 511) = .99, p = .008, showing that gender does not affect this type of belief. However, the effect of LinID and RegID on the belief was significant, ρ(503)=.57, p = .43 and ρ(340) = .73, p = .27, respectively.

A post hoc analysis showed that most participants, regardless of their LinID, were convinced that English and Russian would top the list of prestigious languages in Kyrgyzstan. The hierarchy of most Russian speakers about the future of the Kyrgyz language differed from that of the Kyrgyz speakers because most Russian speakers believed in the Chinese language rather than the Kyrgyz language. Urban students and Russian speakers also differed from rural students and Kyrgyz speakers in their preference for Turkish and Arabic languages. Most urban students and Russian speakers believed more in the Arabic language than in the Turkish language, while most rural students and Kyrgyz speakers believed more in the Turkish language than in the Arabic language (Table 17).

Table 17. A Hierarchy of Languages in Students' Beliefs

	Groups	Eng.	Rus.	Kyr.	Chi.	German	Turkish	Arabic	*N*
LinID	Kyrgyz Speaker	.27	.26	.21	.11	.09	.04	.02	1234
	Russian Speaker	.27	.22	.14	.18*	.10	.03	.05*	477
RegID	Urban (Bishkek)	.29	.24	.14	.14	.10	.04	.05*	164
	Rural (North)	.35	.35	.31	.16	.10	.05	.02	449
	Rural (South)	.27	.26	.22	.03	.09	.04	.01	379

Note. *A significant contribution to within group differences (rows).

The MLR results based on the lowest Akaike with the highest pseudo *R2* (McFadden) confirmed the reliability of the model fit (Table 18). The coefficients represent the *RRR* (*SD*) explained in Chapter 3. The test detected that the effect of LinID on the beliefs is not significant. The effect of all other variables was significant. An increase in male students (vs. female students) weakens the belief in both English and Kyrgyz languages (vs. Russian). An increase in rural students (vs. Bishkek) strengthens the belief in the Kyrgyz language. An increase in students in the Humanitarian University (vs. National University) strengthens the belief in the English and Russian languages at the expense of the Kyrgyz language. An increase in students in the Technical University decreases the belief in the English and Kyrgyz languages.

Table 18. MLR Test Results: The Effect of Demo. Factors and HEIs on Beliefs

	DV1: English	DV2: Kyrgyz	*p*	Ref. Cat.
Male Student	.39 (.34)	.44 (.36)	*	Female Student
Russian Speaker	1.7 (.37)	.11 (.52)		Kyrgyz Speaker
Rural Student (North)	.95 (.40)	3.9 (.48)	*	Urban Student (Bishkek)
Rural Student (South)	1.1 (.46)	3.0 (.53)		
Humanitarian University	7.3 (.71)	0	*	National University
Medical Academy	1.9 (.47)	2.4 (.48)	*	
Arabaev University	1.2 (.50)	1.1 (.48)	*	
Technical University	.71 (.57)	.94 (.55)	*	

Note. $N = 478$; $*p < .05$; McFadden = .22; DV3 (Rev.Cat. of the Outcome Variable): Russian.

As Table 19 shows, Russian and English compete for students' beliefs. The following two questions measured students' expectations from the future expansion of these languages. 1. How can the further expansion of the English language in Kyrgyzstan affect you? 2. How can the further expansion of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan affect you?

Beliefs about languages were collected through closed-ended questions. Responses were coded as a four-point Likert-type scale.

The effect of gender was tested using MANOVA and ANOVA because the assumptions for using these functions were met (i.e., Levene's test did not find a significant variation in homogeneity, $F(1, 501) = .80$, $p = .37$ (about English) and $F(1, 501) = 3.19$, $p = .07$ (about Russian). The Shapiro-Wilks test for both dependent variables in the sex groups showed that the assumption of normality was not violated, $SW = .87$, $p =$ 9e-10 (male), $SW = .88$, $p =$ 2.3e-16 (female). The Mahalanobis distance did not find significant outliers. The correlation test did not find strong collinearity between the questions, $\rho < .41$ (Acceptable range is $< .9$). The size of the data set was significant. These results allowed the use of MANOVA.)

The effect of LinID and RegID was assessed using a PERMANOVA test because Levene's test found that group sizes differed enough to be withheld from using parametric tests. Note that in the RegID test, the size of the dataset was truncated to prevent the effect of LinID on the results (that is, only data from Kyrgyz-speaking students were used).

The MANOVA test did not detect a statistically significant difference between the expectations of male and female students, $SW = .994$, $F(1, 501) = 1.61$, $p = .20$. The PERMANOVA test detected that LinID and RegID cause a significant difference in the

expectations, $F(1, 501) = 6.33$, $p = .01$ and $F(2, 337) = 3.0$, $p = .03$, respectively. A post hoc analysis using descriptive statistics showed that compared to Russian speakers and urban students, more Kyrgyz speakers and rural students had positive expectations from the further expansion of the Russian language than the English language. In contrast, compared to Kyrgyz speakers and rural students, more Russian speakers and Bishkek students had more positive expectations from the further spread of English than Russian.

Table 19. Students' Attitudes toward the English and Russian Languages

ID	Categories	English	Russian
LinID	Kyrgyz Speaker	3.05 (1.20)	3.05 (1.19)
	Russian Speaker	3.32 (1.02)	3.22 (.96)
RegID	Urban (Bishkek)	3.36 (1.05)	3.28 (1.05)
	Rural (North)	3.03 (1.15)	3.05 (1.14))
	Rural (South)	2.98 (1.24)	3.00 (1.17)

Note. Numbers represent *M (SD)* based on four-point scale.

The Kyrgyz language is the third in the list of students. Its survival depends on the current students' beliefs about the importance of passing it on to their (future) children. This belief was measured using the question: Is it important to pass on the Kyrgyz language to your children? The responses were coded as No-1, Not sure - 2, and Yes - 3. Most students had a positive belief ($M = 2.82$, $SD = 0.49$). The effect of SexID and RegID on belief was insignificant, $\chi^2(2, 511) = .46$, $p = .79$ and $\chi^2(4, 340) = 8.38$, $p = .08$, respectively. Regardless of their SexID and RegID, most students believed in the importance of passing on the Kyrgyz language to their children. The impact of LinID on the belief was significant. Compared to Russian speakers, most Kyrgyz speakers considered the transmission important (Table 20).

Table 20. Beliefs about IGT of the Kyrgyz Language

	Categories	*M (SD)*	*n*	*df*	χ^2	*p*	*N*
LinID	Kyrgyz	2.74 (.45)	367	2	6.26	.04	503
	Russian	2.58 (.56)	136				

Minorities are an important part of the current Kyrgyz society. This section assessed beliefs about minority languages. The beliefs were measured based on responses to the

question: Should the government support minority languages? The responses received were coded as No - 1, Not sure - 2, and Yes - 3. Participants who skipped the question and did not mark their identity (Sex, LinID, RegID) were excluded.

Pearson's χ^2 did not detect significant variation of the attitudes depending on students' SexID and RegID, $\chi^2(2,511) = 3.4, p = .18$ and $\chi^2(4, 340) = 3.7, p = .45$, respectively. However, the variation in attitudes in line with LinID was significant.

Post hoc analysis using descriptive statistics showed that most Russian speakers supported the idea, while most Kyrgyz speakers did not (Table 21).

Table 21. Students' Attitudes toward Minority Languages

	Categories	*M (SD)*	*n*	*df*	χ^2	*p*	*N*
LinID	Kyrgyz	1.92 (.92)	367	2	19	.000	503
	Russian	2.32 (.88)	81				

4.2.3. A Comparison of Students with Non-Students

Over 75% of ethnic minorities identified themselves as Russian speakers showing that Russification among ethnic minorities was more robust than among students (who are ethnic Kyrgyz). Religion (Islam and Christianity) did not contribute to the difference between students and non-students (Table 22).

Table 22. LinID difference between students and other participants

	Kyrgyz Speakers	Russian Speakers	Other L Speakers	*n*
Students	.72	.27	.02	511
Older Kyrgyz (Muslim)	.74	.23	.02	82
Older Kyrgyz (Christian)	.80	.20	0	66
Ethnic Minorities	.06	.76	.18	52

Table 23 shows that the hierarchy of the linguistic beliefs of the students in the four popular languages in Kyrgyzstan is like the beliefs of the Kyrgyz Christians and Turkic groups. However, it differs from the beliefs of non-Turkic groups (including Russians) because this group believed more in the Chinese language than the Kyrgyz language. In this aspect, the beliefs of most representatives of non-Turkic minorities correlate more with Russian-speaking

students than with Kyrgyz-speaking ones. Regarding the Kyrgyz language, the strongest belief, more substantial than that of the students and other participants, was found among Kyrgyz Christians.

Table 23. Difference between Language Beliefs of Students and Non-Students

	English	Russian	Kyrgyz	Chinese	*n*
Students	.27	.24	.18	.14	511
Kyrgyz (Christian)	.24	.24	.21*	.11	67
Turkic Groups	.29*	.26*	.17	.14	35
Non-Turkic Groups	.28	.25	.16	.21*	38

Note. *The belief is stronger than that of the students.

Fig. 4 shows that the beliefs of most students about passing on the Kyrgyz language to their children do not differ from the beliefs of most of the older Kyrgyz, Kyrgyz Christians, non-religious Kyrgyz, and representatives of Turkic and non-Turkic ethnic minorities ($M >$ 2.00). However, the difference between ethnic minorities was significant, $\chi^2(4, 73) = 15$, $p =$ .005 because most ethnic Russians did not consider the Kyrgyz language important to their children ($M = 1.90$, $SD = .77$).

Figure 4. Beliefs in the Importance of the Kyrgyz Language for IGT



The sociolinguistic values of students and non-students differed in some aspects. Most students and non-students prioritized a multi-ethnic community and the country's economic well-being over a mono-ethnic community and a fair LP. The perception of the importance of the state language in determining patriotism among students differed sharply from the perception of representatives of ethnic minorities. Most representatives of ethnic minorities believed that being a patriot and knowing the state language are not associated with each other.

Most Kyrgyz Christians emphasized the priority of the Kyrgyz language over economic well-being and strongly associated the knowledge of the state language with patriotism (Table 24).

Table 24. Sociolinguistic Values

	Workplace Preferences		Public Policy		SL and Patriotism	
	Monoethnic	Multiethnic	Effective EP	Fair LP	No	Yes
Students	.34	.55	.57	.40	.42	.46
Non-students	.15	.76	.69	.28	.72	.21

This section presented the results of qualitative and quantitative data analysis regarding LP models, language attitudes, and beliefs.

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION

This chapter discusses the findings and results of the previous chapter. The purpose of this study was to identify and describe: 1) LP models and methods that have been applied in Kyrgyzstan; 2) the impact of the previous LP on the language identities and behaviors of undergraduate students in Kyrgyzstan's main public universities; 3) the association of demographic characteristics of students with their language attitudes and beliefs. The study pursued this goal by answering to the following research questions: 1. What LP has been implemented in Kyrgyzstan? 2. How has the LP affected the target group? 3. What language attitudes and beliefs currently prevail in the target group?

5.1. What LP has been implemented in Kyrgyzstan?

A textual analysis of the USSR constitutions concludes that the Kremlin's LP maintained language rights and equality. However, the triangulation of data from legislative documents, historical materials, expert interviews, and survey questionnaires suggests that a more plausible description of the Soviet LP was a mismatch between the written (overt) and non-written (covert) language policies. A textual analysis of Kyrgyzstan's constitutions suggests Bishkek fluctuated between overt bilingual LP, covert LP, revitalization policy, and vague LP (Table 8).

In the early years of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin used language to strengthen its power and retain national regions in the war-torn country by announcing the ideology of international socialism. In the heydays of its economic growth, as the Soviet power strengthened, it promoted the policy of 'convergence' of languages (Table 5).

The constitutions of the Kremlin and Kyrgyzstan differed in including language planning in the texts of these legislative documents. The Kremlin constitutions do not make explicit mention of language planning. In contrast, the constitution approved by the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz ASSR in 1929 contains explicit language planning. The Kremlin did not approve the first Kyrgyz constitution with an open approach to language planning. It was approved only seven years later when the article on status planning was removed.

The subsequent constitutions of the Kyrgyz SSR contain no article referring to status planning. The constitution of 1978 contains a new phrase, *the convergence* of nations. In short, the Kremlin announced its long-standing intention to merge the languages into one language, a manifestation of the covert policy. The literature of the latest period named this 'merge' with a new term, *Russification*.

Analyzing historical materials revealed that the Kremlin's 'words and deeds' differed. First, although the early Soviet LP did not single out any language by assigning a special status, a surface inspection of the inscriptions on Soviet banknotes shows that the Russian language dominated all the others. In the constitution, all citizens and languages were equal. However, on the banknotes, the Russian language was exceptional (Section 4.2, p. 86), and many non-republican languages were not mentioned.

Further, the analysis of the newspapers of Kyrgyzstan printed during the Soviet times reveals a competing ideology between Moscow and Bishkek, which is evident in the headlines of the newspapers. For example, the headline of the first newspaper in the Kyrgyz language was *Free Mountains* ('Erkin Too' in the Kyrgyz language), which was replicated in Russian as *The Red Kyrgyzstan* ('Qyzyl Qyrgyzstan' in the Kyrgyz language). Gradually, the competition moved from the political plane to the linguistic one when each newspaper was dubbed Russian.

Closer to the collapse of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan's authorities declared the critical state of the Kyrgyz language and issued a language law in 1989 that emphasized: "the need to maintain and revitalize the Kyrgyz language"(Das, 2011, p. 51). However, the effect of this law lasted only a short time because, after independence, Soviet-educated individuals returned to bilingualism with the Russian language using vague terminologies and explanations.

In general, the constitutions of both Soviet and post-Soviet periods do not clearly define 'nationality' and how this term differs from 'ethnicity.' Sometimes, citizens confuse the 'nation' with the 'nationality.' However, in keeping with the local tradition, this study uses 'nationality' as ethnicity, not citizenship (see also Aminov et al., 2010). The constitutions after 2010 introduce a new term, *the official language*, alongside *the state language*, without specifying the difference between these terms. This language planning approach differs from Schiffman's definition of "covert LP" (1996, p. 156) when legal documents do not mention statuses. Here, statuses are mentioned, but they are vague and confusing. Therefore, the LP of Kyrgyzstan after 2010 will be conventionally called a *vague LP* to distinguish them from Schiffman's "covert LP."

The laws adopted on the eve of the collapse of the USSR and during the first decade of independence of Kyrgyzstan contain explicit ideas on revitalizing the Kyrgyz language. However, they did not last long because Soviet-educated leaders returned to the Soviet type of LP by introducing covert ideologies about the insufficiency of the Kyrgyz language.

The survey showed that identity negotiations in Kyrgyzstan are ongoing, and the country has yet to develop an adequate LP. However, as the survey results and interviews show,

demographic trends can lead to a situation in which the Russian language may gradually give way to the English and Kyrgyz languages.

The finding about the covert nature of the Kremlin's policy was reported by Schiffman (1996, p. 156). Data confirm the finding about the *unequal language competition* (Landau & Kellner-Heinkele, 2001) that led to *asymmetric bilingualism* (Smagulova, 2008; Tarbox, 2016, p. 10) and Russification (Wright, 1999; Korth, 2005; Schiffman, 1996). Data suggest demographic factors made Russification in Bishkek inevitable (Tollefson, 1991, p. 16). Table 5 shows that the covert intention became apparent when mandatory teaching of the Russian language in schools was introduced in 1938, and learning the Kyrgyz language became a private issue (Korth, 2005; Grenoble, 2003). It also shows that when the Kremlin was weak, it declared equality, and when it gained power, it enforced Russification (Ornstein, 1959; Schiffman, 2002, para 5; Korth, 2005, p. 69).

Data suggest a mismatch between official policy and language practice, confirming Kroskrity (2010). The idea of creating the Soviet people through the "fusion of languages" was an element of Soviet ideology promoted through mass propaganda from the early years of the Kyrgyz SSR. It encouraged massive borrowing of lexica from the Russian language, eventually leading to diglossia (Ricento, 2000b). The change in fonts and names of the newspapers and the duplication of newspapers in two languages show a fierce competition between languages and underlying ideologies (Paksoy, 1991; BBC, 2021; Jantzen, 2009). Pervasive asymmetric bilingualism in late Soviet time is evidence of the actual intention of Soviet identity planners (Schiffman, 1996; Khanolainen, Nesterova & Semenova, 2020), supporting Grin (1992, p. 71) that a minor deviation in the initial condition of language planning will gradually lead to "drastic changes."

Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet language laws have repeatedly used the word 'state,' showing the authorities' intention to establish the emerging country's identity as an independent political entity. However, according to Professor A, the laws did not increase the number of Kyrgyz speakers, confirming Korth (2005, p. 20) that in most post-colonial societies, "legislation alone cannot cause language shift, nor can it cause a language's societal status." Schiffman (1996) noted that laws are merely a decoration in societies with strong oral traditions.

Often, literature presents Russians as colonizers while others as victims. However, the interview data suggest that the Russification policy involved both Russian and Kyrgyz authorities, confirming Akiyama (2015), who emphasized the primary role of the Kyrgyz elite in annexing the Kyrgyz tribes to the Russian Empire, maintaining the language competition (McDermott, 2017), and consequent Russification (Huskey, 1995). Most Kyrgyz believed that

without the Russian language, a person could not be educated (Professor M), confirming DeLorme (1999, p. 17). Most Soviet-educated Kyrgyz leaders often perceived themselves as members of an inferior ethnic group (Professor K), confirming Korth (2005). They also contributed to the persistent segregation of Kyrgyz into two language groups (Huskie, 1995). The Kremlin propagandists in Bishkek always found a way to (mis)interpret laws to please the dominant group (Ricento, 2000a). Post-Soviet Kyrgyz leaders have swung from one extreme to another. Sometimes they humiliated the Kyrgyz language; other times, they hastily imposed the Kyrgyz language. There is a neglect of knowledge of the laws of language policy and a preference for momentary political interests. A textual analysis of documents approved since 1993 demonstrates that post-Soviet authorities often used a dilettante approach to sociolinguistic issues. They downgraded the Kyrgyz language, so it could not be used nationally. They described it as a language poorly developed for office work, science, and terminology (Concept, 1998, para. 5). The law on the official language under the pro-Russian president in 2000 masked support for language shift rather than language maintenance. It made the Kyrgyz language unnecessary for non-Kyrgyz and the Russified "Kyrgyz." Recently, there has been an active promotion of the Kyrgyz language. However, while not understanding sociolinguistics and not improving the quality of teaching and textbooks, the frank imposition of the state language in a hurry does not create positive attitudes towards the Kyrgyz language.

According to Garett (2010, p. 10), such attitudes are stereotypical and wrong (Sebba, 2013). Grosjean (1984) found similar unhealthy attitudes in Africa, where leaders of post-colonial societies were the primary obstacles to revitalizing native languages. In addition, the function of the Russian language was deliberately misinterpreted by analysts serving the post-Soviet dominant group in power (Ricento, 2000a). These decisions of post-Soviet Kyrgyz leaders showed their "powerlessness in language management," as Spolsky (2005b, p. 2156) described. As a result, the previous attempt to establish balanced bilingualism, which the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan had attempted in 1989, was canceled.

Analysis of the websites of international organizations in Bishkek shows that they use Russian more often than Kyrgyz, confirming the theory that both intra-state and inter-state actors could be involved in the process of language planning (Spolsky, 2009; Tollefson, 2015).

As the interview data show, the participants possessed mixed feelings about the past, particularly about Lenin and Stalin. However, analysis of the constitutions and actual actions of Lenin and Stalin suggests that they spoke one thing but did another. Lenin verbally supported the equality of languages, but hoped that the demographic advantage of the Russian language should ensure its victory (Lenin, 1914; 1917; Schlyter, 2006, p. 821). Stalin, in contrast,

constantly praised the Russian people but did not add official status to the Russian language during his long authoritarian rule. Lenin's rationale behind maintaining an implicit LP was to avoid separatist sentiments in national regions when the empire was at the age of civil war and collapse. That the Kremlin did not approve the first constitution of the Kyrgyz ASSR in 1929, where the state statuses were explicitly assigned to the Russian and Kyrgyz languages, but signed it when the statuses were removed confirms this idea.

Previous literature also presented Lenin's idea to teach children separately by language to preserve internationalism and prevent nationalism (Korth, 2005). However, this study asserts that this policy contributed to the segregation between Kyrgyz and Russian speakers by blocking the integration of ethnic minorities with the titular nationality. When Lenin postponed the tradition of Russification, he firmly believed in the future demand for the Russian language (Lenin, 1917; Ornstein, 1959). It could not have been otherwise since ethnic Russians comprised the overwhelming majority in the Soviet Union. His call to observe minority rights primarily protected the Russian language because the early Russian settlers in the Union republics were a minority. Later, the policy deprived the protection of native languages against the imperial language's demographic advantage and economic leverage. His idea was also a tactic to retain non-Russian ethnic groups in Russia when Russia was at the edge of collapse (Grenoble, 2003; Swanenberg et al., 2013). He also might hope that the mismatch between the official LP and non-official ideology eventually shall marginalize minority languages and melt them with the Russian language (see also the case in post-colonial Africa by Abongdia & Foncha, 2014). However, the mismatch between propaganda and language behavior was a demoralizing factor for Russians and minorities by signaling that the gap between propaganda, laws, and behavior is acceptable.

Strengthening the role of the Russian language in education in 1938 and again in the 1950s confirms the finding that the LP model implemented in Kyrgyzstan aimed at constructing the Soviet identity by Russifying non-Russians (Smagulova, 2008). Assigning a higher status to the Russian language could awaken the desire to do the same with their languages in the national republics. Therefore, the Kremlin avoided overt language planning by showing the actual status of the Russian language. Historical conditions perfectly contributed to the spread of the Russian language in Central Asia due to the heterogeneity of the population and the weak national markers of an independent state. In addition, the peoples in Central Asia were in a deep socioeconomic crisis (Chapter 2, Section 10) which was successfully used by the Kremlin "to assimilate to Russia since incentives to do this were built in" (Schiffman, 1996, p. 165). The covert strategy of Soviet nationalism to remake diverse ethnic groups into "Soviet people" with

one language was a de facto subtractive LP (Evans & Hornberger, 2005) that led to the Russian language's dominance in the national republics.

The literature in Russian and English emphasizes the leading role of Kyrgyz chiefs in the colonization of Kyrgyzstan and related language problems. However, not all leaders were happy with the Russian expansion. The dissenting Kyrgyz leaders were shot or emigrated abroad (Ornstein, 1959). For example, the Basmachi or Turkistani National Liberation Movement resisted Russia and the USSR (Paksoy, 1991; BBC, 2021; Jantzen, 2009). These details show that the early Kyrgyz nationalists were driven by the idea of retaining their ethnic identity by recreating the Kyrgyz people (albeit of a Soviet type). In this sense, the political ideology of Kyrgyzstan oscillated between civic and ethnic nationalism.

Repeated declarations that Russian is the language of interethnic communication and Kyrgyz is the symbolic language (Professor J, personal communication, January 2020) motivated people to choose Russian for pragmatic reasons. This status and role gave Kyrgyzstan's citizens the moral and legal right to learn Russian since it was a convertible currency in all national republics from an economic point of view (Businessman O).

According to Kyrgyz traditions, tribal and regional leaders play an essential role. The Kremlin exploited this tradition to promote its policy using local leaders for whom phone calls had more authority than laws (Ishemkulov, 2021). These leaders served Soviet imperialism rather than Kyrgyz nationalism even after the collapse of the USSR. The Kremlin has never stopped the promotion of the Russian language as the "powerful and uniting common language" in the post-Soviet space (Putin, 2022). Post-Soviet Kyrgyz leaders increased nationalistic terminology in the general body of the constitution but did not extend the functions of the Kyrgyz language to critical domains of economics. By assigning the function of the language for interethnic communication to the Russian language, they removed the need to learn the Kyrgyz language for non-Kyrgyz ethnic groups so that further identity construction would not be around the Kyrgyz language but the Russian language. Therefore, the LP of this Constitution promoted the Russian language.

Bilingualism with the Russian language had a positive effect at the beginning of the Soviet Union and a negative effect when the Soviet power strengthened, and post-Soviet leaders reinforced it. The Russification policy never ceased in the history of the Kremlin's LP (Ornstein, 1959). It negatively affected linguistic diversity (Smagulova, 2008). The "equal rights" led to an "unequal yoke" for national languages under the dominant language. As a result, non-Russians started shifting to the Russian language in all national republics (Schiffman, 1996). In

addition, it was a deliberate policy that directed minority groups in the national republics to the Russian language rather than the indigenous ones.

5.2. How has the LP affected the target group?

Data triangulation suggests that the previous LP has caused a crisis in the linguistic, national, and regional identity of Kyrgyz citizens. Official statistics, Russian sources, and international observers provide varying numbers about the speakers of different languages (Chapter 2, Section 10). This study finds that the LinID of a significant proportion of students (approximately 27%) is associated with the Russian language. In addition, they are also divided by their RegID (Table 11).

The strong correlation between MoI and LinID shows the former's significant effect on the latter's formation (Table 10). In addition, the higher education domain contributes to Russification rather than Kyrgyzification (Table 9, 14). Based on these results, it can be assumed that Kyrgyzstan's educational domains, including general and higher education systems, contribute significantly to the (trans)formation of students' LinID.

According to Teacher T, most peripheral applicants were not fluent in Russian during the recent enrollment period and spoke different dialects. Therefore, some students may hide their identities or languages to avoid discrimination, as their accents or mannerisms could have consequences. The data suggest that discrimination among students depends on LinID (Table 15) and affects their language behavior (Table 12, 13).

The results also show that the association between LinID and sex is weak. However, unlike male students, the increase in female students can contribute to maintaining the Kyrgyz language on campus (Table 14,18).

The students' linguistic situation within the country's broader context shows that Russification among ethnic minorities (except Russians) has become more robust than among the students. Ethnic minorities were more in line with Russian-speaking students than Kyrgyz-speaking students in their beliefs in sociolinguistic values.

Data suggest that religion has no association with Russification (Table 22). However, most Kyrgyz Christians prioritize a fair LP over economic well-being.

Data show that LinID influences sociolinguistic values such as team choice, public policy priorities, and perception of patriotism.

Finally, the results show that the perception of identity varies between the students and other participants, suggesting that the negotiation of the joint construction of identity is ongoing.

The previous literature discussed these issues in several contexts. The students' vague understanding of their ethnic and linguistic identities resembles the case study in India (i.e., LaDousa et al., 2022), where citizens often could not simultaneously identify with their mother tongue and English. Munday (2009) previously reported that some Kyrgyz students identify with the Russian language but mark their ethnicity as Kyrgyz. It is identical to the situation in Ukraine (e.g., Csernicskó & Fedinec, 2016) and Moldova (Tulum & Zubalov, 2022), showing that the origin of the phenomenon is the same, which made it "difficult to separate ethnicity and language" (Das, 2011, p. 53). A widespread language change among Kyrgyz and other ethnic minorities in the late Soviet period confirms Shabaev (2020) and Bolshakov & Farukshin (2022) that the dominant group eventually may replace the local language. Data show that many urban students (Bishkek residents) no longer attach importance to their ancestral language (Professor N, personal communication, January 2020). According to Khilkhanova & Khilkhanova (2004) and Khanolainen et al. (2020), it might derive from their perception that the ancestral language is merely a symbol, and abandoning it does not affect ethnic identity. Data support the concept in the literature that some minorities in the USSR were contributors to derogating their native language (Korth, 2005). McDermott (2017) lamented that "despite many discussions about the importance of language for ethnic identity, most ethnic Kyrgyz believed that bilingualism in Russian and Kyrgyz was ideal." In the scientific realm, a simple count of PhD theses in the centralized dissertation catalog of the National Library resulted in the number of dissertations in the Kyrgyz language being less than 13% (Table 9), though almost 99% of the authors' names were Kyrgyz. The results show that the Kyrgyz language was ignored in the scientific field by the ethnic Kyrgyz themselves, contributing to its gradual decline in the higher education system. This provision supports the concept in the literature that some minorities can be contributors to the derogation of their native language (Grosjean, 1984; Korth, 2005). The pilot and main study results show little has changed since Gavrilov et al.'s (2008, para. 40) report in 2006.

Data also confirm Schiffman's (2002, Section 3) conclusion that "Russians tend to be the most retentive of language, while other groups vary."

The results confirm Darden's (2013) and Ion's (2013) reports that the dominance of Russian-language schools in Bishkek during the Soviet era left its mark on the LinID of Bishkek residents. Many Kyrgyz students who graduated from Bishkek schools became Russian speakers. These results also agree with Goebel (2019) and Landau & Kellner-Heinkele (2012) that regional identity in Kyrgyzstan is essential. The substantial success of the Russian language in Bishkek compared to the periphery supports the idea that the dominant language grows,

especially in areas with ethnic heterogeneity in the community (Agadjanian & Nedoluzhko, 2022). The central region of Kyrgyzstan, where Bishkek is located, has been the home of various ethnic and religious groups since immemorial times (Mambetaliev, 2018b). It is also in line with the conclusions based on observations of the linguistic landscape (McDermott, 2017).

More frequent code-switching among rural students than urban students may stem from discrimination based on regional dialects, supporting Savva & Nygaard (2021, p. 169). It also aligns with Stephen's (2013) idea that developing discriminatory propaganda about language status, function, and potential can eventually throw a language from a public space to a private one. Korth (2005) noticed that some Kyrgyz hid fluency in their native language, considering non-competence in their native language a characteristic of modernity or urbanity. A similar situation in the neighboring city of Almaty was reported by DeLorme (2005).

Code-switching in public is found to occur more frequently among female students than among male students. Spolsky (1989), Martínez-Rivas & Lasagabaster (2022), and Gardner & Lambert (1972) also confirmed that women are more inclined to select prestigious languages and standard varieties than the local language(s) or dialects. This study adds that such language behavior is not associated with discrimination, as Table 15 shows.

Although the association between gender and LinID is weak, more male students than female students became Russian speakers, which confirms previous reports that women contribute more to maintaining the heritage language than men (Wilson, 2012; Siebetcheu, 2022). The effect of demographic factors on sociolinguistic values confirms previous findings on implicit biases that influence workforce selection (Cherry, 2020) and perceptions of patriotism (Spolsky, 2005b, p. 2157; Gershon & Pantoja, 2010, p. 1522). Analysis of post-Soviet laws, websites, interviews, and survey results shows that current language ecology is maintained by language managers, society, and supranational stakeholders, confirming Spolsky (2004), Varennes (2012), Korth (2005), and Grosjean (2006).

Interpretation and explanation of some reasons that led to the current situation require a multifaceted approach, including the views of local experts and previous publications. According to Professor T, Russification would not be possible without the collaboration of the Kyrgyz leaders, who were a close proxy to the Kremlin. A persistent association between LinID and RegID in the target group shows that the current reason for the divide among Kyrgyz is not in Russians but in established regional culture because Russians today comprise a tiny minority. Schiffman (1996, p. 7) noted, "the fact that a language is diglossic is in actuality a feature of the linguistic culture of the area where that language is used, rather than of the language or the overt language policy."

As the results show, citizens living near capitals and administrative centers can be exposed to increased manipulation by supranational powers. For example, in Bishkek, Russian has become the dominant language, pushing all other local languages to peripheral regions (Mambetaliev, 2021a; McDermott, 2017). Some Bishkek residents might believe that ethnicity is inherited through blood, not through language, since their LinID is Russian, though they consider themselves ethnically Kyrgyz. Ong & Ting (2022) state that similar beliefs can lead to a language shift.

As a side note, ignoring the native language among post-nomadic Turkic peoples was known a century ago (Polivanov, 1927). Therefore, some Soviet authorities concluded it was easy to Russify them (Avazov, 2018; Anderson & Silver, 1983). However, those who were Russified obeyed the Kremlin since *Ürkün* (the escape to China during the recruitment campaign for WWI in 1916 (Jantzen, 2009) and *Jut* (famine arranged by the Kremlin among Kazakhs in the 1930s, Kindler & Klohr, 2018) were still fresh in their memory.

The data show that the previous LP instilled an inferiority complex in the minds of many Kyrgyz individuals. For example, an interviewee said: "For some unknown reason, when I see even a single Slavic-looking person in the auditorium, I switch on to Russian" (Professor K, personal interview, January 2020). According to Professor J (personal communication, January 2020), this behavior stems from the "brainwashing" of the Soviet era. However, Professor T (personal communication, January 2020) disagreed with this opinion, arguing that it is a marker of education and politeness. On this occasion, Korth (2005) concluded that some Kyrgyz consider their native language inferior and provincial, which, according to DeLorme (2005, p. 17), is a Soviet legacy.

The sharp increase in internal migration after independence significantly changed Bishkek's linguistic and cultural ecology. Subsequently, Bishkek citizens are divided not by ethnicity but by linguistic and regional differences. While Bishkek residents accused immigrants of lacking civility, rural students backfired them for abandoning the ancestral language. These relationships between the regions have always been, sometimes in latent form, supporting the idea that "the core-periphery relationship is never fixed, but constantly renegotiated" (Pietikäinen & Kelly-Holmes, 2013, p. 2). The difference between language behavior at home and on campus stems from the fact that most Bishkek families have little influence on planning their children's LinID (Table 13). It also shows the significant influence of public places in Bishkek on FLP, confirming previous findings on the transforming power of the country's central city (McDermott, 2017).

The data show that, compared to the students in the central region (Bishkek), most rural students (from both the North and South regions) remain attached to the Kyrgyz language (Table 11). Unlike Bishkek residents, the commitment to the Kyrgyz language corresponds to the traditional family values of rural Kyrgyz. Dewaele et al. (2020) state that FLP can direct children's future language repertoire. This study also adds that conclusions based only on language behavior in public may not explain a community's language ecology. As the findings suggest, language practices at home and in public can differ (Table 12, 13).

Table 14 shows that the Kyrgyz language dominates at the National University and Arabaev University, while the Russian language is popular at the Humanitarian University and Technical University. An explanation for this difference can be found in the historical background of the universities. During Soviet times, the National University and Arabaev University were popular destinations for enrollees from peripheral regions. In contrast, the Humanitarian University and the Technical University were linked to the Russian language. The former name of the Humanitarian University was the Pedagogical University of Russian Language and Literature. The Technical University was the center of training specialists for factories that employed mainly ethnic Russians. Currently, these universities do not have links with factories or other attachments to the Russian language. The results show that the universities' historical background is still associated with the students' LinID, suggesting that an increase in the number of students at different universities can affect the students' language practices. The language practices also might depend on the availability of textbooks in the Kyrgyz language specific to the universities' academic specialization. In addition, most textbooks still need to be translated into Kyrgyz or poorly translated (Professor M, personal communication, January 2020). Therefore, the campus language ecology and the Russian language's dominance in Bishkek's educational system may change students' LinID.

Another critical problem related to the consequences of the previous regimes is the deterioration of the communication skills of post-Soviet students. According to Administrator A, an admissions committee member, many applicants from rural regions cannot express their thoughts in any language. This problem might result from parents' decision in rural places to enroll their children in Russian schools. Without language contact with native speakers, children learn neither language nor other skills. Similar cases have also been reported in other countries (Mbude-Shale, 2013), where children lose the ability to communicate freely in their native language within 2-3 years (Cummins, 2001). This situation can be felt even more strongly by ethnic minorities who want to preserve their native language. Therefore, learning a new language and curriculum subjects may impose a double workload on children, increasing

dropouts or poor marks. Such systems create inequality in schools between children of minority language groups and children of the dominant language group. This study also adds that the decision of parents to send their children to schools where children are not taught in their native language is a consequence of the trauma caused by previous totalitarian systems. For example, some Kyrgyz of the Soviet generation in rural areas dreamed of mastering the Russian language but did not become advanced Russian speakers during the Soviet era. They are trying to fulfill this dream through their children and grandchildren, sending them to Russian schools.

The ethnicity column, removed from Kyrgyzstan's national passport, was restored last year because of protests by some Kyrgyz who did not distinguish between ethnicity, citizenship, and nation. Data also suggest that the perception of citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity is still vague among students and non-students, including minorities. While holding Kyrgyz passports, some minorities associate their national identity with their kin-republics in Russia, showing that they face additional identity problems, including country-level (aka national) identity, as their responses to the open question show. The discussed problems show the previous regime's incomplete construction of the intended identity, which yields disputes over identity titles. However, the appearance of some Kyrgyz speakers among ethnic minorities shows a positive trend for the state language regarding their integration with the country's indigenous people. Although a U-turn seems complicated among current Russified Kyrgyz, it may appear among minorities, as data suggest (Table 22).

Thus, it can be concluded that the past LP has divided Kyrgyz citizens into speakers of two languages. This division occurred in all non-Russian ethnic groups, especially among ethnic minorities. The results suggest that the effects of covert policy may persist for two generations.

5.3. What language attitudes and beliefs prevail in the target group?

This section discusses participants' language attitudes and beliefs, which is the answer to the second research question.

Table 17 shows that in most students' hierarchical list of languages, the state language (Kyrgyz) is not the first most important language but follows English and Russian. Russian-speaking students believe more in Chinese than the state language, distinguishing them from rural and Kyrgyz-speaking students. The most adaptable part of the Kyrgyz switched to Russian in the economic heydays of the Soviet Union. And now these same Kyrgyz are moving fast to English from Russian.

It would probably be appropriate to mention mutually exclusive beliefs in previous studies about English here, considering it a promoter of the linguistic imperialism theory (e.g., Philipson, 2016) and a balancing power for post-Soviet countries (Mambetaliev, 2020b; Kiyizbaeva, 2019).

The data show that support for minority languages is more significant among Russian students than Kyrgyz speakers (Table 21). This characteristic feature of Russian-speaking students is a legacy of Soviet covert ideology, which pretended to support minorities. However, it was a manipulation of minorities to attract them to the Russian language at the expense of the Kyrgyz language. The current state of minorities, which are robustly Russified, demonstrates the true essence of the Kremlin's ideology. Fortunately, in post-Soviet reality, supporting minority languages does not harm the Kyrgyz language because it does not lead to Russification; on the contrary, it contributes to a healthy linguistic ecology by maintaining diversity.

The belief in future demand for English and Russian among students is strong, regardless of sex. The weak effect of gender on the beliefs about international languages is also consistent with findings in various countries, i.e., Açıkgöz (1992) in Turkey, Saranraj et al. (2016) in India, and Orfan & Weijer (2020) in Afghanistan. However, in some contexts, beliefs differ between males and females (Ulysse & Masaeed, 2022). According to Ellis (1994), Gal (1998), Milroy & Milroy (1998), and Wang & Ladegaard (2008), the difference could stem from the socio-economic dimension, where women have fewer educational opportunities than men, which is not typical for Kyrgyzstan where women have free access to education.

Data show that attitudes and beliefs between urban (Bishkek) and rural students differ in most situations, confirming Gajalakshmi's (2013) conclusion. Most students from rural Kyrgyzstan are inclined to believe in the need for the Russian language, confirming the findings of Chohan & Rana (2016), who connected such beliefs with economic interests. In contrast, urban students, especially Russian-speaking ones, are primarily interested in English. Veguilla (2004) and Murthy & Yeo (2018) saw the difference in parents' desire to send their children to schools where the MoI, in their beliefs, is the most prestigious language. It is precisely the case of Kyrgyz parents who did the same during the late Soviet and early independent periods, described in the literature (the last section of Chapter 2).

Most participants do not believe that the Kyrgyz language can compete with the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan, as confirmed by Korth (2005), who argued that people in some ex-Soviet countries believe that information in Russian is more truthful than information in their native languages. The beliefs of Russian-speaking Kyrgyz, especially Bishkek residents, are

close to Mura's (2019) participants, who considered their native language a part of their identity but perceived it as lacking instrumental value. Participants in Gul's study (2019) were also of this opinion when some representatives of the national minorities of the former Soviet Union believed that the literature in their language was less suitable for scientific research than the literature in Russian. These beliefs do not support the official ideology in Kyrgyzstan, confirming Spolsky (2004), who noted that the language beliefs of citizens rarely align with official ideologies.

The data show that Russian-speaking students in Bishkek prefer English to the Kyrgyz and Russian languages, showing that this group is moving further away from the Kyrgyz language. In contrast, most Kyrgyz-speaking students from rural areas prefer Russian to English (Section 4.4.2), indicating a competition between Russian and English for this group of students. According to Consultant J, Kyrgyz-speaking students from the periphery choose Russian "because of the lack of language contact and the weak outcomes of the educational system in teaching English, the most achievable goal remains the familiar Russian language." Another reason lies in the motivation to find a job in Russia, which is a more accessible country for many Kyrgyz citizens than the countries of western Europe and eastern Asia.

In their study, Artoni & Longo (2021, p. 195) reported that English and Russian remain prestigious and do not compete in Georgia. However, their study was based on data from teachers in Tbilisi, Georgia's capital city, excluding the effect of the center / peripheral factor. Therefore, this study adds that competition depends on the proportion of students with different RegIDs: The more students from the capital city, the greater the demand for English, and the more students from the periphery, the greater the demand for the Russian language. Therefore, English and Russian in Kyrgyzstan compete for rural students. The dependence of linguistic beliefs on the regional characteristics of the students might be rooted in the historical and sociodemographic characteristics of Kyrgyzstan's regions, described in the last section of Chapter 2. Several generations of the Kyrgyz, whose mother tongue and ancestral language do not coincide, have grown up in Bishkek.

The dependence of linguistic beliefs on L1 is related to the Soviet tradition of isolating citizens by language from elementary school to higher education, also discussed by Korth (2005). This tradition developed two completely different communities that did not mix. For example, Russian-speaking and Kyrgyz-speaking Kyrgyz were alien to each other and had attitudes, beliefs, and values that were mutually incomprehensible, sometimes exclusive. Therefore, as Professor T states, most Russian-speaking students in Bishkek consider the Kyrgyz language part of their identity but perceive it as lacking instrumental value. Such

attitudes contributed to the stigmatization of the Kyrgyz language and forced it out of many areas of use, as Romaine (2006) and Llamas & Stockwell (2020) noted. Cherry (2020) considers such beliefs an "implicit bias" that affects society subconsciously. The results show that most Russian-speaking students prefer Chinese to Kyrgyz (after English and Russian), distinguishing them from Kyrgyz-speaking students from the periphery. That such an attitude persists after 30 years of the Soviet Union suggests that the language shift is difficult to reverse. Another effect of the language shift to Russian is that Russian-speaking Kyrgyz are separated from their consanguineous relatives and all kindred peoples of the same language family. For example, most Russian-speaking students believe in Arabic, whereas most Kyrgyz-speaking students believe in Turkish.

On the one hand, the similarity of the linguistic beliefs of Russian-speaking Kyrgyz with ethnic Russians can support the Russian minority against pressure from the Kyrgyz-speaking majority. However, ignoring the language of their ancestors irritates the Kyrgyz-speaking Kyrgyz and increases the adverse socio-psychological climate in society. The increasing statements of Russian officials calling for defending the Russian language in neighboring states with weapons are alarming.

According to Minett and Wang (2005), Baker & Wright (2017), Hale (1998), and Skutnabb-Kangas (2000), intergenerational transmission is a requirement for language survival. According to Bourhis (1992) and Yildirim (2020), it can likely occur only in the next generation in Kyrgyzstan. This study found that most students, regardless of their gender, strongly believe in the importance of passing on the Kyrgyz language to their children. A similar result was reported by Abbas et al. (2020, p. 194) about the Punjabi ethnic group in Pakistan. However, as Yu (2010) reported, the willingness to transmit the language cannot be sufficient for language maintenance. Furthermore, the belief in the Kyrgyz language varies between ethnic minorities. There are some individuals among the minorities who marked Kyrgyz as their primary language, showing the influence of increasing contact with the titular nationality (Tódor & Dégi, 2016), who currently comprise most of the country's population (National Statistics, 2021a).

This study found that ethnic Russians hold a contrastingly different view than other minorities. Spolsky & Shohamy (1999) reported a similar case among immigrants from Russia to Israel who refused to learn local languages for an extended period.

Regarding attitudes toward minority languages, data suggest that suspicious attitudes toward minorities (Pavlenko, 2005) are persistent among participants. A recent decree by the country's chief Islamic leader to hold services only in Russian or Kyrgyz (Turkiston, 2019) is

an example that the majority's attitudes toward minority languages remain unchanged, confirming the study in a similar context by Khanolainen et al. (2020).

Data from the analysis of laws (Table 5, 6, 7) suggest that the language authorities continue to maintain the same LP as the Soviet authorities, assuming that by limiting the number of official languages to only Kyrgyz and Russian languages, they can protect the state (Kyrgyz) language. Such an approach to LP is supported by examples of neighboring large countries, such as Russia and China, where the majority's language ranks first in the hierarchy of linguistic beliefs (Tsung, 2014, p. 39). However, discriminating against minority languages can cause a backlash and alienate minorities from the Kyrgyz language in favor of its traditional competitor (Professor A).

These opinions confirm that the majority's attitudes in the post-Soviet space towards minority languages remain unchanged (Khanolainen et al., 2020). The legacy of Soviet policy when asymmetric bilingualism was perceived as acceptable (Bolshakov & Farukshin, 2022) to the degree that the Kyrgyz language might go extinct in Bishkek (Ferdinand & Komlosi, 2016) turned out to be tenacious.

The survey results show that most respondents do not believe the government should support minority languages. Data from interviews and open questions suggest these attitudes are driven by fear of encouraging separatist sentiments (Professor K) and concern about communication difficulties (Turkiston, 2019). The results also might connect to perceptions that minorities are non-patriotic citizens (Spolsky, 2005b).

The Kyrgyz government has not yet awakened the protest moods of minorities. According to Consultant J, "we have the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan, a cultural center for over 80 ethnic groups. Our country provides conditions for them to observe their holidays, events, and festivals and to preserve their languages."

Meanwhile, data show that the Kyrgyz language has not yet become the primary language of inter-ethnic communication due to the robust language shift to Russian among ex-Soviet minorities in Kyrgyzstan. Most minorities think as Professor Y said, "there is no need to learn Kyrgyz because we have Russian as an interethnic language." In such a situation, one can understand the above concerns about the Kyrgyz language since healthy bilingualism or multilingualism can occur when the language of the titular nationality is "secure and dominant in public" (Tarbox, 2016. p. 12).

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the main research findings and results on the research purposes and questions and discussing the contribution thereof. It also reviews the study's limitations and proposes directions for future research.

6.1. Summary of Results

This thesis covered periods when Kyrgyzstan's LP was led by the notions of international socialism, Soviet nationalism, late Soviet language revitalization, and (pre-) independent identity construction. It critically analyzed how policymakers promoted overt and covert ideologies and how these practices shaped language identities, attitudes, beliefs, and practices. The study was conducted within Spolsky's (2004, 2019) concept of LP and nation-building. It extended DeLorme's (1999) research on language and identity planning. It also supplemented Schiffman's (1996, 2002) reports on linguistic culture and LP in the USSR.

The results suggest that Kyrgyzstan's and Kremlin's approaches to LP differed in several key issues. The first constitution of the Kyrgyz ASSR in 1929 contained explicit and overt language policy and planning by assigning the status of the state language to the Kyrgyz and Russian languages. However, the Kremlin did not approve it. After seven years, when the article containing explicit statuses of languages was removed from the constitution, the Kremlin approved it, showing that the Kremlin did not prefer overt de jure LP, confirming Schiffman's (1996) definition of the covert LP. From then on, the Kyrgyz ASSR became the Kyrgyz SSR in 1936, and the LP followed the all-Union model of covert LP, removing any mentions of planning statuses to languages. It led the Kyrgyz language into unequal competition with the imperial language, resulting in asymmetric bilingualism and diglossia (Huskey, 1995). Closer to the collapse of the USSR, the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz SSR attempted to apply a language revitalization policy by issuing a new language law in 1989. However, a few years later, after independence, some Soviet-educated leaders who were in the government of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan brought back the Soviet model of bilingual LP. They also introduced semantically confusing terminologies, which contained vague statements about the statuses and functions of the Kyrgyz and Russian languages. Therefore, this study gives an operational definition of the vague LP to post-Soviet constitutions.

The survey data show that the LP of the past contributed to the identity crisis among post-Soviet students characterized by vague perceptions of their national, ethnic, and linguistic identities. Approximately every third student was found to be a Russian speaker. This

phenomenon, called Russification, has been even more robust among ethnic minorities than ethnic Kyrgyz. In addition, the covert LP of the Soviet Union and the vague LP of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan reinforced language-based discrimination and contradictions between regions and ethnicities. Finally, past LP has divided students, regardless of their gender identities, into Kyrgyz and Russian speakers with mutually exclusive linguistic identities, values, behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs.

These results were obtained using the following data, methods, and procedures. The top-down LP was first analyzed using legislative documents, historical materials, and interview transcripts. Legislative documents included constitutions and laws that were enacted in Kyrgyzstan. Historical materials included banknotes circulated in Kyrgyzstan and newspapers published since 1924 (when the first newspaper in the Kyrgyz language was printed). Interviews were conducted with former government members who chaired LP boards and professors who directed linguistics departments, mentored research projects and authored relevant publications. Unstructured conversations were also extended to members of admission committees, business owners, and representatives of minorities. Legislative documents were studied using text analysis after selecting a comprehensive list of articles related to the language in a separate word document. The banknotes were analyzed by counting the languages and considering the size and arrangement of the words on the currencies. The interview transcripts were analyzed by creating a table with two columns where the interview texts and codes were placed. The bottom-up LP, which presents the survey questionnaire results among undergraduate students, was analyzed using statistical methods, which estimated the effect of gender identity, regional identity, religious identity, and ethnic identity on language attitudes, beliefs, and sociolinguistic values.

The previous literature has not yet discussed why ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan (and in other national republics) switched to Russian, completely ignoring the language of the titular nationality. It also has yet to come across the ideas behind the vague declarations of language rights without mentioning concrete languages and their statuses in the USSR constitution. This study argues that the impediment to overt language planning has led to the fact that the dominant language has de facto displaced the Kyrgyz language from the capital to the periphery and contributed to the Russification of ethnic minorities, preventing their integration with the titular nationality.

The previous literature also did not mention the consequences of Soviet practices, such as the language segregation of students in Kyrgyzstan. However, because of this practice, two groups of citizens have grown up alienated from each other in language and culture. The

construction of isolated identities has become the basis for the emergence of various types of discrimination.

This study believes the effects mentioned above LP were due to national and Kremlin leaders, as other studies, confirm (e.g., Huskey, 1996). According to McDermott (2017), many ethnic Kyrgyz have also contributed to unequal competition between the Kyrgyz and Russian languages, bringing the Kyrgyz language to an inferior position compared to the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan.

Findings and results suggest that preserving a minority language is possible only when the government and majority population are committed to the values of a pluralistic society. Otherwise, the minority cannot preserve their native languages because of demographic and economic factors unless it has a powerful neighboring kin-state.

6.2. Suggestions for Implication and Further Research

The Kyrgyz government is interested in revitalizing the Kyrgyz language and increasing the number of Kyrgyz speakers among students, evidenced by the appointment of vice-rectors in universities. During data collection, universities had campus-level regulations that were not research-based. More information is also needed to regulate the flow of applicants for admission to universities aligned with the national LP.

Based on a wide range of previous studies in different languages and large-scale data, the findings and results of this thesis can be a source of information for language planning processes. Tables 13 and 16 can provide an idea for improving LP in the higher education domain. The results of the MLR test show that encouragement of students to use Kyrgyz on campus, admitting more enrollees from peripheral regions (especially from the South) rather than from Bishkek, and improving LP in some universities would help the government increase the number of the Kyrgyz speakers (Table 14, 18). A focus on language behavior on campus would help reduce language discrimination. The programs should also raise awareness of the role of languages in constructing identities for independent Kyrgyzstan.

The author is convinced that Kyrgyzstan should consider the experience of the USSR, which showed that preserving the diversity of languages is a duty of the majority group because it is unlikely that it depends on minorities. He also believes that supporting minority languages can improve the trust of minorities in the government and the titular nationality. Unilaterally imposing the state language on minorities can cause an adverse reaction. Identifying a specific problem in the concrete local community and creating targeted programs are necessary.

It would be helpful to develop programs that raise the awareness of Kyrgyz-speaking students about the usefulness and necessity of positive attitudes towards minority languages. The author rejects the opinion that "the death of a minority language might be a good thing, as it contributes to social stability and ethnic equality" (Tsung, 2014, p. 49).

Language planners should pay attention to the motivation problems of students whose primary language is Russian, as their belief in the Kyrgyz language is significantly weak compared to students whose primary language is Kyrgyz. Particular attention should be paid to urban students. It is also essential to further investigate the weak interest of students in some universities. It is necessary to improve the educational base for teaching the state language since the poor outcomes of the education system are, as Businessman V noted, "textbooks of the Kyrgyz language are dull and uninteresting" (personal conversation, January 2020).

Further language planning should consider the different levels of interest in the state language among minorities. Kyrgyz authorities must develop targeted programs for Russian-speaking Kyrgyz and ethnic minorities. Primary efforts to revitalize the state language should be directed at ethnic Kyrgyz. Other minorities should have broad rights to preserve and develop their native languages while not restricting their access to learning the state language.

More research is needed to determine why Russian-speaking Kyrgyz, Russians, and some representatives of minorities do not see the need to learn the state language and why some participants think it is not essential for their children. Other reasons might include: (1) poor campus-level LP; (2) students in some departments may consider the state language optional; (3) the need for qualified teachers; (4) along with the language, culture, or religion being imposed.

As a direction for the future, it is proposed to study the linguistic landscape of universities, which can provide additional data on the language policy of universities. Furthermore, a comparative study of public and private universities and universities in the regions remains a research gap. It would also be interesting to investigate how the experience of studying or internships in developed countries can affect linguistic attitudes and beliefs.

Another helpful information among students would be how they view minorities in the country. Besides Russian soft power policies, it would be an asset to investigate any evidence of similar Anglo-American, Arab, and Chinese efforts to influence language-related attitudes in Kyrgyzstan.

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APPENDICES

Appendix Q

Page 1. (This is a translation of the questionnaire package from the local languages of the research sites).

Study Title: Language policies, attitudes, and beliefs in Kyrgyzstan

Researcher: Askarbek Mambetaliev

Email/Phone: askarmambetaliev@gmail.com / +36705516975 / +9965002882221

Research Supervisor: Dr. István Csernicskó

Dear Citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic!

You are invited to be part of a research study. The researcher is a doctoral student at University of Pannonia in the School of Social Sciences and Applied Linguistics. Participation in the study is voluntary.

By filling out the questionnaire and handing it to me, you agree to the purpose and conditions of the study. If, for any reason, you cannot participate in the survey, do not complete the questionnaire. You can also leave the premises at any time.

Please leave your contact number or email if you want to receive updates of this study. Any information you provide in this study that could identify you such as your name, gender, or other personal information will be kept confidential. Your name and surname will not be published anywhere. You can also use an alias.

Your answers will not be considered right or wrong, but please answer as accurately as possible.

For more information on the study, please visit sites.google.com/view/askarmambetaliev.

If you have any questions, please be free to contact me.

Thank you for participating in the survey!

Page 2. **QUESTIONS** (Please read Page 1 before taking part in the survey).

1. Name
2. Gender
3. Age
4. Nationality
5. Education
6. School address
7. Region
8. Religion or ideology
9. Language of instruction at school:
10. Your first language or primary language or a language spoken and written best.
11. In what language do you usually count money?
12. What is your most frequently used language at home?
13. What is your most frequently used language outside the home?
14. Name four languages that will be most useful for Kyrgyzstan.
15. Have you ever been discriminated against for your language?
16. Name four languages that, in your opinion, will be the most popular in our country.
17. How may strengthening the English language in Kyrgyzstan affect your daily life?
18. How may strengthening the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan affect your daily life?
19. Do citizens of Kyrgyzstan need a common language?
20. Is the state language necessary for career success?
21. Is the state language important to your children?
22. Should the government support minority languages?
23. How many official languages do you prefer four our country?
24. What other languages can be given official status in Kyrgyzstan?
25. How might the strengthening of the Russian language affect your daily life?
26. How might the strengthening of the English language affect your daily life?
27. How do you understand the word “Kyrgyzstani”?
28. Is it possible to be a patriot of Kyrgyzstan without knowing the state language?
29. What is more important: a) Religion. b) Language.
30. If you are offered a job with the same salary, a) a team consisting only of your nationality, and b) a team of different nationalities, which one will you go to?
31. What is more important: a) Fair language policy. b) Economic development of the country.
32. Your additional suggestions and recommendations.

Full questionnaire package: https://sites.google.com/view/listofappendices

Appendix P

Pilot Study Dataset Fragment

Appendix D

Main Study Dataset Fragment

Appendix I

Interview Transcripts

Appendix K

Key LP Issues in official documents

Appendix W

Word Frequency in Legal Documents

Appendix R

Codes in R

Appendices can be retrieved from https://sites.google.com/view/listofappendices