Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the
United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic
Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291
Introductory statement ........................................ 291
Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to
the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293
The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300
President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and
at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American
conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302
Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia
(August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305
Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt
urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306
IX C O N T E N T S
Appendix D-Continued Page
Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307
President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message
(September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310
Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311
Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference"
(August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314
Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions
in the negotiations with the United States
(September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316
The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals
(October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319
Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war
between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to
war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the
Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325
The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission
to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5,
1941) ......................................................... 326
The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal"
(November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331
Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with
"Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the
United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337
Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States
(November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344
The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less
favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal"
(November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355
Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United
States and demands an agreement on that basis
(November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360
The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363
The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese-
American conversations and at the same time moves additional
Japanese troops into southern Indochina
(November 27-December 7, 1941) ................................ 387
The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina
appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405
Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United
States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the
United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409
President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern
situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411
President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its
purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina
(December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415
The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French
Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by
the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421
The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424
Page 291
Appendix D
REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN, AND RELATED MATTERS, FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN AUGUST, 1941
THROUGH DECEMBER 8,1941
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This appendix reviews, upon the basis of the record before the Committee
and in greater detail than in Part I of the report to which it is
annexed, the diplomatic conversations between the United States and
Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941
through December 8, 1941. While it is not to be regarded as including
all of the material contained in the record before the Committee that
touches upon those conversations during that period, it does attempt to
set forth the material facts in connection therewith.
Prior to the Committee's investigation, nearly all of the information
concerning the diplomatic conversations during 1941 between the United
States and Japan that had been made public was contained in the official
State Department publications, "Peace and War" (ex. 28) [1] and "Foreign
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29), together
with former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's book, "Ten Years in Japan" (ex.
30), which were published during the war and were subject to wartime
restrictions. To the basic material contained in those publications, the
Committee has added hundreds of documents, personal as well as official,
from the files of the State Department and of the late President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. In addition, the Committee has received in
evidence hundreds of messages between the Japanese Foreign Office in
Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington as intercepted,
translated, and available at the time to high official; in the United
States Government in Washington, including President Roosevelt and
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. There 1S also before the Committee
testimony of former Secretary of State Hull and of former United States
Ambassador in Japan Joseph. C. Grew, a prepared statement and answers to
interrogatories submitted by former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson,
and collateral (regarding diplomatic matters) testimony of Gen. George
C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark, and other high-ranking officers of
the Army and Navy. The record before the Committee also contains
hundreds of captured Japanese documents, as well as reports of
interrogations conducted in Japan for the supreme allied commander, Gen.
Douglas MacArthur, at the request of the Committee, many of which are
directly concerned with the diplomatic events immediately preceding
Pearl Harbor, including an authoritative translation of the memoirs of
Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Premier of Japan until October
[1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to
exhibits introduced at the hearings before the Committee.
Page 292 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
16, 1941. This mass of testimony and documentary evidence, from so many
different and independent sources, and including official documents of
the Japanese and other governments, as well as of the United States
Government, affords countless opportunities for verification by cross-
checking
By interweaving the diplomatic material contained in the documentary
evidence and testimony before the Committee, this appendix attempts to
reconstruct chronologically the significant events in the diplomatic
conversations between the United States and Japan during the 4 months
that immediately preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Only
thus, for example, can the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages
between Tokyo and Washington be examined in the surrounding
circumstances in which they were first seen by high officials in the
United States Government, for those messages were the day-to-day
instructions sent by the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo to the
Japanese Ambassadors in Washington for the purpose of guiding them in
their conversations with Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, and the
Ambassadors' reports and comments to the Japanese Foreign Office
concerning those conversations. While in American hands the diplomatic
messages between Tokyo and Washington not only provided Secretary Hull
and President Roosevelt with advance knowledge of the Japanese plans for
the conduct of the conversations but also were one of the most important
and significant types of intelligence information available to the Army
and Navy in Washington, they did not contain any information pointing
toward Pearl Harbor as a possible target of Japanese attack.
Since the report to which this appendix is annexed discusses in detail
the military aspects and implications of the diplomatic conversations
between the United States and Japan and of the intercepted Japanese
diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington, no attempt is made
here to tie in the events on the "diplomatic front" with the various
warning messages sent by the Army and Navy from Washington to the
commanders in the Pacific, although the latter messages were to a
considerable extent based upon the state of Japanese-American diplomatic
relations at the time they were dispatched. Neither does this appendix
attempt to describe the process of building up American military
strength in the Pacific area which was underway during the period in
question, although by taking up the Marshall-Stark joint memoranda of
November 5 and November 27 in connection with the events that gave rise
to each, it does indicate in general terms the over-all military and
naval considerations that affected American policies in the Pacific
during the latter part of 1941. Parenthetically, it may be noted here
that the inherent relationship between diplomatic policies and military
and naval power was succinctly stated by Secretary Hull when he
testified before the Committee that soon after he came to the State
Department he learned that the representatives of the aggressor nations
with whom he talked "were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our
Army," and that the diplomatic strength of the United States went up or
down with their estimate of what the United States Army and Navy
"amounted to."
The record before the Committee shows that the United States Government
participated in the conversations with Japan in an effort to dissuade
the Japanese Government from its course of military aggression and its
Axis ties with Germany and Italy. The fact that
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 293
the United States was engaging in such conversations with Japan was
believed to strengthen the position of the elements in that country who
disapproved of the policies of those who dominated the Japanese
Government; success in negotiations with Japan on the basis of the
principles to which the United States Government adhered would have had
many material and other advantages for both the United States and Japan.
American participation in the conversations had the further purpose of
giving the United States Army and Navy more time to prepare their
defense of areas in the Pacific regarded as vital to the safety and
security of the United States. Recognition of this dual purpose is the
key to an understanding of the day-to-day course of the conversations.
Every action taken, every move made, on the American side must be
considered in the light of those objectives.
BRIEF RESUME OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS PRIOR TO THE
ATLANTIC CONFERENCE
This narrative begins in August, 1941 with the President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in conference on a
warship off the coast of Newfoundland, discussing how to prevent the
outbreak of war with Japan. It ends on December 7-8, 1941 with Japanese
bombs falling on ships of the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl
Harbor, with Japanese troops invading Thailand and British Malaya, and
with other Japanese attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippine
Islands, Guam, Wake, and Midway.
Into the intervening 4 months were crowded events the causes of which
lay deeper and were more fundamental than the Japanese occupation of
southern French Indochina in July or the breaking off of the Japanese-
American conversations and the freezing of Japanese assets in the United
States which had immediately followed that Japanese move. By August
1941, there was but a slim chance that the Japanese Government would
"reverse the engine," as Ambassador Grew expressed it, and abandon the
course of aggression through force of arms to which it had been
committed. Although it was true that the informal conversations in
Washington between the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo
Nomura, had revealed an apparent willingness on the part of the Japanese
Government to go along with certain of the peaceful principles to which
the United States was committed, *provided those principles were stated
in sufficiently general terms to make their application in specific
situations wholly unpredictable*, those conversations had disclosed
three crucial points of difference between the two Governments: the
question of nondiscrimination in international trade, the question of
the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and the question of
Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact.
During the latter part of January 1941, through private Japanese and
American citizens, the suggestion had reached President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity
to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward the
"China Incident" (ex. 29, vol. II, PP. 328-329; ex. 179). The initial
reaction of the United States Government had been one of caution (ex.
29, vol. II, P. 330). Secretary Hull testified that -
"In the light of Japan's past and current record and in view of the wide
divergences between the policies which the United States and Japan had
been pursuing
[Pairs of asterisks have been used to replace italics in the original
text. LWJ]
Page 294 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the Far East, I estimated from the outset that there was not 1 chance
in 20 or 1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching a peaceful settlement.
Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the
signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling
for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would
contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we
should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.
"We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful,
fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific
area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and
beliefs of the American people. Moreover, the President and I
constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military
authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having
time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United
States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to
enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line
with our need to rearm for self-defense.
"The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government could
not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's
course of aggression. We realized that so much was involved in a
reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any
substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would
require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an
endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We
carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a
basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not
only to Japan but to all countries (tr. 1101-11025)." [1]
In his early conversations with Ambassador Nomura, who reached
Washington in February 1941, Secretary Hull had expressed the hope that
the Japanese Government might have something definite in mind that would
offer a practical approach to a general settlement of the problems in
the Pacific, and had indicated the willingness of the United States
Government to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might
offer that was consistent with the principles to which, the Secretary
had made it clear, the United States was committed (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
331-332). Secretary Hull testified as follows regarding his meeting on
April 16, 1941, with Ambassador Nomura:
"On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador.
I pointed out that *the one paramount preliminary question about which
our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that
the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its
present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which
our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between
nations should rest*, as follows:
(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each
and all nations;
(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs
of other countries;
(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of
commercial opportunity;
(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status
quo may be altered by peaceful means.
"I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to
consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as
could be consistent with those principles (tr. 11041104)."
As the result of these early conversations, on May 12 (Washington time),
the Japanese Ambassador had presented to Secretary Hull, upon
instructions from his Government, a document (Annex A attached hereto)
containing a proposal for a general settlement between the United States
and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 418-425). This document had revealed
authoritatively for the first time what the Japanese Government had in
mind as the basis for an agreement
[1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to
pages of the transcript of the hearings before the Committee.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 295
between the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 332). Between
May 12 and June 21, there had taken place a number of conferences
between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador at which the Japanese
proposal and related matters were discussed. In the meantime a
counterproposal by the United States had been prepared, and on June 21
(Washington time) this counterproposal (Annex B attached hereto) had
been handed to the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 483-492).
On June 22, 1941, Germany had invaded Russia. The German attack upon
Russia had precipitated a series of events in Japan which were to have
far-reaching effects upon Japanese-American relations. It had quickened
the appetites of those in the Japanese Government who believed that
then, or never, Japan's destiny was in her own hands. Intensive
consideration had immediately been given in Tokyo to the question
whether Japan should not attack Russia at once (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs,
p. 16). Foreign Minister Matsuoka in particular had urged this course.
According to the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese Premier
at the time, the attention of the Government became so centered upon
this question that the American counterproposal of June 21, which by
that time had been received in Tokyo from the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington, became completely side-tracked until after an Imperial
Conference with Emperor Hirohito on July 2 (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, pp. 16, 18). At that conference the question of war with Russia
had been temporarily shelved in favor of "an advance into the southern
regions," and it had been decided that, first of all, the plans "which
have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai will be
prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern
territories" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 70; cf. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2.) It is
now known that at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) it was
also decided that, in case the diplomatic negotiations with the United
States should break down, "preparations for a war with England and
America will also be carried forward"; that all plans, including the
plan to use Japan's military strength to settle the Soviet question if
the German-Russian war should develop to Japan's advantage, were to be
carried out-
"in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic
military preparations for a war with England and America;"
and that-
"In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America
into the European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations
under the Tri-Partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and
method of employing our armed forces we will take independent action
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, P. 71)."
The following report of the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time)
had been cabled by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Japanese
Ambassadors in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Russia, the same
day:
"(National Secret)
"At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd 'The
Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing
Situation' were decided. This Policy consists of the following two
parts. The first part 'The Policy' and the second part 'The Principal
Points.' (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this
has to do with national defense secrets, keep
Page 296 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to
both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.
The Policy.
1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world
peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity,
regardless of how the world situation may change.
2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the
China incident, *and shall take measures with a view to advancing
southward* in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence
and self-protection.
The Principal Points.
For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, *increasing
pressure shall be added from various points in the south*, and by means
of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions
shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and
various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in
the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be
reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French
Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German
war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained,
every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall
be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations
shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available
shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining
the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power
Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed* (ex. 1, pp.
1-2)." [1]
It is worthy of note that this intercepted Japanese message, which was
translated and available in Washington [2] on July 8 (Washington time),
did not mention the decisions at the Imperial Conference respecting the
United States.
Commencing immediately after the Imperial Conference, Japan had
proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, calling up from 1
to 2 million reservists and conscripts, recalling Japanese merchant
vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean, imposing restrictions upon
travel in Japan, and carrying out strict censorship of mail and
communications. The Japanese press had dwelt constantly on the theme
that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never
equaled in all Japanese history. The United States had been charged with
using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The
Japanese press had warned that if the United States took further action
in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would
face a final crisis (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 339-340).
Largely as a result of disagreements within the Japanese Government
regarding the reply to be made to the American proposals of June 21,
Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet had resigned *en bloc* on July 16
(Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 20-24). Prince Konoye had
then been ordered by Emperor Hirohito to organize the new Cabinet, which
he had done, the only important change being the appointment of Admiral
Toyoda as Foreign Minister, in place of Yosuke Matsuoka (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 25). The views of the latter had been one of the principal
causes of the disagreements within the Government regarding its reply to
the
[1] Unless otherwise noted, all italics in this appendix have been
supplied.
[2] The expression "translated and available in Washington," as used in
this appendix, means that English translations of the particular
intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were available at the time
stated to those officials of the United States Government in Washington
to whom the Army and Navy were distributing "Magic" at the time. It
should be borne in mind that all such messages to which reference is
made in this appendix were so available: specific reference has been
made to the date when a message became available only in those instances
where knowledge of the exact date is important.
While the information contained in the intercepted Japanese diplomatic
messages was available at the time, the information contained herein
which is derived solely from captured Japanese documents (exhibits 8 and
132) and from the memoirs of Prince Konoye (exhibit 173) was not, of
course, available at the time.
American proposals of June 21. Following this Cabinet change while
Premier Konoye and the new Foreign Minister in Tokyo and Ambassador
Nomura in Washington had made emphatic and repeated protestations of
Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific
problems, the messages from Tokyo to Washington had contained such
statements as "there is more reason than ever before to arm ourselves to
the teeth for all-out war" (ex. 1, p. 8). The bombing of American
property in China had continued, including bursts which damaged the
American Embassy and the U. S. S. TUTUILA at Chungking (ex. 29, vol. II,
p. 343). An intercepted message of July 19 (Japan time) from Tokyo to
Berlin had contained the following estimate of the change in the
Japanese Cabinet:
"The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection
with National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign
policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the
principles of the Tripartite Pact (ex. 1, p. 3)."
In the meantime, the movement of Japanese troops and ships in accordance
with the Japanese plans for the "southward advance" had begun in
earnest, (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 340; ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26).
Those military and naval movements, plus the failure as yet of the
Japanese Government to make any reply to the American proposals of June
21, had led Under Secretary Welles, upon instructions from the Secretary
of State, to inform Ambassador Nomura on July 23 (Washington time) that
Secretary Hull "could not see that there was any basis now offered for
the pursuit of the conversations in which he and the Ambassador had been
engaged" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525). About this time, Colonel Hideo
Iwakuro and Mr. Tadao Wikawa, who had been advising Ambassador Nomura in
the conversations, left Washington and returned to Japan. On July 24
(Washington time), in a conference with the Japanese Ambassador attended
by Under Secretary Welles and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval
Operations, President Roosevelt had proposed that, if the Japanese
Government would withdraw its forces from French Indochina, he would
endeavor to obtain from the British, the Chinese, and the Netherlands
Governments, and the United States Government itself would give, a
solemn and binding declaration to regard French Indochina as a
neutralized country, provided the Japanese Government would give a
similar commitment (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 527-530). Nevertheless, the
Japanese troop movements into French Indochina had continued, and on
July 26 (Washington time) President Roosevelt had issued an Executive
order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 267). The effect of this order had been to bring about very soon
the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan (ex.
29, vol. II, p. 343).
In a message dated July 31 (Japan time), which was translated and
available in Washington on August 4 (Washington time), the new Foreign
Minister had advised Ambassador Nomura that since the Imperial
Conference on July 2 (Japan time) the Japanese Government had been
devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of the policies
there decided upon. He told the Ambassador:
"Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries,
led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly
strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire,
to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of
the South Seas. Our Empire
Page 298 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening
chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with
the participation of England and the United States, acting like a
cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain
military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that
territory.
"That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States,
not to mention Russia quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help
Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever
treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United
States.
[Discontinuous text]
"We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows
it and ought to understand our actions.
"6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order
to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for
each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean
to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not
necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should
trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each
use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.
"Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a
determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the
Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an
Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those
objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to
engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action. (Ex. 1, pp. 9-
10.)"
In the meantime, a reply to the American proposals of June 21 had been
transmitted on July 25 (Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura in Washington
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). He had not presented it to Secretary
Hull, however, because of the change in Japanese Cabinets, because he
thought it would not be acceptable to the United States Government, and
because he had received no instructions from the new Cabinet as to how
to proceed under the circumstances (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26).
Still another proposal had then been drawn up in Tokyo and this new
proposal had been presented to Secretary Hull on August 6 by Ambassador
Nomura with the statement that it was intended to be responsive to
President Roosevelt's suggestion for the neutralization of French
Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 546-550). The new Japanese proposal had
asked, either expressly or by implication, that the United States-
"(1) remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; (2)
suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; (3) discontinue
furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for
the arming of their Far Eastern possessions; (4) discontinue aid to the
Chinese Government; and (5) assent to Japan's assertion and exercise of
a special military position and a permanent preferential political and
economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to
procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States
and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was
committed. In return the Japanese Government offered not to station
Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than
Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina
for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the
menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well
as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the
southwestern Pacific area (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 344)."
About this time, in Tokyo, Premier Konoye had determined to propose a
personal meeting between himself and President Roosevelt (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, p. 29). It is now known that he had presented this idea
to the Ministers of War and Navy on August 4 (Japan time). Before that
day ended, the Navy Minister had expressed complete accord and had even
anticipated the success of the proposed conference (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 30). The Minister of War, General Tojo, however, had replied
in writing as follows:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 299
"If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the
United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which
are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the
same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created.
For these reasons, the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The
attempt to surmount the present critical situation by the Prime
Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed with sincere
respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's
intention to attend such a meeting *with determination to firmly support
the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to the "N"
Plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the
United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the
Empire even after this final effort is made*, the Army is not
necessarily in disagreement.
"However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if after making
preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with
someone other than the President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a
lesser capacity. (2) *You shall not resign your post as a result of the
meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be
prepared to assume leadership in the war against America* (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, pp. 30-31)."
On August 7 (Japan time) Premier Konoye had been instructed by Emperor
Hirohito to proceed immediately with arrangements for the meeting (ex.
173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31). That day the Premier had sent a telegram to
Ambassador Nomura, which was translated and available in Washington on
August 8 (Washington time), directing him to propose such a meeting (ex.
1, pp. 12-13).
Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had met on August 8 (Washington
time), and at that meeting the Ambassador had presented the proposal for
a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye. Secretary Hull
had informed the Ambassador that the new Japanese proposal of August 6
was not responsive to President Roosevelt's suggestion of July 24
(Washington time) mentioned above, and, regarding the proposal for a
meeting between the President and Premier Konoye, had said that it
remained for the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find
means of shaping its policies along lines that would make possible an
adjustment of views between the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
550-551).
The next day, August 9 (Washington time), Secretary Hull had conferred
with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, who had inquired about the
amount of aid the United States Government would be able to give in case
the Japanese should attack Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. Secretary
Hull recorded:
"I replied that I myself have visualized the problem and issue in a
broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to
invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and
continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to
the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape
of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade
routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad
military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in
Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel.
I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the
problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this
Government in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of
resistance will be more or less affected by the British defensive
situation in Europe and hence by the question of the number of American
naval vessels and other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain
at the same time. I said that in the event of further Japanese movements
south this Government and the British Government should naturally have a
conference at once and this Government would then be able to determine
more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance, in
the light of the statement I had just made (ex. 28, pp. 710-711).
Page 300 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Except that President Roosevelt had left Washington for the Atlantic
Conference meeting with Prime Minister Churchill before either of the
two last-mentioned conferences, [1] the foregoing summarizes briefly the
immediate background for that Conference so far as relations between the
United States and Japan were concerned. The Japanese move into southern
French Indochina while at the same time in Washington Ambassador Nomura
was engaging in conversations with Secretary Hull looking toward a
peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific, and the consequent
breaking off of those conversations, together with the freezing of
Japanese assets in the United States, had brought relations between the
two countries to a critical stage. Moreover, French Indochina, where the
Japanese forces were establishing themselves, was an area of great
strategic importance. From it, those forces could strike in many
directions, toward major objectives. To the east, across the South China
Sea lay the Philippines. To the west and northwest, across Thailand and
the Chinese province of Yunnan, lay Rangoon, Kunming, and the Burma
Road, over which American supplies for China were moving. To the south,
at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, lay the British naval base at
Singapore. Beyond Singapore and the Philippines lay the Netherlands East
Indies, with rubber, oil, and other materials needed by Japan for the
purposes to which the Japanese Government was committed.
When Under Secretary Welles informed Ambassador Nomura on July 23
(Washington time) that the conversations were at an end, he said that
the United States could only assume, first-
"that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the
United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy
of force and of conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts
on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety
in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume *that
the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon
a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in
the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that
region* (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525).
THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE
(August 9-14, 1941)
The meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill,
each accompanied by high officials of their respective Governments, took
place at sea near Argentia, Newfoundland, during the second week in
August 1941. At it the President and the Prime Minister agreed upon the
joint declaration of principles which has since become known as the
Atlantic Charter (tr. 1359-1364). Their conversations also dealt with
steps which Great Britain and the United States were taking for their
safety in the face of the policies of aggression of the German
Government and other governments associated with the German Government.
They discussed such matters as the proposed occupation of the Canary
Islands by the British Government to guard the southern Atlantic convoy
route into the
[1] Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles testified, however,
that he believed he (Welles) left Washington for the Atlantic Conference
the evening of August 8 (Washington time) (tr. 1254).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 301
British Isles, a proposal that the Portuguese Government request the
Government of the United States for assistance in the defense of the
Azores as a means of assurance that those islands would not be occupied
by Germany, and the protection of the Cape Verde Islands against Axis
aggressors (ex. 22-C). The President and the Prime Minister also
discussed the situation in the Far East. During those discussions Mr.
Churchill submitted a proposal for parallel declarations by the United
States, British, and Dutch Governments warning Japan against new moves
of military aggression. [1] This proposal also contemplated that the
Russian Government would be kept fully informed of such steps (ex. 22).
The final discussion of Mr. Churchill's proposal occurred on August 11
(ex. 22-C). According to Under Secretary Welles' record of that
discussion-
"The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements
handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.
"The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the
implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that
she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their
economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval
defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including
the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of
which were particularly unacceptable (ex. 22-C)."
The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, and
after expressing his strong feeling that "every effort should be made to
prevent the outbreak of war with Japan," he stated the procedure with
respect to Japan that he intended to follow upon his return to
Washington. He told the Prime Minister that he would inform Ambassador
Nomura that if the Japanese Government would give satisfactory
assurances that it would not further station its troops in the
Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the
Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina would be withdrawn,
the United States Government-would-resume the informal conversations
with the Japanese Government. He said that he would further state that
if Japan should refuse to consider this procedure and should undertake
further steps in the nature of military expansions, in his belief
various steps would have to be taken by the United States
notwithstanding his realization that the taking of such measures might
result in war between the United States and Japan (ex 22-C). Mr.
Churchill immediately concurred in this procedure (ex 22-C).
There was then discussed-
"the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken
as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a
statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the
Soviet Union (ex. 22-C)."
Under Secretary Welles expressed the view that the real issue involved
was whether or not Japan would continue its policy of conquest by force
in the entire Pacific and suggested that the statement which the
President intended to make-
"might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy
rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the southwestern
Pacific area (ex. 22-C).
[1] The record before the Committee also shows that in February 1941,
just before the Lend-Lease Act-described by Prime Minister Churchill as
"the Bill on which our hopes depend"-was enacted by Congress, the Prime
Minister and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, had urged upon
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull their desire for some action by
the United States "to deter the Japanese" (ex. 158).
Page 302 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this, and "*it was
decided that the step to be taken by the President* [1] would be taken
in that sense" (ex. 22-C).
Consideration was then given the question whether or not President
Roosevelt should include in his statement to Ambassador Nomura a
statement with respect to British policy concerning French Indochina and
Thailand (ex. 22-C). However, since the statement ultimately made by the
President to Ambassador Nomura did not mention British policy concerning
those countries this latter proposal appears to have been dropped (ex.
29, vol. II, pp. 554-559).
Under Secretary Welles returned to Washington from Argentia several days
before President Roosevelt, at the latter's request. Upon his arrival,
he advised Secretary Hull of what had transpired there, and, at the
President's further request, he prepared the initial draft (ex. 22) of
the proposed warning to Japan from notes he had made of his final
conversation with the President before leaving Argentia (tr. 1259). A
revised draft was given to Secretary Hull by Mr. Welles on August 16,
1941 (ex. 22-A), and was further revised by the Secretary and his
advisors on Far Eastern affairs before being communicated to Ambassador
Nomura by the President (tr. 1272).
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WARNS JAPAN AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION AND AT THE
SAME TIME OFFERS TO RESUME THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS
(August 17, 1941)
President Roosevelt returned to Washington Sunday morning, August 17
(Washington time) . Late that afternoon, Ambassador Nomura met with the
President and Secretary Hull at the White House, at the President's
request (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 554 et seq.; ex. 124). [2] Mr. Roosevelt
read and then handed to Admiral Nomura the document
[1] The evidence before the Committee is conflicting as to whether or
not Prime Minister Churchill promised President Roosevelt that the
British Government would take action parallel to that to be taken by the
United States Government.
The only contemporaneous records of the Atlantic Conference before the
Committee are three memoranda prepared by Under Secretary Welles (ex.
22-B, 22-C, 22-D). Those memoranda show that the procedure outlined by
President Roosevelt differed substantially from that envisaged in Prime
Minister Churchill's proposal. As there described by Mr. Welles, the
President's procedure did not call for parallel action by either the
British or Dutch Governments, or for keeping Russia informed, as Mr.
Churchill had proposed. Nor, as is the case of Mr. Churchill's proposal,
was the precise phraseology of the warning to Japan prescribed, it being
left entirely up to the President. Mr. Welles testified that the promise
given by the President to Mr. Churchill "was limited to the fact that a
warning would be given" (tr. 1422) and that the only agreement reached
between the President and the Prime Minister was "that the President
made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United
States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to
the Japanese Government of the character which actually was made by the
President on August 17" (tr. 1428).
While it is true that Mr. Welles testified that the promise made by
President Roosevelt was to "take parallel action with the British
Government in warning the Japanese Government" (tr. 12354) and that he
"took it for granted Mr. Churchill must have made that statement" (i. e.
promised to make a parallel warning) to the President (tr. 1446), it is
also true that when asked directly whether the President had told him
that Mr. Churchill had promised to make a parallel warning, Mr. Welles
said, "the President in his conversation with me, so far as I remember,
did not make that specific statement" (tr. 1446). Moreover, as
previously noted, the Welles' memoranda neither state nor indicate that
any such promise was made by Mr. Churchill (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D), and
there is no evidence before the Committee showing that action parallel
to the President's warning to Japan was ever taken by the British
Government. On the other hand both "Peace and War" {ex. 28, p. 129) and
"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941" (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 345) refer to an "agreement" to take parallel action made by
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, though, of course,
neither of these purports to be a contemporaneous account of the
Atlantic Conference. Likewise, in his testimony before the Committee,
Secretary Hull referred to such an "agreement." Though again Secretary
Hull did not attend the Atlantic Conference (tr. 1116).
[2] This discussion of the meeting referred to in the text, and the
discussions in this appendix of other meetings in Washington or Tokyo
between representatives of the United States Government and the Japanese
Government, are based primarily upon the official State Department
records of such meetings appearing in Volumes I and II of " Foreign
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29) and upon
intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo reporting
such meetings, the Committee exhibits in which such messages appear
being indicated-in all cases. Reference is made to such records and
reports, only the material portions of which have been quoted or
summarized here.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 303
drafted by Mr. Welles and the Secretary. It noted that notwithstanding
the protracted conversations engaged in by the United States and
Japanese Governments looking toward a peaceful settlement in the Pacific
and the President's suggestion on July 24, 1941, for the
"neutralization" of French Indochina, the Japanese Government had
continued to dispose its armed forces at various points in the Far East
and had occupied French Indochina. Reading from the document, President
Roosevelt said that the United States Government felt that at the
present stage "nothing short of the most complete candor on its part in
the light of the evidence and indications" in its possession would tend
to further the objectives sought. He then warned Japan against further
aggression, saying:
"Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to
the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any
further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination
by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of
the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all
steps which it may deem necessary toward safe-guarding the legitimate
rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and
toward insuring the safety and security of the United States (ex. 29,
vol. II, pp. 556-557)."
On behalf of his Government, Ambassador Nomura reasserted the sincerity
of its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese-American
diplomatic relations. He expressed his Government's desire to be advised
as to the possibility of arranging a meeting between President Roosevelt
and Premier Konoye and of resuming the informal conversations which had
been terminated by the United States in July because of the Japanese
occupation of southern French Indochina. He stated, however, that he
felt no further explanations regarding his Government's actions in
French Indochina, in addition to the views already expressed to
Secretary Hull, were necessary.
The President then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a second
document. It opened with a reference to the Japanese proposal of August
8 (Washington time) for a meeting between himself and Premier Konoye and
to the Japanese desire for resumption of the informal conversations. The
President said that the United States Government would be prepared to
resume the conversations provided the Japanese Government felt that
Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist
activities, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along
the lines of the program to which the United States was committed. His
statement concluded:
"the Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of
the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal
conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both
Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or
proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be
so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as
to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has
repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 559)."
In Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo on this meeting, he emphasized
the "graveness with which he (President Roosevelt) views Japanese-U. S.
relations." The Ambassador expressed the view that the Japanese proposal
for a "leaders' conference" between President Roosevelt and Premier
Konoye had "considerably eased" the attitude of the United States
Government and that there was no room for doubt "that the President
hopes that matters will take a turn for the better" (ex 124).
Page 304 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The next day, August 18 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent a
message to Prime Minister Churchill describing his meeting with
Ambassador Nomura. This message indicates that the President did not
learn until after his return to Washington of the Ambassador's request
on August 16 (Washington time) for a resumption of the informal
conversations. In his message, the President told Mr. Churchill that-
"I made to him (Admiral Nomura) a statement covering the position of
this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in
the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the
proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made
to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the
statement we had discussed (ex. 70)."
The evidence before the Committee does not show whether or not the
British Government took "parallel action" to the warning given Japan by
President Roosevelt. Under Secretary Welles testified before the
Committee that he took it for granted that the British Government took
such parallel action and that the records of the State Department would
probably show that (tr. 1279), but Secretary Hull testified, and the
State Department has advised the Committee, that its files contain no
record of any such action (tr. 14, 306; 4480). Furthermore, as late as
November 30 (Washington time), Prime Minister Churchill sent a message
to the President saying that "one important method remains unused in
averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain
declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further
act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest
consequences. * * * We would, of course, make a similar declaration or
share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24); and the evidence further shows
that on December 7 the Prime Minister submitted to President Roosevelt a
draft of a proposed warning to Japan (tr. 13738-13740). On the other
hand, on August 25, 1941, in an address reporting to Parliament on the
Atlantic Conference, the Prime Minister said:
"But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by
aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking
to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing
as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying
the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been
wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them
carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now
they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They
snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their
movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and
menace the Philippine islands under the protection of the United States.
"It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to
secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with
infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will
give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We
earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say:
That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves
unhesitatingly at the side of the United States (tr. 1355-1356; 4480-
4481)."
While Secretary Hull testified that he knew of no parallel action taken
by the British other than this address (tr. 14306), which was broadcast
by radio, Under Secretary Welles testified that in his opinion this
address did not constitute "parallel action" of the kind proposed by Mr.
Churchill to the President, and that in Mr. Welles'
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 305
judgment such action would necessarily have had to have been in the form
of an exchange of diplomatic notes (tr. 1356). [1]
On August 21 (Washington time) President Roosevelt sent a message to
Congress describing the meeting at Argentia (tr. 1359-1364). This
message embodied the text of the "Atlantic Charter" and referred in
general terms to other matters discussed at the meeting, but made no
specific mention of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan. Under
Secretary Welles testified that publication of the proposal to issue a
warning to Japan or of the President's warning, itself, would not have
been conducive to a successful result in attempting to find a peaceful
solution, as it would have inflamed public opinion in Japan (tr. 1277).
JAPAN PROTESTS UNITED STATES SHIPMENTS OF OIL TO RUSSIA
(August 27, 1941)
The Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's request on August 17
(Washington time) for a " clearer statement than has yet been furnished
as to its present attitude and plans" was not received until August 28
(Washington time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador
Nomura reported to the Japanese Foreign Office an increasing interest on
the part of President Roosevelt in participating in the resumption of
the Japanese-American negotiations and stated that, in his opinion, "the
President is the one who shows the most interest in the 'leaders
conference' " (ex. 124). About the same time the Ambassador received a
report from Tokyo concerning the Foreign Minister's talk with Ambassador
Grew on August 18 (Japan time) at which Ambassador Grew indicated that
he would give the proposed meeting his personal support (ex. 124). On
August 23 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura
that "everything in our power" was being done " to rush our reply to the
United States and at the same time to bring about the 'leaders
conference' at an earlier date" (ex. 124). The next day Ambassador
Nomura called of Secretary Hull and reported that his Government wanted
the "leaders conference" to take place before October 15. The reason he
gave for this was the fear in Tokyo that the impression would be created
that Japan " had given in in the face of the threat of 'encirclement' "
if the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should follow a reported
British-U. S.-Soviet conference to be held at an earlier date (ex. 124;
ex. 29, vol. II, p. 568).
At about this time the German Ambassador in Japan, General Ott, received
intelligence reports that the United States was preparing to ship oil to
Russia via Vladivostok, that the first of the transporting vessels had
already sailed, that they would soon sail in rapid succession, and that
the oil would undoubtedly be used by Russia for an attack upon Japan.
General Ott repeated this information to the Vice Minister for Foreign
Affairs during an interview on August 19 (Japan time), and in reply the
Vice Minister said that the problem of American oil was receiving very
careful attention (ex. 132-A, item C). The nest day, and again on August
22 (Japan time), the Foreign
[1] There is also before the Committee a memorandum of Dr. Stanley K.
Hornbeck, Political Advisor to Secretary Hull, dated, however, February
28, 1944, in which it is stated that toward the end of August 1941, the
British and American Governments "served on Japan a strong warning"
against further extending her courses of aggression (ex. 108).
Page 306 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura requesting him to call the attention
of the United States authorities to the fact that if it should become
known in Japan that the United States was shipping iron, airplanes, and
other materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this might
have an adverse effect upon Japanese-American relations (ex. 1, p. 19;
ex. 124). Ambassador Nomura told Secretary Hull during their
conversation on August 23 (Washington time) that the shipment of oil by
the United States to Russia through Japanese waters "would naturally
give the Japanese real concern at an early date" (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
566). A more urgent message concerning this matter was sent from Tokyo
to Ambassador Nomura on August 26 (Japan time) requesting him to "make
representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may
reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general
viewpoint of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations" (ex. 1, p.
21 ) . Representations of this nature were made to Ambassador Grew in
Tokyo the next day (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 569), and on August 27
(Washington time) Ambassador Nomura orally protested to Secretary Hull
against American shipments of oil to Russia through Japanese waters.
Secretary Hull stated that only two tankers were involved and that the
shipments were entirely valid under all the laws of commerce (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 570).
PREMIER KONOYE SENDS A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT URGING
THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE"
(August 28, 1941)
Premier Konoye replied to President Roosevelt's statement of August 17
(Washington time) in a personal message which Ambassador Nomura handed
to the President at a conference at the White House on the morning of
August 28 (Washington time). The Premier's message was accompanied by a
statement which the Japanese Government intended to be responsive to the
President's suggestion that it would be helpful if that Government would
furnish a clearer statement of its present attitude and plans than had
as yet been given (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 571-572).
In his message to President Roosevelt, Premier Konoye urged that the
meeting between himself and the President be arranged "as soon as
possible." He said that while the preliminary informal negotiations that
were terminated in July had been "quite appropriate both in spirit and
content," nevertheless-
"the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion
confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet
the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may
produce unforeseen contingencies
"I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the
Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all
important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific
area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation.
Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary be left to negotiations
between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 573)."
The statement which accompanied Premier Konoye's message referred, among
other things, to the-
"principles and directives set forth in detail by the United States
Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a
program for the Pacific area-
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 307
and continued-
"The Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these
principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest
manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be
applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world.
Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 575)."
However, while the statement contained many assurances regarding Japan's
peaceful intentions, the more important assurances were qualified or
conditional. Thus, the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its
troops from Indochina, but only "as soon as the China incident is
settled or a just peace is established in East Asia"; concerning Soviet-
Japanese relations it was said that Japan would take no military action
"as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese
neutrality treaty and does not menace Japanese Manchukuo or take any
action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty"; the Japanese
Government had no intention, it was said, of using, "without
provocation" military force against any neighboring nation (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 573-576).
Ambassador Nomura reported to his Government that President Roosevelt "
vas well pleased" with the Premier's message (ex. 124). The President
had said, he cabled, "I am looking forward to having approximately three
days talk with Prince Konoye", but that Hawaii was out of the question
as a meeting place and that he would prefer Juneau, Alaska. The
Ambassador quoted the President as having "smilingly and cynically" said
during his reading of the message:
"Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince Konoye, I
wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those
conversations just as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during
Secretary Hull's conversations with your Excellency (ex. 124)."
The evening of the same day, August 28 (Washington time), Ambassador
Nomura called on Secretary Hull and outlined to the Secretary his ideas
concerning the arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting.
During this conversation, the Secretary pointed out to Ambassador Nomura
the desirability of there being reached in advance of the proposed
meeting "an agreement in principle on the principal questions which were
involved in a settlement of Pacific questions between the two nations."
The Secretary said that if the proposed meeting should fail to result in
an agreement, serious consequences from the point of view of both
Governments would ensue. He expressed the view that therefore the
purpose of the proposed meeting should be "the ratification of essential
points agreed upon in principle" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 576-577).
Ambassador Nomura concluded his report of this meeting to Tokyo with the
comment:
"In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an
exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is
considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in
fairly close agreement the "leaders conference" will not materialize
(ex. 124)."
GERMANY SUSPECTS TREACHERY
(August 29-30, 1941)
It became known to the American press, soon after Ambassador Nomura left
the White House following his conference with President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull on August 28 (Washington time), that
Page 308 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Ambassador had delivered a personal message to the President from
Premier Konoye. Whether this information was given out by Secretary Hull
or by Ambassador Nomura is not clear from the record before the
Committee (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 582-583; ex. 124); however, as a result
of the disclosure, Foreign Minister Toyoda became greatly concerned that
the proposed "leaders conference" should be kept absolutely secret,
fearing the project would fail if news of it should leak out before a
settlement was reached. The Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura
twice on August 29 (Japan time) urging him "to take every precaution" to
guard against leaks (ex. 124).
This concern in Tokyo over the effect of publicity on the conversations
and the proposed "leaders conference" was a major reason for calls by
the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office on
Ambassador Grew on August 29 and September 3 (Japan time) and for a call
by Ambassador Nomura on Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time)
(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579-582, 586-587, 583-585). During his first
conversation with Ambassador Grew, the Director, Mr. Terasaki, dwelt at
some length on the unfortunate effects of the publicity in Washington
about Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and then
communicated to the Ambassador an appeal from Foreign Minister Toyoda
that (1) the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting be arranged without delay
and (2) pending the outcome of the proposed meeting, the United States
postpone the sending oil tankers to the Soviet Union and suspend the
order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Ambassador Grew's
memorandum of this meeting noted that he left Mr. Terasaki "under no
illusion" that the United States Government would find it possible to
agree to either of the "preposterous requests" contained in (2) above
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 582). Ambassador Nomura's conference with Secretary
Hull on September 1 (Washington time) was concerned largely with
discussion of the effect upon the conversations of the positions taken
by the press in Japan and the United States. The Secretary took
advantage of the occasion to ask the Ambassador what would happen if an
agreement should not be reached at the proposed "leaders conference,"
and to repeat his suggestion that an effort be made to reach an
agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting (ex.
29, vol. II, pp. 583-585).
As a result of the fear in Tokyo of publicity, Ambassador Nomura wrote a
brief note to Secretary Hull on August 29 (Washington time) requesting
his cooperation in keeping the conversations secret. The Secretary
replied on September 2 (Washington time) saying that he would "be glad
to conform to the desires of yourself and your Government in the
foregoing respect, to every extent practical" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579,
586). However, apparently believing that some official comment was
needed in view of the rumors and speculation in Tokyo about Ambassador
Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt, at 2:30 p. M. On August 29
(Japan time). The Japanese Foreign Office released an official statement
that Ambassador Nomura had called on President Roosevelt on August 28
and had delivered to the President a message from Premier Konoye stating
"Japan's view regarding Pacific problems which are pending between Japan
and the United States" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). Ambassador Grew
advised Secretary Hull of this announcement later the same afternoon
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 309
Foreign Minister Toyoda feared publicity because of "the exceedingly
complex domestic situation" and the consideration which had to be given
to "our relations with Germany and Italy" (ex. 124). What the Foreign
Minister had in mind in the first connection is indicated by his cable
to Ambassador Nomura on September 3 (Japan time), in which he said:
"Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made
known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial
talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the
Tripartite Pact banner (ex. 1, p. 25)."
In the second connection, it is now known from captured Japanese
documents that less than 4 hours after the Tokyo announcement of Premier
Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, General Ott, the German
Ambassador, called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau,
and demanded to know whether the Premier's message departed from the
policy determined at the Imperial Conference on July 2, which had been
secretly communicated to the German Government, and whether the Cabinet
was contemplating any change in that regard (ex. 132-A, item C). The
Vice Minister replied that the message did not mean that there had been
"a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in
our relations with the Axis." The reason for sending the message, he
told the Ambassador, "was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific" and
to attempt "to start conversations between the two parties." Ambassador
Ott suggested that "precautions must be taken against America's scheme
to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her
advantage," to which the Vice Minister replied that "we have given the
matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan
with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon
Germany and Italy." "Our aim," he said, "is to keep her (America) from
joining in the war." The German Ambassador then requested an interview
with Foreign Minister Toyoda, which took place on the afternoon of
August 30 (Japan time). At that interview General Ott again demanded to
know whether the intentions of Japan were still as secretly communicated
to Germany on July 2. The Foreign Minister denied that there had been
any change in Japan's intentions, and stated that Japan's preparations
to avail herself of any new developments "are now making headway." The
German Ambassador said:
"In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities
thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an
attitude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to give up
taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion
might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese
government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that
it will continue to take that "line." I would like to ask what Your
Excellency's views are concerning this point (ex. 132-A, item C)."
Admiral Toyoda replied:
"In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to
prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the
same as in the past; nor will it change in the future (ex. 132-A, item
C)."
The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reported to Tokyo on October 1, 1941,
that because of the Japanese-American negotiations everyone in the
German Foreign Office was "thoroughly disgusted with Japan." He said
that the fact that the feeling of German leaders and people in
Page 310 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
general toward Japan was getting bad could not be covered up, and that
if Japan were to go ahead with the negotiations without consulting
Germany, "there is no telling what steps Germany may take without
consulting Japan" (ex. 1, pp. 4849).
In Italy, the impression created by the Japanese-American talks was not
enthusiastic, as the Japanese Ambassador in Rome reported to the Foreign
Office on September 30:
"Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in
the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the
Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the
newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are
concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As
for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first
anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite
Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people
(ex. 1, p. 44)."
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT REPLIES TO PREMIER KONOYE'S MESSAGE
(September 5, 1941)
President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura his reply to Premier
Konoye at a conference at the White House on the afternoon of September
3 (Washington time) (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 588-592). The President's
reply mentioned the reference in the statement which had accompanied the
Premier's message to the basic principles to which the United States
Government had long been committed and the President's desire to
collaborate in making these principles effective in practice. The
President stated that his deep interest in this matter made it necessary
for him to observe and take account of developments both in the United
States and Japan which had a bearing on Japanese-American relations, and
that he could not avoid taking cognizance of indications-
"of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely
entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful
collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure both of
us earnestly desire to follow (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)."
The President then suggested:
"that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward
ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring
to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and
essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I
have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical
application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance
of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement
accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this
suggestion (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)."
The President also read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a statement
which referred to the American proposals of June 21 (Washington time)
and to the fact that subsequent conversations bad disclosed that there
were divergences of view between the two Governments with respect to
certain fundamental questions dealt with in those proposals. Reading
from the statement, the President expressed the desire of the United
States Government "to facilitate progress toward a conclusive
discussion" and its belief-
"that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above
mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific
questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of
the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under
reference (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 591)."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 311
In connection with this statement, it will be remembered that the second
Konoye Cabinet had resigned on July 16 (Japan time) and had been
replaced by the third Konoye Cabinet the next day (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 24).
In his memorandum of the conversation with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary
Hull wrote:
"Both the President and I repeatedly emphasized the necessity for his
(i. e. Ambassador Nomura's) Government to clarify its position on the
question of abandoning a policy of force and conquest and on three
fundamental questions concerning which difficulties had been encountered
in our discussion of the Japanese proposal of May twelfth and the
discussion of which we had not pursued after the Japanese went into
Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 588)."
JAPAN PRESENTS NEW PROPOSALS IN A NEW FORM
(September 6, 1941)
It is now known that about the time President Roosevelt was meeting with
Ambassador Nomura, new Japanese proposals were being discussed at a
Joint Conference of Japanese Foreign Office and War and Navy officials
in Tokyo. According to Premier Konoye, these new proposals were intended
by the Foreign Office to bring up only "immediate and concrete problems"
and to focus the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and the
Premier on those problems. The Foreign Office took the position that it
was difficult to predict how long it would take to consider all of the
important fundamental principles dealt with in the proposals which had
been under consideration by the two Governments before the freezing
orders, and that consequently "the present crisis might not be averted"
if it should be necessary to consider all of those principles (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, p. 37). The new proposals were approved at the Joint
Conference mentioned above and were given to Ambassador Grew by Foreign
Minister Toyoda the next day, September 4 (Japan time), with the request
that they be transmitted to Secretary Hull by the Ambassador to overcome
any possibility of inaccuracy in handling by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 593).
Ambassador Nomura presented the new proposals to Secretary Hull at a
meeting on September 6 (Washington time). He explained that although the
new proposals had been prepared by the Japanese Government before it
received President Roosevelt's reply of September 3 (Washington time),
nevertheless his Government believed that the contents of the new
proposals constituted a reply to the President. He said that the
proposals were also in response to the view expressed by Secretary Hull
at the conference with him on the evening of August 28, namely, that it
would be desirable for the two Governments to reach an agreement in
principle on the fundamental questions involved before making
arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 606-607). As presented to Secretary Hull the new Japanese proposals
were as follows:
DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA)
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1941
The Government of Japan undertakes:
(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters
which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the
United States in the course of their preliminary informal
conversations;
312 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French
Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not,
without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any
regions lying south of Japan;
(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the
European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-
defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the
European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact
by Japan shall be independently decided;
(d) that Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of
general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the
realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from
China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between
Japan and China;
(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will
not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;
(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be
carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of
nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will
cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of
natural resources in the said area which it needs;
(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of
normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in
connection with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue
immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control
regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of
reciprocity.
"The Government of the United States undertakes:
(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment
expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will
abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the
endeavor by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;
(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment
expressed in point (f) referred to above;
(c) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the
Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;
(d) that the United States will immediately (upon settlement)
reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to
above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act
with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against
the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 608-609)."
Secretary Hull testified that these new Japanese proposals-
"were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement
communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese
draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their
obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified
undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort
to military action against any region south of Japan. No commitment was
offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to
China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's
territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in
China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in
wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of
nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula
contained in that draft that "the economic activities of the United
States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an
equitable basis" clearly implied a concept that the conditions under
which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be
conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan (tr. 1118-1119)."
On September 9 (Washington time) Secretary Hull cabled to Ambassador
Grew a series of questions to be submitted to Foreign Minister Toyoda
regarding the intentions of the Japanese Government in offering certain
of the new proposals, especially those relating to China (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 610-613). The Foreign Minister's replies to these questions were
received by Ambassador Grew on September 13 (Japan time) and promptly
cabled to Washington (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 620-624).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 313
On September 15 (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign
Minister Toyoda that it seemed that the matter of the preliminary
conversations had been entrusted to Secretary Hull. He said that in such
conversations the United States would want to be advised of the peace
terms Japan would propose between Japan and China and would refuse to
act as intermediary unless the terms were fair and just; therefore, he
said, it would be necessary to outline the terms in advance of the
proposed "leaders conference." He also reported that the United States
wanted to arrange matters with Britain, China, and the Netherlands in
advance of the proposed conference, so that those countries would not
get the impression the United States was trading them off (ex. 1, p.
27). Two days later, Ambassador Nomura cabled that there were
"considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. Conference" at a
recent United States Cabinet meeting and that "there is no mistaking the
fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the
preliminary arrangements can be made" (ex. 1, p. 28). On September 22
(Washington time), he cabled a long report to the Foreign Minister
concerning conditions and attitudes in the United States generally. His
report concluded with the following estimate:
"Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to
compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up
forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be
restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render
economic assistance to Japan (ex. 1, p. 31)."
In the meantime, in Tokyo at Joint Conferences on September 6 and 13
(Japan time), the Japanese Government had determined the basic peace
terms which it was prepared to offer to China (ex. 132-A, item D). A
document containing those terms (Annex C attached hereto) was handed to
Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23 (Washington time),
having been communicated by the Foreign Minister to Ambassador Grew in
Tokyo on September 22 (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 631-633).
During this conference with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura reiterated
the desire of his Government to have the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting take
place at the earliest possible opportunity. He told the Secretary that
the several documents which he had now presented were a full expression
of everything the Japanese Government desired to say, and that anything
further pertaining to the Tripartite Pact might best be left to the
proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 634-635). However, on September 27 (Washington time), he delivered
to Secretary Hull a further document (Annex D attached hereto), which
had been prepared in the form, and along the lines, of the American
proposals of June 21 (Washington time) and had been approved at a Joint
Conference on September 20 (Japan time). The new document, it was said,
incorporated all that the Japanese Government had communicated to the
American Government since June 21. A similar document had been delivered
to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 636-641).
On September 27 (Japan time) ceremonies were held in Tokyo celebrating
the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. That day Foreign Minister
Toyoda requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and asked the
Ambassador to convey to President Roosevelt, through Secretary Hull, the
anxiety of Premier Konoye and the entire Cabinet
Page 314 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lest the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting might be indefinitely
delayed, stating that all preparations had been made by the Japanese
Government. During this conference he described to Ambassador Grew in
considerable detail his Government's position regarding the
conversations (ex. 29, vol. I1, pp. 641-645). The Foreign Minister
cabled his remarks to Ambassador Nomura, saying that "in view of
internal and external circumstances in our country, we cannot keep
postponing matters forever" (ex. 1, p. 33). Ambassador Nomura
communicated the gist of the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary
Hull on September 29 (Washington time). He said that while he was well
aware of the United States Government's position and had communicated it
to Tokyo, nevertheless, his Government had instructed him to press for
an answer to the Japanese proposal. AS his personal opinion, he judged
that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting between the heads of
the two Governments, it might be difficult for Premier Konoye to retain
his position and that he then would be likely to be succeeded by a less
moderate leader (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 652).
AMBASSADOR GREW SUPPORTS THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE"
(August-September 1941)
In Tokyo Ambassador Grew had reached the conclusion that if the
Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should not be held, or if it should be long
delayed, the Konoye Cabinet might fall. He had first learned of the
proposed "leaders conference" at a meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda
on August 18 (Japan time.) During the Foreign Minister's lengthy remarks
concerning the proposed meeting, Ambassador Grew had commented on
Japan's progressive southward advance and the fact that, in spite of all
peaceful assurances, the United States Government in the light of the
steps Japan had taken "could only be guided by facts and actions and not
words." Notwithstanding the doubts reflected in these statements, at the
conclusion of the Foreign Minister's remarks Ambassador Grew had said
"that in the interests of peace, (he) would give the proposal (for a
meeting) his own. Personal support" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 559-564).
Ambassador Grew reported the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary
Hull the following day in a message which included the following, as
paraphrased in the State Department:
"that naturally he is not aware of the reaction President Roosevelt will
have to the proposal made today orally by the Japanese Minister for
Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador urges, however, with all the force at
his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility
of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this
Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful
consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese
history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not
crystallized completely owing to the fact that the proposal has the
approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The
good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President
Roosevelt is incalculable. The opportunity is here presented, the
Ambassador ventures to believe, for an act of the highest statesmanship,
such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt with Prime Minister
Churchill at sea, with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently
insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 565)."
A month later, in a personal letter dated September 22 (Japan time) to
President Roosevelt, which apparently did not, however, reach
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 315
Washington until after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, he referred to
his conversations with Premier Konoye "who," he said-
"in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements
in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's
relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for
having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now
sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to
hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of
policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has
led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business
and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in
Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the
evidence of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her
commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present
Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than
has been the case in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that
this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than
Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in
carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of
international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The
alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased
probability of war * * *. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can
come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree,
the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to
implement those terms." (Ex. 178.)"
A week later, on September 29 (Japan time), following his meeting with
Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 27 referred to above, Ambassador
Grew cabled a long report to Secretary Hull, in which "in all deference
to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary
Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter
is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan," he stated
at length his appraisal of the existing situation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
645-650). The most significant part of this report was the following, as
paraphrased in the State Department:
"8. Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese
Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut
commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to
principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations
will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet
and its supporting elements desiring *rapprochement* with the United
States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is
hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time.
If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss
of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and
probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's
being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this
may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these
will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans,
while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a
situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war. *The logical
outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the
formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the
disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the
United States.* There is a question that such a situation may prove to
be more serious even than the failure to produce a entirely satisfactory
agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and
Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
648-649)."
In connection with Ambassador Grew's reference to the "viewpoint of the
American Embassy in Japan," in his testimony before the Committee he
said:
"I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to
any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't even
know that they existed (tr. 1481)."
Page 316 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
And again:
"I just want to say once more everything I have said today represents
the point of view of one spot, our Embassy in Tokyo, and we were
deprived of a great deal of the information which was available to the
President and Mr. Hull. We had none of the secret intercepts or
telegrams, we had none of the documents that have come into the State
Department from time to time documents of a secret nature, so of course
the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a great deal more
information than we had available to us (tr. 1903-1904)."
JAPAN DETERMINES ITS MINIMUM DEMANDS AND ITS MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
(September 6, 1941)
It is now known that in the meantime, in Tokyo far-reaching decisions
had been made. The "Policy of the Imperial Government" which was decided
upon at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) had provided that
in carrying out a southward advance the Government would not be deterred
"by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and
America." It had also been decided at that conference that in carrying
out Japan's preparations for war with Russia and in the use of Japan's
military strength against Russia in case the German-Soviet war "should
develop to our advantage,"
"all plans, especially the use of armed forces, will be carried out in
such a way as to place no serious obstacles *in the path of our basic
military preparations for a war with England and America* (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, pp. 70-71)."
When the Japanese advance into southern French Indochina during the
latter part of July had brought about the termination of the
conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura and the
American freezing order, Premier Konoye had come forward early in August
with his proposal for a "leaders conference" between President Roosevelt
and himself. While this proposal had received the support of the
Japanese Navy, it had been supported by the Japanese Army only provided
the Premier intended
"*to carry out a war against America if the President of the United
States still failed to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire*
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31).
As tension increased in Tokyo, the Japanese Army General Staff began
advocating the immediate breaking off of negotiations with the United
States and the opening of Japanese-American hostilities, and Premier
Konoye discussed this question at innumerable conferences with the Army
and Navy Ministers during the latter part of August (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 39-40).
It is now known that during those conferences there were developed
"Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government"
which set forth the manner in which the Government would proceed in
carrying out the plans "for the southern territories" decided upon at
the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time). Premier Konoye submitted
these new "Plans" to the Emperor informally on September ,5 (Japan time)
in the form of an agenda for an Imperial Conference the next day, as
follows:
"1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved
in a war with America (and England and Holland), in order to secure our
national existence, *we will proceed with war preparations so that they
be completed approximately toward the end of October*."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 317
"2. At the same time, *we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic
means to have our demands agreed to by America and England*. Japan's
minimum demands in these negotiations with America (and England),
together with the Empire's maximum concessions are embodied in the
attached document.
"3. *If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of
having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned
above, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war
against America (and England and Holland).*
"Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern
territories will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid.
Special effort will be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from
forming a united front against Japan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."
According to Premier Konoye, on examining the "Plans", Emperor Hirohito
was impressed by the fact that the document seemed "to give precedence
to war over diplomatic activities." The Premier explained that the order
of business in the agenda did not indicate any differences in degree of
importance. The Emperor then summoned the Chiefs of the Army and Navy
General Staffs. When they came, he questioned them sharply concerning
the probable length of hostilities in the event of a Japanese-American
conflict, and then asked whether it was not true that both of them "were
for giving precedence to diplomacy." Both answered in the affirmative
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs pp. 40-41) .
At the Imperial Conference the next day, September 6 (Japan time) the
"Plans" were decided upon and approved (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 40).
However, at the Conference first the President of the Privy Council and
then Emperor Hirohito asked for a clarification of the views of the
Government as to whether the emphasis was not being placed by the
Government upon war rather than diplomacy. When none of the Supreme
Command replied, and only the Navy Minister representing the Government,
the Emperor is reported to have rebuked the Supreme Command by
indicating that he was striving for international peace. After this the
Chief of the Navy General Staff assured the Emperor that the Chiefs of
the Supreme Command were conscious of the importance of diplomacy, and
"advocated a resort to armed force only when there seemed no other way
out." According to Premier Konoye, the Conference adjourned "in an
atmosphere of unprecedented tenseness" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 41).
Japan's "minimum demands" in the negotiations with America and England,
as approved at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time), were
as follows, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs:
"1. America and England would be required to agree not to intervene in,
or obstruct, the settlement by Japan of the "China Incident", to close
the Burma Road, and to cease all aid of any kind to China.
"2. America and England would be required to agree to take no action in
the Far East which offered a threat to the Japanese Empire, and not to
establish military bases in Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies,
China, or Far Eastern Soviet Russia or increase their existing Far
Eastern military forces over their present strength. In this connection
Japan would not consider any demands 'for the liquidation of Japan's
special relations with French Indo-China'."
"3. America and England would be required to agree to cooperate with
Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials; to restore trade
relations with Japan and "furnish her with the
Page 318 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"raw materials she needs" from British and American territories in the
Southwest Pacific; and to assist Japan in establishing close economic
relations with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, appendix V, pp. 77-78)."
The "maximum concessions" Japan was prepared to make in return for
agreement to her "minimum demands" were as follows:
"1. Japan would not use French Indochina as a base for operations
against any neighboring countries 'with the exception of China'.
"2. Japan would be prepared to withdraw her troops from French Indochina
'as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East'."
"3. Japan would be prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the
Philippine Islands (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, appendix V, p. 78). In
other words in an effort to take all possible advantage of the world
situation, the Japanese Government (determined at the Imperial
Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that the least Japan would accept
from America and England in return for the withdrawal of her troops from
French Indochina would be the agreement of America and England to cease
all aid to China, to accept a military and naval status in the Far East
inferior to Japan, and to furnish all possible material aid to Japan.
Furthermore, Japan did not intend to perform her part of the "bargain"
until after "a just peace" had been established in the Far East. From
the Japanese standpoint, this latter qualification meant after the
settlement of the "China Incident" by Japan on her own terms. The
substance of these "minimum demands" was contained in the ultimatum
which the Japanese Government later delivered to the United States on
November 20 (Washington time).
The evening of the same day, September 6 (Japan time), Premier Konoye,
with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese Ministers of War, Navy,
and Foreign Affairs met with Ambassador Grew at a private house under
conditions of extraordinary secrecy. In his notes of the meeting,
Ambassador Grew wrote that the Premier had requested that his statements
be transmitted personally to President Roosevelt in the belief that they
might amplify and clarify the approach which he had made through
Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Grew noted that the Premier and,
consequently, the Government of Japan, conclusively and wholeheartedly
agreed with the four principles put forward by Secretary Hull as a basis
for the rehabilitation of Japanese-American relations. [1] In his
memoirs, however, Prince Konoye stated that when at this meeting
Ambassador Grew asked for his views regarding Secretary Hull's four
principles he said "that they were splendid as principles but when it
came down to actual application a variety of problems arose" and that it
was in order to solve those very problems that he deemed it necessary to
hold the meeting with President Roosevelt (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p.
42). Ambassador Grew noted that Premier Konoye had strongly urged that
no better opportunity for the improvement of Japanese-American relations
would be presented, and that the Premier had
[1] In a memorandum dated October 7 (Japan time) recording a conference
which he had on that date with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador
Grew noted that the Foreign Minister told him that Ambassador Nomura had
been instructed to inform Secretary Hull that the statement in the
United States memorandum of October 2 (Washington time) (*see infra*)
that Premier Konoye "fully subscribed" to the four principles should be
modified to indicate that the Premier subscribed "in principle" (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 664).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 319
said that he had the full support of the responsible chiefs of the Army
and Navy, who were already choosing their delegates to the proposed
conference. Premier Konoye had said, he noted, that he could control any
opposition from within the Government, and that he was determined to
spare no effort, despite all elements and factors opposing him to crown
his present endeavors with success. The Ambassador wrote that during the
conversation he had outlined in general terms-
"the bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the
failure of the Japanese Government to honor the promises given to me by
former Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs apparently in all
sincerity-"
and had stated that, as the result-
"the Government of the United States had at long last concluded that it
must place its reliance on actions and facts and not on Japanese
promises or assurances."
He noted that Premier Konoye had expressed the earnest hope that in view
of the present internal situation in Japan the projected meeting with
the President could be arranged "with the least possible delay" (ex. 29,
vol. II, pp. 604-606).
THE UNITED STATES ASKS JAPAN TO CLARIFY ITS NEW PROPOSALS
(October 2, 1941)
Thus, as September ended the Japanese Government, on the one hand, was
vigorously asserting the urgent and pressing need to go forward with the
proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting at the earliest possible moment. It is
now known that this desire for haste reflected the decision of the
Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that-
"*If by the early part of October* there is no reasonable hope of having
our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will
immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and
England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."
On the other hand, the United States Government, knowing nothing of
these plans but nonetheless skeptical of Japan's peaceful intentions,
was insisting that before the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should
take place the two Governments should preliminary agree upon the
fundamental matters under consideration when the conversations were
broken off in July after the Japanese military occupation of southern
French Indochina. This latter position had been taken in the reply to
Premier Konoye which President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura on
September 3, and had been repeated many times by Secretary Hull in his
subsequent conversations with the Ambassador.
The Committee has obtained from the files of President Roosevelt a
memorandum in Secretary Hull's handwriting, on White House stationery,
apparently written by the Secretary for the President before the latter
left Washington for Hyde Park about September 25 (Washington time) (ex.
179; ex. 1, p. 40). This memorandum summarized Secretary Hull's views at
the time:
"My suggestion on Jap situation-for you to read later*."
"C.H.
"When the Jap Prime Minister requested a meeting with you, he indicated
a fairly basic program in generalities, but left open such questions as
getting troops out of China, Tripartite Pact, nondiscrimination in trade
in Pacific."
Page 320 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"We indicated desire for meeting, but suggested first an agreement in
principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success
of the conference.
"Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic
questions, and now continue to urge the meeting at Juneau.
"My suggestion is to recite their more liberal attitude when they first
sought the meeting with you, with their much narrowed position *now*,
and earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original liberal
attitude so we can start discussions again on agreement in principle
before the meeting, and reemphasizing your desire for a meeting (ex.
179). [Italics in original.]"
President Roosevelt sent his comments to Secretary Hull from Hyde Park
in the following memorandum dated September 28 (Washington time):
"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
"I wholly agree with your penciled note-to recite the more liberal
original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting,
point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot
go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement
in principle, and reemphasize my hope for a meeting.
"F. D. R.
"(Ex. 179.)"
On October 2 (Washington time), Secretary Hull handed to Ambassador
Nomura the United States' reply to the Japanese Government's proposals
of September 6 and its subsequent statements of September 23 (Annex c)
and September 27 (Annex D). This reply briefly reviewed the course of
the conversations thus far, pointing out that developments from early
August up to September 6 had seemed to justify the United States
Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected
to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive
program covering the entire Pacific area. The reply continued:
"It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the
United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by
the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese
Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for
discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two
Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent
explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of
this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the
principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had
been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese
Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting
into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and
maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area (ex. 29,
vol. II, pp. 658-659)."
It was then noted that the Japanese assurances of peaceful intent
continued to be qualified by phrases the need for which was not readily
apparent; that in the economic sphere the new proposals were restricted
to the countries of the Southwest Pacific area, rather than the entire
Pacific area, as before; and that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's
intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and
French Indochina would be most helpful in making known Japan's peaceful
intentions, as would additional clarification of the Japanese
Government's position with respect to the European war. The reply
continued by stating that from what the Japanese Government had so far
indicated in regard to its purposes, the United States Government had
derived the impression that Japan had in mind a program by which the
liberal and progressive principles adhered to by the United States would
be circumscribed in their application by qualifications and exceptions.
The Japanese Government was
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 321
then asked whether, under such circumstances, it believed the proposed
Roosevelt-Konoye meeting would be likely to contribute to the high
purposes "which we have mutually had in mind." The reply concluded by
stating that it was the belief of the United States Government that
renewed consideration of the fundamental principles which it had long
advocated would aid in reaching a meeting of minds in regard to the
essential questions on which agreement was sought and would thus lay a
firm foundation for the proposed meeting, and that it was the
President's earnest hope that a discussion of the fundamental questions
might be so developed that the meeting could be held (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 656-661). After reading the reply, Ambassador Nomura commented that
he thought his Government would be disappointed because of its very
earnest desire to hold the meeting, but that in any case he would
transmit it to his Government, which he did the same day (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 655; ex. 1, p. 50). He added that he was convinced that the
Japanese Government was entirely sincere in this matter and had no
ulterior purpose. He said, however, that in view of the difficulties of
the internal situation in Japan, he did not think his Government could
go any further at this time (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 655).
In a memorandum bearing the same date, October 2 (Washington time),
which was distributed to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in
addition to Secretary Stimson, General Marshall and other high officers
in the War Department, Colonel Hayes A. Kronor, Acting Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, reached the following conclusions:
"10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of
leaders nor economic concessions at this point would be of any material
advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw
from the Axis were obtained prior to the conference. * * *
"11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the
Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before
us. This Division still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis
Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and
economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time,
the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the
Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the
Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy"
by the United States is still clearly indicated (ex. 33)."
The following undated note, in Secretary Stimson's handwriting, appears
at the end of his copy of the above memorandum:
"Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them
strongly. I believe however that during the next three months while we
are rearming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an
explosion by the Japanese Army. Put concretely this means, that while I
approve of stringing out negotiations during that period, they should
not be allowed to ripen into a personal conference between the President
and P. M. [1] I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held
would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to our vitally
important relations with China (ex. 33)."
Admiral Stark testified before the Committee that he neither opposed or
approved the proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt and
Premier Konoye. He continued:
"I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the
President and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss
something with the Prime Minister without some preliminary agreement
regarding the agenda and something which might be accomplished (tr.
6308).
[1] Prime Minister Konoye.
Page 322 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull set forth at
length the considerations which were taken into account in determining
the position to be taken by the United States Government regarding the
proposed "leaders conference" (tr. 1120-1124).
The next day, October 3 (Washington time), after he had forwarded the
United States reply to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign Minister
Toyoda a long report on the situation in the United States as he saw it.
His report began by stating-
"although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. Talks have finally
reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an
absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression that the United
States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope
to penetrate through (ex. 1, p. 51-52)."
He expressed the view that an "understanding" between Japan and the
United States hinged on one point, the problem of the evacuation of the
Japanese troops from China (ex. 1, p. 53).
During the next 2 weeks the Japanese Foreign Office made repeated
efforts both in Washington and in Tokyo to have the United States
Government state what further assurances it desired from the Japanese
Government, emphasizing that the position of Premier Konoye was daily
growing more difficult. Also during this period, Ambassador Nomura
appears to have incurred the displeasure of Foreign Minister Toyoda. In
a message to the Foreign Minister on October 8 (Washington time), the
Ambassador indicated that he agreed with many of Secretary Hull's
criticisms of the Japanese proposals of September 6, which the Foreign
Office had prepared. He expressed the opinion that-
"In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did
we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal
conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees
we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated
concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We
limited the area to which the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment
would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was
geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the
question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China
(including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands
which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that
they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact.
These points you probably already know (ex. 1, p. 59)."
As the result of repeated instructions from the Foreign Minister to
obtain from Secretary Hull an expression of his views regarding the
three major points of difference between the two Governments, i. e.,
which had developed in the earlier conversations, namely, (1) the
withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan's obligations under the
Tripartite Pact, and (3) nondiscrimination in international trade,
Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on October 9 (Washington
time) (vol. II, pp. 670 672). The Ambassador's report of this meeting
(ex. 1, p. 61) was plainly unsatisfactory to Foreign Minister Toyoda,
for on October 10 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador
Nomura that he was well aware of the Ambassador's opinions and that what
he wanted was "the opinions of the American officials and none other."
Saying that "slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has
reached the decisive stage," and that he was doing his utmost "to bring
about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this
senseless procrastination," he told Ambassador Nomura:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 323
"You do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with
these parleys. You do not tell me how Hull answers. You do not tell me
anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire
me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what
they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you
interview Hull or the President of the United States, please take
Wakasugi or Iguchi with you and please send me without delay the
complete minutes of what transpires (ex. 1, p. 63)."
On the same afternoon, October 10 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda
requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and during their conversation
told Ambassador Grew that Ambassador Nomura had been "unable to provide
the information" he had asked for and that-
"a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit
through the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received,
would have measurably accelerated the present conversations (ex. 30, p.
454)."
The Foreign Minister told Ambassador Grew that in order to prevent
further delay he was requesting the Ambassador to ask his Government to
reply to the following question:
"The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United
States with reference to certain questions proposals which are
apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will
the American Government now set forth to the Japanese Government for its
consideration the undertakings to be assumed by the Japanese Government
which would be satisfactory to the American Government (ex. 29, vol. II,
p. 678)?"
He continued by saying that since-
"he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was
apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the
question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to
assist the Ambassador in carrying on the present conversations. Admiral
Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic official with the
personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet approached the official
in question and was therefore uncertain as to whether he would agree to
undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great assistance to the
Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United States, in
the event that it was decided to send the official in question to
Washington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on
the airplane from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the
official in question would not be accredited to the Government of the
United-States but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the
Japanese Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would
transmit his inquiry to my Government.
"In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to
me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of
expediting the progress of the conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 679)."
Ambassador Nomura replied to Foreign Minister Toyoda's message of
October 10 (Japan time) on the same date (Washington time):
"What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, and they
claim that our policy is semipacific and semiaggressive. They say that
our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements
and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory
talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition to the three matters
mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other
objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not
understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at
least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance
with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. *I am sure
that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a
conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.*
"In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they
have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider
at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of
their answer of the 2nd (ex. I, p. 63).
On October 13 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled instructions
to the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington,
Page 324 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Wakasugi, who had just returned to Washington after 2 weeks in
Japan, to call upon Under Secretary Welles. In his message, the Foreign
Minister said that he was particularly anxious to be advised as soon as
possible as to whether he could assume that the United States had no
particular disagreements other than the three major points and whether
the United States would submit a counterproposal to the Japanese
proposals of September 27. He said:
"The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, and it is becoming
absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of
Japanese-U S relations is to be accomplished (ex 1, p 64)."
Counselor Wakasugi talked with Under Secretary Welles on the afternoon
of October 13 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 680-686). Admiral Nomura sent two
reports of that meeting to Tokyo, on the same day (ex. 1, pp. 66-68).
His first report stated that so far as Mr. Welles knew there were no
obstacles to the materialization of the leaders' conference other than
the three major points, though there might be one or two others, and
that the United States had no intention of submitting any
counterproposal other than those of June 21 and October 2. His second
report was a more detailed description of the Welles-Wakasugi meeting.
In reply, the Foreign Minister said that these reports had "clarified
many points" and "that there is no need for us to make any further move
until the other side decides that it is impossible to clarify the
concrete proposal any further" (ex. 1, pp. 69-70).
In Tokyo, the Japanese Government also made frequent overtures to the
officials at the American Embassy. Thus, early on October 7 (Japan
time), the Premier's private secretary, Mr. Ushiba, called on Counselor
Dooman (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 662-663) and complained that the failure of
the preliminary conversations to make any progress had made the
Premier's position difficult. He concluded his remarks with the comment
that-
"the only thing left for the Japanese Government was to ask the American
Government to give specifications with regard to the character of the
undertakings which Japan was desired to give, and that if a clear-cut
reply as not forthcoming to bring the conversations to a close (ex 29,
vol. II, p 663)."
This meeting appears to have been preliminary to a meeting the same
morning between Ambassador Grew and the Foreign Minister, at the
latter's request. At that meeting, as on the occasion of subsequent
calls by Mr. Terasaki on Counselor Dooman and Ambassador Grew on October
8 and 9, the Japanese endeavored to obtain comments on the American
reply of October 2. It was again indicated that the Japanese Government
wished to know more definitely what undertakings the United States
Government wanted it to give. These efforts culminated in Foreign
Minister Toyoda's request of Ambassador Grew on October 10 that he
submit that question to Secretary Hull. On that occasion Ambassador Grew
commented at length on the opinion he had conveyed the day before to the
Foreign Minister, that the reports he had received of plans to dispatch
additional Japanese troops to Indochina in substantial numbers "could
not but seriously and adversely affect these conversations (ex. 29, vol.
II, p. 679).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 325
GERMANY DEMANDS THAT JAPAN WARN THE UNITED STATES THAT WAR BETWEEN
GERMANY AND ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD LEAD TO WAR BETWEEN JAPAN
AND THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT
(October 1941)
The intercepted Japanese messages show that during the latter part of
September and the early part of October both the German and Italian
Ambassadors sought to obtain from Foreign Minister Toyoda confidential
information regarding the Japanese-American conversations. In contrast
with the policy followed by his predecessor, Foreign Minister Matsuoka,
from whom the Axis partners had obtained such information, Foreign
Minister Toyoda declined to give them any (ex. 1, p. 71).
Failing in this, after the German attacks on American merchant vessels
and the movement in the United States for revision of the Neutrality
Act, the Germans took a stronger line. This became known to the United
States not only from intercepted messages but also through statements
made by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau, to
Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on October 15 (Japan time). Mr. Amau told
Ambassador Grew-
"that the German Government is insistently pressing for the issuance of
a statement by the Japanese Government in confirmation of the
interpretation given to the Tripartite Pact by Mr. Matsuoka, to the
effect that Japan will declare war on they United States in the event of
war occurring between Germany and the United States. As a reply,
although it has not yet been decided when or whether such reply will be
rendered to the German Government, the Japanese Government is
considering a formula of a noncommittal nature to the effect that
maintenance of peace in the Pacific is envisaged in the Tripartite Pact
and that the attention of the American Government has been sought for
its earnest consideration of Japan's obligations under the Pact (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 686)."
The following day, however, Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled Ambassador
Nomura that early in October-
"the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to
the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese
Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to
attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would
inevitably arise between Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and the
United States, on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the
convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and
might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United
States. We have not as yet submitted this message because, in view of
the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider
carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The
German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request, and
there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any
longer. While Japan, on the one hand, finds it necessary to do something
in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power
Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is
desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations.
Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United
States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my
separate telegram #672 and as would not affect the Japanese-American
negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me
and you (ex. 1, p. 71)."
The proposed "warning" to the United States sent to Ambassador Nomura in
the Foreign Minister's separate telegram #672 was as follows:
"The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the
American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute
toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war.
Should, however, the
Page 326 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation,
there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a
state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite
Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in
its sincere desire that not only the German American relations will
cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be
alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now
requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government (ex. 1,
p. 71)."
Foreign Minister Toyoda never had an opportunity to select the
"appropriate moment" for the delivery of his warning, because the next
day Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet resigned *en bloc*. The German
Ambassador continued to press for action by Foreign Minister Togo;
Admiral Toyoda's successor, but by November 11 (Japan time) when the
Foreign Minister communicated with Ambassador Nomura concerning it, far
more vigorous measures were contemplated by the Japanese. Foreign
Minister Togo's reply erred on the side of understatement:
"I explained (to the German Ambassador) that there is a good chance that
it would be more effective, under the present circumstances, for us to
present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations
to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether
a mere representation would bear any fruit (ex. 1, p. 117)."
THE KONOYE CABINET FALLS, AND AMBASSADOR NOMURA ASKS PERMISSION TO
RETURN TO JAPAN
(October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 1941)
The attitude of the Japanese representatives in the conversations in
Washington and in Tokyo during the latter part of September and the
early part of October reflected developments within the Japanese
Government during that period. In turn, the course of those developments
was directly affected by the far-reaching decisions which had been made
at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time). As has been
seen, it is now known that at that conference it had been decided that
if "by the early part of October" there should be "no reasonable hope"
of having the Japanese "demands" agreed to in the diplomatic
negotiations-
"we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against
America (and England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."
This decision, according to Premier Konoye, had established a dead line
"beyond which negotiations could not proceed." The Japanese Government
"came more and more to feel that we were approaching a show-down" (ex.
173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 43).
As Ambassador Nomura had told Secretary Hull, with the presentation of
its new proposals of September 6, its proposals for basic peace terms
with China on September 23, and its revision of the American proposals
of June 91 which had been delivered to Secretary Hull on September 27,
the Japanese Government took the position that there was nothing more
that it desired to say and that the next move was up to the United
States. In his memoirs, Premier Konoye criticizes the action of the
Japanese Foreign Office in submitting three proposals during September
without deciding that it would proceed with the September 27 plan
"alone, in complete disregard of the plans of the past" (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p- 46).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 327
This action, which left the Japanese intentions confused, was largely
responsible for the fact that the United States Government, in its reply
of October 2 (Washington time), had asked for a further clarification of
the Japanese intentions.
It is now known that before the United States' reply of October 2 was
received in Tokyo and as a result of the fact that the deadline set on
September 6 was approaching at a faster rate than the conversations were
progressing, Premier Konoye began frequent conferences with members of
his Cabinet. He conferred on September 24 and 25 (Japan time) with the
War Minister, Navy Minister, Foreign Minister, and President of the Navy
Planning Board. From September 27 to October 1 (Japan time) he had
discussions with the Navy Minister "concerning the atmosphere in his
circle." On October 4 (Japan time), after receipt of the United States
reply of October 2, Premier Konoye had an audience with Emperor
Hirohito, following which there was a Joint Conference attended by the
chiefs of the Japanese High Command. On the evening of October 5 (Japan
time) he conferred with General Tojo, the War Minister, to whom he
expressed the opinion "that he would continue negotiations (with the
United States) to the very end" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 49).
On the evening of October 7 (Japan time), General Tojo called on Premier
Konoye and declared that the Army would find it difficult to submit to
the withdrawal of its troops from China. In view of this attitude, on
October 8 (Japan time) Premier Konoye conferred with the Navy Minister
and the Foreign Minister concerning "methods of avoiding a crisis." He
met twice with Foreign Minister Toyoda on October 10 (Japan time), the
day on which the Foreign Minister asked Ambassador Grew to inquire from
the United States Government what additional assurances it desired the
Japanese Government to give. A Joint Conference was held on October 11
(Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 49).
On Sunday, October 12 (Japan time), Premier Konoye called a meeting
attended by himself and the Ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs,
together with the President of the Planning Board, which he described in
his memoirs as "almost the last conference relative to peace or war."
Before the meeting he had learned that the Navy, although not desiring a
rupture in the negotiations, and wishing as much as possible to avoid
war, nevertheless was unwilling to state this publicly, and would
therefore leave the question of peace or war up to the Premier. At the
meeting, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs, the Navy Minister
stated:
"We have now indeed come to the crossroads where we must determine
either upon peace or war. I should like to leave this decision entirely
up to the Premier. And, if we are to seek peace, we shall go all the
way for peace. Thus, even if we make a few concessions, we ought to
proceed all the way with the policy of bringing the negotiations to
fruition. * * * If we are to have war, we must determine upon war here
and now. Now is the time. We are now at the final moment of decision. If
we decide that we are not to have war, I should like to have us proceed
upon the policy that we will bring negotiations to fruition no matter
what happens (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."
In reply to this, Premier Konoye said:
"If we were to say that we must determine on war or peace here, today, I
myself would decide on continuing the negotiations (ex. 173. Konoye
Memoirs, p. 50)."
Page 328 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Tojo, the Minister of War, objected, saying:
"This decision of the Premier's is too hasty. Properly speaking, ought
we not to determine here whether or not there is any possibility of
bringing the negotiations to fruition? *To carry on negotiations for
which there is no possibility for fruition, and in the end to let slip
the time for fighting, would be a matter of the greatest consequence*
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."
General Tojo then asked Foreign Minister Toyoda whether he thought there
was any possibility of bringing negotiations to fruition. In answer to
this question, the Foreign Minister replied that the most difficult
problem was the question of the withdrawal of troops from China. He
continued:
"if in this regard the Army says that it will not retreat one step from
its former assertions, then there is no hope in the negotiations. But if
on this point the Army states that it will be all right to make
concessions, however small they may be, then we cannot say that there is
no hope of bringing the negotiations to fruition (ex. 173, Konoye
Memoirs, p. 50)."
General Tojo, however, would not yield, saying:
"The problem of the stationing of troops, in itself means the life of
the Army, and we shall not be able to make any concessions at all (ex.
173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 50)."
According to Premier Konoye, although the conference lasted 4 hours, no
conclusion was arrived at before the meeting adjourned. The following
day, October 13 (Japan time), Premier Konoye reported the situation to
Emperor Hirohito and Marquis Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and
a leader of the "senior statesmen." The next day the Premier met with
General Tojo before the Cabinet meeting and again asked his considered
opinion concerning the problem of the stationing of troops in China,
saying that he had a very great responsibility for the "China Incident,"
which was still unsettled, and that he found it difficult to agree "to
enter upon a greater war the future of which I cannot at all foresee."
He then urged, according to his memoirs, that Japan "ought to give in
for a time, grant to the United States the formality of withdrawing
troops, and save ourselves from the crisis of a Japanese-American war"
(ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, P. 51).
In response to this, General Tojo declared-
"if at this time we yield to the United States, she will take steps that
are more and more high-handed, and will probably find no place to stop.
The problem of withdrawing troops is one, you say, of forgetting the
honor and of seizing the fruits, but, to this, I find it difficult to
agree from the point of view of maintaining the fighting spirit of the
Army (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 51)."
Premier Konoye records that thus General Tojo did not move from the
position he had taken, and the talk ended at odds. According to his
memoirs, at the Cabinet meeting which followed, General Tojo at the
outset "strongly and excitedly set forth the reasons why the Japanese-
American negotiations should no longer be continued." No further
reference to the question of continuing the negotiations was made at the
Cabinet meeting, as none of the Cabinet ministers would answer General
Tojo (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 51.)
That evening General Tojo is reported to have sent a message to Premier
Konoye in which he said, in effect, that if the Navy's decision to
entrust the question of peace or war to the Premier was due to a desire
on the part of the Navy not to have a war, then the Imperial Conference
on September 6 "will have been fundamentally
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 329
overturned," as the decisions reached at that conference would not have
taken into account such an attitude on the part of the Navy. He then
expressed the belief that the entire Cabinet should resign and "declare
insolvent everything that has happened up to now and reconsider our
plans once more." He said that it was very hard for him to ask the
Premier to resign but that, as matters had come to pass, he could not
help but do so, and begged the Premier to exert his efforts toward
having the Emperor designate Prince Higashikuni, the Chief of the
General Staff, as the next Premier, in the belief that only an imperial
prince would have power to keep control of the Army and the Navy and to
refashion a plan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 52).
The next day, October 15 (Japan time), Premier Konoye was received by
Emperor Hirohito, to whom the Premier reported the foregoing
developments. The Emperor expressed doubts concerning the desirability
of naming Prince Higashikuni the next Premier, saying, according to
Premier Konoye:
"In time of peace it would be all right, but in a situation in which we
fear that there may be war, and when we also think further of the
interests of the Imperial House, I question the advisability of a member
of royalty standing forth (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 52)."
That evening the Premier secretly discussed the situation with Prince
Higashikuni, who said he desired several days to think the matter over.
However, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs, the situation would not
permit further delay, and the following morning all of the Cabinet
members submitted their resignations. The next day the "senior
statesmen" met in consultation regarding the selection of the next
Premier, but Prince Konoye did not attend (ex. 1, 3, Konoye Memoirs, pp.
52-53). Instead, he submitted a long letter explaining in detail the
chain of events leading to the resignation of his Cabinet (ex. 173,
Konoye Memoirs, appendix IX, pp. 87-91).
Several of the intercepted Japanese messages confirm Prince Konoye's
emphasis upon the Army's stand regarding the withdrawal of Japanese
troops from China as one of the main causes of the resignation of the
Konoye Cabinet. Thus, on October 15 (Washington time), shortly after the
Cabinet meetings in Tokyo at which General Tojo refused to make any
concessions regarding the evacuation of troops from China, Ambassador
Nomura reported to the Foreign Office that the Japanese military attache
at the Japanese Embassy in Washington had been-
"instructed by the Headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an
inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops.
They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand
regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point (ex. 1, p.
70)."
On October 17 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda cabled Ambassador
Nomura that the Cabinet had resigned, saying:
"The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is
true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the
matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However,
regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the
United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated.
There shall be no changes in this respect.
"Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single
purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before (ex. 1, p.
76)."
Page 330 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Imperial Command to form a new Cabinet was given on October 17
(Japan time) to General Hideki Tojo, who not only became Premier but
also took the portfolios of the War and Home Ministries. In addition to
having been War Minister in the preceding Cabinet of Premier Konoye,
General Tojo was an Army officer on the active list. The same day,
Premier Konoye's private secretary, Mr. Ushiba, called on Counselor
Dooman at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and through him conveyed to
Ambassador Grew from the Premier
"a very interesting explanation of the circumstances which had led to
the fall of the cabinet and the successful efforts of the Prime Minister
to ensure the appointment of a successor who would continue the
conversations with the United States. The circumstances were
extraordinarily dramatic and constitute what may in future be regarded
as one of the really big moments in Japanese history (ex. 30, p. 458)."
Mr. Ushiba also delivered to Ambassador Grew a letter from Prince Konoye
in which he stated that he felt certain
"that the Cabinet which is to succeed mine will exert its utmost in
continuing to a successful conclusion the conversations which we have
been carrying on up till today (ex. 30, p. 457)."
The following week, a "reliable Japanese informant" gave Ambassador Grew
the following account of the events leading up the resignation of the
Konoye Cabinet:
"The informant called on me at his own request this evening. He told me
that just prior to the fall of the Konoye Cabinet a conference of the
leading members of the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces
had been summoned by the Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to
pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with
the United States. The representatives of the Army and Navy who attended
this conference did not reply to the Emperor's question, whereupon the
latter, with a reference to the progressive policy pursued by the
Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action ordered the
armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's definite stand
necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a
position effectively to control the Army, the ensuing resignation of
Prince Konoye, and the appointment of General Tojo who, while remaining
in the Army active list, is committed to a policy of attempting to
conclude successfully the current Japanese-American conversations (ex.
29, vol. II, p. 697)."
On October 16 (Washington time), in a conversation with Lord Halifax,
the British Ambassador in the United States, Ambassador Nomura said:
"The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was due to internal differences
between on the one hand the Prime Minister and those who wished to reach
agreement with the United States by not insisting on the third point
mentioned above (the right to station troops in China), and on the other
hand those who thought that not to insist on this point would involve
too great a loss of face.
"But the Ambassador did not anticipate any sudden change of policy. The
Emperor was in favor of peace, and even if a general were made Prime
Minister, it was unlikely that the Emperor's wishes would be
disregarded.
"The outburst of a Japanese Navy spokesman as reported in the United
States press today was of no importance, and might be disregarded.
"Everybody in the Japanese Cabinet wanted understanding with the United
States, and the only difference was as to the price that should be paid
for it (ex. 158)."
Two days later, on October 18 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura
cabled his congratulations to the new Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo,
at the same time expressing his fear that he would not "be able to
accomplish much in the future" and asking the new Foreign Minister's
approval of his returning to Japan "in the near
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 331
future so that I may personally report the situation here" (ex. 1, p.
79). He expressed similar views in a message (ex. 1, p. 80) to the
Japanese Navy Minister on October 20 (Washington time), and in a message
to the new Foreign Minister 2 days later in which he said:
"I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. * * * Nor
do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to be the
bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical
existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee
from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way
that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return
to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured
your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my
rudeness (ex. 1, p. 81)."
On October 23 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador
Nomura that the outcome of the negotiations would "have a great bearing
upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue,"
and expressed the hope that the Ambassador would see fit "to sacrifice
all of (his) personal wishes and remain at (his) post" (ex. 1, p. 82).
On November 4 (Japan time), the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador
Nomura to "compose yourself and make up your mind to do your best."
Finally, on November 5 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura cabled the
Foreign Minister that after careful consideration "I have decided to
continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be" (ex.
1, p. 100).
THE TOJO CABINET FORMULATES ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"
(November 5, 1941)
As the result of the Cabinet crisis in Japan, the State Department in
Washington considered the dispatch of a personal message from President
Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito urging Japan to join with the United
States to preserve peace in the Pacific area, but stating that if Japan
should start new military operations the United States "would have to
seek, by taking any and all steps which it might deem necessary, to
prevent any extension" of the war (ex. 20). Such a message was not sent,
however, pending clarification of the situation in Japan and the
policies of the new Japanese Government (ex. 20; tr. 4494-4501).
Commencing October 17 (Japan time) the Tojo Cabinet engaged in
preparations for a formal determination of the policies it would follow,
and such a determination was made at an Imperial Conference on November
5 (Japan time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador
Nomura received only general instructions from the Japanese Foreign
Office concerning the course he should follow in further talks with the
Americans. He was, however, advised on October 21 (Japan time) that
"the new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere
desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our
country has said practically l she can say in the way of expressing of
opinions and setting forth our stands. *We feel that we have now reached
a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to
urge the United States to reconsider her views.*
"We urge therefore, that, choosing an opportune moment, either you or
Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our
country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this
matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal
United States counter proposal to our proposal of 27 September (ex. 1,
p. 81)."
Page 332 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
These instructions were concurred in by the Japanese War and Navy
Ministers (ex. 1, p. 84).
In accordance with the Foreign Minister's instructions, Minister
Wakasugi called on Under Secretary Welles on October 24 (Washington
time). The Minister told the Under Secretary that the new Japanese
Government desired to follow the policy of the preceding Government and
to continue the conversations without delay, adding that in his belief
the new Government-
"had taken office under such circumstances and was pressed by tense
public opinion to such an extent as to make it imminently desirable that
the conversations be pressed to a satisfactory conclusion speedily (ex.
29, vol. II, p. 693)."
He then asked whether the United States had as yet any counterproposals
to make to the suggestions offered by the Japanese Government on
September 27. In reply, Mr. Welles made it clear that the United States
would be glad to continue the conversations, but suggested that recent
belligerent public statements by high Japanese officials and the tone of
the Japanese press were not helpful to the atmosphere in which the
conversations would take place. When Minister Wakasugi pointed to a
recent speech by Secretary of the Navy Knox in which Mr. Knox had said
that a Japanese-American war was inevitable and that the United States
Navy was on a "24-hour basis," Mr. Welles said that this simply showed
the effect on the Navy of the statements being made in Japan. In reply
to the Minister's inquiry regarding the possibility of counterproposals
being submitted by the United States, Mr. Welles said that the United
States position was fully set forth in its draft proposals of June 21
and the statement delivered to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, and that
for this reason he did not think any counterproposals by the United
States were called for. The conversation concluded with a discussion of
the possibility of taking up the three major points of disagreement in
the following order: (1) Economic nondiscrimination, (2) Japan's status
under the Tri-Partite Pact, and (3) the China question (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 692-697). A full report on this conversation was immediately sent to
Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 1, pp. 82-84).
Four days later Minister Wakasugi cabled his own lengthy appraisal of
the general attitude of the United States (ex. 1, pp. 86-87). The basic
United States policy, he said, was the crushing of the so-called
Hitlerism, which he defined as "the establishment of a new order through
the force of arms." Because the United States "presumed" that Japan
intended to develop the French Indo-China and Thailand area "under the
principle of our military's coprosperity sphere, in a monopolistic
manner, and through the force of arms," as contrasted with America's
principle of economic nondiscrimination, there had arisen "a clash of
ideologies." He said that there was every indication that the United
States Government was "anxious to adjust the relationship between the
two nations," but that he doubted that it would make any concessions
from its proposals of June 21 and October 2. He expressed the opinion
that the United States had completed its preparations "in the event of
the worst," and that "a course of economic pressure plus watchful
waiting" had been decided on. He felt, however, that all was not
hopeless and that by "good-naturedly" continuing the talks there would
be opened up "ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use
of world developments." He concluded his report by saying:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 333
"However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local
differences by insisting upon our freedom of action (sic), we must have
our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated,
but that our national relations will be severed.
"The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the
talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly
formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new Cabinet
establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay
our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that
would be to our best interest (ex. 1, p. 87)."
On October 30 (Japan time) in Tokyo the new Foreign Minister received
the diplomatic corps individually, and during the course of his talk
with Ambassador Grew he expressed his desire that the Japanese-American
conversations be continued and be successfully brought to a conclusion
without delay, and he asked Ambassador Grew's cooperation to that end
(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 699-700). Ambassador Grew noted that, compared
with Admiral Toyoda who had preceded him, the new Foreign Minister was
"grim, unsmiling, and ultra-reserved" (ex. 30, p. 465). The Foreign
Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that he had told Ambassador Grew that
Japanese-American relations got worse unfortunate results would ensue, a
statement substantially similar to the statement he had made to Sir
Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador, on October 26 (Japan time) (ex.
1, p. 91).
The great activity in Tokyo during the period immediately after the
formation of the Tojo Cabinet, and the attitude with which that Cabinet
approached the continuance of the Japanese-American conversations, is
illustrated by Foreign Minister Togo's message No. 725 of November 4
(Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura:
"1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the
edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever
adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy,
*the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some
days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are
at length able to bring forth a counterproposal for the resumption of
Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the
Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 and 727).*
This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the
conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.
"2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no
longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain
pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States
of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to
gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, *but this is our
last effort. Both in name and spirit this counterproposal of ours is,
indeed, the last.* I want you to know that. *If through it we do not
reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be
ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the
brink of chaos.* I0 mean that the success or failure of the pending
discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of
Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this
die.*
"When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt
that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some
understanding we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and
yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick
and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with.
Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of
the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things,
our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes,
too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this-
to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who
think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell
you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our
long-suffering. Nay, when it come to a question of our existence and our
honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost.
If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this
position of ours,
Page 334 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. *This time we
are showing the limit of our friendship; this time use are making our
last possible bargain,* and I hope that we can thus settle all our
troubles with the United States peaceably.
"3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward *to what may come
at the end-at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations*-the
Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much
better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be
for the whole world situation.
"4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is
your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your
being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you
please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind
to continue to do your best? I hope you will. Now just as soon as the
conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to
go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to
tell them *how determined we are* and try to get them to foster a speedy
understanding.
"5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there,
so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in
Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the consensus of the American
officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these
things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me
know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting
anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, *I want you to
follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to
know there will be no room for personal interpretation (ex. 1, pp. 92-
93).*"
The day the Foreign Minister sent the long message quoted above, he
cabled Ambassador Nomura the substance of two Japanese counterproposals
to be used in the conversations, if they should be approved at the
Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time). The first proposal was
designated "Proposal A," and was described as "*our revised ultimatum*";
its provisions were referred to as "*our demands*" (ex. 1, pp. 94-95).
The second proposal, designated "Proposal B," was to be used in case of
"remarkable" differences between the Japanese and American views, "since
the situation does not permit of delays." It was advanced, the Foreign
Minister said, with the idea of making "*a last effort to prevent
something happening*" (ex. 1, p. 96-97).
At the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time), the
counterproposals developed in the conferences and discussions which had
gone before were taken up and approved in the form previously sent to
Ambassador Nomura. Foreign Minister Togo immediately cabled the
Ambassador that he should resume the conversations, and instructed him
to submit "Proposal A" first. The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador
that if it should become apparent that an agreement based upon "Proposal
A" could not be reached, "we intend to submit *our absolutely final
proposal*, Proposal B." He continued:
"4. As stated in my previous message, *this is the Imperial Government's
final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very
critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted*. * * *
"5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time
limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a
friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept
our proposal (ex. 1, p. 99)."
The intercepted messages show that the Japanese Government intended to
insist not only on a written agreement signed by the United States but
also to require the United States to "make Great Britain and the
Netherlands sign those terms in which they are concerned" (ex. 1, pp.
98-99). Although the Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Nomura to
avoid giving the Americans the impression that "there is a time limit,"
he made it clear to the Ambassador (No. 736) that such a dead line had
been fixed:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 335
"Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th
of this month.* I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the
circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this
thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations
*from falling into chaotic condition.* Do so with great determination
and with unstinted effort, I beg of you (ex. 1, p. 100)."
The record before the Committee does not show whether or not the
decision to submit the foregoing counterproposals was the only decision
made at the Imperial Conference on November 5. It is now known, however,
that on that date the Navy promulgated its "Combined Fleet Top Secret
Operation Order No. 1" to all Japanese Fleet and task force commanders
(tr. 482). The record does not show whether the issuance of this order
was made known to the Japanese Foreign Office.
Order No. 1, itself, was brief:
"COMBINED FLEET ORDER
"Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT
BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the
Separate Volume (ex. 8)."
The separate volume, which was attached to Order No. 1, prescribed the
operations to be conducted (a) in case war with the United States, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands "begins during the China Operations," and
(b) in case war with Russia "begins during the War with the United
States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and China" (ex. 8). It stated:
"The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great
Britain and the Netherlands," and provided that, in such event, "In the
east the American Fleet will be destroyed" (ex. 8).
Order No. 1 had been in course of preparation since the latter part of
August. From September 2-13 (Japan time) a war plans conference had been
held continuously at the Naval War College in Tokyo. It was during this
same period, on September 6 (Japan time), that an Imperial Conference
decided:
"If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having
our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will
immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America
(England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."
On September 13 (Japan time) an outline containing the essential points
of Order No. 1 had been completed at the Naval War College, but the
Order itself was not promulgated until immediately after the Imperial
Conference on November 5 (Japan time) (ex. 8).
AMBASSADOR GREW WARNS THAT WAR WITH JAPAN MAY COME "WITH DRAMATIC AND
DANGEROUS SUDDENNESS"
(November 3, 1941)
During the period which immediately preceded the Imperial Conference on
November 5 (Japan time), Ambassador Grew was endeavoring to determine
what the policies of the Tojo Government would be. Among the sources of
his information was "a reliable Japanese informant" who called on the
Ambassador on October 25 (Japan time) and again on November 3 (Japan
time). On both occasions the information imparted by the informant fell
short of disclosing to Ambassador Grew the actual decisions affecting
the United States which were
Page 336 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
being made by the Tojo Cabinet, as described above, but was sufficient
to convince the Ambassador that the situation u-as approaching a crisis.
He recorded that on November 3 he was told that the new Japanese
Government "had reached a definite decision as to how far it was
prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an
adjustment of relations with the United States," and that "this
information had been communicated by the Prime Minister to the Emperor
on the afternoon of November 2" (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 701).
In his testimony before the Committee, Ambassador Grew said, referring
to the period immediately following the fall of the Konoye Cabinet:
"I took about two weeks to size up the new situation. I was not quite
sure what Tojo's policy was going to be. I had been assured he was going
to try to keep on the conversations, going to do his best to come to an
agreement with us, and all the rest of it. Frankly, I had my fingers
crossed. I was waiting to size it up, and after I had sized it up I sent
the telegram of November 3 (tr. 1908)."
In the telegram of November 3 (Japan time) to which Mr. Grew referred,
he warned Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles that-
"Japan's resort to measures which might (make) war with the United
States inevitable may come *with dramatic and dangerous suddenness* (ex.
15)."
The telegram summarized his opinions on the general situation in Japan.
In it he noted that the strong policy which he had recommended in his
telegram of September 12, 1940 (ex. 26), called the "green light"
telegram because it gave the go-ahead signal for economic sanctions
against Japan, together with the impact upon Japan of political
developments abroad had brought the Japanese Government "to seek
conciliation with the United States." If those efforts should fail, he
foresaw a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan back once more to its
former position "or still further back," leading-
"to what I have called an "all out, do or die" attempt to render Japan
impervious to foreign economic embargoes, even risking national hara
kiri rather than cede to foreign pressure. * * * such a contingency is
not only possible but probable (ex. 15)."
Ambassador Grew went on to express his opinion that the view that the
progressive imposition of drastic economic measures, while attended with
some risk of war, would probably avert war, was
"a dangerously, uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered
policy and measures of the United States (ex. 15)."
Conceding that in discussing the "grave and momentous" subject of
whether American needs, policies, and objectives justified war with
Japan if diplomacy should fail, he was "out of touch with the
Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon," and that his purpose
was only to "ensure against my country's getting into war with Japan
through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush
headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States," he warned
that-
"it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious preparations
for a program to be implemented if her alternative program for peace
should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on
the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber
rattling (for) the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's
high pressure diplomacy. *Japan's resort to measures which might (make)
war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and
dangerous suddenness (ex. 15).*
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 337
The State Department file copy of Ambassador Grew's telegram of November
3 (Japan time) bears the following handwritten note:
"Paraphrase of this telegram in full given to Commander Watts, ONI, by
telephone on November 8, 1941 (ex. 15)."
On November 17 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew cabled Secretary Hull and
Under Secretary Welles as follows, referring specifically to the last
sentence of his November 3 warning:
"In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval
actions by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict,
7 am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would
exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative
and surprise.* It is important, however, that our Government not (repeat
not) place upon us, including the military and naval attaches, major
responsibility for giving prior warning."
[Discontinuous text]
"We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is
to watch for premonitory indications of military or naval operations
which might be forthcoming against such areas and we are taking every
precaution to guard against surprise. However, our field of military and
naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen
with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that
our Government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible
the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning (ex. 15)."
Ambassador Grew testified that he had no knowledge or indication
whatever of the assembling of the Japanese naval striking force for the
attack on Pearl Harbor, or that at the war games conducted by Admiral
Yamamoto at the Naval War College in Tokyo between September 2 and 13
(Japan time) the final plans were being formulated for the attack (tr.
1481). He further testified that although he knew that a meeting of the
Japanese Cabinet took place on December 1, he "did not (know) and could
not have guessed" that the Cabinet had discussed the attack on Pearl
Harbor (tr. 1615), and that, with the single exception of the
information upon which his message of January 27, 1941 (Japan time) (ex.
15) was based, he had no information of any character prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor which indicated the possibility of such an attack
by the Japanese (tr. 1477).
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK APPEALS TO GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES FOR AID
(October 28-November 4, 1941)
During the latter part of October, the Japanese began extensive troop
concentrations at Haiphong on the coast of northern French Indochina,
and steady streams of Japanese military supplies and materials were
reported arriving at Hainan (off the northern coast of French Indochina)
and at Formosa. As a result of these and other Japanese military
movements, which were interpreted in Chungking as foreshadowing an early
invasion of Yunnan Province for the purpose of taking the city of
Kunming and severing the Burma Road, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made
strenuous efforts to obtain British and American air support for his
ground forces in that area.
On October 28 at his first meeting in Chungking with General Magruder,
the head of the recently arrived United States military mission to
China, the Generalissimo asked General Magruder to
[1] Ambassador Grew's message of January 27 1941 (Japan time) follows
"My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from
many sources including a Japanese sour e that the Japanese military
forces planned in the event of trouble with the United States to attempt
a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military
facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact
that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the
information" (ex 15) Paraphrased copies were promptly sent by the State
Department to Military Intelligence Division (Army) and Office of Naval
Intelligence (Navy) (ex. 15).
Page 338 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
inform Washington at once of the threatening situation, and urged that
President Roosevelt "intercede with London to make available the
Singapore air forces to support his defense." He pled with General
Magruder that the President "be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on
Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an
attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests." He
insisted that if the Japanese should take Kunming and thus sever the
Burma Road, Chinese resistance would end and a Japanese attack on the
Malay Peninsula would inevitably follow. He believed his land forces
could resist the anticipated attack only with air support, which he did
not have and which only the British air forces at Singapore could
furnish in time. General Magruder immediately radioed the
Generalissimo's plea to Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, after
discussing the interview with Ambassador Gauss (ex. 47).
In Washington, on the morning of October 30 (Washington time), Mr. T. V.
Soong handed to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, a message from
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which repeated the substance of what the
Generalissimo had said to General Magruder. Chiang's message urged the
United States "to use strong pressure on Britain to send Singapore Air
Force to cooperate with Colonel Chennault in order to save democratic
position in Far East" and stressed the critical nature of the situation
(ex. 16-A). Secretary Morgenthau sent the Generalissimo's message to
President Roosevelt on the same day, without written comment and the
President forwarded it to Secretary Hull with this handwritten note:
"C. H. Can we do anything along these lines? How about telling Japan a
move to close Burma Road would be inimical? F. D. R. (Ex. 16-A)."
On November 1 (Washington time), Secretary Hull called a conference at
the State Department which was attended by, among others, the Secretary,
Under Secretary Welles, and Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, for that
Department, and by General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans
Division, for the War Department and Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, Director
of the Central Division, for the Navy Department. The conference was
called for the purpose of discussing what action should be taken in
response to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's plea. Secretary Hull
expressed the opinion that "there was no use to issue any additional
warnings to Japan if we can't back them up," and the Secretary therefore
desired to know whether "the military authorities would be prepared to
support further warnings by the State Department." A second meeting in
the same connection was held at the State Department the following day
(ex. 16)."
General Gerow submitted a report on these meetings to General Marshall
on November 3 (Washington time) in which he pointed out that the
Military Intelligence Division's (G-2's) latest estimate did not support
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's conclusions as to the imminence of a
Japanese move toward Kunming, though agreeing that the fall of Kunming
would seriously affect Chinese resistance to Japan. After reviewing the
strength of the United States forces in the Philippines and concluding
that the dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison there
would leave the island of Luzon open to serious risk of capture, General
Gerow's report summarized certain "strong" opinions of the War Plans
Division, which were stated as follows:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 339
"a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations
remain sound; viz.:
(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.
(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of
the war.
(3) Military counter action against Japan should be considered only
in case of any of the following actions by Japan (which were
then enumerated).
[Discontinuous text]
"d. *Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective
to deter Japanese action
"e. * * * *Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from
the military viewpoint, at the earliest, about the middle of December
1941,* when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat
to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to
delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March
1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected
strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.
(ex. 16)."
The weekly meeting of the Army-Navy Joint Board scheduled for November 5
(Washington time) was held on the afternoon of November 3 (Washington
time). The question of aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek received
more attention than any other item on the agenda (ex. 16). Admiral Royal
E. Ingersoll presented the situation as the Navy saw it and General
Marshall gave the Army's viewpoint. Admiral Schuirmann reported on the
two meetings at the State Department and read a memorandum (tr. 5520-
5523) prepared by Dr. Hornbeck in which the latter stated his personal
opinion in favor of a firm representation to Japan, even though war
might result. Among other things, General Marshall said that it was his
information that "the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide
upon the national policy by November 5," apparently referring to the
intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo regarding the
Imperial Conference to be held in Tokyo on that date. He expressed the
view that-
"Until powerful United States Forces had been built up in the Far East,
it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. *It
appeared that the basis of U. S. Policy should be to make certain minor
concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These
concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar
trade restrictions (ex. 16).*"
Following these discussions the Joint Board decided that-
"War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a
memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's
proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take
the following lines:
"Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.
"Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.
"Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. Military forces in support
of Chiang Kai-shek.
"Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as
long as possible.
"Suggest agreement with Japan to tide the situation over for the next
several months.
"Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East
would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided
by the U. S.
"Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the
U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive without the transfer of the
major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific
(ex. 16)."
That evening, November 3 (Washington time), the State Department
received a telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking to the effect
that while it was not yet certain that Japan would undertake an invasion
of Yunnan from Indochina, it was believed certain that in any case large
Japanese air forces would operate against the
Page 340 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Burma Road and any volunteer air forces in China, and that accordingly,
if Anglo-American air units were sent into Yunnan, they should be in
sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese air
concentrations. "Half or token measures " the Ambassador advised, "would
prove dangerous" (ex. 47).
The next morning, November 4 (Washington time), the State Department
received from the Chinese Embassy a personal message to President
Roosevelt from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (ex. 47). This message
quoted a lengthy message which the Generalissimo had sent directly to
Prime Minister Churchill, in which the Generalissimo expressed
substantially the same views as those he had communicated to General
Magruder, and urged that the British air force in Malaya, "with American
cooperation," be sent to his assistance to resist the anticipated
assault on Yunnan and Kunming. The Generalissimo then urged the United
States "to draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an
active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation," saying that-
"unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of
winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately
and in her own time (ex. 47)."
Neither the Generalissimo's message addressed to the Prime Minister nor
his message addressed to the President made any further reference to the
proposal that a warning to Japan be issued by Britain or the United
States. On the 4th Secretary Hull held separate conferences at the State
Department with Secretary Knox, and with General Marshall and Admiral
Ingersoll (tr. 1171, 1173).
The next day, November 5 (Washington time), President Roosevelt received
the following message from Prime Minister Churchill:
"I have received Chiang Kai-shek's attached appeal addressed to us both
for air assistance. You know how we are placed for air strength at
Singapore. Nonetheless, I should be prepared to send pilots and even
some planes if they could arrive in time.
"What we need now is a deterrent of the most general and formidable
character. The Japanese have as yet taken no final decision, and the
Emperor appears to be exercising restraint. When we talked about this at
Argentia you spoke of gaining time, and this policy has been brilliantly
successful so far. But our joint embargo is steadily forcing the
Japanese to decisions for peace or war.
"It now looks as if they would go into Yunnan cutting the Burma Road
with disastrous consequence for Chiang Kai-shek. The collapse of his
resistance would not only be a world tragedy in itself, but it would
leave the Japanese with large forces to attack north or south.
"The Chinese have appealed to us, as I believe they have to you, to warn
the Japanese against an attack on Yunnan. I hope you might remind them
that such an attack, aimed at China from a region in which we have never
recognized that the Japanese have any right to maintain forces, would be
in open disregard of the clearly indicated attitude of the United States
Government. We should, of course, be ready to make a similar
communication.
"No independent action by ourselves will deter Japan because we are so
much tied up elsewhere. But of course we will stand with you and do our
utmost to back you in whatever course you choose. I think myself, that
Japan is more likely to drift into war than to plunge in. Please let me
know what you think (ex. 158)."
President Roosevelt did not reply to Prime Minister Churchill until 2
days later. In the meantime, General Marshall and Admiral Stark
submitted to him, under date of November 5 (Washington time), a joint
memorandum (ex. 16) pursuant to the action of the Joint Board referred
to above. In their joint memorandum
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 341
General Marshall and Admiral Stark referred to the various
communications from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which have been
mentioned above, and to Secretary Hull's request for advice "as to the
attitude which this Government should take" toward a Japanese offensive
against Kunming and the Burma Road, and stated that the question they
had considered was-
"whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive
military operations with U. S. Forces against Japan, to prevent her from
severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, how-ever
well disguised, would lead to war."
In answering this question, General Marshall and Admiral Stark then
advised the President:
"At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior
to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic
offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would
have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels
from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An
unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous
merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now
considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of
naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose
the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.
"The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct
defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the
defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The
Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air,
and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous
undertaking. By about the middle of December 1941, United States air and
submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat
to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces
in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February
or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a
point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in
operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time,
additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have
arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area
against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive
proportions.
"Until such a time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to
Chiang Kai-shek by measures which probably will not result in war with
Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against
Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease,
and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer
Group.
"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in
the following conclusions:
"(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United
States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective
of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and
Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In
any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against
Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the
Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.
"(b) *War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while
building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan
attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United
States is of very great importance.* Military action against Japan
should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:
" (1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the
territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British
Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;
" (2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of
100 East or south of 10 North; or into Portuguese Timor, New
Caledonia, or Loyalty Islands.
"(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the
strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should
be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and
weakening Japan's economic position.
Page 342 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming,
into Thailand, except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia,
would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.
"(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be
extended to the Chinese Central Government
"(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete
coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields,
should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British
Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.
"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.
"Specifically, they recommend:
"That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention
against Japan in China be disapproved.
"That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of
Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
"That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated
to the maximum practicable extent.
"*That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan (ex. 16).*
Secretary Hull testified that he-
"was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be
sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American
foreign policy considerations were involved that material to China
should be accelerated as much as feasible and that aid to the American
Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally *I concurred completely
in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been
striving for months to avoid a showdown with Japan, and to explore every
possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States
and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President
and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.* (tr. 1130)."
On November 7 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent the following
reply, prepared in the State Department, to Prime Minister Churchill's
message of the 5th:
"We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's
appeal is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to
underestimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we
doubt whether preparations for a Japanese land campaign against Kunming
have advanced to a point which would warrant an advance by the Japanese
against Yunnan in the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what
we can to increase and expedite lend lease aid to China and to
facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in
personnel and in equipment. We have noted that you would be prepared to
send pilots and some planes to China.
"We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in
mind along the lines we are taking, together with continuing efforts to
strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar
efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's
hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal
warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an
opposite effect.
"This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention,
study, and effort.
"I shall probably not, repeat not, make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek
before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your
close official circle that I have said above (ex. 16-B)."
The record shows that on November 8, Secretary Hull conferred at the
State Department with General Miles, head of the Military Intelligence
Division (G-2), General Staff (tr. 1173), and on November 10 with
Secretary Knox (tr. 1171). On the latter date he sent to President
Roosevelt a draft of a proposed reply to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
The next day the President dictated the following brief note to his
aide, General Watson, which was attached to the Secretary's draft and
read:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 343
"I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to
me when he comes (ex. 16)."
Written on the same sheet of paper, below the typewritten note to
General Watson and apparently after the conference with Dr. Hu Shih, the
Chinese Ambassador, appears the following, in the President's
handwriting:
"C. H. O. K. to send. F. D. R. (EX. 16)."
The draft was then returned to the State Department, where the message
in final form was handed to Dr. Hu Shih late in the afternoon of
November 14 (Washington time) for transmittal to Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek. In it President Roosevelt described briefly the intensive
consideration that had been given to the Generalissimo's appeal, and
continued:
"Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world
situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we feel that
the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is
along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease
materials and facilitating the building up of the American Volunteer air
force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present,
as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We
are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the
Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries that are
calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In-addition, our
program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly
expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with
great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving
expedition of increasing expedition of increasing amounts of material
for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British
Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems
which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in
the most practicable ways possible.
"I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the
foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering,
adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to
strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward
safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be
developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and
naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being
steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they
do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from
Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole
situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive
preparations in their territories to the south.
"This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government
of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of
aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view
upon Japan on every appropriate occasion (ex. 16)."
In accordance with the joint recommendation that had been made by
General Marshall and Admiral Stark, no warning was delivered to Japan as
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had urged.
It is clear that the movement of additional Japanese troops into
northern French Indochina had a twofold purpose. On the one hand he
troops were an immediate threat to China by their proximity to Yunnan
Province, the Burma Road, and Kunming on the north and northwest.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid recognized the immediacy
of that threat. On the other hand, the additional Japanese forces
increased the potential threat to the British Malay States and
Singapore, and to the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. The
price the Japanese Government hoped to exact from the United States and
Great Britain for the removal of this latter threat had been determined
at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time). The subsequent
fall of the Konoye
Page 344 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cabinet and accession of General Tojo in October had only increased
Japan's determination to use this potential threat to blackmail the
United States, if possible, into (1) ceasing all aid to China, (2)
accepting a military and naval status in the Far East inferior to that
of Japan, and (3) furnishing all possible material aid to Japan.
Furthermore, since the Japanese Army at no time evidenced a willingness
to withdraw its troops from China, or to agree not to use northern
French Indo-China as a base for operations against China it would seem
clear that the Japanese strategy was not only to blackmail the United
States into granting those ".minimum demands" but also, having
accomplished that, to turn on China from northern French Indochina and
thus to expedite the liquidation of the "China Incident" and the
establishment of a Japanese " just peace" in the Far East.
JAPAN DELIVERS ITS NEXT-TO-LAST PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES
(November 10, 1941)
After the Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time) the Japanese-
American conversations were "on the last lap" as far as the Japanese
Government was concerned (ex. 1, p. 101). Immediately after that
conference the final Japanese diplomatic, naval, and military maneuvers
began. The instructions Foreign Minister Togo sent to Ambassador Nomura
to resume the talks and to present proposal "A" to the United States
Government had their counterparts in operational orders issued to the
Japanese Navy and, without doubt, to the Japanese Army as well. Those
orders contemplated naval, air; and troop dispositions which were
commenced immediately. Many of those dispositions were detected and
observed by the United States, Great Britain, or the Netherlands, but
the major Japanese naval movement was successfully kept secret by the
Japanese until the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7,
1941.
It is imperative to an accurate appraisal of this closing period of the
Japanese-American conversations to keep in mind those Japanese military
and naval dispositions. Reports of the military movements toward the
south and alarms about Japanese naval movements (except the one toward
Pearl Harbor) reached Washington and the State Department during
November as the Japanese Ambassadors were presenting their final
proposals, and again, as in July, discredited the intentions of the
Japanese Government. Commencing in the middle of November the American
consuls at Hanoi and Saigon in north and south French Indochina reported
extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina
(tr. 1138). About November 21 (Washington time) the State Department
received word that the Dutch had information that a Japanese naval force
had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese mandated
islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies (ex. 21; tr. 1138).
It is now known that at the same time a powerful Japanese naval striking
force, its formation and purpose successfully kept secret, was
assembling in a northern Japanese harbor for the attack on the United
States Pacific Fleet, under orders issued on or about November 14 (Japan
time). On November 21 (Japan time) the commander in chief of the
combined Japanese fleet was directed to order his forces
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 345
to advance to the area in which they were to wait in readiness and to
station them in such positions that-
"in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of
hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet the situation
promptly (tr. 43S7)."
On November 25 (Japan time) the commander in chief issued an order which
directed the naval striking force to "advance into Hawaiian waters and
upon the very opening of hostilities * * * attack the main force of the
United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow" (tr. 437). The
order provided, however, that-
"Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach
an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all
the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and
return to their bases (tr. 437)."
The striking force sailed from Hitokappu Bay in northern Japan at 9 a.
m. November 26 (Japan time), or about 7 p. m. on November 25 (Washington
time) (tr. 450).
In the meantime, it had been decided in Tokyo to send Saburu Kurusu,
former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, to Washington to assist
Ambassador Nomura. On the evening of November 4 (Japan time) Mr. Kurusu
told Ambassador Grew that the mission had been broached to him "only
yesterday afternoon" (ex. 3O, p. 471), although it appears from the
comments made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew on October
10 (Japan time) that the matter had been under consideration for some
time. Arrangements were made by the State Department for the Pan-
American Clipper to be held in Hong Kong for 2 days to permit Mr. Kurusu
to travel on that plane, and he left Tokyo early on November 5 (Japan
time). Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura on November 4
(Japan time) of this development, saying that Ambassador Kurusu was
being sent to assist Ambassador Nomura and to be his "right-hand man" in
view of "the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your
request on instructions from me" (ex. 1, p. 97). Two days later the
Foreign Minister cabled that the reason for Ambassador Kurusu's dispatch
"so quickly" was "to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations
soon to follow." The officials of the Japanese Army and Navy, the
Foreign Minister said, were "pleased with the special dispatch of the
Ambassador" (ex. 1, p. 101).
In Washington, as soon as he received Foreign Minister Togo's
instructions to resume the conversations, Ambassador Nomura arranged a
meeting with Secretary Hull. At that meeting, which took place on the
morning of November 7 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura informed the
Secretary that he had now received instructions from the new Japanese
Government, and that he wished to resume the conversations. He then said
that the new Japanese Cabinet had deliberated on the various questions
at issue between the two Governments-
"with a view to making the utmost concessions that they could make,
having due regard for the situation in the Far East and the attitude of
public opinion in Japan (vol. II, p. 707)."
He said that of the three principal questions on which there were
divergent views, he thought that it would not be difficult to reconcile
the views of the two Governments on two, namely, nondiscrimination in
international trade and Japan's obligations under the Tripartite
Page 346 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pact. He realized that the difficulties of reaching an agreement on the
third, the China question, were greater. So saying, he handed to
Secretary Hull a document (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 709-710) containing
formulae relating to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and to
nondiscrimination in international trade. This document was, he said, to
be taken in conjunction with the United States proposals of June 21 and
October 2 and the Japanese proposal delivered to the Secretary on
September 27. It embodied the substance of the provisions of proposal
"A" regarding those two points, but was silent regarding the question of
Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Secretary Hull expressed
the hope that some concrete statement concerning the latter point could
be worked out that would be of help, but Ambassador Nomura said it did
not seem to him any further statement was necessary than had already
been made, considering the attitude of the Japanese Government which
"manifestly desired to maintain peace in the Pacific." During the
conversation Secretary Hull again mentioned that before entering into
any formal negotiations he intended to discuss the matter with the
Chinese, the British, and the Dutch (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 708).
Ambassador Nomura requested a meeting with President Roosevelt, which
was subsequently arranged for November 10 (Washington time).
The afternoon of November 7 (Washington time), Secretary Hull attended a
Cabinet meeting at the White House. The situation in the Far East
appears to have been uppermost in the minds of those present; especially
the President, Secretary Hull, and Secretary Stimson. Secretary Stimson
had had a conference with the President the day before, November 6
(Washington time), and had recorded in his daily notes that he and the
President had talked-
"about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the
messenger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he
thought he might say. *He was trying to think of something which would
save us further time.* He suggested he might propose a truce in which
there would be no movement or armament for 6 months and then if the
Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that
meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw
two great objections to that; first, that it tied up our hands just at a
time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our
reinforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would
feel that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him
that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington
conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together, because
the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese
know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into
such an arrangement (tr. 14414-14415)."
The morning of the next day, November 7 (Washington time), Admiral John
R. Beardall, President Roosevelt's naval aide, at the President's
direction, requested the appropriate officers in the Navy Department to
arrange for the delivery to the President of complete translations of
the intercepted Japanese messages, rather than memoranda briefly
summarizing the messages as had been delivered theretofore under the
existing agreement between the Army and the Navy in that connection.
Such arrangements were made and, commencing November 12 (Washington
time), complete translations were delivered each day to Admiral Beardall
for delivery to President Roosevelt. According to reported statements
made by Admiral Beardall at the time, the President told him that he
(the President) "was in fact either seeing or being told about the
material through Hull" (tr. 14525-14526).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 347
According to Secretary Stimson's notes of the Cabinet meeting on
November 7 (Washington time), President Roosevelt took-
"what be said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on
the question of the Far East-whether the people would back us up in case
we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be. It was a
very interesting talk-the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had
since I have been there. He went around the table first Hull and then
myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in
feeling the country would support us. He said that this time the vote
is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of
the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a
following-up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be
done in the future. The thing would have been much stronger if the
Cabinet had known-and they did not know except in the case of Hull and
the President-what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready
we are to pitch in (tr. 14415-14416)."
Secretary Hull testified that at this Cabinet meeting after President
Roosevelt turned to him and asked whether he had anything in mind-
" thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the
international situation. I went over fully developments in the
conversations with Japan and *emphasized that in my opinion relations
were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a
military attack anywhere by Japan at any time*. When I finished, the
President went around the Cabinet. *All concurred in my estimate of the
dangers.* It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical
situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country
would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.
"accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on
November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted
with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic,
but we were " likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side
of the world on the far side of the Pacific"; and the Pacific no less
than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense.
"On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated
that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced
more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the
same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations
bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking
high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening
more and more with each passing day "to engulf our own shores." He
warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917;
that "at any moment war may be forced upon us" (tr. 1131-1132)."
Statements which were made by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Grew
in Tokyo 3 days later, on November 10 (Japan time), show the attitude
with which the Japanese Foreign Office was approaching the conversations
during this period immediately following the Imperial Conference on
November 5. After informing the Ambassador that new proposals had been
sent to Ambassador Nomura for presentation to the United States
Government, the Foreign Minister urged the necessity of a speedy
settlement, saying that national sentiment would "not tolerate further
protracted delay in arriving at some conclusion" and that the position
was "daily becoming more pressing." He said that the new proposals
represented the "maximum possible concessions by Japan," and handed to
the Ambassador the texts of the two documents submitted to Secretary
Hull on November 7. During the Foreign Minister's comments on these
documents, he expressed the desire that the British Government should
conclude an agreement with Japan simultaneously with the United States,
in view of Great Britain's interests in the Pacific. The Foreign
Minister told Ambassador Grew that he felt that the United States did
not adequately appreciate the realities of the situation in the Far
East. Referring to the steadily increasing population of Japan, he
stated it
Page 348 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was necessary to assure the raw materials necessary for the existence of
that population and that unless the United States realized this fact as
among the realities of the situation, a successful conclusion to the
conversations would be difficult. Ambassador Grew told the Minister that
his statements penetrated to the heart of the whole problem, since one
of the fundamental purposes of the conversations was to open a way for
Japan to obtain such necessary supplies, together with a full flow of
trade and commerce and market for her industries, but by peaceful means
as opposed to the use of force. In reply to this the Minister said, as
reported by Ambassador Grew, that-
"He did not wish to go into the fundamentals of the question, but he
thought that he could advert briefly to the importance of commercial and
economic relations between the United States and Japan. The freezing by
the United States of Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many
important raw materials to Japan. Economic pressure of this character is
capable of menacing national existence to a greater degree than the
direct use of force. He hoped that the American Government would take
into consideration circumstances of this character and realize the
possibility that the Japanese people, if exposed to continued economic
pressure, might eventually feel obliged resolutely to resort to measures
of self-defense (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 714)."
The Minister saw no inconsistency between insisting that Japan would not
give up the fruits of 4 years of hostilities in China and at the same
time accepting the principle of refraining from aggression and the use
of force (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 710-714; ex. 1, pp. 109-111).
Ambassador Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt took place at the
White House on the morning of November 10 (Washington time), with
Secretary Hull and Minister Wakasugi present. At this meeting the
Ambassador read from a prepared document an explanation of the proposals
he had been instructed by his Government to present (i. e., proposal
"A"), the substance of which (except as regards the Tripartite Pact) he
had already communicated to Secretary Hull on November 7. Regarding the
first question, the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in
international trade, he said that his Government had now decided to
accept its application in all Pacific areas, including China, upon the
understanding that the principle would be applied uniformly to the rest
of the world as well. As to the second question, the attitude of the two
Governments toward the European war, he stated that his Government was
not prepared to go further in black and white than the language
contained in its proposal of September 27, which was:
"Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in
the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor
jointly for the early restoration of world peace.
"With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration
of world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by
considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United
States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide
entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite
Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, and would likewise determine
what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in
accordance with the said interpretation (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 638)."
He added that if the United States was in a position to give assurance
that it had no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the
term "protection and self-defense," his Government would be prepared to
reciprocate. Concerning the third question, the stationing and
withdrawal of troops from China and French Indochina, Ambassador Nomura
submitted the following formula:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 349
"With regard to the Japanese forces which have been dispatched to China
in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas of
North China and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao
(Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required
duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and
China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as
general peace is restored between Japan and China and the withdrawal
will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China
and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of
peace and order.
"The Japanese Government undertake to respect the territorial
sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present
stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled
or an equitable peace is established in East Asia (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
716)."
The Ambassador said that this formula clearly indicated that the
stationing of Japanese troops in China was not of a permanent nature,
and that however desirable the complete and immediate withdrawal of all
Japanese troops from China might be, it was "impracticable under the
present circumstances." In a written statement, which he then read,
Ambassador Nomura said that as viewed from the Japanese side it seemed
that the United States had remained adamant in its position and had
shown little sign of reciprocation to "concessions" by the Japanese with
the result that "in certain quarters in my country some skepticism has
arisen as to the true intention of the United States Government." He
continued:
"People in my country take the freezing of the assets as an economic
blockade and they go even so far as to contend that the means of modern
warfare are not limited to shooting. No nation can live without the
supply of materials vital to its industries. Reports reaching me from
home indicate that the situation is serious and pressing and the only
way of preserving peace is to reach some kind of amicable and
satisfactory understanding with the United States without any
unnecessary loss of time. In the face of these mounting difficulties,
the Japanese Government bent all its efforts to continue the
conversations and bring about a satisfactory understanding solely for
the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific. *My Government
therefore is now submitting certain proposals as its utmost effort* for
that purpose, and I shall feel very grateful if I can have the views of
your Government on them at the earliest possible opportunity (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 717)."
In reply, President Roosevelt read a brief statement which concluded:
"We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable
results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall
continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we
understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that
the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue
peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification
should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 718)."
The President referred to the improvement of American relations with the
South American countries under the "good neighbor policy" as compared to
the policy of force that had been employed by the United States in some
cases. Then, according to Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo the same
day-
"Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that economic pressure
had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them
impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a modus vivendi
if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this
expression should be translated as "method of living" (ex. 1, p. 116)."
Ambassador Nomura reported that it was not clear to him what the phrase
"modus vivendi" really meant, and that he intended to ascertain whether
the President was referring to, possibly, "a provisional agreement" (ex.
1, p. 116).
Page 350 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Upon receipt of Ambassador Nomura's report, Foreign Minister Togo cabled
the Ambassador that there were-
"indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the
exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that
the date set forth in my message No. 736 is absolutely immovable under
present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore it is
essential that settlement be realized by about that time.* The session
of Parliament opens on the 15th * * *. The government must have a clear
picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You
can see, therefore, *that the situation is nearing a climax and that
time is indeed becoming short.*
"I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in
view of the above-mentioned situation, will you redouble them? When
talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to
them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S.
attitude in the minimum of time. At the same time do everything in your
power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.
"We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not
they will accept our final proposal A (ex. 1, pp. 116-117)."
Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister that Secretary
Hull had agreed to study the Japanese proposals the following day,
Armistice Day, and that his next meeting with the Secretary was
scheduled for the afternoon of November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p.
118).
On November 11 (Japan time), as the result of statements made by Foreign
Minister Togo to him on October 26 (Japan time) (ex. 1, p; 91), the
British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, called on the Foreign
Minister upon instructions from the British Foreign Office and urged the
desirability of a supreme effort to reach an agreement with the United
States, saying that when the point of actual negotiations was reached
the British Government would be ready to join in seeking an agreement
(ex. 1, pp. 117-118; ex. 158). Secretary Hull was informed of the
instructions to the British Ambassador in Tokyo during a conversation
with Lord Halifax on November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 158). During the
conversation between Foreign Minister Togo and Sir Robert Craigie, the
Foreign Minister went to great lengths to convince the British
Ambassador how critical the situation was, saying that in the view of
the Japanese Government the negotiations had reached the final phase,
that the Imperial Government had made its " maximum concessions," and
that if the United States refused to accept those terms and sign the
agreement "within a week to ten days," it would be "useless" to continue
the negotiations, as the Japanese domestic political situation would
permit "no further delays in reaching a decision." He emphasized this
latter point in his report of the conversation to Ambassador Nomura,
saving that it was "absolutely impossible that there be any further
delays," that while there were indications that the United States
Government was "still under the impression that the negotiations are in
the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging
opinions," as far as Tokyo was concerned, "this is the final phase," and
expressed the "fervent" hope that Ambassador Nomura would do-
"everything in (his) power to make them realize this fact and bring
about an agreement at the earliest possible moment (ex. 1, p. 119)."
At the meeting between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura on November
12 (Washington time), the Ambassador said that his new Government had
asked him to emphasize its desire to expedite a
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 351
settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult, people
were becoming impatient and a session of the Diet was impending. He
expressed the hope that "within a week or ten days" some agreement could
be reached. Secretary Hull commented that the matters submitted on
November 10 were being worked on as rapidly as possible, and that as
soon as a good basis had been reached in the exploratory conversations
the United States could then approach the Chinese Government and sound
out their attitude. He had previously handed to the Ambassador a
document setting forth his general ideas relating to mutual conciliation
between Japan and China. In response to a question from Minister
Wakasugi, who was also present, Secretary Hull hinted that Japan and
China might be "brought together" by the United States, but did not say
in so many words that the United States would mediate between them. The
conversation ended with Secretary Hull expressing the hope that he might
have something by way of comment on the Japanese proposals on November
14 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 722-726). According to Ambassador Nomura's
report to Tokyo, Secretary Hull also indicated that the British and the
Dutch were being informed generally of the nature of the conversations,
and that if a basis for negotiations should be worked out, it was
possible that they might sign with the United States, although the
Secretary "could not guarantee this" (ex. 1, p. 120). Ambassador Nomura
told the Foreign Minister he was not "satisfied with their attitude
toward taking up negotiations," and he sent Minister Wakasugi to see one
of Mr. Hull's advisors the following day to press for an early decision.
During that conversation, Mr. Wakusugi said that the public in Japan was
becoming impatient "and almost desperate," and that he hoped for a
clear-cut answer the next day as to whether the United States would
accept or not the Japanese proposal of September 25 as modified through
November 10, or desired changes therein, or whether the United States'
proposal of June 21 was its final proposal (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 729-
731; ex. 1, pp. 123-125). Similar representations concerning the need
for immediate agreement were made to Ambassador Grew on November 12
(Japan time), including statements that the negotiations had reached
their final phase, that Japan had made the greatest possible
concessions, and that "a very critical and dangerous state of affairs
will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in successfully
concluding the negotiations" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 719-722).
Secretary Hull testified that:
"during those early days in October, it looked more and more like they
were prepared to, and were intending to, adhere to their policies * * *
the situation floated along until Tojo's government came into power,
about the 16th, I think, of October * * * and the Konoye Government
fell.
"While they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the
conversations, we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of
duplicity and double dealing, and the real purpose was to go forward
more energetically with their plans, as was indicated by numerous
demands on us to make haste, and statements that this matter could not
go on without something serious happening.
[Discontinuous text]
The impression we received, at least myself, and some others, was that
during those months they tried to prevail on this Government by
persuasion and threats and other methods to yield its basic principles,
so that Japan could maintain intact her policy and her continued course
of aggression and conquest (tr. 1178-1179) .
Page 352 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On November 14 (Japan time), although he knew that Ambassador Nomura had
scheduled a meeting with Secretary Hull for November 15 (Washington
time) at which proposal "A" would be further discussed Foreign Minister
Togo cabled the Ambassador the English text to be used in presenting
proposal "B", and told the Ambassador he would be notified when to
present that "absolutely final proposal" to the United States Government
(ex. 1, pp. 125-126). This message was translated and available in
Washington on November 14 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 126). The same
day Ambassador Nomura cabled the Foreign Minister a long report (No.
1090) in which, although he realized he would be "harshly criticized,"
he cautioned against precipitate action:
"I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.
"I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations,
and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite
patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must
tell you the following:
"1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American
Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part
either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their
command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are
contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.
2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of
preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward;
they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather
than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they
believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It
is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich
conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be
such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been
passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate
peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in
evidence.
"3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China,
and insofar as possible she is assisting Chiang. For the sake of peace
in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of
China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to
the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the
United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.
"4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese
Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are
regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any
case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers
are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and
closer with the Axis.
"5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence
and our lives it naturally follows that we will have to fight England
and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will
participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central
America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those
of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for
their economic existence on the United States, and must maintain a
neutrality partial thereto.
"6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory
or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do
not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out
till the end will be the victor.
"7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and
deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and
as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength
to the Pacific.
"Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German
and Italian Navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength
into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that
should the United States start warlike activities in the Atlantic, there
would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there
has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now
many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal
questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the
Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be
carried out through the Pacific area.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 353
"8. *Though I cannot be a hundred percent sure of the present situation
in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition
must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding
that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am
going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be
harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan
permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order
to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be
the best plan (ex. 1, pp. 127-129).*"
The Foreign Minister's reply came back promptly and unequivocally:
"For your Honor's own information.
1." I have read your #1090, and you may be sure that you have all my
gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but *the fate of our
Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days*, so please fight
harder than you ever did before.
"2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so
and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only
to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you
please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait
and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, *I am
awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the
question.* I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in
my #736, and there *will be no change.* Please try to understand that.
You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States
to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a
solution *on the basis of our proposals*, and do your best to bring
about an immediate solution (ex. 1 p. 137-8).*
The next day, November 15 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura called on
Secretary Hull and the Secretary handed the Ambassador a statement, in
writing, regarding the formula proposed by the Japanese Government on
November 10 (Washington time) for dealing with the question of
nondiscrimination in international trade. After noting that in its
proposal, the Japanese Government recognized
"the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial
relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China,
*on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied
uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well* (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
734),"
the statement suggested that the meaning of the condition attached by
the Japanese was not entirely clear. It was assumed that the Japanese
Government did not intend to ask the United States Government to accept
responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside its
sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with
the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the
consent and cooperation of all other governments. The statement then
reviewed the efforts of the United States over recent gears to reduce
tariff barriers, and suggested that similar action by Japan would be a
"long forward step" toward the objective set forth in the Japanese
proposal. The need for the proviso noted above was then questioned, and
it was suggested that the proviso might well be omitted. The statement
was accompanied by a draft of a proposed joint United States-Japanese
declaration on economic policy, which Secretary Hull told Minister
Wakasugi constituted the United States reply to the Japanese proposal on
the question of nondiscrimination in international trade (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 731-737).
Ambassador Nomura then stated that his Government regarded the
conversations as having progressed to the stage of formal negotiations.
In reply to this, Secretary Hull said that until the conversations had
reached a point where he could call in the British, the Chinese, and the
Dutch and say that there was a basis for negotiation, the conversations
were exploratory. He pointed out that whereas the United States proposal
of June 21 made it clear that the settlement under discussion related to
the entire Pacific area, the proposal the
Page 354 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
previous Japanese Government had submitted on September 27 narrowed the
application of the proposals regarding economic nondiscrimination and
peaceful intent to the southwestern Pacific, and he then requested that
the new Japanese Government give assurances on that point. He said that
it would be difficult for him to go to the British and the Dutch and say
that Japan was willing to enter upon a peaceful program but at the same
time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany. The
Secretary said that if the United States made an agreement with Japan
while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call
upon Japan to go to war with us, this would cause "so much turmoil in
the country that he might be lynched." He asked the Ambassador whether
the United States Government could assume that if the Japanese
Government entered into an agreement with it the Tripartite Pact would
become a "dead letter." When Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether this was an
answer to the Japanese proposal on the question of Japan's relations
under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull said the United States would
be better able to reply after receiving an answer to the question he had
just raised. Ambassador Nomura said he was afraid the American
Government did not trust the Japanese Government, though there was no
material difference between the policies of the new Government and the
previous Government. Secretary Hull said that the new Japanese
Government seemed to be taking the attitude that the United States
Government must reply "at once" to their points, and that he did not
think that his Government-
"should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese
Government under circumstances where the United States had been pursuing
peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government had been
violating law and order (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 734)."
He concluded by saying that when he had heard further from the new
Japanese Government regarding its peaceful intentions, and when the
question of nondiscrimination could be cleared up as suggested in the
proposals he had handed to Ambassador Nomura during the meeting, and
also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that some solution
could be reached on the question of stationing troops in China. The
Secretary emphasized at the same time that he did not desire any delay
and that he was working as hard as he could to bring about a wholly
satisfactory and broad settlement. It was agreed that there should be a
further meeting after Ambassador Nomura had received instructions from
his Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 731-734; ex. 1, p. 132).
In his report of this meeting to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura said that he
had told Mr. Hull he felt his Government would be "very disappointed"
over these replies. He continued: -1
"Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did
clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems,
although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They
harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and
apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion
(ex. 1, p. 137)."
There is no evidence before the Committee indicating that at that time
Ambassador Nomura had any knowledge that the Japanese naval striking
force had already started assembling for the attack on Pearl Harbor.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 355
THE TOJO CABINET REFUSES TO CONSIDER ANY SUGGESTION LESS FAVORABLE TO
JAPAN THAN ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"
(November 18-19,1941)
Ambassador Kurusu reached Washington on November 15 (Washington time)
(tr. 1133). On the morning of November 17 (Washington time), with
Ambassador Nomura, he called on Secretary Hull prior to their meeting
with President Roosevelt. After he had been introduced, Ambassador
Kurusu said, among other things, that he was fully assured of Premier
Tojo's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United States, and
that Premier Tojo was optimistic regarding the possibility of settling
the differences in respect to nondiscrimination in international trade
and Japan's attitude toward the European war, but felt that there were
greater difficulties in the question of withdrawing Japanese troops from
China. Before the meeting with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura
handed Secretary Hull two documents which he said the Japanese
Government was submitting in response to the questions that had been
raised at the conference on November 12 regarding Japan's peaceful
intentions and the scope of the proposed understanding between the two
Governments (ex. 29, vol. It, pp. 738-739).
At the meeting at the White House, Ambassador Kurusu was formally
received by President Roosevelt. The conversation was largely devoted to
a discussion of the relation of Japan and the United States to the war
in Europe and to the China problem. Concerning the latter the President
said that at a suitable stage the United States would, so to speak,
"introduce" Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with
the remaining adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been
determined. Secretary Hull explained at length that America's military
preparations were for defense before it was too late, that the United
States was on the defense in the present Pacific situation and that
Japan was the aggressor. The conference ended with the understanding
that both Ambassadors would see Secretary Hull the next morning (ex. 29,
vol. II, pp. 740-743).
At that meeting at the White House no effort was made by either side to
solve the three major points of difference between the two countries,
and there is no evidence before the Committee of any contact between
representatives of the two Governments on the afternoon of November 17
(Washington time). However, as Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo the
next day (No. 1135), that evening the two Japanese Ambassadors "went to
call on a certain Cabinet member." "This," they cabled the Foreign
Minister, "is what he told us":
"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and
the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no
ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the
great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle
approve of a Japanese American understanding. If Japan would now do
something real, such as evacuating French Indo-China, showing her
peaceful intentions, the way would be open for us to furnish you with
oil and it would probably lead to the re-establishment of normal trade
relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so
long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the
Americans (ex. 1, p. 154)."
356 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There are indications in the record before the Committee that this
meeting between the two Japanese Ambassadors and a member of
President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening before their meeting
with Secretary Hull was more than a coincidence. Under Secretary
Welles testified before the Committee in another connection that he
had been told by Secretary Hull "and other individuals" that Mr.
Frank Walker, then Postmaster General and as such a member of
President Roosevelt's Cabinet, was "negotiating" with the Japanese
and that he thought Mr. Walker "had conversations both with Admiral
Nomura and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well" (tr.
1319-1320). Furthermore, the record of outside telephone calls
through the White House switchboard shows that at 6:25 p. m. on
November 17, before the meeting of the two Japanese Ambassadors
with the "certain Cabinet member," Postmaster General Walker
talked with Secretary Hull, and that he also talked with Secretary
Hull at 9:22 o'clock the next morning, November 18 (Washington
time), before Secretary Hull's conference at 10:30 o'clock with the
two Ambassadors (ex. 179).
The suggestion made that evening by the Cabinet member-that
some action by Japan to show her peaceful intentions, "such as
evacuating French Indochina," would open the way for the United States
to
relax its freezing orders-was substantially the proposal made by the
two Ambassadors to Secretary Hull at their meeting with him at 10:30
the next morning. While at that meeting the greatest emphasis was
placed on the question of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite
Pact, during the discussion of this subject, after Secretary Hull had
pointed out that the American public would never understand an
agreement between Japan and the United States if Japan continued
to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura said that the
situation in the southwest Pacific was now critical, with the United
States and Great Britain reinforcing their armed forces in Singapore
and the Philippine Islands to counter Japan's sending troops to
French Indochina. He suggested that if this situation could now be
checked, if the tension could be relaxed, an atmosphere could be
created in which the talks could continue. Ambassador Kurusu then
said that the freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and
a feeling that Japan had to fight while it could; he said that what was
needed now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course.
Secretary Hull asked to what extent a relaxation of freezing would
enable ,Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that-
"what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get
control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence."
Ambassador Nomura then asked whether there was any hope of a
solution-some small beginning toward the realization of "our high
ideals"-and continued by suggesting:
"*the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the
date in July when following the Japanese move into southern French
Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect.* [1] The
Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo
on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had
mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn
from
French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement
elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some
move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. *The
Secretary said
[1] While the Japanese move that precipitated the United States freezing
order was into *southern* French Indochina, Japanese troops had moved
into northern French Indochina in 1940.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 357
that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long
way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan
was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes
of conquest.* The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of
fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first
step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the
Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered
by the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 750)."
Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu pursued their suggestion further
at a conference with Secretary Hull the next day, November 19
(Washington time). Ambassador Nomura told the Secretary that
they had reported to their Government the conversation of the
preceding day and were momentarily expecting instructions.
"The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador (Nomura) felt about the
possibilities. *The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the
suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed
before the Japanese moved into south Indochina in the latter part of
July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing
measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if
something could be done on his suggestion, it could serve to relieve
that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations.*
The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a
proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would
go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.
The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in
Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a
peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some
time.
"The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now
appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the
Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing
measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in
mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further
efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had not so
far diverged. The Ambassador agreed (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 751)."
In reporting to Tokyo on November 18 (Washington time) the
substance of their conversation with Secretary Hull on that day, the
two Japanese Ambassadors had, in fact, dispatched four separate
telegrams (ex. 1, pp. 146, 149, 151, 152), each of which outlined the
suggestion they had made, thereby indicating the importance the two
Ambassadors attached to it. The sending of four telegrams may also
have reflected the fact that they had already received from the Foreign
Minister the English text of proposal "B", which was far more drastic
than their suggestion and was, they knew, regarded in Tokyo as
Japan's "absolutely final proposal." Furthermore, they had been
told by the Foreign Minister that they would be notified when to
present it to Secretary Hull. The two final telegrams show that both
Japanese Ambassadors regarded a return to the status prior to freezing
as the only means to success in the negotiations. In his message
(No. 1133) Ambassador Kurusu said:
"In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think
there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in
harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that *as a stopgap for
the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires for a
"time limit" in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-
American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present deadlock,
ask them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for
assurance regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.*
"*In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested
the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July*, but in view of the
progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent
to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory
aside from French Indo-China as per Proposal "B" or for our promise in
vague terms of evacuation of troops from French Indo-China * * * Please
have your mind made up to this. I desire instructions re "time limit"
and * * * as we desire to press for a
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at
once (ex. 1, pp. 151-152)."
In his message (No. 1134) to the Foreign Minister Ambassador Nomura
outlined at greater length what he and Ambassador Kurusu had in mind:
"In our conversations of today, *as a practical means of alleviating the
ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful
situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing
before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the
evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French
Indo-China.
"Hull, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan had clearly
demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain,
the Netherlands and other interested powers."
"In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the
American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in
China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal
situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the
Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the
Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather,
exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans
insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to
other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to
bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions.
In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of
successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B"
immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if
we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". *Therefore, looking at
it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to
presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a
practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of
goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in
Proposal "B", and then to try to proceed with the solution of other
questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced
that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.*
[Discontinuous text]
"The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not
interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises
in effect. *It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to
withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and
materials are made available to us.*"
"Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133
(ex. 1, pp. 152-3)."
The temporary arrangement suggested by the two Japanese Ambassadors was
summarily rejected by the Japanese Government in Tokyo. On November 19
(Japan time), in a message in which he referred to the Ambassadors'
messages No. 1133 and No. 1134 above, Foreign Minister Togo emphasized
that in the negotiations consent could be given only "within the scope
of the instructions of this office." He told Ambassador Nomura that-
"the internal situation in our country is such *that it would be
difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-
China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act
will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that
would come up to the B proposal.* With the situation as urgent as it is
now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the
amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your
message, then to push on for an understanding.
"*The Ambassador (Kurusu) did not arrange this with us beforehand, but
made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting
the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result
in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore,
having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797, 800
and 801) will please present our B proposal of the Imperial Government,
and no further concessions can be made.*
*If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will
have to be broken off*; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth
your very best efforts (ex. 1, p. 155).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 359
Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister in Tokyo his
astonishment at the Japanese Government's unwillingness to consider
seriously the suggestion he and Ambassador Kurusu had made. His message
(No. 1136), dated November 19 (Washington time) follows in full:
"I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the
Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation
and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and
the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality.
There are now three ways which the Empire might take
"(1) Maintain the status quo.
"(2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.
"(3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression
arrangement.
"No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war
preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a
state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In
other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs
from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.
"No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the
present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our
objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. *My #1134 of
yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by
the government is beyond my power of comprehension*, but as I view it,
the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China
incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an
opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a
large scale. *I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary
"truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude
to greater achievements to come later.*
"I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary
to my message of yesterday (ex. 1, p. 158)."
In a separate message Ambassador Nomura requested the Foreign Minister
to "convey the above (message) to the Prime Minister" (ex. 1, p. 158).
In reply to this Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura
on November 20 (Japan time) that:
"under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested by
you, as we have stated in our message, would not suffice for saving the
present situation.*"
"We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock *except for you to push
negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our
#798.* Please understand this. *The Premier also is absolutely in
accord with this opinion* (ex. 1, p. 160)."
Message No. 798 referred to in the next preceding paragraph was the
message the Foreign Minister had sent on November 19 (Japan time) which
rejected Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for a "provisional arrangement"
and instructed him to present proposal "B," the Japanese Government's
"absolutely final proposal."
Foreign Minister Togo's message of November 20 (Japan time), which thus
finally and conclusively rejected the suggestion made by Ambassadors
Nomura and Kurusu, was sent not only after the Foreign Minister had
received the Ambassadors' four telegrams of November 18 (Washington
time), including No. 1133 and No. 1134 quoted in part above, but also
after the Foreign Minister had received Ambassador Nomura's message No.
1135 of the same date, reporting on the meeting of the two Ambassadors
with the member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening of
November 17 (Washington time). Consequently, the record before the
committee shows that the Japanese Government, including Premier Tojo,
refused to consider the provisional arrangement suggested by Ambassadors
Nomura and
Page 360 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Kurusu with knowledge not only that Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss
it with the British and the Dutch-thus indicating, in the light of his
prior statements, that he believed a basis for negotiations had been
suggested by the two Ambassadors-but with the further knowledge that
practically the same suggestion had been made to Ambassadors Nomura and
Kurusu by a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet.
The seriousness with which the Japanese Government regarded the stage
that had now been reached in the negotiations is evidenced by the fact
that on November 15 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Office sent out a
circular message to its officials abroad, including those in Washington,
prescribing "the order and method of destroying the code machines in the
event of an emergency" (ex. 1, p. 137). Four days later the Foreign
Office sent out circular messages establishing the so-called "winds
code," to be used in case of an emergency and the cutting off of
international communications. The receipt of a message implementing this
code was to be the signal to "destroy all code papers, etc." (Ex. 1, pp.
154-155). Those two messages were sent from Tokyo before Japan's
"absolutely final proposal" was presented to Secretary Hull, and appear
to have been the first Japanese messages intercepted which dealt with
the destruction of codes, code machines, et cetera.
JAPAN DELIVERS ITS ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND
DEMANDS AN AGREEMENT ON THAT BASIS
(November 20, 1941)
On November 20 (Washington time), Thanksgiving Day, Ambassadors Nomura
and Kurusu called at the State Department. Ambassador Kurusu told
Secretary Hull that they had referred to their Government the suggestion
Ambassador Nomura had made at the meeting 2 days before for a return to
the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into southern
French Indochina in July. He said that both he and Ambassador Nomura had
anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in
moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the
Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal "on that
basis." He said that the Japanese proposal represented an amplification
of the suggestion Ambassador Nomura had made (ex. 29 vol. II, p. 753).
The proposal which Ambassador Kurusu then read and handed to Secretary
Hull was the second formula, proposal "B," approved at the Imperial
Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) as a "last effort to
prevent something happening." In his messages to Ambassador Nomura,
Foreign Minister Togo had described it as "an ultimatum" (ex. 1, p. 99),
as "our absolutely final proposal" (ex. 1, p. 99), and as "our last
possible bargain" (ex. 1, p. 93). As originally drawn up and approved,
proposal "B" had consisted of four provisions, each of which was
contained in the Japanese proposal of November 20 (ex. 1, pp. 97,99; ex.
29, vol. II, pp. 755-756). "If necessary," those four provisions were to
be supplemented by others dealing with the three points previously at
issue in the conversations-i. e., the evacuation of troops from China
and French Indochina, the Tripartite Pact, and nondiscrimination in
international trade. In the English text of proposal "B" cabled to
Ambassador Nomura on November
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 361
14 (Japan time), specific provisions covering those three points were
added to the original four provisions (ex. 1, p. 126). However, the
Foreign Minister's instructions to Ambassador Nomura on November 19
(Japan time) to present proposal "B" had also directed him to delete the
provisions dealing with nondiscrimination in international trade and the
Tripartite Pact, leaving only the provision relating to evacuation of
troops in addition to the four provisions approved on November 5 (Japan
time) (ex. 1, p. 156). But whereas the formula concerning the evacuation
of troops which Ambassador Nomura had presented to Secretary Hull on
November 7 (Washington time) had covered the evacuation of Japanese
troops from both China and French Indochina, the provision contained in
the Japanese proposal of November 20 covered the evacuation of Japanese
troops from French Indochina only. To this, possibly with an eye to the
suggestion made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on November 18,
the Japanese Government had added a provision for the transfer of their
troops from southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina "upon
the conclusion of the present arrangement." [1]
As read and delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Kurusu, the
Japanese proposal follows in full:
"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern
Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-
China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present
"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration (If peace
between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in
the Pacific area.
"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to
remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of
the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final
agreement.
"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a
view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which
the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.
"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to
restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the
freezing of the assets.
"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required
quantity of oil.
"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such
measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the
restoration of general peace between Japan and China (ex. 29, vol. II,
pp. 755-756).
When Ambassador Kurusu handed the Japanese proposal to him Secretary
Hull said that he would examine and study it sympathetically. Secretary
Hull referred to the fact that the United States was supplying aid to
both Great Britain and China, and indicated that until Japan made it
perfectly clear that her policy was one of peace it would be impossible
to cease aiding China. However Ambassador Kurusu observed in connection
with paragraph 5 of the proposal that it "might be interpreted to mean
that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that
negotiations were started." (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 753-755.)
In his testimony before the Committee Secretary Hull summarized the
Japanese note of November 20 in these words:
[1] Secretary Hull testified that the conditional offer of the Japanese
"to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was
meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern
Indochina within a day or two and furthermore they placed no limit on
the number of troops they might continue to send there." (Tr. ;4261.)
Page 362 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to
Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing
measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China and
for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese
government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed
forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no
limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into
Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until
after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the
establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there
were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into
southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there
were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh
Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to
the north of Indochina-for example, China and the Soviet Union. The
proposal contained no Provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and
to revert to peaceful courses (tr. 1137-38)."
It is now known that the Japanese note of November 20, was in fact, a
restatement in more peremptory terms of Japan's "minimum demands"
determined at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on September 6 (Japan
time). As applied to the United States, the three major Japanese
"demands" decided upon at that Imperial Conference were, that the United
States would not "intervene in or obstruct a settlement by Japan of the
China Incident", i. e., would cease all aid to China; that the United
States would "take no action in the Far East which offers a threat to
the defense of the Empire"; and that the United States would " cooperate
with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials" (ex. 179,
Konoye Memoirs, pp. 77-78). In an intercepted message to Ambassador
Nomura which was translated and available in Washington on November 24
(Washington time), Foreign Minister Togo said:
"our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of
Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American
petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p.
172)."
Secretary Hull testified that the Japanese must have known that their
proposal was-
"an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 or 5 years
exploration of each others situations and attitudes (tr. 1181)."
He continued-
"To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly
unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in
Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with
Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the
United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant
abject surrender of our position under intimidation (tr. 1140)."
Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, as well as other high officials
of the Government, not only knew from the intercepted Japanese messages
already mentioned that the note the Japanese delivered on Thanksgiving
Day, November 20, was their "absolutely final proposal," they also knew
from the same source that the Japanese Government had fixed November 25
(Japan time) as the dead line by which the written agreement of the
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to its demands were to
be obtained. On November 22 (Washington time), the following intercepted
message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura was translated
and available in Washington:
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my
#736 (November 25). You should know this, however, I know you are
working hard. Stick"
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 363
"to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to
bring about the solution we desire. *There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by
the 26th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your
conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the
29th, (let me write it out for you-twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes
can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and
the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it that the dead line
absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going
to happen.* Please take this into your careful consideration and work
harder than you ever have before (ex. 1, p. 165)."
Even with four added days of grace, the situation was, Secretary Hull
testified,
"critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired
to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution
and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this
country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need for time to
prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a show-
down.
"There the situation stood-the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in
their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.
"The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically
vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws (tr. 1140)."
Neither Secretary Hull nor President Roosevelt, nor any of their
advisors, knew, however, that almost simultaneously with the delivery in
Washington of the Japanese ultimatum of November 20, the Imperial
Japanese General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered the commander in
chief of the Japanese combined fleet to direct the Japanese naval
striking force, already assembling in a harbor in northern Japan, to
"advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness" for the
attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 437).
THE UNITED STATES REPLIES
(November 26, 1941)
The United States reply was handed to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in
the late afternoon on November 26 (Washington time), 6 days after the
delivery of the Japanese ultimatum (tr. 1147). Those 6 days were a
period of intense activity, involving not only the highest officials in
the United States Government but also the highest officials of the
British, Dutch, Australian, and Chinese Governments.
From time to time Secretary Hull had told the Japanese Ambassadors that
when his conversations with them got beyond the exploratory stage he
would talk with the representatives of the British, Dutch, and Chinese
Governments. On November 18 (Washington time), after the Japanese
Ambassadors suggested a return to the status prior to the freezing
orders in July, Secretary Hull told them he would consult the British
and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
750). Immediately after that conference, Secretary Hull requested the
British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, to call on him. Secretary Hull's
memorandum of his conversation with the Minister is as follows:
"I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking
Japanese representatives, including Mr. Kurusu, who is here for the
purpose of carrying on conversations with this Government. I added that
the conversation related to the question of a proposed peaceful
settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing was agreed upon
at this meeting and that the discussion included the subject of two
opposing policies-of conquest by force on the one hand and a
364 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
policy of peace, law, and order on the other. I went on to say that the
three main points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in
former conversations with Ambassador Nomura, namely, the bringing of
Japanese troops out of China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of
commercial policy, were discussed at length; but that the Japanese made
no concessions on the troop matter or on the matter of the Tripartite
Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally inquired whether a
brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out that would
enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of
peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea
of Japan's coming out of China. They said while the United States and
maybe Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be
so disposed on consultation, would to a partial extent relax embargoes
on exports to Japan, Japan on its part would correspondingly take steps
in the direction of a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating
its public opinion in support of such a policy during the next few
months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a
general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually
developed and public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more
satisfactorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us, on the
more difficult questions such as removing their troops from China and
the Tripartite Pact. They did not, however, make any definite
commitments as to just how far they could comply with our position with
respect to these two points."
"I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese
that if their Government cared to present something on this point. I
would give it consideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of
consideration, but that I could make no promise, and that if it should
be deemed feasible, I would confer with the British, the Dutch, the
Chinese and the Australians about any phase of the matter in which they
would be interested to which they would give consideration. I also said
to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a peaceful
policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far
in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might
need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated (ex. 168)."
The next day the Australian and Netherlands Ministers called separately
on Secretary Hull, at his request, and to each he gave the substance of
his talk with the British Minister (ex. 168).
Before turning to a discussion of the preparation of the United States'
reply to the Japanese note of November 20, it is important to recall
briefly the evidence before the Committee of the consideration given
earlier in November to-
"the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement with the Japanese
to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a
breakdown in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a
subsequent general agreement (Hull, tr. 1128)."
At the Joint Board meeting on November 3 (Washington time) which
followed the conferences called by Secretary Hull to determine whether
"the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings"
by the United States to Japan as urged by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
General Marshall had expressed the view that-
"the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions
which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be
a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions (ex.
16)."
The Joint Board had decided that the War and Navy Departments would
prepare a memorandum for President Roosevelt which would, among other
things, oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan as urged by the
Generalissimo advocate State Department action to put off hostilities
with Japan as long as possible, and suggest that an agreement be made
with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.
However, the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark
actually submitted to President Roosevelt on November 5 contained only
the first of the Joint Board's
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 365
recommendations; no reference was made in the memorandum to the second
or third points recommended by the Board and mentioned above (ex. 16).
The day after the Marshall-Stark joint memorandum was given to President
Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson-
"had an hour's talk alone with the President with regard to the Far
Eastern situation and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was
coming from Japan. The thing uppermost in his mind was how to gain more
time (tr. 14386-14387)."
In his notes of that talk with the President, Mr. Stimson recorded:
"The President outlined what he thought he might say. *He was trying to
think of something which would give us further time.* He suggested that
he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement of armament
for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their
arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis (tr.;
14414)."
At the Cabinet meeting the next day, November 7, the President had heard
Secretary Hull's estimate of the situation in the Far East and had
polled the Cabinet as already described (tr. 14415). On November 10,
during his talk with Ambassador Nomura, the President had made reference
to a "*modus vivendi*," and after this meeting, in his report to Tokyo,
Ambassador Nomura had said he intended to find out whether the President
referred to "possibly, a provisional agreement" (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
718; ex. 1, p. 11G). Again, in his report to Tokyo of the meeting with
President Roosevelt on November 17, Ambassador Nomura had commented
that, in connection with a remark by the President that the United
States desired to preserve peace in the Pacific,
"I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind (ex. 1, p.
139)."
It was on the evening of the same day that the two Japanese Ambassadors
had called on a member of the President's Cabinet and had been told that
the President "was very desirous of an understanding between Japan and
the United States," and if Japan would do something real to show her
peaceful intent, "such as evacuating French Indo-China," the way would
be open "for us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to
the re-establishment of normal trade relations" (ex. 1, p. 154).
Exhibit 18 before the Committee includes the following undated, penciled
memorandum in President Roosevelt's handwriting:
"6 months
"1. U. S. To resume economic relations-some oil and rice now-more later.
"2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or
any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).
"3 Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact if U. S. gets into
European war.
"4 U. S. to *introduce* Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to
take no part in their conversations.
"Later on Pacific agreements. (Ex. 18). [Italics in original.]"
Attached to the President's memorandum, which was obtained from the
files of the State Department, is a cover sheet on which appears the
following typewritten note: "Pencilled memorandum given by the President
to the Secretary of State (not dated but probably written shortly after
November 20, 1941)" (ex. 18). However, the fact that the memorandum
suggests only that Japan should not be permitted to send "more troops to
Indochina or Manchurian Border," whereas by November 18 the Japanese
Ambassadors were suggesting to Secre-
Page 366 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tary Hull the withdrawal of Japanese troops from at least southern
French Indochina, would seem to indicate that the memorandum may have
been written by the President before the latter date.
Likewise, since early in November the State Department had been giving
intensive study to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement,
knowing that-
"The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to
keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to
prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We
considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or
keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the
integrity of American principles (Hull, tr. 1128)."
Two of those suggestions were used in preparing the United States' reply
to the Japanese note of November 20. On November 11 (Washington time),
the Far Eastern Division of the State Department had submitted to
Secretary Hull a draft of a proposal intended to serve as a-
"transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not
only to continue the conversations pending the advent of a more
favorable situation, even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to,
but also to provide the entering wedge toward a comprehensive settlement
of the nature sought providing the proposal is accepted by Japan and
provided further that China is able to obtain satisfactory terms from
Japan (ex. 18)."
This draft proposal consisted of two parts, the first of which contained
a statement of principles and mutual pledges with respect to economic
relations which followed closelythe lines of the counterproposals made
to the Japanese on several prior occasions beginning in April. The
second part contemplated immediate Japanese-Chinese negotiations during
which there would be an armistice between those countries and the United
States would hold in abeyance the shipment of supplies of a military
character to China and Japan would not increase or supply its military
forces in China and French Indochina. Upon the conclusion of a peace
settlement between Japan and China the United States was to negotiate
with both China and Japan for the resumption of normal trade relations
(ex. 18).
On November 18 (Washington time), Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
sent to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull a draft of a proposed
comprehensive settlement between Japan and the United States (ex. 168).
This draft was revised in the Far Eastern Division of the State
Department the same day and copies of the revised draft entitled
"Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and
Japan," were sent at once to General Marshall and Admiral Stark for
their consideration (ex. 18). As revised, the proposal set forth in
summary form various steps "proposed" to be taken by the United States
and Japanese Governments, respectively (ex. 18). The evidence before the
Committee shows that on the same day, November 19, Secretary Hull had
two meetings with Admiral Schuirmann, through whom the State Department
maintained liaison with the Navy Department (tr. 1173), and that a
conference attended by Admiral Stark for the Navy Department and by
General Gerow for the War Department (General Marshall was out of town)
was held at the State Department on the morning of November 21
(Washington time) at which the "Outline" was discussed. At that
conference Secretary Hull requested both Admiral Stark and General Gerow
to
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 367
submit their comments on the "Outline" from the military and navaI
standpoint (ex. 18).
This they did the afternoon of the same day, November 21
(Washington.time). In his memorandum General Gerow said that he believed
General Marshall would concur in the views which he expressed concerning
the "Outline" and advised Secretary Hull that on the basis of a hasty
study War Plans Division saw "no objection to its use as a basis for
discussion." He said that-
"the adoption of its provisions would attain *one of our present major
objectives-the avoidance of war with Japan.* Even a temporary peaee in
the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the
Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material
assistanee to the British-both of which are highly important.
"The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to
all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. *War Plans
Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the suceess of
our war effort in Europe that we reach a *modus vivendi* with Japan*
(ex. 18)."
General Gerow suggested the deletion from the "Outline" of a provision
which would require Japan to withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria
except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided Russia
withdrew all her troops from her far eastern front except for an
equivalent remainder, on the ground that such a provision would probably
be unacceptable to Russia. He requested that the War Department be given
an opportunity to consider the military aspects of any major changes
that might be made in the proposal (ex. 18).
In his memorandum, Admiral Stark objected to provisions in the "Outline"
which would place limitations on American naval forces in Pacific
waters, commit the United States to use its influence toward causing
Great Britain to cede Hong Kong to China, and require Japan to sell to
the United States a specified tonnage of merchant vessels. He agreed
with General Gerow that the provision concerning the withdrawal of
Japanese troops in Manchuria should be deleted. He made several
suggestions regarding the phrasing of other provisions, and ended his
memorandum with the comment that while the provisions of the "Outline"
might be assumed to abrogate the Tripartite Pact on the part of Japan,
it would be helpful if that could be specifically stated (ex. 18).
The following day, November 22 (Washington time), there was completed in
the State Department the first draft of a counterproposal in reply to
the Japanese note of November 20. This draft counterproposal was in two
sections. The first section contained a proposed *modus vivendi*. As an
alternative to the Japanese proposals of November 20, and was prefaced
by a brief statement of the circumstances leading to its preparation.
Revised drafts of this section were prepared on November 24 and 25. From
November 22 to November 26 the *modus vivendi* project was discussed and
given intensive consideration within the State Department, by President
Roosevelt and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy, including
Secretaries Stimson and Knox and General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The
*modus vivendi* was also discussed with the British, Australian,
Chinese, and Dutch Governments, principally through their diplomatic
representatives in Washington. Such revisions as were made in the
original draft of this section are discussed
Page 368 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in connection with the final draft of November 25, which is set forth in
full below.
The second section of the November 22 draft consisted of two parts. The
first part contained the statement of principles and mutual pledges with
respect to economic relations which had been prepared by the State
Department's Far Eastern Division on November 11. The second part was
based primarily upon the "Outline" sent by the State Department to the
War and Navy Departments on November 19, modified, however, in
accordance with the suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Gerow
in their memoranda of November 21 to Secretary Hull mentioned above. The
changes made in this section in the succeeding drafts of November 24 and
November 25 were few in number and, as so modified, this section became
the reply to the Japanese note of November 20 which was handed by
Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors on November 26 (Washington
time). Secretary Hull testified that all who saw the *modus vivendi*
section also saw the section which became the United States reply of
November 26 (tr. 14363).
The final, November 25 (Washington time), draft of the *modus vivendi*
section was as follows:
"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the
Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months
informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a
settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area
based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing
among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability
of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the
principle of non interference in the internal affairs of other
countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon
international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and
pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international
conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in
reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the
Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous
of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and
peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward
creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the
conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be
in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in
the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such
*modus vivendi* include as one of its provisions some initial and
temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and
normal intercourse between Japan and the United States.
"*On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary
of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken
respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the
United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to
accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain
features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the
fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under
consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is
committed.*
"The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute
to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to
afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the
Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of
peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the
Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the
Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary *modus
vivendi*, as follows:
"MODUS VIVENDI
"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan,
both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their
national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace
throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs
therein.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 369
"2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they
have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force
into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern
or the northern Pacific area.
"3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed
forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace
those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to
the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval,
land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.
"The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the
position of the Government of the United States with regard to the
presence of foreign troops in that area.
"4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify
the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the
extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the
United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their
peoples:
"(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the
sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the
purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at
Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese
obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds
in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is
understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of
which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the
adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United
States.
"(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:
(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here
provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades
as the two Governments may agree
(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such
limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in
respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.
(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in
value per month.
(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations
as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of
commodities in short supply in the United States.
(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of
petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon
a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of
petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs
will be determined after consultation with the British and the
Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in
Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing
industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial
and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.
(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and
additional commodities added by agreement between the two
governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this
agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of
outstanding problems in the Pacific area.
"5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the
application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the
extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the
United States as provided for in paragraph four above.
"6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach
the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those
Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph
four above.
"7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China,
the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in
reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the
Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions
and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and
exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice,
which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between
the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and
which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.
"8. This *modus vivendi* shall remain in force for a period of three
months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the
instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an
extension of the *modus vivendi* for a further period (Ex. 18.)"
Comparison of this final draft of the *modus vivendi* section and the
prior drafts of November 22 and November 24 shows that paragraphs
Page 370 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above were contained in each draft and remained the
same in substance throughout, with but few changes in text. In paragraph
3, the final draft added the proviso contained in the second sentence
and omitted specific mention of a limitation of 25,000 upon the total
number of Japanese troops to remain in French Indochina, retaining from
the prior drafts, however, the limitation expressed in terms of "the
number there on July 26,1941." Paragraph 4 was the same in both the
final draft and the draft of November 24, but differed from the
corresponding provision in the November 22 draft, which had been as
follows:
"The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the
freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United
States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to
remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American
assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain
subject to the respective export control measures which each country may
have in effect for reasons of national defense (ex. 18)."
During the 5 days from November 22 to November 26, inclusive, the State
Department was the focal point of great activity. After the preparation
of the November 22 draft of the *modus vivendi* and in accordance with
his conversations with the British Minister on November 18 and the
Netherlands and Australian Ministers on November 19, on Saturday,
November 22 (Washington time), Secretary Hull arranged a meeting at the
State Department with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador; Dr. Hu Shih,
the Chinese Ambassador; Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Minister; and Mr.
Richard G. Casey, the Australian Minister. His report of that meeting
follows in full:
"The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and the Netherlands
Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later
on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been
carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this
year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during
that time and need not be repeated here.
"I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a *modus
vivendi*, I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese
Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my
proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal.
There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute was more
desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for
section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the
present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese.
Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this
preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was
somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China
arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is
very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision
in our proposed *modus vivendi* which would block a Japanese attack on
China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would
commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three
months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a
question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving
attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese
and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would
accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed
temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations
looking toward a general agreement on the basic questions (ex. 18)."
Secretary Hull's memoranda of his subsequent conversations with those
who attended this meeting show that each of them immediately reported to
their respective Governments, for comment, the terms of the Japanese
note of November 20 to the United States and of the November 22 draft of
the proposed *modus vivendi* (ex. 18)."
Later that day, November 22, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called on
Secretary Hull. The Secretary told them that he had
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 371
talked with the representatives of the other Governments mentioned
above, and
"that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things
(meaning Japanese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in
such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing.
The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the
suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be
settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory evidences that
their intentions were peaceful.
"The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the
representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen
in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the
course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to
the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador
and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move
last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases
by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in progress, to the
fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments
because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the
conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal
civilian consumption.
"The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting
a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese
statesmen are talking about a peaceful course whereas in the American
press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked
why was there not some Japanese statesmen backing the two Ambassadors by
preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and
other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there
would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she
desired, that the Japanese Government knows that.
"The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard
to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan
out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese
Government could assert control of the situation in Japan as it relates
to the policy of force and conquest. He said that if the Ambassador
could give him any further assurances in regard to Japan's peaceful
intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators and
other persons in this country (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 757-758)."
Later, Secretary Hull commented that Japan made it very difficult by
leaving troops in Indochina. Ambassador Kurusu replied-
"that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indo-China in order to
bring about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement
of the China affair Japan promised to bring the troops out of Indo-China
altogether.
"The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that
also uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indo-
China, and commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the
pushing toward bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should
get out of Indo-China.
"Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told
Ambassador Grew that we seemed to expect that all the concessions should
be made by the Japanese side (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 760)."
After further discussion of the troop situation in Indochina. Ambassador
Nomura pressed Secretary Hull for an answer to the Japanese proposal of
November 20. In reply, the Secretary said-
"that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday before having his
answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to
confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned
after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He
repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the
Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking (ex. 29,
vol. II, p. 761)."
Ambassador Nomura "disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard
for an answer * * * and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to
wait until Monday" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 761). Ambassador Nomura sent two
reports of this meeting to Tokyo (ex. 1, pp. 167-169,170-171), in one of
which he observed:
Page 372 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk,
and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the
same (ex. 1, p. 171)."
The two Ambassadors did not meet with Secretary Hull again until
Wednesday afternoon, November 26 (Washington time), when the Secretary
gave them the United States reply (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-770) .
There is no evidence before the Committee of any meetings or conferences
outside the State Department regarding the *modus vivendi* the next day,
Sunday, November 23 (Washington time). However, Monday, November 24
(Washington time), like the preceding Saturday, was a day of great
activity. A new draft of the entire counterproposal was completed in the
Department over the weekend (ex. 18). During the early part of the
afternoon Secretary Hull had telephone conversations with Secretary
Stimson and Secretary Knox, as well as a conference with Admiral
Schuirmann (tr. 1166). At 3:30 p. M., Secretary Hull had a conference at
the State Department with General Marshall and Admiral Stark, at which
the new draft was discussed in detail (tr. 1166; ex. 18). During this
conference General Marshall expressed the opinion that 25,000 Japanese
troops in French Indo-China, the maximum permitted under the current
draft of the *modus vivendi*, would not be a menace (ex. 18). Following
his conference with General Marshall and Admiral Stark at the State
Department, Lord Halifax, Dr. Hu Shih, Dr. Loudon, and Mr. Casey called
on Secretary Hull at his request, and to each of them he handed copies
of the latest draft of the *modus vivendi*. The Secretary's memorandum
of that meeting records that they spent an hour reading the draft and
taking notes to send back to their Governments. The memorandum
continues:
"The Chinese Ambassador objected to more than a maximum of 5,000
Japanese troops being left in Indochina. I again stated that General
Marshall had a few minutes before expressed to me his opinion that
25,000 troops would be no menace and that, while this Government did not
recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we
were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily
because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time
is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be
more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the
Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the
point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are
not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that
such an outbreak may soon occur-any day after this week-unless a
temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of
public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more
practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general
agreement.
"The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed
figure of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000. I pointed out
and each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would
be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course
for three months and set forth the advantages to each of having
additional time in which to make further preparations, et ectera, et
ectera. They seemed to be very much gratified. They seemed to be
thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought
of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered
that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to
this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands
Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested
in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the
same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to
be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the
entire area. And yet I said their Governments, through some sort of
preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about
these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I
was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the
lack of interest and
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 373
lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the
Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his
Government and that it would support the *modus vivendi* proposal. I
then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the
Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and
attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion (ex.
18)."
Later that day Secretary Hull sent to President Roosevelt a draft of a
proposed message from the President to Prime Minister Churchill. The
proposed message summarized the Japanese note of November 20, saying
that the Japanese Ambassador had "represented" that the conclusion of
such a "modus vivendi" might give the Japanese Government opportunity to
develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and
comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that "the
domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent
some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal." The message pointed
out that the Japanese proposal "would apparently not exclude advancement
into China from Indo-China " It went on to say that the United States
Government proposed to inform the Japanese Government that in its
opinion the Japanese proposals contained features "not in harmony with
the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general
settlement" to which each Government had declared that it was committed,
and then summarized the terms of the *modus vivendi* which was being
considered by the United States Government as an alternative proposal.
The message advised the Prime Minister that the British Ambassador in
Washington had been informed and was informing the British Foreign
Minister (ex. 18). President Roosevelt returned the draft message to
Secretary Hull with the notation "O. K., see addition. F. D. R." (Ex.
18). The "addition" referred to by the President was the following
sentence which he had written in longhand for insertion at the end of
the message:
"This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance
or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not
very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon
(ex. 18)."
The message, with the sentence added by the President, was sent to the
Prime Minister at 11 p. m. That evening, November 24 (Washington time),
through Ambassador Winant in London (ex. 18).
The next day, Tuesday, November 25 (Washington time), the draft
counterproposal was once more revised in the State Department. This was
the final revision of the section containing the *modus vivendi*. At
9:30 a. M. Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox met with Secretary Hull
at the State Department for their "usual Tuesday morning meeting" (tr.
14,390), which Secretary Stimson described in his notes:
"Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce, which he was
going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately
safeguarded all our interests, I thought as we read it, but I don't
think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was
so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do;
namely, to at once evacuate and at once to stop all preparations or
threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her
neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient
quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was
particularly applicable to oil. We had a long talk over the general
situation (tr. 14,417-14,418)."
It is clear that Secretary Stimson's description of the *modus vivendi*
as "so drastic" refers to the limited nature of the trade concessions to
be made by the United States under it.
Page 374 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
At noon that day the so-called "War Council" composed of President
Roosevelt, Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, and General Marshall and
Admiral Stark met at the White House. The discussion centered on the
Japanese situation. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the
President
"brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as
soon as) next .Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an
attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The
question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the
first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. [1] It was a
difficult proposition. Hull laid out his general broad propositions on
which the thing should be rested-the freedom of the seas and the fact
that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy
of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such
expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an
encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our
vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President
that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in
notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into
Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to
point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation
of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing
that (tr. 14,418-14,419)."
In addition to Secretary Hull's testimony regarding this meeting (tr.
1144), the record before the Committee contains a copy of a letter
written by the Secretary to the Roberts Commission a little over a month
after the meeting. In that letter, after stating that at the meeting of
the War Council on November 25, as well as the meeting on November 28,
he had "emphasized the critical nature" of the relations between the
United States and Japan, the Secretary continued:
"I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of
an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese
were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force;
and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the
hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference
expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should
include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of
surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at
various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of
defense and of coordination for purposes thereof (ex. 174)."
General Marshall testified that he had "a very distinct recollection of
Mr. Hull's saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, 'These
fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared" (tr. 3079).
Admiral Stark, who attended the War Council meeting on November 25,
added a postscript concerning it to a letter of that date which he sent
to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. In the postscript, he described the
comments of the President and the Secretary of State:
"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.
I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as
did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise
attack (ex. 100)."
After the meeting at the White House, Secretary Hull returned to the
State Department and Secretary Stimson to the War Department. Secretary
Stimson recorded in his notes:
[1] With reference to this sentence in Secretary Stimson's notes,
General Marshall testified: "* * * they were trying to arrange a
diplomatic procedure, rather than firing of a gun, that would not only
protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese
couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also anything they
did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we
were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not
a military order. It was not a military arrangement" (tr. 13801).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 375
"When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (a
Japanese) expedition had started. Five Divisions have come down from
Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships-30,
40, or 50 ships-and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called
up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the
President of the menace from G-2 (tr. 14419)."
Secretary Hull's record of telephone calls shows a call on that day from
Secretary Stimson at 4:30 p. m. (tr. 1166), and the record of outside
telephone calls through the White House switchboard shows such a call at
4:25 p. m. and that the call was completed (tr. 5545). The latter
record also shows that Postmaster General Walker telephoned Secretary
Hull four times that afternoon (tr. 5545-5546). The first call was at
12:27 p. M., while the meeting at the White House was in progress, and
was not completed. The other calls, which were completed, were at
3:30,4:05, and 5:30 p. m.
In the meantime reports were reaching Washington of the reactions of the
Chinese, Dutch, and British Governments to the terms of the proposed
*modus vivendi*. As noted above, the Netherlands Minister informed
Secretary Hull at the conference on the afternoon of November 24
(Washington time) that his Government would support the *modus vivendi*
proposal. The next day the Minister formally transmitted to Secretary
Hull his Government's comments on the Japanese note of November 20 and
the proposed *modus vivendi* (tr. 4471-4474). The comments of the
British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, were contained in a
memorandum handed to Secretary Hull on the same day by Lord Halifax, the
British Ambassador (ex. 18). That memorandum expressed the willingness
of the British Foreign Office to leave to Secretary Hull the decision
whether to reject the Japanese proposals or make a counterproposal. It
took the position that the Japanese proposals should be regarded " as
the opening movement in a process of bargaining," and suggested that if
a counterproposal should be made, "our demands should be pitched high
and our price low." On this basis it was suggested "for the
consideration of the United States Government" that any counterproposal-
"should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo-China not merely of
the Japanese "troops" as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval,
military and air forces with their equipment and for the *suspension of
further military* advances in China in addition to satisfactory
assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Southern
Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate relaxation of
existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited
quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian
population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war
potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no
shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course
only become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces
took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a similar
nature from Japan if we required them.
"Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any
interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which
must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United
States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have
to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and
is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on
more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned (ex. 18).
(Italics in original.)"
Prime Minister Churchill's reply to President Roosevelt's message of
November 24 reached the State Department early on the morning of
November 26 (ex. 23). In it the Prime Minister said:
"Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord
Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which
Foreign"
Page 376 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle
this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is
only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not
having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse
our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard
of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We
feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves (ex. 23)."
The views of the Chinese Government had already been made known to the
United States Government. The Chinese Foreign Minister, to whom on
November 22 the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had cabled the
substance of the Japanese note of November 20 and the proposed *modus
vivendi*, sent the following message to the Chinese Ambassador on
November 24:
"After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed strong reaction.
He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside
the Chinese question in its conversations with Japan instead of seeking
a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of
China. * * * We are * * * firmly opposed to any measure which may have
the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or
of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China. Please
inform the Secretary of State (ex. 18)."
On November 25, Owen Lattimore, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's American
advisor, cabled Lauchlin Currie, one of President Roosevelt's
administrative assistants:
"After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's
conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently
advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have
never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or
unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in
China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in
China would dismay the Chinese. Any 'Modus Vivendi' now arrived at with
Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to
the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British
prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the
resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against
occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or
increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at
this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's
fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the
Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if
the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of
Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory (ex. 18)."
The same day, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek cabled Mr. T. V. Soong in
Washington the following message, which the latter promptly delivered to
Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox:
"I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram
yesterday. Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox
and Stimson immediately.
"Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should
relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if
reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency,
the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two
months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November
an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They
have even come to a silent but nonetheless definite understanding with
the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any
relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of
that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has
been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the
entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith,
and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most
tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will
collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans,
so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the
situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China
alone.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 377
"We could therefore only request the United States Government to be
uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies
from China, is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or
freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American
attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its
fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the
break-down of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with
the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled
in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our
resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do
not indeed know how history in future will record this episode (ex.
18)."
The evening of November 25 (Washington time), Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese
Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull and delivered to him a copy of the
Chinese Foreign Minister's telegram quoted above. According to Secretary
Hull's memorandum of the conversation, the Ambassador endeavored to
explain Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's opposition to the *modus
vivendi* on the ground that the Generalissimo was not thoroughly
acquainted with the over-all international aspects of the Japanese
situation, and viewed it only from his own situation in Chungking (ex.
18). The Secretary's memorandum continued:
"I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and
Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into
war with Japan until they have had an opportunity to increase further
their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the
second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for
conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful
settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on
conversations and making some progress thus far, and the Japanese are
urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of
a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the
proposed *modus vivendi* is really a part and parcel of the efforts to
carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been
fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador
and to others.
"I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek
almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how
extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road
through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the
first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to
require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to
protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent
danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that situation which we
have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly about another matter
relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan corresponding to
the progress made with our conversations concerning a general peace
agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve
the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area,
including Singapore the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and also the
United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes.
All of this relief from menace to each of the countries would continue
for ninety days. One of our leading admirals stated to me recently that
the limited amount of more or less inferior oil products that we might
let Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable extent
increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said that, of course, we
can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding that we
are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near
Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a
military drive southward.
"The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back
to his Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the
situation more or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly
spirit (ex. 18)."
The same evening, whether before or after his talk with Secretary Hull
is not clear from the record before the Committee, Dr. Hu Shih called on
Dr. Stanley E. Hornbeck, political advisor to the Secretary. After
expressing to Dr. Hornbeck his complete confidence that the United
States "would yield nothing in the field of principles and pursue no
course of 'appeasement' ", the Chinese Ambassador repeated what
Page 378 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he had said at the conference the preceding day regarding the second and
third points of the *modus vivendi*, evidencing the concern of his
Government that point 2 would leave Japan free to continue operations
against China and that point 3 would not sufficiently limit the number
of Japanese troops in Indo-China to dispel the Japanese threat to the
Burma Road. He expressed the hope that the *modus vivendi* would be made
more restrictive (ex. 18).
In the meantime, other intercepted Japanese messages available to
Secretary Hull before delivery of the United States reply on November 26
(Washington time), in addition to the messages (ex. 1, pp. 155, 160) in
which the Japanese Foreign Minister told Ambassador Nomura that a return
to the status prior to the freezing orders was not enough and that it
would be necessary to have a solution that would "come up to the B
proposal," had indicated that the Japanese Government would accept
nothing less than the terms of that proposal. Thus, on November 24
(Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura:
"Our expectations, as I told you in my #798, go beyond the restoration
of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation of the freezing
legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with
the exception of clauses 6 and 7. (*Note*. Clauses 6 and 7 were not
included in the Japanese proposal of November 20.) Therefore, our demand
for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies
goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as
well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p. 172)."
Again on November 26 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Togo cabled
Ambassador Nomura that "our final proposal envisages an agreement on the
basis of the 'B' proposal in toto" with the two exceptions already noted
(ex. 1, p. 176). The same day the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador
Nomura that as soon as he reached a settlement on the basis of the
November 20 note-
"it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods
in connection with clauses 2 and 3 (*Note*: clauses 3 and 4 of the
November 20 note) of that proposal. Of these goods the acquisition of
petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the
Empire. Therefore, * * * prior to the signing of an understanding, and
at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes
known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following
lines:
"4,000,000 tons per year from the United States (ex. 1, p. 177)."
On November 21 (Washington time) Ambassador Kurusu had called on
Secretary Hull and handed him a letter which he proposed to sign as a
clarification of Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. The
proposed letter asserted that the Pact did not in any way infringe the
sovereign rights of Japan as an independent state; that Japan was free
to make its own interpretation; that the Japanese Government would not
become involved in war "at the behest of any foreign power"; and that it
would " accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for
the maintenance of its security and the preservation of its national
life against active injustice" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 757). The record of
the conversations shows that the substance of all of these assertions
had been made by the Japanese many times before. Secretary Hull asked
the Ambassador whether he had anything more to offer on the whole
subject of a peaceful settlement, and Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 756). Secretary Hull described this incident in his
testimony:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 379
"The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and was
talking about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize that,
and I suddenly inquired of him if his government had anything more to
offer on the general peace situation, and he quickly said, 'No.'
"So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal and what
their interceptions had informed us was very final in the matter (tr.
1181)."
Secretary Hull had also received a report from Ambassador Grew of his
talk with Foreign Minister Togo on November 24 (Japan time), during
which the Foreign Minister stated that the withdrawal of the Japanese
troops from southern to northern Indochina was the maximum concession
Japan could make "in any event", and that Japan would be willing to have
President Roosevelt act as "introducer" between Japan and China "with
the understanding that then the United States would refrain from action
prejudicial to restoring peace between China and Japan," I. E., cease
all aid to China (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 762-763).
On Wednesday, November 26 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson talked
with Secretary Hull at 9:15 a. M. And again at 9:50 a. m., according to
the White House telephone records (tr. 5546). Mr. Stimson summarized the
conversations in his notes:
"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up
his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on
the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over-to tell
them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected
to that proposition-when he showed it to them; that is, to the
proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving
to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the
interval of the truce of the three months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a
special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad
impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that
they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that
the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has
asked to see me and I had called Hull up this morning to tell him so and
ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said
above-that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in
respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no
further action to propose (tr. 14,420)."
On his return to the State Department from the War Council meeting the
preceding day, Secretary Hull had been told by Secretary Stimson that
the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of 30, 40, or 50
ships at Shanghai and that this expedition was proceeding along the
China coast south of Formosa. Secretary Stimson had also telephoned
President Roosevelt about this, and had sent copies of the intelligence
report to him. A few minutes after his telephone conversations with
Secretary Hull on the morning of November 26, Secretary Stimson
telephoned the President to inquire whether he had received the report
on the Japanese expedition. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the
President-
"fairly blew up-jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't
seen it and that that changed the whole situation because it was an
evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were
negotiating for an entire truce-an entire withdrawal (from China)-they
should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-china, I told him
that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy
Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent
last night and sent it over to him by special messenger (tr. 14,420-
14,421)."
The record before the Committee contains the following "Memorandum for
the President," dated November 26 (Washington time) and signed by
Secretary Stimson:
380 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JAPANESE CONVOY MOVEMENT TOWARDS INDO-CHINA
"About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese
Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move
approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000
already there by previous agreement.
"Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from
ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been
assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could
mean a force as great as 50,000 but more probably a smaller number.
Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat
carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment.
Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships
leave been seen south of Formosa.
"The officers concerned in the Military Intelligence Division feel that
unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal
movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to
the Vichy Government.
"I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular
field (ex. 98)."
At 6:54 p. M. That day the following priority message was dispatched
from the Navy Department:
"From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines
"Admiral Hart will deliver to you a copy of a despatch which with my
approval the CNO and the COS addressed to the senior Army and Navy
commanders in the Philippines. In addition you are advised that the
Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrisons and naval forces on
the Mandates in a manner which indicates they are preparing this region
as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by US Forces.
However, I am more particularly concerned over increasing opposition of
Japanese leaders and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai
and Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming apparent in
China, Formosa, and Indo China for an early aggressive movement of some
character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its
strength or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road,
Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.
Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I consider it possible
that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of
hostilities between the U. S. and Japan. I desire that after further
informing yourself as to the situation and the general outlines of naval
and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General
MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the
President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I
am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people.
Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding public
pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more
difficult. Roosevelt (tr. 13,861-13,862)."
The evidence before the Committee shows that at about 1:20 p. m. that
day, November 26, Secretary Hull telephoned n Stark (tr. 1166, 5546),
that Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull at 2:35 p. m. after attempting
to telephone General Marshall (who was out of town) at 1:28 (tr. 5546),
and that late that afternoon Secretary Hull conferred at the White House
with President Roosevelt (tr. 1147). The Secretary was preceded at the
White House by the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, and Mr. T. V. Soong
(ex. 179). Secretary Hull testified that on November 26 he recommended
to President Roosevelt-and that the President approved-the Secretary's
calling in the two Japanese Ambassadors and handing them the proposals
contained in the second section of the counterproposal that had been
under consideration at the State Department, while withholding the modus
vivendi plan (tr. 1147). President Roosevelt was, Secretary Hull
testified, "thoroughly familiar" with both sections of the
counterproposal (tr. 14, 312). The record before the Committee contains
the following memorandum dated November 26 (Washington time) from
Secretary Hull for President Roosevelt:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 381
"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
"With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the
Japanese Government, namely:
"(1) A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad, basic,
peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made
a part of the general conversations now going on and to be carried on,
if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on
this subject.
"(2) The second proposal is really closely connected with the
conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature
of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the
conversations.
"In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the
half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the
Netherlands, and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide
publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will
naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast
importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, without in any way
departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to
all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested
in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this
time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the
comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at
the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal.
"/S/ CORDELL HULL (ex. 18)."
In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull gave a more
detailed statement of the considerations which led to his recommendation
to the President:
"I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese
military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were
demanding-and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended
later to November 29, for-acceptance by our Government of their extreme
last-word proposal of November 20.
"It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other
high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal
was remote.
"So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese,
it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton,
oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared
with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.
"It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American
opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the
supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese
Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments
were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable
or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that
the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major
blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear
that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did
not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it,
especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance
and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly
evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.
"The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were
being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the
other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing
Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to
restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered
all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and
mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to
Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It
still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's
decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually
extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic
effort in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be
worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort
should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement
(tr. 114S1147). "
Upon his return to the State Department from his conference with
President Roosevelt, at 5 p. M. Secretary Hull met with Ambassadors
382 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Nomura and Kurusu at the Department and handed them, in reply to the
Japanese note of November 20, the second section of the counterproposal
which had been under consideration since November 22, together with an
explanatory statement. The explanatory statement was the first section
of that counterproposal as quoted herein (pp. 70-71) modified by the
deletion of the modus vivendi and with further changes made necessary
thereby. It reviewed briefly the objectives sought in the exploratory
conversations, and stated that it was believed that some progress had
been made with respect to the general principles involved. Note was
taken of the recent statements of the Japanese Ambassadors that it would
be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to that successful
outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be
agreed upon, to be in effect while the conversations looking toward a
comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area were
continuing. It was stated that the United States Government most
earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of the
discussions to this end. The statement continued:
"The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on
November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this
Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part
of the general settlement under consideration and to which each
Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the
United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be
likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under
law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that
further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to
the practical application of the fundamental principles already
mentioned.
"With this object in view *the Government of the United States offers
for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but
simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical
exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as
something to be worked out during our further conversations.*
"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap
between our draft of June 21, 1941. and the Japanese draft of September
25, by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a
comprehensive Pacific settlement. *This plan contains provisions dealing
with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we
have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for
worth-while international relations. We hope that in this way progress
toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be
expedited (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 767)."
The outline of a proposed basis for agreement which Secretary Hull
handed to the Japanese Ambassadors follows, in full:
"Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment.
"WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941.
"OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOB AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN
"SECTION I
"*Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy*
"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both
being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national
policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the
Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that
they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using
military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that,
accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and
give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon
which their relations with each other and with all other governments are
based:
"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and
sovereignty of each and all nations.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 383
"(2) The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other
countries.
"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment."
"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and
conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies
and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and
processes.
"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have
agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing
recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will
actively support and practically apply the following principles in their
economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
"(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial
relations.
"(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition
of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
"(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw
material supplies.
"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming
countries and populations as regards the operation of international
commodity agreements.
"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and
arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential
enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may
permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of
all countries.
"SECTION II
"Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the
Government of Japan
"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose
to take steps as follows:
"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British
Empire China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and
The united States.
"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American,
British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland, and Thai Governments an
agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to
respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event
that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of
Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking
such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the
threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the
Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential
treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would
use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of
treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.
"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and
police forces from China and from Indochina.
"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
not support-militarily, politically, economically-any government or
regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of
China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China,
including rights and interests in and with regard to international
settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of
1901.
"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British
and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in
international settlement's and in concessions and under the Boxer
Protocol of 1901.
"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and
Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation
treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including
an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds
in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the
dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose,
half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
384 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has
concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in
such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this
agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the
Pacific area.
"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other
governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic
political and economic principles set forth in this agreement (ex. 167;
ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 768-770)."
Ambassador Grew was fully informed the same evening of the sub-stance of
the United States' reply. (Tr. 4513-4522; ex. 75.)
The record before the Committee shows that, commencing with the first
draft of an American counterproposal on November 22 (Washington time),
all the officials of the United States Government who were consulted by
Secretary Hull regarding the proposed modus vivendi necessarily saw and
considered the successive drafts of the foregoing so-called "Ten Point"
note, since from the outset the provisions which, as revised, became the
"Ten Point" note had constituted the second section of the
counterproposal and had been attached to the first section containing
the modus vivendi. The record also shows that the provisions of the "Ten
Point" note probably received more attention from the high officers of
the Army and Navy than did the terms of the modus vivendi, since the
part containing the so-called "Ten Points" was based primarily upon the
State Department's revision of the Morgenthau suggestions of November
18. It will be recalled that that revision was sent to the Army and Navy
for comment on November 19, and was the subject of the conference at the
State Department on November 21 attended by General Gerow and Admiral
Stark, who thereafter submitted their comments and suggestions to
Secretary Hull in memoranda of the same date. As has already been
pointed out, the first section of the "Ten Point" note was based almost
entirely upon the statement of principles contained in the draft
proposal submitted by the State Department's Far Eastern Division to
Secretary Hull on November 11, which in turn had been frequently
discussed with the Japanese during the six months since the
conversations began in the spring of 1941.
Returning to Secretary Hull's meeting with Ambassadors Nomura and
Kurusu, after the Japanese had read the documents handed them by the
Secretary, Ambassador Kurusu asked whether this was the United States
reply to their proposal.
"The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as
there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the
United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United
States we have a political situation-to deal with just as does the
Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which
have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a
natural reaction among the public in this country. *He said that our
proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial
cooperation, to which, however, were not referred to in the outline for
fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding.* He also referred to
the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the
Ambassador of the ambition that had been his *of settling the
immigration question* but that the situation had so far prevented him
from realizing that ambition (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 764).
Ambassador Kurusu then commented adversely on various provisions of the
American note, saying among other things that he did not see how his
Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4), and that if this
represented the idea of the American Government he did not see how any
agreement was possible. He said that when they reported the United
States' answer to their Government "it would be
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 385
likely to throw up its hands". He suggested that it might be better if
they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents
further informally in Washington. Later, he said that he felt the reply
could be interpreted "as tantamount to meaning the end." He asked
whether the United States was interested in a modus vivendi. Secretary
Hull replied that he had explored that and that he had done his best in
the way of exploration (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-766).
In reply to Ambassador Kurusu's suggestion that the document should be
discussed informally before reporting it to Tokyo-
"The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents
carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were
trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a
result of their being harangued. He explained that in the light of all
that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we would go
at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so
much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about
some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has
lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a
document which would present a complete picture of our position by
making provision for each essential point involved.
"The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public
feeling was so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if
he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan
should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies
ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He
reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they
were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries
neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our
permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina
affects our direct interests (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 765)."
At the conclusion of the meeting, Ambassador Nomura asked whether the
two Ambassadors could see President Roosevelt, and Secretary Hull
replied that he had no doubt the President would be glad to see them at
any time. The Ambassador also said that he would like to have the
counselor of the Japanese Embassy call on Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, one
of the Secretary's principal advisors on Far Eastern affairs, the next
day "to discuss further details" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 766).
Secretary Hull testified:
"The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a
restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's
foreign policy. The practical application of those principles to the
situation in the Far East as embodied in the ten points contained in the
document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the
Japanese representatives in the course of the in-formal exploratory
conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in
question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable
policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country
and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis
for further conversations.
* * * * *
"Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the
Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked
out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either
Government was free to offer.
We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the
conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there
was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task
of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter
how slight. It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was
given to the Japanese Government (tr. 1151-1152)."
*Before their meeting with Secretary Hull late in the afternoon of
November 26 (Washington time)*, the two Japanese Ambassadors had sent a
joint telegram to Foreign Minister Togo in which they recognized, *even
before Secretary Hull delivered the " Ten Point" note to them,*
386 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that the negotiations were for all practical purposes at an end. They
told the Foreign Minister:
"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of
having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we
let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so,
the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, *if indeed they may not
already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete* (ex. 1,
p. 180)."
They then asked the approval of the Foreign Minister of the only
remaining suggestion they had to offer, as a device to obtain more time.
The Ambassadors suggested, with "grave misgivings," that they be
permitted to propose to Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt wire
Foreign Minister Togo (not Emperor Hirohito) that "for the sake of
posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will co-operate for
the maintenance of peace in the Pacific * * * and that you in return
reply with a cordial message." The Ambassadors asked that their request
be shown to the Navy Minister (ex. 1. p. 189).
While Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu were meeting with
Secretary Hull at the State Department, and at their direction, the
counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasugi, using the trans-Pacific
telephone, informed the Foreign Office in Tokyo that the meeting was in
progress and that "the future of the present talks would be decided
during the course of today's conversation" (ex. 1, p. 179). In making
this call, Mr. Wakasugi used a telephone code established earlier that
day in a message from the Foreign Minister which said "the situation is
momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long" (ex. 1, p.
178). There is no evidence before the Committee of the use of a trans-
Pacific telephone code in connection with the negotiations prior to the
establishment of this code by the Japanese Foreign Office before the
American note was delivered on November 26 (Washington time).
Almost immediately upon his return to the Japanese Embassy, Ambassador
Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the trans-
Pacific telephone. He told the Chief of the American Division, Kumaicho
Yamamoto:
"I have made all efforts, *but they will not yield*. I sent a cable
expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. [1] The
situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of
accomplishing it (ex. 1, p. 179)."
He continued-
"I rather imagine you had expected this outcome (ex. 1, p. 180)."
To which Bureau Chief Yamamoto replied:
"Yes, I had expected it, but I wished to exert every effort up to the
final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished (ex. 1, p.
180)."
That evening Ambassador Nomura cabled three reports to the Foreign
Minister of the Ambassadors' meeting with Secretary Hull. The first was
a brief resume of the "Ten Point" note, accompanied by this comment:
"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and
said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to
Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why
did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well,
England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then,
too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a
number of important Japanese in speeches have
[1] The message referred to above in which the Ambassadors said "Our
failure and humiliation are complete".
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 387
been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover,
there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us
complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in
these two hard proposals, or we think so (ex. 1, p. 182)."
The third telegram was a detailed account of the meeting (ex. 1, pp.
183-185). The second telegram consisted of general comments on the
situation (ex. 1, pp. 182-183). In it Ambassador Nomura showed great
concern lest some "independent action" taken by Japan *while the
negotiations were continuing* should place upon Japan the responsibility
"for the rupture of the negotiations." He pointed out that "up to the
present we have only been able to press them for an early solution.
During this time we have not expressed any final intention!" Recognizing
that "such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict
military secret," the Ambassador recommended:
"consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of
course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations
be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to
the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and
external consumption.* I would like, if such a course is followed, to
make representations here at the same time (ex. 1, p. 183)."
THE TOJO CABINET MAKES A PRETENSE OF CONTINUING THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN
CONVERSATIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME MOVES ADDITIONAL JAPANESE TROOPS INTO
SOUTHERN INDOCHINA
(November 27-December 7, 1941)
The record before the Committee thus shows that there was little hope or
expectation in Washington on November 27, either among those in the
United States Government who were familiar with the Japanese-American
conversations or on the part of the two Japanese Ambassadors, that the
Tojo Government in Tokyo would continue the conversations. Nevertheless,
as requested by Ambassador Kurusu the day before, a meeting with
President Roosevelt was arranged for 2:30 p. m. on November 27
(Washington time) at the White House.
That morning, before the White House conference, Secretary Hull held a
"special and lengthy" press conference at which he reviewed the Far
Eastern situation and particularly the state of the Japanese-American
conversations in much greater detail than had been true of the statement
made to the press late the preceding afternoon, following his conference
with the two Japanese Ambassadors (tr. 1154-1161). That statement had
said only that the Japanese Ambassadors had been handed for their
consideration a document that was the culmination of conferences back
and forth during recent weeks, and that it was unnecessary to repeat
what had been said so often in the past that it rested on certain basic
principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in
the light of many repetitions (ex. 167). At Secretary Hull's press
conference on the morning of November 27, he emphasized that from the
beginning he had kept in mind that the groups in Japan led by the
military leaders had a plan to conquer by force half of the earth with
half its population; that this movement had started in earnest in 1937,
and carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of
conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of
justice or fair play. The Secretary said that from the beginning, as the
world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy, the
United States had sought to keep
388 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing
viewpoint in international relations, but that it was no easy under-
taking. He then briefly reviewed the nature of the conversations he had
had with the Japanese, commencing in the spring of 1941, to determine
whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area might
not be possible. He said that while the conversations during the
preceding several months had been purely exploratory, for the past 10
days or so all phases of the basic questions presented and of
suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States
as close together as possible had been explored, on the theory there
might thus be reached the beginning of some peaceful and cordial
relations between Japan and other nations in the Pacific area, including
the United States. He said that during the conversations it had been
necessary to keep in mind not only the political situation in Japan but
also the activities of the Japanese Army and Navy, and he cited the
fact:
"that we had known for some days * * * that the Japanese were pouring
men and materials and boats and all kinds of equipment into Indo-China.
* * * There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make
attacks some-where there around Siam, any time within a few days (tr.
1156-1157)."
He said that if the Japanese established themselves in Indochina in
adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they would have a base
not only for operations against China but the whole South Sea area. The
Secretary said that the United States Government had exhausted all its
efforts to work out phases of this matter with the Japanese; and that
those efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general
agreement. On November 26, he continued, because he had found there was
so much confusion and so many collateral manners brought in, while at
the same time high Japanese officials in Tokyo continued to proclaim
their old doctrine of force he had thought it important to bring the
situation to a clear perspective by restating the fundamental principles
to which the United States was committed and at the same time show how
those principles could be applied to a number of specific conditions
which would logically be a part of a broad basic settlement in the
entire Pacific area. When he was asked whether he expected the Japanese
to come back and talk further on the basis of what he had given them on
November 26, Secretary Hull replied that he did not know, but that the
Japanese might not do that. In reply to a question whether it could be
assumed there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept the
principles to which he had referred and go far enough to afford a basis
for continuing the conversations, the Secretary said there was always a
possibility but that he would not say how much probability there might
be.
Secretary Hull's press conference took place at about 10 o'clock that
morning. Both before and after it, at 9:17 and 11 o'clock, the Secretary
talked with Secretary Stimson regarding the state of the negotiations;
he also talked with Admiral Stark that morning (tr. 1167, 5547).
Secretary Stimson's notes for that day (November 27) describe his two
conversations with Secretary Hull:
"A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and
movement south by the Japanese of a large Expeditionary Force moving
south from Shanghai and evidently headed towards Indo-China with a
possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma
Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but prob-
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 389
ably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position
from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives.
The first thing in the morning I call up Hull to find out what his
finale has been with the Japanese-whether he had handed them the new
proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he
suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told me
now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have
washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox-the
Army and the Navy." I then called up the President. The President gave
me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they ended up
with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards
that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our
constant and regular position.
"General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of
our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated
Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in
the Mandated Islands and these planes can fly high over them, beyond the
reach of their pursuit planes and take photographs.
"Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General
Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence
very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and
Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I
didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States
or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The
main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur.
We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the first signal for an
alert, and now, on talking with the President this morning over the
telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the
final alert; namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack
and telling him how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went
over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally
got it in shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I
got the exact statement from him of what the situation was (tr. 14,421-
14,423)."
Because of its relationship to events which followed, it is necessary
here to refer briefly to the background of Secretary Stimson's
observation in his notes that General Gerow and Admiral Stark desired
"to seek for more time." It will be recalled that on November 5, in
connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for British and
American aid, General Marshall and Admiral Stark had concluded that-
"war between the United States and Japan should be avoided while
building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan
attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United
States is of very great importance (ex. 16)."
As has been seen, one of the major considerations in the modus vivendi
proposal was the desire of the military and naval authorities "for more
time." However, at the War Council meeting on November 25 attended by
General Marshall and Admiral Stark, Secretary Hull stated that there was
"practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan"
(ex. 174, Item 13). The next day, at an Army-Navy Joint Board meeting,
General Marshall and Admiral Stark directed the preparation of a
memorandum to President Roosevelt regarding what steps should be taken
if the negotiations with Japan should end without agreement. The meeting
on November 27 described by Secretary Stimson in his notes for that day
was also described in a memorandum for General Marshall prepared the
same day by General Gerow:
"2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of
War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the
Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint
message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy
attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you
and Admiral Stark
390 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to
be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation
to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He
was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be
shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.
"3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of
War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made
(copy attached) (ex. 45)."
In his prepared statement submitted to the Committee, Secretary Stimson
stated that at the meeting with General Gerow and Admiral Stark,
"I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time
but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or
of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on
our part (tr. 14, 394)."
General Marshall summed up his viewpoint and that of Secretary Stimson
in his testimony before the committee:
"He (Secretary Stimson) was very much afraid-he feared that we would
find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our
disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when
the Japanese actually broke peace.
"He also felt very keenly that; and thought about this part a great deal
more than I did because it was his particular phase of the matter, that
we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to
sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that.
"My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I
was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we
would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular
time.
"So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will
say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which
allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a
hopeless situation before the peace was broken and mine, which as I say
were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we
should get as much time as we could in order to make good the terrible
deficiencies in our defensive arrangements (tr. 13,820-13,821)."
The memorandum for President Roosevelt, although dated November 27
(Washington time), was signed by General Marshall upon his return to
Washington on November 28 (Washington time), with the minor changes
suggested by Secretary Stimson, and was as follows:
"Memorandum for the President
"Subject: Far Eastern Situation.
"If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack:
the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the
Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.
"There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the
Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent
Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.
"The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct
attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat
exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.
"Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives
involving less risk of major conflict than the others named, and clearly
within the means available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the
Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. If successful,
the Chinese Nationalist Government might collapse. Occupation of
Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to
operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies; might relieve
internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic
pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road,
Thailand, or the Philippines cannot now be forecast.
"The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to
gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to
the
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 391
Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The
process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate
concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine
Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000
are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is
important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before
hostilities commence.
"Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long
as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more
positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval
and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered
and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands.
War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to
Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.
"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch
military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military
counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan
attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the
United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies,
or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 east or
south of 10 north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty
Islands.
"Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is
advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of
communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a
Japanese advance to the west of 100 east or south of 10 north,
immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent
that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might
lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.
"It is recommended that:
"prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military
counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens
United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;
"*in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the
United States, the British and the Dutch governments that advance beyond
the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint
military opposition be undertaken;*
"*steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and
Dutch for the issuance of such warning.*
"[S] G. C. MARSHALL
"[S] H. R. STARK (ex. 17)."
Before the meeting at the White House at 2 p. M. On November 27
(Washington time), Secretary Hull conferred briefly alone with President
Roosevelt (ex. 58). When the two Japanese Ambassadors arrived,
Ambassador Nomura seized the first opportunity to say that they were
disappointed over the failure of any agreement for a modus vivendi.
President Roosevelt expressed his grateful appreciation and that of the
United States Government to the peace element in Japan which had worked
hard in support of the movement for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific
area, and made it clear that the United States was not overlooking what
that element had done and was still ready to do. He added that most
people in the United States wanted a peaceful solution of the Pacific
problems, and that while he had not given up yet, the situation was
serious and that fact should be recognized. He pointed out that the
Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had had the effect of a cold
bath on the people of the United States as well as on the United States
Government, and intimated that a second such bath appeared to be in the
offing. He said that throughout the conversations there had been no real
indication of a desire for peace by any of Japan's leaders, and that
this also had had its effect on the conversations. According to his
memorandum of the meeting, Secretary Hull then
"made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in
control of the Government should make up its mind definitely to act and
talk and move in a peaceful direction, no conversations could or would
get anywhere as has been so
392 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of
co-prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in
certain areas are all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the
policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military
agencies of the political economic, social, and moral affairs of each of
the populations conquered; and that so long as they move in that
direction and continue to increase their cultural relations, military
and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern
Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be
any real progress made on a peaceful course (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 772)."
During the conversation, Ambassador Kurusu suggested that the trouble
was not with fundamentals so much as with their application. However,
with reference to a recent remark of President Roosevelt about
"introducing" Japan and China, when the Ambassador asked who would take
such action and the President said "both sides"-meaning Japan as well as
China-the Ambassador pointed out "that from a practical standpoint that
would be very difficult to accomplish" (ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 770-772).
According to Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo, as the meeting ended,
President Roosevelt told the Ambassadors that he was leaving the next
day, Friday, for Warm Springs, Ga., for a rest and was planning to
return the following Wednesday. He said that he would like to talk with
the Ambassadors then and would be very gratified if some means of
settlement could be discovered in the meantime (ex. 1, pp. 192-194). In
addition to Ambassador Nomura's cabled report of the meeting, Ambassador
Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the voice
code previously arranged, and said that in the conversation with the
President "there wasn't much that was different from Hull's talks of
yesterday." He asked how things were in Tokyo, and was told that a
crisis appeared "imminent." The Ambassador reported that the United
States wanted to continue the negotiations, but Bureau Chief Yamamoto
said "we can't yield." The Ambassador concluded by saying that there was
nothing of particular interest in the day's talk with President
Roosevelt, except that the southward advance of Japanese troops was
"having considerable effect" (ex. 1, pp. 188-191).
The record shows that President Roosevelt had an appointment with
Admiral Ernest J. King at 3:45 p. m. immediately after his conference
with the two Japanese Ambassadors (ex. 58), and that at about 4:00 p. m.
Secretary Stimson telephoned and talked with Secretary Hull (tr. 1167,
5547). At 5:00 p. m. Secretary Hull telephoned Admiral Stark, but was
unable to reach him and talked with Admiral Schuirmann instead (tr.
5547).
In addition to the conversations Secretary Hull had with officials of
the United States Government on November 27 (Washington time), the
Secretary and Under Secretary Welles also conferred that day with
representatives of three of the governments that had been consulted in
connection with the proposed modus vivendi. The Netherlands Minister
called and handed Secretary Hull a memorandum of the same date in which
the Netherlands Foreign Minister took the position that inasmuch as the
modus vivendi proposal was only the beginning of negotiations, the
military and economic concessions suggested therein as a start seemed to
be "quite far reaching" and that it was "most unlikely" that Japan would
at the present moment leave the Axis (ex. 18). The Australian Minister,
Mr. Casey, also called on Secretary Hull and asked whether the
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 393
modus vivendi had been abandoned permanently. When Secretary Hull said
he so considered it, Mr. Casey
"expressed great concern and desired to know more about the movements of
Chiang Kai-shek and others intended to discourage the further
consideration of the modus vivendi. I referred to copies of British
communications on the subject, adding that Ambassador Halifax was strong
for the proposal all the way and that I sympathized with his situation
but I did not feel that the communications from Churchill and Eden, with
qualifications such as were in them, would be very helpful in a bitter
fight that would be projected by Chiang Kai-shek and carried forward by
all of the malcontents in the United States, although I felt
unreservedly that Churchill and Eden, like the British Ambassador here,
would be for whatever we might do, even though not entirely to their
liking in every way. The Minister inquired whether I thought it would be
feasible to take up this matter further with the Chinese, and I replied
that I did not think so, so far as I am concerned. I thanked the
Minister for his cooperation and that of his Government (ex. 18)."
Also that morning the British Ambassador "urgently" called on Under
Secretary Welles. The Under Secretary's memorandum of their conversation
noted that Lord Halifax said that Secretary Hull had telephoned him the
previous evening and told him the nature of the United States' reply to
Japan, and continued:
"The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to
the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese
Government with a document other than the modus vivendi document which
had so recently been under discussion.
"I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in
this regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was
the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier
proposal which had been under discussion and the raising of repeated
questions by the British Government in regard thereto.
"Lord Halifax said he could not understand this inasmuch as he had
communicated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British
Government.
"To that I replied that the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the
President yesterday could hardly be regarded as "full support," but on
the contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed.
"Lord Halifax said that this message had been intended merely to express
the objections on the part of the Chinese Government. He went on to say
that he himself had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese
objections and that he had, in fact, stated to the Chinese Ambassador
that in view of the fact that only ten days ago General Chiang Kai-shek
was imploring the British and the United States Government to prevent
the closing of the Burma Road, it would seem to him, Lord Halifax, that
the course proposed by Secretary Hull gave positive assurances to the
Chinese Government that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the
modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated. He said that he
felt that the attitude taken by the Chinese Government was based partly
on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterical reaction
because of the fear that any kind of an agreement reached between Japan
and the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown
of Chinese morale.
"I told Lord Halifax that information received this morning tended to
show that Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already
very active and that Japanese forces there were being quickly increased
in number. I said these reports likewise indicated that the threat
against Thailand was imminent. I said, in conclusion, that it was
evident from the information received here that the Japanese were
preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. The gravity of the
situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated (ex. 18)."
While on November 27 (Washington time) both Secretary Hull and Under
Secretary Welles thus believed the situation could not be more serious,
the record before the Committee indicates that the political adviser to
the Secretary, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, was less concerned. In a
memorandum of that date entitled "Problem of Far Eastern relations-
Estimate of Situation and certain probabilities," Dr.
394 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hornbeck expressed the opinion that he did not believe the United States
was "on the immediate verge of 'war' in the Pacific." He stated that in
his opinion there was less reason on November 27 than there was a week
before for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make war on
the United States. "Were it a matter of placing bets," he wrote, "the
undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and
Japan will *not* be at 'war' on or before Decem-15 [sic]." (Tr. 5523-
5537). [Italics in original.]
Apart from the remark of Bureau Chief Yamamoto during his telephone
conversation with Ambassador Kurusu the evening of November 26
(Washington time), when Yamamoto told the Ambassador that he had
expected that the United States would not yield to the demands made by
the Japanese Government in its note of November 20, and Yamamoto's
remark the next day in his telephone conversation with the Ambassador
that Japan "can't yield," there is no evidence before the Committee that
the Japanese Foreign Office furnished the two Japanese Ambassadors any
official comment or instructions as to their next step until November 28
(Japan time). That day Foreign Minister Togo cabled the following
instructions:
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. *The
Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.*
Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this
American proposal which l will send you in two or three days, the
negotiations *will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I
do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken
off.* Merely say to them that you awaiting instructions and that,
although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to
your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just
claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the
Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and
conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States
has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish
negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man
you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present
circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. [1] From now on
do the best you can (ex. 1, p. 195)."
This message, in the above form, was available in Washington on November
28 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 195), whether before or after the War
Council meeting that day is not known definitely, although, as noted
below, there is some indication that it was not available until
afterward.
The War Council met at noon at the White House, with President
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary
of the Navy Knox, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark present.
Secretary Hull repeated the comments he had made 3 days before, at the
War Council meeting on November 25, emphasizing again that there was
"practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan,"
that the Japanese were likely "to break out at any time with new acts of
conquest," employing the element of surprise as "a central point in
their strategy," and that the "safeguarding of our national security was
in the hands of the Army and the Navy" (Tr. 1203). Earlier that day
Secretary Stimson had received from the Military Intelligence Division
(G-2) a summary of the available information regarding Japanese military
and naval move-
[1] This has reference to the suggestion made by the two Ambassadors on
November 26 (Washington time) that they be permitted to propose to
Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt send a personal message to
Foreign Minister Togo (ex. 1, p. 180).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 395
ments in the Far East, and had taken it to President Roosevelt and
suggested that he read it before the War Council meeting, which the
President had called. In his notes of the meeting, Secretary Stimson
said:
"When we got back there at 12:00 o'clock he had read the paper that I
had left with him. The main point of the paper was a study of what the
Expeditionary Force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed
South, is going to do. G-2 pointed out that it might develop into an
attack on the Philippines or a landing of further troops in Indo-China,
or an attack on Thailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands, or on
Singapore. After the President had read these aloud, he pointed out that
there was one more. It might, by attacking the Kra Isthmus, develop into
an attack on Rangoon, which lies only a short distance beyond the Kra
Isthmus and the taking of which by the Japanese would effectually stop
the Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good
suggestion on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that
the present move-that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of
about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere-completely
changing the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could
address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already
had on land in Indo-China. It was now the opinion of everyone that if
this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-
China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or
further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers,
Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines.
It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we
discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into
the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if
the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that
if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indo-
China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of
going.
"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the
Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't
think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the
other, which we didn't think we could do; that the only thing for us to
do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a
certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The
President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from
himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at
the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem
to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President.
In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be
couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn
an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of
the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I
said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the
United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an
address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have
to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this ides of a
message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his
letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not
publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send
his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and
then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more
understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the
final decision at that time and the President asked Hull and Knox and
myself to try to draft such papers (tr. 14,424-14,426)."
Shortly after the meeting ended, President Roosevelt left for Warm
Springs, Ga., telling reporters that the Japanese situation might
require his return at any time. [1]
Also on November 28, the Netherlands Minister called on Secretary Hull
to inquire what reactions the Secretary had had from the Japanese
situation. The Secretary recorded that he handed the Minister-
"three cables from Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina
area indicating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with
equipment, vessels, trans-
[1] Earlier that day he had informed the press that American merchant
vessels sailing the Pacific would not be armed "under existing
circumstances." When asked how long he expected the existing
circumstances to prevail, the President had replied that that question
"should be asked In Tokyo" (Washington Post, November 29, 1941).
396 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ports, et cetera, were proceeding to that area from the north. He
examined the cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the
Japanese troop movements. The Minister stated that this presented a very
serious situation.
The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally
in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I
abandoned on Tuesday evening. November twenty-fifth. Or practically
abandoned when the Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true
facts or waiting to ascertain them. I said that I had determined early
Wednesday morning, November twenty-sixth, to present to the Japanese
later ill the day the document containing a proposed draft of an
agreement which set forth all of the basic principles for which this
Government stands and has stood for, for many years. Especially
including the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. I
reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan w-as the
continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working
out of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the
Pacific area and that the so-called modus vivendi was really a part and
parcel of these conversations and their objectives intended to
facilitate and keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing
that in any way could be construed as a departure from the basic
principles which were intended to go into the general peace agreement.
The Minister said he understood the situation (tr. 4475-4476)."
The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called on Dr. Hornbeck that
day to inquire whether the Japanese-American negotiations had in fact
"broken down" as, he said, was stated in a message the British armed
authorities had received from the United States armed authorities. [2]
Dr. Hornbeck told the Minister that so far as he was aware neither
Government had "declared or indicated" that the negotiations were
terminated, but that he was not in a position to confirm or deny the
statement referred to by the Minister (ex. 18). At 7 o'clock that
evening the State Department sent a telegram to Ambassador Gauss in
Chungking which summarized the Japanese demands of November 20 and the
terms of the proposed modus vivendi. The telegram briefly reviewed the
circumstances which led to the decision to withhold the modus vivendi
from the United States reply of November 26, concerning which Ambassador
Gauss had been previously informed, describing in some detail for the
Ambassador's information the position regarding the modus vivendi taken
by the Chinese Government (ex. 18).
According to Secretary Stimson, the rest of the week-end after the war
council meeting on Friday "was largely taken up with preparing a
suggested draft of a message for the President to deliver to Congress"
(Tr. 14403). The record before the Committee shows that Friday afternoon
Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull on the White House telephone at 2:49
o'clock and talked with one of the officials of the State Department's
Far Eastern Division, and that at 5:25 o'clock Secretary Stimson called
Secretary Hull and talked with Dr. Hornbeck (Tr. 5548). The next day,
Saturday, November 29 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson and Secretary
Knox sent to Secretary Hull suggested drafts, which they had prepared,
of the proposed message to Congress decided upon the day before (ex.
161). In an attached note in his handwriting, Secretary Stimson
described his suggestions as a "memo which may be helpful as to certain
portions of the message to the Congress." Secretary Knox also forwarded
a copy of his suggestions to President Roosevelt en route to Warm
Springs, with an accompanying letter in which he said that he had had
the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in preparing the
summation of the military situation contained in his draft. He told the
President:
[2] The message referred to appears to have been the Navy "war warning"
dispatch of November 27 (Washington time) to Admiral Hart and Admiral
Kimmel, which was sent to the United States Naval Observer in London
with instructions to "inform British" (ex. 37).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 397
"The news this morning indicates the Japs are going to deliberately
stall for two or three days, so unless this picture changes, I am
extremely hopeful that you will get a two or three day respite down
there and will come back feeling very fit (ex. 161)."
It seems probable that Secretary Knox's information that the Japs were
stalling "for two or three days" was based on Foreign Minister Togo's
message quoted above, in which the Foreign Minister told Ambassador
Nomura that with a report of his Government's views on the United
States' reply of November 26 "which I will send you in two or three
days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured" (ex. 1, p. 195). While
this is not conclusive as to whether or not that message was available
before the War Council meeting on November 28 (Washington time), it does
indicate that, although the message was translated by the Navy on
November 28 it was not seen by Secretary Knox until "this morning", i.
e., November 29 (Washington time).
The suggestions sent by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox to
Secretary Hull were combined in a single draft (ex. 161-A), which then
underwent extensive revision and modification. The revised draft was
ready by noon the same day, Saturday, November 29 (Washington time),
according to a handwritten note accompanying a copy of it which Dr.
Hornbeck sent to Secretary Stimson the next day (ex. 161-A). It was
accompanied by a draft of a proposed message to Emperor Hirohito and by
the following memorandum for President Roosevelt dated November 29
(Washington time):
"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
"There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress to which
draft the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War made material
contributions, and the officers of the Department made further
contributions, which together comprise the draft of proposed message.
"In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to
go over this draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to
read it at all critically, but expect to do so over the week end and
give you the benefit of any further comment or suggestions.
"I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible
message from you to the Emperor of Japan. My personal view continues as
on yesterday to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except
for the purpose of making a record. It might even cause such
complications as Col. Stimson and I referred to on yesterday.
"If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to
defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the
Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that
you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our
relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.
"I think you will desire to have any message to the Emperor dispatched
in code to Ambassador Grew for communication by him to the Emperor
through appropriate channels (ex. 19)."
The draft of a message to Emperor Hirohito was brief. In it, after
referring to the long period of unbroken peace between the United States
and Japan, the President was to state that he was addressing the Emperor
"because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in
formation." He was then to continue:
"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to
deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence
of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain
tragic possibilities.
"The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which
your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their
enlightened decisions
398 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and
better courses-thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both
countries and to the peoples of other lands.
"Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address
myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your
Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark
clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of
restoring and maintaining the traditional state of amity wherein both
our people may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the
Pacific area (ex. 19)."
The draft of the proposed message to Congress was longer, a document of
some twenty typewritten pages (ex. 19). It will be remembered that the
War Council had decided on November 28 that the message was to be a
message "to the people of the. United States" as well as "an address to
Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the
danger happened" (tr. 14426). If the President should send the message
to Emperor Hirohito, that, the War Council had decided, was to be "one
thing and a secret thing," as a message to an Emperor could not be
publicized as a message to Congress could, and the President was to make
his speech to Congress "as a separate and more understandable thing to
the people of the United States" (tr. 14426). The proposed message began
with these words:
"GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: I come before you to report to you on
serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in
the Far East. Relations between the United States and the Japanese
Empire have reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to lay
before you the essential facts of the situation and their extremely
serious implications (ex. 19)."
It then briefly reviewed the development of American foreign policy in
the Far East since 1833, discussing American relations with China, the
acquisition by the United States of sovereignty over the Philippines
with its attendant responsibilities, and the relations between the
United States and Japan since 1908, including a brief discussion of the
Nine Power Treaty of 1921. It considered the policy of aggression
followed by the Japanese first in Manchuria commencing in 1931 and then
in China, during the course of which American lives and property had
been imperiled and damaged in disregard for American rights under
existing treaties.
The proposed message then took up the relationship of Japan to Germany
and Italy in their scheme of world-wide conquest. It pointed out that in
flat defiance of its covenants Japan had invaded and sought to overthrow
the Government of China and that step by step the Japanese armed forces,
passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the
Philippine Islands, had invaded and taken possession of French Indo-
China. It continued:
"Today they are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into
the territory of Thailand. That step, if taken, would place them where
they would directly menace, to the North, the Burma Road, China's
lifeline, and, to the South, the port and Straits of Singapore through
which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between
the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
"To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan has extended her threatening
activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation
of the mandate under which she received the custody of those islands,
she has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and
fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the
Philippines.
"By these steps Japan has enveloped with threatening forces the western,
northern, and eastern approaches to the Philippines. Should this process
go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace vital
interests of the United States.
* * * * *
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 399
This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds
unmistakable threats to our interests, especially our interest in peace
and in peaceful trade, and to our responsibility for the security of the
Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in
a military sense. Is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we
import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit
Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies
of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner
and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go
practical Japanese control of the Pacific.
Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and
considerations of justice, humanity, and fair dealing are restored, we
will witness in that region of the world precisely what has already
transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler
seeks dominion by ruthless force (ex. 19).
It was then pointed out that throughout the period in which Japan had
been making it clear that this was her program, the Government of the
United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that
Japan's best interests lay in maintaining and cultivating friendly
relations with the United States and other countries that believe in
orderly and peaceful processes. Reference was made to the 8 months of
conversations with the Japanese which had been carried on by the
Secretary of State and the President for the purpose of arriving, if
possible, at some understanding agreeable to both Governments, and the
principles for which the United States had stood, as set forth in the
United States note of November 26 to Japan, were summarized. It was
stated that in this effort the United States Government had had the
agreement and support of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia,
the Netherlands, and China. Every effort had been made, it was said,
toward reaching a fair and workable agreement, and to commit Japan to
practices in line with the principles advocated by the United States.
These efforts, the proposed message continued, had failed, and Japan had
refused to change her position or her practices, an(l relations between
the two nations were threatened with rupture. The supreme question
presented to the United States, it was said, was the question of self-
defense; the immediate question was whether the United States would, or
would not, stand by while Japan went forward with a program of conquest.
The effects of that program of conquest, if successful, on China and the
Philippines were then described, and it was said that-
If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon, and
were to succeed in conquering, the regions which they are menacing in
the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies
and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports
from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports
in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of
commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and
with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, an
interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic (ex. 19).
The proposed message then concluded by stating that the United States
did not want war with Japan, but that if war should come, the fault and
responsibility would be those of Japan, and that the primary cause would
have been the pursuit by Japan of a policy of aggression. The policy of
the United States and its relation with Japan should not be influenced
by fear of what attacks, acting unlawfully and with resort to force,
Japan might make upon the United States-
but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we
are reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and
security and
400 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
justice to which we have been and are committed, with confidence that it
is within our capacity to withstand any attack which anyone may make
upon us because of our pursuit of that course (ex. 19)."
Also on November 29 (Washington time), the British Ambassador called on
Secretary Hull to learn of any further developments in the Japanese
situation, especially with reference to the question of the proposed
modus vivendi. As Secretary Hull described the conversation:
"This caused me to remark in a preliminary way that the mechanics for
the carrying on of diplomatic relations between the governments
resisting aggressor nations are so complicated that it is nearly
impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and
safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for
example, has sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different
Cabinet officers and high officials in the Government other than the
State Department, and sometimes even ignoring the President, intruding
into a delicate and serious situation with no real idea of what the
facts are. I added that Chiang Kai-shek has his brother-in-law, located
here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press
and others, apparently with no particular purpose in mind; that we have
correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which
is entirely their privilege to do, except that at times we all move too
fast without fully understanding each other's views, et cetera, et
cetera. I stated that this was well illustrated in the case of the
recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek. In referring to this I remarked that
it would have been better if, when Churchill received Chiang Kai-shek's
loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of passing
the protest on to us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying
and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the
British Government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable
back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to brace up and fight with the same
zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening
and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly countries were
now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement
between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a
procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this
calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by
peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be obliged to enter
into with China.
"*I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with
Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the
officials of the Army and the Navy with whom I have talked and to whom I
have given my views for whatever they are worth. Speaking in great
confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country
and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of
resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move
suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over
considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the
peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer
and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on
the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited
conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble
and requires the utmost boldness and risk.*
"*I also said to the Ambassador that a calm deliberate Japanese
Government would more than ever desire to wait another thirty days to
see whether the German Army is driven out of Russia by winter. I added
that the extremist fire-eating elements in Japan who have preached a
general forward movement supported by the Army and Navy have influenced
a vast portion of the Japanese public to clamor for such a movement,
would probably take no serious notice of the Russian-German situation
but would go forward in this desperate undertaking which they have
advocated for some time; that at least it would be a mistake not to
consider this possibility as entirely real, rather than to assume that
they would virtually halt and engage in some movements into Thailand and
into the Burma Road while waiting the results on the Russian front. The
Ambassador, I think, had his reservations on this latter point. He did
not disagree with what I said about the badly confused mechanics for the
conduct of diplomatic relations between several of our countries in
these critical times (ex. 18). *"
Also that day the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, called on Secretary
Hull and intimated that he was prepared to suggest to the Japanese
Ambassador that Australia would be glad to act as mediator between Japan
and the United States. In his memorandum of the
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 401
conversation, Secretary Hull noted that he gave the matter no serious
attention, except to tell the Minister-
"that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of a
move of that kind. I interrupted him to make this conclusive comment
before the Minister could make a detailed statement of the matter on the
assumption that he would develop a set of facts along lines that he
began to intimate (ex. 174)."
That afternoon the State Department received from Ambassador Grew the
text of a Japanese note protesting the alleged flight of an American
airplane over the island of Formosa on November 20, claiming this was a
violation of Japanese territory and requesting that the matter "be
brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned."
Ambassador Grew was informed on December 6 (Washington time) that the
requested action had been taken, and that on November 24 an unidentified
airplane had carried out a reconnaissance of Guam (ex. 130). The same
afternoon (November 29) Secretary Hull received a request from the
British Ambassador for a copy of the text of the United States' note of
November 26 to send to the British Foreign Minister, to whom the general
character of the note had previously been communicated (ex. 158). A copy
of the note was sent to the Ambassador by Under Secretary Welles the
following Tuesday (tr. 1338). Also that afternoon the State Department
instructed American diplomatic and consular offices at Saigon, Bangkok
and Singapore to report "all movements of military or naval units"
promptly to the American Consul at Manila, who was told to transmit such
information to Admiral Hart, the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet
(ex. 21).
Overshadowing the other events of the day, however, was an Associated
Press report of a speech made by Premier Tojo in Tokyo before a rally
sponsored by the "Imperial Rule Assistance Association" and the "Dai
Nippon East Asia League," in commemoration of the first anniversary of
the Joint Declaration by the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo and the
Wang Ching-wei regime in Japanese-occupied China (ex. 29, vol. II, p.
122). [1] In his speech, Premier Tojo said:
"It is certainly the most fortunate lot of the three powers to have the
privilege of collaborating together under this banner for cutting open
the thorny way, and 1 year has already gone by since we started this
honorable work together, and if it is not the greatest task of the
present century what else can it be.
"However if we look around we find that there are still many countries
who are indulging in actions hostile to us. In fact they are trying to
throw obstacles in the way of the construction of the East Asia co-
prosperity sphere and are trying to enjoy the dream of exploitation of
East Asia at the cost of the 1,000 million populace of the East Asiatic
peoples to satisfy their greed of possession.
"The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain,
America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young
men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of
Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East
Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp
the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the
United States.
"For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice
from East Asia with a vengeance (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 148)."
The reports of this speech by Premier Tojo commenced coming in on
November 29, the date fixed by Foreign Minister Togo as the final
deadline before which Ambassador Nomura was to obtain the written
[1] Extracts from Premier Tojo's speech were carried in American
newspapers on November 30 under such headlines as "Japan Threatens to
Purge Asia of U. S. And Britain" (Washington Post, November 30, 1941).
402 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
agreement of the United States to the Japanese demands of November 20 or
else things would "automatically" begin to happen (ex. 1, p. 165). It
must be assumed Secretary Hull was aware of this and of the Foreign
Minister's message to Ambassador Nomura stating that the negotiations
would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3 days (ex. 1, p. 195).
Late Saturday evening, November 29 (Washington time), Secretary Hull
telephoned President Roosevelt at Warm Springs and had a lengthy
conversation with him, after which the President's press secretary told
reporters:
"In view of the reported statement-an Associated Press dispatch by the
Premier of Japan, the President tonight is of the opinion that he may
have to leave Warm Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad
schedule so as to arrive in Washington Monday before noon (tr. 14337)."
Secretary Hull testified that "the gravity of the situation was evident
from many sources", and that as Premier Tojo's statement reflected the
extreme acuteness of the situation, "in that sense it may be said that
the statement prompted my telephone call and the President's return"
(Tr. 14,340).
In the meantime, after cabling Ambassador Nomura on November 28 (Japan
time) that he did not wish the Ambassador "to give the impression that
the negotiations are broken off" (ex. 1, p. 195), Foreign Minister Togo
had followed up that message with another the next day in which he
instructed the Ambassador:
"*We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following
lines:*
"The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial
position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the
claims of both sides.
"However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has
now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be
made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which
ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the
prestige of the Imperial Government.
"With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem,
what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. Government has
made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these
points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the
United States government.
"*(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does
not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations)* (ex. 1, p.
199)."
This message was translated and available in Washington on Sunday,
November 30 (Washington time). Late that evening Ambassador Kurusu
telephoned Bureau Chief Yamamoto in Tokyo that arrangements had been
made for the two Ambassadors to meet with Secretary Hull the next
morning, Monday. The Ambassador reported that President Roosevelt was
returning to Washington the next day because of Premier Tojo's speech,
and cautioned against such "ill-advised statements," saying that it put
the two Ambassadors "in a very difficult position." When Yamamoto urged
the Ambassador to continue the negotiations, Ambassador Kurusu said they
would need Tokyo's help, and both the Premier and the Foreign Minister
would need "to change the tone of their speeches." Ambassador
continued:
"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of
happenings in the South. You understand that don't you? (Ex. 1, p.
207)"
Yamamoto replied:
"Yes, yes (ex. 1, p. 207)."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 403
Secretary Hull testified that he telephoned the President that Sunday
[1] "after conferring With our military regarding the Japanese Prime
Minister's bellicose statement and the increasing gravity of the Far
Eastern situation" (tr. 1163). The record shows that the Secretary had
two telephone conversations that morning with Admiral Stark at 10:30 and
12:08 o'clock (tr. 1167). Admiral Stark attended the Secretary's
conference with President Roosevelt at 11:45 a. m. The next day
immediately following the President's return to Washington, and it would
seem probable that the arrangement for Admiral Stark to attend that
conference was made during the Secretary's telephone conversations with
him.
At 1:28 o'clock Sunday afternoon there was received in the State
Department, through Ambassador Winant in London, the following message
from Prime Minister Churchill for President Roosevelt:
"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war
between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret
or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by
Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequence. I realize your
constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into
war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the
dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider
whether, *at the moment which you judge right which may be very near*,
you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel
you to place the gravest issues before Congress", or words to that
effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a
joint declaration, and in any ease arrangements are being made to
synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for
presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it
might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the
war (ex. 24)."
Also that Sunday both the Australian Minister, Mr. Casey, and the
British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, called on Secretary Hull. The
Australian Minister gave the Secretary the substance of a talk he had
had with Ambassador Kurusu. Secretary Hull recorded:
"This amounted to very little and there was really nothing new in what
he said except that Kurusu made it repeatedly clear that the Japanese
were very desirous of continuing conversations with this Government. The
Minister then referred to his notes and said that the British Ambassador
desired to urge, along with him, the Australian Minister, that I do the
best possible to continue our relations with Japan so as to avoid a
military conflict at this time, the idea being that they needed more
time for preparation to resist in the Pacific area. This view has been
asserted constantly during recent weeks by the British Ambassador, the
Australian Minister, and twice by the Netherlands Minister (ex. 168)."
One of the purposes of the British Ambassador's call was to hand
Secretary Hull the following memorandum:
"MOST SECRET
"There are important indications that Japan is about to attack Thailand
and this attack will include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic
points in the Kra isthmus.
"We have plans for the rapid movement of a force from Malaya to hold a
line across the Kra isthmus in the neighborhood of Singora. Time is the
essence of this plan, particularly at this season of the year when the
Kra isthmus is water logged. Consequently great tactical advantage lies
with the side which gets there first.
"R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for
three days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East
has requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake
air recon-
[1] Newspaper accounts of Secretary Hull's s activities that Sunday
state that the Secretary again telephoned President Roosevelt at Warm
Springs before his departure for Washington (Washington Post, December
1, 1941).
404 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
naissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days. Commander in
Chief Far East, has asked for permission to move into Kra isthmus, if
air reconnaissance establishes the fact that escorted Japanese ships are
approaching the coast of Thailand, and he asks for an immediate decision
on this point.
"To allow the Japanese to establish themselves so near the Malay
frontier would be an obvious threat to Singapore even though at the
present season it might not develop at once. We have also to bear in
mind the encouragement which the Japanese success would give to their
extremists. Demands of appetite would grow and other Far East peoples
would be correspondingly depressed. It looks therefore as though, to
ensure the defense of Singapore and for wider reasons we might have to
take the proposed action to forestall the Japanese (ex. 21)."
In his memorandum of his conversation with the British Ambassador
Secretary Hull stated that the Ambassador-
"was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States would do if
the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base
on the Kra Isthmus. *I said that the President was returning tomorrow
morning and that I would lay all phases of the situation before him on
Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and the President agreed to
notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to his inquiry*. * * *
The Ambassador continued his attitude of desiring more time for his
Government to make preparations to resist in the Pacific area. He
assured me that his Government would be in harmony with any steps that
we might pursue to this end (ex. 21)."
The next day Lord Halifax sent Secretary Hull a copy of a telegram he
had received from the British Foreign Office, "as the point may possibly
arise in the course of your discussions this morning." "You will
remember," he wrote the Secretary, "you mentioned the point to me as I
was leaving your office yesterday" (ex. 158). The Foreign Office
telegram was as follows:
"It is conceivable that United States Government may raise with you the
question of the compatibility of the operation referred to with our
treaty of nonaggression with Thailand. It may be useful for you to know
therefore that we have given careful consideration to this point.
"In July last we informed the Thai Government that we should regard the
grant of bases to Japan as an infraction of that treaty. Similarly
(although we have as yet made no communication to the Thai Government)
we should not feel we could allow the treaty to be a bar to our entering
Thailand if a Japanese invasion occurred or was clearly impending. But
it would be greatly preferable if in these eventualities we could act in
co-operation with the Thai Government. If therefore it were decided to
undertake the operation, we should naturally do our best to secure
Thai's consent. It would be important however not to reveal to the Thai
Government prematurely the existence of our plan owing to the danger of
leakage to the Japanese (ex. 158).
Thus the record before the Committee shows that as President Roosevelt
returned to Washington from Warm Springs, the information available to
his advisors in Washington indicated that a crisis was fast approaching,
if not already at hand.
A series of intercepted Japanese messages that were translated and
available in Washington the next day, December 1 (Japan time), fully
confirmed this view. In a telegram dated December 1 (Japan time) to
Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the Ambassador
that-
"The date set in my message No. 812 has come and gone and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United
States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been instructing the
Press and others that though there are some wide differences between
Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing.
(The above is for only your information) (ex. 1, p. 208).
That same day the Japanese Foreign Office informed the Ambassador that
its four offices "in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 405
have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to
dispose of them," and that the machine in Batavia had been returned to
Japan (ex. 1, p. 209). From a message dated November 29 from the
Japanese Ambassador in Thailand to Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo, it
was learned that the Ambassador was conspiring with the pro-Japanese
faction in Thailand to place that country in a position where it would
be compelled to declare war on Great Britain. The Japanese Ambassador in
Thailand reported to Tokyo that the question of joint military action
between Thailand and Japan had been brought up in the Thai Government,
but that the Government had expressed a desire to pursue a course of
strict neutrality. He told Foreign Minister Togo that the Thai
Government-
"had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless of whether
they be Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be considered
Thai's enemy. Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as Thai's helper,
she should put Britain in a position to be the first aggressor. *For the
purpose of accomplishing this Japan should carefully avoid Thai
territory, and instead, land troops in the neighborhood of Kotaparu in
British territory, which would almost certainly force Britain to invade
Thailand from Patanbessa.*
"*The consequence would be Thai's declaration of war on Britain.* This
strategy is being given careful consideration. Apparently this plan has
the approval of Chief of Staff Bijitto. Our naval Attache has advised
the Naval General Staff also, I think (ex. 1, p. 203)."
While the record before the committee shows that all of these Japanese
messages were translated and available in Washington on December 1, it
does not show the exact hour when translation was completed. It
therefore cannot be said with certainty which, if any, of the messages
were seen by Secretary Hull before his conference with the Japanese
Ambassadors that morning, or which of the messages were seen by
President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark before their
conference immediately after the President's return to Washington from
Warm Springs.
THE INVASION OF THAILAND BY JAPANESE FORCES FROM FRENCH INDOCHINA
APPEARS IMMINENT
(December 1-7, 1941)
Thus on December 1 (Washington time) there was much information in
Washington that pointed toward Thailand as the next objective of
Japanese aggression. Geographically, Thailand lies between French
Indochina on the east and Burma on the west, and, with the Gulf of Siam,
between French Indochina on the northeast and the British Malay States
on the south. After the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina
in late July, Thailand thus became a barrier between those forces and
two possible objectives, the Burma Road on the one hand and Singapore on
the other. This strategic location of Thailand had been emphasized by
General Marshall and Admiral Stark in their joint memorandum of November
5 (Washington time) when they concluded that no military action against
Japan should be undertaken by the United States unless, among other
contingencies, the Japanese should move their forces "into Thailand to
the west of 100 east (i. e., toward the Burma Road) or south of 10
north" (i. e., toward Singapore) (ex. 16).
It is desirable here to review briefly the situation with respect to
Thailand as it had developed since July. The record before the Com-
406 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mittee shows that after the Japanese invasion and occupation of French
Indochina late in July, the Thai Government, fully aware of Thailand's
strategic position and importance to the Japanese, on August 12
(Washington time) had formally asked the State Department whether, in
the event Thailand should be attacked and should resist attack, the
United States Government would extend material assistance to it, the
Thai Government having determined and formally announced that it would
defend itself against attack by any other country. Mr. Maxwell M.
Hamilton, then Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, to
whom the question was presented, had advised the Thai Minister that the
matter would be taken up with higher officers of the Department and that
he would then communicate further with the Minister (ex. 169, item 6).
The Thai Minister had previously made informal inquiry of the State
Department to the same effect, after Secretary Hull had stated at a
press conference on August 6 (Washington time) that the United States
was becoming increasingly concerned over events in the southwestern
Pacific area (ex. 169, item 1-6). Again on August 14, the Thai Minister
had called at the State Department and stated that he had received
another telegram from his Government which, "in the gravity of its tone,
indicated that a critical state had been reached in respect of the
threat of invasion." He had further stated that he had been instructed
"to spare no effort to obtain an expression of the views of the American
Government in this situation," and that the Thai Government was ready
and able to purchase in America the arms it needed (ex. 169, item 7).
On August 15 (Washington time) the State Department had received from
the United States Minister at Batavia in the Netherlands East Indies a
telegram containing the substance of a message from the Netherlands
Minister of Colonies in London to the Governor-General of the
Netherlands East Indies. In it the Minister of Colonies advised the
latter that he had been assured by the British Foreign Minister that in
the event of an attack by Japan upon the Netherlands East Indies; the
British Empire would back up the Netherlands completely. The Governor-
General was also advised that a further conference would soon be held in
London with the British Foreign Minister in this connection-
"since it has become clear now that the United States and England will
not resist Japanese occupation of Thailand with force of arms. It is
also brought to your attention that any guarantee or certainty of United
States participation by force of arms is absolutely excluded (ex. 169,
item 8)."
Secretary Hull had conferred with the Thai Minister in Washington on
August 18 (Washington time). In reply to the Minister's previous
inquiries as to the attitude of the United States Government toward
Thailand if Thailand should be attacked and should endeavor in good
faith to defend itself, Secretary Hull had stated that the United States
had been aiding China in many ways against the aggression of Japan and
that, in the contingencies mentioned, the United States Government would
place Thailand in the same category (ex. 169, item 9).
The next action of importance in connection with Thailand appears to
have occurred on October 27 (Washington time), when the British Minister
in Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell, discussed the Thailand situation
with Under Secretary Welles and left with him two memoranda dated
October 25 dealing with possible material aid to
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 407
Thailand, including guns, ammunition, planes and aviation gasoline and
lubricating oil, by Great Britain and the United States (ex. 169, item
13). It will be recalled that it was about this time that Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek had appealed to Great Britain and the United States for
planes and pilots to defend the Burma Road against an anticipated attack
by the Japanese from northern French Indochina. The American reply to
the British memoranda of October 25 had been delayed in order that both
of these matters could be considered at the same time (ex. 169, item
11). On November 6 (Washington time), that reply, in the form of an aide
memoire, had been handed to the British Minister (ex. 169, item 13). The
aide memoire pointed out that for some weeks it had been the policy of
the United States Government to give sympathetic consideration to
priority and export applications filed on behalf of the Thai Government
and, whenever practicable in the face of demand from other areas upon
American production, to take favorable action upon such applications.
Regarding the proposals contained in the British memoranda, the United
States reply commented that the British proposal to require the
acceptance of British instructors along with the howitzers and field
guns which were to be offered to the Thai Government might serve as a
pretext upon which the Japanese Government might exert additional
pressure upon Thailand. As to planes, the memoranda suggested that the
British might wish to consider the release to Thailand of a number of
airplanes at Singapore which it was understood were in excess of the
number for which pilots were available there. If this should not be
practicable, it was suggested that if the British should decide to make
available to Thailand planes from those being supplied to it from the
United States, the United States Government would be agreeable to such
an arrangement. Concerning aviation gasoline and lubricating oil, it was
stated that a reply would be made in the near future, after further
investigation (ex. 169, item 13).
On November 18 (Washington time) the State Department had advised the
American Minister at Bangkok that it had explored the possibility of
making available to the Thai Government antitank and antiaircraft guns
and ammunition, but that it had been found impossible to spare any of
such items at the moment (ex. 169, item 15). Four days later, on
November 22 (Washington time), the State Department had advised the
American Minister at Bangkok that the question of supplying planes to
Thailand had been under active consideration by the British and the
United States Governments but that neither Government was in a position
to supply any planes to Thailand at the present time. The Minister had
been advised that the supplying of aviation gasoline and aviation
lubricating oil had also been under consideration, and that the British
Government was prepared to furnish limited amounts of aviation gasoline
and the United States Government was endeavoring to arrange to supply
aviation lubricating oil (ex. 169, item 16). The same day reports had
reached the State Department from the British Embassy of Japanese
requests for the use of Thai airfields for "survey flights" and for
aviation gasoline, presumably for such flights (ex. 169, item 17).
The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, had called on Under Secretary
Welles on November 25 (Washington time) regarding a report from the
British Minister at Bangkok that the Thai Government was again becoming
very shaky and that unless some practical action were
408 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
taken by Great Britain and the United States the Japanese influence
would again become predominant. The British Ambassador had reported that
title aviation gasoline and artillery the British had given the Thai
Government had been regarded by the latter as completely insufficient
"and had had no appreciably beneficial effects." When Lord Halifax had
said that the Thai Government was urgently desirous of obtaining
airplanes, the Under Secretary had said that the United States was
building up its air strength as rapidly as possible in the Philippines
and that he had been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral Stark
that the planes the United States had in the Philippines were infinitely
more valuable to the United States there than they would be in Thailand.
The British Ambassador had then suggested on behalf of his Government
that the situation "might be ameliorated by a credit of $10,000,000 to
Thailand by the United States." Under Secretary Welles had said that
this matter would be given immediate consideration (ex. 169, item 18).
On November 27 (Washington time) the State Department had advised the
American Minister at Bangkok concerning renewed instructions which were
given on November 22 to American diplomatic and consular officers in
Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hongkong and French Indochina
regarding the withdrawal of American citizens from those areas, and had
authorized him to inform American citizens in Thailand of those
instructions (ex. 169, item 20). The next day the Thai Minister had
called at the State Department and stated that he feared a Japanese
attack on Thailand was imminent. He had said that Thailand would resist
any such attack with all its forces. Referring to the statement
previously made to him that the United States would place Thailand in
the same category as China and would offer assistance in the case of an
attack by an aggressor, he had suggested that immediate consideration be
given to making planes and other supplies available to Thailand. He had
been advised that the matter would be promptly brought to the attention
of the appropriate authorities (ex. 169, item 23).
On November 29 (Washington time) the State Department had received a
telegram from the American Minister at Bangkok stating that on the
previous day the Thai Prime Minister had urged his people to be neutral
but to prepare to fight if war became inevitable. The Thai Prime
Minister had been reported as saying-
"that Great Britain and the United States had promised not to attack
Thailand and that the Japanese Ambassador had guaranteed that Japanese
troops in Indo-China are not intended for attack on this country in any
circumstances (ex. 169, item 28)."
On December 1 (Washington time), the day President Roosevelt returned to
Washington, from Warm Springs, the Thai Minister, accompanied by his
military attache, called at the State Department and described in detail
the general military situation in Thailand, stating that the military
equipment now most urgently needed by Thailand was heavy artillery,
bombing planes, and pursuit planes. The Minister expressed the hope that
means could be found to make this equipment available immediately in
order that Thailand might be better able to resist aggression by Japan
(ex. 169, item 26).
The following day the State Department sent a telegram to the American
Consul at Singapore requesting him to render all possible assistance in
connection with the immediate delivery of small quanti-
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 409
ties of appropriate aviation lubricating oils to Thailand, arrangements
for which, the Department said, had been tentatively agreed upon between
representatives of this Government and representatives in Washington of
the British and the Netherland Governments (ex. 169 item 28).
GERMANY TELLS JAPAN THE TIME IS RIPE TO STRIKE AT THE UNITED STATES, AND
PROMISES TO JOIN WITH JAPAN IN WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
(November 29, 1941)
Several additional intercepted Japanese messages between Tokyo and
Berlin that were translated and available in Washington on December 1
(Washington time) disclosed that Germany once again was exercising
pressure upon Japan under the Tripartite Pact. In a message dated
November 29, 1941, from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in Berlin to
Foreign Minister Togo, the Ambassador reported a conversation he had had
with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop the day before, following a
conference of high German Government and military officials at the
official residence of Chancellor Hitler. The Ambassador reported that it
was an absolute certainty that at that conference Japan's moves were
discussed in connection with discussion of the German war against
Russia. He quoted von Ribbentrop as saying:
"It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without
losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be
a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so
important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and
establishes her European New Order all the military might of Britain and
the United States will be concentrate against Japan.
"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the
very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We
have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of
the Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of
the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.
"If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision
to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will
not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would
bring about favorable results for Japan herself (ex. 1, p. 200)."
The Japanese Ambassador informed the Foreign Minister in Tokyo that von
Ribbentrop had said that the Germans would like to end their war with
Russia during the next year, and that he had then continued
"should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States,
Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely
no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the
United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on
that point (ex. 1, p. 202)."
Foreign Minister Togo replied to this message on November 30 (Japan
time). His message was in three parts, only the first and third of which
were ever intercepted. [1] Both of those parts were translated and
available in Washington, however, on December 1 (Washington time):
"1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April
during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere
efforts of the
[1] In this connection, the War Department advised the Committee that
the microfilms of Japanese files received from General MacArthur's
headquarters did not contain the second part of this message (tr.
13665).
410 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Imperial Government, now stand ruptured-broken. (I am sending you an
outline of developments in separate message #986.) In the face of this,
our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will
Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a
summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the
United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that
they are planning to move military forces into various places in East
Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops.
*Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through
some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war
may come quicker than anyone dreams.*
* * * * * *
"4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you
about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified
our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that
by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure
against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England
and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to
turn upon her with all our might; however right now, it is to our
advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to
refrain from any direct moves in the north.
"5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must
under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes
without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and
Italians how important secrecy is.
"6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this
to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier
Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano. As soon as a date is set far a
conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.
"Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the
separate message (ex. 1, pp. 204-205)."
In the separate message (#986) referred to above, Foreign Minister Togo
reviewed the course of the Japanese-American negotiations for Ambassador
Oshima's benefit. He stated that during the 6 months of negotiations
"the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tripartite Alliance as
the cornerstone of the international policy regardless of the
vicissitudes of the international situation, and that Japan had based
her hopes for a solution between Japan and the United States definitely
within the scope of that Alliance (ex. 1, p. 205)."
The Foreign Minister said that the American and Japanese views on the
question of the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and French
Indochina "were completely in opposition to each other." He said that
the United States had taken the position that as long as the Imperial
Government of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy there could
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United
States, and that the United States had begun to demonstrate a tendency
to demand the divorce of the Japanese Government from the Tripartite
Alliance. "That is to say," the Foreign Minister continued,
"it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial
Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States.
It became clear, too, that a continuance of negotiations would
inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this
attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into
with the third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing
upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in
the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that
in case the United States enters the European war at any time the
Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and
Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes
it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for
negotiations. What is
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 411
more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China-they did 80
repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan along with
Germany and Italy, as an enemy (ex. 1, p. 206)."
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT RETURNS TO WASHINGTON AS THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION
MOVES RAPIDLY TOWARD A CLIMAX
(December 1, 1941)
When the two Japanese Ambassadors called on Secretary Hull on Monday
morning, December 1 (Washington time), it was their first conference
with the Secretary since their meeting with him and President Roosevelt
5 days before. Ambassador Nomura's description of their arrival at the
State Department shows that many assumed the Ambassadors had requested
the meeting with the Secretary to present the Japanese Government's
reply to the American note of November 26. Ambassador Nomura reported to
Tokyo:
"Upon our arrival at the State Department we found not only
newspapermen, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding
the corridors. Some of these spectators were of the opinion that the
issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general,
the scene was highly dramatic (ex. 1, p. 210)."
At the start of the conference Ambassador Kurusu asked the reason for
President Roosevelt's sudden return to Washington, and Secretary Hull
indicated that one of the reasons was the recent "loud talk" of the
Japanese Premier. The Ambassador endeavored to minimize the Premier's
recent speech and stated, in accordance with the instructions he had
received from Tokyo, that the American note of November 26 had been
communicated to his Government and that within a few days the Japanese
Government's observations concerning it would be presented to the
Secretary. He said that his Government believed its proposals of
November 20 to be equitable, and had found it difficult to understand
the position taken by the United States Government. He had been
directed, he said, to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United
States in the conversations and to request the United States Government
to make "deep reflection of this matter." He said that the Japanese
offer to withdraw its troops from southern French Indo-China still stood
(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 772-774)
Secretary Hull replied that the United States Government had to take
into account the "bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo" and that
there never would be possible any peaceful arrangements if such
arrangements had to be based upon principles of force. Later, the
Secretary called attention to reports received from the press and other
sources-
"of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and endeavored to make
it clear that, when a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we
have to give that situation all the more attention when Japanese
statesmen say that they will drive us out of east Asia. He pointed out
that we cannot be sure what the Japanese military leaders are likely to
do, that we do not know where the Japanese Army intends to land its
forces, and that for this reason we cannot sit still but will have to
puzzle these things out in some way. The Secretary explained that this
situation had been very painful to him and he did not know whether the
Ambassador could do anything in the matter of influencing the Japanese
Government. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt it was a shame that nothing
should come
412 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
out of the efforts which the conversations of several months had
represented. He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an
agreement except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals
seem to carry the two sides further away than before.
"The Secretary pointed out that every time we get started in the
direction of progress the Japanese military does something to overturn
us. The Secretary expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead
in view of all the threats that had been made. He pointed out that the
acts of the Japanese militarists had effectively tied the hands of the
Ambassadors and he did not know whether the Ambassadors could succeed in
having anything accomplished toward untying their hands. Mr. Kurusu
brought up again his contention made on previous occasions that China
had taken advantage of the Washington Conference treaties to flaunt
Japan, and commented that if we don't look out China will sell both the
United States and Japan down the river. The Secretary observed that he
has been plowing through various contradictions in Japanese acts and
utterances. He pointed out that the Japanese had been telling us that if
something quick is not done something awful was about to happen; that
they kept urging upon the Secretary the danger of delay, and kept
pressing the Secretary to do something. He said that in view of all the
confusion, threats and pressure, he had been brought to the stage where
he felt that something must be done to clear the foggy atmosphere; that
his conclusion was that he must bring us back to fundamentals, and that
these fundamentals were embodied in the proposal which we had offered
the Japanese on November 26. He said that we have stood from the first
on the points involved in this proposal. He pointed out that everything
that Japan was doing and saying was in precisely the opposite direction
from the course we have been talking about in our conversations, and
that these should be reversed by his government before we can further
seriously talk peace (vol. II, pp. 775-776)."
The Secretary asked what possibility there was of peace-minded people
coming out in Japan and expressing themselves, whether anybody in Japan
would be free to speak unless he preached conquest. When the Ambassador
commented that the Japanese People were not talking about conquest,
Secretary Hull pointed out that everyone in America understood the
implications of such terms as "New Order in East Asia" and "Co-
prosperity sphere". The Secretary went on to say:
"that there was no reason for conflict between the United States and
Japan, that there was no real clash of interests. He added that Japan
does not have to use a sword to gain for herself a seat at the head of
the table. He pointed out that equality of opportunity is in our opinion
the key to the future peace and prosperity of all nations (ex. 29, vol.
II, pp. 776-777)."
When Ambassador Kurusu, after remarking that war in the Pacific would be
a tragedy, added that the Japanese people believed that the United
States wanted to keep Japan fighting China, and to keep Japan strangled,
and that they believed they were faced with the alternative of
surrendering to the United States or fighting, Secretary Hull said that
he had practically exhausted himself here, that the American people were
going to assume that there was real danger to this country in the
situation, and that there was nothing he could do to prevent it (ex. 29,
vol. 2, p. 777).
Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Togo that during the
conference Secretary Hull had emphasized:
"The tone and trend of the 'Japanese Government's expressions and
movements and that of the general public opinion organs, and the
increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China (ex. 1, p.
210)."
He reported that from the beginning of the conference the Secretary had
worn "a deeply pained expression," but that during the course of their
explanations the Secretary "showed visible signs of relief (ex. 1, p.
210).
President Roosevelt reached Washington from Warm Springs shortly before
noon on Monday, December 1, and went directly to
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 413
the White House for his conference with Secretary Hull and Admiral
Stark. [1] It will be recalled that in Secretary Hull's memorandum of
his conversation with the British Ambassador the day before, the
Secretary stated that he laid before President Roosevelt on Monday " all
phases" of the matters he discussed with the British Ambassador, which
had included the Ambassador's inquiry as to "what the United States
would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to
establish a base on the Kra Isthmus", and that "the President agreed to
notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to his inquiry" (ex.
21). Clearly, a further subject discussed at the White House conference
was Secretary Hull's conversation that morning with the Japanese
Ambassadors. It would also seem probable that at the conference the
other events mentioned above that had occurred after the President's
departure the preceding Friday were discussed. These included Secretary
Hull's revised draft of the proposed message to Congress and the
accompanying draft of a message to Hirohito; the significance of Premier
Tojo's speech; the information received from the British Ambassador
concerning a possible Japanese move into Thailand, which appeared to be
confirmed that day by the intercepted Japanese message revealing the
intrigues of the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand; Prime Minister
Churchill's plea for similar or joint declarations by the United States
and Great Britain that "any further act of aggression" would "lead
immediately to the gravest consequence," at whatever moment the
President should judge right "which may be very near"; and the
intercepted Japanese messages showing that the Japanese Government was
only making a pretense of continuing the conversations. In addition, the
President, Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark must be assumed to have
seen either before or after the White House conference the exchange of
messages between the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo and the Japanese
Ambassador in Berlin showing the strong German pressure on Japan to make
war on Great Britain and the United States and the Japanese reply that
"*war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan *
* * quicker than anyone dreams*."
There is no evidence before the Committee of any meeting between
President Roosevelt and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, during the
period December 1-7 (Washington time), and no reference to such a
meeting has been found in newspaper accounts of President Roosevelt's
activities that week. However, the Washington Post reported on December
2 that after the President's conference on December 1 with Secretary
Hull and Admiral Stark, the President had a luncheon conference with Mr.
Harry Hopkins, who had been driven to the White House from the Naval
Hospital for that purpose, returning to the Naval Hospital after the
conference; that thereafter
[1] The next day referring to this meeting the Washington Post reported:
"President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and
military moves relating to Japan as the lights of peace flickered low in
the Orient and Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador told reporters
that 'there must be wise statesmanship to save the situation.'
"It was in a tense atmosphere that the President reached the White House
from Warm Springs shortly before noon to receive a report from Secretary
of State Hull on his conversation yesterday morning with official
Japanese representatives and to confer with diplomatic, naval and
personal advisers.
"Washington reports indicate that Japan is massing troops in southern
Indochina for a possible military move into Thailand which an
authoritative statement made here last week indicated the United States
could not tolerate. In Manila the leaves of United States naval and
military forces have been canceled and London reports said military and
air forces are being mobilized in the Netherlands East Indies
(Washington Post December 2, 1941)."
414 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the President called Under Secretary Welles to the White House for a
brief conference, after which the Under Secretary "on orders" conferred
briefly with Lord Halifax; and that after the latter conference Sir.
Welles returned to the White House for a further conference with the
President that lasted an hour and a half. The record before the
Committee does not show what matters were discussed at the conference
between Under Secretary Welles and the British Ambassador. [1]
In the absence of other evidence concerning the subjects discussed at
the White House conference that noon, the evidence before the Committee
of action taken that evening and the next morning at the direction of
President Roosevelt is important. Just before midnight that day,
December 1 (Washington time), the Navy Department sent the following
dispatch, marked priority, to Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief of the
United States Asiatic Fleet:
"President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and
within two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter 3 small
vessels to form a "defensive information patrol." Minimum requirements
to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer
and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews
may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose
which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China
Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue,
one vessel off the Indo-China coast between, Camranh Bay and Cape St.
Jaques and one vessel off Pointe De Camau. Use of ISABEL authorized by
President as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report
measures taken to carry out President's views. At the same time inform
me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at
sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines
and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures (ex.
37)."
In Tokyo on December 1 (Japan time) the Japanese Cabinet met at the
official residence of Premier Tojo. Domei, the authoritative Japanese
news agency, issued a report stating that at the meeting the Japanese
Cabinet had decided to continue negotiations with the United States,
despite the divergence of views of the two Governments. In a telegram to
Secretary Hull received the evening of December 1 (Washington time),
Ambassador Grew reported that-
"Tonight s newspapers reported that the Cabinet at its meeting today,
while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of
the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington
conversations (ex. 25)."
As already noted, Ambassador Grew testified before the Committee that
although he knew that the Cabinet meeting took place, he "did not (know)
and could not have guessed" that the Cabinet had discussed the attack on
Pearl Harbor (tr. 1615).
[1] The record before the Committee does, however, contain the
following: On December 6, 1941, Captain John Creighton, the United
States Naval Attache at Singapore, sent a message to Admiral Hart,
commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, at Manila which stated, among
other things, that Brooke Popham (the British commander in chief at
Singapore) received Saturday from War Department London quote: 'We have
now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: 1.
We are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of
Kra or take action in reply to Nips Invasion any other part of Siam * *
*.' " (tr. 13520-13521) Captain Creighton testified before the Committee
that he did not know or recall who it was that gave him the information
upon which this message was based, or where that person had obtained the
information, and that it was really nothing more than rumor (tr. 13530).
Upon receipt of this message, Admiral Hart, on December 6, 1941, sent
the following message to Admiral Stark in Washington: "Learn from
Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four
eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."
(Ex. 40) Admiral (now Senator) Hart testified that he never received a
reply to his message (tr. 12850-12851). In this connection see also the
discussion infra of the second message received by the State Department
on December 6 (Washington time) from Ambassador Winant in London
regarding the two Japanese naval convoys moving toward the Kra Isthmus
in which Ambassador Winant said. Among other things: "British feel
pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand, fearing
Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before
British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out
President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax" (ex. 21)
and Under Secretary Welles testimony before the Committee in connection
therewith.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 415
However, it is now known that at this meeting the Japanese Cabinet gave
its formal approval to the commencement of hostilities against the
United States, and that immediately thereafter an Imperial Naval Order
was issued on instructions from the Imperial General Headquarters:
"Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense,
has reached a position to declare war on the United States of America
(tr. 438)."
By that time, the Japanese naval striking force which had left its
rendezvous in northern Japan on November 25 (Washington time) had
steamed nearly half the distance to Pearl Harbor.
In Washington, however, Ambassador Nomura that day cabled the Foreign
Minister there were indications that the United States desired to
continue the negotiations "even if it is necessary to go beyond their
stands on the so-called basic principles" (ex. 1, p. 213).
He continued:
"If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a
leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a
conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence
(for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States
and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the
President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting
could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and
navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one
final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their
discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.
"We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to
war or peace (ex. 1, p. 213)"
It seems doubtful that Ambassador Nomura would have sent this message,
if in fact he knew that that day the Tojo Cabinet had formally approved
the commencement of hostilities against the United States. The Foreign
Minister's message in reply to the Ambassador's suggestion, which was
translated and available in Washington on December 3 (Washington time),
avoided any reference to the Cabinet's action:
"As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a
meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but
the proposals failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be
inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time.
Please be advised of this decision (ex. 1, p. 224)."
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ASKS THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN ITS PURPOSE
IN MOVING ADDITIONAL TROOPS INTO SOUTHERN INDO-CHINA
(December 2, 1941)
The next day, Tuesday, December 2 (Washington time), the two Japanese
Ambassadors called on Under Secretary Welles at the latter's request,
Secretary Hull being ill and absent from the State Department. Under
Secretary Welles told the Ambassadors that he had been asked by
President Roosevelt to communicate to them the following, which he then
read and handed to Ambassador Nomura:
"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese
troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very
rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by
Japan in Indochina.
"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement-and
there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement-between
Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of
Japanese forces per-
416 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was
very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already
there.
"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would
seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of
further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be
required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could
conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands
of the East Indies; against Burma, against Malaya or either through
coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of
undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of
course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken
against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been
repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government.
"Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador
Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual
reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is
the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and
rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in
the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German
Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon
the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the
utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that
reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I
should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government (vol. II,
p. 779)."
Ambassador Kurusu said that he was not informed by the Japanese
Government of its intentions but that he would communicate the foregoing
statement immediately to his Government. Then followed an inconclusive
discussion of the general situation, during which Under Secretary Welles
pointed out that the settlement which the United States was offering
Japan in the United States note of November 26 (Washington time) was one
which would assure Japan of peace and the satisfaction of Japanese
economic needs much more certainly than any other alternative which
Japan might feel was open to her. Ambassador Kurusu said that in view of
the actual situation in the Far East there were points in the United
States proposal of November 26 which the Japanese Government would find
it difficult to accept. When asked by Under Secretary Welles whether a
reply to the American proposal would be received from the Japanese
Government, Ambassador Nomura answered in the affirmative, but said that
it might take a few days in view of the important questions which it
raised for the Japanese Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 778-781).
In his report of this conversation to Foreign Minister Togo, Ambassador
Nomura said:
"Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my
conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is
anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am
convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement.
Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of
our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233
(ex. 1, pp. 222-223)."
Soon after his meeting with the two Japanese Ambassadors, Under
Secretary Welles attended a meeting at noon at the White House at which,
in addition to President Roosevelt and Mr. Welles, only Secretary
Stimson and Secretary Knox were present. Secretary Stimson described the
meeting in his notes as follows:
"I left for the White House conference at 12:00 o'clock and there were
present there just Knox, Sumner Welles and myself, as Hull is laid up
with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation and I
think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese
through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of
southern Indo-China-just what they are going to do-and has demanded a
quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a
message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against
it,
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 417
but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, and he will make a
Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to
the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when
he left us (tr. 14,427)."
That afternoon, at his press conference, President Roosevelt was asked-
"if the Japanese marched into Thailand what would the United States
Government do? The President evaded the question. Another correspondent
asked if the President could give any indication of the nature of the
information requested from the Japanese representatives this morning.
The President said let us put it this way, and this answers again many
questions at the same time. Since last April we have been discussing
with the Japanese some method to arrive at an objective that is
permanent peace in the whole area in the Pacific and at times it seemed
that progress was being made. During the whole period up to the end of
June we assumed that as both nations were negotiating toward that
objective there would be no act contrary to the desired end of peace. We
were therefore somewhat surprised when the Japanese Government sent
troops to a specific over-all total into Indo-China after very brief
negotiations with the Vichy Government at the conclusion of which the
Vichy Government let it be understood clearly that they had agreed to
this number of troops principally because they were powerless to do
anything else.
"Sometime later conversations were resumed with the United States and
again we made it perfectly clear that the objective we were seeking
meant the taking of no additional territory by anyone in the Pacific
area. We received word the other day that there were large additional
bodies of Japanese forces of various kinds, including troops, planes,
war vessels, etc., in Indo-China and that other forces were on the way.
Before these forces had arrived the number of forces already there had
greatly exceeded the original amount agreed to by the French and the
number on the way were much greater, and the question asked this morning
very politely, at my request, was as to what the purpose and intention
of the Japanese Government was as to the future, eliminating the
necessity of policing Indochina which is a very peaceful spot and we
hope to receive a reply in the near future.
"In reply to a question as to whether any time for a reply had been set,
the President said that there had naturally been no time limit set (ex.
167)."
The same day Ambassador Nomura sent a special report to the Japanese
Foreign Office concerning this press conference, as follows:
"On the 2d in a press interview the President stated that he had sent us
an inquiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French Indo-
China. Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly stated
that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past few days
and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French Indo-China had
both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of the negotiations
(see special intelligence from Washington). This was the first interview
since returning from Warm Springs, and particular attention is to be
paid to the fact that he referred directly to negotiations (ex. 1, p.
223)."
Also that day the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Terasaki,
called on officials of the State Department's Far Eastern Division and
delivered a document in which it was denied that Premier Tojo had ever
made the speech attributed to him on November 30. Mr. Terasaki claimed
that when Ambassador Kurusu referred to the Premier's speech in his
telephone conversation with Bureau Chief Yamamoto the preceding Sunday
evening, Yamamoto had been nonplused and had asked "What speech?" (ex.
29, vol. II, pp. 777-778). The record of that telephone conversation
before the Committee shows no such statement by Yamamoto; on the
contrary Yamamoto is shown to have taken no exception to Ambassador
Kurusu's references to the Premier's speech (ex. 1, pp. 206-207). That
day the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, delivered to the State
Department a memorandum in further explanation of the position of the
Chinese
418 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Government on the modus vivendi, which ended by stating that the Chinese
Foreign Minister had expressed-
"great gratification in the latest reply of the Secretary (Hull) to the
Japanese envoys, which, he understands, reaffirms the fundamental
principles repeatedly enunciated by the United States Government (ex.
18)."
Two intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese-American relations
generally were translated and available in Washington on Tuesday,
December 2 (Washington time). One was a message sent from the Foreign
Office in Tokyo to Washington on November 27 (Japan time), for
retransmittal by Washington to Japanese diplomatic establishments in
various North and South American cities. "With international relations
becoming more strained," the message set up an emergency system of
dispatches in hidden word codes to be used in communicating with those
establishments. These emergency dispatches consisted of instructions
regarding radio communications and the evacuation of Japanese Embassies,
messages stating that relations between Japan and countries whose names
were to be inserted were not in accordance with expectations or had been
severed, and messages stating that Japan's armed forces had clashed with
the armed forces of countries whose names were to be inserted or that
Japan and countries whose names were to be inserted were entering a
"full fledged general war" (ex. 1, pp. 186-188). The second message was
from Hsinking to Tokyo, dated November 28, and contained the following:
"In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent
authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of
British and American nationals in Manchukuo *in the event that war
breaks out with England and the United States* are as outlined below. We
are unanimously agreed on these matters. Should there be any questions
regarding them, please wire me at once.
"I. Policy. *On the outbreak of war with England and the United States*,
after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals
together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a
date as possible. However, until this return can be arranged, they are
to be interned in places of concentration in Manchukuo.
"The control of such property as they might leave behind will be
administered by the Manchukuo Government (ex. 1, p. 198)."
On December 3 (Washington time) Secretary Hull held a press conference
at which he repeated in large measure the statements he had made at his
press conference on November 27 (Washington time), making it plain that
at no time had the Japanese Government shown any disposition to modify
its basic policies, which he described as at complete variance with
those of the United States (tr. 1163). [1] That afternoon the Secretary
had a telephone conversation with Admiral Stark at 4:45 o'clock (tr.
1167).
That day, and again the next day, the State Department received
telegrams from the American Minister at Bangkok expressing the hope of
the Thai Government-
"that the American and British Governments will issue public statements
to the effect that Japan by invading Thailand would incur the enmity and
armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand (ex.
169, item 30)."
Other than Ambassador Nomura's report on his and Ambassador Kurusu's
conference with Under Secretary Welles on December 3, and Foreign
Minister Togo's reply to Ambassador Nomura's suggestion regarding a
"leaders conference", both of which have been mentioned above, there is
no evidence before the Committee of other
[1] Cf. Washington Post, December 4, 1941.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 419
intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese-American relations
generally that were translated and available in Washington on December 3
(Washington time).
The next morning, Thursday, December 4 (Washington time), six majority
and minority leaders of the Senate and House met with President
Roosevelt for 2 hours and thoroughly canvassed the Far Eastern situation
"in connection with the defense of our own territories and vital
interests in the Far East", and were reported to have left the White
House "with the impression that the situation is critical, but will not
necessarily come to a show-down with the presentation of Japan's reply"
to the President's request for an accounting for the continued Japanese
troop movements into southern French Indochina (Washington Post,
December 5, 1941). That afternoon at 2:15 o'clock the President
conferred for an hour with Secretary Knox (ex. 58). As he left the
meeting Secretary Knox told reporters that, among other things, he knew
definitely that there would be an investigation of the publication that
day by the Chicago Tribune, practically in full, of a copy of United
States plans for fighting a global war if it should eventuate, "the most
highly secret paper in the possession of the Government" (tr. 14,411;
Washington Post, December 5, 1941). At 3:30 o'clock, President Roosevelt
conferred at the White House with Secretary Hull (ex. 58). That evening,
according to a message dated December 6 (Washington time) from
Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo-
"those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him
against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at
once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known
what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the
President is his usual attitude (ex. 1, p. 247)."
In explanation of this information, Ambassador Nomura told the Foreign
Minister that-
"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and
Hull we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members
having close relations with the President and through individuals
equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State
Department, please keep this point strictly secret) (ex. 1, p. 247)."
That day, Thursday, December 4, there were translated and available in
Washington the first intercepted Japanese messages from Tokyo directing
the destruction of code machines and machine codes by the Japanese
Embassy in Washington. As already noted, there had been translated and
available in Washington on December 1 (Washington time) a message sent
from Tokyo on December 1 (Japan time) which informed the Japanese
Embassy in Washington that the Japanese diplomatic offices in London,
Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to abandon the use
of code machines and to "dispose of them." This message had specifically
stated, however, that regardless of other instructions, "the U. S.
(Office) retains the machines and the machine codes" (ex. 1, p. 209).
However, on December 2 (Japan time), in one of the intercepted messages
translated and available in Washington on December 4 (Washington time),
the Japanese Foreign Office had instructed the Japanese Embassy in
Washington to destroy one code machine unit completely, as well as to
burn all telegraphic codes except "those now used with the machine," and
the various other codes. The Embassy was also instructed
420 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to dispose of "all files of messages coming and going and all other
secret documents" at the time and in the manner "you deem most proper"
(ex. 1, p. 215). This message was followed by a second message on
December 4 (Japan time) which gave more detailed instructions concerning
the burning of certain codes recently brought to Washington by a
Japanese official from the Japanese Embassy in Mexico City, and directed
that a certain code keying be kept in Ambassador Nomura's custody "until
the last moment" (ex. 1, p. 231).
Admiral Beardall, the Naval Aide to the President, testified that about
the 4th or 5th of December, in connection with the delivery of "Magic"
to the President, he called the President's particular attention to a
message about the burning of codes. He testified that to the best of his
recollection the gist of his conversation with the President was as
follows:
"I said, "Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch," which he
read very carefully, and he said "Well, when do you think it will
happen?" I said, "Most any time" (tr. 14035-14036)."
He testified that when the President said, "When do you think it sill
happen," he understood the President to mean, "When is war going to
break out, when are we going to be attacked, or something" (tr. 14037).
A third intercepted message translated and available in Washington on
December 4 (Washington time) was from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese
Foreign Office, in which the Ambassador said:
"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it I8
expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore
consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with
the evacuation of the Consuls (ex. 1, p. 227)."
Also that day there was translated and available in Washington Foreign
Minister Togo's reply, dated December 3 (Japan time), to Ambassador
Nomura's report of his and Ambassador Kurusu's conference with Secretary
Hull on December 1 (Washington time). In it, the Foreign Minister put
forward arguments for the Ambassadors' use in their forthcoming meeting
with Secretary Hull. The Foreign Minister claimed that the United States
was using the recent statements of Japanese officials and the Japanese
troop movements in the South "as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in
wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S.
Negotiations," and complained that Britain, the United States and others
had been making military preparations against Japan "at an increasing
tempo" and had been acting in a "more and more antagonistic manner of
late. "We are insisting", the Foreign Minister said, "that all aid to
Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the
instigation of the United States are launched" (ex. 1, pp. 225-226).
On December 5 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew sent a rush telegram to
Secretary Hull in which he stated:
"You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal is being
represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of
"fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation", and
that no intimation whatever has been given out that the proposal, if
implemented would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with
that security-political as well as economic-which she affects to seek by
exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said
that the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful
principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well-
balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating
order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong
disappointment that the private individual
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 421
is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a
matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the
American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an
attitude of intransigence on the putt of the Japanese would be viewed
with regret by the masses.
"It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect publication of our
proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the
proposal, notably complete evacuation of China. Would be strong and
indeed might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an
agreement. However, there would seem to be even greater risks of the
elimination of that possibility if the points at issue continue in Japan
to be befogged by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that you
will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as
possible after consultation with the Japanese Government, but even
without the latter's assent if that should not be forthcoming (tr. 1821-
1823)."
THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ITS TROOP MOVEMENTS IN FRENCH INDOCHINA
ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENSE AGAINST AN ATTACK BY THE CHINESE
(December 5, 1941)
In the meantime, on December 3 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Togo had
sent Ambassador Nomura his message No. 875 containing the Japanese
Government's formal reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry regarding the
movement of additional Japanese troops into southern French Indochina
(ex. 1, p. 224). This reply took the position that the Japanese
reinforcements were a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in
bordering Chinese territory. Ambassador Nomura had regarded the reply as
unsatisfactory, and had at once cabled the Foreign Minister:
"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this
reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The
United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this
reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it
is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key
deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United
States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will
take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really
the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the
explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor
prevent them taking the bold step referred to-even if your reply is made
for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in
view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to
the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives
a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore,
reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once (ex. 1,
pp. 227-228)."
The Foreign Minister's reply to Ambassador Nomura had come back the next
day:
"What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it
would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set
forth in my #875. I would advise against it because unfortunate results
might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned
message (ex. 1, p. 232)."
Accordingly, on December 5 (Washington time), the Japanese Ambassadors
called on Secretary Hull and presented their Government's reply to
President Roosevelt's inquiry'(ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
[1] It is significant that press reports which reached Washington early
in the morning of December 5 (Washington time), stated that in Tokyo
that day the authoritative Japanese news agency had announced that
"Japan cannot accept" the provisions of the United States' note of
November 26. Domei was reported to have said: "Such a document cannot
serve as a basic datum in Japanese-American negotiations henceforth".
These statements, together with Japanese comment critical of Secretary
Hull's remarks at his press conference on December 3 (Washington time),
were carried in morning newspapers in Washington on December 5 under
such headlines as "JAPAN 'CAN'T ACCEPT' TERMS" and "JAPAN EXPECTED TO
REJECT TERMS" (Washington Post December 5, 1941). Secretary Hull
conferred for a short time with President Roosevelt before his meeting
with the Japanese Ambassadors (Washington Post, December 6, 1941).
422 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
781-783). The Japanese reply as handed to the Secretary follows in full:
Reference is made 1;e your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese
Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in
French Indochina. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as
follows:
As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along
the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese
troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have
been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French
Indochina. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have
been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress
the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan std
France (vol. II, p. 784).
After reading the reply, Secretary Hull said:
that he understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern
Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he
had never heard before that Japan's troop movements into northern
Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The
Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was
on the defensive in Indochina (vol. II, p. 781).
Ambassador Nomura then repeated to the Secretary the gist of the Foreign
Minister's message of December 3 (Japan time) mentioned above, claiming
that the Japanese were alarmed over increasing naval and military
preparation of the "ABCD" powers in the southwest Pacific, and asserting
that the Japanese Government was "very anxious" to reach an agreement
with this Government and that the United States ought to be willing to
agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations between China
and Japan were initiated. The remainder of the conversation consisted
largely of a repetition of matters expressed many times before by both
the Japanese. And the Secretary (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 781-783).
That morning, December 5 (Washington time), President Roosevelt had
received a memorandum from Under Secretary Welles passing on to him a
suggestion from the Australian Prime Minister that if Sir. Wendell
Willkie should visit Australia with the "imprimateur" of the President,
his visit would be most welcome to the Australian Government. The
President had immediately dictated a letter to Mr. Willkie regarding
this, in which he said:
"There is always the Japanese matter to consider. The situation is
definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment if
the Japanese continued their forward progress against the Philippines,
Dutch Indies or Malaya or Burma. Perhaps the next four or five days will
decide the matter (ex. 111). "
Following his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors, Secretary Hull
had lunch at 1 o'clock at the White House with President Roosevelt,
after which both the President and the Secretary attended a full Cabinet
meeting at 2 o'clock (ex. 58).
That day the American Minister at Bangkok reported to the State
Department that he had been informed by the Thai Minister for Foreign
Affairs that the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand had told the Minister
that the Japanese forces in Indochina "definitely would not be used to
invade Thailand and that they were concentrated for use against the
Burma Road" (ex. 169, item 31). Also that day, Lord Halifax, the British
Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull, who recorded that the Ambassador-
"said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office,
setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate
cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of
course relates to the matter of defense against Japan. I expressed my
appreciation (tr. 14,515)."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 423
The evening of December 5 (Washington time) the State Department sent a
telegram to the American Embassy in Tokyo via Peiping by naval radio for
the information of the American Embassy in Chungking and the American
consul at Hong Kong containing instructions applicable to all offices in
Japan Japanese-occupied areas in China, Hong Kong Indochina, and
Thailand. Those instructions were-
"intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in
case communications with the Department are delayed or severed, to take
appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees,
archives, leases, the evacuation of the American members of the staff,
et cetera (tr. 1967-A)."
The telegram included the following paragraph concerning the destruction
of codes:
"It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals,
codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be
destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of
at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained
(tr. 1967-D)."
It ended as follows:
"The sending of this instruction is in the nature of a precautionary
measure and the authority granted in the foregoing paragraphs is
intended to enable the officers concerned to deal with a sudden
emergency. The concerned officers should quietly formulate plans to deal
with an emergency if and when it arises. It is highly desirable that
discussion be kept to a minimum and that publicity be avoided (tr. 1967-
E)."
Previously, on November 27 (Washington time), the day after the delivery
of the United States reply, the State Department had sent a telegram to
Ambassador Grew which strongly suggested the probability that the
Japanese-American conversations might "lapse" and result "in withdrawal
of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan," and that he
should quietly prepare for that eventuality (ex. 18). Also, on November
19 (Washington time), the State Department had sent a telegram to the
American Embassy in Tokyo via Shanghai by naval radio for the
information of the American Embassies at Chungking, Peiping, and the
American consul at Hong Kong, in which it was stated that the Department
desired that-
"the American diplomatic and consular officers concerned call to the
attention of American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied
areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice
previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that
the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because
of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be
possible to retain in the Pacific even the the [sic] present facilities
(tr. 4508 4509)."
The telegram of November 19 (Washington time) was the last of three
major warnings sent by the State Department during 1940 and 1941
advising American nationals to leave the Orient, the other major
warnings have been sent on October 6, 1940, and February 11, 1941 (tr.
4502-4508).
On December 5 (Washington time), there was translated and available in
Washington a message sent 2 days earlier by Ambassador Nomura to Foreign
Minister Togo in which the Ambassador said:
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action
between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a
declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an
occupation of Thailand (ex. 1, p. 227).
At the Japanese Embassy in Washington that day, Councilor Iguchi cabled
the Japanese Foreign Office, in response to its instruc-
424 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tions to destroy one code machine unit and to burn all telegraphic codes
except those used with the machine:
"We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese
negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire
to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine (ex. 1,
p. 236)."
The Foreign Office promptly replied that its instructions regarding code
machines were:
"of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is
equipped, you are to burn one set and *for the time being* to continue
the use of the other (ex. 1, p. 237)."
Both of these intercepted Japanese messages were translated and
available in Washington the next day.
THE LAST HOURS
(December 6-8, 1941)
The next day was Saturday, December 6 (Washington time). In the
southwest Pacific, the Japanese naval and military forces whose
movements in and toward French Indochina had commenced in earnest soon
after the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) and
had been observed both by British and American forces based in Malaya
and in the Philippines, had begun their final dispositions. It is now
known that at the same time, in the mid-Pacific some 6,000 miles away,
the Japanese naval force that had left its rendezvous in northern Japan
on November 25 (Washington time)-still undiscovered and now almost
within striking distance of the Hawaiian Islands-was steaming at high
speed toward its target, the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl
Harbor.
While reports of the final Japanese movements in the southwest Pacific
began to reach Washington before noon on December 6 (Washington time),
the record before the Committee conclusively shows that no one in the
United States Government or in its military and naval forces, either in
Washington or in the field, knew of the approach of the Japanese naval
striking force to the Hawaiian Islands.
That morning, at 10:40 o'clock, the State Department received the
following telegram from Ambassador Winant in London, marked "Triple
priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret to the Secretary and
the President":
"British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two
parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14
hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10
destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers (ex.
21)."
The State Department file copy of this message bears the stamp "Sent to
the President," but does not indicate the hour when that action was
taken. The same information had been received in Washington by the Navy
Department earlier that morning in a message sent by Admiral Hart from
Manila at 7:55 a. m. (Washington time) to Admiral Stark (tr. 4344, ex.
66). The information so received by the Navy Department was communicated
to the State Department in a memorandum of December 6 signed by Admiral
Schuirmann (ex. 66). Secretary Hull's engagement books for that day show
that he had an appointment with Admiral Schuirmann at 1:50 p. m. (Tr.
1168), at which time the memorandum was presumably handed to the
Secretary by Admiral Schuirmann. Similar information was received
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 425
in the State Department from the War-Department early the next morning
(tr. 14,290). The record of outside telephone calls through the White
House switchboard on December 6 shows that Secretary Hull was again
called by Secretary Stimson at 12:58 p. m. and by Admiral Stark at 1:09
p. m. (Ex. 58; tr. 1168). At 3:05 p. m. that afternoon the State
Department received a second message from Ambassador Winant, marked
"Triple priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret for the
Secretary," containing additional information concerning the
Ambassador's earlier message regarding the Japanese naval movement. The
second message follows in full:
"Again from Cadogan. Admiralty conference on information just forwarded,
Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of
parties is Kra or Bangkok. Latter would not be reached before Monday.
"Note a discrepancy in time reported by me and time reported in our
naval despatch. Latter stating 3 a. m. Greenwich time, by despatch as
given me 3 a. m. London time. Believe former correct.
"British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support
Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext
protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but
wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles
to Halifax.
"Leaving to spend evening with Eden in order to go over with him your
number 5682, December 5 although I had previously pressed on him each of
the points you outlined prior to reception your message with the
exception of paragraph seven which I agree is not clear and which I will
clear up with him this evening. I want you to know that I had nothing to
do with the insertion of the reference to the I. L. O.
"I am having lunch with the Prime Minister tomorrow at his usual place
in the country and will be constantly in contact with the Embassy over
private wires in case you wish to communicate with me [1] (ex. 21). "
At 5:15 o'clock that afternoon Secretary Hull again telephoned Admiral
Stark (tr. 1168).
That morning at 11 o'clock the State Department received the following
telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking:
"The Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Office informed
a member of my staff yesterday that "the British wanted to move into
Thailand but hesitated to do so in the absence of a clear indication of
the American attitude." He said that this report came from a very
reliable source in the United States. I attach no significance to the
report except as indicative of an interesting and somewhat prevalent
tendency to play up the situation (ex. 169, item 32)."
At 6 p. m. that day the Department sent a telegram to the American
Minister at Bangkok informing him that he might assure the Thai
authorities that the extension of credit to Thailand for its current
needs was fully agreed to in principle and that the Department expected
no delay in working out the details with the appropriate lending
agencies of the United States Government (ex. 169, item 33).
In the meantime, both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull had given
renewed attention to the proposal to send a message to Emperor Hirohito.
It will be recalled that a draft of such a message had been prepared the
preceding Saturday and probably discussed the next
[1] Under Secretary Welles was questioned at length by Senator Ferguson
regarding the "message transmitted by Welles to Halifax" referred to in
Ambassador Winant's telegram quoted above (tr. 1300-1316; 1337-1340). At
Senator Ferguson's request, Mr. Welles undertook to make a special
search for the message (tr. 1316), after which he reported to the
Committee that it was his understanding that the message in question was
the message from President Roosevelt which he communicated to the
Japanese Ambassadors on December 2 (Washington time) and a copy of which
he sent to the British Ambassador the same day (tr. 1338). The State
Department advised Committee counsel that no written record of the
message referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram could be found in
its files, and that accordingly it must be assumed the message was oral
(tr. 1300). See in this connection the discussion supra of Under
Secretary Welles reported conference with Lord Halifax on December 1
(Washington time).
Telegram number 5682 referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram appears
in the record before this Committee as exhibit No. 166. It does not deal
with the situation in the Far East in any way.
426 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Monday by the Secretary with the President upon his return from Warm
Springs. The next day, Tuesday (December 2), Secretary Stimson had
recorded in his notes:
"The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the
Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in
addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a
message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to
the country (tr. 14,427)."
Secretary Hull testified that he was in consultation with President
Roosevelt at all stages of the drafting of the President's message to
the Emperor (tr. 14,297). The record contains a note in President
Roosevelt's handwriting, undated but bearing a stamp showing that it was
received in Secretary Hull's office on December 6, which reads:
"DEAR CORDELL: Shoot this to Grew-I think can go in grey code-saves
time-I don't mind if it gets picked up.
"F. D. R. (ex. 20)."
The message to Emperor Hirohito attached to the President's memorandum
was returned to the President attached to a "Memorandum for the
President," also dated December 6 and initialled by Secretary Hull, as
follows:
"There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page three
of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I
spoke to you on the telephone.
"If you approve the draft as it now stands, we shall see that it gets
off to Grew at once (ex. 20)."
Beneath Secretary Hull's initials appears the following in President
Roosevelt's handwriting:
"C. H. O K-send the amended p. 3 to the British Ambassador & send a copy
to me. F. D. R. (ex. 20)."
The amended page 3 bears the President's handwritten "O. K.," followed
by his initials (ex. 20). There is no explanation in the record before
the Committee of the reason for the President's instruction to send a
copy of the amended page three to the British Ambassador.
The first three and last paragraphs of the message as thus finally
revised were substantially the same as those of the draft message
attached to Secretary Hull's memorandum of November 29 to the President.
The remainder of the message sent-comprising the main part-consisted of
material that is not found in any of the drafts in evidence before the
Committee. Secretary Hull testified that the message actually sent to
the Emperor-
"was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions
made in the White House as well as material contained in the drafts
prepared in the State Department during the preceding weeks (tr.
14,264)."
At 8 o'clock that evening (December 6), the State Department dispatched
to Ambassador Grew a brief telegram stating that an important telegram
to him was being encoded and that it contained the text of a message
from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, to be communicated by
Ambassador Grew to the Emperor at the "earliest possible moment" (ex.
20). Both messages were initialled for Secretary Hull by Dr. Hornbeck
(ex. 20), which may indicate that after approving the message in final
form the Secretary had left the Department for the day. The telegram
containing President Roosevelt's
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 427
message to Emperor Hirohito was dispatched from the State Department at
9 o'clock that evening (ex. 20). The message follows in full:
"Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to
the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the
people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was
accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which
has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their
peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have
substantially helped humanity.
"Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries
need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I
should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency
which appears to be in formation.
"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to
deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence
of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain
tragic possibilities.
"The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of
nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations
between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for
a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. Vs e have
hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way
that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side
without fear of invasion that unbearable burdens of armaments could be
lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without
discrimination against or in favor of any nation.
"I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me,
that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States
should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed
essential to the attainment of the high objectives.
"!More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement
v I h the Vichy- Government by which five or six thousand Japanese
troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the
protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further
north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further
Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for
the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saving
that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been
contemplated.
"During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that
Japanese military, naval, and air forces have been sent to Southern
Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the
part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China
is not defensive in its character.
"Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such
large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the
southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the
people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East
Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether
these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one
or more of these many directions.
"I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these
peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and
their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand
why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance
at the establishment of military, naval, and air bases manned and
equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of
offense.
"It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.
"None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either
indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.
"There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of
invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be
withdrawn therefrom.
"I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of
the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of
Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the
part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese
forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout
the whole of the South Pacific area.
"I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope
that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite
emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that
both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great
countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have
a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and
destruction in the world (vol. II, pp. 784-786)."
428 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Also at 9 o'clock that evening a telegram from Secretary Hull to
Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was dispatched by the State Department,
instructing the Ambassador to communicate to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek a copy of President Roosevelt's message to Emperor Hirohito, for
the Generalissimo's confidential information. This telegram was also
initialled for the Secretary by Dr. Hornbeck. After quoting the
President's message in full, the telegram concluded:
"In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state
orally as from the President that the quoted message has already been
sent by the President to the Emperor; that this message, as the
situation now stands, would seem to represent very nearly the last
diplomatic move that this Government can make toward causing Japan to
desist from its present course; that if the slender chance of acceptance
by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would have been
taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much hoped
that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese
Government circles adverse comment (tr. 14,517)."
The final comment may well have been intended to forestall comment such
as the Generalissimo had made at the time the modus vivendi was under
consideration.
Ambassador Grew testified that he first learned of the President's
message the evening of December 7 (Japan time) while listening to a
radio broadcast from San Francisco (tr. 1501-1503; ex. 30, pp. 486-487).
He immediately instructed Mr. Dooman, the Embassy Counselor, to stand
by, and not long thereafter the first, short telegram from Secretary
Hull was received. Although it showed on its face it had been received
in Tokyo at 12 noon (Japan time), an hour after its dispatch from
Washington at 11 a. m. (Japan time), the Secretary's second telegram
containing President Roosevelt's message to the Emperor was not
delivered at the Embassy until 10:30 p. m. "In other words," Ambassador
Grew testified, "the telegram appears to have been delivered to the
Japanese post office, which handled telegrams, 1 hour after its receipt,
and they held it up throughout that day, from 12 noon until-10:30 p. m."
(Japan time) (tr. 1501), or 8:30 a. m. December 7 (Washington time).
Ambassador Grew saw Foreign Minister Togo at about a quarter past 12
that night. He read President Roosevelt's message aloud to the Foreign
Minister, handed him a copy, and then requested an audience with the
Emperor to present the President's message personally. Not until after
Ambassador Grew had found it necessary to repeat his request did the
Foreign Minister agree to present the matter to the Throne, (tr.
14,516).
To return to events in Washington, President Roosevelt's appointments
for Saturday, December 6, as shown by his engagement book were two, both
at the White House and both in the morning. The first was at 10 o'clock
with Justice William O. Douglas, and the second was at 11:15 o'clock
with Budget Director Harold O. Smith (ex. 58). The President had no
scheduled appointments that afternoon. That evening the President and
Mrs. Roosevelt entertained at dinner at 8 o'clock at the White House
(ex. 58). Apart from the evidence already mentioned of the President's
activities that day in connection with his message to Emperor Hirohito,
the only other evidence before the Committee affirmatively showing the
President's activities before the White House dinner that evening is a
statement contained in a letter dated May 22, 1946, from an official of
the Australian Legation in Washington in answer to certain inquiries
made by the Committee through the State Department (tr. 14,631-14,632).
Referring to a telegram from the Australian Minister for
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 425
External Affairs in Canberra to the British Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom in London, a paraphrase of which
is quoted below, that letter states:
"The telegram contains the substance of a message which the Australian
Minister for External Affairs had received from the Australian Minister-
at Washington. This message was dispatched from Washington at 9:30 p. m.
On December 6th, 1941. *The information contained therein regarding the
procedure to be followed by the President had come orally from the
President late in the afternoon of December 6th.*" (Tr. 14,631).
The paraphrase of the Australian Minister for External Affairs' telegram
is as follows:
"Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of
warning as drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning,
we concur in draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty's
Governments. I point out that message from Australian Minister at
Washington just received notes that
"1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.
"2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by
him from the Emperor by Monday evening
"(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening,
"(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until
Wednesday morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered
repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington (tr. 13, 741-13, 742)."
It would seem clear that the "draft" referred to in the telegram quoted
above was the document, a copy of which was obtained by the Committee
from the files of President Roosevelt, attached to an unsigned
memorandum dated December 7, 1941, on stationery bearing the official
seal of the British Government (tr. 13,738). The memorandum was as
follows:
"The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the
President may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the
Japanese Government.
"The Dominion Governments have yet to give their views on this text.
They are being consulted urgently.
"The Netherlands government have been given a copy of the draft (tr.
13,738)"
The draft declaration to the Japanese Government which was attached to
this memorandum was as follows:
"YOUR EXCELLENCY:
"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed
to make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government
on behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada,
the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South
Africa.
"His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth
of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely
in consultation with the United States Government the negotiations in
which the latter have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a
view to relieving the present tension in the Far East. His Majesty's
Governments viewed with the same concern as the United States Government
the rapidly growing concentration of Japanese forces in Indo-China which
prompted the enquiry by the United States Government to the Japanese
Government on December 2nd. They have found Japanese reply to that
enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the explanations in regard
to North Indo-China as to which they expressly reserve their views the
reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese
forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and
heavily augmented.
"There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this
concentration in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption
that the Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive
move directed against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand.
"Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the
Netherlands Government are too well known for the Japanese Government to
430 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on territories
of the Netherlands. In the interest of peace His Majesty's Governments
feel it incumbent upon them, however, to remove any uncertainty which
may exist as regards their attitude in the event of attack on Thailand.
"His Majesty's Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the
contrary, preservation of full independence and sovereignty of Thailand
is an important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that
independence or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malay
and His Majesty's Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel
bound therefore to warn the Japanese Government in the most solemn
manner that if Japan attempts to establish her influence in Thailand by
force or threat of force she will do so at her own peril and His
Majesty's Governments will at once take all appropriate measures. Should
hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will rest with Japan
(tr. 13738-13740)."
It would seem clear that the foregoing draft is the draft warning to
Japan "concurred in" by the Australian Minister for External Affairs in
his telegram to the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,
which was dispatched from Canberra the evening of December 7 (tr.
14,631-14,632).
In connection with these documents, it will be recalled that the
Marshall-Stark joint memorandum of November 27 to President Roosevelt
had recommended that-
"prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military
counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens
United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;
"*in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the
United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance
beyond the lines indicated may lead to war*; prior to such warning no
joint military opposition be undertaken;
"*steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and
Dutch for the issuance of such warning (ex. 17).*"
It will be also recalled that on Sunday, November 30 (Washington time),
the State Department had received through Ambassador Winant a message
from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt in which the Prime
Minister, while stating that he realized the President's "constitutional
difficulties," begged the President to consider at such moment as the
President should judge right "which may be very near," the President
should not tell Japan "that any further Japanese aggression would compel
you to place the gravest issues before Congress or words to that
effect." The Prime Minister had said that this was the one important
method that remained "unused in averting war between Japan and our two
countries," and that Great Britain would "make a similar declaration or
share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24).
There is thus evidence before the Committee that by the late afternoon
of December 6 the President had determined upon a procedure which
contemplated that his message to Emperor Hirohito, as the first step
(which he took despite the views of those of his advisors who felt that
it would have little effect), would be followed, as recommended by
General Marshall and Admiral Stark and previously discussed at length
with his principal Cabinet advisors, and as urged by Prime Minister
Churchill, by a warning to Japan by the United States Government, with
similar warnings by the Governments of Great Britain and the
Netherlands. The warning recommended by General Marshall and Admiral
Stark was to be given "in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand," and
by late Saturday afternoon the progress of the Japanese naval force
around Cambodia Point had
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 431
made such an advance an imminent probability. While both General
Marshall (tr. 13809) and Admiral Stark (tr. 13760) testified that to the
best of their recollection they were not consulted regarding the
President's procedure outlined in the Australian message quoted above,
that procedure followed the recommendation made in their joint
memorandum of November 27 to the President so far as a warning to Japan
was concerned.
In this connection it should be noted that according to Secretary
Stimson, President Roosevelt planned to give his warning to Japan in his
proposed message to Congress. He said:
"The final view was that an additional warning to Japan should be given
(tr. 14482).
* * * * * * *
"The President was in fact during the early part of December engaged in
preparing an address to Congress which would incorporate such a warning,
and was also considering a special telegram to the Emperor. Before the
address to the Congress was delivered, however, the Japanese struck on
December 7th (tr. 14478).
"The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and through the address
to Congress to give the Japanese a final warning (tr. 14487)."
Both the State Department, with respect to its files, and Miss Tully as
custodian of the President's files, were requested by the Committee to
furnish it with all information and documents relating to the proposed
British warning and the telegram from the Australian Minister for
External Affairs mentioned above (tr. 14628-14629; 14632-14633). The
State Department searched its files twice and after the second search
advised the Committee that no material relevant to those documents had
been found (tr. 14629). Miss Tully advised the Committee that a further
search of President Roosevelt's files had not disclosed any additional
documents or memoranda regarding the documents in question. Regarding
the message from the Australian Minister at Washington to Canberra, Miss
Tully reported that she believed that "he and the late President
discussed the subject but, of course, no record was ever made of such
conversations" (tr. 14634).
The preceding day, perhaps at the meeting of his Cabinet, President
Roosevelt had requested Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox to compile
for him the information available in their respective Departments
concerning Japanese air, ground, and naval forces in French Indochina
and adjacent areas. A memorandum dated December 5, 1941, based on Office
of Naval Intelligence estimates, was transmitted by Secretary Knox to
Secretary Hull with a covering, undated memorandum signed by the
Secretary stating that the figures attached were those concerning which
he had just talked with Secretary Hull on the telephone (ex. 175). A
similar memorandum, dated December 6, and prepared by the Military
Intelligence Division, was transmitted by Secretary Stimson to Secretary
Hull on the same day with a covering letter in which Secretary Stimson
specifically referred to the President's request of "yesterday" (ex.
175). The information contained in the memoranda, together with
information received in the State Department from American diplomatic
and consular sources, was combined in the State Department in a
"Memorandum for the President," dated December 6, as follows:
432 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Japanese Forces and Recent Increase in Japanese Military Material and
Equipment in Indochina
"According to information reported by our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon,
received by them from French military sources in Indochina and not
confirmed it is estimated that there are at present in northern
Indochina (Tongking) 25,000 Japanese troops and 80,000 in southern
Indochina, making a total of 105,000, and that there are at the outside
some 450 Japanese planes in Indochina. According to a statement made
December 4 by the Governor General of Indochina to our Consul at Hanoi,
there are approximately 70,000 Japanese troops in Indochina, a little
less than 30,000 being in Tongking and the balance in the south. The
estimate of 105,000 is considered to be approximately correct by the
Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.
"According to the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department,
21 transports were sighted in Camranh Bay on December 2 by an air patrol
from Manila, 12 submarines were sighted at sea northeast of Saigon
proceeding south and nine of these submarines are now in Camranh Bay
with other naval units including several destroyers. Our Consul at Hanoi
reported on December 5 information from a reportedly reliable source
that there were in Camranh Bay 30 transports carrying an estimated
division of troops. Our Consul at Tsingtao reported on December 1 that
for the preceding ten days an average of about three transports had left
Tsingtao daily loaded with troops in summer uniforms.
"An official of the French Foreign Office at Vichy stated to an officer
of our Embassy on December 3 that the Japanese recently had been sending
large amounts of military equipment and material into Indochina.
According to our Consul at Hanoi Japanese military equipment recently
landed in Indochina includes, as estimated by French military sources,
3,400 trucks and tractors, 600 automobiles, 500 motorcycles, 260 tanks
(categories unspecified), 300 cannon, 2,000 machine guns, 1,300
submachine guns, 2,100 pack horses and a large number of bicycles.
"The marked increase in Japanese troops in Indochina reportedly began
November 21 with the arrival of 21 troop and supply ships at Saigon, the
landing of 20,000 troops there, the transfer of 10,000 troops from
northern Indochina southward and the subsequent landing of additional
troops at both Saigon and Haiphong, those landed at the latter place
proceeding southward by train.
"At nearby Hainan Island there are estimated by the Military
Intelligence Division of the War Department to be some 30,000 Japanese
troops and an unknown number of planes. Pursuit planes as well as
bombers can fly from Hainan Island to northern Indochina, either direct
or via Waichow Island off Pakhoi, Kwantung Province of China (ex. 175)."
Secretary Hull testified that he was most invariably at home in the
evening "working on Departmental matters," and that while it was
possible he might be mistaken, it was his best recollection that he was
"at home on the night of December 6, 1941" (tr. 14,315-14,317). The
record before the Committee shows that at 8:45 o'clock that evening
Secretary Hull had a telephone conversations with Secretary Knox,
lasting not over 2 minutes (ex. 58; tr. 1168). While Secretary Hull's
records indicate that he called Secretary Knox (tr. 1168), the records
of the While House switchboard operators indicate that Secretary Knox
called Secretary Hull that evening at 8:45 p. m., between two calls to
Secretary Stimson made by Secretary Knox at 8:30 and 8:47 p. m. (Ex.
58). It is not clear from the record [1] before the Com-
[1] Captain Kramer testified that before delivering copies of the first
13 parts to the White House, to Secretary Knox, and to Admiral Theodore
S. Wilkinson (then Director of Naval Intelligence), he telephoned the
several persons to whom he customarily made deliveries of intercepted
Japanese messages, and that he commenced these phone calls at about a
quarter of 9 (tr. 10446-10450). He testified that he did not begin
deliveries that evening until after 9 a. m., and that he did not reach
Secretary Knox's apartment until after 9:15 p. m. (tr. 10451). He
further testified that Secretary Knox read the lengthy 13 parts before
making any telephone calls (tr. 14454). On the basis of this testimony,
Secretary Knox s phone calls could not have been made before 9:30 p. m.,
whereas the actual records made at the time show that the first of
Secretary Knox's three calls to Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull was
made an hour earlier at 8:30 p. m., and that his telephone conversation
with Secretary Hull occurred at 8:45 p. m. (Ex. 58; tr. 1168). This
evidence leaves two major alternatives (1) Captain Kramer's memory with
respect to times that evening was faulty and the times he gave should
all be moved back at least an hour, making his arrival at Secretary
Knox's apartment prior to 8:30 p. m. Under such circumstances it would
have been possible for Secretary Knox's reading of the 13-part message
to have been the immediate reason for arranging the meeting of the three
Secretaries the next morning, provided it is also assumed that the
meeting was not arranged during the several conversations among the
three Secretaries earlier that Saturday; and (2) Captain Kramer's memory
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 433
mittee whether or not Secretary Knox's three telephone calls through the
White House switchboard were the calls, "apparently to Mr. Hull and Mr.
Stimson" according to Captain Kramer (tr. 10676), made by Secretary Knox
after he received and read that evening the first 13 parts (Annex E
attached hereto) of the intercepted message from Foreign Minister Togo
to Ambassador Nomura containing the Japanese Government's reply to the
United States note of November 26. Secretary Knox gave instructions that
the first 13 parts of that message, together with any additional
intercepted messages that might become available during the night,
should be brought to him at the meeting at 10 o'clock the next morning
at the State Department which had been arranged with Secretaries Hull
and Stimson (tr. 10676-10677). Captain Kramer, who delivered the 13
parts to Secretary Knox that evening, testified that the Secretary
agreed with the conclusion he had placed on it, "that it aimed toward a
conclusion of negotiations" (tr. 10676), and that nothing was said by
the Secretary with respect to taking any action on the message (tr.
10454-10455).
There is no evidence before the Committee that Secretary Hull saw the
intercepted Japanese message containing the first 13 parts of the
Japanese reply before Sunday. Secretary Hull testified that he could not
"recall definitely the exact time" when he first saw that message (tr.
14299). Regarding the so-called "pilot message" which preceded it,
Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence
Division, who was in charge of the delivery of "magic" to the Secretary
of State, testified before the Committee that the "pilot" message, which
was sent by the Japanese Foreign Minister to Ambassador Nomura on
December 6 (Japan time) and was translated and available in Washington
the afternoon of December 6 (Washington time), was distributed to the
Secretary of State around 3 p. m. That afternoon (tr. 12049-12050). That
message (#901) was as follows:
"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of
the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for
the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen
parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not
sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I
want you to please keep it secret for the time being.
"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United
States I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the
meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to
present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions
(ex. 1, pp. 238-239)."
Colonel Bratton's testimony in this regard is uncontradicted, and it is
therefore reasonable to conclude, since deliveries of "magic" were made
directly to the Secretary of State's office, that Secretary Hull
[Footnote 1 continued from previous page] with respect to times that
evening was correct. Under such circumstances it must follow that the
meeting of the three Secretaries the next morning had been arranged
before Secretary Knox knew of or saw the 13 part message, unless the
assumption is also made that Secretary Knox made a second series of
calls after 9:30 p. m. to Secretary Hull and Secretary Stimson that were
not made through the White House switchboard and, in the case of
Secretary Hull, went unrecorded.
In this general connection, Secretary Hull testified.
"As r recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 was the result
of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, and myself.
It might have been suggested in the first instance by any one or two of
us three. According to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting
grew out of a desire to continue our discussion of the situation created
by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of
the southernmost point of Indo China" (tr. 14318).
The log of the duty officer at the Navy Department that Saturday evening
contains an entry showing that *at 8 p. m.* Secretary Stimson's aide
telephoned that Secretary Stimson desired certain specified information
regarding American, British, Dutch, Japanese, and Russian naval vessels
in the Pacific before 9 a. m., the next morning, that Secretary Knox,
among others, was consulted in regard to this, and that Secretary Knox
directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to
10 a. m. The next morning (tr. 13946-13947, ex. 162). This would seem to
indicate that the meeting of the three Secretaries had been arranged
prior to 8 p. m. On Saturday, December 6.
434 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
saw the "pilot" message that afternoon before leaving the State
Department. In the case of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message,
however, the evidence before the Committee as to whether or not the
first 13 parts were delivered to the State Department before the morning
of December 7 (Washington time) is contradictory [1] and as stated above
there is no evidence before the Committee that the first 13 parts were
seen by Secretary Hull Saturday evening, December 6 (Washington time).
The evidence before the Committee is uncontradicted, however, that the
first 13 parts were delivered to President Roosevelt a little after 9:30
o'clock the evening of December 6 (Washington time). At that time, the
President and Mr. Harry Hopkins, who was one of the guests at the White
House dinner party, were in the President's study on the second floor of
the White House. Commander Schultz, an assistant to Admiral Beardall,
naval aide to the President, who personally handed the intercepted
messages to the President, testified that he gained the impression the
President was expecting them, and that the President read the messages
and then handed them to Mr. Hopkins, who was pacing back and forth
slowly. His testimony continued:
"Commander SCHULZ. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back
to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said
in substance-I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance-"This
means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps 5
minutes, the situation of the Japanese forces; that is, their deployment
and-
"Mr. RlCHARDSON. Can you regal what either of them said?
"Commander SCHULZ. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I
can definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that-I
believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first-that since war was imminent, that
the Japanese intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when
all was most opportune for them-
"The CHAIRMAN. When all was what?
"Commander SCHULZ. When all was most opportune for them. That is, when
their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina
in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces had already
landed there and there were implications of where they should move next.
"The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese
Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in
effect requesting their withdrawal.
"Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going
to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was too bad that we could
not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The
President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are
a democracy and a peaceful people."
[1] Colonel Bratton testified that the last of the 13 parts came into
his office some time between 9 and 10 o'clock that night and that he was
in his office when the last of the 13 parts came in (tr. 12049). He
further testified that he personally delivered the 13 parts to the night
duty officer at the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that
night telling the duty officer that it was a "highly important message
as far as the Secretary of State was concerned" and that it should be
sent out to Secretary Hull's quarters which he was assured would be done
(tr. 12052-12053). This testimony is directly contrary to the affidavit
of Col. Clyde Dusenberry, then Colonel Bratton's chief assistant in the
Clausen investigation. In his affidavit Colonel Dusenberry stated that
he specifically recalled the intercepted message in question and that
"It started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty.
Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and
he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left
and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I
waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of
the message was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went
home. I returned the next morning *to begin the distribution of this
intercept consisting of the fourteen parts* and *I began the
distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept* about 9 a.
m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State
Department *as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of
State*. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to
then Colonel Thomas D. Handy who upon reading it said to me: "This means
war " or words to that effect. *None of these parts comprising this
intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941* because
the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and
he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night" (Clausen, p.
50).
Colonel Dusenberry's statements in his affidavit are in accord with the
testimony of Gen. Sherman Miles, then Chief Of the Military Intelligence
Division and the superior officer of Colonel Bratton and Colonel
Dusenberry, who stated that Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson and the
others on the War Department's "magic" distribution list received on
December 6 all intercepted Japanese messages that were translated that
day up to midnight "*except the first 13 parts of the 14-part message*"
(tr. 4123-4124).
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 435
Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said,
"But we have a good record."
"The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that
record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait
until it came.
"During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only
geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might
begin was not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was
no indication that tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that
impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the
news did come.
"Mr. RlCHARDSON. Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to
the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that
were being read?
"Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further
warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the
war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said
that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get
Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined-I do not recall
exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that
Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater.
"Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, was it from what was said there that you draw the
conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported?
"Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but
the National Theater was mentioned in my presence, and the President
went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later,
that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged
or otherwise when in the theater, where, I believe, the fact that he had
a box reserved was mentioned and that if he had left suddenly he would
surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue
alarm might be caused, and the President did not wish that to happen
because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any
case.
"Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there anything said about telephoning anybody else
except Stark?
"Commander SCHULZ. No, sir; there was not (tr. 12436-12444)."
Captain Krick, who testified that he was at the National Theater that
evening with Admiral Stark, recalled that when he and Admiral Stark
returned to the latter's home, one of Admiral Stark's servants advised
the admiral that there had been a White House call during the evening
(tr. 14757). According to Captain Krick's testimony, Admiral Stark
retired immediately to his study on the second floor where he had a
White House phone (tr. 14755). He returned between 5 and 10 minutes
later, and told Captain Krick that-
"conditions in the Pacific were serious; that was the substance of it,
that conditions with Japan were in a critical state, something of that
sort (tr. 14757)."
Captain Krick testified that while he could not recall that Admiral
Stark had said upon his return, "I have talked with the President of the
United States", he had-
"heard, of course, the statement of the servant that there had been a
White House call, and the Admiral retired immediately, and he may have
stated that he was going to call the White House; but I have the
distinct impression that the conversation was with the White House (tr.
14758)."
There is no evidence before the Committee of any other action taken by
President Roosevelt the night of December 6 (Washington time).
A report that the Japanese Embassy in Washington had burned its codes
and ciphers the preceding evening was received in the State Department
from the Navy Department on December 6 (Washington time) (ex. 174).
Intercepted Japanese messages which were translated in Washington that
day, in addition to the first 13 parts of the 14-part message, included
a message dated December 3 (Japan time) instructing the Japanese Embassy
in Washington to keep its "hidden word" code lists "until the last
moment" (ex. 1, p. 226); a message
436 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
requesting Ambassador Nomura to have certain Embassy officials "leave
(Washington) by plane within the next couple of days" (ex. 1, p. 234);
Ambassador Nomura's report on his and Ambassador Kurusu's meeting with
Secretary Hull the day before; and a message dated December 3 from the
Japanese Ambassador in Rome to Foreign Minister Togo reporting on his
conference that day with Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano
(ex. 1, pp. 228-229). In the latter report the Ambassador stated that at
the conference he had described the developments in the Japanese-
American negotiations as set out in message No. 986 from Foreign
Minister Togo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin (which was translated
and available in Washington on December 1 (Washington time) as has
already been described). During the course of the conference in Rome,
the Japanese Ambassador asked Mussolini and Ciano, if Japan should
declare war on the United States and Great Britain,
"would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She
is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since
Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer
with Germany on this point" (ex. 1, p. 229)."
The fourteenth and final part of the intercepted Japanese message
containing the text of the Japanese Government's reply to the United
States' note of November 26 was translated and available in Washington
the next morning, Sunday, December 7 (Washington time). The record
before the Committee shows that it was delivered to President Roosevelt
in his bedroom at the White House about 10 o'clock that morning by
Admiral Beardall, the President's naval aide (tr. 14010; 14033). Admiral
Beardall testified that when the President had read it and such other
messages as accompanied it in the delivery pouch, he turned to the
admiral and remarked that it looked as if the Japanese were going to
break off negotiations (tr. 14011; 14034). While Captain Kramer
testified that he made a second delivery of "magic" to the White House
that morning, at about 11 o'clock, Admiral Beardall testified that he
had no recollection of delivering any other "magic" messages to the
President (tr. 14034), or of seeing the President again, until after he
received word at home about 2 o'clock that afternoon of the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 14015).
Secretary Hull testified that he had no record of nor did he recall-
"having seen or having talked with the President between 9:30 p. m. on
December 6, 1941 and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
According to my best recollection, I was available during all that
period (tr. 14319)."
He testified that on Saturday and Sunday up to the time of the Japanese
attack he-
"was in constant contact * * * with officers of the State Department and
of the Army and Navy * * *. It would be impossible to recall the details
of all the conversations which took place, but I might say that the
Japanese large-scale military movement from the jumping-off place in
Southern Indo-China was very much in the minds of all of us who were
called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to ascertain
the full significance of those military movements their probable
destination, etc. (Tr. 14319-14321)."
That Sunday morning Secretaries Knox and Stimson met with Secretary Hull
at the State Department. Secretary Hull testified that, according to his
best recollection, the subject of that conference-
"was in line with our increasingly frequent conferences over the
telephone or in person as the dangers and the threatened outbreak in
Japan increased.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 437
"For instance, on the day just before we had received all of this
information from our consuls and from a British dispatch that this
Japanese armada had left its jumping-off point and was sailing toward
the Kra Isthmus and * * * Prime Minster Tojo had made a speech * * * a
little before this. But that, along with these actual movements,
especially these movements, was the occasion, the chief occasion, I
think of our conference.
* * * * *
"Senator LUCAS. In the conversations that you had with Secretary Knox
and Secretary Stimson on Sunday morning of the 7th was there anything
said in that conversation about the likelihood of Japan attacking Pearl
Harbor?
"Mr. HULL. Nothing. As you understand, the attack was then on
apparently. The fleet was moving toward the Kra Peninsula, which would
greatly endanger the situation.
"Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman; I could not get your last answer
Will you read it, please?
"Mr. HULL. I said the attack was under way, according to the dispatches
on the sixth. This fleet was moving, not up north in the Bay of Siam or
Thailand, but it was, so far as my impression extended, moving toward
the Kra Isthmus, which was probably a threat all the way down toward
Singapore, down the peninsula, and not far from Malaya (tr. 1605-16O6)."
The record before the Committee shows that all 14 parts (Annex E) of the
intercepted Japanese message containing the Japanese reply to the.
United States note of November 26 were delivered to Secretary Knox at
the State Department a few minutes before the meeting of the three
Secretaries (tr. 10468), and that the intercepted message in which
Foreign Minister Togo directed Ambassador Nomura to deliver the Japanese
reply to Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. that day (ex. 1, p. 248) was handed
to one of Secretary Hull's private secretaries at about 10:45 o'clock
(tr. 10473). These deliveries were made by Captain Kramer, who testified
that at the time of the second delivery he mentioned to Mr. Hull's
private secretary the tie-up between 1 p. m. Washington time and "the
scheme that had been developing for the past week or so in the Southwest
Pacific with reference to Malaya and the Era Peninsula" (tr. 10472).
A further indication of the matters discussed at the conference of the
three Secretaries at the State Department that Sunday morning is a
memorandum entitled "Location of U. S. Naval Forces in the Pacific and
Far East, as of 7 December 1941" in evidence before the Committee (ex.
176). In the upper right hand corner of this memorandum appears the
following handwritten note: "SECNAV (2), 1000", meaning, apparently, two
copies for the Secretary of the Navy at 10 o'clock. This note,
considered in conjunction with the log of the duty officer at the Navy
Department the preceding evening (ex. 162), leaves little doubt that the
memorandum was prepared expressly for the conference at the State
Department that morning. The memorandum listed the major ships of the
United States, Japanese, British, Dutch, and Russian fleets in the
Pacific Ocean by name, and the destroyers and submarines in those fleets
by number, giving their location "as of 7 Dec. 1941". The Japanese
cruisers and destroyers referred to in the Hart message to the Navy
Department and the Winant telegrams to the State Department the day
before were listed as "off southern Indochina." The bulk of the Japanese
Navy was listed as in the two major Japanese naval stations at Kure and
Sasebo on the main Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu. Included among
the Japanese ships listed by name as in those two Japanese naval
stations that morning were all of the ships which, it is now known, were
at that very moment less than 300 miles north
438 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the Hawaiian Islands in the act of launching their bombers and
torpedo planes for the Japanese attack on the United States Pacific
Fleet in Pearl Harbor.
Secretary Stimson's notes for that day, which appear to have been
written the following day, describe in greater detail the meeting of the
three Secretaries.
"Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to
Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time
back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox
and I arranged a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole
matter over Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some
deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three
stayed together in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for
what should be said or done. The main thing is to hold the main people
who are interested in the Far East together-the British, ourselves, the
Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese. Hull expressed his views, giving
the broad picture of it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and
I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had his views as to the
importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand
together and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. Hull
was to see the Japanese envoys at one o'clock but they were delayed in
keeping the appointment and did not come until later-as it turned out,
till 2:00 o'clock or after. * * * The messages which we have been
getting through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages
which are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that
large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam. This itself
was enough excitement and that was what we were at work on our papers
about. The observer thought these forces were going to land probably
either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where it would be still
in Indo China, or on the western side, where it would be the Kra
Peninsula, or probably Malaya. The British were very much excited about
it and our efforts this morning in drawing our papers was to see whether
or not we should all act together. The British will have to fight if
they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that we must fight
if the British fought (tr. 14428-14429)."
The statement dictated by Secretary Hull as referred to in Secretary
Stimson's notes, follows:
"PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENT BY HULL
"(See Record, December 7)
"The Japanese Government, dominated by the military fire-eaters, is
deliberately proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out its
long proclaimed purpose to acquire military control over one-half of the
world with nearly one-half its population. This inevitably means
Japanese control of islands, continents, and seas from the Indies back
near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples would be governed
militarily, politically, economically, socially, and morally by the
worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman, and semi-
slavery methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the
people in China and Hitler on the peoples of some fifteen conquered
nations of Europe. This would virtually drive and force all free and
peaceful peoples off the high seas.
"At this moment of serious, threatened, and imminent danger, it is
manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the
control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and
commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area
must be commenced within the South Sea area at such times and places as
in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within sufficient
time and at such strategic points as would make it most effective. In no
other way can it be satisfactorily determined that the Pacific area can
be successfully defended.
"More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world movement to
conquer and destroy, with Hitler moving across one-half of the world and
the Government of Japan under the military group moving across the other
half of the world by closely synchronizing their efforts and
collaborating and cooperating whenever to their individual or their
mutual advantage.
"This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worth
while. Self-defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation of
each and all of our civilized institutions (tr. 14433-14434)."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 439
Secretary Knox's statement was as follows:
"SUGGESTION BY KNOX
"(See Record, December 7)
"1. We are tied up inextricably with the British in the present world
situation.
"2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of Malaya will
automatically not only wreck her far eastern position but jeopardize her
entire effort.
"3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are almost certain to
lose theirs.
"4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their positions we are almost
certain to be next, being then practically Japanese-surrounded.
"5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or
the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be
stated any threat to any one of the three of us is a threat to all of
us. We should therefore be ready jointly to let together and if such
understanding has not already been reached, it should be reached
immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or
somebody may be left out on a limb).
"6. I think the Japanese should be told that any movement in a direction
that threatens the United States will be met by force. The President
will want to reserve to himself just how to define this. The following
are suggestions to shoot at: Any movement into Thailand; or any movement
into Thailand west of 100 east and South of 10 North-this in
accordance with the recommendations of the British and Dutch and United
States military authorities in the Far East; or any movement against
British, Dutch, United States, Free French, or Portuguese territory in
the Pacific area (tr. 14435-14436)."
After the meeting at the State Department, Secretary Stimson went to his
home for lunch (tr. 14428). Secretary Knox returned to the Navy
Department. Both his aide, Admiral Beatty, and his confidential
assistant, Major Dillon, testified that he arrived there from he State
Department probably about 11:30 o'clock, possibly a little later (tr.
10239, 10253, 10260). Secretary Hull remained at the State Department.
At about noon the Japanese Embassy telephoned the State Department and
asked for an appointment for Ambassador Nomura with Secretary Hull at 1
p. m. that afternoon. Somewhat later the Embassy telephoned again and
requested that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 p. m., as Ambassador
Nomura was not quite ready (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 786).
That morning the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington,
Mr. W. G. Hayter, called at the State Department on an official of the
Far Eastern Division. In response to an inquiry whether there was any
news, Mr. Hayter is reported to have said-
"after some hesitation, that the British Minister in Thailand had sent a
message to the (British) Foreign Office, which began "For God's sake"
and which was endorsed by the Thai Foreign Minister requesting that
British armed forces *not* move into Thailand" (ex. 169, item 34).
[Italics in original.]"
At 1:50 o'clock that afternoon the Navy Department received the
following dispatch from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of
the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H.:
"Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not drill (tr. 14204)."
When this message was brought to Secretary Knox, he was talking with
Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, in Major Dillon's office, who
testified that after reading the message, the Secretary exclaimed: "My
God, this can't be true, this must mean the Philippines" (tr. 10262).
Secretary Stimson recorded in his notes for that day that-
"just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President
called me up on he telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me,
"Have you heard the news?" said, "Well, I have heard the telegrams which
have come in about the Japanese advances in the Gulf of Siam." He said,
"Oh no, I don't mean that. They have
440 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that was an
excitement indeed (tr. 14428-14429)."
Secretary Hull testified that President Roosevelt telephoned him before
the Japanese Ambassadors reached the State Department and told him
"There was a report that Pearl Harbor had been attacked" [1] (tr. 1594).
He continued:
"I discussed before they came whether I would accredit that report as
the unquestioned truth of the situation and refuse to admit them or
whether in view of the extremely delicate relations I would leave open
the one chance in ten or more that the report was not correct. I
proceeded to receive and confer with them although I felt that the
chances were altogether virtually certain that the report was true (tr.
1594)."
The Japanese Ambassadors arrived at the State Department at 2:05 p. m.,
but were not admitted to Secretary Hull's office until 2:20 p. m. (ex.
29, vol. II, p. 786). According to the official State Department record
of the meeting Ambassador Nomura stated-
"that he had been instructed to deliver at 1:00 p. m. the document which
he handed the Secretary, but that he was sorry that he had been delayed
owing to the need of more time to decode the message. The Secretary
asked why he had specified one o'clock. The Ambassador replied that he
did not know but that that was his instruction.
"The Secretary said that anyway he was receiving the message at two
o'clock (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 786-787)."
The document Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull was the full text
of the memorandum contained in the 14-part message that had been before
the three Secretaries at their conference that morning, the first 13
parts of which had been seen by Secretary Knox and President Roosevelt
the evening before. The full message as intercepted before its delivery
to Secretary Hull is printed as Annex E attached hereto. Secretary Hull
testified that the first few pages defined "the Japanese attitude just
the reverse of what it was," as "Peace, peace, peace," and the next few
pages defined the American attitude "as just the reverse of what it was"
(tr. 1594). The final paragraph, which had been contained in the
fourteenth part of the intercepted message and had not been seen by
either the President or any of the three Secretaries before 10 o'clock
that morning, was as follows:
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire
with Great British and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts
toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in
East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and
interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been
revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus,
the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American
relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through
cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
"*The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations* (ex. 1, p. 245; ex. 29, vol. II, p. 792)."
Secretary Hull testified that at the time he-
"felt and knew of the extreme probability that the Pearl Harbor report
was true. I felt like taking liberties in talking to them about their
government in what would not be diplomatic language in ordinary times
(tr. 1595)."
Secretary Hull interrupted his reading of the memorandum to ask
Ambassador Nomura whether the memorandum was presented under
[1] Under Secretary Welles also testified that he first learned of the
attack through a telephone call from President Roosevelt (tr. 1322;
1362-1373)."
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 441
instructions from the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied that
it was. When he finished reading, Secretary Hull turned to the Japanese
Ambassador and said:
"I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine
months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out
absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have
never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and
distortions-infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that
I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was
capable of uttering them (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 787)."
According to the official State Department records of the meeting the
two Japanese Ambassadors "then took their leave without making any
comment" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 787).
Later that afternoon, Secretary Hull issued the following statement:
"Japan has made a treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack upon the
United States.
"At the very moment when representatives of the Japanese Government were
discussing with representatives of this Government, at the request of
the former principles and courses of peace, the armed forces of Japan
were preparing and assembling at various strategic points to launch new
attacks and new aggressions upon nations and peoples with which Japan
was professedly at peace including the United States.
"I am now releasing for the information of the American people the
statement of principles governing the policies of the Government of the
United States and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peaceful
settlement covering the entire Pacific area, which I handed to the
Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941.
"I am likewise releasing the text of a Japanese reply thereto which was
handed to me by the Japanese Ambassador today. Before the Japanese
Ambassador delivered this final statement from his Government the
treacherous attack upon the United States had taken place.
"This Government has stood for all the principles that underlie fair
dealing, peace, law and order, and justice between nations and has
steadfastly striven to promote and maintain that state of relations
between itself and all other nations.
"It is now apparent to the whole world that Japan in its recent
professions of a desire for peace has been infamously false and
fraudulent (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 793)."
The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had begun at 1:25 o'clock
that Sunday afternoon (Washington time). It was followed almost
immediately by a Japanese attack upon Thailand at various places on its
land and sea frontiers. Five and half hours after the attack on Thailand
commenced the Thai Government gave the order to cease fire (ex. 169). At
3 p. m. On December 7 (Washington time) the first Japanese attacks on
Singapore were made; at 3:40 p. m. (Washington time) the Japanese
attacked Khota Baru in British Malaya; at 6:10 p. m. (Washington time)
they attacked the Gulf of Davao in the Philippine Islands and the Island
of Guam (tr. 14127)
In Tokyo, in the meantime, after receiving from Ambassador Grew a copy
of President Roosevelt's message to Emperor Hirohito, Foreign Minister
Togo had gone to Premier Tojo's official residence with a summary
translation of the President's message, and there, at an emergency
conference with the Premier and the other members of the Cabinet, had
determined the line of action to be taken (ex. 132, item 1, p. 2). At 7
a. m., December 8 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew was awakened by a
telephone call from an official of the Japanese Foreign Office who
requested him to call on Foreign Minister Togo as soon as possible (ex.
30, p. 493). When Ambassador Grew arrived, Foreign Minister Togo, "grim
and formal," handed him the Japanese Government's memorandum breaking
off the negotiations. The Foreign Minister said that he had been in
touch with Emperor Hirohito,
442 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
who desired that the memorandum be regarded as his reply to President
Roosevelt's message. Ambassador Grew reported to the State Department
that the Foreign Minister thereupon made to him the following oral
statement:
"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the
cordial message of the President. He has graciously let known his wishes
to the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a
reply to the latter's message:
" "Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the
circumstances of the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina
to which His Majesty has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of
Japanese forces from French Indochina constitutes one of the subject
matters of the Japanese-American negotiations. His Majesty has commanded
the Government to state its views to the American Government also on
this question. It is, therefore, desired that the President will kindly
refer to this reply.
" "Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world,
has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of
which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest
endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this
fact" (ex. 178)."
Following his conference with Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Togo
arranged a conference with the British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie.
Upon his arrival, the Foreign Minister informed the British Ambassador
that it had become necessary to break off the Japanese-American
negotiations, and handed him a copy of the memorandum he had previously
given to Ambassador Grew (ex. 132, item 2).
While Foreign Minister Togo was holding his conferences with the
American and British Ambassadors, a meeting of the Committee of
Advisement of the Privy Council, attended by all of the other members of
the Japanese Cabinet and certain other Japanese governmental officials,
was in progress in the Imperial Palace. At this meeting the committee
considered and approved an Address of Advisement to the Throne and a
draft of an Imperial Rescript declaring war against the United States
and Great Britain. One of the officials present at the meeting asked
Premier Tojo what Germany's attitude would be. Premier Tojo replied that
"Germany's entrance in the war in our support is almost certain, and
negotiations to that effect are now in progress" (ex. 132, item 3).
Following the meeting of the Committee of Advisement, a full session of
the Privy Council in the presence of Emperor Hirohito, was held in the
Imperial Palace. At this meeting the address to the Throne was presented
and unanimously approved. Later that morning, Ambassador Grew received
the following communication:
"EXCELLENCY:
"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that there has arisen a
state of war between Your Excellency's country and Japan beginning
today.
"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
assurances of my highest consideration.
"SHIGENORI TOGO,
"Minister of Foreign Affairs.
"(Ex. 30, p. 499.)"
In Washington, Sunday evening, December 7 (Washington time), a meeting
of the Cabinet called by President Roosevelt took place in the White
House at 8:30 o'clock (tr. 14430). The President opened the meeting by
stating that it was the most serious Cabinet meeting that had taken
place since 1861, and he then described the Japanese attack at Pearl
Harbor so far as it was known at the time. After this the President read
a draft of a brief message to Congress which he had prepared. According
to Secretary Stimson's notes, the draft
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 443
presented much the same thoughts as were actually presented the
following day to Congress (tr. 14431). The Cabinet meeting lasted over
three-quarters of an hour, after which the majority and minority leaders
of Congress joined the President and the Cabinet for a meeting which
lasted for over 2 hours. At this meeting the President reviewed the
events of the preceding weeks and described the events of that Sunday in
Washington and at Pearl Harbor. The President asked whether the members
of Congress would invite him to appear before a joint session the
following day and was told that they would. He said that he could not
tell them exactly what he was going to say, because events were changing
so rapidly (tr. 14431-14432; ex. 160).
The next day, December 8 (Washington time), shortly after noon,
President Roosevelt delivered the following address before a joint
session of Congress:
"TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
"Yesterday, December 7, 1941-a date which will live in infamy-the United
States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and
air forces of the Empire of Japan.
"The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the
solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and
its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.
Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in
Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague
delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American
message. While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the
existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war
or armed attack.
"It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it
obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks
ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has
deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and
expressions of hope for continued peace.
"The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage
to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have
been lost. In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on
the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.
"Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against
Malaya.
"Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.
"Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.
"Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.
"Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.
"This morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.
"Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending
throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for
themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their
opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and
safety of our Nation.
"As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all
measures be taken for our defense.
"Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us.
"No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated
invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through
to absolute victory.
"I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I
assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will
make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us
again.
"Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people,
our territory and our interests are in grave danger.
"With confidence in our armed forces-with the unbounded determination of
our people-we will gain the inevitable triumph-so help us God.
"I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly
attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed
between the United States and the Japanese Empire (ex. 29, vol. II, pp.
793-794)."
Within an hour after President Roosevelt finished his address, the
Senate and House of Representatives, acting independently, passed
444 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the following resolution, the Senate by a vote of 82 to 0 and the House
of Representatives by a vote of 388 to 1:
"JOINT RESOLUTION Declaring that a state of war exists between the
Imperial Government of Japan and the Government and the people of the
United States and making provisions to prosecute the same
"Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts
of war against the Government and the people of the United States of
America: Therefore be it
"*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled*, That the state of war between
the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus
been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the
President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval
and military forces of the United States and the resources of the
Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan;
and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the
resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the
United States (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 795)."
The declaration of war against Japan was signed by President Roosevelt
at 4:10 p. m. that afternoon, December 8 (Washington time).
ANNEX A 445
Draft Proposal Handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on May 12
(Washington time)
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint
responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement
disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.
Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the
sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the
deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be
prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and
unfortunate consequences.
It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may
establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of
an *entente cordiale* [*amicable understanding*], arrest, if not dispel,
the tragic confusion, that now threatens to engulf civilization.
For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited
and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate
instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general
agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in
act.
It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the
pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be
deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our
respective Governments.
Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve
harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified
or improved; to wit:
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting
international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the
Pacific area.
Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding:-
I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting
international relations and the character of nations.
The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge
each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.
446 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as
directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration
of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.
Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present,
concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a
family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting
responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful
processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical
welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound
not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to
oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional
concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles
of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and
never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to these moral
principles and concepts.
II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
The Governments of the United States and Japan make it their common aim
to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavour
not only to prevent further extension of the European War but also
speedily to restore peace in Europe.
The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis Powers
was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not
at present directly affected by the European War from engaging in it.
The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military
assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy
will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the
said Pact.
The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward
the European War is, and will continue to be, directed by no such
aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another. The
United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and
accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue
to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the
protective defense of its own national welfare and security.
III. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three principles
as enunciated in the Konoe Statement and the principles set forth on the
basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking
Government as well as in the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and
China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to
establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall
forthwith request the Chiang Kai-shek regime to negotiate peace with
Japan.
IV. Commerce between both nations.
When official approbation to the present Understanding has been given by
both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to
mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or
required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take
necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 447
relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and Japan.
V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the
Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American
cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural
resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.
VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in
the Pacific area.
a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the
independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the
Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The
Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment.
b. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable
consideration-on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom
from discrimination.
Addendum.
The present Understanding shall be kept a confidential memorandum
between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.
The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this
Understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.
ORAL EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT
II. Par. 2.
Attitude of Both Governments toward the European War.
Actually the meaning of this paragraph is virtually unchanged but we
desire to make it clearer by specifying a reference to the Pact. As long
as Japan is a member of the Tripartite Pact, such stipulation as is
mentioned in the Understanding seems unnecessary.
If we must have any stipulation at all, in addition, it would be
important to have one which would clarify the relationship of this
Understanding to the aforementioned Pact.
III.
China Affair.
The terms for China-Japan peace as proposed in the original
Understanding differ in no substantial way from those herein affirmed as
the "principles of Konoe." Practically, the one can be used to explain
the other.
We should obtain an understanding, in a separate and secret document,
that the United States would discontinue her assistance to the Chiang
Kai-shek regime if Chiang Kai-shek does not accept the advice of the
United States that he enter into negotiations for peace.
If, for any reason, the United States finds it impossible to sign such a
documents a definite pledge by some highest authorities will suffice.
The three principles of Prince Konoe as referred to in this paragraph
are:
1. Neighborly friendship;
2. Joint defense against communism;
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 448
3. Economic cooperation-by which Japan does not intend to exercise
economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the
interests of Third Powers.
The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:
1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories;
2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation
cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus
contributing to world peace;
3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance
with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China;
4. No annexation, no indemnities;
5. Independence of Manchoukuo.
III.
Immigration to China.
The stipulation regarding large-scale immigration to China has been
deleted because it might give an impression, maybe a mistaken
impression, to the Japanese people who have been offended by the past
immigration legislation of the United States, that America is now taking
a dictating attitude even toward the question of Japanese immigration in
China.
Actually, the true meaning and purpose of this stipulation is fully
understood and accepted by the Japanese Government.
IV.
Naval, Aerial and Mercantile Marine Relations.
(a) and (c) of this section have been deleted not because of
disagreement but because it would be more practical, and possible, to
determine the disposition of naval forces and mercantile marine after an
understanding has been reached and relations between our two countries
improved; and after our present China commitments are eliminated. Then
we will know the actual situation and can act accordingly.
Courtesy visit of naval squadrons.
This proposal, (b) of IV might better be made a subject of a separate
memorandum. Particular care must be taken as to the timing, manner and
scope of carrying out such a gesture.
V.
Gold Credit.
The proposal in the second paragraph of V has been omitted for the same
reasons as suggested the omission of paragraphs (a) and (c).
VI.
Activity in Southwestern Pacific Area.
The words, in the first paragraph, "without resorting to arms" have been
deleted as inappropriate and unnecessarily critical. Actually, the
peaceful policy of the Japanese Government has been made clear on many
occasions in various statements made both by the Premier and the Foreign
Minister.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 449
VIII. [VII]
Political Stabilization in the Pacific Area.
As the paragraph (a) implying military and treaty obligation would
require, for its enactment, such a complicated legislative procedure in
both countries, we consider it inappropriate to include this in the
present Understanding.
Paragraph (b) regarding the independence of the Philippine Islands has
been altered for the same reason.
In paragraph (c) [(d)] the words "and to the Southwestern Pacific Area"
have been omitted because such questions should be settled, as necessity
arises, through direct negotiation with the authorities in the
Southwestern areas by the Government of the United States and of Japan
respectively.
Conference.
The stipulation for holding a Conference has been deleted. We consider
that it would be better to arrange, by an exchange of letters, that a
conference between the President and the Premier or between suitable
representatives of theirs will be considered when both the United States
and Japan deem it useful to hold such a conference after taking into due
consideration the effect resulting from the present Understanding.
Announcement.
In regard to the statement to be issued on the successful conclusion of
the present Understanding a draft will be prepared in Tokio and cabled
to Washington for the consideration of the United States Government.
(Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 420-425.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 450
ANNEX B
Draft Proposal Handed by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura on June 21
(Washington time)
Unofficial, Exploratory And Without Commitment
[WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1941.
The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint
responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement
of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption
of traditional friendly relations.
Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the
sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the
deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be
prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and
unfortunate consequences.
It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States
and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and
preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation
of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not
dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.
For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited
and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate
instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general
understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and
in act.
It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding
should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory
concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.
Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve
harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified
or improved; to wit:
1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting
international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5 Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6 The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the
Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of
Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of
policy:
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 451
I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting
international relations and the character of nations.
Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward
the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of
reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.
Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present
concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a
family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord
through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting
responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful
processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical
welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound
not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to
oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional
concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles
of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and
never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral
principles and concepts.
II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite
Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the
prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European war.
The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward
the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely
and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its
national security and the defense thereof.
NOTE (There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a
substitute for the Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of
the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the United
States draft of May 31, 1941.
III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the
United States the general terms within the framework of which the
Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful
settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the
Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding
neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories
and with the practical application of those principles, the President of
the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the
Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation
on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of
hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.
NOTE (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further
discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic
activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese
territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and
Japan. With regard to suggestions that the, language of Section III be
changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can
most advantageously be given
452 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been
satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can, be viewed
as a whole.)
IV. Commerce between both nations.
When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by
both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other
mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and
required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take
necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established
under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States
and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it
would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance
with usual procedures.
V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and
American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful
means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in
international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the
Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other
toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United
States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber,
tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and
development of its own economy.
VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in
the Pacific area.
Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this
understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental
purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance
and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has
territorial designs in the area mentioned.
VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.
The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time
as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with
the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a
treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine
independence shall have been achieved.
[Annex 1 to Annex B]
ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:
1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities-
including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.)
Subject to further discussion.
3. (Economic cooperation.) Subject to agreement on an exchange of
letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of
non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 453
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation
cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus
contributing to world Peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as
promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded
between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchoukuo.
[Annex 2 to Annex B]
ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
IV. Commerce between both nations.
It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan
and the United States each shall permit export to the other of
commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade,
except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own
purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned
to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as
restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both
Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating
relations with friendly nations.
[Annex 3 to Annex B]
SUGGESTED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador:
EXCELLENCY: In Section II of the Joint Declaration which was entered
into today on behalf of our two Governments, statements are made with
regard to the attitudes of the two Governments toward the European war.
During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of
this Joint Declaration I explained to you on a number of occasions the
attitude and policy of the Government of the United States toward the
hostilities in Europe and I pointed out that this attitude and policy
were based on the inalienable right of self-defense. I called special
attention to an address which I delivered on April 24 setting forth
fully the position of this Government upon this subject.
I am sure that you are fully cognizant of this Government's attitude
toward the European war but in order that there may be no
misunderstanding I am again referring to the subject. I shall be glad to
receive from you confirmation by the Government of Japan that, with
regard to the measures which this nation may be forced to adopt in
defense of its own security, which have been set forth as indicated, the
Government of Japan is not under any commitment which would require
Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental
objective of the present agreement, to establish and to preserve peace
in the Pacific area.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
454 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State:
EXCELLENCY: I have received your letter of June-.
I wish to state that my Government is fully aware of the attitude of the
Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe as
explained to me by you during our recent conversations and as set forth
in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to my Government
the policy of the Government of the United States as it had been
explained to me, and I may assure you that my Government understands and
appreciates the attitude and position of the Government of the United
States with regard to the European war.
I wish also to assure you that the Government of Japan, with regard to
the measures which the Government of the United States may be forced to
adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any commitment
requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the
fundamental objective of the present agreement
The Government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely
assumed by the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to take no
action inimical to the establishment and preservation of peace in the
Pacific area.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished
consideration.
[Annex 4 to Annex B]
SUGGESTED LETTER To BE ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN CONNECTION WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION
EXCELLENCY: In the informal conversations which resulted in the
conclusion of a general agreement of understanding between our two
Governments, you and your associates expressed fully and frankly views
on the intentions of the Japanese Government in regard to applying to
Japan's proposed economic cooperation with China the principle of non-
discrimination in international commercial relations. It is believed
that it would be helpful if you could be so good as to confirm the
statements already expressed orally in the form of replies on the
following points:
1. Does the term "economic cooperation" between Japan and China
contemplate the granting by the Government of China to the Japanese
Government or its nationals of any preferential or monopolistic rights
which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Government and
Japanese nationals as compared with the Government and nationals of the
United States and of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon
the inauguration of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan
and China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China
Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and their
subsidiaries, will be divested, in so far as Japanese official support
may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights that
they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by virtue of present
circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?
2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel
by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 455
under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese Government
indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately
upon the entering into by the Government of Chungking of negotiations
with the Government of Japan and what restrictions will be removed at
later dates, with an indication in each case in so far as possible of
the approximate time within which removal of restrictions would be
effected?
3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the Chinese
Government shall exercise full and complete control of matters relating
to trade, currency and exchange? Is it the intention of the Japanese
Government to withdraw and to redeem the Japanese military notes which
are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored
regimes in China? Can the Japanese Government indicate how soon after
the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the
above ends can in its opinion be carried out?
It would be appreciated if as specific replies as possible could be made
to the questions above listed.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
(Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 486-492.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 456
ANNEX C
TEXT OF BASIC JAPANESE TERMS OF PEACE WITH CHINA
1. Neighborly friendship.
2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. Cooperative defense between Japan and China.
Cooperation between Japan and China for the purposes of preventing
communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a
menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public
order in China.
Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the
Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to
above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.
4. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.
The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for
carrying out the China Affairs will be withdrawn from China upon the
settlement of the said Affairs, excepting those troops which come under
point 3.
5. Economic cooperation.
(a) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China, having
the development and utilization of essential materials for national
defense in China as its principal objective.
(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic
activities by third Powers in China so long as they are pursued on an
equitable basis.
6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-wei
Government.
7 No annexation.
8 No indemnities.
9. Recognition of Manchoukuo. (Ex. 29, Vol. II, p. 633)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 457
ANNEX D
Japanese Proposals Submitted to Secretary Hull on September 27
(Washington time)
The Governments of Japan and of the United States accent joint
responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement
of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption
of traditional friendly relations.
Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the
sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the
deterioration of the amicable sentiment between their countries should
be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and
unfortunate consequences.
It is the earnest hope of both Governments that, by a cooperative
effort, Japan and the United States may contribute effectively toward
the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by
the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world
peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens
to engulf civilization.
For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited
and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate
instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general
understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and
in act.
It is the belief of both Governments that such an understanding should
comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory
concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.
Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve
harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified
or improved; to wit:
1. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting
international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the
Pacific area.
Accordingly, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United
States have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration
of policy:
I. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting
international relations and the character of nations.
Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward
the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a
458 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of
both countries.
Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present,
concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a
family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord
through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting a
responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful
processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical
welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound
not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to
oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.
Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional
concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles
of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and
never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral
principles and concepts.
II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in
the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor
jointly for the early restoration of world peace
With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of
world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by
considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United
States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide
entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite
Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what
actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in
accordance with the said interpretation.
III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.
Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that the settlement of
the China Affair has a vital bearing upon the peace of the entire
Pacific area and consequently upon that of the world, will endeavor to
expedite a rapid realization of the settlement of the said Affair.
The Government of the United States, recognizing the effort and the
sincere desire on the part of the Japanese Government concerning the
peaceful settlement of the China Affair, will, with the intention of
facilitating the realization of the settlement, render its good offices
in order that the Chungking Government may promptly enter into
negotiations with the Government of Japan for a termination of
hostilities and a resumption of peaceful relations, and will refrain
from resorting to any measures and actions which might hamper the
measures and efforts of the Government of Japan directed toward the
settlement of the China Affair.
The Government of Japan maintains that the basic general terms of peace
for the settlement of the China Affair will be in harmony with the
principles embodied in the Konoye statement, and those agreements
between Japan and China and those matters which have been put into
effect in accordance with the said statement; that the economic
cooperation between Japan and China will be carried on by peaceful means
and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in the
international commercial relations and also with
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 459
the principle of especially close relationship which is natural between
neighboring countries; and that the economic activities of third Powers
in China will not be excluded so long as they are pursued on an
equitable basis.
NOTE: There is appended a draft of the basic terms of peace between
Japan and China.
IV. Commerce between Japan and the United States.
Both Governments agree to take without delay measures necessary for
resuming normal trade relations between the two countries.
Both Governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first of
the measures envisaged in the preceding paragraph, discontinue
immediately the measures of freezing assets now being enforced, and that
they will supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively,
available and required by either of them.
V. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.
Both Governments mutually pledge themselves that the economic activities
of Japan and the United States in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be
carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of
non-discrimination in the international commercial relations in
pursuance of the policy stated in the preceding paragraph, both
Governments agree to cooperate each with the other towards the creation
of conditions of international trade and international investment under
which both countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure
through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and
commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and
development of its own economy.
Both Governments will amicably cooperate for the conclusion and
execution of agreements with the Powers concerned in regard to the
production and supply, on the basis of non-discrimination, of such
specific commodities as oil, rubber, nickel, and tin.
VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in
the Pacific area.
Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that it is a matter of
vital importance to stabilize promptly the situation in the Southwestern
Pacific area, undertake not to resort to any measures and actions which
may jeopardize such stabilization. The Government of Japan will not make
any armed advancement, using French Indochina as a base, to any adjacent
area thereof (excluding China), and upon the establishment of an
equitable peace in the Pacific area, will withdraw its troops which are
now stationed in French Indochina.
The Government of the United States will alleviate its military measures
in the Southwestern Pacific area.
Both Governments declare that they respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Thailand and Netherland East Indies, and that
they are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the neutralization
of the Philippine Islands when its independence will have been achieved.
The Government of the United States guarantees non-discriminatory
treatment of the Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands.
[Here follows text of basic terms of peace between Japan and China set
forth in Annex C above.]
(Ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 637-640.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 460
ANNEX E
(TEXT OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS REPLY TO UNITED STATES NOTE OF NOVEMBER
26, 1941, AS INTERCEPTED AND DECODED IN WASHINGTON PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO
SECRETARY HULL BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADORS)
(Part 1 of 14)
MEMORANDUM
1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order
that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of
the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world
peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April
last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment
and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of
the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views,
concerning the claims the American Government has persistently
maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain
have taken toward Japan during these eight months.
2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the
stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable
all nations to find each its proper place in the world.
Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part
of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government
has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted
its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It
was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri
Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.
(Part 2 of 14)
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the
establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering
with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East
Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing
French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration
to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these
regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with
France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both
American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a
threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government
to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing
economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously
hostile attitude, these countries
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 461
have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement
of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very
existence of the empire.
(Part 3 of 14)
Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan
proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for
a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering
the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the
Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an
agreement of view had been reached on fundamental -(75 letters garbled)-
The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula
proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration
past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated
discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of
view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal,
moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal
points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to
reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to
its original proposal failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit
of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.
(Part 4 of 14)
Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November
20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution
of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its
previous proposal, stipulated the following points:
(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-
China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the
acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and
commodities of which the two countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations
to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required
quantity of oil.
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to
measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration
of general peace between Japan and China.
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan
and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific
area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern
part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of
the present agreement.
462 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Part 5 of 14)
As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its
readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to
act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously
suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to
do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when
the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.
The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new
proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang
Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the
offer of the President to act as the so called "Introducer" of peace
between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it.
Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese
government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American
government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a
source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.
(Part 6 of 14)
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government
has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did
its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible
concessions often in spite of great difficulties.
As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the
negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory
attitude.
As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce,
advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed
its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and
declared that along with the actual Practice of this principle in the
world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the
Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no
intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers
pursued on an equitable basis.
Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French
Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned
above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern
French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.
(Part 7 of 14)
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost
degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully
appreciated by the American government.
On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to
theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its
impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is
difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the
Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American
government especially to the following points:
1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the
acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 463
about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through
recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of
one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and
imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose
of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
(Part 8 of 14)
Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a
basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the
Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the
world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of
the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact
between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet
Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old
concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of
East Asia.
The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded
with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to
conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the
establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It
is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to
restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact
when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such,
it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
(Part 9 of 14)
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may
be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on
the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is
engaged. On the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to
attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that
are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is
totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American
Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through
peaceful means.
3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly
upholds, objects to settling international issues through military
pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other
nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means
of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at
times more inhuman than military pressure.
(Part 10 of 14)
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American
Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great
Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied
not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a
464 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fact of history that one countr-(45 letters garbled or missing)- been
compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of
imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the -es to the prosperity of
the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the
perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to
Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its
proper place in the world.
(Part 11 of 14)
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French
Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American
policy. That the six countries,-Japan, the United States, Great Britain,
The Netherlands, China and Thailand,-excepting France, should undertake
among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would
be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the
governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a
proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to
the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be
considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to
the n-(50 letters missed)-sible for the present predicament of East
Asia.
(Part 12 of 14)
5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding
China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional
application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International
Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to
destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The
attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support
militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime
at Chunking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking
government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This
demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chunking regime,
demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to
obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and
the return of peace to East Asia.
(Part 13 of 14)
5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items
such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade
agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and
stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of
extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the
proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the
China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its
honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese
government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 465
6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the
Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed, with Great Britain
and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the
American government. However, since the American government has made the
proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with
Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chunking, ANDND*
presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the
questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that. All these countries
are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.
(Part 14 of 14)
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire
with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts
toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in
East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and
interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been
revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus,
the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American
relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through
cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations.
(Ex. 1, pp. 239-245)
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