Of the 37 leaflets prepared during the UNITAF phase of the Somalia intervention, many featured standard PSYOP themes. Some of these themes are the number of Allied forces in the coalition occupying a nation, the rebuilding (consolidation) of the nation, the prohibition against weapons, warning against touching mines and bombs, the prohibition against looting, and a general call for law and order among the populace. Some of the standard leaflet themes that we do not find are rewards for individuals or weapons and safe conduct passes. In general, the leaflets are crude with most in printed in just one or two colors.
An example of the number of allied forces of the coalition is leaflet S3. The leaflet depicts an Allied soldier (probably an Australian from the cut of his uniform and his "boonie" hat) shaking hands with a Somali on the front, and the flags of the 21 nations above and below the vignette. The Australians namesd this campaign Operation Solace. They sent about 1,200 men, 1 Royal Australian Regiment Battalion Group, an Australian HQ and the HMAS Tobruk.
The leaflet is found with two different texts on the back. Both mention prohibited weapons. The text is:
There were numerous mine warning leaflets. S15 shows a Somali about to touch a mine. There are 23 coalition flags above and below him. Drawings of different kinds of explosives are all around the boy. Text on the front is:
This leaflet appears in several variations with different colors. It was printed with fronts and backs in blue, red or green.
Leaflet S13 features and anti-looting theme and depicts Somalis trying to steal grain bags from an armed UNITAF convoy. Text on the back is:
This leaflet was printed in red and green.
Leaflet S28 has a nation-building theme. The front depicts Somalis and Americans working together to clean up the streets. The American drives a bulldozer. The text is:
Leaflet S20 depicts a bulldozer and an engineer with a theodolite on the front in bright red. The back is all text in green. The text is:
We mention “Technicals” above and the Museum of Modern Art was interested in images of Technicals for a project they were working on. As a direct result, I decided to add this one, a rather bland leaflet in black and white, but with a nice image of an armed Technical civilian vehicle. The other side depicts an armed Somali. The text on the front is:
Other PSYOP loudspeaker actions included warning civilians before an attack. For instance, the After-Action says:
It is probably worth noting that this is the first legal recognized use of German troops in a war zone since the end of WWII. It is common knowledge that the Germans clandestinely took part in Operation Desert Shield and Storm in 1990 and sent propaganda leaflet balloons over the Iraqis, but in this case, they were out in the open and everyone knew they were there.
About 20-odd years after I wrote this article, retired Colonel Larry Dietz allowed me to study his personal papers. Among the publications he had accumulated was Deployment of Information Operations in Somalia from 3 August 1993 to 23 March 1994. This book describes the German PSYOP campaign in Somalia. Among the illustrations are about 42 propaganda leaflets and 21 propaganda postcards that the unit printed. I don�t want to double the size of this article which in 2023 was already 24,000 words long, but I will add a few of the leaflets and postcards just to show the quality of the German artists and printers. The book says is part:
This German flag was made as a sticker to be placed wherever needed. 4,000 copies were produced sized DIN A4, a standard paper size (8.27 x 11.60-inches) by the DrUg 951 at the request of III Corps. Flag symbols are important because they tell other people who you are, and it is good for the morale of your own troops. When a commander wants something patriotic and colorful printed, he needs to find artists and printing presses. Where do you find them? At the local PSYOP unit who has both.
The German leaflets are uncoded. The backs usually show the flags of Germany and Somalia side-by-side. The text on the front is:
Protect your children.
This leaflet depicts a group of happy Somali children. The text is:
Calendar
Calendars are wonderful propaganda products and have been printed since the days of the Vietnam War. Back in the 1960s the 7th PSYOP Group on Okinawa printed beautiful art and historical calendars for Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and other nearby countries. At the same time, the enemy printed small pocket calendars with sentimental scenes of a sad American wife at home waiting for her husband�s return, and similar themes. Why calendars? Because once the target places it on the wall he sees your propaganda every day for a year as he checks the day�s date. It is the PSYOP product that goes on giving. The calendar depicts the German forces helping the Somalis in many ways and has text in both German and Somali. The text is:
We take care of the sick
We build schools.
We drill wells.
We build bridges.
We can only do this with your support.
POSTCARDS
We read above that one of the responsibilities of the German PSYOP unit was to support troops by providing field postcards and special postmarks. That is odd. PSYOP units are often asked to produce cards or certificates for special occasions because they have artists and printing presses. I have never seen them tasked with postcards before. During Desert Storm when every American was asked to write to the troops there were perhaps as many as 100 different patriotic cards produced by organizations, cities, states, and various commercial enterprises. Cards by the French contingent in Kuwait were very attractive. I said above that there were over 20 official postcards created by the German unit. I will show some here.
Postcard 4
Although the number of the postcard is not depicted on the front side, the Germans did number each card and this one was number 4. The card was titled "Africa," and 10,000 were printed.
Postcard 12
Christmas postcards are often prepared by PSYOP units for their supported combat units. In this case, the German unit printed them as a responsibility. In all, three were produced. This one is titled "Nicolas." 30,000 copies of this card were printed.
Postcard 18
The later cards all show the Germans at work helping the Somalis to live a better life. This one is simply called "Water Supply." A German soldier fills a Somali water point with fresh, clean water.
Postcard 20
Many safe conduct leaflets mention the medical facilities that are open to those who come back to the government. This last postcard depicts a Somali father holding twins with a German doctor and nurse standing by. It depicts the Germans as peaceful people willing to help the Somalis.
The Germans also used loudspeakers in their propaganda. Some of their comments on the subject are:
The length of a call should not exceed 60 seconds. Messages should be short and concise, with a simply structured sentence.
On 2 September 1993, The Germans used the medium of loudspeakers for the first time. The following priorities were set. The basic positive attitude of the Somali population towards the German soldiers had to be maintained and strengthened. The announcement of humanitarian measures should be as specific as possible, without making promises that cannot be fulfilled. Help for self-help should always be mentioned. By using local proverbs, it was possible to achieve a special closeness to the target group.
The specialist literature on the Somali language that had been procured before the start of the deployment made it clear that it was characterized by flowery idioms. The consequence of this was that the principles conveyed in the course about writing loudspeaker announcements in the country of assignment were not applicable and required the loudspeaker personnel to rethink their thinking.
Composing the German loudspeaker text, considering the limited knowledge of the Somali language, showed that the content had to be divided into a total of 4 messages in order not to exceed the 60-second limit. The resulting breaks should be bridged by Somali music.
At the start of the operation, the Germans assigned an English-Somali translator to the teams on an hourly basis.
The first thing to do as a preliminary to the translator's work was to translate the adapted, rather excessive German texts into English. However, to transmit these texts and phrases, considerable language skills were required, which the speaker personnel did not have. This task fell to the information center cell, which had a suitably qualified editorial soldier. In addition to translating the loudspeaker texts into the Somali language, the Somali interpreter also helped select the music.
The following guidelines for the use of loudspeakers have been established: The live transmission of a Somali text was excluded; The loudspeaker texts were to be recorded and translated back into English by another uninvolved interpreter; And if possible, the uninvolved translator should belong to a different clan than the speaker.
German text of the loudspeaker message to Matabaan on 2 September 1993:
Music
We German soldiers greet the Somali brothers of MATABAAN.
You have never seen a visitor who stays less than a day and pays less than one person.
As friends we are here for the 4th time to help.
We want to help lay the foundation so that you can rebuild your country.
May today be another successful day.
Soldiers from the 9th PSYOP Battalion along with a security escort provided bythe 10th Mountain Division, operate HMMWV Loudspeakers as part of U.S. humanitarian aid relief efforts in Kismayo. Somalia. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army)
The 4th PSYOP booklet also mentions the use of loudspeaker teams in Somalia,
From the initial landing on the beach at Mogadishu to the transition to UNOSOM II, the eight loudspeaker teams participating in Operation Restore Hope faced many different challenges. The loudspeaker teams broadcasted numerous messages, including surrender appeals, instructions during weapons sweeps and at roadblocks and announcements to organize crowds at feeding sites. Loudspeaker teams also distributed the UNITAF newspaper RAJO in many of the major towns and villages in each humanitarian relief sector.
As loudspeaker teams were attached to Army and Marine forces in each of the humanitarian service sectors, they were given the responsibility and authority to request specific leaflets based on the situation confronting each maneuver commander
The heliborne PSYOP personnel also disseminated leaflets informing the people of Mogadishu that the objective of the operation was to improve security in the city. It was earlier noted that children liked to chase the leaflets, which also provided a simple and effective way to draw them out of the way of the potentially dangerous areas being searched.
Specialist 4 Jamie Santos eating Ramen noodles for breakfast
from a canteen cup while waiting for the chopper - 3 October 1993
Photographed by Matt Reilly - Etching by Scott Sullen
Sergeant Joe Zimmerman and Specialist 4 Jamie Santos of the 9th PSYOP Battalion used a loudspeaker Humvee while deployed to Somalia. They operated out of Bardera and used their 700 watt loudspeaker to convince the Somalis to cooperate rather than to fight. The team traveled from the Somali capital of Mogadishu along 300 miles of pitted, dusty roads to the lawless towns of Baidoa and Bardera, helping the 7th Marine Battalion expand the security umbrella over much of the country.
The Blackhawk Helicopter in Somalia
PSYOP specialists are often called names like BS bombers, litterbugs, and Speaker Monkeys. A group of them talked to me and it was clear that they were far more than just propagandists. They could go anywhere and do damn near anything. A case in point: Sergeant First Class Joel Krall told me that Members of both A and B Company of the 9th PSYOP Battalion took part in the Somalia operations. He remembers taking that UH60 Blackhawk to Somalia. It was used all through the operation and the leadup to the battle of Mogadishu. He told me:
The loudspeaker array was a last-minute purchase from Anodyne Electronics Manufacturing Corporation and there was no hardware for us to install it. So, MSG Danny Eller and I took the parts to the Mobile Maintenance Depot and literally did an emergency fabrication from speaker wings to a mounting plate. The plate was a problem and had to go over to the Army Airfield to mark mounting holes for the UH60. The 2100/2700 Loudspeaker system did not have a dedicated airframe. Which is why we fabricated it so it could go from UH 60 to UH 60. This was the newest system of its type and the only one used in Somalia to my knowledge. Another problem was determining where to get the electric power to charge the loudspeakers. There was an auxiliary power place for an auxiliary power unit, and we had to get one of those too. The 9th PSYOP Battalion S4 (Logistics) opened most of the doors for us, but then came the mounting of the amplifiers in a fabricated box. That took approximately 36 hours as I recall, and then into my trailer on my hummer and onto the chopper. We did not have time to test it before deployment, but we did some tests at Baledogle before taking it to Kismayo. I did manage to fly a couple of missions with it after the battle of Mogadishu. During the Blackhawk Down phase of the operation, the chopper took part in the Durant hostage crisis when Chief Warrant Officer Mike Durant was almost killed by an angry Somali mob while in the downed helicopter but was taken prisoner instead. After 12 days in a violent captivity, he was set free.
Years after I wrote this article, the website We are the Mighty added more about the mission in an article titled POW in Mogadishu, by Blake Stillwell. He said in part:
This makes for an agonizing scene, with Durant suffering from a broken cheekbone, eye socket, back, femur, and nose as the sun goes down over Mogadishu. He thought he was going to die. And the Somalis did try to kill him three times. But the Army did not just remind one of their soldiers that he would not be left behind, his friends in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment wanted him to know they were actively looking for him and they would not stop until they found him. When you�re in captivity, if you hear an aircraft, it obviously gets your attention because the first thing you�re trying to determine is, do they know where I am?
Durant heard a telltale BONG of his favorite song, and then the opening lines of AC/DC�s Hell�s Bells. It was an incredible moment, Durant recalled. They had loudspeakers attached to this Black Hawk, flying around the city, broadcasting this music. That�s when the voice bellowed the words echoed in the movie: Mike, we won�t leave here without you.
On the subject of Blackhawk Down, Operation Gothic Serpent, led by U. S. Special Operations Forces during the Somali Civil War took place in Mogadishu from August to October 1993. On the afternoon of Oct. 3, armed militants shot down two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, after which U.S. ground forces converged on the two downed aircraft to recover the personnel. The ensuing intense firefight resulted in the loss of 18 American Soldiers. 28 years later, in 2021, the U.S. Army approved the upgrade of 60 Army special operators’ awards for their heroic actions during the Battle of Mogadishu. Fifty-eight awards were upgraded to Silver Stars and two were upgraded to Distinguished Flying Crosses.The upgrades are a result of the October 2020 directive from former Secretary of the Army, Ryan McCarthy, who directed the Senior Army Decorations Board to re-evaluate previously approved awards for valor.
Propaganda loudspeakers in the door of a Blackhawk helicopter
Staff Sergeant Anthony Hardie of B Co, 9th PSYOP Battalion, sent me a picture of his 2700-Watt loudspeaker in Somalia. The loudspeakers sit in the door of a Blackhawk helicopter. On his inaugural flight in Somalia from Kismayu he imitated APOCALYPSE NOW and played the Flight of the Valkyries. He flew many missions with this chopper and loudspeakers during the early phase of Operation Restore Hope in southern Somalia. SSG Hardie told me:
My teams and I did a few missions with the Blackhawk during Operation Restore Hope in early 1993. The Blackhawk was based at the Kismayo airport (we were based at the Port of Kismayo). We did various broadcast missions, including curfews and other public service-type announcements, and at least one consolidation mission. We also did various leaflet drops. On one Blackhawk mission over a village out beyond Kismayo, our messaging was not well received, and I will never forget the sound of bullets pinging off the Blackhawk as the pilot rushed us upwards out of range. That mission was a leaflet drop, but while my memory is fading, I believe it was also simultaneously a loudspeaker mission. It was especially challenging that our Somali-American translator had a severe fear of heights, and flying with the door open caused special challenges for him, including the time he vomited out the open door and the rotor wash blew it back in on him.
There were also issues with sound quality and altitude, too low and the broadcast was overpowered by the noise of the Blackhawk; too high and it was lost entirely. As we learned during our combat deployments, we had to improvise, adapt, overcome, and relearn a lot of key knowledge that was almost certainly gained during Vietnam, and then lost. It was during this deployment that we perfected (rediscovered?) the use of the cheap-trash-bag method of helicopter leaflet delivery rather than the unwieldy, ineffective BOX method we had been taught at the Special Warfare Center and School. The trash bag method used a thin, poor-quality trash bag, filled with leaflets. We shook the leaflets in the bag to get a good mix (like laundry in a washing machine) so they were not stuck together in big stacks that were heavy and would fall too far, too fast. We used a tie-down ratcheting cable tied tightly around the top of the bag. For leaflet deployment, toss the bag out into the rotor wash, attached to the inside of the helicopter of course. The rotor wash forced the bag to stretch, and because it was poor quality, break open, spreading the leaflets in a cloud over the target. Then encourage the pilot to zoom up to high altitude for occasions when they were not received well, and the locals sent some rounds back at us.
This was our first deployment to Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope. Most everyone in the 9th PSYOP Battalion redeployed home in February/March 1993. I stayed on, dropping down to Tactical PSYOP Team leader with the Quick Reaction Force, and was joined by Eric Christopher, and then later augmented by Hans Marc Hurd and a translator. During those couple months, March-April 1993, we were entirely on the ground (Hummer, with a 900-watt loudspeaker I believe). Elements of the 9th PSYOP Battalion were tasked out across the Somalia theatre of operations and were all doing different things, dependent on location and type of unit supported (Conventional of the 10th Mountain Division, Rangers, USMC, Special Forces, etc.). The missions were widely disparate. In early 1993, Mogadishu got quieter while Kismayo heated up and at times was augmented with additional resources.
I also note that in those days (early 1990s, perhaps beyond), those of us with foreign language skills got pulled for taskings and missions on that basis, seemingly without regard for our unit of assignment. For example, I got the same kinds of taskings and missions in and related to Sub-Saharan Africa, attached to 5th/3rd Special Forces Group A-detachments, when I was assigned to the strategic 6th PSYOP Battalion and the tactical 9th PSYOP Battalion. I was also pulled for the 1992 Guantanamo Haitian boat people relief/refugee camp operations, I was there with a lot of people from 1st PSYOP Battalion, and beyond. So, we never know exactly where we will be when a situation arises.
Danny Elder added:
We normally used the AEM 900-watts system, but we did fabricate a helicopter floor mount for a 2700-watt system using three 900s in a series. I used a vehicle AEM 450 system rigged to the floor in a Blackhawk during the capture of Talill Air Base in 91 during Desert Storm. The door gunner literally kept us from getting shot down.
A lot of people WRONGLY say that the messages cannot be heard when these are used from aircraft. They are WRONG. By using messages 30 seconds or less and repeated three times while in a low fast circle of the target audience, they can not only hear it but understand it well. I have personally witnessed enemy soldiers following our directions exactly as we were giving them. Of course, the Cobra running as our wingman helped a great deal in convincing them.
We also jury-rigged an LSS350 to an OH-58 Kiowa helicopter in the Arraijan Tank Farm and nearby Howard AFB, Panama, while playing games with the dignity battalions in 1988-1989. That caused a ruckus. I almost fell out of the thing trying to manage a huge spotlight, the loudspeaker remote while pointing my M16 out the door. Had a near disaster with the spotlight going off in the cabin as the dang thing had a hair-trigger while we were flying using night vision goggles.
The Marines were happy to have the Army PSYOP specialists attached to their unit and used them several times to save both American and Somali lives. Colonel Greg Newbold, Commander of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) said about the PSYOP broadcasts:
They didn’t have to sell us. We were very interested in the technique. It is absolutely the right way to maximize the ability to save lives.
In the town of Baidoa, Intelligence sources located a warehouse that contained Armed Somali fighters and vehicles equipped with heavy weapons known as “Technicals.” The Marines surrounded the building. Colonel Newbold did want the Somalis to feel trapped and decide to fight their way out of the warehouse. He called the PSYOP team. The team played a tape that said in part:
Lay down your weapons and walk away.
A Rocket Propelled Grenada (RPG)
The Somali fighters realized they were surrounded and that any attempt to resist would result in a firefight and probably their deaths. They took about six minutes to consider their options and then walked out, lifting their shirts to show they were unarmed. The Marines entered the empty building and found five Technicals, a rocket propelled grenade, rockets, machine-guns and food stolen from the local civilians.
The Somalis were sent home unmolested. The Marines believed that they would tell their story and the people would understand that they did not have to fight to the death.
The loudspeakers often used prerecorded tapes. Santos told me that the military had searched their records for Somali speakers and found only a very few. In one case a Naval Petty Officer was found in Norfolk News, VA. Over two days he recorded 20 propaganda messages to cover a great number of scenarios like armed convoys and food convoys. Many of the tapes were used during the PSYOP campaign. These tapes were used during the PSYOP campaign.
The February 2018 issue of Myrtle Beach’s Dunes Living said about Santos:
Jamie was also active in securing the perimeter of Mogadishu Airport, clearing hangers of shoulder-fired Stinger missiles like those ones that took the UH-60 helicopters out action. Attached to Task Force Mountain, he was instrumental in the pursuit and elimination of Somali War Lords who had effectively caused over 300,000 Somali citizens to starve by denying the distribution of food donations from around the world.
UNOSOM II
UNITAF was a moderate success. Most Somalis were being fed and there was a reasonable amount of law and order within the country. The United Nations was not satisfied. Besides the earlier ongoing missions, UNOSOM II was also entrusted with assisting the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure. Force was authorized. The mission that started with feeding the Somali people and protecting food convoys had become one of building a new society. This is sometimes called "mission creep." That required the neutralization of the warlords, and would lead directly to the American military disaster popularly depicted in the book and movie "Blackhawk Down."
The U.S. military takes no responsibility for this mission creep. They point out that on 14 August 1992, the U.N. voted to deliver humanitarian aid by airlift. The Americans performed this mission. On 6 June 1993, the U.N. voted to take all necessary means to bring those responsible for the problem to justice. This took the American military from a peaceful to a wartime mission and yet there was no heavy armor or weaponry to do the job properly.
The shift caught all entirely by surprise, and those involved resisted the mission. Army Major General Waldo Freeman, deputy commander of U.S. Central Command during Operation Restore Hope said:
CentCom was very much against the intervention, Even after we developed our plans, we went to the Joint Staff with the position that we don't think this is a very good idea.
Since Somalia, American military leaders have been extremely careful to watch their mission orders and be sure that there is no “creep,” no sudden movement of one desired result to another without adequate planning and preparation.
Some of the basic PSYOP problems are mentioned in Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War. The author points out that the PSYOP role was taken away from the American contingent and given to a U.N. contingent. The American military staff of 100 personnel was cut to a U.N. military staff of eight personal. The radio and newspaper was taken from the military and given to unprepared civilian personnel. The Somalis are an oral culture and it was important to communicate with them by radio, but that ability was lost. The authors conclude:
It is critical to win the internal information battle. The UNOSOM decision to reduce PSYOP manning to a mere five personnel (from a high of almost one hundred during UNITAF) virtually eliminated the Forces’ primary means of communications and influence.
Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994 says about UNOSOM II PSYOP:
The absence of “combat multipliers” limited UNOSOM II’s operational capability in Somalia. Combat multipliers such as PSYOP, civil affairs, aviation, and electronic warfare (jamming assets), engineers and logistics units were visibly absent from the force structure of UNOSOM II.
U.S. PSYOP personnel provided continuous support to UNOSOM II from 4 May 1993 until 31 March 1994. The eighty soldier PSYOP Task Force (POTF) which had supported UNITAF returned to Ft. Bragg, N.C. and was replaced by a far smaller PSYOP support element. This support element consisted of one officer seconded to UNOSOM II, four soldiers assisting the radio and newspaper and four additional soldiers supporting the U.S. Quick Reaction Force with Tactical PSYOP (loudspeaker) operations. The POTF was reestablished on October 15, 1993 under the command of JTF-Somalia. The POTF rapidly expanded from nine to forty eight soldiers and a civilian analyst from the 4 POG (A) Strategic Studies Division.
Upon the transition to UNOSOM II, the PSYOP effort would focus primarily on leaflets. This focus would lead to the belief that leaflets were virtually the only tool available and that newspaper and radio were a civilian information asset and not PSYOP tools. Aircraft disseminated over four million leaflets during the period from May through November.
We should mention a lesser known loss of a Blackhawk helicopter that led directly to a PSYOP leaflet being prepared and dropped over
Mogadishu
.
Somali Militiamen on wreckage of “Courage 53”
At 0200 on 25 September 1993, during a night reconnaissance mission over
Mogadishu
, a 101st Airborne Division UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter with the call sign "Courage 53" was hit by a rocket propelled grenade. The explosion ignited the fuel and brought down the aircraft. As the helicopter fell from the sky in flames, the pilot tried to steer it toward friendly forces occupying the seaport. Instead, the helicopter hit the top of a building and then fell to the ground and skidded over a hundred yards before it came to rest against an embankment.
PFC Matthew K. Anderson, SGT Ferdinan C. Richardson, and SGT Eugene Williams were killed in the fiery crash. Chief Warrant Officer Dale Shrader the pilot, and Chief Warrant Officer Perry Alliman the co-pilot, survived the crash.
Shrader's arm was broken and Alliman was badly burned and blinded. Somali militiamen rushed to the scene and opened fire on the two Americans with AK-47s and hand grenades. Shrader fought them off and killed at least one attacker. In the midst of the firefight a friendly Somali approached the two Americans waving a flashlight and yelling “American boys!” They had no choice but to trust him. He led Alliman and Shrader to a nearby
United Arab Emirates
unit that was securing the seaport. That Somali saved their lives.
“Thank you
Mogadishu
” leaflet
After the attack, in an attempt to foster friendship with the Somali people, UNOSOM printed a leaflet thanking the good citizens of
Mogadishu
for their help in rescuing the two Americans. The front of the leaflet depicts the downed helicopter, the two injured pilots, the Somali that guided them and others who point the way to safety. Text on the back is:
Thank you
Mogadishu
. Three UNOSOM soldiers died during the attack on a helicopter last Saturday. But other UNOSOM soldiers were saved by the actions of the brave Somali rescuers. These rescuers are heroes, and UNOSOM salutes them. Their actions bring great honor on themselves and
Somalia
.
Graffiti of a U.S. Helicopter drawn on a Somali Wall
The artist tried to spell “Cobra” on the Chopper
Michael Clauss who served in
Somalia
from July 1993 to March 1994 as a sergeant (E5) with the 10th Aviation Brigade (10th Mountain Division) in the Quick Reaction Force S-2 (intelligence section) adds:
We eventually found the Somali who helped the crew and offered him a reward. He asked for a job instead.
In May 1993, all the parties involved in the civil war agreed to a disarmament conference proposed by Mohammed Farah Aideed, the leading Somali warlord. However, on 5 June, 24 Pakistani troops in the UN forces were killed in an ambush in an area of Mogadishu controlled by Aideed. On 8 August his forces detonated a mine under a passing
U.S.
Military Police vehicle on
Jialle-Siaad Street
in
Mogadishu
killing four
U.S.
MPs. The UN passed resolution 837 calling for the arrest of all involved. On 22 August Task Force Ranger deployed to Somalia under the name Operation Gothic Serpent. The Task Force was made up of U. S. Army Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment, 130 members of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment (Delta Force), and 16 helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Regiment (Night Stalkers). During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into
Mogadishu
, all of which were tactical successes, although in one instance the task force members mistakenly raided an unlisted UN facility and temporarily restrained some UN employees.
On the afternoon of 3 October 1993, the task force received intelligence that foreign minister Omar Salad and top political advisor Mohamed Hassan Awale, two of Aideed's Habr Gidr clan leaders, were in central Mogadishu. The task force sent 19 aircraft, 12 vehicles, and 160 men to arrest them under Operation Irene. The two leaders were quickly arrested along with a number of other suspects. During the action, two MH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were struck by rocket propelled grenades and crashed. The end result was a 15-hour pitched battle that resulted in 18 American combat deaths and 73 wounded in action. The Somalis desecrated the bodies of the American soldiers and television stations around the world broadcast the scenes. The soldiers could not be rescued by tanks or heavy armored vehicles because Clinton Defense Secretary Les Aspin had personally turned down repeated requests for heavier armor, believing that the sight of such weapons would make the Americans appear to be on a mission of conquest rather than peacekeeping. One American, Chief Warrant Officer Mike Durant was taken hostage, but was returned to American forces on 14 October 1993. Operation Gothic Serpent ended on 13 October 1993. Following these events, the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a joint task force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. At the same time, United States President William Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Secretary Aspin resigned under fire at the end of 1993.
Each year, all over the United States, races are run called the “Mogadishu Mile” in honor of the route taken by American Rangers and Delta Force soldiers from the helicopter crash site to an appointed rally point held by the 10th Mountain Division during the battle of Mogadishu. This is a typical American commemoration of the night when the soldiers fought their way, many on foot, out of Mogadishu while under fire from hundreds of the enemy.
Curiously, the same thing happened after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. New York City firefighter Stephen Siller was on his way home when his scanner told of the first plane hitting the Twin Towers. Stephen drove his truck to the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel only to find that it was closed to traffic. With sixty pounds of gear strapped to his back, he ran through the Tunnel, hoping to meet up with his own company, Squad 1. He was killed in the collapse of the Twin Towers, but each year his dedication is commemorated by a number of races called “Tunnels to Towers.”
UNOSOM II PSYOP
PSYOP Loudspeaker teams advised the people not
to block the roads or interfere with the covoys
The PSYOP transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was not a smooth one. Lieutenant Colonel Charles P. Borchini, the Commander of the 8th PSYOP Battalion and the PSYOP Task Force hired and trained local Somali reporters and journalists, translators, artists, broadcasters, radio producers, and printers so that after the U.S. Army personnel from the 4th PSYOP Group returned to Ft. Bragg and the UN took over, the transition would be seamless. The UN seemed to agree. In February 1993, two UN officials recommended that the operation use the Somali civilian staff with the addition of some UN employees as supervisors.
In March, the UNOSOM II staff surprised everyone by requesting that there be no change in the PSYOP staffing, and that the U.S. Army personnel remain.
In April, the Central Command still planned to have the 4th PSYOP Group redeploy back to the Continental United States. Meanwhile the State Department approved the United Nations request. LTC Borchini reduced the military manpower to the absolute minimum and shipped all non-essential equipment home. At the same time, the UN assigned a single US Army officer to supervise the PSYOP organization.
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Admiral Jonathan Howe visited the PSYOP Task Force on 3 May 1993, the night before the change from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was to take place. After seeing the complexity of the operation, he requested more UN personnel that same evening. Meanwhile, LTC Borchini left four noncommissioned officers to supervise the operation until the UN was ready to take full control.
UNOSOM II Leaflets
The official code numbers for the UNOSOM II leaflets are partially known. All start with the letters CH followed by a number. The highest number that I am aware of is 40, but I have at least six with unknown numbers, so there could be more than 40 standard airdropped leaflets. Like the UNITAF leaflets most are fairly crude pen and ink drawings. Some are in color, some not. Some of the more interesting leaflets are:
CH3
Leaflet CH3 depicts a white dove of peace being crushed by a fist labeled "USC/SNA" ("United Somali Congress / Somali National Alliance"). Text on the back is:
The people of Somalia are striving for peace, but USC/SNA is bringing armed conflict back to serve their own greedy purposes. Only the Somali people can break the grasp and return peace to the country. Embrace peace and bring Somalia back to prosperity and security.
CH5
Leaflet CH5 depicts a Somali woman showing her children where to hide as armed gunmen pass by on the other side of the street. Text on the back is:
Citizens of Somalia. To insure the safety and well-being of all Somali citizens, UNOSOM II asks that if at any time violence or military actions commence in your area, you immediately leave the area or seek the nearest available shelter.
CH6
Leaflet CH6 depicts a street with happy civilians walking and shopping in peace. Some citizens enter a building where one of the civilian charity agencies that donate food to the Somali people is located. The text on the back is:
Along with UNOSOM II came the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), bringing food and aid for the people of Somalia. Do not allow this beneficial relationship to be destroyed. When stability returns to Mogadishu so will the NGOs. Cooperate with the UN and continue the progress that has been made toward improving the lives of all the Somali people.
CH31
Leaflet CH31 depicts a Somali walking along a road toward a beautiful city with a signpost that says "progress." He pulls a camel that bears the Somali star. Text on the back is:
The answer to Somalia's problems lies within you. The world community will continue to donate its vast resources to the restoration of Somalia, but relief efforts are being hampered by a few individuals. We must work together to end the violence and create a safe secure environment for the relief and restoration of Somalia.
CH10
Leaflet CH10 depicts General Aideed at the left and a woman holding her dead husband at the right. Text on the back is:
On 19 June at 1240 a.m., four gunshots were fired by Aideed bandits VIC of K-4. The Aideed bandits were In a white car that shot bullets into a group of innocent Somali people who were in the streets by the Saudi Relief Agency compound. A number of innocent Somali casualties occurred due to this ruthless action by the Aideed bandits. This proves to the Somali people that Aideed is an enemy to the Somali people and the entire world.
UNOSOM asks the assistance of the Somali people to catch the bandit Aideed so that he may be tried by an international court so that the whole world will know of the criminal acts that he has committed against the Somali people.
CH12
CH12 also depicts the Somali warlord. Text to the left of his sketched portrait is:
To any Somali citizen. UNOSOM is offering a reward to any citizen who provides information leading to the arrest and apprehension of Mr. Aideed, former chairman of the USC/SNA. Information should be provided to UNOSOM force headquarters at gate eight, or Mr. Aideed can be delivered to force headquarters.
The identical message is on the back to the left of a second sketch of Mr. Aideed, this one bareheaded.
The N.Y. Times of 11 June 1993 stated that the United nations is offering $25,000 for the arrest of General Aideed. It says that 500 posters and 60,000 leaflets have been prepared and disseminated.
CNN reported that helicopters dropped "wanted" leaflets showing a drawing of Mohammed Aideed from 22 to 24 June 1993. The English word "wanted" and the Somali words "Raadin Abaal Marin" were on the front of the leaflet. The back had a message offering an unnamed reward for Aideed's capture.
The NY Times of 24 June 1993 mentions the United Nations military campaign against Mogadishu warlord and clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed:
American gunships bombed the clan leader’s weapon depots and Radio Mogadishu, the site used for General Aideed’s broadcasts, and then ground forces were deployed on 17 June to attack his headquarters. Today the United nations dropped tens of thousands of leaflets over Mogadishu that offered a reward of an undisclosed amount to any Somali who turned General Aideed in or provided information leading to his arrest. Bold letters across the top of the bright yellow posters bearing a sketch of General Aideed proclaim him to be ‘wanted.’ Some Mogadishu residents are collecting the posters as souvenirs.
General Zinni noted in Battle Ready that bombing Aideed's radio station wasn't necessarily a good idea:
The months to follow would show that the UN failed to learn this lesson. Instead of countering Aideed’s hostile media blasts in kind, they tried to close down his radio station. Freedom of the press has to work both ways; we don’t shut down the radio stations just because we don’t like what is broadcast. The resulting confrontation was the opening of the violent war between the UN and Aideed.
CH18
Leaflet CH18 depicts an armed helicopter taking aim at a pile of munitions. The text on the back is:
UNOSOM II has taken and will continue to take decisive steps towards reestablishing stability in Somalia. These actions are not directed against any clan or group, but against those who continue to use violence. This destruction of unauthorized weapons and the facilities that contain them will help move Somalia forward intro a new era of stability and peace.
CH19
Leaflet CH19 depicts a UN helicopter firing rockets and destroying a Somali armed "Technical" vehicle. Text on the back is:
UNOSOM II will not tolerate any actions which threaten the safety and security of the Somali people or UN personnel. Response to these attacks will be stern and direct. UNOSOM II is determined to end the violence and ensure the restoration and rehabilitation of Somalia.
CH21
Leaflet CH21 shows a mother and two children looking at a young man holding a grenade. The text is:
Some of Aideed's supporters are using innocent children to attack UNOSOM troops. These selfish criminals do not care about the Somali people or their safety. They care only for themselves. Parents protect your children! Do not allow them to be used by others to commit violent acts. Children are the future of Somalia. Assist in the capture of these criminals before any children are injured or killed as a result of these ruthless acts.
CH33
Leaflet CH33 has a nation building theme. It depicts citizens walking happily down a peaceful street where shops are open and children play. Text at the top is, "Tomorrow's future will be prosperous if..." and at the bottom, "We work together!" The text on the back is:
The world community will continue to donate its vast resources for the restoration of Somalia. We must work together to end the violence and create a safe environment for all the people of Somalia. The answer to Somalia's problems lies within you!
CH34
Leaflet CH34 asks the people of Somalia to come together to oust Aideed. It depicts his thugs about to murder three respected elders. The text is:
Once again the criminal Aideed has demonstrated that he has no concern for anything except power. He has now proven that even elders of the Habar Gidir clan who want peace for their people are not safe from his murderous tendencies. The time has come for the people of Somalia to take action and rid themselves of the scourge Aideed.
CH39
Leaflet CH39 depicts an armed Somali standing in front of Digfer Hospital in Mogadishu. The text on the back is:
Digfer Hospital is being used to store weapons and launch attacks against UNOSOM forces. This places the doctors and patients in great danger. If you continue to allow attacks against UNOSOM forces from the hospital, the hospital will lose its protected status. You must immediately stop all military activity in Digfer Hospital.
In 1993, French soldiers at Digfer Hospital came under fire when gunmen using patients as shields started shooting…French and Italian forces believed General Aideed was hiding in the hospital with members of his militia. As Coalition forces came under sniper fire a decision was made to use artillery to clear the hospital.
CH40
Leaflet CH40 depicts a Somali "technical" armed vehicle firing a rocket. Text on the back is,
Citizens of Mogadishu! Recently the criminal elements of the SNA and its illegal leadership have launched indiscriminate rocket attacks of the citizens of Mogadishu. These attacks have resulted in numerous casualties among innocent citizens. This must be stopped. UNOSOM forces will take direct measures to destroy these rockets and the personnel firing them. We seek your assistance. Report these criminals to the Somali police force or UNOSOM II forces.
Reuters reported on 9 September 1993 that UN helicopters dropped leaflets over Mogadishu warning of eminent military activities. Women and children were warned to stay indoors after dark.
UN Chronicle,June 1993 lists the four phases of UNOSOM II. Military support of relief activity and the disarming of factions would continue. Operations would be extended into Northern Somalia. Once all of Somalia was under control, the military presence would be scaled down and some civilian government supported. In phase four, the military forces would be reduced. UNITAF already occupied 40% of Somalia with 37,000 troops. The UNOSOM II force of 20,000 troops was considered sufficient to control the rest of the country.
The September 1993 issue of UN Chronicle reports on the death of Pakistani peace-keepers:
Twelve of the soldiers were helping to unload food at a feeding station when they were foully attacked by cowards who placed women and children in front of the armed men. On 17 June, UNOSOM raided the headquarters and weapons stores of the SNA/USC faction to deprive General Aideed of weapons and tools needed to intimidate the Somali people.
In the June 1944 UN Chronicle, the headline is "Mandate for UNOSOM II revised. Coercive methods not to be used." The Council on 18 November 1993 in its resolution 886 had asked the Secretary-General to provide a future strategy for UNOSOM II. In the wake of five months of violent confrontations between international peace-keepers and as armed Somali faction, including a 5 June ambush of a Pakistani contingent which resulted in 24 deaths and street fighting in October during which 18 American soldiers lost their lives."
Dr. Daniel L. Haulman seems to feel that Somalia was not a victory for PSYOP. He says in the 2003 report: USAF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, 1990-2003:
Psychological operations largely failed in Somalia during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in 1992-1994. The United States dropped almost three million leaflets, mostly from C-130s, but they failed to prevent violence against United Nations forces or thefts of delivered food by armed bands under warlord control. Although AC-130s at times targeted hostile radio facilities, EC-130s did not deploy to Somalia to broadcast alternative radio messages from the air.
Like UNITAF, UNOSOM II broadcast on the radio and published a newspaper with the same name. Instead of Radio RAJO (Radio Hope), UNOSOM used the name Radio MANTA (Radio Today). The radio station was operated on shortwave by the United Nations staff in Mogadishu. Radio Manta began broadcasting on 4 May 1993 following the handover of the international operation in Somalia from the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). It broadcast news, inquiries about missing persons, songs, plays and poems. The station transmitted in the Somali language from two 600-watt shortwave transmitters. Their schedule was as follows: 0415-0500, 1000-1045, 1100-1145 and 1300-1345 on 9540 kHz. The station also broadcast at 1600-1645, 1700-1745 and 1900-1945 on 6170 kHz. The radio signal was not strong enough to reach all over Somalia.
Maanta Newspaper
UNOSOM II continued the UNITAF policy and produced the newspaper Manta, (sometimes written as "Maanta"), written by Somalis but edited by the United Nations staff. This paper was distributed in Mogadishu. Lieutenant Colonel Borchini discussed the newspaper delivery problems:
When we first started producing the daily newspaper, we used our own soldiers to deliver the paper throughout Mogadishu. We quickly learned that like everything else in Somalia, this too was a difficult task.
First, after a long discussion concerning whether we should charge something for the paper. I decided that we should give it away free and say so on the paper. I did not want to get involved with collecting money for the paper, and all the administrative requirements money would create. I also wanted the Somalis to have free access to what we were publishing.
Secondly, when we started delivering the paper, crowds would surround our vehicles, grabbing wildly for the paper, and anything else they could get ahold of. After one of my NCOs had his M16 rifle stolen while he was handling out newspapers and others lost their wrist watches and sunglasses, I was determined to find a better, safer way to deliver the paper. The simple solution to this problem was that we hired Somalis to deliver the paper. They proved to be highly effective in getting the paper delivered throughout the city. They divided themselves into teams with vehicles, posted delivery men in different locations, and dropped off packets in shops. They also packaged newspapers for each of the cities and towns where UNITAF forces were based and delivered these packages to the different Coalition nations responsible for those sectors, and airport officials for delivery to these remote locations.
I spoke to a Special Forces trooper who served in the 8th and 9th PSYOP Battalions from 1989-1994 and worked on both the UNITAF newspaper RAJO and the UN newspaper Maanta. Both were printed on high speed Risograph machines. He still grieves for five Somali civilians who delivered the newspapers throughout Mogadishu. During one of their delivery runs, they were stopped by a group of gunmen who opposed the UN campaign. The five were executed on the spot. He said:
They may not have been soldiers, but they believed in our cause.
A second member of the 8th PSYOP Battalion who served in
Mogadishu
from January to October 2003 added:
I have my own memory of these men. Two of them in particular stand out in my mind. The leader of our deliverers was a gentleman we referred to as “the Colonel.” He was older and always carried a walking stick and claimed to have been trained in the
United States
when there was a legitimate Somali Army.
The second man is the one that still bothers me to this day. I don't recall his name, but he was a young man about 18 or 19. I dip Skoal (a smokeless tobacco), and agreed to buy Skoal for him if he would stop chewing khat (a mild narcotic). When he came to pick up Maanta for the day he would make sure that he had a great big plug of tobacco in his mouth, and I would make sure that he had been laying off the khat. About two weeks later the slaying occurred. I can still picture his face in my mind.
Victor K. Bolena was a Sergeant (E-5) assigned to the 8th PSYOP Battalion from 1990 to 1994 as a 97E Interrogator and Korean Linguist. He arrived in
Somalia
April 1993 and departed October 1993. He remembers:
We had a very tight knit group and we worked practically non-stop to keep up with demands of the United Nations staff and managing the couple dozen Somalis working for us. A few of us were awarded a United Nations commendation medal by Lieutenant General Bir prior to our departure. The day that our delivery crew was executed was an extremely sad day for all of us. I think about those men often. Everything you wrote was correct to the best of my recollection except that I remember that our lead deliveryman was referred to as “the Major” and not “the Colonel.”
One of my favorite PSYOP products was the Aideed “Wanted” poster. We were actually just toying around with the Old-West wanted poster motif when one of our senior Somali translators told us that we should use it since Somalis love American Western movies. It took some convincing but the United Nations staff eventually approved the poster and we ran with it.
This may be the poster mentioned by William J. Durch in UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, Macmillan, 1996. Durch says:
Admiral Howe printed and distributed a wanted poster that offered a $25,000 reward for information leading to the apprehension of General Aideed.
Thomas K. Adams adds in US Special Operations Forces in Action, Taylor & Francis, 1998:
The initial response was a counteroffer by Aideed of one million for Admiral Howe’s head.
If nothing else, Aideed apparently had a sense of humor.
Radio Rajo, the voice of the Unified Task Force, was changed to Radio Maanta (Radio Today) with the handover of command from the US-led Operation Restore Hope to UNOSOM-2 (UN Operation in Somalia Phase 2) on 4 May
1993. It broadcast only in Somali and has two short-wave transmitters which with a power of 600 Watts. Their schedule is as follows: 0415-0500, 1000-1045, 1100-1145 and 1300-1345 on 9540 kHz, 1600-1645, 1700-1745 and 1900-1945 on 6170 kHz.
Phil Taylor�s Papers (University of Leeds), mentions a report titled �Radio and Military PSYOPS� by N. Grace:
"Operation Restore Hope" was launched in December 1992 as part of a UN multilateral peacekeeping force, UNOSOM. And as soon as the military arrived, a radio station operated by Army PSYOPS began broadcasting with 600 watts. Called Radio Rajo (Radio Hope), it was first heard at 1480 kHz but then in January 1993 was heard on the shortwave frequency 9540 kHz. The humanitarian intervention was multinational, therefore, the station identified itself as the "Voice of the United Task Force." Radio Rajo was handed over to the United Nations when Phase 2 of the intervention commenced (UNOSOM-2) and became Radio Manta (Radio Today), broadcasting on both the old frequency of 9540 kHz as well as new 6170 kHz. Italian psychological operations troops also broadcast Radio Ibis on 89.7 MHZ FM. Both humanitarian stations signed off when the UN coalition troops returned to their home bases.
The operation ended on 28 February 1995. There were then six PSYOP tactical teams, each with a Somali linguist. Six loudspeaker systems were in play and one aerial loudspeaker system was on alert.
Certificate of Appreciation – Restore Hope
This was the standard Certificate of Appreciation awarded to members that took part in the Somalia operation. I add this because it actually is a PSYOP product. It sometimes seemed that PSYOP units did more printing for American military units than for the enemy. Fancy full-color certificates are a great motivator and build pride in a unit or individual. I once told an audience that I could borrow a jeep or get a thousand rounds of ammo simply by offering a First Sergeant some notepads with his name and an image of his stripes at the top. Americans love paper. A half-dozen notepads might get you a set of wheels for three or four days, or a GP Medium tent. Everything is up for trade.
Certificate of Appreciation – Continue Hope
Operation Continue Hope provided support of UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by providing personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force, and other elements as required.
Conclusion
Major General S. L. Arnold talks about the U.N. Accomplishments in an article entitled "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," Military Review, December 1993. He says:
The cycle of starvation in Somalia has been broken. Except for some isolated incidents, the food emergency is over. Factions have turned in many of their crew-served weapons, and disarmament talks are being conducted. Marketplaces have opened and are thriving, while many displaced persons and refugees are moving back to their homes, villages and farms…We have come very close to establishing the right environment to enable the Somalis to arrive at a ‘Somali solution.’ The last obstacle is the warlords. They must join together, combining their power for the collective good of all, or individually, they must lose power. Only then will Somalia be on the road to full recovery.
LTC Borchini adds:
Operation Restore Hope focused international attention on the challenges faced by military forces as they applied their combat talents and training to support different humanitarian objectives. The soldiers of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (ABN) readily adapted to the demanding requirements of the challenge. Based on their experiences in Somalia, they are better prepared to face new opportunities to use their unique skills in operations around the globe. The devastation and loss of life in Somalia humbled our soldiers, but having witnessed how PSYOP directly contributed to that country’s first tentative steps toward peace and reconstruction has also strengthened their readiness to participate in future peacekeeping operations.
The
United States
Army in
Somalia
says:
The
United States
entered
Somalia
in December 1992 to stop the imminent starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. Although it succeeded in this mission, the chaotic political situation of that unhappy land bogged down
U.S.
and allied forces in what became, in effect, a poorly organized United Nations nation-building operation. In a country where the
United States
, perhaps naively, expected some measure of gratitude for its help, its forces received increasing hostility as they became more deeply embroiled into trying to establish a stable government. The military and diplomatic effort to bring together all the clans and political entities was doomed to failure as each sub-element continued to attempt to out-jockey the others for supreme power. The Somali people were the main victims of their own leaders, but forty-two Americans died and dozens more were wounded before the
United States
and the United Nations capitulated to events and withdrew
.
The New York Times was less optimistic in their Donatella Lorch column of 20 March 1944 entitled: “Last of the U.S. Troops Leave Somalia; What Began as a Mission of Mercy Closes with Little Ceremony.” The author said in part:
There was no official flag-lowering today, just a brief handshake between an American Marine officer and an Egyptian captain at the airport. Then, shortly before noon, after a dozen Marine helicopters lifted off in a blizzard of sand, the remaining amphibious vehicles were driven single file into the ocean to waiting ships, and the American expedition in Somalia came to a close. With the 1,100 marines went the frustrations and contradictions of a mission that the Government called Operation Restore Hope, which for a time lived up to its name.
Ultimately, what might have become a blueprint for future missions evolved into an unsuccessful manhunt for a Somali faction leader, Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, with heavy casualties for both sides. Yet there were successes acknowledged by both the Somalis and relief officials. The famine has ended, and in much of the countryside life is returning to normal. Hundreds of thousands of children were vaccinated, wells were dug, roads were built and farmers returned to their fields under military protection. After repeated delays, all 15 warring Somali factions represented by General Aidid and his chief rival, Mohammed Ali Mahdi, signed a reconciliation pact in Nairobi that calls for a cease-fire, repudiates violence and sets a date for a future reconciliation conference.
Of the 100,000 Americans who served here since December 1992, 30 were killed and 175 wounded; many of them in the search for General Aidid. The United Nations contingent suffered at times from a lack of internal cooperation. Units from its multinational force often waited for orders from their own country, an arrangement that fueled instability in Mogadishu. In June, after General Aidid's militias ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani peacekeeping forces, the United Nations, led by American forces, attacked him in turn, bombing his strong points. There were serious miscalculations. United Nations officials now say that General Aidid's military strength and his willingness to fight were significantly underestimated and that the intelligence network set up by the United Nations and the United States was not only inefficient but rife with double agents.
"It is easy to criticize the Americans, " said Mohammed Jirdeh, a prominent Somali businessman. "But you have to look at the desperate situation here before they came. They did a lot of good and they gave it a good try. But the Americans should have known better. They set deadlines. In our society we have no deadlines. The Americans kept on shifting their commitments. They never incorporated the Somalis in their decisions. There was a misperception of cultures."
The author seems to be saying that this was a no-win situation. Perhaps she is right.
