Abstract
The growth of Allied policy toward Germany during World War II can be observed in three discernible phases, each of which is associated with one or more of the major Allied wartime conferences. Tehran-Moscow, Yalta, and Potsdam serve as evolutionary stages to demonstrate the development and persistence of the central theme of this policy: Germany must be divided so that she may never again pose a military threat to any of the victors.
I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.
President Roosevelt, October, 1944
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Reference
United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, Department of State Publication 7187 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 600-604; “Tehran Conference of the Leaders of the Great Powers (Documents),” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 8, August, 1961, pp. 121-122; and Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. V: The Closing Ring (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), pp. 400-403. The five states Roosevelt proposed were: (1) Prussia, (2) Hanover and the northwest part of Germany, (3) Saxony and Leipzig, (4) Hesse, Darmstadt, Kassel, and the area south of the Rhine, and (5) Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg. In 1949, the Minister President of East Germany was to remind the world of the President’s proposal and thereby attempt to lay the blame for the present division of Germany on the West. See Neues Deutschland, October 13, 1949, as quoted in “Extracts from the Policy Declaration of Otto Grotewohl, Minister President of the German Democratic Republic, 12 October 1949,” Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed.), Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945–1955, Royal Institute of International Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 425–430.
Churchill, The Closing Ring, p. 401.
Ibid., p. 402; and Wolfgang Wagner, The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line (Stuttgart: Brentano Verlag, 1957), pp. 24–25.
United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Department of State Publication 6199 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 110 note; and John L. Snell, Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma Over Germany (New Orleans: The Hauser Press, 1959), pp. 44 and 54.
“Protocol Between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union Regarding Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin, September 12, 1944,” and “Amendments to the Protocol, November 14, 1944,” The Conference at Malta and Yalta, pp. 118-123. See The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 970, for reference to the approval of the Protocol.
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI: Triumph and Tragedy (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), pp. 156–157.
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), Vol. II, pp. 1602 and 1606-1610; Henry Morgenthau, Germany is Our Problem (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), pp. 17-29 and 156-159; and Chester Wilmot, Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper and Bros., 1952), pp. 548–551.
Hull, Vol. II, p. 1617.
David and Deane Heller, The Berlin Crisis (Derby, Conn.: Monarch Books, 1961), pp. 40-41; Hull, Vol. II, pp. 1606-1610; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), pp. 818-819; and Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), pp. 568–583.
Sherwood, pp. 818-819. The Soviet position on the Morgenthau Plan is vague yet Moscow would have approved of heavy reparations and the gaining of German territory in the East. See The Brookings Institution, The German Peace Settlement: A Problem Paper, A Report Prepared by the International Studies Group (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1949), p. 13.
Michael Balfour, “Germany,” Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria, 1945-1946. Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946, ed. Arnold Toynbee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 142.
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Vol. I: Year of Decisions (Garden City N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955), p. 236.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 241.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. non and 117.
Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, pp. 611-612, 614, and Matthews Minutes, pp. 624-625
Ibid.; and Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 350-352.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Bohlen Minutes, pp. 615 and Matthews Minutes, p. 626.
Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, p. 614. This reference does not appear in the Matthews Minutes.
Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, pp. 614-615, and Matthews Minutes, pp. 626-628.
Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, p. 616, and Matthews Minutes pp. 627-628.
Ibid., Page Minutes, pp. 656-658, and Matthews Notes, pp. 657-658. Also see “Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference,” Ibid., p. 978.
Wilmot, pp. 548-551.
The interpretation given here of the British position on dismemberment is not generally entertained, however. Another point of view is that Churchill was very much in favor of partitioning Germany. This argument is presented in Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: A Diplomatic History of World War II (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 538. Churchill himself is rather vague on this point, writing only that he was generally in favor of dismemberment, but believed “the actual method was much too complicated to be settled in five or six days.” See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 351. Such equivocation makes a concrete interpretation difficult, but then equivocation may be the art of great statesmanship.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Bohlen Minutes, pp. 618-619, and Matthews Minutes, pp. 627-628. Also see “Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference,” ibid., p. 978.
Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, p. 613, and Matthews Minutes, p. 625.
Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, p. 572.
Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, p. 669, and Matthews Minutes, p. 680. In the accounts of Stalin’s statement in both the Bohlen and Matthews Minutes, he was careful to designate the West Neisse as the river in question. The Matthews Minutes record Stalin as saying that there are two Neisse Rivers, and that he definitely meant the western one.
Ibid., Bollen Minutes, p. 717, and Matthews Minutes, p. 720. According to the Bohlen Minutes Stalin stated that the German population in what was to become western Poland had already fled. However, subsequent statistics revealed that this was definitely not the case, and that the number of Germans expelled from Poland was considerably higher than Churchill had estimated. See Ministry for Refugees, Expellees and War Victims of the West German Federal Republic, Facts and Figures about Germany’s Refugee and Expellee Problem (Bonn: Buchdruckerei Gebr. Hermes, 1956), hereafter cited as Facts and Figures about Germany’s Refugee and Expellee Problem
Roosevelt’s concern over the 1944 presidential election and the effect on it by a premature Allied announcement of the plans for Poland may be seen in a message from him to Churchill, dated October 22, 1944, requesting that no publication be made of these plans “for about two weeks.” The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 207.
Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, p. 777, and Matthews Minutes, p. 787.
The Rooseveltian concept of a German peace settlement is, in part, demonstrated by his suggestion to Stalin at a private meeting between the two on February 4, 1945, that the latter propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 German army officers. Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, p. 571. In terms of dismemberment the President desired that Dutch farmers be compensated for a period with German land for that which had been temporarily lost as a result of the German breeching of their dikes. Ibid., Bohlen Minutes, p. 618, and Matthews Minutes, pp. 629-630.
The status of the Control Council itself was somewhat vague. The United States supported a plan giving it broad governmental powers. See “Memorandum from The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), October 28, 1944,” ibid., p. 162. Both the British and the Soviets were reticent about delegating sweeping powers to the military officers who would staff the Council. See “Memorandum from The United States Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President, January 28, 1945,” ibid., p. 132. For a statement on the officially agreed nature and function of the Control Council, see “Report of the Crimea Conference,” ibid., p. 970.
Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin, pp. 530-531.
Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, translated by R. H. Stevens in collaboration with David Woodward (New York: World Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 461–462.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1952), pp. 423–426. Eisenhower does not mention consulting Washington before making his decision to reject a partial surrender.
President Truman consistently relied upon military advice as the most important determinant in resolving policy questions, such as the extent of the American advance into Germany and Czechoslovakia at the end of the war. In British policy formulation the reverse was true, and political considerations superseded military ones. See Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 210–219.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 520, and Heller and Heller, pp. 60-61.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 501-503.
“Protocol Between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union Regarding the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin,” The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 118-123. See above, pp. 2-3.
Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 141–144; and Heller and Heller, p. 61.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 605.
William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 380.
Feis, Between War and Peace, p. 103. In particular Hopkins believed, as he wrote, that British policies designed to preserve the Empire were an obstacle to a close-working Anglo-American relationship. See Sherwood, pp. 921-922.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Bohlen Minutes, p. 617, and Matthews Minutes, p. 628. Roosevelt made the remark to Churchill and Stalin during the second plenary session on February 5, 1945.
Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 215. General Eisenhower made this assertion in a message to Truman on April 23, 1945.
Ibid., p. 215.
An indictment of American diplomacy for its failure to develop wartime political objectives may be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, “Germany: The Political Problem,” Germany and the Future of Europe, ed. Hans J. Morgenthau (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 77–81.
United States Office of Military Government for Germany, Civil Administrations Division, Council of Foreign Ministers Secretariat, Summary of Multipartite Agreements and Disagreements on Germany (Berlin: February 15, 1948), p. 1. See “Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the Zones of Occupation in Germany.”
Heller and Heller, pp. 61-62.
“Prime Minister to President Truman,” as quoted as Document 1, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin, 1945, Department of State Publication 7015 (2 vols.; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), Vol. 1, p. 3.
Feis, Between War and Peace, pp. 236-237.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Page Minutes, p. 657. The decision to refer the dismemberment question to a special committee was made at a foreign ministers’ conference on February 6, 1945.
Feis, Between War and Peace, pp. 237-238.
Ibid The other members of the EAC were Anthony Eden (chairman), Fedor T. Gusev (U.S.S.R.), and John G. Winant (U.S.), the last two being respectively the Russian and American ambassadors in London.
“Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State,” Document 26, of The Conference of Berlin, pp. 50-51.
Balfour, pp. 143-144, and Summary of Multipartite Agreements and Disagreements on Germany (February 15, 1948), p. 118.
When Morgenthau asked for permission to go to Potsdam, Truman summarily refused his request. Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 327.
Balfour, p. 41.
Feis, Between War and Peace, p. 221.
Zoltan Michael Szaz, Germany’s Eastern Frontiers: The Problem of the Oder-Neisse Line (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1960), pp. 90–91.
The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, pp. 305-306, and Cohen Notes, p. 314.
“Polish Territory Annexed by Germany in 1939: Recommendation,” Document 512, ibid., Vol. I, pp. 751-754.
“Memorandum by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Document 514, ibid., Vol. I, pp. 757-777
“The Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State,” Document 429, ibid., Vol. I, pp. 630-633.
“The Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union,” Document 517, ibid., Vol. I, pp. 630-633.
“Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs,” Document 518, ibid., Vol. I, pp. 777-781.
“The Assistant Secretary of State to the Secretary of State,” Document 520, ibid., Vol. I, pp. 783-784.
Ibid.
The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Bohlen Minutes, pp. 620-623, and Matthews Minutes, pp. 630-633.
The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, Thompson Minutes, p. 90, and Cohen Notes, p. 96.
Ibid., Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, pp. 208-209, and Cohen Notes, p. 217.
The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, pp. 210-215, and Cohen Notes, pp. 218-221.
Ibid According to the Cohen Notes, Churchill added a “Can’t we sleep on it?” which seems to have been an admirable summation of Western policy. See p. 221.
Ibid., Vol. II, Thompson Minutes, pp. 247-248, and Cohen Notes, p. 262.
Ibid., Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, p. 213, and Cohen Notes, p. 262.
Ibid., Vol. II, Thompson Minutes, p. 248, and Cohen Notes, p. 262.
Feis, Between War and Peace, pp. 228-231.
“Summary of the Views expressed by the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, July 24, 1945, on the Subject of Poland’s Western Frontiers,” The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, pp. 335-336; and “Summary of Statements Made by Members of the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, July 24, 1945,” ibid., Vol. II, pp. 332-335. Also see above, p. 19.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 661-667, and Feis, Between War and Peace, 228-231.
The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, Cohen Notes, p. 389, contains the exact quotation, and the Thompson Minutes, p. 384, offer corroborating information.
Ibid., Vol. II, Thompson Minutes, pp. 385-388, and Cohen Notes, pp. 389-391. The exchange between Churchill and Stalin at the ninth plenary session (July 25) was very heated on this point.
Ibid., Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, p. 209, and Cohen Notes, p. 217. The President specifically renounced any reparations at the fifth plenary meeting, July 21.
Facts and Figures about Germany’s Refugee and Expellee Problem, figure 1.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 662.
Ibid., p. 661.
See below, Chapter III.
“Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué of the Berlin Conference,” Document 1383, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, p. 1485.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 672-674.
Balfour, p. 77; and James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), pp. 80–81.
The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, pp. 586-587, and Cohen Notes, pp. 597-598. Also see “Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué,” ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1491-1492.
Ibid, Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, pp. 586-587, and Cohen Notes, p. 597. Also see “Protocol of Proceedings and Communique,” Document 1383, ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1485-1487. The Soviet Union was to receive from the Western zones 15% of the industrial equipment and 10% of the capital equipment considered unnecessary for a German peace economy. Nothing was given by the Soviets in return. By way of comparison the Soviet plan presented at Yalta had called for the removal of 100% of specialized war industries, such as aviation plants and synthetic oil refineries, and a general reduction of German heavy industry by 80%. See The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Bohlen Minutes, p. 620, and Matthews Minutes, pp. 630-631. These references also indicate that Roosevelt and Churchill were in favor of heavy reparations.
Balfour, p. 77
“Proposal of the United States Delegation,” Document 1151, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, p. 1150.
Ibid., Vol. II, Bohlen Minutes, p. 472.
Ibid., Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, pp. 518-519, and Cohen Notes, pp. 533-534.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 661 and 664, and Facts and Figures about Germany’s Refugee and Expellee Problem, figure 8. Germany lost 15,000 square miles to the Soviet Union and 40,000 square miles to Poland. See William S. Schlamm, Germany and the East-West Crisis: The Decisive Challenge to American Policy (New York: David McKay Co., 1959), 0. 233.
“Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period,” Document 848, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, pp. 751-753.
“Report by the Economic Subcommittee,” Document 863, ibid., Vol. II, pp. 796-798; and “Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué,” Document 1383, ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1483-1485.
Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 303.
“Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to Govern Germany in the Initial Control Period,” Document 852, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, pp. 775-778.
“Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany,” ibid., Vol. II, p. 141.
Ibid., Vol. II, Department of State Minutes, pp. 521-522, and Cohen Notes, pp. 535-536. For a reference to Stalin’s statement at Yalta, see The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Bohlen Minutes, p. 612, and Matthews Minutes, p. 625.
The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, Thompson Minutes, pp. 90-91, and Cohen Notes, p. 95.
Ibid., Vol. II, Thompson Minutes, p. 233.
Feis, Between War and Peace, p. 241 Note.
The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, Bohlen Minutes, pp. 274-275.
Leahy, pp. 366 and 389.
Feis, Between War and Peace, p. 259.
“Conversation between Mr. Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, and Mr. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, at the Department of State, August 23, 1945,” Document 1414, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, p. 1563; and the New York Times, October 7, 1961.
“Protocol of Proceedings and Communique,” Document 1383, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. II, pp. 1479-1481.
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© 1963 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Wolfe, J.H. (1963). The Diplomacy of World War II Genesis of the Problem. In: Indivisible Germany. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9199-9_2
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