Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
Retracing the confused and inconsistent pattern of planning for escalation of the Vietnam War, Edwin Moïse carefully reconstructs the events of the night of August 4, 1964, when the U.S. Navy destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy reported that th
|
Contents
|
Covert Operations
|
1 |
|
Covert Pressures on the North
|
2 |
|
OPLAN 34A
|
4 |
|
The United States the RVN and OPLAN 34A
|
6 |
|
Maritime Forces Based at Danang
|
8 |
|
Increasing the Tempo of Attacks
|
19 |
|
Thoughts of Escalation
|
22 |
|
The Defense Budget
|
30 |
|
The Search for Consistency
|
145 |
|
The Radar Evidence
|
155 |
|
Radar and Gunnery
|
157 |
|
Detection of North Vietnamese Radar
|
163 |
|
The Torpedo Reports and the Sonar Evidence
|
165 |
|
Other Visual Sightings on the Destroyers
|
179 |
|
The Report of Automatic Weapons Fire
|
183 |
|
The Problem of Excited Witnesses
|
184 |
|
The Cost of a Real War
|
32 |
|
The Psychology of Escalation
|
33 |
|
Public Threats
|
37 |
|
Saigon Calls for Attacks on the North
|
38 |
|
The Laotian Alternative
|
43 |
|
Talking to Different Audiences
|
44 |
|
The Question of PAVN Infiltration
|
45 |
|
The DRV China and the Soviet Union
|
47 |
|
The DeSoto Patrol
|
50 |
|
The Comvan
|
52 |
|
The Immediate Background to the August Incidents
|
55 |
|
A Note on Course and Time Information
|
63 |
|
The DeSoto Patrol Begins
|
65 |
|
The Destroyer Approaches Hon Me
|
68 |
|
The First Incident August 2
|
73 |
|
Air Attack on the PT Boats
|
82 |
|
Evaluation
|
86 |
|
DRV Accounts of the Incident
|
91 |
|
The DeSoto Patrol Resumes
|
94 |
|
The August 3 Raid
|
97 |
|
Were the Destroyers Set Up?
|
99 |
|
The Second Incident
|
106 |
|
Toward the August 4 Incident
|
109 |
|
An Imminent Threat
|
112 |
|
Skunk U
|
121 |
|
Skunks V and V1
|
123 |
|
Spurious Continuities between Skunks N to V1
|
127 |
|
The Apparent Incident Continues
|
129 |
|
The Evidence from the Destroyers
|
143 |
|
Evidence from Other Sources
|
186 |
|
Captured DRV Naval Personnel
|
194 |
|
Communications Intercepts
|
197 |
|
Daylight Searches
|
201 |
|
DRV Public Statements
|
202 |
|
Summing Up
|
203 |
|
Retaliation
|
208 |
|
Observing from Afar
|
209 |
|
The Decision
|
210 |
|
The Pierce Arrow Airstrikes
|
214 |
|
Defending against the American Airstrikes
|
221 |
|
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution
|
225 |
|
Denying Provocation
|
228 |
|
The Facts of August 4
|
229 |
|
North Vietnamese Motives
|
230 |
|
Shades of John Wayne
|
233 |
|
Overall Attitudes and Patterns
|
234 |
|
Soviet and Chinese Reactions
|
236 |
|
The American Interpretation
|
239 |
|
Hidden Doubts
|
241 |
|
Toward Further Escalation
|
244 |
|
US Operations Continue
|
247 |
|
The Consequences of Tonkin Gulf in Vietnam
|
250 |
|
The Phantom Streetcar
|
253 |
|
Notes
|
257 |
|
Bibliography
|
289 |
| 296 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action report track actually after-action reports aircraft airstrikes American attack August 4 incident Barry believed bombing Bundy Captain Herrick Chinese CIC log CINCPAC CINCPACFLT Commander Communist COMSEVENTHFLT comvan Danang defense DeSoto patrol destroyers Edmondson escalation fact fired five-inch FOIA NHC forces Gerrell Moore GOTA Gulf of Tonkin guns Hanoi intercepted Interview James Stockdale Joint Chiefs joint chronology Joy action report Joy's July Khanh Laos later Maddox Marolda and Fitzgerald McGeorge Bundy miles Nguyen Nhan night of August North Vietnamese North Vietnamese coast officers Ogier operations OPLAN 34A raids Patrick Park personal communications pilots planes President Johnson PT boats PTFs radar contacts range records report track chart retaliation Saigon Schaperjahn shells ship skunks sonar South Soviet Stalsberg statement Stockdale sunk Swatow Ticonderoga Tonkin Gulf incidents torpedo boats Turner Joy action U.S. government U.S. Navy United vessels Viet Vietnam Vinh VNSF Washington William Bundy yards