IN THIS ISSUE

* Russia and Georgia welcome the E.U. war report
* Ingushetia revives the issue of Ingush refugees from North Ossetia
* Ukrainian court bans advertisements hostile to Tymoshenko
* Ankara intensifies its diplomatic efforts on regional issues
** New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
- A Bungled Privatization in a Bungle of a Country

Danger Recedes of New Conflict in the South Caucasus

Pavel Felgenhauer

This week in an unusual demonstration of solidarity, the authorities in Tbilisi and Moscow jointly welcomed the E.U.-sponsored report on the origins of the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, compiled by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. Each side praised the 1000-page report as "balanced" and concluded that it vindicated them. Moscow implied that it had named Georgia as the "aggressor," while Tbilisi claimed the opposite (RIA Novosti, September 30).

A visibly happy Russian Permanent Representative to the European Union Vladimir Chizhov announced that though the word "aggression" was not used in the report, it blamed Georgia for starting the hostilities. Chizhov lauded the professional qualities of Tagliavini. The flamboyant Russian permanent representative to NATO Dmitry Rogozin declared: "Some Western politicians will now be forced to apologize for criticizing Russia." The Russian foreign ministry announced that not only had the report proved "Georgian aggression against South Ossetia," but it also pointed out the nations that armed and trained the Georgian military [the U.S., Israel, Ukraine and the Czech Republic]. The Russian foreign ministry also reproached the report for falsely accusing Russia of a "disproportionate use of force" (RIA Novosti, September 30).

Eduard Kokoyty, the President of the breakaway South Ossetia told Russian television that he applauded the E.U. report's conclusion that the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili "is an international criminal who committed an aggression and genocide against the Ossetian people." Comments from Tbilisi were more guarded: Georgian officials fully agreed with the reports' factual findings, while disagreeing with some of its conclusions (Interfax, September 30).

Apparently, most Russian officials did not really read the text. The publication of the E.U. report was preceded by leaks of its contents that seemed favorable for Russia. Georgia would be damned for causing the war, while Russia reproached for the disproportionate use of force (Der Spiegel, September 21). The reality turned out different: the report damned Russia.

The E.U. report pointed out the fact that "the shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian armed forces during the night of August 7 to 8, 2008 marked the beginning of the large-scale armed conflict in Georgia, yet it was only the culminating point of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents." The main Russian force crossed the international border and initiated a full-scale invasion after the Georgian forces launched an offensive against South Ossetian separatist forces. The report did not substantiate fully Georgian claims that the Russian invasion preceded the attack on Tskhinvali, though evidence was found "that regular Russian troops as well as volunteers and mercenaries had entered South Ossetia before the start of the conflict on August 7" (www.ceiig.ch, September 30).

Equally, "the report shows that any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus solely on the artillery attack on Tskhinvali on the night of August 7 to 8 and on what then developed into the questionable Georgian offensive in South Ossetia and the Russian military action." The E.U. report states: "It has to consider, too, the impact of a great power's coercive politics and diplomacy against a small and insubordinate neighbor." The report accuses Russia of a "creeping annexation" of Georgian territory before the 2008 war. It accuses Russia of a disproportionate use of force, invading and bombing outside the territory of South Ossetia, illegally initiating a conflict in Abkhazia, deliberately lying about a nonexistent "genocide" of Ossetians, and using false pretexts to invade Georgia. The report declares illegal and invalid the recognition by Moscow of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the continued presence of Russian forces on their territory, as well as the distribution of Russian passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2002.

The report also condemns the expulsion by Russia in 2009 of U.N. and OSCE observers from Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the refusal to allow in E.U. observers. It accuses Russian-led Ossetian irregular forces of mass ethnic cleansing of Georgian civilians, mass destruction of civilian property, marauding and rape. It accuses Russian forces of preventing the free return of Georgian refugees to their homes. The report insists that crimes against humanity in Georgia must be referred to the International Criminal Court. Moreover, it alleges that Russia has pursued a destabilizing foreign policy to assert: "A privileged spheres of interest, in particular with regard to neighboring countries, set to deprive smaller states of their freedom of choice and to limit their sovereignty" (www.ceiig.ch, September 30).

The E.U. report concludes that the situation has not improved since August 2008, and that a "substantial number of dangerous incidents" have happened and "the risk of a new confrontation remains serious." A more concerted international effort is needed to reinforce the fragile ceasefire and promote a political solution.

This summer the situation in Georgia hovered around a possible renewed full-scale war, but now the risk is minimal. Abnormally early heavy snowfalls in the Caucasus have already virtually cut off South Ossetia from Russia by snow-drifts (RIA Novosti, September 28). Essential supplies for the reconstruction of South Ossetia are not being delivered. It will be a harsh winter for the occupying Russian soldiers and the remaining civilian population of South Ossetia, while the border with Georgia is closed and access to Russia impeded until spring 2010. Any major Russian military action is virtually impossible until next April, when the threat of a new war will reappear, if no diplomatic progress is made in the meantime. Profound differences continue to separate Russia, Georgia and the West, making progress difficult.

Government of Ingushetia Tries to Resolve Ossetian-Ingush Conflict

Valery Dzutsev

On September 25, a group of Ingush civil activists made an unprecedented public statement, harshly criticizing the policy of Ingushetia's President, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, regarding the disputed lands in the Prigorodny district of neighboring North Ossetia (www.ingushetia.org, September 25). President Yevkurov had previously said that North Ossetia's Prigorodny district would remain part of North Ossetia and that Ingushetia had no intention to lay claims to the contentious lands anymore (www.rusnovosti.ru, August 17). The well-known Ingush human rights defender Magomed Mutsolgov stated: "President Yevkurov is not entitled by the constitution of the republic of Ingushetia to make any decisions about the future of the Ingush people's territories. The parliament of Ingushetia does not have this right either. This is the sovereign and inalienable right of the repressed Ingush people, which should be expressed in a referendum, and only the Ingush people are allowed to decide the fate of its native, historic homeland."

The other side of Yevkurov's position was that he demanded that the Ingush refugees who left their homes or were driven out during the short 1992 Ossetian-Ingush conflict return to their homes in North Ossetia's Prigorodny district. He defended himself: "Yes, I could hit the table and say Prigorodny is ours, but then the matter [the issue of Ingush refugees] would be stalled for another 17 years [17 years have passed since the 1992 conflict]. Today there is a real opportunity to return people to their homes, this is what we are trying to achieve. Besides, we need to support those [Ingush people], who live there now" (www.ingushetia.ru, September 28).

Ingush refugees returned to North Ossetia in large numbers, not all of them to their original homes, but rather to specifically designated areas, typically situated far away from their native villages and the city of Vladikavkaz. Estimates on Ingush refugees vary widely from several thousand up to 60,000 and more.

In an unusually friendly move, the head of North Ossetia, Taimuraz Mamsurov, visited his counterpart in Ingushetia to discuss issues between the two sides informally (www.ingushetia.ru, September 29).

A short but bloody ethnic conflict between the Ossetians and the Ingush in Prigorodny district of North Ossetia and Vladikavkaz took place in the fall of 1992. Over 600 people were killed on both sides during several days of fighting; thousands of homes were burnt down and most of the Ingush population, estimated at the time at 30,000-60,000, left or were driven out into neighboring Ingushetia. The conflict's origins were rooted in a territorial dispute over part of the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia and its capital Vladikavkaz. Many Ingush felt that they were unlawfully deprived of the lands, which had belonged to them prior to their deportation by Stalin in 1944.

Even though the authorities in Moscow and Vladikavkaz were both anxious to proclaim the territorial dispute over in 2006 and later in 2007, this issue continues to remain a very sensitive topic to Ingushetia and its people. For example, Article 11 of the Ingush constitution states the wish "to return the unlawfully alienated lands" to the republic (http://www.ingushetia.ru/institute/constitution.shtml). Therefore, North Ossetia is concerned that after the return of the refugees, another round of fighting over the disputed lands might begin and has tried to keep the returning Ingush refugees as far as possible from its capital Vladikavkaz.

North Ossetians widely believe that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack on the school in the town of Beslan in September 2004 were ethnic Ingush; that plus the fact that other attacks in North Ossetia are blamed on the Ingush further diminish the possibility of an easy reconciliation between the two peoples. The precarious security situation in Ingushetia and the relative stability of North Ossetia create additional political obstacles for a mass return of Ingush refugees to their homes in North Ossetia.

Despite the generally negative background for resolving the Ossetian-Ingush dispute, several recent trends have enhanced the chances for the return of the Ingush refugees to North Ossetia. Ingushetia's leadership has conveyed the message to the Russian political leadership that the explosive situation in Ingushetia is caused in large part by the fact that the Ingush people feel that their interests are being ignored when it comes to the loss of Prigorodny district (www.ingushetia.ru, August 28).

The Ingush insurgents obliquely confirmed the official view of Ingushetia by accusing the pro-Moscow authorities of Ingushetia of selling out their homeland in Prigorodny (www.hunafa.com, September 18). Moscow, eager to quell the unrelenting wave of violence in Ingushetia, might be tempted to help the Ingush to return to North Ossetia, as an easy way out. On the North Ossetians' side, their positions might soften as well, because Moscow has presumably "won" lands for them in South Ossetia. Given the fact that the majority of the ethnic Ossetians living in the disputed lands originate from South Ossetia or the inner districts of Georgia, this thinking may have serious implications for North Ossetians' flexibility.

Meanwhile, municipal elections are scheduled to take place in Ingushetia on October 11. A special commission on the Caucasus formed in the upper chamber of the Russian parliament held a meeting to try to design a way of supporting the elections using "moral-political means." The local authorities have vowed not to allow any supporters of the insurgency to be elected (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, September 29). The problem with this is that if there is no legitimate internal consensus on important political issues like the disputed territories in Ingushetia, it will be very difficult to reach an agreement with the neighboring Ossetians. And, if there is no lasting agreement on contentious issues, it will likely produce a situation in which the issue will be exploited by various political actors. As a sign of Moscow's ongoing paranoia about the involvement of foreign forces in jeopardizing the security situation in the North Caucasus, foreigners are prohibited from visiting the Prigorodny district unattended unless they receive special permission from the Federal Security Service (FSB).

Party of Regions Claims Tymoshenko Attacks Freedom of Speech: Déjà Vu?

Pavel Korduban

The Pechersky district court in Kyiv on September 22 banned "any unfair advertisement" against Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This prompted Viktor Yanukovych, her main rival in the run-up to the January 17 presidential election, to accuse Tymoshenko of infringing freedom of speech. Ironically, it was Yanukovych's team that was accused of this ahead of the previous election in 2004. The semi-official instructions to journalists on how to cover political events, imposed by the administration of the then President Leonid Kuchma, who viewed Yanukovych as his successor, sparked journalist protests in the fall of 2004, which were a core element of the Orange Revolution that brought Viktor Yushchenko to power as president and Tymoshenko as prime minister.

The court ruled on a lawsuit filed by Tymoshenko's Fatherland Party against an entrepreneur accused by the party of producing a video to compromise Tymoshenko. The court's wording was significant as it ruled that unfair advertisements against Tymoshenko are "anti-social in nature, discredits Tymoshenko, increases social tension and causes other negative consequences" (Ukrainska Pravda, September 24). A newspaper linked to Yanukovych's Party of Regions (PRU) admitted that the PRU was behind the video, which claimed that Tymoshenko does not deliver on her promises. The video reportedly mocked Tymoshenko's main campaign slogan "She Works," which is frequently used in her own advertisements (Segodnya, September 25).

The PRU's initial reaction came from the party's unofficial spokeswoman Hanna Herman who claimed that the verdict was "an unprecedented offensive against freedom of speech [which means that] censorship is returning to Ukraine" (Ukrainska Pravda, September 24). Yanukovych claimed that the ban on unfair advertisements against Tymoshenko meant that Ukraine was returning to totalitarianism. He repeated the allegation that is often leveled against Tymoshenko by her rivals that she indirectly controls the judiciary, thus violating the balance of power (www.partyofregions.org.ua, September 25). This allegation was prompted by the fact that the Supreme Court is chaired by Tymoshenko's ally Vasyl Onopenko.

PRU deputy Olena Lukash appealed against the court's ruling on September 25 (Kommersant-Ukraine, September 28). Nonetheless, it was Lukash who defended Yanukovych in the courts as his lawyer when the 2004 election results were disputed. The PRU also appealed to the international community, just like its opponents did five years ago. Yanukovych told the Yalta European Strategy international forum that the court had effectively "banned people from telling the truth" (ICTV, September 26). The PRU complained against the verdict to the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the Reporters without Borders human rights watchdog (www.partyofregions.org.ua, September 25, 28).

President Viktor Yushchenko and Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, whose bloc is part of the pro-Tymoshenko coalition, effectively sided with the PRU. Yushchenko's aide Maryna Stavniychuk suggested that the verdict banning unfair advertising against Tymoshenko "looked like an infringement of freedom of speech" (Ukrainski Novyny, September 25). According to Lytvyn: "This showed that the court has joined the presidential election campaign." Lytvyn also criticized Tymoshenko for spending too much on her advertising campaign and accused her of violating the law according to which political advertising is illegal until the official start of the election campaign on October 20 (TVI, September 27).

Actually the law is openly violated by many candidates including Yanukovych. Tymoshenko's team argued that her media campaign was not political but "social," meaning that they "foster [the government's] communication with the community" and that Ukrainian television had broadcast them for free (Ukrainska Pravda, July 8). Tymoshenko said that the "She Works" billboards were paid for by the Fatherland Party, and therefore they were also "social" (UNIAN, August 5). This prompted suspicions that Tymoshenko's team had used taxpayers' money. Yushchenko's ally people's deputy Andry Paruby officially requested that the prosecutor-general's office investigates the sources of financing of Tymoshenko's advertisements. He suggested that public money might have been used (Ukrainski Novyny, September 15).

Meanwhile, the PRU has not escaped accusations of violating freedom of speech. Savik Shuster, the anchorman of the "Shuster Live" political show on Ukrainian television, complained of pressure from the PRU over his September 25 broadcast, which featured Tymoshenko. Shuster apparently did not want to invite PRU deputies, who acted as Tymoshenko's main opponents in the show. He wanted Yanukovych to be her opponent in a broadcast debate, but he failed to appear; in place of their tongue-tied leader, the PRU reportedly imposed several PRU deputies as guests on the show and wanted the air time to be shared equally between them and Tymoshenko (Interfax-Ukraine, September 28; Segodnya, September 29).

Yanukovych's opponents might argue that the very fact that Shuster, who sympathizes with Tymoshenko, anchors a political show on a TV channel that belongs to the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov (a supporter of Yanukovych), shows that freedom of speech still exists in Ukraine. However, this is an achievement that the country owes to Yanukovych's opponents in the 2004 election. It remains to be seen whether the court-imposed ban on advertisements hostile to Tymoshenko is only an episode in the election campaign or a harbinger of what is to come if the international community does not pay more attention to the Ukrainian election and journalists do not display solidarity as they did in 2004.

Turkey Pursues an Intermediary Role Between Iran and the West

Emrullah Uslu

Ankara will intensify its diplomatic efforts this month in order to extend Turkey's foreign policy preferences into regions that it considers as its primary interest zone. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that he expects October to be a "month of peace," while Turkey facilitates peace in the Middle East, the South Caucasus and the Balkans (Today's Zaman, October 1). On October 8-9 Turkey will host a trilateral meeting between the Turkish, Bosnian and Serbian foreign ministers to consider a new initiative toward establishing lasting peace in Balkans. The meeting will be the first step toward forming better relations between Serbia and Turkey. On October 25 the Turkish President Abdullah Gul will visit Serbia to restore Turkey's relations with Serbia.

In addition to the Balkans, members of the Turkish government will travel to other regional capitals to promote Turkey's foreign policy perspective in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. On October 25 Erdogan and Davutoglu along with other cabinet members will visit Iraq to attend the second joint cabinet meeting between the Turkish and Iraqi governments. At that meeting terrorism, energy, investment and transportations issues will be discussed. The significance of the trip lies in its detail. The meeting between the trilateral mechanism, which was established between the United States, Turkey and Iraq in order to combat Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism, will be held in Arbil, the capital of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq (Anadolu Ajansi, September 30). Ankara has long attempted to ignore the existence of the KRG in Iraq and has preferred instead to establish direct relations with the central government in Baghdad. Thus, the meeting between the U.S., Iraq, including KRG officials, and Turkey will be the first direct diplomatic relations between the KRG and the Turkish government.

In late October Erdogan will visit Pakistan and Iran to discuss regional issues -especially Iran's ambition to be a nuclear power. During his recent visit to New York Erdogan and President Barack Obama held a brief meeting to discuss regional issues. The Turkish press emphasized that Obama and Erdogan discussed regional problems including Iran's desire to develop nuclear weapons. On his return to Turkey Erdogan stated that Ankara opposed the idea of military intervention in Iran. He suggested that the international community should explore other options, including breaking off diplomatic relations, as possible ways to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear ambitions (Anka, September 27). Erdogan once again stressed Ankara's aim to act as a mediator between Iran and the West. He said that, "as a result of Turkey's efforts, Iranian and E.U. officials will meet in October. Turkey is ready to act positively if there is any request for further assistance" (Anka, September 27).

It appears that Erdogan and the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will continue to discuss the issue during Erdogan's visit to Tehran. Ahmadinejad, following his meeting with Erdogan in New York in the context of the U.N. General Assembly in late September, stated that "we will continue to explore the issues that we have discussed when Erdogan visits Tehran at the end of October" (Hurriyet, September 25).

Regarding the nuclear issue, Davutoglu echoed Erdogan's earlier statement: "Sanctions would hurt the Iranian people as well as Iran's neighbors, including Turkey. Therefore, we will intensify our diplomatic efforts in order to prevent the option of sanctions." He also noted that he had talked with the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki on September 28 and added that Tehran has assured the international community that it will work with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Today's Zaman, October 1).

In addition to Ankara's pro-active diplomatic initiatives on the Balkans and Middle East, one major diplomatic breakthrough that might occur later this month relates to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. It is now widely expected that Ankara and Yerevan will sign a protocol in Zurich on October 10 that will re-establish their diplomatic relations. However, the agreement must be ratified by the countries' parliaments in order to take effect, and a potential stumbling block is the continued disagreement over the tragic events of 1915.

The critical issue in Turkish-Armenian normalization is how Azerbaijan might react to the rapprochement. Gul and Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev will meet in Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan province on October 2-3 to discuss these issues. The date of this meeting is important because Aliyev and the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan will also meet on October 7-8, just two days before the signing ceremony between Turkey and Armenia (Zaman, September 29). Meanwhile, Sargsyan will try to build support to establish ties with Turkey among members of the influential Armenian diaspora in the U.S., Lebanon and France (Haberturk, October 1), which suggests that after signing the protocol Turkish-Armenian relations could develop rapidly.

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