



# **A SEARCH FOR AN INTEGRATED PEACE FRAMEWORK FOR ANGOLA: THE CASE OF KUITO-BIÉ AND VIANA**

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
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## DECLARATION

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Signed

15<sup>th</sup> December 2016

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## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to all Angolans Soldiers that have fought for this country, either from UNITA, FNLA or MPLA.

## **PREFACE**

Peace is the fundamental right for every human being. This observation has motivated this research. The study deals with the root causes of the Angolan conflict, gains and shortcomings.

The failed peace accords are presented. The study looks at the reasons behind the failures of Bicesse in 1991 and Lusaka in 1994.

Lastly, the Luena accord in 2002 is looked at. The research investigates the current situation by enquiring mainly from the grassroots how they feel the current peace, negative or positive. Finally the researcher suggests ways forward to attain sustainable peace.

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To all peace makers, thanks for the good work you do for our human nature.

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## **ABREVIATIONS**

**FAA-** ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES ( FORÇAS ARMADAS DE ANGOLA)

**FALA-** ARMED FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FORÇAS ARMADAS PARA LIBERTAÇÃO DE ANGOLA)

**FNLA-** NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FRENTE NACIONAL PARA LIBERTAÇÃO DE ANGOLA)

**MPLA-** POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MOVIMENTO POPULAR PARA LIBERTAÇÃO DE ANGOLA)

**UNITA-** NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNIÃO NACIONAL PARA A LIBERTAÇÃO TOTAL DE ANGOLA)

## **ABSTRACT AND KEY TERMS**

The 2002 ceasefire agreement in Angola represented an unprecedented achievement as far as building peace is concerned. With the belligerents able to talk, the country had a great opportunity to embark on a full reconciliation process. However, the situation in the country is in the status of unresolvedness. The peace is still negative. There are no avenues for open dialogue for positive change. This thesis presents the various phases of the Angolan peace process, its shortcomings and success. Further, a suggestion for a full framework for Angola based on John Paul Lederach's Integrated Framework for peacebuilding is given for the Angolan grassroots to embark on peace process starting from the bottom.

The researcher selected 200 hundred respondents with experience of the war. One hundred from Kuito- Bié and the other hundred from Viana. Through snowball and purposive sampling participants were identified.

Furthermore, the researcher interviewed with one member of MPLA, one from UNITA, one from the civil society and one from the Catholic Church.

The results showed that the civil society is not satisfied with the current peace, and urges for a new era. Thus, Lederach's peace structural framework fits well in Angola.

**KEY TERMS:** Conflict, Peacebuilding, Lederach's Integrated Model, Dialogue, Change, Reconciliation, Forgiveness, MPLA, UNITA.

## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

Angola is a southern African country which was colonized by the Portuguese. The first Portuguese personnel arrived in 1482. They were in the country for almost five centuries.

In 1961, the Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) liberation movements started fighting for independence, and later on the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) joined the fight. These movements fought for decades for independence, and 1975 independence was achieved.

The years that followed independence were marked by mistrust and antagonism. As a consequence a war broke out. For 27 years the country suffered the consequences of a war that was caused by unwillingness to share power in a country coming out of colonial domination.

During the war period, many attempts were made for a peace settlement. Bicesse in 1991 and Lusaka 1994 were a failure because the MPLA and UNITA were unwilling to compromise their own ambitions. Through the years of searching for peace, there were many contributors that tried to broker peace for Angola. The troika, (a combination of United States of America, Russia and Portugal) mediated the process of Bicesse in Portugal. The UN had an informal role to play. The negotiators rushed the country into elections. In 2002 elections were held. The main contestants were MPLA with José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA with Savimbi. The polls did not favour UNITA. The MPLA won. Savimbi refused to accept the results, and amidst the confusion the war resumed.

In 1994 another attempt in Lusaka resulted in nothing. The UNITA was urged to demobilize its army and play as a normal political party. Savimbi and UNITA beat around the bush and war returned. In 1998 the government decided to launch a war for peace. Helped by the UN sanctions against UNITA, they could fight against a fragmented movement. The result was a defeated UNITA that had no other solutions but to settle for peace. A cease-fire was signed and UNITA militants were granted amnesty for the war crimes.

With the victor's peace, UNITA became weak and the MPLA got stronger. As such, UNITA militants were living like MPLA hostages, it was like they were saved by MPLA's goodwill.

What came out of this process was a fragile peace that could not be monitored. For the MPLA, the achievement of a cease-fire was sufficient. The road towards common healing and

reconciliation was not on the agenda. The party narrowed down the reconciliation framework to forgive and forget.

As a result of the relativism as far as the peace process is concerned, the relative “peace” in Angola is negative. People’s needs are not met, people are living in fear. The possibility of talking about the future is very limited.

Overall, there is no clear framework for peace building. The idea of journeying towards sustainable peace is a dream. As much as people are confident the country will not go back to war, currently there is a lot of discontent and anger.

Thus, this research has been an attempt at bringing across a framework based on Lederach’s (1995; 1997; 2005) work on peace building. The aim was to bring about a framework that will prevent violence and favour rebuilding of relationships.

The study underlines that current situation in the country is of a victor’s peace, it is a one man takes all situation. The closing of ways for togetherness hinders the rebuilding of broken relationships. The aim of a peace process should be constructive social change. To move from fear to love, from despair to hope, from suffering to joy.

The research was both quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative side dealt with grassroots through questionnaires. Respondents from Kuito-Bie and Viana were asked about their war experience and peace expectations. Everyone acknowledged the need for dialogue as a way of mending broken relationships and moving towards a desired future.

The interviews (qualitative side) dealt with leaders from political parties, a member from UNITA and one member from the MPLA and one civil society representative and one Church representative. The interview questions were aimed at understanding the reasons behind the failure of the Bicesse and Lusaka accords and the likelihood of a successful 2002 Luena peace agreement. All the respondents agreed that there is a need for a clear roadmap for peacebuilding. Currently there is nothing in place to prevent conflict.

The current chapter 1 presents the reasons behind this research and points the reader to the various chapters included on this work.

## 1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The study took place in two Angolan municipalities. Kuito-Bié and Viana. An enquiry of the situation of the current peace process was sought. The study showed that the road towards peace has been a long one, many accords and talks took place in many countries as a way of helping UNITA and MPLA, the warring political parties to reach an understanding. The first of these attempts, after independence, took place in 1989 in Gbadolite, an encounter organized by president Mobutu of the Republic of Zaire. The gathering bore no fruit. The second happened in Bicesse, where a peace accord was reached, but collapsed after elections in 1992. After the collapse of Bicesse, there were many attempts to return to a cease-fire. The warring parties met in Addis-Abeba and Abidjan in 1993 this various talks under the supervision of the United Nations led to the signing of the Lusaka protocol in 1994.

All the above mentioned accords failed due to mistrust amongst the political parties. The country went back to large scale conflict in 1998 when the Angolan government decided to declare a war to achieve peace.

The main problem is that the current peace is elusive. Peace can only be effective if a whole society embarks on seeking solutions and avenues to interaction and change.

Two municipalities were investigated as a way of getting an indication of people's perceptions on peacebuilding processes and the peace aspiration. The study took place in the context of post-war reconciliation. The urgency of breaking the chains of past memories represents a key turning point into the desired outcome the country needs to reach.

Angola is currently facing an economic crisis due the low prices of crude oil in the international market. As a consequence, prices of basic goods are too high and common citizens have no buying power. Under severe life conditions there is a need for a clear road map for peace building, otherwise the grassroots can become a source of social unrest.

## 1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

After an armed conflict there are a number of tasks to be undertaken for peace building. The 2002 peace agreement in Angola, symbolizes advancement in people's lives, yet there are still problems to solve. How can peace become social? How can the 2002 agreement be changed into an opportunity for integration? Which framework can better fit the Angola post war

period? These are main problems of the current study. Finding a better suitable peace framework was the challenge undertaken.

### 1.3. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study was to understand how civilians perceive the current peace process. After the enquiry, which has clearly shown that the current peace agreement has led the country to negative peace, Lederach's integrated framework for conflict transformation is suggested as way forward for the country. Thus the research asked the following questions: How is the population embracing the current peace? What are the priorities and needs of civilians affected by the armed conflict? How does the population sense security and protection after the armed conflict? Is dialogue necessary to improve the current situation?

### 1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The study was motivated by the lack of an existing clear process for the Angolan situation. Since the signing of Luena Memorandum in 2002, the process is at a stalemate. The researcher found it important to embark on a study which would suggest a clear way for peace building.

By suggesting Lederach's framework as a method for an integrated peace system, the research contributes to the loophole in the Angolan peace process. It is observed, that there is very little literature on peacebuilding initiatives from below – the bottom-up approach. The researcher acknowledges that peace is never achieved at once. It is a sensitive process and requires patience from all sides so that a peace process becomes sustainable.

### 1.5. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study limits itself to the 25 years of the struggle to attain peace, that is, from 1991 to 2016. This period is also divided into two sections, from 1991 to 2001 as the conflict era, and from 2002 to 2016 as the post conflict era. In the first period the investigation aimed at understanding the reasons behind the failure of the peace accords. From 2002 to 2016 the aim was to understand the trends of conflict transformation in the country. The focus was in Kuito-Bié, because it was badly affected by the war, and in Viana, an area that was not directly affected.

The aim was to find out how much importance they give to dialogue as a method for peace building.

#### 1.6. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The researcher found it challenging to interact with people because of political sensitivity. Most public institutions are affiliated to MPLA, most people do not like to talk about politics, mostly when they belong to an opposition party. This difficulty can be shown on the data about political affiliation as most of the respondents avoided that question, which challenged the full picture of party support.

#### 1.7. STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY

This research is made up of seven chapters. The second one is a literature review. This chapter 2 is based on the published literature on peacebuilding. The aim is to refer to already existing literature and then build up with specific peace aspects with respect to Angola.

Chapter 3 presents the trend of conflict transformation in Angola. The history behind the conflict is brought to light, as well as the challenge of the current situation. It concerns the current president who has been in since 1979 at the centre of many challenges affecting the post-war Angola.

Chapter 4 presents the research methodology. The way through which the researcher went through to collect data and its interpretation is looked at.

Chapter 5 is the presentation of results. Both the qualitative and quantitative research results are presented.

Chapter 6 discusses the results from the research. A consideration of the important trends in the Angolan conflict is carefully presented.

Chapter 7 presents the recommendation and general conclusion. Combining both the discussion and the recommendations the research asserts that if Angola has to prosper it has to pay attention to the grassroots. The grassroots in turn are challenged to be drivers of change in society.



## **CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Theories are designed to guide a research to a desired outcome. A well designed theory helps to structure a research mapping guide. Mehtha (2016:1) asserts that “theories are constructed in order to explain, predict and master a phenomenon”. The choice of a theory is determinant for a validity of a research, Mvumbi and Ngumbi (2015:60) define theoretical framework as “an appropriate tool that is used to explain and bring together all the arguments and statements made in a research”. This chapter will therefore provide the theoretical framework for the current study. In the chapter, a set of theories are presented. Peace and Conflict Research (PCR) uses a number of approaches to understand and intervene in conflict situations, but a special attention will be given to Lederach’s (1997) Integrated Framework for peace building.

### **2.1. THEORIES**

Angola’s peace process lacks a transformational theory. As already mentioned Angola was at war for 27 years. Peace was achieved in 2002. After the signing of Luena Memorandum of Understanding, amnesty was granted to the belligerents. While the amnesty helps to stop revenge and massive killing, it hinders the possibility for true reconciliation. This chapter considers relevant theories that can be applicable in the Angolan context as a way of starting a true transformation process.

The Angolan peace process is perceived to be a disintegrated one. The civil grassroots is not active in the process and also there are still deep rooted conflicts in the society. The clashes show themselves through the political intolerance between UNITA and MPLA partisans. There is a culture of culpability of past events.

There are a number of theories that address the issue of integrated peace-building processes. These will be mentioned briefly before the focus of this research which primarily used John Paul Lederach’s (1997) Integrated Framework for Conflict Transformation towards Sustainable Peace.

### 2.1.1-AFRICAN UNION POLICY ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (PCRD)

The PCRD aims at creating a secure environment for the affected state and its population through juridical statehood, defined and controlled territory, responsible and accountable state control over the means of coercion, and a population whose safety is guaranteed (AU, 2006). Thus, the PCRD sets the roots for the peace agenda in the continent, however, more specific theories are applicable in Angola.

### 2.1.2-PRACTICE-RESOURCE MODEL

Another important theory for the proposed study is the Practice-Resource Model. The model is an anthropological approach to peace studies. It defines peace building as the creation of sociopolitical structure which is able to prevent the outbreak of conflict and perpetuate peace (Oda, 2007). The Practice-Resource Model favours bottom-up peace building. This approach allows for peace practices by non-state actors using various resources to create amicable relationships with national, ethnic, racial, religious and political others, and to build a social structure which is able to create a political order and which is able to promote sustainable peace (Oda, 2007).

### 2.1.3- CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE BUILDING

Given the road Angola has travelled to achieve peace, it would also have been appropriate to study the Angolan peace process from the point of departure of the Contingency Framework for Peace building.

As Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) observe the failure of peace agreements can be attributable to the parties' unwillingness to adhere to the provisions of that particular agreement and their willingness to resume conflict in order to forcefully get their way. They also note that literature suggests a variety of factors that ensure that negotiated settlements achieve what they were agreed upon to achieve, which is in most instances the end to conflict and the realization of peace. Such factors include the environment in which the agreement is negotiated, international security guarantees, provisions for political and military power sharing and the level of which

the agreement is specific and not drawn in vague terms that are open to many interpretations (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010).

The contingency framework integrates features of structure, process and environment of conflict management and assesses the nature of the process in light of historical experience and what is expected of the process (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). According to the framework, whatever the outcome of the negotiation, in terms of whether they manage to reach an agreement there is a total failure to reach an agreement, it can be assessed in terms of the nature of the conflict, the attitude of the mediators and the environment in which the conflict exists. The contingency framework deals with the past, present and the future aspects of conflict management and mediation and through this analysis we can assess the durability of the agreement. The reason behind this kind of analysis, as Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) observe, is to put mediation efforts in the context where their outcomes are considered in light of the above mentioned factors.

In as much as the contingency framework allows for an examination of cases where mediation was used as a mode to reach an agreement that brings an end to conflict, it does not consider the post-conflict consequences of mediation. The framework does not provision for how third parties who are part of the mediation process can help to implement the agreement. In order to fully appreciate the implementation of such agreements, the environment for implementation is considered under three factors namely how specific the agreement is, third party guarantees as well as how the conflict is managed in order to ensure that the agreement is implemented successfully (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). With regard to third party guarantees, the presence of a peace keeping force, for example, can be instrumental in ensuring that the agreement is not violated.

#### 2.1.4- PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

The contingency approach fails to outline strategy after mediation. Preventive diplomacy, on the other hand, gives a full view on how to go about conflict prevention. As put by Lund, quoted by Wokoma (2004:1) preventive diplomacy is “action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed and related forms of coercion by states or group or settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change”. Currently, Angola is experiencing an economic meltdown, a fragile government, thus preventive diplomacy is appropriate for Angola, given that it prevents recurrence of armed conflict by looking at different segments of a society.

## 2.2-LEDERACH'S CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK

Albeit above mentioned theories would suffice for the study, how Lederach's conflict transformation framework is privileged because it reduces the limitations of peace-building and increases the likelihood of sustainable peace. Thus, conflict transformation has the merit of shifting the focus of conflict and peace studies to local actors. This study will focus on local actors.

Lederach (1997:79) suggests that peace-building is a process. He asserts that "[the] process underscores the necessity of thinking creatively about the progression of conflict and the sustainability of its transformation by linking roles, functions, and activities in integrated manner". Furthermore, Lederach's (1997) peace-building framework represents a comprehensive set of lenses for describing how conflict emerges, evolves, and brings about changes in the personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions. His approach to peace studies aims at transforming conflict into peaceful cohabitation. Thus an integrated approach that includes every segment of the affected society is *sine qua none* for the effectiveness of a peace-building process.

Lederach's levels of leadership provide an insight into Angola's negative peace. He makes use of a pyramidal system to outline different peace actors. At the top of the pyramid there are the high rank members of a society. This segment of the society approaches peace by focusing on high levels of negotiation, such as ceasefire. Then there is the middle level, composed of religious leaders, academics and intellectuals. This component of the pyramid approaches peace-building through problem-solving and peace commissions. The last level of the pyramid is the grassroots leadership, composed of local leaders and community developers. They approach peace through psychological recovery (Lederach, 1997).

Lederach's approach to peace-building will enlighten the current situation of the Angolan peace-building process, by asking whether the different aspects of an integrated framework have been observed after 13 years of peace accords.

### 2.2.1-LEDERACH'S INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING

Lederach explains his model of peace building in the context of the kinds of conflict that are prevalent in present day. Pete (2004) observes that these are divided into long-lasting conflicts

and ethnic intrastate conflict usually arising from differences in tribe, community and religion. This presents a shortcoming, in that the focus of the model cannot be applicable to in situations where the conflict exists between states or where the conflict arises due to the military intervention of a third party state in an attempt to restore order between the two conflicting states or in situations where the occurrence of conflict is real but it has not yet intensified to the point of open violence. However, Pete (2004) notes that Lederach's model of peace building provides a unique perspective to conflict transformation.

Sabur (2011) on his part observes that Lederach makes reference to conflict transformation as compared to conflict resolution because the transformation view alerts the parties to the conflict to their role in what caused the conflict and its results thereafter. This involves all the parties to the conflict from the grassroots to national party leaders and this process becomes a tool to ensure that community members take responsibility for what transpired during the conflict and encourages them to build sustainable peace. He says that Lederach's notion of conflict transformation ensures that people come together and, with the aid of their cultural diversity, achieve self-sustaining peace. He sees that Lederach believes that conflict cannot be controlled or abolished but it can be transformed and through such a transformation, relationship between previously conflicting parties can be mended (Sabur, 2011).

Lederach and Maiese (2009) point out that in every attempt to ensure sustainable peace, the starting point is presenting the situation. This includes taking a look at what caused the conflict, how the conflict could have been dealt with before the eruption of violence and the nature of the relationships of the conflicting parties. The notion of conflict transformation immediately seeks to address the challenges that need to be resolved as a matter of urgency. Then it seeks to identify destructive patterns that worsen the situation. This enables people to connect what is happening to what happened in the past. This stage includes the involvement of all the parties to the conflict including the people at grassroots because it provides a clear picture of relationship patterns which would have led to the conflict (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). It is however important, that in as much as this stage brings forward the current situation and how decisions and actions made in the past resulted in the occurrence of conflict, it does not change the fact that the conflict transpired.

### 2.2.2-THE FUTURE

The second point of consideration is attempting to build sustainable peace. According to Lederach it is the horizon of the future that the process has consider in order to attain a desirable outcome. In this stage, all the parties to the conflict including people from the grassroots are asked what they envision for the future. They are expected to express the kind of future they want for themselves (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). The present situation provides a motivation for the kind of future that all the parties want to embrace and most of these include the end of conflict and building sustainable peace. This stage looks back to the past to see what went wrong and assesses the immediate challenges that have to be addressed in order to be on the path of achieving the desired future.

### 2.2.3-STRATEGIC PLAN

Lederach and Maiese (2009) observe that the final inquiry is the formation of strategy and support for the change to be experienced from conflict to peace process. This stage seeks to consider the response to the conflict as the development of change processes which include the needs, relationships and action plans for the parties involved in the conflict. However, although the focus of this stage is to address immediate challenges and put in motion attempts at addressing broader challenges, there is a need to contemplate on more than one operational solution. In this way, the change process will provide platforms for people, especially in the grassroots and enable them to stimulate long-term sustainable peace (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). Hence, Lederach's model of peace building through conflict transformation enables the parties to a conflict to foresee the possibilities of a peaceful future even though they may still be in conflict and encourage them to take the steps away from the conflict towards build and achieve long-lasting peace.

Lederach's framework shows that peace takes time to build. When a conflict turns violent, there is need for a commitment to achieve positive peace. It is said that it takes as long as a conflict took to build peace.

The study found out that the current peace in Angola is negative, it resulted from a cease fire and less is being done to tackle the root causes of the conflict. The country still witnesses the effects of negative issues to be resolved. There is still intolerance and rivalry between divided political parties, meaning that there are still core problems to be solved. Peace building

becomes a reality when parties in a conflict deal with the deeper feelings, such as resentment, hatred, revengeful behaviour and aggression and decide to move on (Lulofs and Cahn, 2000).

Lederach's relational integrated framework best suits the Angola process because it aims at restoring relationships over time. For him (2003:14) "conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and response to real-life problems in human relationships". This definition informs us that to understand a conflict, there is a need for the existence of a mapping guide.

To map a conflict, it is a requirement to know the history of the conflict, context, parties involved, the respective dynamic and issues of concern. Mapping a conflict is an important step towards building sustainable peace. By knowing the root causes of a conflict, a strategy can be put in place to address unresolved issues in relational conviviality. Lederach (2003:17) points out that "relationships-visible and invisible, immediate and long-term, are the heart transformational processes".

Building peace for Lederach therefore, is interconnected with strengthening relationship in a society. Thus there are some key concepts he uses in order to better explain his approach to peace, such as conflict, change, and the centrality of relationship.

#### 2.2.4-CONFLICT

It could be perceived that conflict is an inherent energy for human life. Without conflict humanity is meaningless. The eternal challenge is to avoid the appearance of violent conflicts. "Conflict is the motor of change, that which keeps relationships and social structures honest, alive and dynamically responsive to human needs, aspirations and growth" (Lederach, 2003:18).

Africa has experienced a varied number of violent conflicts. Over decades countries in the continent have been ravaged by recurrent complex intrastate wars. External intervention has produced insignificant lasting peace. Very often, quick solutions are sought. The possibility of transforming violent conflict into peaceful cohabitation is hard to achieve.

Conflict is inevitable in societies, but when they turn violent, there is a need to transform it into peaceful event. Angola needs a complete moral trajectory at peace (Obiekwe, 2009). The absence of war does not mean peace (Galtung, 1969).

#### 2.2.5-THE IMPORTANCE OF LEDERACH'S APPROACH

Leaderach's breakthrough is the importance he gives to human relationships as way of building peace. Recognizing where a society is as far as peace is concerned, and designing a structural plan for true peace is technique that requires time. His main concepts help society to see each as part of common solution for a given problem.

#### 2.2.6- THE CONCEPT OF CHANGE

The unique constant reality in human life is change. Just as conflict is always present, change journeys with everyone's life. Conflict and change are interconnected. A change can be positive or negative depending on the desired outcome. In conflict transformation, the desired outcome is always positive. As pointed out by Obiekwe (2009:9) "... conflict transformation as an endeavour to transform and channelize social conflict to produce or support positive dynamic growth and stability to prevent the undesired and undirected effects of conflict from reaching a critical point of tension that affects peoples". For Lederach (2005:2) "... constructive social change is the pursuit of moving relationships from those defined by fear, mutual recrimination, and violence toward those characterized by love, mutual respect and proactive engagement".

#### 2.2.7- CENTRALITY OF RELATIONSHIP

Reconciliation is a key concept in Lederach's peace building framework. "Reconciliation is a behaviour process in which we rebuild trust in a relationship and work toward restoration" (Lulofs and Cahn, 2000:326). At the centre of peacebuilding is the preoccupation of ameliorating broken relationships over a long period of time and formulate a strategic vision. For Lederach (1997:xvi) "... building peace in today's conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society, an infrastructure



that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside”.

## 2.2.8- THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

A conflict is neither bad nor good, it what is done with it that characterizes its badness or goodness. In other words, conflict is a result of interaction of individuals or groups with different cultural orientation, and values. Thus, conflict is part of any society. Lederach defines social conflict as “... a phenomenon of human creation, lodged naturally in relationships. It is a phenomenon that transforms events, the relationships in which conflict occurs, and indeed its very creators. It is a necessary element in transformative human construction and reconstruction of social organizations and reality” (Ledearch, 1995:17).

Lederach spouses a methodology for peacebuilding that is linked to the restoration of human relationships. The above mentioned elements are essential parts to his concept of building peace. Furthermore, he underlines that for peace to be effective different groups of a society have to work in web of connection, otherwise peace becomes a challenge.

To elucidate his point, Lederach suggest a relational pyramid aiming at changing the structure of conviviality in a divided societies and suggests a more subsidiary type of social relationship. Lederach’s framework “... focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships and engaging the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central component of peacebuilding” (1997:24). The reworking of relationships take place in the pyramid. There are three important levels in the pyramid: Top level, middle range, and the grassroots. In the top level - leadership are the main negotiators. The middle range are in between the grassroots and the top levels.

The grassroots is at the bottom of the pyramid. They are the ones who suffer the most during conflicts. And continue to suffer after ceasefire and are often left out of the picture as far as peace is concerned (Lederach, 2007).

At this point we turn to literature to find out the main determinants of peacebuilding after intrastate conflict. Later, at the discussion session we return to Lederach’s integrated framework in order to apply it to the Angola situation.

### 2.3-PARADIGMS OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

In broad terms, the main objective of all international relations theories is the regulation of the international system of states in a bid to maintain peace as security, order or justice (Bercovitch, 1984). Realism maintains that a balance of power is brought about by a common understanding among states that the international system is aged and that states are driven by self-seeking motives rather than idealistic norms (Paffenholz, 2009). Idealism, on the other hand, as Paffenholz (2009) points out, observes that the world would function smoothly if states were subject to the regulation of international organisations, norms and standards. Peace building in reality therefore connotes the maintenance of stability in the world through hegemonial power and keeping state interests clearly defined (Paffenholz, 2009) while peace building in idealism refers to the achievement of peace in the world through the creation, acceptance and observation of international norms and standards under the regulation of international organizations.

Specht (2008) notes that there are different approaches in the consideration of peace building. These include conflict transformation, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution and prevention (Specht, 2008). In as much as all these approaches are relevant to conflict transformation as a whole, these need to be aided by other interventions which would seek to assess the underlying reasons for the conflict. Specht (2008) provides the example that in any given instance conflict resolution would focus on addressing attitudes and building positive relationships between the parties who were in conflict; in the same breath conflict transformation would then focus on addressing and hopefully changing the whole context of the conflict.

Dijk (2009) states that the main aim of conflict transformation is to achieve peace. The aim is not to merely end violent acts or merely transform a negative relationship between conflicting parties but rather a transformation of the social, political and economic aspects which may be the underlying cause of the initial conflict. Therefore, Dijk (2009) suggests that conflict transformation must be aimed at equipping people so that they can become involved in the nonviolent process of creating an environment where peace and justice prevail.

### 2.3.1- STAGES IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

Lederach and Maiese (2009) provide the components of the conflict transformation framework and point out that each stage is an investigation in developing a response to conflict. The stages include the presenting situation, the horizon of a preferred future and the development of the change processes linking the two. Lederach and Maiese (2009) observe that the transition from the world we live in today to the world in which we desire to live in can be achieved through a set of initiatives which inspire change and establish platforms to practice long-term change.

As universally agreed it is not easy to transform an undesired situation to a more desired one, as Reyhler and Langa (2006:4) put it: "... transforming conflict-torn, political unstable, and socially and economically disintegrated countries into more politically stable, equal and prosperous ones require not only a clear and legitimate vision of the peace, or future one wants to achieve, but also a clear understanding of how to get there".

Thus to address the conflict situation envision a desired outcome there is a need to acknowledge the various time frames in conflict transformation.

### 2.3.2- THE PRESENT SITUATION

The first point of the investigation will be the consideration of the presenting situation and this looks at the conflict itself which will provide the context into the reason behind the conflict the manner in which differences of opinion are expressed which in turn lead to the conflict (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). This leads to the questions which need to be addressed at this stage. Such questions include what concerns would need immediate resolutions in order to stop the conflict. What needs to be considered in order to change the destructive patterns of dealing with the conflict? In this stage transformation views the presenting issues as being expressions of a broader system of relationship patterns. These issues will usually have strong connections with the past and will present a context on how things have been, how the conflict arose and the expressions of the parties to the conflict. This stage however, does not have the capacity to reverse what has already transpired (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). Therefore, the potential for change is in the ability to recognize and accept what has already occurred and to establish new avenues of interacting in the future.

### 2.3.3- THE HORIZON OF THE FUTURE

The second point of the investigation is the horizon of the future and this suggests the kind of future in which we aspire to live. This stage asks us questions about what we would ideally like to see created or to be in place. It is noted that this is by no means a linear model of change but rather a movement from what we presently experience to future desired experiences (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). This leg flows from the first one in the sense that for there to be a desired future, there has to exist a present that requires changing. Therefore, the arrow of transformation will point forward to the future in which we wish to live and back to where we are coming from (Lederach and Maiese: 2009). Hence the process of transformation can be perceived as both a circular and linear process.

### 2.3.4- CHANGE AS PROCESS

The third point of the investigation is the design and support of change processes. This stage requires us to look at the responses to conflict as developments of change processes which have an effect on interconnected needs, relationships and patterns (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). It will also consider immediate concerns and a broader analysis of patterns and so it would be important to look at multiple levels and types of change instead of focusing on one solution that seems to work. Therefore, it follows that the change processes must come up with short-term solutions and also establish platforms which promote long-term change (Lederach and Maiese, 2009).

Dijk (2009) considers the social aspect of conflict transformation and suggests that the social aspect is central to conflict transformation. According to Dijk, three closely connected aspects have to be considered in the process of conflict transformation. These are the perceptions and attitudes of people, the context in which people live and the behaviour of people. Perceptions and attitudes influence how a group of people are going to behave and examples of such are distrust, superiority or the opposite. Context looks at the circumstances under which people live and examples of these will include whether or not there is equal access to basic services, the availability of economic opportunities and the ability to participate in the political processes (Dijk, 2009). Context influences perceptions. Behaviour is the consequence of a group of people's perceptions and attitudes as well as the context in which they live and examples of behaviour include violence and corruption (Dijk, 2009).

In summary of what conflict transformation is and what it entails, Lederach and Maiese (2009) state that the whole process of conflict transformation allows us to come up with responses for immediate concerns, while providing those responses with a platform for long-term change. This involves the capacity to not only address the immediate problems but to look beyond these problems and create responses that address real issues in real time (Lederach and Maiese, 2009).

Peacebuilding is a long and structured process that needs to be taken seriously and methodologically. One of the processes that allows for avenues for peace is dialogue, a catalyst that helps broken relationships to be amended. The next section presents the significance and importance of dialogue for peacebuilding.

#### 2.4. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE PEACE

The process of building peace after a history of conflict and striving to ensure that the reasons for the initial conflict are guarded against is a challenging task (Samuel and Einsiedel, 2004). Studies show that among some of the challenges that are encountered, the most daunting in the process of peace building are inadequate strategy, lack of co-ordination and the unwillingness to compromise (Samuels, 2005). In as much as these studies point out to the challenges on building sustainable peace, Samuels (2005) observes that there is very little clarity on how such issues can be addressed. For example, it is difficult to ensure human security in an environment which is still riddled with conflict or to disarm those who were fighting for various sides before a ceasefire was reached or to even integrate them into a single army successfully (Samuels, 2005). However, mediation and dialogue remain the main facets in which peace during conflict and sustainable peace can be achieved (Mirimanova, 2009).

This section will consider the role that dialogue plays in a bid to achieve sustainable peace. The notion of conflict which is the reason why parties sue for peace will be discussed. Thereafter, a discussion of what dialogue is and what it entails will ensue.

##### 2.4.1- CONFLICT AS A PART OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS

Nicholson (1971) defines conflict as a situation where there is an interaction between two or more parties whose motives for doing something differ. Galtung (1996), on the other hand,

views conflict as a triangle which has structure, attitudes and behaviour as its facets. The structure is the situation which is the conflict of differing interests which arises between the parties. Attitudes are how the parties view the conflict which is usually from their own point of view and lacking consideration or understanding for the concerns of the opposing parties. Behaviour refers to actions by deed or communication which will be hostile or conciliatory towards the opposing party (Galtung, 1996). Coser (1956) defines conflict as a struggle over matters such as values, claims to status, power and scarce resources and the intentions of the parties would be not only to have these but also to eliminate any opposition to their claims.

From these definitions, it is clear that conflict is an inevitable occurrence in human relationships. Emuedo (2013) observes that conflict can be peaceful or violent. Girvetz (1974: 185) views violence as "... harm perpetrated on persons or property ranging from restriction of movement, torture and death (persons), and from simple damage to total expropriation or destruction". Therefore, it follows that conflict is violent when there is the use of force and arms in a bid to resolve differences (Francis, 2006). The reason why conflicts tend to turn violent is the frustration which stems from anger or worry over why a particular point of view is being disregarded or regarded (Emuedo, 2013).

In the midst of the conflict, there will be attempts to bring it to an end and to achieve peace. In the Angolan context, these came in the form of the Alvor accords in 1975, the Bicesse accords in 1991, the Lusaka peace agreement in 1994 and Luena peace agreement in 2002. It is important to note that even though peace may be achieved through such attempts, it is of paramount importance to ensure that steps are taken to preserve the peace. Dialogue is one such step and this chapter will at this juncture turn to consider it in greater detail.

#### 2.4.2- DIALOGUE AND WHAT IT ENTAILS

Mirimonova (2009) observes dialogue and mediation to be longstanding strategies for conflict resolution. Both principles are grounded in the notion that whenever parties are in a conflict, the best way to assist those parties to reach an understanding or common ground there must be intervention from a neutral third party. Therefore, mediation and dialogue appear to be fair, cost-effective and a democratic means to resolve conflict as opposed to arbitration or military intervention by an outside party (Mirimonova, 2009). Mediation and dialogue can be employed

in the context of violence, distrust, political opportunism and injustice as a means to address and resolve such ills.

#### 2.4.3- DIALOGUE AS AN OFFICIAL ENCOUNTER

Dialogue is viewed as open communication between parties in conflict which can either be facilitated or moderated by an impartial third party in a bid to bring about mutual recognition, understanding and trust (Mirimanova, 2009). The ultimate goal of dialogue is to improve the understanding between parties with conflicting views and to build a mutual trust between those parties. Casual conversation, discussion or debate by conflicting parties cannot be considered as dialogue for the simple reason that for dialogue to happen, communication between the parties has to occur according to particular rules, where the parties acknowledge and develop compassion towards each other's points of view (Mirimanova, 2009). Therefore, dialogue focuses on the process but it can also be result oriented. Mirimanova (2009) observes that this may occur when the conflicting parties have one particular goal, for example the exchange of prisoners of war. Such a goal cannot be achieved in the absence of trust and empathy between the conflicting parties.

Official dialogue is dialogue between parties whose members or their delegates hold top rank that include decision making responsibilities. These persons generally include leaders of states or leaders who represent interested groups such as rebel leaders. Unofficial dialogue is usually termed as public peace processes or problem solving workshops and can be defined as the interaction between members of conflicting groups who attempt to influence public opinion and develop strategies in a bid to resolve the conflict (Mirimanova, 2009). This form of dialogue arises from the weariness of talking with no visible change and these have had influence in conflict transformation, human rights and development.

#### 2.4.4- INFORMAL DIALOGUE

Unofficial dialogue processes are as important as the official processes in that these usually continue after the official dialogue process has either collapsed or ended in the reaching of a mutual understanding. Without unofficial dialogue, there is also a danger of top ranking officials reaching an agreement which will not be accepted by the masses leading to the outbreak of conflict (Mirimanova, 2009). The government's power to negotiate with a

conflicting power emanates from the notion that the agreement reached will be to the benefit of its citizens and unofficial dialogue processes bring awareness to the government of what its citizens want and what they will likely accept after negotiations with a conflicting party.

Dialogue and justice reinforce each other and promote reconciliation. Whether it is official or unofficial dialogue, the end result is to reach a common understanding between conflicting parties. The unofficial dialogue process feeds into the official dialogue process and in these processes the needs of the citizens are clear and are taken into consideration in any negotiation. Therefore, in the development or transition of any state, the importance of dialogue whether it is the official or unofficial process cannot be overemphasized.

## 2.5. THE ROLE THAT DIALOGUE PLAYS IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE PEACE

There have been many instances of conflict in Africa and Angola gives a perfect example of the challenges and the lessons that can be learnt in bringing about an end to such conflict. However, the end of the conflict usually has to be consolidated with a well thought out plan for peace-building after the conflict. Kumar (1998) observes that in as much as international organizations and governments have intervened in many instances to bring an end to many violent conflicts around the globe, it has been their main objective to establish a conducive environment for peace which guards against the occurrence of conflict again.

Kumar (1998) further points out that those attempts to ensure sustainable peace for the short or long term, whether they are domestic or international, attempts will not yield any tangible results if there are no sustainable political processes in place. He goes on to note that such processes should operate in such a way as to be able to manage and resolve disputes before they turn violent and result in the outbreak of conflict. Therefore, in the absence of such processes, recovery from conflict to building sustainable peace will be disturbed by disputes, some of which could cause the occurrence of another conflict notwithstanding the amount of international support in place for reconstruction and development.

### 2.5.1-DIALOGUE AS A PROCESS

Dialogue is one of the processes which can be incorporated into political systems in order to ensure sustainable peace. For LeMoyne (2009) dialogue is a process that not only entails



talking but learning too. Dialogue is an attempt to change or to improve the way people talk and communicate with each other regardless of their differences and this requires elements like reflection, inquiry and being open to ideological changes to be present (LeMoyne, 2009). Therefore, through the process of dialogue, parties will be open to discuss the root causes of their differences and not merely how they are reacting to such differences. This would ensure meaningful people in the short-term as both sides would have an idea of the stance of the other and through dialogue they would attempt to understand the conflicting party's stance in a bid to prevent violent conflict.

LeMoyne (2009) observes that not only does dialogue show empathy for the other party but also focuses on long-term goals. If parties are engaged in dialogue, they tend to acknowledge their differences and accept areas of common ground. Dialogue differs from other forms of processes in ensuring sustainable peace whereas other processes may focus on addressing short term challenges whilst dialogue tends to focus on symptoms of differences and in order to do so, both parties need to be patient (LeMoyne, 2009). The downside to this is that the process is time consuming and is filled with trial and error solutions to the point that once-off interventions are virtually impossible.

#### 2.5.2- MUTUAL TRUST AS PRE-CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL DIALOGUE

For the process of dialogue to ensure sustainable peace and to be successful certain conditions first have to be present. LeMoyne (2009) states that where there is a history of violence, hate and mistrust, such as in the case of Angola, the road to peace building and sustainable peace becomes more challenging even where the process of dialogue has been instituted. Moreover, the parties have to be free to voice their concerns without fear for their lives. Therefore, dialogue can be considered to be just one of the tools for policy-makers in a way to ensure sustainable peace. Other flexible and adaptable tools have to be employed along with dialogue for parties with a history of conflict to learn to trust each other and to collectively focus their efforts on peace building.

In conclusion, in order to ensure sustainable peace one of the tools that policy makers ought to make use of is dialogue. Dialogue can either be official where the relevant stakeholders are top ranking government officials with the capacity to make decisions or unofficial where the stakeholders are organizations and concerned citizens who through their dialogue can inform

and influence decision making. Both of these avenues are paramount in peacebuilding. However, as already discussed, the process is time consuming and requires parties and prerequisite conditions for it to be effective. Moreover, dialogue is not a once-off solution but has to be considered with other processes in a bid to ensure sustainable peace.

## 2.6- RECONCILIATION

When dialogue is successful, what follows are steps towards full reconciliation. In fact, dialogue and reconciliation go hand in hand. When parties accept to dialogue means they have started to reconcile. “Reconciliation is of vital importance for the success of sustainable peace building. Reconciliation releases the necessary energy to build a new future. It requires the cooperation of the conflicting parties” (Langer and Reychele, 2006:34).

### 2.6.1- IMPORTANCE OF RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation is of paramount importance in that it is a process which focuses on restoring relationships between conflicting groups after a cease-fire has been reached (Steele, 2008). Brouneus (2007) observes that this process is vital in this day and age considering that most conflicts are intrastate and when the parties agree to end the conflict, former enemies, perpetrators and victims will still have to continue residing near each other. Steele (2008) notes that reconciliation requires action in all stages which begin with the stabilization process and must be initiated from national to local levels in the political as well as social aspects. Therefore, reconciliation can be viewed as the tape that holds a society emerging from conflict together long after the ceasefires have been reached.

This part will focus on the concept of reconciliation. It will unpack what reconciliation entails, investigate how the process of reconciliation is carried out and most importantly, it will consider the actors involved especially the role of the grassroots in the process of reconciliation.

## 2.6.2- THE IMPORTANCE OF RECONCILIATION IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

Literature suggests a variety of definitions of reconciliation depending on what perspective one takes in looking at it. It could be from a religious or political or even psychological perspective. Brouneus (2003) views reconciliation as a process whereby parties involved accept the wrongdoings of the past and acknowledge their role in the events, in a bid to build lasting relationships which ensure sustainable peace. From this definition by Brouneus, one can deduce that the central components to the process of reconciliation are a change in emotions, attitude and behaviour. It is a process that involves the society at large (Bloomfield, 2006).

Molenaar (2005) notes that reconciliation is a process. It cannot be realized at once because it takes time to forgive the wrongdoings of the past and to attempt to rebuild sustainable relationships between previously conflicting parties. The parties to a reconciliation process are usually parties which have a negative history and there is usually no clear difference between the wrongdoer and the victim. Molenaar (2005) is of the view that restoration of a relationship is the ultimate goal for the reconciliation process and this goal cannot be achieved unless all the affected parties are actively involved in the process.

Brouneus (2007) points out that in most post-conflict societies there are situations where peace and justice dialogue. This is because it is common place for leaders who were previously in conflict to reach peace agreements in return for amnesty. By the same token, weak security, imbalanced power-sharing arrangements and unwillingness of political institutions have a tendency of limiting the scope of achieving justice. Brouneus (2007) points out that victims in post-conflict societies may be angry if no one is called to acknowledge or held accountable the atrocities perpetrated against them and achieving sustainable peace can be a challenge if peace, justice and other development priorities have to compete for resources.

With this in mind, Steele (2008) points out that reconciliation must encompass the needs of all the parties concerned in order to help them to deal with their differences. Only then can there be reconciliation. In order for the process to be effective, there is a need to address all the dimensions to a conflict which include people, challenges and systems, all of which come with their own challenges (Steele, 2008). There also needs to be mechanisms in place in order to establish trust, healing of grievances, doing away with biases and stereotypes and building relationships so that people can live and work together in harmony. Additionally, people should

have problem solving skills which are necessary to help them resolve their disputes amicably (Steele, 2008).

Kumar (1999) points out that social reconciliation intervention is designed specifically to develop understanding among the involved parties in order to strengthen nonviolent conflict resolution and to heal wrongdoings of the past. The main objective of this is to promote social reconciliation not to promote economic or political development. It is here that there is a need for grassroots structures which include peace committees, citizens' groups and local leaders to be part of the process in order to ensure tolerance among all the parties involved. Tolerance is achieved through countering rumours and exaggeration, encouraging non-violent means to resolve disputes, awareness of peace education and mediation between conflicting groups and the government (Kumar, 1999).

### 2.6.3- WHAT THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION ENTAILS

In the past years, reconciliation has come to be viewed as a medium employed in post-conflict societies to guard against the reoccurrence of conflict. Brouneus (2007) observes that it was predominantly the work done by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa which sought out reconciliation after it emerged from decades of apartheid through truth commissions, official apologies and memorials that inspired the initiation of the process in other post-conflict societies in order to achieve sustainable peace. Therefore, reconciliation has become a priority in national development for such societies and several countries like Peru, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Rwanda and Liberia have initiated reconciliation mechanisms (Brouneus, 2007).

Steele (2008) points out the necessity of reconciliation noting that if there are ineffective mechanisms for dialogue and dispute resolution, it is impossible to build harmonious relationships between previously conflicting parties. He also points out that several other challenges may arise as a result, these include a deadlock in the attempts of establishing democratic governance, threats to security arising from suspicion, stagnation of economic development due to other competing developmental priorities and an interpretation of justice in negative terms like guilt and punishment instead of common values for the common good (Steele, 2008).

Backer (2007) notes that since reconciliation seeks to change the behaviour, attitude and emotions between previously conflicting parties, truth telling is the backbone of the process. Literature in peacebuilding and in politics suggests that the telling of the truth is therapeutic and healing, thereby speeding up the process of reconciliation between former enemies. However, Backer (2007) points out that there is not empirical evidence of this. Hamber (2006) observes that the acknowledgement of perpetuating past acts of violence against a particular class of persons is important in addressing individual traumatic experiences as it confronts what happened in the past and assists in rebuilding a particular class of people's self-esteem. On the other hand, Stover (2004) notes with concern that confronting past atrocities which resulted in humiliation, shame and guilt is usually challenging and may lead to the stigmatization of a specific group of people which can be viewed as counterproductive in the reconciliation process.

Molenaar (2005) notes that in as much as truth telling is the cornerstone of the process of reconciliation, other factors like mercy, justice and peace are essential to the success of any reconciliation process. Mercy envisions the need for accepting what happened thereby opening up the possibility of starting again on a clean slate. Justice in this sense searches for the rights of individuals and groups in order to rebuild and compensate them for what they went through during violent conflict. Peace is considered as a need for human security, interdependence and well-being (Molenaar, 2005).

Although these factors may seem independent, they should not be considered in isolation because successful reconciliation depends on the interdependence of these factors and if one of these is neglected there is a reality of undermining the whole process. For example, Molenaar (2005) states that truth without justice will not be accepted by victims who suffered vast human rights violations if the perpetrators of such violations are not brought to book for their actions or for their part in those violent acts. Justice achieved without truth is dangerous as it may create historical amnesia which may lead to a reoccurrence of previous hostilities in the future thereby threatening the possibility of sustainable peace which the process of reconciliation should aim for (Molenaar, 2005). Mercy is also ineffective if it is not combined with other factors like truth and justice. It must not be used as a means to protect perpetrators from taking responsibility for their previous violent acts. If there is no peace, it is virtually impossible to establish peaceful relationships or a harmonious society.

Concerning justice within the reconciliation process, Minow (1998) states that it is important that the kind of justice sought should be restorative rather than retributive. Minow (1998) observes that retributive justice focuses on the crime which is seen as against the law and punishment for such is imposed by a criminal justice system and not by individuals who want to satisfy their desire for revenge for the acts perpetrated against them. On the other hand, Zehr (2001) explains restorative justice as the kind of justice which views the crime as a conflict between individuals and the consequences of that conflict affects all the parties concerned, which include the victim, the perpetrator and the society. In a reconciliation process the justice system will be established to reconcile as well as to heal relationships broken by the conflict so that a harmonious society may come into existence.

#### 2.6.4- THE ACTORS INVOLVED IN A RECONCILIATION PROCESS

Assefa (2001) points out that attempts at building lasting peace by post-conflict societies has to start from its roots meaning that reconciliation has to be mindful of a specific society's cultural heritage as well as its traditions. A perfect example of this is the use of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa of the notion of Ubuntu. Tutu (1999) states that the notion of Ubuntu stipulates that at the core of humanity is interdependence, loosely translated to mean that a person is a person because of other people. This also means that if one individual behaves badly such behaviour is attributable to everyone and by the same token, if an individual portrays exemplary behaviour that too is attributed to everyone. In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission sought to restore Ubuntu to both the victims and perpetrators in order to achieve national reconciliation (Tutu, 1999).

Brouneus (2007) observes that reconciliation can be instituted from three levels namely top-level, middle-range and grassroots; each of these levels have their own actors. The top-level tier consists of international and national criminal tribunals. This level is important for two reasons. The first reason is that for reconciliation to be achieved, perpetrators of atrocities during conflict must take responsibility for their actions or their input in those atrocities and in case of crimes like genocide, be punished for them (Brouneus, 2007). Brouneus (2007) observes the second reason is that for reconciliation to be realized, there should exist an effective legal system which is able to maintain order after a society is emerging from conflict. It is important at national level for top-level actors to receive the requisite training needed to

confront issues around suffering and co-existence after conflict as their decisions have a bearing on its citizen's rehabilitation in a bid to achieve reconciliation (Brouneus, 2007).

Hayner (2001) states that middle-range tier mechanisms aim to sway the emotions, attitudes and behaviour of the top-level and grassroots towards reconciliation. Actors in this level include civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, the media and religious groups. Brouneus (2007) notes the importance of the media in this level as it can be instrumental in promoting peace instead of instigating violence. Hayner (2001) also stresses the importance of truth commissions in this level in that they usually influence the top-level as well as involve the participation of the whole population in order to achieve reconciliation.

Brouneus (2003) notes that the grassroots tier is the level with the most number of people as the actors are the general population of the country. However, as no single programme can successfully incorporate the whole population, grassroots mechanisms include involving community leaders who would in turn spread peace awareness and reconciliation projects in their communities. Community leaders who are part of the grassroots tier should not be too confrontational or aggressive in addressing past atrocities but have to foster a process of tolerance and understanding for past acts so that their communities do not revert back to conflict but help in laying the foundation for national reconciliation (Brouneus, 2003).

#### 2.6.5- AID WORKERS IN RECONCILIATION

Brouneus (2003) points out that it is crucial for aid workers who run reconciliation projects at a grassroots to have a thorough understanding of the conflict and the effect that it has on the people as well as the goals that the process of reconciliations seeks to achieve. This is because such aid workers interact with the general population and it is important that in engaging with these people, aid workers understand the challenges that conflict and post-conflict impose on the people so that the process of reconciliation is also characterized by empathy. Brouene (2003) points out that if such a quality is lacking in aid workers who are working at a grassroots level, then the whole purpose of achieving reconciliation may be defeated when the population senses disrespect for what they went through during the conflict. Such feelings may in turn result in a renewed desire for revenge against former enemies putting a halt to the attempts to establish harmonious relationships. Although aid workers are usually from international organizations and may not have had first-hand experience of the effects of the conflict, it is

their duty to understand the effects of the conflict so that they can better assist the grassroots in the process of reconciliation.

#### 2.6.6- TRUTH COMMISSIONS

It is at the grassroots level that we observe the importance of truth commissions because the success of these is based on the participation of the general population which include the victims, perpetrators and the community at large (Brouneus, 2007). The reach of truth commissions also stretches beyond those who were directly affected during the conflict to those who were in other cities and to those who were not yet born at the time of the conflict through the use of the media or programmes which enable the establishment of village tribunals as in the case of Rwanda (Brouneus, 2007). As seen in the case of South Africa, truth commissions also have an invaluable contribution in informing national policy in ensuring that the injustices of the past are adequately addressed.

Kumar (1999) states the various initiatives which have been used at various tiers to ensure reconciliation in a number of countries. For example, peace committees which included citizens, leaders of ethnic groups, political parties, academic and religious institutions were established in the cities of India in 1947 in order to stop the ethnic clashes which had the country on its knees (Kumar, 1999). Such committees have also been responsible to fostering mutual understanding and paving a way for restoration in places like South Africa and Nicaragua. Reconciliation Commissions have also been established in countries like Bulgaria and Poland where grassroots have contributed significantly to the process of reconciliation.

#### 2.6.7- TYPES OF GRASSROOTS RECONCILIATION

For the past few years, there has been a revision of thinking on the complex dynamics and processes of post-conflict peace building which has included the idea that effective and sustainable peacemaking processes must be based not merely on the manipulation of agreements made by the elite but more so the empowerment of the communities torn apart by conflicts. This means that a good peace building shifted from top-down, but was now also bottom-up. This is because of three elements that have so far been seen as important. First, that there are some embedded cultures and economies of violence that makes it hard for



constructive interventions (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005). Secondly, the specification of the significance of post-conflict peace building and formal agreements needs understanding, structures and long-term development frameworks on the ground. Lastly, there is a need for the local actors with their knowledge and wisdom. This therefore would help to put in place or enhance sustainable citizen-based peacebuilding initiatives.

What must be noted is that bottom-up peacebuilding cannot be seen in isolation of cosmopolitan conflict resolution, acting to confront the global and higher level forces that impact on local communities (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005).

## 2.7- PEACEBUILDING FROM BELOW (BOTTOM-UP)

After different attempts to bring peace in conflict areas like Yugoslavia in the 1990s became a challenge to peacemakers, approaches to peace building were developed. The anti-hegemonic, counter-hegemonic and post-hegemonic peace building projects as well as counter-life world constructs were put in place. Seeming not to respond to what was desired, an idea or a thinking that peacebuilding need to "... move away from an outsider neutral approach towards a partnership with the local actors. This element of involving the local actor is what brought about the peacebuilding from below." (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:217)

Lederach (1995) is a leading scholar on the issue of peacebuilding from below. Grassroots peace building then offers a way of bottom up peace building that changes the nature of violence and possible violent outbreak. Peace from below does not allow readymade solutions. It is clear in the bottom-up framework that any solution that the people could have received due to their experience of war and suffering and give true solution was that which could come deep from their heart. And any other would just be important enough but not relevant to promote peace. Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, (2005:218) agree that "... through local peacemakers who had received advices, consultative-facilitative roles through workshops and training in areas necessary according to their own circumstances and needs" peace has the highest possibility of being sustainable. Peace from below empowers the local community who knew what the conflict has been like and help able to rebuild democratic institutions and develop local peacemakers. Therefore, all players from outside including the UN and Peacekeepers are only to take part in empowerment. Empowered grassroots can deal with

questions of “how to control violence and how to relate the control of violence and building relationships at the community level.” (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:218)

Furthermore “... peacebuilding from below [is] linked to the idea of liberating communities from the oppression and misery of violence in a project whose main goal was the cultivation of cultures and structures of peace” (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:220), and for effectiveness and success, of grassroots peacebuilding it is important to identify “... cultural modalities and resources within the setting of conflict in order to evolve a comprehensive framework which takes into consideration both short and long term perspectives for conflict resolution” (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:220).

### 2.7.1- IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACEBUILDING FROM BELOW

While Angola ignores the role of the grassroots for peace builders and promoters of justice, Lederach (1995; 1997) and Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) see grassroots peacebuilding as a way of avoiding problems and promoting stability in a given society. In chapter 6 this research dedicates more attention to the issue of peacebuilding from below as a way out for sustainable peace process in Angola. This is not to stop the outsiders’ intervention, but just calling them to reorient their roles.

The above idea is therefore taken as a good model for a sustainable peacebuilding in post-conflict society which must be rooted at the grassroots or communal level. Another trend supporting peacebuilding from below is the liberal peace project. A summary of this approach is presented below in order to elucidate the efficacy of bottom-up peace building.

### 2.7.2- LIBERAL PEACE FROM BELOW

For a long time efforts have been made to respond to need for peace, especially by those who may be called come from outside the conflict zone and many times or always they are state actors. But a new approach has taken root as well where non-state actors and the civil society from within these war or conflict zones participate and work towards a sustainable peace. So these actors work not just to bring civil peace but also contribute to the construction of constitutional peace (Richmond, 2005).

### 2.7.3- HUMAN SECURITY AS A FOUNDATION FOR PEACE

With the need to redefine what security is from state to individual, a new concept emerges called Human security. It was based on the concepts or framework associated with civil society, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This has become notable for it has been taken by key policy circles like UN organizations and donor states like Japan (Richmond, 2005). This means that now "... instead of focusing on the inter-state relations to foster peace building, social, political and economic reforms are introduced which in turn affects the people directly" (Richmond, 2005: 128). This new approach was seen to be an effective way because these non-governmental actors were seen to have unparalleled access to conflict zones far beyond the official actors like the political actors.

This new approach, human security as a concept, then broadened the agents and structures from something that had been seen before as a source of insecurity itself. At the same time "... it has recognized the complexity of security issues, and the breath of issues and actors who are affected by them" (Richmond, 2005:129). Liberal peace from below "offers a vision of peace in which social welfare and justice can be incorporated into parallel constitutional and institutional projects for peace" (Richmond, 2005:129).

Based on the number of non-state actors that we have today working in the area of peacebuilding, we can say without any doubt that this bottom-up approach to attaining peace is a very important way and means in attaining sustainable peace with human security as a means in achieving this goal. Social justice, development and democratization of institutions have been elements which this process and the actors can boast of as having been achieved. Thus those non-state actors must continue to remain focused on civil peace otherwise they may confuse their role and also find themselves promoting their personal interests rather than those whose suffering they are to serve. In the event that they are not able to secure and conduct their work of liberal peace effectively, they could secure the help of outside actors who could use force to produce liberal order.

On the other hand, Babo-Soares (2004) observes that there are two categories of grassroots reconciliation and the first one is family reconciliation which involves personal contact with the general population. In East and West Timor, this form of reconciliation was done through welcoming ceremonies and arranged meetings to welcome exiled and internally displaced people back into their communities (Babo-Soaes, 2004). This category also makes provision

for family reunions, ceremonies conducted to traditionally welcome exiles by community leaders in a bid to foster reintegration into the communities. Babo-Soares (2004) observes that during such ceremonies in Timor, such celebrations would reserve time for an address by a public figure who will acknowledge the atrocities committed during the conflict, offer apologies and accept consequences of their actions.

The second category is people's reconciliation which is like family reconciliation but involves the whole community. In this category, parties to the conflict arrange to have refugees returned to their places of origin and the ceremonies are conducted in the presence of all the political authorities who were party to the conflict. These ceremonies usually end with the parties involved making commitments to preserve peace and foster the process of reconciliation within their communities.

## 2.8- RECONCILIATION AND FORGIVENESS

Monteville (2002) observes that the objective of reconciliation especially in post-conflict reconstruction processes is usually vaguely defined but in most cases it is the acknowledgement of wrong-doing from the perpetrators and the forgiveness on the part of the victims. McGonegal (2009) notes that in recent years, whenever there are attempts at reconciling societies torn apart by conflict, forgiveness is an important topic for the social, cultural and political theorists. Hamber (2007) suggests that in this day and age in which we live where conflict and political turmoil is the order of the day, the connection between reconciliation and forgiveness has become paramount to establishing sustainable peace in a state.

Mellor, Bretherton and Firth (2007) point out that forgiveness and reconciliation have to be analyzed considering their political context. This means that the circumstances in which the conflict arose will be considered within the process of reconciliation as well as the possibility of forgiveness in a post-conflict situation. The concept of reconciliation can also never be referred to as an absolute but it invites a wide variety of questions such as what needs to be reconciled and the reasons for the reconciliation (Mellor Bretherton and Firth, 2007). Therefore, Lerche (2000) concludes that reconciliation and forgiveness cannot be made uniform for all circumstances as though in a particular context they can have universal application.

Derrida (2001) points out that the emphasis on forgiveness in the process of achieving reconciliation has the possibility of tainting forgiveness. This is because reconciliation and forgiveness are different processes and hence using the language of forgiveness in the process of reconciliation hinders parties from achieving true and pure forgiveness. This is because, as already mentioned, the process of reconciliation involves more than two parties whereas the presence of a third party risks the possibility of not achieving pure forgiveness (Derrida, 2001).

However, Cary (1998) observes that forgiveness is a catalyst to achieving reconciliation because it essentially combines notions of civil relationship and those of empathy. In his argument, he describes the process of forgiveness in the German-American post-war and the Vietnam-American relations and emphasizes that the process involved truth telling, apologizing and healing. Cary (1998) also points out that whenever people are speaking about the political theory of forgiveness, there is a high possibility of combining forgiveness with politics or to label the act of forgiving as a political one but a deep consideration of what forgiveness is, shows that it is a personal and internal change of heart or perspective and it will have a bearing on the political realm. This is the clear distinction between forgiveness and politics which is a longshot from grand gestures in public by political figures which will be aimed at portraying acts of forgiveness.

To support the view of how separate reconciliation and forgiveness is, Huyse (2003) suggests that the process of reconciliation does not require forgiveness as a prerequisite. However, in the political arena, there is usually the tendency to force forgiveness through what has been termed false reconciliation where the involved parties feel obliged to forgive the perpetrator or that they need to publicly show that they have reconciled with the perpetrator. Ignatieff (1996) observes that this occurs when the perpetrator forces the notions of putting the past behind them or forgiving and forgetting on the victim. Hamber (2007) observe that this was one of the major shortcomings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission process.

In conclusion, the process of reconciliation is necessary in countries emerging from conflict in order to foster sustainable peace. There are three tiers involved in the reconciliation process and these are top-level, middle-range and grassroots. The grassroots are instrumental in fostering harmonious relationships between previously conflicting parties and also inform national policies too.

### 2.8.1- MEDIATION

The period from the 90s until the early 2000s was evidenced by the United Nations involvement in the peaceful settlement of disputes (Hampson, 2003). Hampson (2003) notes that not only did the UN have a large number of peacekeepers in war torn areas than before, but its involvement was instrumental in the negotiation and implementation of settlements which as a result, ended some of the bloodiest and longest civil wars. Mason (2007) observes that of the international and civil crises that occurred from 1918 to 2001, 128 of these were resolved through some form of mediation. The level of such mediation is also observed to have moved from the development of a straight forward agreement to end a conflict to the development of an agreement that has a vision beyond the conflict which is a more complex process (Mason, 2007).

This section will unpack what mediation and facilitation is and the rationale of using mediation and facilitation as intervention strategies to end conflicts. It will then consider the role of the UN as a mediator in the Angolan conflict to assess whether or not its involvement was crucial to putting an end to the 27 year long civil conflict.

### 2.8.2- MEDIATION AND FACILITATION

Mirimanova (2009) notes that mediation and facilitation are types of conflict intervention which aim to resolve conflicts through monitoring the communication between conflicting parties. The process of mediation is characterized by the presence of a third party who leads the communication between the representatives of the parties in conflict in order for these representatives to meet and talk to each other, discuss pertinent issues, make compromises and reach an agreement to end the conflict.

Official mediation is when those who hold top rank positions and those in decision making positions or their representatives meet. Mirimanova (2009) notes that the parties in an official mediation range from members from the government or state representatives to members of active parties in the conflict such as armed rebels to those who do not recognize the law or the government in power. Hence, parties in an official mediation are the official leaders of the groups that they represent. On the other hand, participants in an unofficial mediation vary from

civil society representatives, students, journalists and concerned members of the general public (Mirimanova, 2009).

Mirimanova (2009) observes that when parties are party to a mediation, they are bound to reach an agreement that is mutually acceptable to all the parties concerned. The process of mediation also enables the parties concerned to examine other possible avenues to resolving their conflict over and beyond what international and national law prescribes for political, economic and social agreements to end conflicts (Mirimanova, 2009). This is the advantage that mediation has over arbitration or the imposition of a solution by force. Measures are set during mediation to guard against the possibility of parties being in violation of the terms of the agreement and an example of such measures are the imposition of sanctions. Mirimanova (2009) notes that the imposition of sanctions is not the only measure that ensures that parties adhere to the terms in the agreement but the dedication by top officials to the realization of peace as well as the advantages that will come their way if the agreement is observed also is a factor to ensuring that the parties to a mediation process do not violate the agreement.

### 2.8.3- THE RATIONALE BEHIND MEDIATION AND FACILITATION

The main reason behind the process of mediation is that parties come up with their positions based on what they think the other parties' position is (Mason, 2007). However, such notions tend to change and shift according to what the parties gather when they are at the mediation table. This is because they begin to realize that what they thought was the position of the conflicting party is actually not and the more they listen the better they get to understand the actions or strategies that have been taken by that particular party. However, as already mentioned, the process of mediation works better with the presence of a third party facilitating the communication between the parties (Mason, 2007).

Mason (2007) notes that if the state in conflict is not willing to settle the conflict peacefully or if the conflict is the cause of international disagreements then then the process by which the conflict is resolved has to be informal and dependent on whether or not the independent or sovereign parties engaged in the conflict. Hence, the process of mediation has to be mandated by the parties in conflict.

Compared to other forms of resolving conflict like through military interventions, mediation is less expensive (Mason, 2007). However, mediation has to be used along other conflict

intervention tools like military peace support operations as such tools become necessary to implement the terms of the agreement. Mason (2007) also observes that since the success of mediation lies in whether or not the conflicting parties accept the third party and its power to facilitate the process, it is a tool that is more effective for small countries. This is because in as much as such countries do not have the capacity to compete internationally for power but they have the capacity to influence some decisions made internationally.

## 2.9- UN AS A MEDIATOR AND FACILITATOR

Hampson (2003) considers pertinent questions about the role of the UN in mediation processes and whether or not such interventions have been successful. Such questions include what mediation resources brings with it into the process and what lessons can be learnt from previous mediation interventions which were facilitated by the UN. Hampson (2003), in an attempt to provide answers to the questions asked, notes that in its role as a facilitator in a mediation process, the UN:

- i.* Lacks real power
- ii.* Is not flexible or vigorous enough to follow an effective negotiation plan
- iii.* Is the last resort to resolving conflict and as a result has to confront immensely challenging differences and
- iv.* Lacks sufficient legitimacy which in turn affects its ability and capacity to play the role of mediator.

Zartman (2001) notes that regardless of who the mediator is, the conflicting parties have to be ready to consider the outcome of the negotiation as the way to resolve the conflict. In other words, the conflict should have reached a boiling point such that it would be the opportune moment for mediation to happen as a means to ending the conflict. Therefore, Zartman (2001) suggests that the precondition for mediation to happen and to have any chance of success should be either that both the sides have come to a realization that continuing with conflict will be more burdensome than sitting down at the negotiating table for mediation. Negotiation through mediation has to be the only logical manner in which the parties observe as a means to end the conflict.

Boutros-Ghali (1996) notes that for the UN to even consider the role of a mediator between conflicting parties, it has to be given a clear mandate and support by the Security Council.



However, if the members of the Security Council are divided on whether or not the UN should act as a mediator between conflicting parties because members of the Security Council have their own agendas or they stand to benefit more if the conflict continues compared to when parties end the conflict, then it will be a challenge for the parties and those following the negotiations to gain trust in the intentions of the UN or the level of power that it has to see the mediation process through (Boutros-Ghali, 1996).

Hampson (2003) notes that in as much as the UN may seem to have little power as a mediator, it is a mistake to view it as neutral and impartial. This is because in some instances where it seems as if the most effective way to get parties to comply with an agreement reached after mediation is cohesive intervention, the UN is capable of unleashing the power of the Security Council on the parties, as was seen in the cases of Mozambique and Tajikistan (Hampson, 2003). However, for this to happen there has to be agreement between the mediator, the Secretary General and the Security Council and it has to be unanimous on the part of the Security Council to send a force to the area in conflict or to carry out threats.

Most importantly, the success of the UN in any mediation process is dependent on the coordination of the Security Council members and they have to set a clear political strategy, be prepared to provide support and the resources so that the process is legitimate and not undermined (Hampson, 2003).

The UN has been instrumental in the mediation between conflicting parties and the success or failure of such mediation has been largely attributable to certain facts. Such include that the Security Council plays a huge part in giving the UN the mandate to act as a mediator and that the parties in conflict have to be at a point where continued conflict is more disadvantageous compared to meeting with a mediator and resolving the conflict through mediation.

Taken together, the literature on conflict transformation suggests that to deal with a conflict there is a need to address both the “episode and the epicentre of conflict” (Lederach, 2003:31). Presenting the full picture of a conflict is a challenge that needs patience. As Lederach (2003:39) puts it, the challenge consists of “... how to end something not desired and build something that is desired [...] It requires capacity to see through and beyond the presenting issues to the deeper pattern, while seeking creative responses that address real-life issues in real time”.

If the process of peace building is successful through the various mechanisms outlined above, there are stages that take place for peace to be sustainable. Many countries that have reached

agreements, face challenges of climbing the ladder of transformation. Very often there is a stalemate at the level of negative peace, the achieved peace takes time to become positive peace. It is happening today in Somalia, Liberia, Burundi, and Angola. The literature on peace distinguishes clearly the difference between positive and negative peace. A brief description of the concepts is presented below.

## 2.10- NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE PEACE

Sharp (2012) defines physical violence as murder, rape, torture and other civil and political violations. On the other hand, economic violence refers to economic and social rights violations, corruption and the senseless pillaging of natural resources (Sharp, 2012). Although physical violence is often direct, economic violence is usually indirect but the definition of these forms of violence is not entirely accurate because not every civil or political violation will be characterized by the use of force or violence and some economic and social rights violations, for example hunger, are a form of physical abuse (Sharp, 2012).

Christie, Tint, Wagner and Winter (2008) state that the use of the term positive peace often refers to the transformation that takes place in order to address past or previous inequalities. Positive peace occurs when the political party in charge of the government includes the other parties and gives a voice to the minorities who were previously marginalized. When it comes to the economic structures of a country that has been in armed conflict, transformation occurs when those who were previously exploited or disadvantaged gain access to the country's resources on a sufficient level to satisfy their basic necessities. Christie, Tint, Wagner and Winter (2008) also observe that while negative peace usually relies on the dominance of the state, positive peace does not depend on the dominance of the state and can take place at any point when social and economic injustices are present.

Sharp (2012) states that negative peace does not only involve the absence of violence or conflict but the absence of all other forms of violence such as poverty, corruption and all forms of social and economic inequalities. While positive peace seeks to achieve many goals of provisional justice, it should also seek the attainment of the rule of law and establishing democracy (Sharp, 2012). This is because countries that are established democracies and boast of the efficiency of their rule of law still have high levels of poverty and other forms of violence (Sharp, 2012).

Galtung (1985) notes that in a country emerging from conflict, the focus should not only be on negative peace but also on positive peace in the sense that efforts to reduce violent episodes should be done at the same time as redressing the social, economic and ecological injustices suffered in the past. Christie, Tint, Wagner and Winter (2008) also agree with Galtung (1985) and state that for peace to be real and lasting, it has to ensure that all forms of physical violence are eliminated and that an impartial social order is created so that the needs and rights of all citizens are met.

Christie, Tint, Wagner and Winter (2008) observe that in most instances conflict within countries occurs due to competition for scarce resources. Even when the conflict is over, challenging life conditions like economic deprivation, which is what Angola is facing currently, can frustrate people to the degree of disturbing the existing peace. They note that in extreme cases, absolute deprivation can lead to mass murders and genocide and history has shown this to be true, for example in the case of Rwanda.

In summary, this chapter has dealt with various lenses of conflict transformation. It looked at the concept of generational change for peace. What comes across is that peace building requires concrete and complete structural engagement. By concrete is meant a clear strategy that goes to the core problems, effects, and proposes a desired change. By complete is meant the participation of all intervenient in a society.

What is clear is that ceasefire is a good beginning towards peace building, but honest and true dialogue is necessary to deepen any peace process. For the dialogue to happen, mediators like the UN are very important. At times the UN seems weak, but through the backing of Security Council they can be at a longer run drivers of change and bring about true reconciliation.

Chapter 3 now looks at the Angolan peace process. The causes of the conflict are brought forward, and the stalemate of the current state of affairs is clarified.

## **CHAPTER 3: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN ANGOLA**

This chapter explores at the main changes Angola has gone through until the 2002 cease fire in Luanda. First it presents the reasons for the breaking up of the war. Then it looks at the factors that led the failure of the Angolan peace attempts

### **3.1- THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE IN ANGOLA**

The history of Angola is one which prominently features colonialism and a protracted period of conflict. The presence of the Portuguese and its interaction with the locals was the relationship of the colonial master and the oppressed, whilst the country became the trade link with Asian countries as well as a place for the development of the slave trade (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). The 1960s were the height of anti-colonial sentiment across Africa. Africans gained consciousness of a sovereign people and starting fighting for independence. Angola joined the wave of freedom. However, Knudsen and Zartman (1995) observe that a poorly thought through independence agreement and a weak Marxist-Leninist regime resulted in a bloody and prolonged civil war. One of the most pressing issues among the nationalist groups was how a satisfactory agreement on power-sharing was going to be produced (Malaquais, 2001). In 1975 a civil war broke out and despite attempts by the international community to broker peace through the use of peace agreements, the war continued until the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002 (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010).

#### **3.1.1- NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT**

As has been alluded to already, the Angolan civil war broke out in 1975; this was immediately after the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonialism.

From the period of the struggle for independence three main nationalist groups were formed: The Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA), the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), and the União Nacional para Independência de Angola (UNITA) (UN, 2012). However, after the struggle for independence was won the FNLA did not play much of a role in the events that led to the outbreak of the civil war. The civil war ensued after the struggle for independence mainly because of the ideological differences between the MPLA and the UNITA (Birmingham, 1992). These movements claimed

legitimacy and autonomy, however, as put by Ruigrok (2011:76) "... the question of identifying the first genuine political force that emerged in Angola and its consequent legitimacy and credibility before the Angolan people and the world, are discordant issues that have remained until today".

The challenge of pin pointing the legitimate movement, has caused some confusion in the country. It seems like, the past has one history and two memories. As put by Ruigrok (2011:78) "... the basic concern of each movement was not just to end Portuguese colonialism and to liberate Angolan people, but also to take control of the state and to eliminate rival forces". Furthermore, the military variable in the Angolan conflict played a paramount role in the conflict. The three parties involved in the fight after independence had armies. For decades, these armies fought to defend the party's colours. It is with this sentiment that civil war broke out for approximately 27 years and led to the loss of over 1.5 million lives whilst over 4 million people were internally displaced. (Brinkman, 2003).

The MPLA was formed in 1956 with the primary objective to be the leaders of the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonialism (Malaquias, 2000). The weakness of this nationalist group was that its influence did not reach the people who lived in the South. The group's area of influence was predominantly in the Northern area because that was where most of its leadership was centralized. The major strength of the MPLA was that its support base included a significant number of Angolans who had obtained higher degrees of education and who had embraced the Portuguese way of life, known as *assimilados*. Its support base also included mixed Angolans as well as members of the settlers. (Malaquias, 2000).

Malaquias (2000) observes that the FNLA was formed with the objective of the restoration of the ancient Kongo kingdom in the northern part of Angola. The FNLA was therefore largely composed of several ethnic groups which had the same vision for northern Angola. The main area of influence of the FNLA was almost exclusively the Bacongo ethnic group and various attempts to expand on its area of influence failed (Malaquias, 2000).

Like the reasons behind the formation of the FNLA, UNITA was also formed purely for ethnic reasons. UNITA represented the Ovimbundu people who are the major ethnic group in Angola in terms of numbers. With their strength in numbers, the Ovimbundu believed that they should also have their own liberation movement in order to counterbalance the power that the movements which represented the other bigger ethnic groups had (Malaquias, 2000). Literature has shown that the reasons behind the formation of the nationalist movements in Angola was

never national but rather sub-national. Malaquias (2000) is of the point of view that these movements were concerned with furthering the aspirations of particular ethnic groups and not the realization of a multi-ethnic and an all racial inclusive Angola.

### 3.2- THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR

Khadiagala (2005) notes that the end of Marcello Caetano's dictatorship in 1974 facilitated the rate at which Portuguese colonies were decolonized but this was not without challenges as there were no decolonization plans in the pipeline and there were major divisions in the government. The main reason behind this state of affairs was that before the military coup which ended the dictatorship, the regime's strategy was to defeat the liberation movements as opposed to negotiating with them. There were issues around power sharing beyond the colonial war and as soon as factional divisions set into the government, Lisbon lost its grip on the Angolan political process (Khadiagala, 2005). This resulted in four provisional governments in one year which increased the influence of discontenting factions and this had an effect on the decolonisation process. Khadiagala (2005) also observes that the chaos during the transition period was largely due to the lack of long-term preparation for independence and so the colonial regime was improvising as it engaged with the nationalist movements.

Ekaney (1977) highlights that in 1974 General Spínola in Portugal appointed Vice-Admiral Rosa Coutinho to head the military in Angola. One of the major tasks that he had to perform was to navigate the Angolan transition in the face of a deteriorating economy, racism, violence as well as divisions within the nationalist movements. General Spínola had a framework for the decolonization of Angola which included that the three major liberation movements in Angola be recognized, and the setting up of a two-year provisional government including the three liberation movements and the settler community and the preparation by the government to conduct elections for the Constituent Assembly, under the monitoring of the United Nations, which would be tasked with drafting a Constitution for Angola (Ekaney, 1977).

This plan was met with resistance by the nationalist movements. Their main argument was that if the settler community was included in the government it would be an outright rejection of the objectives of attaining independence. This resistance caused a commotion within the government and the country (Africa Research Bulletin, 1974). The chances for the formation of the interim government vanished when the settler community attempted a coup and General

Spinoza was ousted in September 1974. The FNLA increased its military attacks in the northern parts of Angola, as put by Ruigrog (2011: 77)

“In January 1961, falling cotton prices and the failure to pay the peasant growers led to strike, which was by beatings and arrests. This triggered a revolt against the Portuguese authorities and their system of enforced cotton growing in Kassanje area. A group of disgruntled cotton workers attacked government buildings and a Catholic mission. The violence spread to the northwest, where over the course of days Bakongo in Uíge province attacked isolated farmsteads and towns killing hundreds of Portuguese”.

The combined effects of these instances were decisive in putting an end to any prospects of an all-inclusive multiracial government (Khadiagala, 2005).

In October 1974, UNITA’s Savimbi sought to unite all the nationalist movements and his party’s congress endorsed a UNITA-MPLA-FNLA united front. The congress also gave Savimbi the leeway to gather support for the united front from other African countries (Bridgland, 1986). However, this was almost brought to naught by the violence which resumed almost immediately in Luanda between the supporters of MPLA and FNLA. According to Malaquias (2009:320) “Civil war in post- independent Angola was inevitable. The major problems that conspired against the visibility of the Angolan state were glaringly visible at the time of independence. The chaotic decolonization process took place amidst complex political and military crises arising from the three anti-colonial groups”. Bridgland (1986) points to the fact that another incident of civil disorder erupted during the strike by longshoremen which blocked the shipment of goods on the Benguela railroad in Lobito. Maximizing on this chaos a group from the settler community attempted a rebellion against the authorities, which was quickly subdued resulting in a more united MPLA and FNLA who started to work with the authorities to patrol streets and curb incidents of violence (Bridgland, 1986).

For Spikes (1993) the efforts by other African countries like Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania and various continental organizations like the African Union played a significant role in uniting the three nationalist movements in Angola. After a meeting with regional leaders the FNLA and UNITA signed a unity agreement in November 1974. Furthermore, following a meeting between Couthi and Savimbi, UNITA and MPLA signed a bilateral agreement. The night before the Mombasa summit in 1975, Savimbi was a mediator between a meeting with the FNLA and the MPLA. One of the highlights of the agreement was

the pledge to bring an end to the violence and propaganda and to create an atmosphere that favoured cooperation and mutual respect (Spikes, 1993).

Gleijeses (2002) observes that peace in Angola was dependent on the willingness of the nationalist movements to uphold the agreements that they had made as well as Portugal's willingness to deploy military troops to ensure that the provisions agreed to were honoured. The events that unfolded proved that neither of the parties was willing to do what was necessary to uphold the agreements (Spikes, 1993). Prior to the agreements, the nationalist movements separately boosted their military and financial standing. This led to the provision of arms and instructors from China to the FNLA via the Democratic Republic of Congo and in response to this the Soviet Union provided arms to the MPLA through Tanzania (Bridgland, 1986).

With this level of foreign support, both the FNLA and the MPLA wanted to gain control of Luanda, and although both movements had great influence especially in the slums, the FNLA was militarily superior to the MPLA (Africa Research Bulletin, 1975). Around the same time there was a wave of labour strikes which caused a serious economic downturn. The transitional government was not able to disarm the thousands of civilians who had arms from the period of the struggle for independence. Although there were attempts to disarm the civilians, there was a perception that the MPLA was instead reluctant to disarm them in a bid to give them power (Africa Research Bulletin, 1975).

In order to keep pace with the increasing influence of the MPLA in Luanda, the FNLA leadership acquired a television station and a leading newspaper (Africa Research Bulletin, 1975). It also began to facilitate the movement of well-armed soldiers from the Democratic Republic of Congo into Angola. In March 1975, there was a clash between the FNLA and the MPLA in Luanda as a result of the soldiers brought in by the FNLA from outside Angola. In April the FNLA attacked the headquarters of MPLA in Luanda leaving hundreds dead and more than a thousand wounded. At the same time there were instances of fighting between UNITA and MPLA. Attempts of a ceasefire were fruitless as bloody battles between the MPLA and the FNLA were expanding into the northern parts of Angola and the Cabinda enclave (Africa Research Bulletin, 1975).

These battles were heightened by the military intervention of outside powers. For example, more than 50 000 Cubans fought on behalf of the MPLA and by the late 1980s the MPLA could be characterized as being oppressive, intolerant and corrupt, unjustly enriching its members and embezzling vast amounts of money through the sale of Angola's oil resources (London



Conciliation Resources, 2004). UNITA reigned terror on larger parts of Angola compared to the other movements. The Bicesse Accords which were signed by the MPLA and UNITA to stop the war were fruitless as were the UN peacekeeping missions in 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1998 (London Conciliation Resources, 2004).

Carames (2009) observes that the war resumed in 1998 between the Angolan armed forces and UNITA and although the armed forces sought to control the whole country via military means, UNITA had control of all rural areas. Conflict ended in 2002 with the death of Savimbi but even then there were reported incidents of violence in the Cabinda, Benguela and Huambo.

### 3.3-PEACE ACCORDS

Angola has experienced numerous failed attempts of to stop the massive killing that was devastating the country. These attempts were the Alvor Accords in 1974, Bicesse Accords in 1991, Lusaka Protocol in 1994, and Luena Memorandum of Understanding in 2002. Only the Luena agreement worked.

The first step in conflict transformation is immediate action which seeks to stop the killing in a violent situation. After a ceasefire is observed there are crucial steps leading to sustainable peace.

The step following ceasefire is negotiation, leading eventually, to the signing of a peace agreement. Lederach (2005:41) asserts that peace accords are at times “a simple act of former enemies placing their names side by side on a piece of paper represented the culmination of negotiations to supposedly end what were years, if not, decades of violence and war”. The definition presented by Lederach underlines the difficult task of transforming a negative peace into a positive peace.

Very often after a very long period of violent confrontation, when peace is reached via a peace agreement, government rushes into reconstruction of physical infrastructure. As strengthen by Lederach (2005:41-42)

“... The difficulties of attaining a durable peace in context of protracted violence suggest we know more about how to end something painful and damaging to everyone, but less how to build something desired. When we do build after a war, we think first and foremost about our physical infrastructure: buildings, roads, bridges, and schools. To fully understand and reweave the social fabric of

relationships torn apart by decades and generations of hatred remain significant challenges”.

Most accords fail, because they lack integrated vision. There is a lack of clear steps towards sustaining the ceasefire. Scholars acknowledge that in instances of negotiating peace agreements it is paramount to note that the period is clouded by risks and insecurities and other concerns by the parties concerned. Hartzell (2009) views these concerns to be the fact that the opponent might have greater control of the country; or that the opponent might obtain more political power, or that the opponent might gain considerable economic power within the country. Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) observe that as a result of these concerns strategies have to be in place to ensure that parties negotiate in good faith and that a lasting peace is achieved because of the agreement. One of the most important strategies is the involvement of a third party in the negotiation, production and the compliance of the agreement (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010).

Khadiagala (2005) notes that the negotiations for the decolonization of Angola which resulted in the Alvor Accords of 1974 portray a situation of non-cooperation and distrust between the colonising power and the nationalist movements. The Alvor Accords were formulated in the midst of a chaotic transition between the Portuguese and the nationalist movements. The result of this was a transitional constitutional document which failed in restoring peace or creating rules for the maintenance of that peace.

### 3.3.1- THE ALVOR ACCORDS IN 1974

The Alvor Accords had sixty articles and three major sections. The first was the acknowledgement of the three nationalist movements as representatives of the Angolan people. The second was the legal and the administrative provisions for Angola’s independence in November 1975. The third was the establishment of procedures by which independence would be decided. Chapter 2 made provision for the role of the Portuguese High Commissioner who has to arbitrate differences within the transitional government, but in reality the High Commissioner could not be afforded such power in the highest transitional institution (Khadiagala, 2005).

The Alvor Accords stipulated that the army would decide on their rightful regions and created a ceasefire by incorporated previous bilateral agreements. The Accords also made provision

for the creation of a National Defence Commission in order to oversee the integration of 8000 soldiers from each movement and 24000 Portuguese soldiers into a mixed armed force (Angola Peace Fund, 1988). The lack of trust amongst the nationalist movements caused them to ask Portugal to keep troops in the country for three months after independence. (Angola Peace Fund, 1988).

The Alvor Accords received criticism over a document that was drawn up in haste and in the midst of a disorderly decolonization process which Lisbon had embarked on in 1974. It is believed that the document was drawn up out of convenience and attempted to bring together those parties with a long history of mutual distrust, to negotiate in good faith. Khadiagala (2005) notes that in recognizing the three major nationalist movements as the representatives of the people of Angola, the Accords marginalised other parties which would have provided a political equilibrium among the nationalist movements.

The failure of Alvor led the country into a long-lasting conflict. Many attempts were taken to reach lasting peace. This discussion continues with an outline of the many attempts to reach peace.

### 3.3.2- THE BICESSE ACCORDS

The United States of America, Russia, Portugal and the United Nations were part of the mediators who sought to broker peace between UNITA and MPLA in May 1991. This resulted in the signing of the Bicesse Accords. Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) note that the circumstances under which the parties met to negotiate a peace agreement were at an appropriate time as both sides were experiencing food shortages; this was one of the reasons they agreed to a ceasefire along the routes that was used to transport food. In addition, both sides had suffered heavy military losses and were reluctant to keep fighting and were willing to try and find common ground through the negotiation of a peace agreement. The Bicesse Accords were reached a year after negotiations began. The agreement included the formation of a multiparty democracy, a ceasefire and the monitoring of elections, the demobilization of conflicting parties, and the formation of a national army (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010).

Messiant (2004) observes that the elections took place in September 1992. The results of the elections were a clear victory for MPLA with 54% of the votes and 34% for UNITA. By the time that the elections were conducted the credibility of the United Nations was questionable;

therefore, their description of the elections as free and fair did not hold much weight. Those who voted for the MPLA wanted the results of the elections to be recognized but UNITA was clear that it did not recognize these results (Messiant, 2004). Savimbi outright refused to acknowledge these results and adamantly refused to give the MPLA the upper hand and as a result, Angola went back to war. At this juncture the mediators had failed to ensure respect for the results and as such turned a blind eye to the killing of people. The question of whether the election results should be ratified or rectified was central to the battle for power between the UNITA and MPLA and the mediators could not avoid the resumption of war that resulted because of this (Messiant, 2004).

Using the contingency framework, Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) put forward reasons why the Bicesse Accords failed. Lack of clarity cannot be attributed to the failure of the Bicesse Accords for the simple reason that the agreement was specific in its stipulations. It clearly stated that both parties were prohibited from purchasing lethal weapons, it had clear provisions for the reorganisation of the military and police to include combatants from all the conflicting parties, and it made provision for elections and how these would be conducted (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). Although the agreement broke down and the parties went back to war, this was not because of any confusion or misinterpretation of the Bicesse Accords as the provisions were clear and did not include any vague terms.

International guarantees were close to non-existent in the case of Angola after the elections. This was contrary to the stipulations of the Bicesse Accords which provided for international supervision for the implementation of the agreement (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). The mediators were not too concerned with the ending of the conflict in Angola. This may be seen clearly in that, for example, the United Nations deployed 1000 trained peacekeepers from the period before the elections in order to keep the peace as compared to the 6000 trained peacekeepers deployed in Namibia which had a significantly smaller population than did Angola at that time (Messiant, 2004). The settlement failed because the mediators lacked a genuine interest in ensuring a sustainable peace from before the elections through to ensuring that the parties did not violate the agreement and that they accepted the results of the elections.

The environment in which the Bicesse Accords were to be implemented was a challenging one. The country is a neighbour to the Democratic Republic of Congo which has a similar history of being consumed by internal conflict and close African countries like South Africa helped mediate the agreement. However, since Angola has one of the largest diamond reserves in

Africa, there was a great deal of illegal diamond smuggling to neighbouring countries; the returns were used to further finance the conflict between UNITA and the MPLA (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). As such, there were some neighbouring countries that had vested interests in the conflict in Africa being prolonged to enable them to have access to its mineral wealth which could leave the country without much regulation. This also contributed to the failure of the Bicesse Accords.

The signing of the Bicesse Accords did not make provision for equal power sharing and this was the main reason for UNITA refusing to acknowledge the results of the elections. The Accords did not specify that both parties would provide 20000 soldiers to the national army and it did not guarantee positions in the police force for both parties (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). The Lusaka Protocol sought to address the issues around power sharing but despite ensuring that both parties would participate in all levels of government and that UNITA would be given ministerial portfolios, the Protocol failed and once again the conflicting parties went back to war.

### 3.3.3-THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL

Comerford (2007) notes that the war that resumed after the election results was bloodier than what Angola had previously experienced. This came with UNITA's control of almost 70% of the country. These circumstances laid a foundation for the negotiation and the signing of the Lusaka Protocol. In October 1993, UNITA sent a communication reaffirming the validity of the Bicesse Accords. This made it possible for talks to resume between UNITA and the MPLA; this was happening despite the continued fighting and death of citizens (Messiant, 2004). The Lusaka Protocol recognized the validity of the election results and therefore viewed UNITA as rebels. It put pressure on UNITA to disarm and become part of the government army (Messiant, 2004). In addition, the sanctions that had been imposed on UNITA by the government in order to compel it to negotiate were not lifted. The clause that forbade both sides to rearm themselves and other countries from providing such arms was not part of the Protocol. Messiant (2004) observes that this left the possibility of other countries providing arms to both the legitimate government and the rebels.

Although this was the case, the Lusaka Protocol saw the arrival of UN peacekeepers, saw UNITA members take their place in parliament and the creation of a Government of National

Unity and Reconciliation (Comerford, 2007). This did not come easily as UNITA leaders constantly refused to travel to Zambia to sign the Protocol and this gave rise to questions about the commitment of the party to the validity of the agreement (Comerford, 2007). Comerford (2007) notes that although the Lusaka Protocol increased international guarantees with the increase of the UN's mandate and resources, it still had weaknesses which stemmed from the Bicesse Accords that still remained unaddressed. From the Bicesse Accords, only the parties which were at war were given the exclusive right to negotiate a peace settlement. This therefore excluded important key civic contributors such as churches leaders, civil society organisations, academics who had a good knowledge and thorough understanding of the key issues leading to the conflict and other political parties. Comerford (2007) observes that the contribution of these actors would have given the agreement stability as it would not only include the voices of the conflicting parties but the voices of all Angolans.

The implementation of the Protocol was slow and many deadlines were missed largely due to UNITA procrastinating in fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. For example, it was reluctant to return areas that it held to be administered by the state, it attempted to derail the demobilization process by presenting ordinary citizens in place of its soldiers and surrendering old weapons that they no longer used (Comerford, 2007). This in turn resulted in the determination within the MPLA to end the rebellion of UNITA once and for all which was inspired by the support of the United States of America, as it recognized the MPLA as the official winners of the elections (Comerford, 2007). Messiant (2004) observes that in addition to this, the government did not live up to its obligations regarding the national police and the army, and, although the government now included UNITA members, it was exclusively led by the MPLA and so, in this instance the notion of power-sharing was a fictitious one. The final straw was the fact that the government, the MPLA, decided to intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo and to offer its military support to help put a sympathetic government in power; this was an outright violation of the Protocol (Messiant, 2004). At the end of 1998, the government, led by the MPLA, embarked on a war against the enemy, UNITA.

Solomon (2003) points out that a consideration of both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol shows that the parties' inability to implement these peace agreements undermined the already volatile relationship of trust that existed between the UNITA and the MPLA. For example, during the demobilization process under the Lusaka Protocol, there were instances of vast food shortages in areas where UNITA soldiers and their families were resident; this was observed to be engineered by the government (Solomon, 2003). This led to these soldiers

looting and stealing food from nearby villages and it greatly undermined the peace process. The UNITA members in parliament were adamant that the failure by the government to cater for the areas where its soldiers and their families resided was a violation of the agreement.

#### 3.3.4- THE LUENA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The failure of Lusaka protocol led the country to worsening bloodshed. The violence settled when Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, was killed by military forces in February of 2002; this victory was essential to subduing UNITA's rebellion (Griffiths, 2004). By March of the same year, the government had already reached out to the remaining UNITA leaders to engage in talks for a ceasefire. UNITA who had been crippled by the loss of respected leaders and its many defeats in the battlefield agreed to a ceasefire.

The Luena Memorandum of Understanding was specific and technical about the ceasefire and it had detailed definitions for the process of demobilization of UNITA's forces (Griffiths, 2004). A Joint Military Commission was established and the UN had the role of observing this process, a role it shared with countries like the United States of America and Portugal. Griffiths (2004) notes that the talks were strictly labelled as military negotiations and so matters relating to the position that the remaining UNITA leadership would play in the government or elections or the constitution were not discussed but exclusively reserved for further negotiations. It was the Luena Memorandum of Understanding that essentially ended the bloodshed that Angola had been experiencing for 27 years.

The different accords that have failed in Angola are an affirmation that post accords are not taken as avenue for redefining relationships, rather they are taken as conflict changers (Lederach, 2005).

Furthermore, as quoted by Ramsbotham and Miall (2005:185)

“Peace agreements provide a framework for ending hostilities and guide to the initial stages of post-conflict reform. They do not create conditions under which the deep cleavages that produced the war are automatically surmounted. Successfully ending the divisions that lead to the war, healing the social wounds created by war, and creating a society where the differences among social groups are resolved through compromise rather than violent conflict requires that conflict resolution and

consensus building shape all interactions among citizens and between citizens and the state.”

The Luena agreement seems to be working, as it has not de-escalated to violent confrontation. However, from the point of view of an agreement creating “social and political space where negotiation represents an ongoing platform” (Ledearach, 2005:47) nothing is happening. Conflict transformation underscores an ongoing and combined effort by the different sectors of a given society to transform negative conflict into a desired positive relationship.

To transform a conflict there are stages to be observed and the different layers of society have to be taken into consideration. The issue of different players in Lederach Framework has been dealt with in Chapter 2, and will further be discussed in Chapter 5.

### 3.3- ANGOLAS’ NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE PEACE

After discussing the trends of conflict transformation in Chapter 2, it is possible to point out the limitation of the Angolan peace process: it is a peace that has stopped in the ceasefire stage. As mentioned before, the death of Jonas Savimbi was a euphoric moment for the country, thus the year 2002 will always be a memorable year in the minds of Angolan citizens and the world over. This is because in April of that year, a historical ceremony took place at the National Assembly in Luanda where a memorandum of understanding was signed by opposing military leaders to bring to an end the longest lasting civil war in the history of Angola (Porto and Clover, 2004). Today in 2016, 14 years since the end of the civil war and since peace was brought about, Angola faces more challenges than what was thought would be the case. Porto and Clover (2004) note that the major consequence of the severity and the duration of the civil war was that it completely destroyed Angola’s economy and infrastructure thereby leaving scores of citizens destitute and in utter poverty.

This section will consider the effects of the civil war on Angola and its citizens. It will also differentiate between negative and positive peace in order to consider whether Angola’s peace, as the absence of conflict, has brought about progression or stagnation in the lives of its citizens.



### 3.4.1-ANGOLA BEFORE AND AFTER THE CIVIL WAR

Porto and Clover (2004) observe that Angola possessed natural resources in the form of fertile and agricultural lands, large oil reserves, gas, diamonds, iron ore and gold. However, these resources were not spared the impact and effects of the war. Angola was a coffee-producing country; it had a promising cotton and sisal export industry in addition to a vibrant mining sector all of which were completely destroyed by the war (Porto and Clover, 2004). However, the destruction of the Angolan economy and the squandering of the country's resources cannot only be attributed to the war. Poor policy decisions by the parties in power also contributed to the demise of the economy.

During the Angolan civil war, which lasted a record-breaking 27 years, diamonds were a prominent feature in the financing of soldiers who fought during the war (Reno, 2000). However, Reno (2000) observes that in as much as the exports of diamonds provided large sums of money needed for parties like the MPLA and UNITA to continue fighting, such exports were not always lawful. In the mid-90s, UNITA was understood to have had in its possession up to US\$700 million from the sale of diamonds (Reno, 2000). MPLA had areas rich on oil under its control and it supplied the government with the petroleum it needed and by the late 90s MPLA revenues from oil were estimated to be around US\$3.3 billion whilst the UNITA diamond revenues were just below US\$200 million (Reno, 2000). Twenty-seven years of civil war was characterized by the illicit export of diamonds the monies which were not used in developing the country's infrastructure or improving the country's schools; rather it was used in accelerating the destruction of the country's infrastructure and the killing of children and young adults who were meant to be in school.

Porto and Clover (2000) observe that after the war, the road and rail infrastructure were completely destroyed and previously accessible fertile land became inaccessible. A road network 80000 kilometres completely destroyed making it impossible for people to transport their produce and other goods by land. During the war, UNITA forces targeted the railway. Therefore, after the war railway system continued to be associated as a target, this impacted on the economy of the entire country: Luanda, Namibe and Lobito ports which relied on agricultural produce and products which were manufactured in Angola to fully operate collapsed as a result of the country's inability to manufacture or move goods from one point to the other (Porto and Clover, 2004). As a result of this the price of goods and services became unaffordable for the ordinary Angolan citizen. The country's economy never fully recovered

from the abuses and misappropriation of the country's resources made by the parties during the war.

After the peace agreement in 2002 the government rushed into rebuilding infrastructure. Roads and railways were rebuilt. With profit from good oil prices Angola enjoyed an economic boom due to the rise in international oil prices period from 2008 to 2012.

Despite this economic boom, the period immediately after the war characterizes the Angolan peace process as negative. Peace is not the absence of fighting. It is a myriad of countless factors to characterize a true peace. After 14 years the country still faces some challenges, in some cases they are even worse off. Although an agreement was signed, the people at grassroots level are still suffering deep poverty. Apart from the poverty itself, Angolan peace is negative, because it lacks a clear vision for integration. Furthermore today there are reports of physical violence due to political differences.

Before the war, Angola was rich in natural resources that could have developed the country beyond what it is today. It was rich in diamonds, oil and gold and had vast fertile, agricultural land. However, these resources were abused and used to finance a war that lasted 27 years and left the country devastated, with a non-existent economy and poor infrastructure. This chapter has observed that in as much as the goal during the war in Angola was to end the violent conflict, which is negative peace, there is a need to also achieve positive peace in order to address the non-physical violence e.g. the economic violence in order to ensure equality. After the war things did not change much. Next an overview of the post-Angolan war is presented.

### 3.4.2- CHALLENGES IN THE POST-ANGOLA WAR PERIOD

With the end to civil war that was experienced, some positive elements can be counted and this is something that all must be grateful for. The large-scale violence and destruction of properties and lives can be said to be no more. Another civil war seems not possible according to the way people see things. And the country, Angola, is no longer under the colonial master. Having given these things our back, the building of communication infrastructure and macro-economic has added stability to the country. At the same time, the country is not an island but has friends from across the border and across the seas (Oliveira, 2015:205)

While the above is true, the country has gone through and continues to go through challenges which ought not to be overlooked. Three areas can be pointed out as some of the major challenges that have to be checked by especially the ruling elite and the MPLA government.

### 3.4.3- ILLIBERAL PEACE BUILDING

State building projects with the articulated ideas of the future designed by few yet having nothing much to deal with the local people like poverty reduction are letting the country down (Oliveira, 2015). But western countries and donors support it because of the hidden interest to work with the regime to exploit the resources that is the area of oil, management consultancies and global banks. Oliveira (2015) states that all what this does is fosters the empowerment of the status quo and has forgotten to contribute to peace, security and prosperity. At the same time, increase in revenues due to oil production has led to the strengthening of the state and of elite interests with resources empowering the elites which in turn diminished the influence of internal and external forces on their actions.

While there was end to the war and there have been elections which have lead the country to the path of democracy, the victory by MPLA afforded it a “rare concentration of political, coercive and ideational power” (Oliveira, 2015: 205)

The status quo has been and continues to be tested and the question of the future after José Eduardo dos Santos, who seems to be a hostage to the need for protection of his families and allies because of their large stake in the economy which leaves nothing for the new comers and the people to appropriate (Oliveira, 2015). Ricardo (2015) continues to assert that there is a fear in José Eduardo dos Santos which is not just in the internal politics but also in the prospect of foreign legal prosecution which may come up in the event that he retire. So he would stay so long as he has not seen a transition that can operate to protect him and the status quo. This has been a concern because José Eduardo dos Santos has allowed little by way of autonomous decision making or institutionalization. With no clear structure and an institution framework devoid of personalities that would be working towards satisfying the status quo, especially José Eduardo dos Santos, whatever the next move may be, it would be very shaky for peace and economic stability.

#### 3.4.4- LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ON TWO INSTITUTIONS, MPLA AND ARMED FORCES

Another key concern that Ricardo (2015) sees moves around MPLA and the Armed Forces which are two key organizations at play in the country. The MPLA and the armed forces deserve particular scrutiny. The MPLA possesses a challenge in that it has failed to look at the country in the broader picture but narrowed its views and dealing to the narrow constituency of the elites. And this constituency's concern is working always for continued cooperation rather than disintegration. Because of this, many times disputes are suspended for fear of losing their happiness and riches. So many are less or not interested in the common citizens' concerns (Oliveira, 2015)

On the part of the armed forces, Oliveira (2015) states that less seems to be known to the people even though Angolan armed forces still remain among the best and largest in Africa in terms of the funding. Though they have been kept at a distance from the political interferences, maybe because of immense wealth owned by the leadership around the president, lack of information on its operation does not give a glimpse of how the army sees the future. Thus these two institutions, MPLA as a party and the armed forces becomes a challenge for the future.

#### 3.4.5-LACK OF DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY

With the blessing of oil as a natural resource, the country for a long time has been able to run its budget with more than 90% of its budget coming from the oil export. This has come with a lot of challenges in that it has exposed the country to external shocks especially with the drop in the oil prices at the international level. Nothing from the current regime and maybe in the next seems to show that there is a thought out system to look at how to diversify the economy, especially within the domestic arena like industries, agriculture and investing in the human or population capacities (Ricardo, 2015) At present, what is happening is that the few that are being put in place seem to be designed primarily to favour those close to power instead of increasing the Angola's productivity capacity. Without this, the country will continue to face the problem of human resources as it does today.

During war, people become more demoralized, especially when it came to things to do with the state, more so when the state was involved in their suffering. To put them together would be close to impossible because they had given up. This was the feeling after the war and so the

elites were even free to do whatever they wanted with the resources as if those were theirs to exploit at will. At this also led the elites to lose touch with the people. But now, this seems to be long gone. A new error of popular mobilizing seems to be taking shape and the major demand moves around the equitable distribution of the oil revenue. This awareness and mobilization has been brought about by the increase level of poverty, suffering in terms of lack of basic needs like water and electricity for the common Angolans, yet the political class continues to be rich. So people feel excluded and if not checked and addressed may lead to anti-MPLA mobilization. Even if it does not bring a regime change through a revolt or uprising, it may increase the cost of domination and weaken a legitimacy claim.

#### 3.4.6- REGIME CHANGE

With a challenge should always come solution unless one barriers one's head in the sand to wait and see what will happen next like the ostrich. In the case of Angola, based on the question that not just those we could call the elite and the common citizens have been asking, is itself a good sign of the consciousness of the state of affairs. The question of whether they will be courageous enough to move beyond the questioning and begin to do something to deal with these issues is another thing. And this is what is important not just for the today's society, but tomorrows as well. However, a change to address these issues for many, has been narrowed down to one major area according to Oliveira (2015), a regime change. He disagrees with this view for he thinks a regime cannot revolutionize itself where you have a few elites dictating almost everything that happens. And he says that at the same time, "... the regime has no inclusive project of national development" (Oliveira, 2015:212) The elites in the party are like-minded, and, having their hands in the common pie, they would prefer to stay that way instead of disturbing the current system because one does not know how a call for change could turn out.

Looking at where the country has come from during the tough time with the disparate domestic and international trials when the country was able to stand, Oliveira (2015) believes that there is a possibility of a change especially when those in the system open their eyes to see that there is not a foreseeable future for the country. They need to establish a broad-based clientelism that includes a plurality of Angolans. This is possible for there is within the MPLA people who defend a wider distribution of resources even though their views are based on trying to block possible unrest and discomfort among the masses.

Another area that needs to be exploited more is that area public pressure. In a democratic system, the opposition always has a role to check the government. Based on their policies, they are always seen as the government in waiting. The question that many people still ask is whether UNITA or the other political parties are able to offer that which MPLA does not. Oliveira (2015) would say that many people do not believe that they are capable of articulating a different approach to the current system. This means that the populous are left on their own and without having people to give direction. This could lead to mass mobilization that can take any direction. Such a pressure has not been taken positively by the MPLA which has now resorted to harsh policing to deal with the emerging threats to its rule. What the MPLA needs to do is to employ what oil rich countries have done to reach the large masses with some kind of disbursements to cool down the tensions.

Taken together, the literature suggests that the peace accords prior to the Luena Memorandum of Understanding stagnated in the cease fire stage. The Luena Memorandum has not gone beyond the top leaders. This therefore means that Angola needs a more integrated peace framework that go in line with universally agreed strategies for sustainable peace respecting the specific context. Furthermore, it needs to go beyond party politics that hinder the country's development.

## **CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY**

When one carries out a study one has to define the methods used for the collection of data. One either uses qualitative or quantitative methods or both methods simultaneously. Data analysis in qualitative research is an ongoing process (Henning, 2005). Quantitative research involves collecting primary data from a number of different sources and making sense out of the observed data (Durrheim, 2006). Thus, research design “is a strategic framework for action that serves as a bridge between the research questions and execution or implementation of the research” (Blanche, Durrheim and Painter, 2006). For Senkaran (2003) the purpose of a study may be exploratory, descriptive or hypothesis-testing. An exploratory study aims at discovering new theories. It takes places in fields where less or almost nothing is available (Sekaran, 2003).

Descriptive research is based on available material; it consists of describing a population, or phenomenon (Zikmund, 2003). Descriptive research answers questions, such as who, what, when, and where questions. The present research was descriptive. It looked at the problem of conflict transformation in Angola.

It is important to note that a conflict is transformed through a long process. Countries that have experienced conflict have shown that when avenues for peace are not taken holistically they tend to fail. This research was about finding out how people are dealing with the ceasefire signed in 2002 in Luena.

### **4.1- RESEARCH SITES**

This is case study research. The case study method has the advantage of enabling the researcher to carry out an in-depth study of a phenomenon. Two municipalities were considered for the present study. Kuito-Bié in the South of Angola, and Viana in the North, respectively.

Kuito-Bie is the capital city of Bié Province, located in Central Angola. According to the last census of the population it has 424.169 inhabitants (INE, 2014). Kuito-Bié was under siege twice during the war, first with the collapse of first elections in 1993/94, and then in 1998/99 with collapse of the Lusaka Protocol.



4.1- Map of Angola showing Kuito-Bie and Viana

Source: [http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/angola\\_map.htm](http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/angola_map.htm)



Viana is located 18 km out of Luanda, the capital city of Angola. It is one of fastest growing municipalities in Luanda. According to the 2014 census of the Population it has 1.525, 711 inhabitants. This locality did not suffer the direct impact of the war.

The two localities were chosen as research sites for comparison purposes. First, from Kuito-Bié the researcher sought to investigate how the current peace is perceived. The same questions were asked in Viana where no direct confrontation took place. The results showed that both localities found it necessary to embark on dialogue as key elements for reconciliation and forgiveness.

#### 4.2- PARTICIPANTS

The population targeted was citizens living in Kuito-Bié and Viana. The aim of the research was to understand how peace is currently perceived in both communities.

For the primarily quantitative (questionnaire) part of this research, a sample of 200 hundred respondents was used, being 100 from Kuito-Bié and 100 from Viana. This study used purposive and snowball sampling as sampling methods to select individuals who were either directly involved or indirectly affected by the armed conflict. There were 94 males altogether, 45 in Viana and in 49 Kuito-Bié, and 106 females altogether, 55 in Viana and in 51 Kuito-Bié. Thus the samples were almost equally divided with respect to gender. The average age was 37. The participants came from a variety of educational levels and employment backgrounds, the details of which are described in Chapter 5.

For the primarily qualitative section of this research, interviews were conducted. The respondents that were interviewed were selected through their experience and involvement in the various peace processes Angola experienced. There were interviews with one member of MPLA, one from UNITA, one from the civil society and one from the Catholic Church. The researcher intended to interview three political leaders, but the member from FNLA did not avail himself for the interview.

#### 4.3- RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

The researcher constructed his own survey questionnaire. This included questions relating to biographical variables, experience of life since the war with respect to basic amenities, experiences of the war, perceptions of war, peace and reconciliation, and attitudes towards

dialogue and its role in community rebuilding. A copy of the questionnaire may be found in Appendix 1.

For the interviews, a schedule was prepared which asked questions about security and conflict transformation, local peace initiatives, exposure to violence, importance of dialogue and reconciliation. A copy of the schedule may be found in Appendix 2.

#### 4.4- PROCEDURE

Before this research could proceed, ethical clearance was obtained from the Human Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee at UKZN HSS/1737/015M and then gatekeeper permission for access to the participants was obtained from Kuito-Bié and Viana, from Mr. Victor Nicacio Sahombe and Mr. André Buma.

The researcher approached the participants in church settings, schools and universities. The respondents were told that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw if they felt uncomfortable with the questionnaires being administered. Fortunately there were no incidents of rejection.

The researcher explained the nature of the research and the respondents signed an agreement of informed consent. The agreement explained that the research was for academic purposes, and the responses were anonymous and that the researcher would only use the findings for academic purposes. This was done to avoid unethical practices during and after the research.

The researcher asked the participants to fill in the questionnaires.

For the interviews, the participants also signed informed consent. They were asked the questions and all answers were recorded and transcribed for later analysis.

#### 4.5- DATA ANALYSIS

The data collected through the questionnaires were captured on an Excel Spreadsheet for descriptive analysis.

The interviews were all recorded. They were then transcribed. The data from the interviews were then submitted to a narrative thematic (content) analysis.

## CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of the successful peace accord signed between the Government and the belligerent movements in the country. Thus, the investigation sought to compare people's perception's from the south of Angola vis-à-vis a society in North of Angola. It compared ceasefire and reconciliation, and enquired whether people found necessary the whole society to embark on a process of reconciliation through dialogue, leading to forgiveness and reconciliation. The information was gathered through the administration of questionnaires with semi-structured and open closed questions to 200 participants, 100 from Kuito- Bié and 100 from Viana.

The interviews aimed at understanding the current stage of the peace building process and comparing the leadership perspective against the perspective gathered from the ground. Four respondents were interviewed.

This chapter first presents the results from the questionnaires and then the interviews. The discussion follows in the next chapter.

### 5.1- QUESTIONNAIRE DATA

The composite table shown below summarises the quantitative data results. Graphic representation follows, with a brief interpretation and analysis. Full discussion is presented in the next chapter - chapter six.

**Table 5.1: Response frequencies for the questionnaire data**

<b>Variable</b>		
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Kuito</b>	<b>Viana</b>
Male	49	45
Female	51	55
<b>Age</b>		
Mean	37 y 7m	36y 7m
<b>Education</b>		
Primary	1	1
Secondary Complete	68	30
Tertiary	26	66
Unknown	5	3


**Table 5.1: Response frequencies for the questionnaire data (continued)**

<b>Employment</b>	<b>Kuito</b>	<b>Viana</b>
Private	17	37
Retired	8	2
Self Employed	5	9
State Employed	49	32
Unemployed	21	13
Unknown	0	7
<b>Parenthood</b>		
Yes	91	65
No	2	34
Unknown	7	1
<b>Access to School</b>		
Yes	85	53
No	6	47
Unknown	9	0
<b>War Experience</b>		
General Suffering during the War	96	48
Injury	33	12
Shot	24	2
Beaten	26	5
Raped	5	0
Lost loved one	95	61
Loved one injured	96	40
Loved one Shot	96	43
Loved one beaten	83	35
<b>Experience of Positive Peace</b>		
No, not at all	12	7
A little	45	23
Average	6	14
A lot	31	49
Yes, definitely	6	2
<b>Economic Equity</b>		
No, not at all	7	4
A little	28	3
Average	4	3
A lot	52	53
Yes, definitely	7	22
<b>Dialogue and community building</b>		
There is a need for dialogue to bring people together	4.1	4.6
To talk about the past helps to better prevent future conflicts	3.9	4
Political difference is a cause of conflict today	3.9	3.9
Lack the of dialogue is hindering the peace process	4	4.1
Dialogue can improve the current state of affairs	4	4.4
To dialogue is not to agree, but understand each other in different ways	4	4.2
Effective dialogue can build community trust	4.1	4.5

**Table 5.1: Response frequencies for the questionnaire data (continued)**


<b>Participation in Confrontation</b>	<b>Kuito</b>	<b>Viana</b>
Did you participate in the confrontations	52	9
Military Participation	13	6
Civilian Participation	39	3
Unknown	48	91
<b>Party Support</b>		
MPLA	58	23
UNITA	4	1
UNKNOWN	37	76
FNLA	1	0

These results are now presented graphically for each section as illustration for further analysis.




**Figure 5.1- Graph showing that there more female respondent in Kuito and Viana.**

During the research more women were willing to participate, both in Viana and Kuito-Bié.




**Figure 5.2- The graph shows the level of Education in Kuito- Bié and Viana**

The graph shows that Viana has more tertiary alumni than Kuito- Bié. Viana is an urban area; it has more tertiary institutions than Kuito-Bié. Furthermore, the years of war draw back the development in Kuito-Bié, the underdevelopment affected every areas of the society.




**Figure 5.3- Graph showing employment**

The graph shows that most workers are employed by the government, followed by the private sector. The government is the major employee in the country. The years of war have not allowed for the development of the private sector. Likewise, the current crisis the oil industry has affected the private sector that used to balance the market. Has the graph shows that there is very few private initiative for creation and innovation. This is explained by the factor, that even in places where there foreign workers, there is lack of knowledge transfer.




**Figure 5.4 Graph showing parenthood**

The graph shows that there are more parents in Kuito-Bié than Viana. This explains the data on schooling that shows that there are more children attending school in Kuito-Bié.



**Figure 5.5-** Graph showing access to school

The study shows that Kuito- Bié has got more parents than Viana.




**Figure 5.6-** Graph showing casualties during the war

The researcher has delved into the lived experiences during the war. Analysed, the graph shows that there was more suffering in Kuito-Bié than Viana. In terms of direct experience, those who lived in Kuito-Bié had more consequences, relatives shot and some wounded and others dead.

Viana on the hand did not experience the war first hand, but had some relatives injured and killed during the armed conflict.

Thus, 96 percent of respondents in Kuito-Bié answered yes to the question about suffering during the war, whereas in Viana only 48 percent responded yes to the suffering during the war. On the other hand, in Kuito-Bié 9percent lost a loved one, whereas in Viana only 43 percent answered yes to the question.


Taken together, there were much more casualties in Kuito-Bié than in Viana.



**Figure 5.7- Graph showing the effects of peace.**


The peace sentiment is mixed; there are those who feel that the absence of shooting is already a gain. The graph shows that there is more confidence of the current peace in Viana rather than Kuito-Bié. The difference shows that peace needs to become a social event where people can feel and prosper with the dawn of a ceasefire. To simply appreciate the end of shooting is not enough. Peace is a combination of factors that leads to wellbeing and development. The current trend, fails to show integration and significant peace sentiment. From the graph, it could be noticed, that there is a narrow gap between those who said, that they feel the peace effect a lot, and those who answered a little.






**Figure 5.8- Graph showing the need for economic equity**

The respondents from both localities find it necessary to have a fair distribution of resources to strengthen the peace process. Equitable distribution of resources is of paramount importance in peace building, lack of fair distribution can work has a spoiler of positive prospects for sustainable peace. Respondents from both localities acknowledge that economic justice is an important variable for sustainable peace.




**Figure 5.9- Graph showing how respondent perceive the urgency of dialogue**

The graph shows that respondent from both localities find it important to engage in dialogue in order to prevent future conflict. Dialogue is an encounter that bridges differences and builds communities. Respondents from both localities showed interest in engage in dialogue, they also acknowledge that effective dialogue plays an irreplaceable role in bringing people together.



**Figure 5.10- Graph showing the participation in confrontations**

The graph shows that there was more participation in confrontation in Kuito-Bié than in Viana. Kuito-Bié suffered various attacks during the war that is why there are more participants who have participated in the confrontations than in Viana.



**Figure 5.11- Graph showing political militancy**

The graph shows that MPLA has more support than UNITA. However it is important to note as well that many respondents avoided the political militancy question.

Taken together these results suggest that the current peace in Angola is negative. There is no economic inclusion, lack of dialogue and the whole structure misses a clear framework for conflict transformation

## 5.6- ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

This section presents the key themes and the not the interpretation of the collected data. At the discussion chapter the interpretation on the findings will be dealt with.

A summary of the interview questions and the responses is presented in Table 5.2

**Table 5.2: Interview questions with MPLA, UNITA, Catholic Church and Civil Society.**

<b>Question</b>	<b>MPLA</b>	<b>UNITA</b>	<b>Catholic Church</b>	<b>Civil Society</b>
1. Have you been involved in any reconciliation effort, if so what?	Yes, represented the Angolan Government	Yes, represented UNITA	Yes, calling leaders from both parties to understand each other	Yes, during and after the war. Bringing about awareness of the need of peace for development
2. What you think caused the failure of Alvor, Bicesse and Lusaka?	Lack of trust	Bad faith and lack of Trust	External influence and lack of national consciousness	Immaturity of the Political elite of Angola. Rush to elections, lack of dialogue. The politicians tried to solve the problem on their own without an inclusive method.
3. Luena only dealt with military issues. When will the common citizen engage in dialogue?		Change of Leadership will improve the peace process	Courage to face the truth and dialogue	Work towards informed citizenship
4. Do you think there are still unresolved issues that can negatively affect the current situation of apparent calm?	No	Yes, inequality is the source of all evil		Yes. The current model is neither based on forgiveness nor on reconciliation. There a tentative of a national amnesia. The liberations movements have not gone through a process of internal reconciliation

**Table 5.2: Interview questions with MPLA, UNITA, Catholic Church and Civil Society. (continued)**

5. Which methods can be used to avoid future armed conflict?	Nationhood, and address people's problems	Dialogue is the solution for Angola	Respect the history of the country and dialogue	Conflict transformation workshops at the all levels of the Society
6. Are you aware of any system of conflict prevention in the country?	No	UNITA has a Party tries to foster dialogue for peace		There is no structured preventive system in country.
7. If there still latent tensions between militants from different parties, how can citizens pass beyond party politics?	Parties have to understand that there are other people in Society	Through Dialogue	Through Dialogue	Yes. Partisans of the different parties at the low level are still very intolerant to each other
8. There are people who assert that the liberation movements do not serve for the independent Angola, do you agree?	No	No	No	No
9. Are you personally involved in any peace initiatives?	Yes, working as a mediator for SADC	No	No	Yes

From this table it can be seen that the reconciliation process is on stalemate. The respondents from UNITA and MPLA acknowledged their participation in negotiation peace process and confirmed that mutual misunderstanding led the country into war. The representative from the Catholic Church participated in the process of bring awareness to people for a peace agenda. The civil society respondent participated in the help at grassroots as an NGO agent to bring awareness for peace.

The narrative content summarized in this table also allows for thematic analysis.

From the interview questions 9 themes emerged. The Themes are presented in Table 5.3 overleaf.

**Table 5.3: Themes**

<b>Theme</b>	<b>Number of times</b>
Lack of Trust	2
Bad faith	1
External influence	1
Lack of national consciousness	3
Political Immaturity	2
Lack of dialogue	3
Inequality	1
Lack of forgiveness	1
Lack of reconciliation	1

From this table it can be seen that dialogue is of paramount importance for peace.

Taken together, the questionnaire and interview data have indicated that the country needs to embark on reconciliation process through dialogue. Both the respondents from the interviews and the questionnaire are in agreement that peace building should unfold. The main themes outlined suggest that the difficulty in Angola relies on people's ability to trust each other. This will now be explored in more depth in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

The research undertaken in Kuito-Bié and Viana sought to find out civilians' perception of the current peace process. Questions concerning dialogue, economic equity, education and mutual acceptance were administered. The result shows some level of concern of citizens as far as peace is related. This part presents the main findings of the research. The chapter concludes with a suggestion of a strategic framework for peacebuilding in the country.

### 6.1- DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

The findings of this research can be looked at from four aspects, gender balance, education (access, infrastructure and attendance), employment and parenthood. In the first place, there were more women than men – about 53% – due to what they went through due to their husbands and children being in war with many being left widows. Many men who survived were either handicapped or blinded. At the end of the war, schools were built, making it easier for many to get access especially in the government institutions with high numbers though the quality is poor. In Kuito-Bié, a high number of children go to school yet many fail to make it to university compared to Viana. Lastly, with an economy dependent on oil as a source of revenue, the unemployment rate is high and the private sector has not done much to fill in the gap except those with direct foreign investment like the Chinese.

### 6.2- WAR EXPERIENCE

This research has covered the period that goes from 1991 to 2016. The year 1991 represents the first attempt of the country to achieve peace with the Bicesse accords and then through elections. But a common mistake in African soil is to confuse democracy with elections and so as in many countries in Africa, electoral democracy did not work for the case of Angola.

Civil war comes along with civilian casualties. The Angolan conflict ended with a lot of casualties with many survivors left with a lot of marks. Landmines, psychological trauma are amongst the negative effects of the conflict. According to Heywood (2001), after the failure of the elections “thousands of UNITA members were hunted down in the *mussesques*, chopped, shot, machetes, went from door to door massacring anyone they suspected belonging to UNITA (Heywood 2002: 322). Likewise, thousands of civilians were killed in areas controlled by

UNITA. The agreement in 2002 reduced violence, as put by Heywood (2011:328) “the year 2002 reduced widespread military and state violence, but psychological trauma that Angolans had experienced during the entire course of civil war still remained”.

During this period relatives were killed, injured, beaten and raped. It is a conflict that left many negative marks. Civilians suffered both from the side of MPLA and UNITA alike. The high frequency of suffering in Kuito-Bié justifies intervention as a way of amending people’s worries.

Viana on the other hand did not have direct confrontations apart from riots after the general elections in 1992. The few incidents are from that period with others related to relatives that were affected elsewhere.

Under the population size of Kuito-Bié, it is to be seen that there is a lot of pain and trauma from the conflict. 96% of the respondents had had a bad experience of the war. The data on war experience shows a clear difference between Kuito-Bié and Viana. The former had first-hand war experience, unlike the latter. Thus, for Kuito-Bié, most of the respondents had some kind of negative experience during the period.

#### 6.2.1- EXPERIENCE OF POSITIVE PEACE

The researcher found out that the perception of peace differed from Kuito-Bié and Viana. Respondents from Kuito-Bié reported a low degree of satisfaction as far as positive peace was concerned, whereas Viana looked at the current peace more positively. Over all, the responses of Kuito-Bié are negative. Given the fact that they have experienced war first hand, their perception of the current peace is paramount for the formulation of a peace building strategy that addresses the pending issues.

#### 6.2.2- ECONOMIC EQUITY

Peace is not the ceasing of hostilities for it goes beyond stopping the shooting. It is a process that seeks to amend social injustices and economic integration that many times causes it. The respondents from both research sites found it very important to have a balance of distribution of economic revenues.

Angolan war was fuelled with funds from the exploration of oil and diamonds. What is necessary today, after the war, is to use the revenues from these resources for the betterment of the life of the people. Respondents from Kuito-Bié and Viana find it crucial to equitably distribute the reaches of the country as a way of attaining sustainable peace for the reason that currently there is a perception that the resources of the country are in the hands of the same people who used it before to fuel the war. Certain people have taken the country hostage by owning the oil industry, diamond and communication sectors. As such there is a perception of an economic inequality which can in the near future cause upheaval in the country.

### 6.2.3- DIALOGUE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING

Active dialogue as participation in the building process was a common concern of respondents from both municipalities. As Langmead (2009:2) puts it, dialogue “is about respectful conversation in which two or more parties share what they believe would be open to learning from each other” (2009:2). Furthermore, they agree fully in dialogue as an “exchange of experience and understanding between two or more partners with intention that all partners grow in experience and understanding” (Knitter 1985:207).

The data on dialogue show clearly that civilians are willing to engage in the healing process through dialogue. Asked about the importance they give to dialogue, almost everyone agreed that the Angolan society needs to embark on reconciliation process through dialogue. It is acknowledged by respondents that dialogue is a necessary step in bringing people together. The encounter serves to revisit the past and heal outstanding wounds. For by journeying to the past, the country will be able to prevent future conflict as well as improve the situation at the present moment.

The respondents positively agreed that effective dialogue can build community trust. And the situation in Angola requires a dialogue based on mutual trust as a way of passing beyond the guilty trap. Today, there is a culture of culpability. The respondents confirmed as well that the lack of the dialogue can hinder the peace process as a whole.

### 6.2.4- PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFRONTATION

During war situations, civilians sometimes become involved in the fighting in order to defend a town under siege. In various instances in Angola, the population had to arm itself in order to



defend towns against opposing forces. In fact, many weapons were given out by the government (Heywood, 2011). From the data collected, the research found out that amongst the respondents who participated in the confrontation in Kuito-Bié 39 were civilians, 13 as military, 48 did mention the type of participation and 48 were unknown. Viana on the hand, had insignificant participation in confrontation. In fact, 91 respondents did not answer the question concerning military participation in the confrontation.

#### 6.2.5- PARTY SUPPORT

It is common in Angola not to publicly own up to be a UNITA or FNLA militant. This is for the reason that most institutions are party controlled. To say that a person is UNITA and works in the public sector is challenging. Thus, the data on party affiliation was affected by the sentiment of fear.

During the research it was found that most people in Kuito-Bié supported MPLA. And in Viana most people did not respond to the question of party affiliation.

#### 6.2.6- INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE BUILDING BY LEADERS IN COUNTRY

There are many ways of attaining a ceasefire, either through dialogue and mediation, or through defeat in the battlefield. Angolan cease-fire, was a result of the latter. Its process was through the agreement of belligerent forces, both MPLA respondent and UNITA respondent agree that the current peace which was a result of Luena agreement was possible due to the weakened UNITA. War was not sustainable. The nature of the conflict whereby opposing movements fought for autonomy, the military always determine how peace should go about. The military always perceive that because they cause the war they should be the one to seek peace. Therefore, the civil society and the Church in general, particularly the Catholic Church had an informal role to play. Thus, the eternal question remains, if the militaries are the ones who sued for peace, why did Alvor, Lusaka and Bicesse Accords fail?

#### 6.2.7- REASON BEHIND THE FAILURE OF BICESSE AND LUSAKA

The war left many negative marks in the country. This section, briefly looks at the negative consequences of the armed conflict. It seeks to investigate the reasons behind the failures of

the accords and suggests ways of actions for the success of Luena Memorandum of Understanding.

The year 2002 represents a change in Angola. The war ended and a new era dawned for the country. However, the road that brought the end to war started officially in 1991 in Bicesse and in 1994 in Lusaka. According to the interviewees, the reasons behind the failure of the previous accords were lack of trust among political parties (MPLA; UNITA), external influence and lack of national consciousness (Catholic Church). Further the intervenient to the process lacked political maturity. As the interviewee from the civil society puts it “the movements were not ready for the transition, they were challenged to move from one party system to multiparty democracy; they were challenged to accept each other as belonging to the same process of transformation” (Civil Society). Another important player was the international community. And in the words of the representative from the Catholic Church, “The ‘godfathers’ in the Angolan peace process failed the country. They helped the accords to be signed, but never oversaw it fully implemented” (Catholic Church). The international community that helped the country to reach the agreements, did not show interest also in looking for the new avenues for negotiation after the agreements collapsed (Anstee, 1996). Without the real interest of the international community the warring parties victimized civilians at their will for hegemonic power.

The failure of these two accords had devastating consequences, as Messiant asserts (2004:16) the failure of Bicesse and Lusaka “resulted on a resumption of the war, with ever more deadly consequences for the civil population”.

The main points found during the research suggest that the peace agreement did not work due to lack of trust and the inability of UNITA and MPLA to work together. Messiant (2004) adds another point by saying that, “by the hegemonic power by the two warring parties a deadly pursuit of military victory” influenced the collapse of the accords.

### 6.3- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

The Angolan war can be said to have been sponsored by international players. The United States and the Soviet Union played a vital role, both in sponsoring the war and in supporting the peace process. The negotiation for the first accord were overseen by the Troika, composed of Portugal, USA and USSR. The negotiators, mainly the United States forced MPLA to abandon Marxism-Leninism and to opt for democracy. The Troika, was in a sense representing

its own interest with the principle of conflict transformation was being ignored and not respected. Therefore, “the unarmed actors in Angola, moral, political, civic, had no role in the negotiation or any say in the implementation of the accords” (Messiant, 2004:18). This absence of unarmed actors favoured the collapse of accords, as Comefords (2007:7) puts it:

“... had the agreements sought to include society and community based organizations, religious institutions and women groups, historians and other political parties in Angola, it is possible that such input could have shaped the of the final agreements themselves, placing greater emphasis on transparency and accountable governance”

The international community’s main objective was not to reach peace. What they seem to have being after is to have UNITA into power. That is why they deployed very weak UN personnel to oversee the process. As Anstee (1996) rightly observes, the UN lacked a clear mandate, money, and personnel for a proper peace operation.

### 6.3.1- CORE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE BICESSE AND LUSAKA ACCORDS

The international community with its biased role in the process can be said to have led to the failure of the accords and which was summed up by what the representative from the Catholic Church said about the influence of international community. Because Troika had its own interest, the process became vicious. The United States supported UNITA, and for them a victorious outcome from the ballots was almost guaranteed. So the international community ignored signs of re-escalation of the conflict and conventional mechanism applied after ceasefire, and working towards reconciliation was overlooked. For example, disarming of conflicting parties as a way of preparing elections as an important tool was taken lightly. In the Angolan case, the disarmament process was over looked. Right before the elections there were clear signs of the war resuming, but these signs were ignored. And so when the ballot was cast and UNITA lost, Savimbi refused to accept the results and war re-escalated. Many UNITA leaders were killed in Luanda and many other centres in Angola. Anyone perceived to have voted for UNITA, or who wore any distinctive signs of UNITA became victims of a post-election violence that killed over five hundred people.

Messiant (2004:18) argues that the Accord at Bicesse was badly conducted, “... the transition was placed entirely in the hands of the armed parties. Transitory political rules were not

established, nor was a coalition government which would have avoided a wins takes it all” put in place. Before the election, the parties never agreed to have a common body to prepare the elections as a guarantee of impartiality in the electoral process. In a sense, both political parties were immature and lacked clear vision of what to do in order to secure peace (Civil Society respondent).

It was in the environment of armed groups that the election took place. The MPLA won 54 per cent of the votes, over UNITA’s 34 per cent. José Eduardo Santos won the presidential election by 49.7 per cent while Savimbi got 40.7 per cent of the votes cast. The presidential results were not conclusive. However Savimbi rejected the whole process and war resumed. What followed this rejection was a bloodshed. Messiant (2004) asserts MPLA launched a “pre-emptive attack on UNITA” because they feared UNITA would attack the capital Luanda.

### 6.3.2- THE FAILURE OF LUSAKA PROTOCOL

After the unsuccessful Bicesse, the United States of America, who supported UNITA changed its support and began to recognize the Angolan government with UNITA being as labelled as rebel movement after they returned to war. As a consequence, UNITA was sanctioned by the UN, therefore, access to weapons was restricted.

The UN through Alioune Blondin Beye and the Troika started negotiation with UNITA and MPLA to go back to the negotiation table. In 1994 the parties agreed to negotiate and signed the Lusaka Protocol. But with the lesson learnt from the failure of Bicesse, the negotiators proposed a new route for the settlement. A Government of National Unity for Reconciliation (GURN) was suggested. The second clause was to take disarmament seriously contrary to what had happened in Bicesse. Further, the second round for the presidential elections was to be scheduled.

One important element of Lusaka is that, because UNITA had rejected the previous elections results and it was now considered an illegal rebellion, as mentioned before, the consequence was that they were the only ones who were supposed to disarm, and their personnel to be incorporate in the national army. The leadership of UNITA procrastinated the fulfilment of the protocol and the Government did not take extra efforts to endorse the agreement. As put by Messiant (2004: 22) “UNITA violated the agreement by day, the government by night”. The consequences of the constant violations “fuelled mutual distrust and led to re-armament of both sides”. Even though UNITA was under sanctions, and Bicesse had forbade any country in

supporting them with weaponry material, they did so illegally while the government was able to buy arms dealings with other governments.

Despite the inauguration of GURN in 1997 the situation in the country continued to escalate to full violence. The UN that helped the agreement to be reached, abandoned its mandate and from 1998 full escalation devastated the country.

Taken together, the agreements failed because of false interests of Troika combined with mistrust amongst the worrying parties. Authors such as Messiant (2004), Comeford (2007), Ruigrok (2011), and Heywood (2011) have drawn support for the hypothesis that lack of inclusion of other segments of society hinder the success of the peace.

#### 6.3.4- LUENA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The year 2002 marked the end of the civil war in Angola. The Death of Savimbi, the president of UNITA, left the movement without any possibility to continue the fight. The Angolan government negotiated an agreement to officially stop hostilities. Right in Luena where Savimbi died, the two armies agreed on an immediate ceasefire and, further, they agreed on working on what had failed in the Lusaka Protocol, mainly those issues dealing with the disarmament of UNITA personnel and consequent demilitarization and reintegration. As far as reconciliation was concerned, a general amnesty was granted to all UNITA militants for their war crimes.

The Luena Memorandum signed in 2002 focused its attention in military issues. As mentioned above, reconciliation was restricted to the blanket amnesty for war crimes. At the time of the agreement the UN showed unhappiness for a process of reconciliation that forgives without justice when it said, “The United Nations does not recognize general amnesty for crimes against humanity and for violations of international and humanitarian law and crime” (UN, 2002:8). With the same token, Ramsbotham and Miall (2005:185) asserts that

“When wars have ended, post-conflict peacebuilding is vital. The UN has often devoted too little attention and too few resources to this critical challenge. Successful peacebuilding requires the deployment of peacekeepers with the right mandates and sufficient capacity to deter would-be spoilers.”

What the authors argue is that the UN has to have a more influential role in peacebuilding. Angola has experienced the problems with UN's incomplete framework for desired change in Angola, for most of its agreements only dealt with military issues.

As it happened in previous agreements for peace, the civilian population is not considered in the reconciliation process in Luena Memorandum of understanding. It is true that the population is enjoying the cease-fire, through the stopping of violence. However, there are other matters to be addressed. The government assumed that reconciliation is and forgiveness happens without a proper process. As quoted by Monteiro (2004:66), the Lusaka Protocol suggests that "... in the spirit of National Reconciliation, all Angolans should forgive and forget the offences resulting from the Angolan conflict and face the future with tolerance and trust". The statement assumes that peace can be achieved by forgetting the horrors from the war.

#### 6.3.5- RECONCILIATION AFTER LUENA

After the Memorandum in Luena the peace process stopped at the cease-fire stage, meaning that "... to a large extent hostilities have stopped or limited to certain regions; however, the root or structural causes of the conflict are not addressed and so the reconciliation of different parties and/or communities has no priority" (Langer, 2006:5).

To address a conflict properly it is necessary to identify the key problems disputed. The Angolan war had as root cause, of mistrust and the inability of the liberation movements to share power. The greed to govern led the country into a long bloodshed. The process to resolve these problems takes a long time to be achieved. During the post conflict era many core problems evolved, the main one is the notion of a victor's peace. The MPLA defeated UNITA in the battle field. They perceive themselves as winners. There is little room to compromise in order for a more balanced process to occur. The effects of the victor's peace are intolerance, hatred, corruption, dysfunctional institutions and favouritism for MPLA partisans (UNITA and Civil Society Respondents).

The reconciliation process is at a stalemate, the military perceives that the peace has been achieved and there is nothing to be done as asserted by Raimundo (2004:66):

"... although national reconciliation continues to be invoked as an important aspect of consolidating peace in Angola, in the political arena it has basically amounted to the reconciliation of the warring parties without exploring the causes

of the conflict. Little attention has been paid to the social processes that enable individuals and communities to address and overcome the distrust, polarization and pain caused by conflict”

The pain and suffering of people are not acknowledged publicly as an issue to deal with. And in the reconciliation process, it is very important to face the truth. The acknowledgement of past events can only happen if perpetrators and victims agree to dialogue, decide to join forces for a common cause. This has been lacking and because in the case of Angola where there are many truths about the cause of the conflict, it is important a complete engagement so that the many truths are amalgamated to one so that the country moves forward.

Lederach proposes an integrated framework as discussed extensively in chapter 2, now the pyramidal framework will be used to respond the Angolan need for a complete framework for peace building.

#### 6.4- LEDERACH’S FRAMEWORK AS GROUNDS FOR TRANSFORMATION IN ANGOLA

The Angolan peace process has been largely militarized. The process did not include the civil society, the churches, and community based organisations (Civil Society Respondent). The consequence is that people are still intolerant to each other. There are still scenes of violence in various communities due to party politics. The need for the involvement of members from different layers of the community is urgent.

Lederach’s (2003; 2005; 2003; 2007) work on peace building fosters human relationship as a ground for interconnectedness and a shared vision for the future. The researcher finds it appropriate to use the integrated framework having in mind that the main aim is to ameliorate people’s relationship that is the way they look to each other. This integrated framework is composed of three main role players symbolized on pyramid. First there is the top level leadership, followed by the middle-range leadership and lastly the grassroots leadership. All these players have specific roles to play and outcomes to achieve.

##### 6.4.1- TOP LEVEL LEADERSHIP

Top leadership in a conflict transformation environment involves, high ranking military personnel, politicians and church leaders. The role of these representative of the people is to

broker peace when there is a conflict. However, it must be mentioned that the military and politicians are very often at the genesis of a conflict. For the case of Angola, politicians and the military were the cause of the intrastate conflict.

At the time for the peace settlement, military and the politicians felt that because they caused the war they should be the one to solve it. They then took the role of solving the problem alone leaving out other important players from the civil society and church leaders. The Angolan conflict therefore confirms the theory that top-level leadership represents the highest visible leaders in a conflict, consequently the key players in cease fire processes, as Lederach (1997:38) asserts “in an intrastate struggle, these people are the highest representative leaders of the government and opposition movements”. These top leaders played the role of cease fire negotiators. Therefore, we had representatives from the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and UNITA armed forces (FALA) signing the agreement on 4<sup>th</sup> of April 2002. They were at the time the highest visible persons in the ceasefire process. According to Lederach, the peace process that initiates from top leaders is top-down approach to peacebuilding, whose first aim is to achieve a cease fire agreement as he (1997:44) asserts:

“Peacebuilding approach at this level is often focused on achieving a cease-fire or a cessation of hostilities as a first step that will lead to subsequent steps involving broader political and substantive negotiations, which in turn will culminate in an agreement creating the mechanisms for a political agreement from war to peace.”

#### 6.4.2- MIDDLE RANGE

Middle range persons are influential in society without a directly being linked to the official power structure but influences change in a society. Lederach (1997) points out that a middle range person can be characterized differently. First, it is someone who is an actor and can be influential, is much respected or occupies important portfolios in the society. Secondly, the leadership can be broadened to institutions and groups networks, such as football clubs, religious denominations, and academic institutions. A third approach in words of Lederach (1997:41):

“Is to concentrate on identity groups in conflict, and to locate middle range leaders among people who are well known as belonging to minority ethnic group, or who



are from a particular geographic region within the conflict and enjoy the respect of the people of that region but are also known outside the region.”

This second approach is paramount for Angola. So far, this layer of conflict transformation has not been utilized. The resources from local communities have not been used. In tackling the current stalemate in the process, it will be important to concentrate on the dynamic of North and South, Ovimbundo versus Kimbundo because the genesis of the conflict has got an ethnic tone to it. To solve this difference, it will be very important to apply the process of the middle range approach which goes beyond the effect and addresses the root causes. By selecting influential people in the community, it will be possible to connect with influential people at the top level, “... middle-range leaders are positioned so that they are likely to know and be known by top level leadership, yet they have significant connections to the broader context and the constituency that the top leaders claim to represent” (Lederach, 1997:41).

Middle range leaders, if integrated properly, represent a swing vote in the peace building process. At this level people “are trained for peace through problem solving workshops, conflict resolution training and the development of peace commissions” (Lederach, 1997:46). It is important for Angola to diversify its peace agenda and to be inclusive.

#### 6.4.3- GRASSROOTS

The grassroots are the bottom of the pyramid, they represent the general population and very often the first to face the negative effect of a civil war, but the last to be contemplated in the reconciliation process. For the peace process in Angola, they were not considered whatsoever. So, as much as reconciliation of civilians affected by war is considered to be the backbone of a peace process, Angolans have been left out by the top leaders who signed and drafted the various peace agreements. As Monteiro (2004:65) has rightly noted “... although the war [In Angola] and its consequences have been extensively written about, individual traumas and collective suffering are scarcely mentioned either in private or in public”, people are victims that have no avenue to be heard. Thus, the grassroots are people whose “life is characterized, particularly in settings of protracted conflict and war, by survival mentality” (Lederach, 1997:42).

The leaders at the grassroots operate and interact with the community on daily basis. They are people involved in local communities’ organizations and are “people [who] understand

intimately the fear and suffering with which much of the population must live” (Lederach, 1997:42).

The grassroots faces peace building from a bottom-up strategy, even though these are people who suffer on daily basis with the lack of basic needs, they have a role to play in peace building. Taken together, these approaches suggest that peace building has to be a combined effort from the various groups in a given society. The top leadership alone cannot achieve sustainable peace, neither can the middle range alone. It has to be a threefold approach, top-leadership, middle and the grassroots.

This means that Angola needs to combine forces from its political mosaic, church leaders, business people and common Angolans in order to have in place a more integrated peace strategy that will be able to address the needs of dialogue for change and sustainable peace.

#### 6.5-ANGOLAN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: WHO DOES WHAT?

From cease-fire to full reconciliation, there are a number of issues that have to be considered, all bearing in mind that to achieve sustainable peace is a process that “revolves around a need to or desire to address incompatibilities by changing a situation” (Coleman et al. 2014: 723).

Any peace process has to have a framework so that systematically sustainable peace can be attained. Dialogue, either official or unofficial, plays an important role to reconcile a society. Respondents, both from Kuito-Bié and Viana are in agreement that to dialogue helps to prevent future conflicts and gives strength to the current peace process. Chapter 2 devoted time to types of dialogue. Thus, a framework for Angola should base on the concepts of dialogue, forgiveness and reconciliation. The current peace process in Angola is in state of “stable unresolvedness” (Langer, 2006:5). The state of unresolvedness is the absence of clarification of the root causes of a conflict making it difficult for any meaningful peace process.

Taking into consideration Lederach’s integrated framework, the research suggests roles to be played by the different leaders, bearing in mind that the outcome should be a more reconciled society.

### 6.5.1-TOP-LEADERSHIP

The first mandate of the leadership is to achieve an agreement that facilitates a cease-fire. This having been achieved, the current Angolan leaders have to be involved in other activities. In Lederach's perspective, these leaders are highly visible and can be drivers of change. The researcher suggests that their role in order to climb the transformation ladder is to create a political climate as "the total experience of social-psychological environment in which the conflict transformation and the peace building process takes place" (Langer, 2006:33). This calm climate for healthy political encounter has been spoiled by the conflict. As a consequence there is a culture of fear and hatred and it is the leadership that can help to ameliorate the shortcomings.

Moreover, the leadership should create a favourable climate so that citizens see the future with confidence. Hopelessness is not a good recipe for reconciliation. It is through looking at the future with confidence that a common future can be dreamed of and reconciliation unfold. As Langer (2006:34) puts it, "Reconciliation is a joint process of releasing the past with its pain, restructuring the present with reciprocal respect and acceptance, and reopening the future to new risks and spontaneity".

A more confident future will come about in Angola once the peace process takes the right direction. The first step towards that desired outcome is a process of truth telling. The aim of disclosing the reasons behind the conflict is to heal the perpetrators and victims. It is very important to understand, how and why things happen the way they did.

Currently, we do have two histories for the same memory. When UNITA militants are heard, they recount the history from their perspective, when it is MPLA militants, they recount their triumphant version of events. The difference in the histories they share does not help reconciliation because they give two different accounts of the same event. As Langer (2006:67) suggests, "... to understand the why and how actions is a pre-condition for any reconciliation policy". For the Angolan situation, the main objective in truth telling will not be to find guilty and innocent participants in the war, rather it is to facilitate a dialogue that will help cohabitation amongst the various political players in the country.

### 6.5.2- ECONOMIC EQUITY

Another important role to be played by the top-leadership is to promote economic equity, because reconciliation with empty stomachs in peacebuilding does not work. The war process

had created a lot economic injustices. The state favoured, state security instead of human security. Respondents from Kuito-Bié and Viana agree that a more balanced economy will help a better integration in the society. In fact, currently the level of dissatisfaction is on the rise. Fourteen years after the peace agreement things are falling apart. As discussed in chapter 3, Angola is rich in natural resources but most of the revenue from the oil industry and diamond has gone towards funding the war rather than positive human development. And now with the end of the war, citizens are clambering for a more equitable distribution of the resources. This matter has caused discontent in Cabinda, an enclave in the North of Angola. The respondent from UNITA also pointed out the need of economic inclusion for peace building.

In summary, the top-leaders have to strengthen public institutions to become more democratic. They need to foster dialogue to help a new model of cohabitation to come about. However, the full picture of reconciliation can only take place if the other players on the pyramid are taken into consideration.

#### 6.5.2-MIDDLE RANGE

The middle range plays an important role for peace yet for the Angolan case the identification of important key players in this level has not been done. Unlike Lederach's proposal where the Church leaders are in the top-leadership, for Angola it is suggested that the religious leaders are solely placed in the middle range, the reason being that religious leaders have not been involved so much in formal transformation activities. They were vocal during the conflict years, but today nothing much takes places on consistent manner. By placing them at the middle range leadership, they become good mediators between the top leaders and grassroots, and, most importantly, they can participate in the change process through the sermons at the Church services.

Middle range leaders are placed in position that can influence top leaders and grassroots as well. Lederach (1997) suggests that they take this key role in problem solving through workshops. The aim of these problem solving workshops is to invite participants who know the story of the conflict and also to try and influence top leaders. Secondly, it is important that the workshop takes place on an informal environment. "An environment that enables direct interaction with adversaries and encourages the development of relationships as well as flexibility in looking at the parties' shared problems and possible solutions" (Lederach, 1997:47). These Training workshops are of paramount importance for Angola. For Lederach

(1997) the workshops provide multiple services by facilitating encounters amongst warring parties and providing resource persons for training. As alluded before, the key finding of this research is that respondents find dialogue an important feature for peace structure.

Another important element of Lederach's (1997:48), middle range leadership is the conflict resolution training which aims at raising awareness about conflict dynamics. Conflict resolution training has the goal of "teaching people specific techniques and approaches for dealing with conflict often in terms of analytical, communication, negotiation, or mediation skills". The post war Angolan society needs extensive training on an integrated peace framework which can help the people to see each other as struggling for the same future.

Taken together, looking at the top leadership and the middle leadership in the Angolan context, it is suggested that their action should be directed towards a more integrative framework at the grassroots. Those at the bottom of the pyramid have a role to play, even though they are often affected by either during confrontations by being victims of armed forces, both from the rebel side or the government, or after cease-fire struggling with daily worries of how to survive, their voices ought to be heard. The Angolan process has completely overlooked the grassroots leadership. Yet for a process to be integrated, as it is suggested here, the way to sustainable peace has to be complete.

### 6.5.3- GRASSROOTS

Grassroots are the oppressed that need to liberate and to liberate themselves. It is difficult for the oppressor to be changed by those they oppressed. For this framework to work, the grassroots plays pivotal role in changing the status quo of Angola reconciliation. However, as the grassroots citizens seek their dignity through a process of reconciliation, revenge has no place for it is an encounter that uplifts both the oppressor and the oppressed. As quoted by Ramsbotham and Miall (2005:215) Paulo Freire attests that:

"The struggle for humanization, for the emancipation of labour, for the overcoming of alienation, for the affirmation of men and women as persons...is possible only because dehumanization although a concrete historical fact, is not a given destiny but the result of an unjust order that engenders violence in the oppressors, which in turn dehumanizes the oppressed. Because it is a distortion of becoming more fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the oppressed

struggle against them who made them so, in order for this struggle to have meaning the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity become in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restores of humanity of both.”

In chapter 2, the importance and role played by the grassroots reconciliation was presented as made up of two trends, family reconciliation and group reconciliation respectively. Further inside into the liberal peace as peacebuilding from below followed. However, this research favours Lederach’s insight on grassroots.

Ledearch’s (1997) approach widens the spectrum of the grassroots activities for peace building. He sees the grassroots as having a leeway to pressure for peace because they are the ones who most of the time face the real consequences of the war. They therefore have the bargaining power to improve reconciliation efforts. A clear example of the importance of grassroots importance in peacebuilding comes from Liberia where the women’s league pressured for a cease fire and it was achieved.

The Angolan context needs a more informed grassroots in order for the society to change. Like any other conflict situation, they have suffered during the war period and continue to suffer today. And so if in times of killings, grassroots pressure for peace, in time of peacebuilding they should pressure for change.

Taken together the three models can be applied into Angolan situation as one single model. Specific roles have been outlined, and there is a need for a follow-up in order for full reconciliation to be attained.

#### 6.6.1- CONTEXTUALIZATION

The way forward for the Angolan peace process passes through strengthening peace building from below which is a bottom-up approach. The grassroots have suffered the worst war consequences. If they depend on the top-leaders to free them it will take a longer time than they expect. In as much as it has to be an integrated framework whereby top-leaders strengthen public institutions and promote truth telling, and the middle range promote conflict resolution training, it is the grassroots that has to have the greatest visibility and attention.

### 6.6.2- THE IMPORTANCE OF PEACEBUILDING FROM BELOW – BOTTOM-UP

It is common place for the grassroots to be ignored during peace settlement. They are often the weakest link in peace building processes. The researcher suggests peace building from below as the guiding framework for the Angolan situation. What has happened until now in Angola has been top down framework. This approach has produced negative peace, whereas the peace building from below will produce a more integrated approach.

The bottom-up approach will be strengthened by the concepts of dialogue as effective communication, and reconciliation and forgiveness as the decisive steps towards sustainable peacebuilding.

### 6.6.3- THE PROCESS OF BOTTOM-UP PEACEBUILDING

Peace from below is a process that acknowledges that “ sustainable peace making processes must be based not merely on the manipulation of peace agreements made by elites, but more importantly on the empowerment on communities torn apart by war” (Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005:215). When common citizen become aware of their role as peace makers the process begins to unfold. More importantly, peace-making from below opens up participatory public political spaces for citizens to participate in the changing process. The method at the bottom-up approach aims at training peace agents that help to change the communities they are involved in. in some ways, this bottom up approach is an indigenous empowerment process.

One of the most important characteristics of peace building from below is to liberate communities from dominating structures; the current peace process in Angola, is on the status of unresolvedness as mentioned before, through peace building a new era can come about.

## CHAPTER 7- RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

A framework for Angola will be focused on grassroots initiatives. Thus, far top-down approaches have produced negative peace. Bottom-up have the chance of bringing change to the country.

### 7.1-RECOMMENDATIONS

The key element in conflict resolution from below is that the people at the grassroots enlighten the solution of the problem. No outsiders bring ready-made solutions, rather it is the real people that have suffered the horrors of the war that seek for ways of solving pending issues. There are a number of possibilities of grassroots organizations. One important feature of grassroots organizations is the presence of both international and community based non-governmental organizations. For the case, of Angola, there is an urgency for real community based NGOs to be builders and developers of peace trainers to bring awareness to the community. Today, there are some NGOs working on the field of human rights promotion. These NGOs have already served as an alternate voice for the peace process in Angola. In late 1990s they appeared appealing for a true peace process. Organizations such as Angolan Action for Development (AAD) and Action for Rural Development and the Environment were formed after 1991, although their main role was to deal with rural development they helped to bring awareness to people, by showing that another way is possible.

The Christian Churches also represented a great shift. As independent participants they have greatly influenced the peace agenda of the country by advocating for peace during war period.

The shortcomings of these organizations is that they depend solely on international funding. At the grassroots level it is important not to be so dependent on aid, but rather the search for local donors so that peace promotion does not become a business.

Taken together, it can be observed, that although the peace process from below is not widely publicized, it has the potential to be a driver of change. Using Lederach's model, but placing the emphasis at the bottom of the pyramid is a guarantee for a change in the Angolan peace stalemate. The bottom-up approach sets medium-term perspective at the instructional level and national building within the long-term goal of human security-oriented peacebuilding and reconciliation (Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005).



## 7.2- RECONCILIATION

The researcher finds important an agenda to reconcile the country as way of bringing about sustainable peace. Reconciliation implies togetherness. It is an act of conflicting parties deciding to march to a common destiny. As Assefa and Washira (1996:42) affirm, "... reconciliation refers to the act by which people who have been apart and split off from one another begin to march together again. It is the restoration of broken relationships". Thus "... reconciliation is both a goal - something to achieve - and a process - a means to achieve that goal" (Bloomfield, 2003:12). The Angola situation is clear example of a broken relationship at the societal level. The main political parties do not see eye to eye, they keep a rather informal and false relationship.

The MPLA, who won the elections for three times, in 2008, 1992 and in 2012, show arrogance and an unwillingness to compromise. The country's hegemonic power and regional influence has given partisans of MPLA a sense of self-sufficiency that others are irrelevant ( De Oliveira, 2015). The arrogance coming from the top of the ladder affects common militants whose relationships are deeply broken. The amendment of relationships will be a great remedy towards healthier grassroots peace initiatives. A goal is something desirable, at the end the day the goal of reconciliation is to see the society where people are able to relate freely without grudges from confrontation periods. Thus, for this goal to be achieved, it is important to focus on the process. A process gives prevalence and preference to the present moment as the right time to work for change.

At the time of the peace at the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, the issue of reconciliation was narrowed down to amnesty, war crimes had a blanket forgiveness. The way the government dealt with issue did help people to relate and reconcile. The choice of grassroots as preferential model for peace building in Angola obliges the society to undergo the process of reconciliation as

"... an over-reaching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and healing... it means finding a way to live alongside former enemies- not necessarily to love them or forgive them or forget the past on any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our

society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately” (Bloomfield, 2003:12).

To reconcile means to accept, to move forward and design a new future for a once victimized community. People at the grassroots have suffered consequences of a war that was driven by greed and ambition to govern by the liberation movements in Angola, As a consequence, once united communities were separated, relationships broke. To face eye to eye after violent conflict is a challenge for any community that envisions a productive future. Concisely, “reconciliation is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future” (Bloomfield, 2003:12). Reconciliation processes remind societies that any successful future depends on level of seriousness of a peace process. Instead of avoiding pending issues a society coming out a conflict should look at its past as way of getting out of an enslaving past preventing the moving forward the society towards a desired future.

The Angolan conflict was deeply rooted in difference, contradiction, polarization and violence that seriously fragmented the society at large, which makes reconciliation delicate and difficult (Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005; Bloomfield, 2003:12)

Given the Angolan context, reconciliation is a sensitive ground to step on. There is need for a clear process that unfolds methodologically and constantly. Thus attitudes and conduct have to change towards each other and the community. Events of violence because of party affiliation need to be resolved. Furthermore, the members of the community should elucidate the fear of the neighbour who was once the opposition during the conflict period. When fear is overcome, trust in the community can be built, and empathy can unfold. All the mentioned steps can take place when traumas and atrocities from the war period are properly addressed.

### 7.3- DEALING WITH THE PAST

The ability to live in the present moment, the here and now is crucial to move towards reconciliation. At times, the reconciliation process is hindered by past memories that make former enemies to look at each with anger and remorse. To move beyond hate is crucial for the mending of broken relationships.

Before full reconciliation it is necessary “for individuals and groups to recover from trauma, and for the time-bomb of remembered injustice to be defused” (Ramsbotham and Miall,

2005:227). Communities can only dream a common future once they have moved beyond past injustices.

Dealing with the past is complex endeavour, it is much easier, after a cease-fire to recover infrastructure than to deal with the invisible effects of the war. However, there will be no full reconciliation if the psychological traumas are not addressed.

The researcher suggests grassroots truth commissions as way for the Angolan people to address the past, as extensively presented in chapter 2, the truth commissions have the ability to allow people to share their experience without revenge. The advantage of this method to deal with past is that it is contextual and local leaders and common citizens are fundamental players in the process of reconciliation. The truth commissions help societies to acknowledge past hurts and victims and perpetrators start to move on. By the same token, truth commissions will help to clarify the root causes of the conflict and help communities to go beyond the guilt trap. Furthermore, truth commission restore justice. For Angola the restoration of justice is paramount for the success of the current existing negative peace. Peace without justice is an ingredient for the re-escalation of violence.

In all, reconciliation means to end violence, to overcome polarization, managing contradiction and celebrating difference (Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005). These three elements are crucial for true reconciliation given that no society can fully reconcile if there is still deep-seated political animosity. Angola reached its ceasefire through the defeat of UNITA. The victorious mentality makes difficult for MPLA's partisans for forgive UNITA and move forward. As Ramsbotham and Miall (2005:243) put it, "it is hard to forgive a defeated enemy, and harder to forgive a finally victorious enemy, it is harder still to forgive an enemy who is still seen to be an immediate and potent threat". In as much as UNITA is much weaker than the MPLA, they are still seen as a possible threat by MPLA, given that they challenge the hegemonic power. This animosity happens at the top of the pyramid as well as at the bottom. Since the way forward for peacebuilding passes through the grassroots, consciousness of their role as peace builders makes it important to move beyond political indifference. "The deeper process of reconciliation cannot be reached while dehumanization images of the enemy are still current and mutual convictions of victimization are widely believed" Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005:244).

When perpetrators and victims are rehumanized, conflicting demands are met. These demands include a better sense of security and a better future for children in a given community. In as

much as individual problems are not managed, the sense of a common security moves reconciliation forward.

With the issues of economic rearrangement dealt with, political representation considered, reconciliation moves to a more decisive step, based on atonement and forgiveness. Here “former enemies are reconciled to the point where differences are not only tolerated but, even appreciated” (Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005:244). Reconciled societies are the ones that acknowledge that a shared vision for the future is more important than a divided past.

The movement towards reconciliation in Angola has to undergo the three stages mentioned above. Moving towards acknowledgement of everyone’s similarity at the same time as the common destiny of the community is appreciated. The MPLA party which is leading now, should be transformed, both with the top leadership as well at the grassroots. Transformation at the grassroots can happen through including at the syllabus right from primary school themes relating to peace and reconciliation.

When reconciliation reaches its highest point, forgiveness unfolds. To forgive is not to forget. The researcher uses forgiveness as a tool to accept a past experience and move forward. Forgiveness occurs when people no longer define their emotions, desires or behaviours in the terms of injury – the injury becomes part of who people are, but they are not defined by it (Lulofs and Cahn, 2000).

#### 7.4- FORGIVENESS

In chapter 2 forgiveness was discussed. It was established that forgiveness goes hand in hand with reconciliation. Whenever the issue of reconciliation comes about in war torn societies, the issue of forgiveness is dealt with. As presented above, forgiveness is the highest point in the reconciliation process. Lulofs and Cahn (2000:326) define “forgiveness as cognitive process that consists of letting go of feelings of revenge and desire to retaliate” it is the ability that people have to live together after violent experience. It is agreed that “forgiveness in an important mental process that should follow traumatic experiences” (Lulofs and Cahn, 2000:328). The process of forgiving replaces anger and transforms anger into a positive energy. “The key in getting into the point of forgiveness is the ability to reframe the event that has occurred, to see an event among many in a relationship instead of the central event that defines the guilty of the relationship” (Lulofs and Cahn, 2000:331). In chapter 2, an overview of different schools were presented. The views are divided amongst scholars who affirm

forgiveness is not a pre-requisite for reconciliation (Derrida, 2001; Huyse, 2013) and those who argue that forgiveness is determinant for reconciliation (Carry, 1998). This research suggests that forgiveness is a pre-requisite for full reconciliation. No society can be reconciled if a decision to move beyond traumatic experience has not been made. Angolans at the grassroots level need to forgive past atrocities in order in order to build a harmonious community.

Forgiveness and reconciliation happen within a dialogical context. Members of given community have to talk about their history freely. A communication that can flow can inform change.

#### 7.5- DIALOGUE AS COMMUNICATION

This research investigated the level of satisfaction of the peace process in Kuito-Bié and Viana. Unlike Kuito-Bié where people had first-hand war experience, Viana did not. However, when it came to the priority given to dialogue as a way of moving towards full reconciliation, both municipalities shared the same sentiments. The majority of respondents agreed that dialogue is of paramount importance for the process of reconciliation and sustainable peacebuilding. Fisher-Yoshida (2014:879) said the aim of dialogue in conflict transformation is to “change the nature of the communication between parties in conflict as they engage in dialogue”.

The aim of dialogue then is to build effective communication aiming at building mutual trust. A truth commission in Angola has to start from creating avenues for encounters and dialogue. There will be no sustainable peace if Angolans do not decide to talk openly to each other. It is a process whereby the whole community is engaged and interconnected towards a common goal.

The Angolan conflict left the Angolan population severely hurt. As result sentiments of hurt created fear and common distrust. Both the interpersonal and intercommunity relationships are deeply affected by the sentiment of anger and bitterness. Dialogue as a process can help communities to move forward the roadblock to interconnection in society.

It is clear that the Angolan peace process needs an integrated framework to address the pending issues resulting from the many peace processes. The divided MPLA-UNITA which affects relationships at the bottom of the pyramid needs to carefully deal with so that a new era led by

grassroots can take place and the country can move decisively towards sustainable reconciliation.

Altogether, this research confirms that reconciliation is a key concept in post-conflict peace building. There will be no peace without reconciliation and forgiveness. The way towards reconciliation passes through the restructuring of the current model used in the country. The peace process has been a top-down approach due to the nature of the way peace was achieved. What is suggested is that peace building should change to bottom-up framework with an emphasis at the bottom of the pyramid. As mentioned by Lederach (1995:212):

“The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect and promote the human cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily see the setting and the people in it as the problem and the outsider as the answer. Rather, we understand the long term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting.”

The idea is to build peace from the community and with their respective resources. Reconciliation and forgiveness are crucial topics from Angola. Through a process of truth commissions, communities will be able to come together and discuss the history of the conflict, understand the root cause, deal with effects and suggest ways towards a common goal. This encounter should be a celebration of difference, where people will see each as different but not as enemies. Peace can only unfold through a shared vision for the future.

As the respondents in Viana and Kuito-Bié showed, peace should be based on dialogue. The framework based on dialogue acknowledges that peace can only be sustainable if people agree to openly talk about the past and decide to move beyond hindrances reconciliation can be possible.

Although, this research advises for peacebuilding from below as it is preferred approach to peace in Angola, it advises that top leaders have to strengthen public institutions and work more towards economic equity.

After the 2002 Peace Agreement, Angolan experienced a flourishing economy. With oil prices raising from 2008 to 2012 the country had the possibility of creating a more integrated economic system. However it did not happen. Rather, personnel enrichment and embezzlement of the country's resources has driven the country into an economic crisis that can further

become social unrest. That is why this research advocates for an urgent intervention on peacebuilding from below.

Right from the beginning of the armed conflict in 1975, it was always perceived that the Northern part of the country is more privileged than the south, in times of hunger, the south suffer more than the north. The inland provinces, with drought have no possibility of farming and as consequence poverty increases. That is why both respondents, that is Kuito-Bié and Viana, find it crucial to work towards economic equity.

The Angolan peace process started in officially in 2002, whatever happened before were failed attempts. Since 2002 the peace has been negative. It is more important to move towards reconciliation. The current peace is perceived to be negative, based on cease-fire, citizens are unhappy with turning of events. The question on level of enjoyment of the current peace shows that the current situation leaves a lot to be desired. People's priorities are the use of dialogue as a way of addressing past offences and moving towards reconciliation. Reconciling people will have a better sense of security. Currently, there is a culture of fear and intimidation. Dissatisfaction cannot be shown publicly as it is taken as opposition to the ruling party. The way towards reconciliation is to free the media, so that people can express themselves and voice out their problems. What is really needed in the country is a democratic structure that will allow the grassroots to fully participate in their own future as far as peace is concerned. If a change does not happen now then the grassroots instead of being peace makers will turn into trouble makers.

Looking at how people in the post war period have been treated, poor transition, corruption, resource-dependency, volatile economy based on oil as the main source of income though depended on the international dictates, poor governance, migration to the cities, shows a insecurity for the future. The area is just like many African countries which are facing in terms of what to do with the young people that seem to demand so much yet there seems to be too little – a group who has no idea of what war was like and could easily turn to it because they are naïve of its consequences. The stories their parents and grandparents have talked of like, “liberation struggles, the civil war victories and the even the early postwar threat of confusion,” remains too many in this group just stories that do not make sense (De Oliveira, 2015:217). Thus “disruptive political phenomena are bound to emerge” (De Oliveira, 2015:217).

What the country therefore needs is a more patriotic group that will look at where the country has come from, where it is at the moment and where it ought to be where as many as possible

can take part in the building of a new Angola. De Oliveira (2015) says that if this does not happen then what could happen is "... populist reactions that marshal ethnic, regional and racial resentment, laced with xenophobic sentiment against expatriates, into a rousing critique of postwar order" (Oliveira, 2015:217). At this moment this is likely to happen for those who rule (the elite). All they do is to dine and wine with the expatriates whose investments or shares may be what is running the economy of the country if oil is kept aside. The rest of the society is just busy bodies and noisemakers who have nothing to say about how the country is governed. These elite have even failed to learn from history where such comforts with the expatriates were the order of the day like Uganda and Cote d'Ivoire (Oliveira, 2015). If this does not happen, then those within the slums may resort to gangland violence typical of the Latin American cities (De Oliveira, 2015).

While this is the reality in which the country stands in terms of its challenges, the other reality is that tomorrow will not be like today and yesterday. And tomorrow can be better if those in a position to give direction are willing and ready to look at the real challenges that are affecting the people today. Those who think that the fears of yesterday may make people keep quiet and watch things happening yet they go to sleep with empty stomachs may be living in a dream land. The earlier they wake up from this slumber, the better or else they may not be able to tell their dreams tomorrow. And this tomorrow will not be built by few though some would have to sacrifice more than others, but it is the work of all Angolans. The beauty that would happen tomorrow if the spirit of the people remains the way it is, is that this time round it would not begin from the top but from below. The question is, is the country ready to hold such an event? And if it was to come, how will those who would want to guard and protect the status quo act? This is what we have to deal with now.



## 7.6- GENERAL CONCLUSION

Peace is about reconciliation. The only possible way to reconcile after long war is to acknowledge past wrongs and to move towards a common future. Thus, reconciliation takes place in places where human beings acknowledge each other as important for a common cause. At the heart of peacebuilding is the realization that as a society, there are common goals to achieve and these are “characterized by love, mutual respect and proactive engagement” (Lederach, 2005:42). The Angolan peace agreement achieved in 2002 lacks such proactive engagement.

After 27 years of armed conflict, politicians find it hard to work together, UNITA and MPLA still see each other with animosity. The cold relationship at the top level leadership affects grassroots conviviality. Added to the current problems of social exclusion based on party affiliation, is the absence of a clear framework to achieve true peace. This research has showed that after the peace agreement in Luena, the only item relating to reconciliation is related to amnesty to former war crimes. The pain and hurt of civilians seems to have been less of importance and were not considered by those who signed the agreement.

At the times of these accords, the government’s main agenda was only promoting a forgive and forget perspective. As a consequence sensitive issues related to the root causes of the conflict were never addressed. And so, in as much as the country is celebrating 14 years of cease-fire, the peace is still negative, the road to positive peace is rather still too long.

This research has delved into the genesis of the Angolan conflict as well as the peace attempts in Bicesse and Lusaka. It was found that the reason why the peace accords never worked is because the political parties did not trust each other, furthermore, the Troika, who was the mediator had hidden agenda for Angola.

To better understand the feeling of the population, the researcher turned his works to two town municipalities in the country, Kuito-Bié and Viana, with an aim of finding out what peoples’ expectations have been based on the current peace agreement. What can be concluded is that the current peace is disintegrated and negative. The interviewed civilians agree that the country needs to move forward as far as peace is concerned. For sustainable peace Angolans need to work together towards a common goal. This research gives preference to a bottom up approach where more grassroots actors are involved. However, it acknowledges that the top leadership have to create necessary conditions for common understanding and avenues for better political integration of former enemies.

To attain the aim of healthy relationships, the researcher suggests Lederach's integrated framework for peacebuilding. This is because the model presents peace building as a long term process, a process that changes dominating structures to collaborative ones. This is because today's peace building endeavour calls for a complete intervention that touches all levels of a society. For Lederach (1997:24) peacebuilding "focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships and engaging the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central component of peacebuilding". Based on the principles of long term goals for peacebuilding this research acknowledges sustainable peace built through respect and the promotion of human culture.

It was clearly observed that the current situation in Angola is on a status of unresolvedness, thus there is a need for an agenda to unite people so that those still affected by trauma can move forward. According the interviewee from the Catholic Church, peace in Angola has to be thought in the terms of African traditional gatherings, where you have drummers, singers and dancers. The dance is only possible if each intervenient plays their role well. If the drummers do not play well the singers will fail, so will the dancers. This analogy helps to elucidate that for any peace to be successful, a combined effort is necessary for leading to the ultimate destiny. The pyramidal approach can be a good help for a peaceful Angola.

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APPENDIX I

Dear Respondent

My name is Marmiliano Keyse de Oliveira Naufila, a Masters of Arts (MA) student in Political Science at University of Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa. I am conducting research on the impact of the peace initiative in Angola. This study aims at fulfilling the requirements of a Masters Degree Thesis. Given the importance of the study, you are kindly requested to provide critical information to make this study a success. Being an academic work there is no money involved and your cooperation is voluntary. You may withdraw from participation at any time.

Please be assured that your responses will be acknowledged, credited and used strictly for academic purposes only. Information obtained will be treated confidentially.

Thank you for your participation

**Marmiliano Naufila**

Masters Candidate - UKZN

**Biographical Information**

Gender	Age	Education				
		None	Primary	Some Secondary	Secondary Complete	Tertiary

Employment				
Unemployed	Self-Employed	Employed by Government	Employed by Private Organization	Pension / Disability

**Your life since the war**

How long have you lived in Bailundo or Kuito?			Do you have children?	Do you have access to school for your children?	Do you have running water and electricity at home?
Less than 10 years	10-15 years	16 years and above			

Do you feel the positive effects of peace?	No, not at all	A little	Average	A lot	Yes, definitely
Is economic equity a necessary path for sustainable peace?	No, not at all	A little	Average	A lot	Yes, definitely

Please add any comments about your life since the war:

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Please describe your experiences of the war

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### War, peace and reconciliation

Who caused the war?					Did you participate in the confrontations?	If yes, as Military or Civilian?	Has the community come together to talk about the conflict?
UNITA	MPLA	FNLA	Foreign Powers	None of these			

Do you have any comment about the war?

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### Dialogue and its role in community building

Which party do you mainly support?				Do you dialogue with UNITA militants or vice-versa?
UNITA	MPLA	FNLA	None of these	

<b>There is a need for dialogue to bring people together</b>	Disagree Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Agree Strongly
<b>To talk about the past helps to better prevent future conflicts</b>	Disagree Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Agree Strongly
<b>Political difference is a cause of conflict today</b>	Disagree Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Agree Strongly
<b>Lack the of dialogue is hindering the peace process</b>	Disagree Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Agree Strongly
<b>Dialogue can improve the current state of affairs</b>	Disagree Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Agree Strongly
<b>To dialogue is not to agree, but understand each other in different ways</b>	Disagree Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	
<b>Effective dialogue can build community trust</b>	Disagree Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	

Any other comment about dialogue?

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*Thank you for your participation*

**Interview Question Schedule**

Gender	Age	Education				
		None	Primary	Some Secondary	Secondary Complete	Tertiary

1. Have you been involved in any reconciliation effort, if so what?
  
2. What you think caused the failure of Alvor, Bicesse and Lusaka?
  
3. Luena only dealt with military issues. When will the common citizen engage in dialogue?
  
4. Do you think there are still unresolved issues that can negatively affect the current situation of apparent calm?
  
5. Which methods can be used to avoid future armed conflict?
  
6. Are you aware of any system of conflict prevention in the country?
  
7. If there still latent tensions between militants from different parties, how can citizens pass beyond party politics?
  
8. There are people who assert that the liberation movements do not serve for the independent Angola, do you agree?
  
9. Are you personally involved in any peace initiatives?