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Conclusion: Money, Power and Representation

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Party Funding and Corruption

Part of the book series: Political Corruption and Governance ((PCG))

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Abstract

In this final chapter, the complexity of the findings is summarised. First, in both cases I find a prevalence of perceived donor-based corruption. State subsidy is, in fact, unrelated to the type of corruption, perceived or otherwise. If subsidies are to be introduced or sustained, it should be done for other reasons—they are not a cure for corruption or, importantly, perceived corruption. They can, however, be justified on public utility grounds. Anti-corruption measures should focus on other regulations, but even then we should not expect such measures to impact on perceptions of corruption.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Though of course these things are not mutually exclusive.

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Power, S. (2020). Conclusion: Money, Power and Representation. In: Party Funding and Corruption. Political Corruption and Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37580-5_10

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