Abstract
This chapter discusses the operationalizations of the central concepts of the study. In principle, all democratic countries with a separate head of state and head of government are eligible for inclusion in the research population. In terms of mode of selection of the head of state, I distinguish between popularly elected presidents, non-popularly elected presidents, and hereditary monarchs. The powers of the head of state are measured with regard to political practice rather than constitutional provisions and are captured by seven questions from the V-dem dataset. By adding the values, an index of powers ranging from 0 to 7 is obtained. In addition, the countries are grouped into five categories along the power scale. Altogether, the research population consists of 4,110 cases covering the time period 1850–2019.
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Appendix: Measuring the Powers of the Head of State Based on the V-dem Dataset
Appendix: Measuring the Powers of the Head of State Based on the V-dem Dataset
- 1.
Head of State appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs, *_osp, *_ord). ‘In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint –or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of—cabinet ministers?’ Recoding procedure: 0–2 = 0, 3–4 = 1.
- 2.
Head of State dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdmhs, *_osp, *_ord). ‘If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?’ Recoding procedure: 0–1 = 0.0, 2 = 0.5, 3 = 1.0.
- 3.
Head of Government removal by other in practice(C)(v2exrmhgnp). ‘Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?’ Recoding procedure: 5 = 1, others = 0.
- 4.
Head of State proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpphs, *_osp, *_ord). Recoding procedure: 0 = 1.0, 1 = 0.5, 2 = 0.0.
- 5.
Head of State veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvths, *_osp, *_ord). Recoding procedure: 0 = 0.00, 1 = 0.25, 2 = 0.50, 3 = 0.75, 4 = 1.00.
- 6.
Head of State dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdfdshs, *_osp, *_ord). ‘If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?’ Recoding procedure: 0 = 0.00, 1 = 0.33, 2 = 0.67, 3 = 1.00.
- 7.
HOG control over (C) (v2exctlhg). ‘In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?’ Recoding procedure: 5 = 1, others = 0.
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Anckar, C. (2022). The Research Population. In: Presidents, Monarchs, and Prime Ministers. Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03960-7_3
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