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Elite support for constitutional reform in the Netherlands

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Abstract

Explaining endogenous institutional change is not the strongest point of neo-institutionalist theory, and various strands of new institutionalism offer different explanations. This paper contributes to this literature by focusing on the attitudes of (Dutch) legislators to political reform: they are able to bring about endogenous institutional change, and by learning more about their attitudes we can better understand when and why institutional change occurs. Using the Dutch Parliamentary Study of 1990 and, primarily, of 2006, it is shown that ideology has substantial explanatory power, as predicted by sociological institutionalism. However, overall explanatory power increases substantially when variables such as party size, which fit better in a rational-choice institutionalist model, are added. Furthermore, the greater support for reforms in 2006 compared to 1990 could be the result of a critical juncture (the end of the Cold War) as predicted by historical institutionalism. These findings support those scholars who argue that these three instituionalist approaches are complementary rather than competing.

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Notes

  1. The most relevant questions for this analysis are the questions about the desirability of formal reforms of national institutions. The relevant reforms available in 2006 include: (1) A consultative-corrective referendum; (2) A binding- corrective referendum; (3) A binding referendum regarding constitutional change; (4) A citizen legislative initiative; (5) A mixed member proportional electoral system; (6) A district system with reduced proportional representation; (7) A directly elected mayor; (8) A mayor elected by the municipal council; (9) A directly elected prime minister; (10) Removing the veto right of the First Chamber; (11) Abolishing the First Chamber; (12) Fewer seats in the Dutch Second Chamber; (13) Judicial review. The questions available for 1990 are questions regarding the desirability of a decisive referendum, a consultative referendum, a citizen legislative initiative, introducing judicial review and abolishing the First Chamber.

  2. Other dimensions do not meet the criterion of an eigenvalue above 1.

  3. For this purpose, the items loading highly on a certain dimension in the factor analysis were converted by adding up the different answers and then dividing the amount by the number of indicators to produce four scale variables. Although one might argue that the opinions of MPs are not important as they usually tend to follow party lines, the high standard deviations found in this analysis among parliamentarians belonging to the same party indicate that their opinions with regard to constitutional reforms, both in 2006 and 1990, tend to be quite divergent.

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Acknowledgements

I thank Jaques Thomassen and Rudy Andeweg for giving me access to the Dutch Parliamentary Studies (DPS) of 1990 and 2006. The DPS of 1990 was made possible by financial support from the Dutch Scientific Foundation NWO; the DPS of 2006 was financially supported by the Dutch Council for Public Administration (ROB). I also want to thank the anonymous reviewers, Rudy Andeweg, Werner Heijstek and the participants of the workshop ‘The Politics of Constitutional Change’ at the ECPR Joint session in Rennes, 11–16 April 2008 for their valuable comments.

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  1. Department of Political Science, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, RB, Leiden, 2300, The Netherlands

    Kavita Ziemann

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Appendix

Appendix

Operationalization of independent variables

  1. 1

    Left-right self-placement: Parliamentarians were asked to place themselves on a left-right scale from 0–10; zero being extreme left and 10 being extreme right.

  2. 2

    Left-right party: Parliamentarians were asked to place their parties on a left-right scale from 0–10; zero being extreme left and 10 being extreme right.

  3. 3

    Time in parliament: The amount of time a respondent has been a parliamentarian throughout his or her career was calculated in months.

  4. 4

    Democratic satisfaction: Parliamentarians were asked how satisfied they are with democracy. Parliamentarians could choose from four categories very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not satisfied and extremely unsatisfied.

  5. 5

    Confidence gap: Parliamentarians were asked whether a confidence gap exists between voters and representatives yes or no.

  6. 6

    Governmental party: If the party a parliamentarian belongs to has ever been in government before he or she is categorized as belonging to a governmental party.

  7. 7

    Party size: Parliamentarians from parties with 28 seats or more are categorized as belonging to a large party.

  8. 8

    Parliamentarians on the left: Parliamentarians belonging to the Labour party (PvdA), the Socialist party (SP) and the Green party (GL) are categorized as leftist parties.

  9. 9

    Parliamentarians on the right: Parliamentarians belonging to the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), the Christian Union party (CU), the liberal party (VVD), Pim Fortuyn party (LPF) and the reformed political party (SGP) are categorized as rightist parties.

  10. 10

    Parliamentarians 1990: Respondent in the 1990 Dutch Parliamentary Study.

  11. 11

    Parliamentarians 2006: Respondents in the 2006 Dutch Parliamentary Study.

  12. 12

    Party in government: Parliamentarians from parties, which are in government at the time of the interview are categorized as belonging to a party in government.

  13. 13

    Party in opposition: Parliamentarians from parties, which are in opposition at the time of the interview are categorized as belonging to a party in opposition.

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Ziemann, K. Elite support for constitutional reform in the Netherlands. Acta Polit 44, 314–336 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2009.8

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