https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3062-1284
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ABSTRACT
This article develops the menu of autocratic innovation to account for a perceived transformation in the nature of autocratic rule. Drawing from an original list of 20 techniques intended to cultivate the pretence of accountability without permitting the actual practice of it, the article describes how autocratic innovation takes different forms (informational, legal, political, reputational and technological) and concerns different targets (citizens, civil society activists, opposition members and foreign policymakers). This theoretical framework is tested against nine autocratic regimes in Southeast Asia from 1975 to 2015. The evidence shows substantial variation in terms of the form and target of at least six distinct techniques: libel and defamation suits, anti-civil society measures, mock compliance to human rights agreements, public relations firms, think tanks and zombie monitors. The article concludes by discussing three possible explanations for why autocratic innovation occurs: waves of autocratization, density of international linkages and leadership turnover.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers for their constructive and engaging feedback on this article. In addition, he wishes to thank Nicole Curato, Diego Fossati, Seva Gunitsky, Allen Hicken, Masaaki Higashijima, Ellen Lust, Ferran Martinez i Coma and Duncan McDonnell for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Dobson, The Dictator's Learning Curve, 4.
2 Puddington, Breaking Down Democracy.
3 On this claim, see Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 83.
4 Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.”
5 Ginsburg and Simpser, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes; Shen-Bayh, “Strategies of Repression”; Morgenbesser, Behind the Façade; Gandhi, Political Institutions; Miller, “The Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset.”
6 See Tansey et al., “Ties to the Rest,” 1221–54; Slater, Ordering Power; Knutsen et al., “Autocratic Elections,” 98–143; Gerschewski, “Three Pillars of Stability,” 13–38.
7 Pepinsky, “Institutional Turn,” 650–1.
8 Gerring, Social Science Methodology, 109.
9 Glasius, “What Authoritarianism Is,” 518.
10 Sullivan, “China's Weibo,” 8.
11 Carothers and Brechenmacher, “Closing Space”; Dupuy et al., “Hands Off My Regime.”
12 Chen and Weiss, The Political Logics of Anticorruption.
13 Coalson, “Russia: Partying Abroad.”
14 Dukalskis, “Toward a Theory of Authoritarian,” 2.
15 Bogdanich and Forsythe, “How McKinsey Has Helped.”
16 Williams et al., “Foreign Government Contributions.”
17 Gunitsky, “The Great Online Convergence.”
18 Roberts, Censored, 80.
19 Ayres, “Government-Controlled ‘Keyboard’ Armies.”
20 Slater, “Democracy and Dictatorship.”
21 The autocratic country-years are sourced from Boix et al., “A Complete Data Set,” who provide a dichotomous measure of democracy for all sovereign countries. The analysis of Indonesia (1975–1998) and the Philippines (1975–1985) is limited to their autocratic country-years. Finally, Thailand is excluded because of a lack of regime continuity (that is, six alternations between autocracy and democracy over the four decades under analysis).
22 Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order.”
23 Sim, “The Singapore Chill.”
24 Christensen and Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent.”
25 Rodan, “Embracing Electronic Media.”
26 Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, “Human Rights in a Globalizing World,” 1373–411; Gruffydd-Jones, “Citizens and Condemnation,” 579–612; Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties,” 1935–2042.
27 Walter, Governing Finance, 5.
28 Sloan, “More Nations Seek a P-R Polish,” F3.
29 Dhani et al., “Political Public Relations in Indonesia.”
30 Grainger, “PR Firms Finds it Tough,” 2.
31 Edsall, “Think Tank's Ideas Shifted,” A01.
32 Rushford, “How Hanoi's Hidden Hand.”
33 Hyde, Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma.
34 Debre and Morgenbesser, “Out of the Shadows,” 332–3.
35 Morgenbesser, “Fake Monitors.”
36 March, “Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime,” 507.
37 Richter, “Putin and the Public Chamber,” 39.
38 Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 127–9.
39 Cooley, “Countering Democratic Norms,” 123.
40 Wee and Nebehay, “At UN.”
41 Luhrmann and Lindberg, “A Third Wave of Autocratization,” 1102.
42 Tansey et al., “Ties to the Rest.”
43 Goldring and Greitens, “Rethinking Democratic Diffusion.”
44 Koesel and Bunce, “Diffusion-Proofing,” 754–6.
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Lee Morgenbesser
Lee Morgenbesser is a senior lecturer with the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University and a recipient of an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Research Award (2018–2020). His research areas are authoritarian politics, dictators, democratization, election observation and Southeast Asian politics.