

The background of the cover is a complex, abstract composition of vibrant colors and textures. It features large, irregular patches of bright orange, deep blue, and magenta, interspersed with smaller, more intricate patterns of purple and yellow. The overall effect is reminiscent of a marbled paper or a textured surface with a rich, multi-colored palette. The colors are highly saturated and appear to have a slightly grainy or fibrous texture, suggesting a material like paper or fabric that has been treated with various dyes or pigments.


January 2022

ASIAN STUDIES










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
The Article

BUDDHISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE

by *Daniel Capper*

In November 2021 the COP26 climate change summit was held in Glasgow, Scotland. Highlighting the spiritual dimensions of ecological action, many religious groups attended the conference or engaged in peripheral activities. Buddhist participants included members from Japanese, Vietnamese, and even American forms of the religion, who together explored the linkages between Buddhism and climate change.

Collectively these Buddhists argued that their tradition offers great help in combating global warming. Some practitioners, for instance, stated that mindfulness meditation can reduce our consumerist impulses and therefore our carbon footprints. Vegetarian Buddhists sought to eliminate nonhuman animals, and by extension the greenhouse gases they emit, from our dinner plates. Still others insisted that simply by embracing the Buddhist notion of an interconnected universe, one acts in more environmentally appropriate ways.



Ethical Limitations

There are some merits to these Buddhist outlooks regarding climate change, but representatives at COP26 did not always mention these views' shortcomings. For instance, in 2020 Yale University's Center for Environmental Law and Policy ranked 180 countries in terms of positive ecological performance. The average primarily Buddhist nation ranked 102 out of 180, with Burma's finishing next to last at number 179. While diverse factors shape such rankings, these evaluations still make it difficult to accept some of the ecofriendly praises that Buddhism has received.

Collectively, these Buddhists argued that their tradition offers great help in combating global warming.

How do we then make sense of the relationship between Buddhism and climate change? In my book, *Roaming Free like a Deer: Buddhism and the Natural World*, I respond to this question by exploring Buddhist interactions with seven ecologies from ancient India to the contemporary United States. In the end I find that Buddhist green credentials are strongest in terms of the ethical protection of nonhuman animals. Buddhist abstention from meat, for example, although

not universal within the tradition, provides one avenue through which useful action regarding climate change can arise. Moreover, explicit Buddhist calls to extend the same lovingkindness and compassion to nonhuman animals that we do to human ones also may carry valuable ecological effects.

Unfortunately, though, the Buddhist focus on benefiting animals, as laudable as it may be, blinds the tradition to other important ecological realities. Consider, for example, the important roles that plants and nonliving entities play in healthy environments. Plants, which are not considered available for rebirth, receive little Buddhist ethical regard outside of some minor rules for monastics. Further, nonliving manifestations such as stones enjoy virtually zero Buddhist ethical respect, as minerals exist simply in order to serve humanity. But battling climate change means turning to techniques such as carbon sequestration, in which carbon in the atmosphere is returned to the ground in the form of stone, perhaps via the medium of plants. A religion like Buddhism that recognizes only limited ethical significance in plants or stones cannot morally guide such carbon sequestration strategies, which by their nature involve valuation of flora and rocks.

Plants, which are not considered available for rebirth, receive little Buddhist ethical regard outside of some minor rules for monastics.

Turning to the Future

The moral systems of many other religions struggle with the contours of climate change, too, since teachers of old like the Buddha never heard of global warming. Thus, Buddhism may be forgiven some of its current environmentalist shortcomings. Nonetheless, being uncritical of religious traditions provides no pragmatic advantage in the face of today's ecological woes. It therefore benefits us all to recognize that Buddhism as a tradition exudes ethical strength in its treatment of animals but remains a less steady platform for working with plants or lifeless things. When world leaders meet next for the climate conference COP27, perhaps they can learn from these qualities of Buddhism as they chart a course to a greener world for us all.

THE
EXCERPT



NEIL J.
DIAMANT

USEFUL BULLSHIT

Constitutions in Chinese Politics and Society



NEIL J.
DIAMANT

Introduction

Constitutions, Legitimacy, and Interpreting Popular Commentary

[For the liar] it is correspondingly indispensable that he considers his statements to be false. For the bullshitter, however, all these bets are off. His eye is not on the facts at all . . . except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with what he says.

—Harry G. Frankfurt, *On Bullshit*

[The government] is always coming out with some verb or noun but never explains what that word means. You're not to be counterrevolutionary, it says, for instance, without defining counterrevolutionary. You can't be a hooligan, it says, but it won't tell you what a hooligan is . . . if we say you're guilty, you're guilty.

—Han Han, *This Generation: Dispatches from China's Most Popular Literary Star (and Race Car Driver)*

“There’s no point researching that useless document” was how a colleague in China, a comrade in the social sciences, shot back when I told him I had turned my attention to studying the 1954 Constitution. Even though that 1954 document formed the basis of all subsequent constitutions (1975, 1978, and 1982) and on this basis alone would seem to be somewhat important, his frustrated voice is far from a lonely one: Chinese citizens, including officials, have long critiqued politicians’ long-standing preference to govern by way of administrative policy, utterance, phone call, speech, and proclamation rather than “rule of law” or “rule by law” standards, as well as for their willingness and ability to flagrantly violate rights that appear to be very clear on paper.¹ Correspondingly, scholars have been reluctant to invest scarce resources to studying a document that, although tenacious in terms of its long-term survivability across political turmoil since 1949, does not seem

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to matter much at all, at least in the sense of shaping political, legal, and social behavior they deem to be meaningful.²

This book challenges this perspective. Profiling the voices of ordinary Chinese participants whose constitutional comments, queries, musings, and deliberations have been preserved in archives, I will make the case that the study of Chinese constitutions—as written and audible texts, as a form of interaction between officials and citizens, and as a political process—provides powerful insights about how people understood law and assessed the legitimacy, meaning, and consequences of the Communist Revolution, as well as the variety of emotions stirred up by law and revolution.³ Substantial evidence demonstrates that many state officials did not understand constitutions, did not accept their underlying rationale, or even cursed them—but still found these documents useful as words that could easily induce feelings of terror, jealousy, uncertainty, and confusion among citizens and other officials; intensify social divisions; and help push through unpopular policies. Constitutions were also useful as brute displays of political power: despite knowing that people at home and abroad knew that these documents had a problematic relationship with truth, the government promulgated and discussed them anyway.⁴ Evidence also shows that ordinary citizens who did not believe a wide variety of constitutional claims nevertheless found constitutions useful as a mechanism to defend rights and as a convenient platform for criticizing the government for a variety of transgressions, commenting on current and past policies and their experiences of them, or requesting better enforcement or abrogation.

This book will also make the case that Chinese constitutions must be understood beyond their textual forms. Constitutional texts sometimes became country-wide constitutional conversations that were initiated by the state but not entirely controlled by it. Largely ignored in the legal and political science literature, these constitutional discussions allow us to explore—for the first time—various dimensions of popular constitutionalism in China, or what ordinary people thought and felt about this document.⁵ Talking about constitutions was the product of the state's efforts to enhance citizens' legal knowledge but (probably unintentionally) opened a surprisingly safe political space for people from all walks of life—including officials—to talk about law and politics and raise fundamental questions concerning the nature of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, its governance practices, interpretation of history and understanding of class, and their role as citizens. Within this space, people also defended their status in ideology, promoted Han ethnic superiority, sought out enhanced material and symbolic benefits, caught officials in flagrante delicto about policy and legal knowledge, and mocked, ridiculed, critiqued, and rebutted them, all well-established features of Chinese

CONSTITUTIONS, LEGITIMACY, AND COMMENTARY

political culture that predated the CCP and continue to survive its humorless politics.⁶

The perspective on Chinese constitutions offered in this book, I suggest, requires a major adjustment of the more commonly used lenses through which they have been understood in scholarship and among nonspecialists. The first, which can be best described as *disappointment*, is largely the result of constitutions consistently failing, for a variety of reasons, to match their words with real-life functions (e.g., a “legislature” that does not do much legislating) and to live up to their idealized definition of “constraint” on the coercive power of the executive in a democracy, a feature achieved through inclusive and effective popular participation in the constitutional drafting process and clear separation of powers in the final product.⁷ The second, but still related to the first, is *insignificance*, a perspective shaped by the idea that constitutions are important if and when they shape politics, culture, and society. Considered disappointing and insignificant, it is unsurprising that Chinese constitutions have been dismissed as documents unworthy of the paper they are written on.

Among these two perspectives, the disappointment position is easier to critique. While many contemporary observers are disheartened by the failure of Chinese constitutionalism—the oft-noted arbitrary and ruthless behavior of officials—we cannot assume that those who experienced the rollout of the constitution in 1954, or in 1982, felt the same way. This fallacy, which the intellectual historian Quentin Skinner awkwardly called the “mythology of prolepsis,” occurs when “the historian is more interested—as he may legitimately be—in the retrospective significance of a given historical work or action than in its meaning for the agent himself.”⁸

The view that constitutions are insignificant is a tougher rival largely because it runs counter to the popular notion that the most important questions in the social sciences are of a causal nature, whose answers can be measured and replicated. Echoing political scientist John Gerring’s critique, I would argue that this approach is mistaken both in principle (describing something well is as important as establishing cause and effect) and in practice; in authoritarian or revolutionary regimes, we frequently lack the data to make strong causal arguments.⁹ While state intentions might be possible to figure out, the impact of any law, ideology, or policy is harder to assess, particularly when trying to account for mentalities or emotional states of large social units. Many scholars try to work around this data problem simply by asserting unsubstantiated claims about citizens’ “subjectivity” and the existence and power of hegemonic “discourses,” but this is a road I would rather avoid.

Rather than make deductions based on limited information, this book adopts an inductive approach that is rarely applied to studies of constitutions,

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even in “law and society” scholarship that privileges the voices of ordinary people. Discipline-wise, this book is situated at the intersection of legal and social history, a fairly well-trod space in studies of the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368–1644; 1644–1911, respectively) and the Republican era (1911–1949) but still off the beaten track in studies of the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and nearly nonexistent in studies of constitutions in the legal academy and political science.¹⁰ Focusing primarily on China’s first constitution of 1954, I look closely at the constitutional text—the words, grammar, concepts, phrases, and the many things that were omitted but remained cognitively present through memory, association, connotation, and metaphor—and describe how these were understood and emotionally absorbed by a wide variety of people, including Buddhists, businessmen, Christians, ethnic minorities and Han, men, officials, policemen, university faculty, villagers, women, and workers. For example, how did officials think about law as a source and tactic of public order? How did ordinary people “sense the state” in conditions of widespread misinformation, confusion, and general unfamiliarity with key concepts in constitutional law and Marxist-Leninist ideology? More generally, how did people understand and interpret the Communist Revolution in Year Five, ignorant about how things would turn out politically or constitutionally even several years later? Beyond 1954, was China’s first large-scale constitutional moment relevant to politics and law in the subsequent decades? The answers to these questions will speak to the historiography and governmentality of the Mao era while also providing a colorful view of Chinese society during the formative stages of a new political and legal order.

This book contributes to legal and social scientific study of constitutions in another important way: the quantity and quality of data it provides.¹¹ Between April and September 1954, the Chinese Communist Party, apparently following the model of the 1936 Soviet constitutional process, promoted an “all-people national discussion” (*quanmin taolun*) of its draft constitution, encouraging hundreds of millions of people to suggest amendments to its articles, propose corrections to wording and grammar, and ask questions to clarify its meaning. These discussions, often led by poorly trained propaganda officials (*baogaoyuan*) and lasting anywhere from several hours to days, ranged widely, covering the preamble (six pages dealing with revolutionary history, ideology, and policy); “General Principles” (chapter 1, consisting of twenty articles addressing the identity of state, power, class relations, economy, ethnic minorities, and the military); state structure (chapter 2, the largest, at sixty-three articles); citizens’ rights and obligations (chapter 3, eighteen articles); and state symbols such as the flag, the national emblem, and the location of the capital (chapter 4, three articles).¹² This constitutional verbiage produced a

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massive paper trail that has been preserved in archives, compiled in the classified political newsletter *Neibu cankao* (Internal Reference), a regularly read source in the highest echelons of the Communist Party, or gathered in the multivolume *Collected Suggestions about the Draft Constitution from the All-People Discussion* (*Quanguo renmin taolun xiancao yijian huibian*) in the National Library in Beijing.¹³ Despite the abundance and accessibility of these materials, law school-based legal scholars either have not utilized *Neibu cankao* or the *Collected Suggestions* in any analysis of the PRC constitutional process or perhaps worse have praised it based on biased official statements.¹⁴ Those few who have used nonpublic sources, such as Han Dayuan, have also argued that it was a very well-received document everywhere it was discussed that (causally) contributed to political legitimacy.¹⁵

Fortunately, this extensive documentation about the constitutional process provides us leverage to address the issue of legitimacy, as well as two others that have long preoccupied China scholars: the origins and functions of constitutions, and how people experienced the Communist Revolution (which overlaps to a certain extent with legitimacy). As we will see throughout this book, when people read the constitution or heard others read it to them, they often asked questions, and offered what they claimed to be helpful suggestions. But many of these were in fact critiques of the state, law, the revolution, policies, the economy, and ideology, frequently expressed from the standpoint of their own personal and family experiences. For many, insinuating by questioning mitigated the risk in confronting authority—the more vagueness and ambiguity, the more deniability. But if we assume that the authorities were not easily bamboozled and that they were aware of widespread skepticism as people talked about their experiences, why did they promulgate constitutions and even celebrate them (under Xi Jinping, Constitution Day is every December 4)? Exactly how did this serve state interests (often called “instrumentalism”)? On the flip side, why would ordinary people invoke the constitution knowing that the authorities do not take it seriously?

Constitutions and Legitimacy

Why have PRC leaders bothered to write constitutions in the first place? This was by no means preordained. Most Chinese dynasties, after all, functioned for centuries without them, and many countries manage to conduct political life in their absence.










To date, scholars interested in this issue have focused on the concepts *modernity* and *legitimacy*. Since the late Qing, the argument goes, political reformers

INTRODUCTION

associated some form of constitutional government (monarchal, democratic, or authoritarian) and political rights as necessary to make China a modern state that enjoys domestic and international legitimacy, as well as to strengthen China against foreign powers; Japan's post-Meiji resurgence was a case in point.¹⁶ By 1911, when the Qing dynasty fell, most influential politicians accepted the idea of constitutional rule. In accordance, the Republic of China (1911–1949) emerged with three constitutional documents (a “provisional constitution” in 1912; the 1913 Draft Constitution [also known as the “Tiantan Constitution”]; and the 1947 Republican Constitution), as well with a tight-knit circle of legal professionals well versed in constitutional theory and practice. Not a few articles in the Republican constitution, including important parts of its administrative structure and many political rights and obligations, carried over to the PRC's, whose leaders were immersed in late Qing and early republican discourse causally linking constitutions with political legitimacy. Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser call this alleged connection scholars' “standard answer” about why authoritarian regimes (as a more general category of analysis) have adopted constitutions that they then proceed to ignore.¹⁷

Mao Zedong's early views on constitutions are not entirely in focus. As a youth Mao avidly read Liang Qichao, the famous constitutional monarchist and political reformer.¹⁸ In the 1940s, when the CCP was a severely weakened party and at war along several fronts, he appeared receptive to at least the concept of constitutional government but mainly on tactical grounds. As part of the wartime “United Front” strategy (building a coalition between the revolutionary classes and progressive intellectuals, so-called patriotic businessmen, and relatively well-off segments of rural society), he reasoned that a constitution could help attract “all possible democratic elements to us” and help achieve “our goals of defeating the Japanese bandits and building a democratic country.”¹⁹ In November 1948, as the CCP neared victory in the Civil War, a small group of its leaders drafted a document intended to have this coalitional appeal and calm fears of Communist rule, much along the lines of Mao's logic from 1944.²⁰ After some discussion with nonparty intellectual elites in a CCP-led Constitutional Draft Committee, an interim constitution, called the Common Program (*gongtong gangling*), was promulgated in the name of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, an important body in the CCP's United Front.

Several articles in the Common Program would seem to support the view that the constitutional enterprise was, at least in part, motivated by the desire to bolster legitimacy. For example, it incorporated, rather than excluded, based on class status. Its preamble stated that “New Democracy” would be the “political foundation” of the state; Article 1 recognized the leading role of workers in alli-



The Article

PERFORMING POWER: FACE MASKS, EVERYDAY RESISTANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

by Arnout Van Der Meer

If there is one object that encapsulates the anxieties of the year 2020, it is the face mask. Virtually absent from our lives prior to March 2020, its subsequent rise to ubiquity makes it hard to imagine public life without it today. Instead of being widely embraced as an effective health measure in the fight against a global pandemic, the face mask turned into a controversial object, exposing deep social anxieties and divisions.

A recent New York Times editorial observed that future “historians will puzzle over the idea that mask-wearing in service of protecting all citizens was considered by many to be a mark of oppression.” To historians and social scientists, however, this is less puzzling when we consider the issue of mask-wearing as a form of everyday resistance and a means to contest or strengthen hegemonic status, power, and privilege.

People who choose not to wear a mask do so for a variety of reasons, such as political orientation, science denialism, their concerns over masculinity, and to protect individual liberty against government mandates. In contrast, mask wearers might seek to signal support for expert opinion and that individual liberty does not mean freedom to infect others, especially when the disease disproportionately affects racial and ethnic minority groups. Clearly, although unfortunately, the debate about face masks is not just a public health issue, but about cultural beliefs, social values, identity, status, and power.

If there is one object that encapsulates the anxieties of the year 2020, it is the face mask.

It is precisely the everydayness of mask wearing that makes it so fascinating. Our non-stop news cycle as well as academic studies privilege more direct and obvious forms of political and social resistance as protests, revolts, wars, and of course elections. But face masks direct our attention to the lived experience of people and their interactions in daily life. The personal decision to wear, or not to wear, a mask is a form of social communication. While the exact implications of the current contentiousness of mask wearing are indeed something for future historians to puzzle over, the study of the past suggests how it might signal broad social change.

Performing Power
Cultural Hegemony, Identity, and Resistance in Colonial Indonesia



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Clearly, although unfortunately, the debate about face masks is not just a public health issue, but about cultural beliefs, social values, identity, status, and power.

For instance, in my new book *Performing Power: Cultural Hegemony, Identity, and Resistance in Colonial Indonesia*, I explore how the Dutch colonizer communicated colonial hegemony through language, manners, clothing, material status symbols, and even physical gestures and posture. Through this scripted performance of power, authorities sought to affirm, uphold, and strengthen colonial hierarchies of race, class, and gender. However, the colonized were not mere extras in this colonial play. Through acts of everyday resistance, such as speaking a different language, withholding deference, and changing one's appearance and consumer behavior, a new generation of Indonesians successfully contested the hegemonic colonial performance, and the racial and gender inequalities that it sustained.

Through everyday acts of resistance, such as speaking a different language, withholding deference, and changing one's appearance and consumer behavior, a new generation of Indonesians successfully contested the hegemonic colonial performance, and the racial and gender inequalities that it sustained.

Crucially, my book suggests that instead of focusing on political events as hinges of historical change, everyday discursive acts—exchanging a sarong for trousers, speaking Dutch or Malay rather than Javanese, demanding a chair instead of sitting on the ground—reveal a more pervasive moment of social transformation in the year 1913. In the case of Indonesia, this means that the so-called national awakening, the development of a national consciousness during the final decades of colonialism, was not just a movement that a small political elite incited from the top-down but also one that grew out of a large social transformation from below. Thus, it was through everyday encounters that new national, racial, social, religious and gender identities were actively constructed.

The performance of power, however, is not just a colonial phenomenon. A person's conscious decision about mask wearing, compliance with social distancing, and efforts to be politically (in) correct are all part of the performance of power in our time. As my work on colonial Indonesia suggests, these everyday forms of resistance challenge us to look beyond our current political moment defined by presidential populism and look for deeper and broader social changes, anxieties, and rifts from which they sprang. Only then will future historians be able to fully solve the puzzling refusal to wear a mask during a global pandemic.

THREE QUESTIONS WITH CHIEN-WEN KUNG

author of *Diasporic Cold Warriors*

1. What's your favorite anecdote from your research for this book?

I started graduate school hoping to write about transnational right-wing networks in Cold War East Asia and the world. But in the early years of the PhD, I became more interested in modern China and the Chinese diaspora thanks to Eugenia Lean and the late Adam McKeown, my professors at Columbia. After finding numerous references in Kuomintang (KMT) propaganda from the 1950s-60s extolling the Philippine Chinese, I decided to zoom in on ties between the latter and the

Shangri-La Hotel in the business district in Manila. However, as good as the buffet was, we didn't talk about my research at all. Only in the car ride back to my hotel did I learn, from the wife of the patriarch who did all the talking over lunch, that the deported family member was released early from detention in Taiwan, migrated to Australia, traveled to China during the Cultural Revolution, disappeared for several years, and now lives in the United States. I was asked not to inquire further about her. Still, it was nice to have a kind of closure on one of the stories about ordinary persons that I tell.

“Even though I worked really hard on the book, I could have put myself through even further intellectual agony.”

KMT as a way of connecting my eclectic research interests and exploring a topic I could find almost no scholarship on. I was also lucky to have Southeast Asianists like Mike Montesano at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and Carol Hau at Kyoto University who encouraged me every step of the way and helped me refine my half-baked ideas.

2. What do you wish you had known when you started writing your book, that you know now?


In 2016, a mutual friend arranged for me to meet the (wealthy and well-connected) relatives of a young woman who was deported from the Philippines to Taiwan in 1957 for being a “communist.” We had lunch at the

3. How do you wish you could change your field of study?

I wish I'd known a lot of things then that I know now. In hindsight, even though there was a ton of materials on the Philippines and Nationalist China for me to work through in the multiple archives and libraries that I visited, I could have searched more extensively for primary sources on the KMT in other parts of Southeast Asia and the world, both before and after 1945. They'd have enabled me to write a longer, more spatially dispersed, and more explicitly comparative book. In other words, even though I worked really hard on the book, I could have put myself through even further intellectual agony.

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AN INTERVIEW WITH **LINH D. VU**,
AUTHOR OF *GOVERNING THE DEAD*,
HOSTED BY JONATHAN HALL

1869

The Cornell University Press Podcast

THE TRANSCRIPT

JONATHAN Welcome to 1869 the Cornell University Press podcast. I'm Jonathan Hall. This episode we speak with Linh Vu, author of *Governing the Dead: Martyrs, Memorials, and Necrocitizenship in Modern China*. Lin is assistant professor at Arizona State University's School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies. We spoke to Linh about how growing up in post-war Vietnam inspired her to learn more about how nations, in this case China, handled the millions of war debt from conflicts in the 20th century, the evolving concept of necrocitizenship, and the most famous of the Nationalist regime's "martyrs for the nation". Hello, Lynn, welcome to the podcast.

LINH Hello. Thank you, Jonathan.

JONATHAN My pleasure, our pleasure. And congratulations on your new book *Governing the Dead: Martyrs, Memorials, and Necrocitizenship in Modern China*. Tell us how you got interested in this topic and the backstory of this book.

LINH So I have always interested in wars and conflicts. Part of it is because I was born in Vietnam. Even though I was born a decade after the Vietnam War ended, the war was pretty much there. My parents and grandparents don't really talk about it so much, but it's there. And it's sort of haunting me for ever. So when I began to study Chinese history in college, I became curious about how wars affected people in China. And I did my PhD coursework and went into field work hoping to find out more about you know, what happened to people during the war, multiple wars during the 20th century. So to narrow down my focus, as you know, doing archival research, I thought that I would be able to find documents about how the government and the people handled the corpses, the millions of the warded? How can they deal with this logistical issue, which is a huge one, if you think about it, the war a lot of dead bodies everywhere, as I imagine, but I couldn't find any. I found some stuff about dead bodies and burials of Chinese soldiers in Burma and India during the Burma campaign of the 1940s. But that's about it. So I pivoted a bit to work on, you know, the idea that how the state and the people dealt with loss and suffering, and other, you know, sort of how did they come back together after the war. So that became the topic of my book.

JONATHAN Interesting. Now, I read in the acknowledgments that part of your interest was spurred by visiting catacombs in Rome. Is that correct?

LINH Yes. So even though I studied Chinese history, in college, when I had the opportunity to study abroad, I chose Rome. And my professor then, his name is - I'm blanking now- I only remember his last name Paxton. He's a medieval historian. And he told us to the catacomb, and I was struck about the idea to, you know, how the dead started live among us among the living, and how they are not forgotten how they are, you know, still there. So yes, I became very deeply interested in in the dead, and actually

wrote articles about car accidents and suicides and sort of, you know, this, like the theme for my intellectual endeavor somehow, hopefully, I will pivot to something more uplifting in the future. But I think there's so much to be done about dead and the dead. And, you know, the role that they play in our lives as the living?

JONATHAN

Yeah, I don't think it's a depressing topic. I mean, I think it's part of life. And there, you know, it's something that people, at least in the West try to avoid thinking about. And I think we need to think more about the impact of the dead on living. Now, your focus specifically is on China and modern China. And there's been a lot of death in over the past 100 150 years, typically, the first half of the 20th century, the whole world was on fire, really. But for the Chinese 20 to 30 million Chinese military and civilian died lost their lives in the first half of 20th century. How did the nationalist regime in China assume the responsibility for caring for the dead and also in doing so create a powerful nation state?

LINH

Yes, so that's one of my main arguments for the book is that the nationalists, you know, the regime they were quite competent in creating the foundation for a strong nation state even though they lost the Chinese Civil War and you know, Now they kind of shrink to fit into the island of Taiwan, actually, they also lost a lot of power in Taiwan as well. But in a way, we sort of have to give them some credit, as early as you know, the 1910s and 1920s, members of the revolutionary Alliance. So this is the, you know, sort of the former identity of the Nationalist Party, and also the Nationalist Party to during the, you know, early 1920s, they started to promote the idea that sacrificing one's life for the nation, and the pollute, and the political party was a good death. It's something that is actually desire. And then when the nationalist regime was formed, in the mid 1920s, they started to create institutions to commemorate this martyrs who died for the Chinese Republic. And then they also compensated the families of those martyrs. And the Nationalist government also did a bunch of, you know, first, they first build a military cemetery for fallen soldiers in Nanjing, they also mandated county governments to be a shrine for martyrs, then they also made the county governments to organize commemorative events. So as you can imagine, all these policies reinforced a very strong notion of national martyrdom and national belonging, you attended those ceremonies, you feel like you are connected to the people that sacrificed their lives, and you feel connected to the community. You know, in a way, those propaganda those policies worked in creating, you know, the the national community. And also, you know, not just those intangible notion of the nation, but the institutions that they built. The institutions also provided tangible benefits. So families of those who are honored as martyrs, they could receive stipends, and then the children could attend school for free. So you know, there's a lot of incentives for people to, you know, joy, the nationalist cause, and, you know, became more willing to die for the nation have become willing to think of the death of someone, as you know, for the nation, even though

in many cases, this could be considered victims, they probably did not have this very nationalistic, very patriotic notions when they die. But they, the families of those people were inclined to think that these debts are, in fact for the nation.

JONATHAN Interesting. Tell us that, you know, in the in the subtitle, you have necro-citizenship. Can you explain a little bit more of this concept?

LINH Yes. So I think, and to be honest, you know, this is one of the concepts that I'm still working through. And I think other authors, you know, also work on it as well. But for me, in my research, I think there are two meanings to Nicko citizenship. One is the idea that people that died way before the nation was founded. Think, think about there were people that died revolutionaries that died in the late Ching Dynasty and only republican period. So you know, late 19th century and early 1910s, this will die before the national nationalist regime was established. But then when the you know, the, the regime was built, the nationalist of tech all these people that died during this period, you know, prior to the establishment and say, these are the ancestors of our nation. So Nicholson ships in a way means that those that there was sort of scoop up from different periods of history, and now they become incorporated into the nation. They are the negotiations of the nation. And the second meaning of NATO citizenship is a little bit darker and more sinister, I guess, his idea that you can only gain citizenship, you can only become part of a nation upon your death. So a lot of these people, and you know, a lot of soldiers and many more of the civilians, they they were not known to the state, the state did not know they exist. But once they die during the war, especially the war, the war of resistance, would were to you know, the word that the Chinese fought against and the Japanese army. Once they die, they became incorporated into the nation stage, they are celebrated as martyrs as heroes as part of the nation. So in in a way, they only gained citizenship upon their death. So it's a little bit of a morbid idea that You know, you are only part of the nation, you only gain citizenship by dying.

JONATHAN That's a tough and mentally tough way to become a citizen.

LINH But you know, in the case of America to, you know, some soldiers, you know, green card holders, they could come seasons after they die during the war and then ship posthumously. So there's a little bit, something that is sinister by then, about the nation. state. Yeah.

JONATHAN And you mentioned, you mentioned parallels with the American Civil War and European states, European countries after world war one that a lot of them erected monuments to the dead war memorials. And so there was this Western mode of war commemoration. And you're looking at the eastern the Chinese approach. And I was fascinated by these loyal martyr shrines tell us how they were different than the traditional Western approach to war commemoration.

One of the main difference is that the national government and you know, the central government did not build a lot of those, but they sort of just mandate county governments to do so. And as you think about a, you know, the bureaucracy, the county governments will just pick some sort of an empty space in an existing temple. And they say, this would be the space for the martyrs now, and that would save us a lot of, you know, money, a lot of costs associated with building a whole new strike a whole new Memorial. So that's what happened during, you know, the nationalists who, in mainland China. So a lot of those temples that became the loyal martyrs, shrines will already temples. So in the same space, as I explained the book as well, sometimes, you know, heroes from the Han Dynasty, for example, or the sub dynasty, they would be honored in the same space as republican martyrs. So there's a lot of sort of, you know, mixing and mixed match, as you can imagine, which is really counter to what the nationalist agenda would be right? They would want to commemorate only the people that die for the nation, and the political party, but then in a way, those tribes have to conform to the local conditions, and they sort of become a place for, you know, all the martyrs or the heroes or the local prominence that died. So and then, because of, you know, the idea that they only appropriated temples that already existed. So when the communists took over all the strides disappear overnight, well, I would not say overnight, but they would sort of revert reverted back to being the stripes Union, the Han Dynasty heroes, and the Song Dynasty heroes and the trace of the republican heroes disappeared. So we couldn't see a lot of those today, there are, there are a few of them that are still standing, but you no, no longer see those. So that's another difference to that, you know, if you visit Europe or you know, America, the memorials are probably still there, they are constructed more sort of prominently, and they did not suffer the same fate as the Chinese lower martyrs shrine.

JONATHAN That's fascinating. Tell us more about the actual ceremonies with which they called comforting the loyal spirit.

LINH Yes, so I think it's very fascinating. And I think I have long sections in the book describing the cemetery, the beginning, they would follow this sort of ancestral worship, ancestor worship, the ceremonies for those so they offer incense or for all these meats that are prepared ritually, or this fruits and all these offerings food, most of the time, because, you know, the Chinese courts are hungry. The you have to feed the goats in China and a lot of other Asian societies. So all these foods would be put in ritual, and you know, bowls and plates and everything like that. And then later on a course, you have a lot more martyrs, you have more ceremonies to conduct and also you face the difficulty of war times and you simplified it and basically, the board got good gather. And they would, you know, bow three times, to the martyrs portraits and some allergies, some poems. Some lectures will be read to those martyrs so became a more stan-

andardized and I guess politicized, but in a way, it's still you know, those ceremonies still played a very important role in creating an immunity. You know, even though it's centered around the dead, but it's unified the living to a large extent.

JONATHAN And just out of curiosity, I know this is beyond the scope of your book. But then, you know, the Communist Revolution occurs. And a lot of these traditions that are more spiritual in nature didn't jive with the "new scientific man" that they were proposing. So how did some of these traditions, did they just stop some of these traditions?

LINH So I haven't done a lot of research about the Communist era yet. But I, what I found is that it's very gradual. It's not like they took over and they forced people to abandon all this, actually, the communists also have the, you know, very similar rituals. Up until the 1950s, before they carry out, you know, the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, a lot of the ceremonies that were invented by the nationalists to worship, you know, their martyrs were adopted by the communists as well. There are some ceremonies and there are the, what, what is called the public sacrifice, which is, you know, a memorial, but it's called sacrifice because you make sacrificial offerings to the dead. A lot of these activities were carrying out for prominent Chinese politicians as well. Even in Beijing, there's a cemetery for the cadre, it's called the eight treasures mountain, cemetery. cemetery. And from what I read, from the newspapers, in the 50s, a lot of the ceremonies resembled what the nationalists did during the 1930s, and 1940s. But of course, the biggest change would happen during the Cultural Revolution. And a lot of those rituals would be abolished and condemned. But, you know, a lot of times things sort of cycled back, I guess, and the idea of organizing a public sacrifice and make offerings to the dead. I mean, you know, they still doing it, to this day. Maybe not, at the top Politburo level, but the people still King at the same ceremony. That makes sense. It's not state sanctioned, necessarily, but there's the local municipalities are doing it. So yes, yeah. Interesting. Interesting.

LINH Yes. So you know, like a Chinese politicians, maybe the state organize a state funeral. There is more, you know, I guess a scientifically guided, that's not the right word. But you know what I mean, but the families are carrying out all this, you know, tomb sweeping festival, hoes, and all these burning incense and winning people good to know this thing. So there's sort of a separate the public spirit and the private sphere where people could exhibit more of the traditional ways of, you know, mourning the dead.

JONATHAN That makes sense that makes sense. During this time, Who were some of the most famous of the martyrs for the nation?

LINH Yes, sir. The most famous one would be Lin Juemin. And I only briefly mentioned him in the book, because he's, I think he's too popular. And

he's, he died in 1911, in a very small uprising in Guangzhou South China. But he was not that famous for what he did. In the revolution in the uprising, what he was famous for, is actually because he wrote a very long loving letter to his wife. And I think one of my friends in Taiwan told me that the letter that Lin Juemin wrote to his wife was taught in Taiwan, in schools, you know, to school children's for a long time, I couldn't verify that, but I could imagine that that is the case. And then, he also wrote a very short one farewell letter to his father, he said, You know, I'm so sorry, I was so unfilial. But the letter to his wife made him very famous, because, as you can imagine, of course, you can always talk about those models, you know, bang for the nation dial for the stage, they die. So he wrote, like, you know, in front of the enemy and all these things, but then eventually, in order to, you know, create something that resonates with people, you want the backstory, you want those models to be three dimensional. So a lot of times the stories and I mentioned earlier in this interview, that, you know, the Nationalists already create this idea of dying from the nation is the good death. But they are but you know, keep in mind, the Nationalist regime and the Nationalist Party members and you know, the the leadership's they also create all the stories or they promote those stories as well. The idea that, you know, someone dies for the nation, but before he did that, he was a failure, son. He had this you know, marital bliss with his wife and even though, you know, dying for the nation means he could no longer take care of his parents and his family. But of course, you would lose an heir, you know, a male stand behind, to continue his lineage. So, so this is really the theme for, you know, the martyrs of the nation actually. And you can kind of think about how, you know, those three dimensional, you know, characters would be more would be a better candidate to motivate people, right? So you read about those people, and you can really think that, oh, they had a really good life. And even, you know, post two, mostly, they were cared for by the edge, and they were not affiliated at all. So that's another thing with, you know, the whole idea of constructing the notion of martyrdom is that you need to reconcile or not you, but the nationalist regime, it has to reconcile the Confucian idea of someone who you know, live a long life, taking care of his parents, taking care of his families and raising his children with someone that would die or would be willing to die for the nation. So those stories of the martyrs have to cater to that sensibility, right. So they have to make sure that the martyr was not only you know, wanting to die, but he was also very handsome, he had a great life. And his lineage is maintained, and actually had a really long, I have a very long story about Chen Gengxin in, in the book, I included his whole biography, because I really want people to see what was put out there for the people and how those stories motivated the living. So you know, Chen Gengxin, who was very handsome, who could ride horses, and shoot guns, but then he can also, you know, recite poetry. And then when you know, he engaged in the suicide missions, he had this long talk about, you know, how, how that would be okay. In the Confucian society in the Confucius, you know, how he did not violate the Confucian principle. And so the story is a very


wholesome. So you know, before, I guess, before Netflix, or before all the movies about heroes, those stories, those stories of martyrs that are promoted by the state, but in a way, they became very popular, they almost became like a popular fiction for people, you can see that, you know, the stories, motivate people, because it caters to a lot of the human needs, the idea that they want to live a fulfilled life, and death, which is, you know, part of the ideal life that was left.

LINH So I think that's very important. And I just want to add one thing, that you know, why it's so important to for the martyrs to, you know, to live a well lived life and then have an heir to take care of him. It's because in the, in the Chinese society, there's no, you know, are the watery rewards for the dead. This is something that is different from, let's say, you know, American and European societies, some of those is that there's no God to embrace those martyrs into, you know, his arms. So, it is very important for the stories of the martyrs that once they die, their wife stays chaste. Their parents are taken care of either by the family or the state, and their son went to school and carrying out, you know, the efficiency of the debt, you know, Father martyr, so that is very important. Yeah.

JONATHAN Interesting, interesting. Well, thank you so much for sharing these stories and making this history come alive. It's a fascinating look, as you said, how the dead were used as a way of creating a whole new system of government, the bureaucracy that you said, constructed military cemeteries, there were hundreds of local murder shrines, they collected biographical data on the dead, and they collectively mourned millions of fallen soldiers and civilians, as well as distributed millions of Yuan to 10s of 1000s of widows and orphans. It was a huge undertaking, and as you also eloquently said, they're also presented the murders as heroes and presented them as a way of bringing cohesion to the state. So all of this is detailed in much more elaborate ways, with in depth research in your new book, governing the dead martyrs memorials and niekro citizenship in modern China. Thank you so much, Lynn for joining us. I really enjoyed this conversation.

LINH Thank you for taking time with me.

JONATHAN That was Lynn Vu, author of *Governing the Dead: Martyrs, Memorials, and Necrocitizenship in Modern China*.




THE ENDS OF METER IN
MODERN JAPANESE POETRY

TRANSLATION AND FORM
SCOTT MEHL



YAJUN MO



TOURING
CHINA



Babaylan
Sing Back

Philippine Shamans and
Voice, Gender, and Place

Grace Napa



**CULTURAL
IMPRINTS**

WAR AND MEMORY IN THE SAMURAI AGE
EDITED BY
ELIZABETH DYLER AND KATHERINE SALTZMAN-LI



**A REGION
OF
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PROSPERITY & PLUNDER
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SYMPATHIES**

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The
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MINA ROCES

**PURSuing RESPECT IN
THE CANNIBAL ISLES**

AMERICANS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FIJI

NANCY SHOEMAKER



**ORDERING
VIOLENCE**

EXPLAINING ARMED GROUP-STATE RELATIONS
FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION

PAUL STANILAND

THREE QUESTIONS WITH MATTHEW GALWAY

author of *The Emergence of Global Maoism*

1. What's your favorite anecdote from your research for this book?

Mao Zedong Thought first fascinated me in 2004 during my undergraduate studies at the University of Ottawa, where I majored in history. I was most fortunate to find in the university's library collection several books by scholars whose pioneering work inspired this project. Raymond Wylie's book *The Emergence of Maoism* inspired the namesake of this book and introduced to me the challenges that lay ahead in navigating the perplexing road of Mao's thinking. Other highly influential Mao

I relished walking to and from the National Archives during rainfall. I will never forget those moments when the downpour pushed me to take a brief pause from stressing over the day's digging through archival materials to appreciate where I was in that moment, right then and there. Whether it was stopping to gaze upon the architectural brilliance of Vann Molyvann on the walk home, passing by Wat Phnom for prayer and refuge from the rain, or even trudging through knee-high flooded streets around Central Market in the midst of a monsoon, those moments left a lasting imprint on me from my research in Cambodia.

"I was most fortunate to find in the university's library collection several books by scholars whose pioneering work inspired this project."

scholars whose books paved the way for this one include Timothy Cheek, Nick Knight, Arif Dirlik, Yeh Wenhsin, Maurice Meisner, Cheng Yinghong, Wu Yiching, Matthew Johnson, Yang Kuisong, and Shen Zhihua.

2. What do you wish you had known when you started writing your book, that you know now?

I conducted my archival research in several cities—Shanghai, Xiamen, Phnom Penh, Paris, Aix-En-Provence, among others—so there are plenty of stories to go around from my experiences in these locales. My fondest memories of archival research were from my time in the Cambodian capital. Aside from the excitement of discovering some very important primary sources for my book by happenstance,

3. How do you wish you could change your field of study?

That the political situation in China would worsen to the point that archives large and small across the country would close off to foreigners and locals alike. I lived in Shanghai during my archival research and encountered almost no difficulty accessing materials from the Shanghai Municipal Archives. In years since, access to archives all over China, even in cosmopolitan epicenters like Shanghai and Xiamen, is much more restrictive. Larger archives like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remain closed off to foreigners, which is truly a shame.


The Article

PROTESTS IN THAILAND: OTHER “BLUE WAVES”

by Trais Pearson

While many in the United States anticipate a “Blue Wave” in the November elections, Bangkok, the Thai capital, is already awash in one. In recent days, authorities have unleashed water-cannons on anti-government demonstrators in the city center, drenching them in jets of chemically treated water dyed an uncanny blue. These “blue waves” sting the eyes and stain the skin and clothing of demonstrators so that police might identify and apprehend them afterwards.

The Thai protestors are calling for the end of “feudalism and dictatorship.” By dictatorship, they mean the current regime, which is headed up by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, a former military general who first came to power in a coup in 2014, and who now presides as the unelected Prime Minister of a government that came to power under the terms of its own constitution amidst allegations of electoral and judicial malfeasance.



The Thai protestors are calling for the end of “feudalism and dictatorship.”

The call to abolish feudalism, however, is more complicated. It is a rejection of socioeconomic inequality, unelected officials in parliament, and the current status of the monarchy. Protestors demand constitutional limits on the power of the monarch—limits that were first imposed in 1932, but which have receded in recent years as the current reigning king, Vajiralongkorn, has helped to rewrite the constitution, taken direct control of segments of the military, and transformed the financial assets of the institution of the monarchy into his own personal property, among other changes that harken back to the days of absolutism.

The Thai protestors are calling for the end of “feudalism and dictatorship.”

Last week, a defiant Prayuth responded to the protestors from Government House. He invoked the Thai equivalent of the Grim Reaper, advising protestors not to “tempt Matjurat.” The warning was couched as benign spiritual advice about the transitory nature of life. But there was a sinister undercurrent: a reminder that past instances of state and communal violence—including,

most notoriously, the events of October 6, 1976—might be repeated.

The Prime Minister's ominous remark is troubling for another reason: it seems to betray an elite view that the life of the average Thai citizen is inherently precarious, even revocable. It is a view that I have encountered before in the course of my research on the kingdom of Siam (as the state was known until 1939). And, ironically, it is one that seems to confirm the protestors' allegation that Thai society remains mired in feudalism.

For a time at least, the deaths of even the most anonymous peasant living in the Siamese capital were subject to state scrutiny.

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As I argue in *Sovereign Necropolis: The Politics of Death in Semi-Colonial Siam*, in the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century, the Siamese state discovered a newfound interest in the dead and injured bodies of its subjects. Government ministers called upon police and foreign physicians to investigate and document cases of unnatural or suspicious death. When accidents occurred, such as on the tracks of the Bangkok Tramway Company (a foreign limited liability corporation), the same ministers signed off on legal agreements that granted modest compensation to the victims while guaranteeing legal protection for the company and its shareholders.


For a time at least, the deaths of even the most anonymous peasant living in the Siamese capital were subject to state scrutiny. The reasons for these interventions are complicated—having to do with a constellation of factors including the pressures of expansionist European empires and the arrival of new forms of capital, technology, and expertise—but I argue that they have had important and lasting implications for Thai political culture.

For a time at least, the deaths of even the most anonymous peasant living in the Siamese capital were subject to state scrutiny.

As the Siamese state increasingly came to view its subjects through the lens of tort law and forensic medicine, they became “morbid subjects,” dead and injured members of the body politic who were rendered mute to the claims made on their behalf. The political implications for these subjects during a time of absolute monarchy were minimal. But the ways in which the lives of the

THE
EXCERPT

From Family to Police Force



SECURITY
AND BELONGING ON
A SOUTH ASIAN BORDER

FARHANA IBRAHIM

INTRODUCTION

Sometime in 2007, I was traveling back with colleagues to Mumbai, where I was teaching at the time. We were on our way back from Kathmandu via New Delhi. As I passed through immigration and passport control—an unremarkable exercise at the best of times—the official looked at his computer screen for what seemed like an inordinate amount of time. He looked up at me a couple of times, then back to his screen. My colleagues were waiting impatiently on the other side; we had very little time to make our connecting flight. I must have asked if everything was okay; I cannot remember the details. I do remember what he said, though. With the hint of a smile, to just take the edge off, he stated rather than asked, “In 2002–2003, you lived in Bhuj.” I nodded, somewhat bewildered at this unexpected conversational turn. He continued, “You lived in Friendship Colony,” correctly identifying the neighborhood where I had rented an apartment in a residential complex for the duration of the fieldwork for my PhD dissertation. By now, I was even more bewildered, and he continued, enjoying my reaction. “You lived on the mezzanine floor of Sunlight Terrace.” At this point, I asked—maintaining

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the same tone of careful jocularly that he had used to initiate this conversation—“*Wah* [Wow], does it say all of this on your computer screen?” He responded, “Oh no. You see, I was ‘on deputation’ to the CBI [Central Bureau of Investigation] that year and I was posted in Bhuj. I lived in the same neighborhood. When I saw you just now, I thought you looked familiar; I used to see you walking home now and then, so I thought I would ask if you were the same person.” I recall laughing this off and asking him whether he just had a very good memory or whether his job while “on deputation” was to keep an eye on me, but this marked the end of our exchange; he stamped my passport and waved me through.

This exchange stayed with me and got me thinking about the fieldwork that I had concluded four years previously in Kutch, a district on the border between Pakistan and the western Indian state of Gujarat. Bhuj is the administrative capital of Kutch and the place where I had rented an apartment for my yearlong residence while conducting research for my PhD.¹ Even though many people in the field had warned me about the ubiquity of state surveillance and the possibility of my movements and conversations being monitored by the various state intelligence networks who combed the border region, this was my first “direct” encounter with such “official” surveillance that also disconnected from my fieldwork both spatially and temporally. On the other hand, my notes from that year in the field are filled with what I thought were “suspicious” encounters and regular exhortations to myself not to be paranoid or read too much into everyday interactions with acquaintances in the field even as I was somewhat self-congratulatory about having “escaped” surveillance.

On my next visit to Kutch, I related the incident at the airport in New Delhi to one of my acquaintances, a journalist and editor who also ran a small stationery and office supplies store with a printing press in the old city. He confessed that a mere week after I had moved into my apartment in August 2002, he had received a “friendly” visit from an intelligence official. (The apartment rented by the CBI for its field officers was indeed right behind where I lived, he confirmed.) The official asked about me and what the journalist thought I was doing in Kutch. I was surprised and asked him why he had never mentioned this to me. He replied, “Well, if I had told you, then I would not be doing my job, would I?”

I was puzzled at first and not a little disappointed; perhaps I expected that this kind of information would have been shared with me as a matter of

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course, particularly by someone I met with so regularly and thought of as a confidant. As I was to learn, however, information was like capital; it had the power to generate enormous dividends. It could be bestowed as a gift or withheld from public circulation. Information was leveraged for other kinds of reciprocal exchanges, material and symbolic. Transparency could not be taken for granted in interpersonal relationships. For me to have expected it was surely naive; after all, as an anthropologist in the field, did I also not manage my persona and encounters in a way that enabled me to most effectively gain access to information from others? Why did I assume that I was the only one collecting information from others without being subjected to a similar exercise in return? The fact is that although I was predisposed to thinking that I would be primarily policed by the state, there were many other forms and sources of policing that I was interpellated in, including those that emanated from my own practices as an anthropologist, and that only became clear to me in hindsight. In this book, the state and its documentary practices are not the only ones disposed to surveillance and the management of information—the credibility of the immigration officials' claims apart, he did not acknowledge his recognition of me on the basis of official records but on an interpersonal exchange at the airport where he claimed familiarity on the basis of living in the same neighborhood.

Anthropology and Forms of Policing beyond the State

Although my interaction with the immigration official suggests that individuals in politically sensitive areas are policed by state agencies—the immigration checkpoint is after all the quintessential site for policing the entry of individuals into state space (Luibhéid 2002; Jeganathan 2004; de Genova 2013)—this book looks beyond the obvious sites, sources, and modes of policing that are usually tied to its institutional elaboration within the context of the state. By “policing” I mean the complex web of discourses and practices that are produced by multiple agents in service of maintaining what is basically a contested social and moral order. In this approach, policing is a form of embodied social practice rather than merely a state institution.² It is in this broader sense that we might refer to “moral policing,” “caste policing,” “community policing,” and so on, each of which provides additional texture to the forms of policing that are deployed by the state.³ Various institutionally

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organized forms of the police do figure in the chapters that follow, especially in part I of the book. However, my intent is to constantly reflect on how modes of practice that are seen as quintessential to institutional forms of policing are also replicated more generally across various social sites that straddle the “public” and the “private,” through not only law but also through the family. Domestic order is linked to public order; modes of policing the family, from *within* the family, also have repercussions for how public order and citizenship is perceived in this borderland society.

Even as I make this argument, I am also attentive to the fact that within the institution of police, what counts as “police work” has been significantly expanded.⁴ In this western Indian borderland that separates Kutch, a district in the western Indian state of Gujarat, from Sindh, a southern province in Pakistan—a national border between nation-states that cultivate a mutual hostility at the political level—there are civil and border police, the air wing of the armed forces, and paramilitary forces besides various central intelligence agencies that depute officers to the region. A long-standing anthropological engagement with the region has allowed me to observe how policing—as practice—plays out at multiple levels that exceed these institutional sites of order maintenance and also how these distinct institutional forms of policing are experienced differently by residents of this borderland.

This book reflects on the multiple sources and forms of policing that structure everyday interaction on a microscopic scale such as the family, the religious community, and the individual. Thus, I was able to observe how everyday interactions at home or at work among Muslims who lived in this region were continually engaged in policing—and producing—what it meant to live a secure and well-ordered life. A key impetus behind this argument is to suggest first, that relations between state institutions and a borderland public—where mutual cooperation is of essence to the project of national security—go beyond the framework of patronage.⁵ I propose the concept of “adjacent sovereignty” to suggest that forms of policing that are elaborated through state institutions in fact derive much of their force through forms of local, even familial, sovereignty that operate in this borderland. Second, through a focus on forms of policing that play out at the level of the family and the religious community, I hope to be able to reclaim some agency for India’s Muslim citizen beyond the abjection of “bare life.” Produced as the “other” of India’s citizenship regime and border management practices, it is clear that the Muslim is more often than not the object of the state’s

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policing regime. I explain this with reference to early debates on policing and the constitution of the police force after Partition in chapter 1. However, one of the questions that also animates this book is, what would it take to envisage the Muslim as a *subject* of policing? How is information and movement deployed within this borderland society by those very actors who are also produced as “terrorists” and “infiltrators” by the state, as they determine their own modes of belonging to the family and the religious community?

Key to my argument is the figure of the “Bengali” Muslim woman, who is marked by the state and allied discourses—such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—as either an “illegal infiltrator” or a trafficked marriage migrant into the region.⁶ Muslim families in this borderland society are able to creatively use the presence of the “Bengali” woman to fundamentally transform the nature of sociality that underpins the task of kin making. Everyday life in a borderland society—already saturated with forms of suspicion-imbued sociality—does not always sit well with too much transparency vis-à-vis each other. Consanguineous marriage—where cousins marry each other—is a traditionally preferred marriage arrangement among Muslims in this region. However, the relations that this kind of marriage engenders across the terrain of the social become fragile when affines are too closely related. Much of the work of kinship—as the social practice of *relating* to others (Strathern 2005)—has to do with the transformation of affines (as outsiders) into consanguines (those “of the house”). This is demonstrated for north Indian Hindu society through the practice of gift giving (Vatuk 1975). Giving gifts continuously to affines is one way to smooth over the fundamental fragility of affinal relationships. The work of kinship is thus the continual working through this knotty site of affinity; kin making is a processual task, a constant site of incorporation (Carsten 1997). However, when affines are too closely related by blood, it can rip apart the terrain of the social; the carefully maintained fragility between affines and consanguines threatens to implode across the terrain of the family and the social. How, then, to reintroduce the creative tension of an “outsider” who has to be “incorporated,” thereby reintroducing the very logic of kinship?


Although the “Bengali” remains somewhat of a social outsider (what the state refers to as an “infiltrator”), it is precisely her foreignness to the local social context that allows her to become a catalyst for the resumption of an increasingly strained sociality. Arranging marriages with these “outside” women allows Muslim families in Kutch to restore social and familial capital

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through affinity, something that had become difficult to maintain within traditional forms of consanguineous marriage, where affinity continually collapsed into consanguinity. Marriage with an “outsider”—who nevertheless brings other forms of capital with her—allows for the stability of Muslim marriage in the region albeit through the fundamental transformation of a traditional form of alliance: the consanguineous marriage. This argument is also offered here as a new way in which we can understand marriage migration within India for it moves beyond the restrictive lens of demographic indicators as an explanation for why women migrate for marriage. The literature on marriage migration in India views it primarily as a consequence of uneven sex ratios that lead to fewer girls born in an area, and bases its arguments primarily on the study of north Indian Hindu society.⁷ My focus on the Muslim family, in addition to bringing the conceptual lens of policing into the family and marriage, thus also argues that sex ratio or demographic concerns cannot explain all instances of cross-region marriage migration. Kin making and border making—the policing of not only marriage but also of citizenship—is a dialogic process that rests on the work of multiple actors across the domain of the family and the state. Kinship and affinity are fundamentally political values, and this is underscored again in chapter 5 with a discussion on Hindu men from Pakistan who seek to migrate into India through marriage alliances that subvert the traditionally honorable category of marriage among upper caste men. These chapters also allow me to reposit the relationship between the state/law and the family. The family is certainly not a space of interiority, invisibility, or resistance to the state, but neither is it in collusion or alliance with it.

Although South Asian ethnographies on law and kinship are familiar with this relationship, they often fall back into the trope of the manner in which law and the patriarchal family come together to ensure compliance across gender and caste lines. By engaging primarily with the Muslim family, as well as Hindu men who crossed the border from Pakistan in and around 1971, this ethnography argues that policing across the terrain of state, family, and religious community is not always predictable. It is through an ethnographic entanglement with the “imponderabilia of actual life” (Malinowski 2002, 16)—sharing in births, marriages, and deaths, stumbling upon secrets that kept families together but also tore them apart, upholding through my ethnographic practice public secrets that were not spoken of but often shared by the ethnographer and her subjects—that this book arrives at its conclusions

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Transpacific Developments

The Politics of Multiple Chinas
in Central America

Monica DeHart

MAPPING MULTIPLE CHINAS ON THE DEVELOPMENT LANDSCAPE

In 2007, the People's Republic of China (PRC) consummated its newly established diplomatic relationship with Costa Rica by gifting the nation a new stadium. Because all other Central American nations maintained official relations with Taiwan at that time, Costa Rica's abrupt turn to Beijing seemed momentous in both local and geopolitical terms. A PRC government-sponsored firm imported over six hundred Mainland Chinese laborers and equipment, housed in a camp adjacent to the construction site, to construct the new thirty-five-thousand-person stadium. That structure replaced an older, wooden stadium to take on all the trappings of what one Costa Rican fan called a "true First-World" establishment. Locally, the stadium's modern profile earned it the moniker "Nido Tico" (Costa Rican Nest) for its resemblance to the famous Bird's Nest stadium in Beijing, built for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Upon its inauguration, the stadium broadcast its newfound global significance by hosting friendly international soccer matches and concerts by global talents like Shakira.

While the stadium was meant to showcase the benefits of partnership with Beijing, it immediately referenced a much more complex set of Chinese actors. To begin, many Costa Ricans I spoke with evaluated the benevolent gift of the stadium and its modern contours in relation to the treatment of the "other" China—that is, their "friend" Taiwan—which, to their minds, had been callously cast aside by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias Sánchez in his pursuit of the status and opportunities offered by Beijing. Those critics would shake their heads in frustration as they recounted the long history of partnership with Taiwan and

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the many forms of development support it had offered, only to be traded for the PRC. Others raved about the amazing construction feat performed by the industrious Chinese workers who, to invoke a longstanding racialized image, “worked like ants, moving back and forth over the structure” night and day to complete the stadium a whole month ahead of schedule. Members of the local Chinese diasporic community expressed ambivalence about the structure, wondering whether Beijing’s arrival would bring more commercial opportunities or problematic politics that would reflect badly on their community.

Costa Rican narratives about the stadium thus illuminated not only the multiple forms of China present in Central America but also what these meant for regional development. For example, many expressed their admiration for the Chinese engineering prowess that produced the “state-of-the art” stadium and what it portended for future projects. Some observers were more skeptical of what this iconic structure boded for the future. Indeed, several identified the stadium as something of a Trojan horse, implying that the “gift” might come back to haunt them in the form of the invasion of Mainland Chinese commodities or PRC political demands that would ultimately be harmful to Costa Rica’s future. A more pragmatic contingency simply read the stadium in terms of what PRC-sponsored development might mean for them as working-class Ticos (slang for Costa Ricans): given the high ticket prices for stadium events, they worried about being locked out of the future if the cost of development was one they could not afford. In this sense, it was not only which China that mattered but also how Chinese involvement might impact Costa Rican national identity, sovereignty, and development goals.

Despite the fact that Beijing’s growing influence suggests to many a future in which the PRC might replace both Taiwan and the United States as Central America’s strategic development partner, I argue that focusing on a single state regime and its perceived interests is insufficient for understanding the current and future effects of China in the region. Instead this book illuminates the complex nature and stakes of Chinese development by exploring the multiple Chinas (plural) at work in Central America.

These multiple Chinas include Central American citizens of Chinese descent, some of whose family members came over in the nineteenth century to construct railroads but stayed on to build businesses, communities, and ethnic associations in the region. Over multiple generations of migration across the Pacific and the Americas, these largely Cantonese-speaking diasporic communities have come to embody a history of small business and translocal connections that continue to reflect some of the main ways that non-Chinese-heritage Central Americans have come to know what it means to be Chinese.

MAPPING MULTIPLE CHINAS ON THE DEVELOPMENT LANDSCAPE

Another form of China is composed of the diplomats, entrepreneurs, engineers, and institutions representing Taiwan, the development partner that four out of seven countries in Central America still recognize as the “official China.” Often of more elite class status and Mandarin speaking, these Chinese actors reflect the cross-strait economic collaboration that has enabled textile assembly plant production in Central America and expanded the contours of the Chinese diaspora there.

And finally, there are the embassy officials, investors, tourists, and laborers representing Mainland China and the PRC government. These are the newest of the Chinese development partners, and, as illustrated by the stadium example, they represent both powerful new sources of development capital and racialized forms of labor that have incited new development possibilities even as they have inspired new fears.

While locals throughout Central America might refer to all of these various actors and institutions as *chinos* (Chinese) and associate them in some way with Chinese development efforts in Central America, they cannot be reduced to agents of the PRC. Instead, differences between Cantonese and Mandarin speakers, between earlier and more recent migrants, between prodemocracy supporters of Taiwan and Communist Party members from the Mainland are crucial to shaping the everyday politics of China in Central America, but they are not visible through a study of bilateral state-to-state relations. Guatemalan business owners of Chinese descent, PRC state enterprise employees building infrastructure in Panama, Taiwanese assembly plant owners in Nicaragua, and diasporic Chinese Association members in Costa Rica all reflect different ideological positions, generational and class interests, ethnicities, and nationalities. These diverse identities, politics, and practices—what I refer to here as forms of Chineseness—mark people’s belonging to one or various of these multiple Chinas, and also reflect the stereotypes that are frequently used to make sense of *los chinos* in Central America. These distinctions thus reveal the fluid and often entangled connections and affiliations that map different Chinese actors in relation to one another and to the hispanized Central American culture in which they are embedded.

This book explores these politics of China and Chineseness in Central America, a place where their presence and implications are especially pronounced. Central America has not featured prominently in studies of China–Latin America dynamics to date because of the region’s lack of the commodity exports, like petroleum or soy, for which China has shown a high demand. Nonetheless, Central America’s development dynamics hold clear geopolitical significance given the region’s role as a political ally of the United States, a production platform

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for North American markets, a hub for global commerce, and a chessboard for cross-strait tensions across the Pacific. Based on field research in three different Central American countries—Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica—between 2011 and 2019, I identify which actors, projects, and ideas count as Chinese and how locals in very distinct national and local contexts perceive them in relation to larger development concerns. By analyzing initiatives in one country that has established diplomatic relations with the PRC (Costa Rica) and two that maintain relations with Taiwan (Nicaragua and Guatemala), I am able to analyze diverse forms of Chinese development and public diplomacy efforts, as well as the domains in which they unfold.

This ethnographic approach is central to illuminating the transpacific analytic that I develop throughout the book. Scholarly and policy conversations about China–Latin America relations have focused on the PRC government’s “going out” to Latin America as a new kind of encounter among essentially different actors, worlds apart. Tracking a longer history of the movement of people, goods, capital, and politics across the Pacific, I show how China and Central America are by no means strangers; instead I argue that they have been constituted by longstanding circulations through and encounters with each other. By moving back and forth across these diverse spaces of encounter and levels of analysis, my transpacific analytic illuminates the wide range of cultural, political, and economic exchanges that have produced transpacific assemblages of identity, place, race, and development. Approaching China–Central America relations in this way not only highlights important shifts in the global development landscape but also illuminates its continuities. As such, it allows us to reimagine contemporary developments less as a battleground over global hegemony and more as a space for conjuring new worlds defined by different identities, scales of action, and politics for the future.

Shifting Development Landscapes

When I began my anthropological research in Central America in 1995, my work was focused on the cultural politics of economic development. During the 1990s, those politics were defined largely by the development industry’s interest in ethnic identity (e.g., ethnodevelopment or indigenous knowledges); community-based, participatory development models; and migration as valuable strategies for addressing both local identity concerns and neoliberal economic goals.¹ Working as I was with indigenous communities and nongovernmental organizations in Central America and Latinx migrants in the United States, China was not on my screen. However, as my ethnographic work in the

MAPPING MULTIPLE CHINAS ON THE DEVELOPMENT LANDSCAPE

region continued, I began to see the signs of change. The Central American landscape was increasingly marked by new Chinese products—everything from the inexpensive rubber boots used by rural farmers in the milpas to the knockoff name-brand clothing and cheap plastic containers taking over the local markets. Factories devoted to assembly production for export to US markets proliferated, as did new family-owned Chinese restaurants. Suddenly, signs posted alongside development project sites that advertised their sponsorship by the “Republic of China (Taiwan)” caught my eye in a new way; instead of just marking foreign-sponsored products, they seemed significant as a way of marking *which* China was operative there.

When Costa Rica abandoned Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with China in 2007, it was clear that something important was happening. Therefore, although a Latin Americanist by training and interest, I found myself studying Mandarin and scanning the Central American landscape for more signs of Chinese influence. Most of my Chinese-heritage Central American friends spoke Spanish, but their home language was usually Cantonese. When I mentioned to them my interest in studying the Chinese language, however, they all instructed me to learn “official” Chinese (*putonghua*)—Mandarin, not Cantonese. Mandarin, they noted, was the language of the future.

Their recommendation reflected changes in a global development landscape that is increasingly defined by different actors, modes of operation, institutions, and issues, China principal among them. That refigured landscape represents the tremendous economic growth and deepening global connections enabled by the new millennium, as well as the widening inequality and vulnerability that have accompanied it. The inauguration of political economic initiatives by actors from the Global South like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Consortium, new regional organizations that do not include the United States like CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), and new banks like the AIIB (the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) indexes the importance of new voices in reshaping the international system. Global energy market crashes, climate change disasters, and deadly pandemics have also highlighted crucial challenges to national sovereignty within contemporary global politics. In this context, China has emerged as an important, if controversial, development model and agent whose exceptional politics have been perceived as having the power to redefine the nature and stakes of development.

Perceptions of China’s transformative role derive, in part, from the PRC’s dramatic economic growth and poverty-reduction strategies at home. The World Bank estimates that the PRC government has reduced poverty from 88 percent in 1981 to below 1 percent in 2018.² These transformations have catapulted the

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PRC from a developing nation to a development donor purveying major international finance and infrastructure projects throughout the developing world. For example, in Latin America, the PRC has become the region's biggest lender, far outspending Western financial institutions through over \$150 billion in loan commitments to the region.³ Furthermore, at the 2015 CELAC reunion, the PRC government announced that it had \$45 billion earmarked for infrastructure investment in the region.⁴

The PRC government's method of achieving this economic success—through its one-party political system, planned economy, and heavy reliance on state-subsidized firms—has also provoked major fears. Critics in the West have often used the terms “Beijing Consensus” and “China Model” to identify central features of the PRC government's development policy at home and extrapolate them to its policies abroad.⁵ The PRC government's combination of free-market economics and authoritarian politics rejects the “standard package” of policies promoted by global development institutions and Washington Consensus advocates—such as privatization, deregulation, and democratization, among other recommendations—and thus challenges the liberal foundations of the global system.⁶ Indeed, the PRC government's policy of noninterference in its partners' domestic politics has only deepened fears that the PRC government not only condones but supports illiberal politics. The PRC's ability to increase its global footprint through growing investment, trade, and membership in regional and international organizations has thus been read as evidence of the PRC's growing global power and the likelihood that it will create new sources of conflict within the global order.⁷

Even though the 2010s have not borne out fears that the PRC seeks to export its brand of state politics abroad, the idea of China as an exceptional development actor remains.⁸ China's creation of powerful new global institutions and initiatives reinforces this perception. Invoking historic connections, the PRC government's “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road” project—now referred to simply as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—promised to radically reconfigure global commerce through the construction of new transportation corridors connecting Europe and Asia. By 2018, this initiative had been stretched to encompass new infrastructural developments in such faraway places as Latin America, where nineteen nations had signed on. Therefore, designs to renovate and control central features of the Panama Canal or to build transcontinental dry canals across South America have raised the specter of new Chinese inroads to these areas that were once presumed to be firmly under the influence of the United States and multinational corporations.

THREE QUESTIONS WITH PAUL STANILAND

author of *Ordering Violence*

1. What's your favorite anecdote from your research for this book?

I kept coming across cases in which governments and armed groups – even those that formally called themselves insurgents – seemed to be willing to work together, or at least agree to leave each other alone. Some of these arrangements lasted years or even decades, which was quite different than many conventional approaches to civil war would suggest: these often were not clear-cut battle between governments and insurgents, but instead murkier and more ambiguous. I realized that an important reason for differences in how groups

be under way at the time. During that trip, I twice went to a government-linked institute, funded in part by foreign donors, that was supposed to be a key piece of the peace effort (it no longer exists). While there were shiny new facilities, important proclamations, and some thoughtful individuals, the overall feel of the facility and interactions was one of hollowness – missed appointments, empty rooms, glossy literature full of platitudes, large aspirations undercut by limited capacity and ambiguous political will. I didn't quite know what to make of it all at the time, but after the fact it's come to symbolize the limits and pretenses of the now-dead Myanmar peace process, which

“It was a humbling reminder that our knowledge of the world often turns out to be only barely scratching the surface.”

are treated is variation in how governments define more-and-less “acceptable” political demands, which in turn is driven by their nationalist and ideological goals. The same type of group can be politically perceived in radically different ways. I found that this basic framework can also help us make sense of governments' relationships with militias, armed political parties, and other non-state armed actors, extending the book beyond civil wars into a broader world of “armed politics.”

2. What do you wish you had known when you started writing your book, that you know now?

I did some field research in Myanmar in 2013 to learn about a peace process that seemed to

collapsed into renewed warfare.

3. How do you wish you could change your field of study?

I realized that my understanding of much of the relevant history was both thinner and more rigid than the reality turned out to be: as I dug more deeply, the importance of contingency and number of roads-not-taken grew dramatically. It was a humbling reminder that our knowledge of the world often turns out to be only barely scratching the surface.

Recharging China in War
and Revolution, 1882–1955

Ying Jia Tan



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CHINA, INC.

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
YELING TAN



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AND NECROCITIZENSHIP
IN MODERN CHINA

LINH D. VU



COMING HOME TO
A FOREIGN COUNTRY

XIAMEN AND RETURNED OVERSEAS CHINESE,
1843–1938

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GIDEON FUJIWARA



Oliver Charbonneau

Civilizational
Imperatives



AMERICANS, MOROS,
AND THE COLONIAL WORLD

THREE QUESTIONS WITH REENA KUKREJA

author of *Why Would I Be Married Here*

1. What's your favorite anecdote from your research for this book?

This book is a response and a fulfilment of a promise to the pointed query of a cross-region bride. She felt that her voice would gather dust in a notebook on my bookshelf and that nothing would ever change, either for her or for other cross-region brides, who, she was sure, would continue to come to this region for reasons similar to hers. "Tell me, what will I gain from this furious writing you are doing in your notebook? Will my reality change? Will I wake up tomorrow morning and find that everyone treats me nicely? Tell me, what

capitalist accumulation in India that has had a devastating impact on impoverished rural women from India's marginalized communities. It led me to conceptualise "dispossession of matrimonial choice" as a novel manifestation of capitalist accumulation. This gendered dispossession not only reduces marriage options locally, it also forces women like her to marry men who are considered "rejects" in their own marriage markets. In doing so, it unfolds a myriad other dispossessions and dislocations, including that of cultural alienation and uprootedness from the support of their natal families. The intimate and gendered violence of this dispossession occurs silently

"It led me to conceptualize 'dispossession of matrimonial choice' as a novel manifestation of capitalist accumulation."

is the point of doing all this?" I owe it to the women who entrusted me with their stories of struggle, despair, and resistance in the hope that their voices and their lived reality would get heard beyond the scribbles in my notebook.

2. What do you wish you had known when you started writing your book, that you know now?

"Poverty is a powerful force that shapes people's destinies. It torments the life out of you. If I was not poor, do you think that I would have been married here?" These poignant words spoken by a young cross-region bride who I met in Nuh have resonated with me ever since she uttered them. They encapsulate the ferocity of the gendered impact of neoliberal


on a mundane and ongoing basis for low-class, low-caste women from India's peripheries, in their marriages with rural men from North India and this is exactly what Mehrunissa, the bride summed up.

3. How do you wish you could change your field of study?

To put it very simply: that no single truth claim can be simplistically made about contemporary cross-region marriages or the manner in which poor, rural women from historically socio-economically marginalized communities from India's development peripheries end up as brides of rural North Indian men.

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