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Judicial Power in Germany and the European Union

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The Two Faces of Judicial Power
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Abstract

What are the preconditions that allow constitutional courts to exercise power? To answer this question, I discuss the effects of (non-)institutionalized features inherent in the design of the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) on the court’s ability to (threaten to) make decisions. Moreover, I show that the political branches have established procedures to account for the court’s influence when presenting bills. Finally, I argue that the court and political actors need to account for the environment in which they interact. All these components define a court’s strength and are combined in two indices to compare preconditions of judicial power across Europe. The indices show that the GFCC is a representative case to study judicial power. Assessing the judicial–political processes around Germany’s parental custody reform from 1998 puts the hypotheses on the two faces of judicial power to a preliminary test.

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Engst, B.G. (2021). Judicial Power in Germany and the European Union. In: The Two Faces of Judicial Power. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46016-7_3

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