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What can sports governing bodies do to comply with EU antitrust rules while maintaining territorial exclusivity?

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Abstract

Territorial exclusivity clauses are so ubiquitous and ingrained in the statutes and regulations of sports governing bodies (SGBs) that, until now, they seem to have gone largely unnoticed by members of the sporting community. In recent years, however, they have been challenged by means of antitrust complaints and occasional litigation: a trend that is currently showing no signs of abating. By revisiting these decisions, and the pattern emerging from them, the paper aims to discuss what SGBs may do to comply with antitrust rules while maintaining territorial exclusivity. Solutions available include “splitting” or “unbundling,” the “revocation of statutory rules” and, finally, “light-touch application and sanctions renunciation.” An exploration of challenges identified and solutions found in the European Union is provided, and further contributions from other parts of the world, based on the legal requirements in force in other jurisdictions, are encouraged.

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Notes

  1. Cf. Pugh (2003), p. 15. “It was once said that ‘a fish would be the last to discover the existence of water’; an apt metaphor for the limited awareness of language that is sometimes found in social work.”

  2. Pijetlovic (2015), p. 37: “The described ‘one-federation-per-sport’ structure reveals the apparent monopolistic position of the governing bodies that regulate everything from professional to amateur and youth sports. They are able to pass the rules and regulations which affect the way in which clubs buy and sell players, dispose of their commercial rights, conduct themselves on the stock market, impose disciplinary sanctions which in turn affect the clubs’ profits, and so on. For example, in football, a club such as FC Milan is affiliated with the Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Italian football federation—FIGC). The FIGC, the national federation, governs the game of football in Italy from all levels of clubs as well as the national team and is affiliated with Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) “UEFA has 53 such member national associations. In addition to playing games in its Italian-based league, FC Milan, is (at the moment) one of the top four teams in the Italian Serie A (the highest Italian league) and is thus eligible to play in the UEFA-organised Champions League. The world governing body for football is the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). FIFA regulates matters and organises football events that have worldwide importance, such as the men’s and women’s World Cups. FIFA is comprised of six continental federations and 208 national federations. Many other sports in Europe have similar basic organizational arrangements (such as basketball), while others do not (such as boxing).”

  3. Starting with Vieweg (1983) and most recently Fischer (2018). For early examples see also Gießelmann-Goetze (1987), Deselaers (1998), Fleischer (1996) and Heermann (2009a, b).

  4. Cf. Hoare (1981), p. 81: “There are two ways of constructing a software design; one way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far more difficult.” Identified thanks to the website of US computer scientist Prof. Gabriel Robins: Good Quotations by Famous People. https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/quotes.html, Last modified: April 4, 2016 (accessed 10 December 2019).

  5. Not a classical Latin adage, but often attributed to the Belgian philosopher Arnold Geulincx (1624–1669). Common in German legal discourse, cf. Kliesch (2017), p. 337).

  6. Decision C (2017) 8240 final. Commission Decision of 8.12.2017 relating to proceedings under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty) and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement Case AT.40208—International Skating Union's Eligibility rules (Only the English text is authentic). http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40208/40208_1384_5.pdf.

  7. Rule 102 (Eligibility) ISU Constitition 2016. Meanwhile amended to reflect the Commission’s decision; current version: International Skating Union Constitution and General Regulation 2016, as accepted by the 56th Ordinary Congress June 2016, https://csndg.org/Reglement_interieur/documents/pdf/ISU/2016/constitution-and-general-regulations-2016.pdf.

  8. Infra, 2.2.

  9. Infra, 3.9. Lawsuit registered 19 February 2018 (Case T-93/18).

  10. Agafonova (2019), p. 95.

  11. Case C-49/07. 1 July 2008. Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio. ECR 2008 I-04863. AG Kokott, Opinion of 6 March 2008. ECLI:EU:C:2008:142.

  12. AG Carl Otto Lenz, 20 September 1995. Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman et al. and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman. Case C-415/93. ECR 1995 I-04921. ECLI:EU:C:1995:293, at 126, 255, 263, 266, 273, 286.

  13. Case COMP/36.776 et al. Infra, 2.2.

  14. CJEU, 18 July 2006. David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission, Case C-519/04 P. ECR 2006 I-06991. ECLI:EU:C:2006:492.

  15. Ibid., at 42–43.

  16. CFI (Fourth Chamber), 26 January 2005. Laurent Piau v Commission of the European Communities. Case T-193/02. ECR 2005 II-00209. ECLI:EU:T:2005:22, at 116: “The fact that FIFA is not itself an economic operator that buys players’ agents’ services on the market in question and that its involvement stems from rule-making activity, which it has assumed the power to exercise in respect of the economic activity of players’ agents, is irrelevant as regards the application of Article 82 EC, since FIFA is the emanation of the national associations and the clubs, the actual buyers of the services of players’ agents, and it therefore operates on this market through its members.”.

  17. ECJ, 13 July 1966. Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Kommission., Joined Cases 56 and 58-64. ECR 1966. ECLI:EU:C:1966:41, pp. 321, 390.

  18. ECJ (Sixth Chamber), 23 April 1991. Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Oberlandesgericht München—Germany. Case C-41/90. ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, at 21.

  19. See e.g. Commission Staff Working Document.The EU and Sport: Background and Context. 11.7.2007. SEC(2007) 935, sec. 3.4. White Paper on Sport. Brussels, 11.7.2007. COM(2007) 391, p. 18.

  20. Case C-49/07. AG Kokott, 6 March 2008 (fn 11).

  21. CJEU (Grand Chamber), 1 July 2008. Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Dioikitiko Efeteio Athinon—Greece. Case C-49/07. ECR 2008 I-04863. ECLI:EU:C:2008:376.

  22. Ibid, at 23: “As stated in the order for reference, and as also confirmed at the hearing before the Court, ELPA organises, in cooperation with ETHEAM, motorcycling events in Greece and, enters, in that connection, into sponsorship, advertising and insurance contracts designed to exploit those events commercially. Those activities constitute a source of income for ELPA.” Ibid, at 26: “In the present case, it is necessary to distinguish the participation of a legal person such as ELPA in the decision‑making process of the public authorities from the economic activities engaged in by that same legal person, such as the organisation and commercial exploitation of motorcycling events. It follows that the power of such a legal person to give its consent to applications for authorisation to organise those events does not prevent its being considered an undertaking for the purposes of Community competition law so far as concerns its economic activities referred to above.” Ibid, at 27: “As regards the effect that the fact that ELPA does not seek to make a profit may have on that classification, it should be noted that, in Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraphs 122 and 123), the Court stated that the fact that the offer of goods or services is made without profit motive does not prevent the entity which carries out those operations on the market from being considered an undertaking, since that offer exists in competition with that of other operators which do seek to make a profit. “ Ibid., 28”: That is the case of activities engaged in by a legal person such as ELPA. The fact that MOTOE, the applicant in the main proceedings, is itself a non-profit-making association has, from that point of view, no effect on the classification as an undertaking of a legal person such as ELPA. First, it is not inconceivable that, in Greece, there exist, in addition to the associations whose activities consist in organising and commercially exploiting motorcycling events without seeking to make a profit, associations which are engaged in that activity and do seek to make a profit and which are thus in competition with ELPA. Second, non-profit-making associations which offer goods or services on a given market may find themselves in competition with one another. The success or economic survival of such associations depends ultimately on their being able to impose, on the relevant market, their services to the detriment of those offered by the other operators.”

  23. Case C-49/07. AG Kokott, 6 March 2008 (fn 11), at 96: “The pyramid structure […] that has developed in most sports […] helps to ensure that the special requirements of sport, such as uniform rules and a uniform timetable for competitions, are taken into account. An organisation such as ELPA, which is the official representative of the FIM in Greece, is part of that pyramid structure. Under its right of co-decision in the authorisation by a public body of motorcycling events, it may legitimately assert the interests of sport and, if necessary, refuse to give its consent. However, a refusal to grant consent becomes an abuse where it has no objective justification in the interests of sport, but is used arbitrarily to promote the organisation’s own economic interests, to the detriment of other service providers that would like to organise, and above all market, motorcycling events on their own responsibility.” [emphasis added: J.K.].

  24. CJEU, 1 July 2008. MOTOE. Case C-49/07 (fn. 21), at 51.

  25. Weatherill (2014), p. 476: “This is stark and it is quite brutal!”

  26. CJEU, 1 July 2008. MOTOE. Case C-49/07 (fn. 21), at 52.

  27. Ibid., at 97: “Irrespective of whether any abuse actually exists, it is sufficient, for the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article 86(1) EC in conjunction with Article 82 EC, that a State measure merely creates a risk of abuse. […] In the present case, the risk that ELPA will abuse its dominant position […] in exercising its right of co-decision under Article 49 of the Greek Road Traffic Code is particularly high, for two reasons […]”. [emphasis added: J.K.]

  28. Ibid., at 98: “Firstly, rules on consent such as those in question here lead to a conflict of interest: […] ELPA, which itself organises and markets motorcycling events, receives from the Greek State a right of co-decision in the authorisation of motorcycling events of other, independent service providers. ELPA thus not only has the legal means that allow it effectively to prevent other service providers from entering the Greek market, but also an economic interest in limiting access to the market by its competitors to its own advantage.”. [emphasis added: J.K.].

  29. Ibid., at 99: “Secondly, ELPA is not subject, under those rules on consent, to any restrictions, obligations or controls in relation to the grant or refusal of its consent to the authorisation of motorcycling events. This makes it particularly easy for ELPA to refuse to give consent to the authorisation of the motorcycling events of other, independent service providers. As the present case clearly shows, the mere fact that ELPA omitted to act was sufficient to thwart the plans of another service provider—in this instance, MOTOE—in the year 2000.” [emphasis added: J.K.].

  30. Weatherill (2014), 472.

  31. Van Rompuy (2012), p. II. (Hans von der Groeben, “Competition in the Common Market,” address given at the European Parliament, Brussels, October 19, 1961).

  32. See e.g. Lee and Shin (2016).

  33. Esposito (2014), p. 185: “Die Kontrolldichte muss umso weiter reichen, je stärker die Grundbedingungen privat-autonomen Verhaltens außer Kraft gesetzt sind”. (Translation: J.K.).

  34. Infra, Table 1.

  35. Infra, Table 2.

  36. Kornbeck (2019a, b, 2020).

  37. Infra, 2.

  38. Infra, 3.

  39. Infra, 4.

  40. Infra, 5.

  41. For a comparison sof the French v German models, for productivity being higher in DB than SNCF as well as for the role of the German Federal Government in refinancing its debt, with SNCF being more concerned with cutting transaction costs than with raising productivity, see Emmanuel and Crozet (2014).

  42. Cassely (2014).

  43. For a comparison between North American freight railways and telecommunications, with reflections on duopolistic ownership structures observed there, see Beard et al. (2016), or Knieps (2011).

  44. Roehrich and Caldwell (2012), p. 996.

  45. Ibid., p. 1006, citing “examples where the ability of the main contractor to act as an integrated solutions provider appears to be reduced leading to the unbundling paradox. The client does not have the resources and will (given pressing day-to-day concerns) to insist otherwise, becoming by default a reactive rather than proactive customer. This stands in stark contrast to the public sectors intention at a national level to receive an integrated solution rather than an ‘unbundled’ one.”

  46. European Commission, Staff Working Document: Ownership unbundling. The Commission practice in assessing the presence of a conflict of interest including in case of financial investors. 8.5.2013, SWD (2013) 177 final, p. 3.

  47. Van Rompuy (2012), p. I. (Hans von der Groeben, “Competition in the Common Market,” address given at the European Parliament, Brussels, October 19, 1961.): i“[…] competition is not looked upon as an end in itself. But it is a suitable and, given the federalist structure of our Community, a feasible means for reaching the objectives embodied in our Treaty […]”

  48. European Commission, SWD (2013) 177 (fn 46), p. 3: “The concept of ‘control’ is taken from Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (‘the EC Merger Regulation’) and should be interpreted accordingly (recital 13 Electricity Directive and recital 10 Gas Directive). Under Article 3(2) EC Merger Regulation, control is constituted by ‘rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combination and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking’.”

  49. Howell and Potgieter (2019), p. 137.

  50. Notwithstanding doubts from some quarters of empirical economic research, arguing that low or inexistent substitution for fans cannot be taken for granted, see Mills and Winfree (2016). However their research drew exclusively on data from North American (as opposed to European) sports and, besides, consumer welfare is not the only argument in favour of outlawing anti-competitive behaviour by SGBs: ensuring fair market access to all interested economic operators is another, equally valid consideration, as emphasised by Hans von der Groeben (fn. 31, 47).

  51. Howell and Potgieter (2019), p. 133. However, they went on to consider that “what matters is the elasticity of demand for that bundle relative to all the other possible bundles of content, applications and internet access available and, in the case of mixed bundling, all the individual components sold separately.”.

  52. Infra, 3.9.

  53. Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning Cases COMP/35.163—Notification of FIA Regulations, COMP/36.638—Notification by FIA/FOA of agreements relating to the FIA Formula One World Championship, COMP/36.776 — GTR/FIA ' others (Text with EEA relevance). OJ C 169, 13/06/2001, p. 5–11.

  54. Ibid.

  55. Supra, 1.2.

  56. Wall Street Journal, 15.01.1998. Cf. Deselaers (1998), p. 947.

  57. Action brought on 29 May 1998 by Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile against the Commission of the European Communities (Case T-85/98). OJ C 234, 25.7.98, p. 34-35. (No further information available on the Court’s website: http://curia.europa.eu/).

  58. Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning Cases COMP/35.163—Notification of FIA Regulations, COMP/36.638—Notification by FIA/FOA of agreements relating to the FIA Formula One World Championship, COMP/36.776 — GTR/FIA ' others (Text with EEA relevance). OJ C 169, 13/06/2001, p. 5–11.

  59. Regulation No 17. First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. OJ OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204–211. Replaced by Reg. (EC) 1/2003.

  60. Notice COMP/35.613 (Fn. 53).

  61. Notice COMP/35.163, COMP/36.638, COMP/36.776, 13/06/2001 (fn 53), p. 5.

  62. Case COMP/36.520 and Case COMP/37.319.

  63. Case COMP/36.776 (fn 58).

  64. Notice COMP/35.163, COMP/36.638, COMP/36.776, 13/06/2001 (fn 53), p. 5.

  65. From Ancient Greek μόνος (mónos) “single” + ὀψωνία (opsōnía) “purchase.”.

  66. From Ancient Greek μόνος, mónos, “single” + πωλεῖν, pōleîn, “to sell.”.

  67. Cf. Blair and Whitman (2017).

  68. See e.g. the Court’s rulings in Consten (Joined Cases 56–94 and 58–64) (fn 17) and Höfner (Case C-41/90) (fn 18).

  69. Notice COMP/35.163, COMP/36.638, COMP/36.776, 13/06/2001 (fn 53), p. 5.

  70. 30 October 2001. Press Release (IP/01/1523). “Commission closes its investigation into Formula One and other four-wheel motor sports”, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-1523_en.htm.

  71. Notice COMP/35.163, COMP/36.638, COMP/36.776, 13/06/2001 (fn 53), p. 5.

  72. Ibid., p. 8.

  73. Ibid., p. 5.

  74. Ibid., p. 7.

  75. Ibid., p. 5: “The Statutes are the principal constitutional document of FIA. They record the objectives of FIA; the persons eligible to become members; the rights and obligations attaching to membership; the role of FIA and its members in relation to motor sport; the structure and the organs of FIA and its sources of income.”.

  76. Ibid., p. 6.

  77. Ibid., p. 7; see inter alia: “In the Concorde Agreement, the teams recognise FIA’s exclusive property in the FIA Formula One Championship, including in particular the trade marks, the right to the title thereof and responsibility for its organisation (clause 1.1). The teams undertake to participate each year for the duration of the agreement (clauses 5.3 and 5.2) and not to participate in any other race, competition, exhibition or championship for open wheel single seat cars other than formula one or a race for cars complying with a current FIA Formula (for instance, Formula 3000) (clause 5.2).”.

  78. Ibid., p. 7: “The FIA/ISC Agreement became effective on 27 August 1996 and expires on 31 December 2010. Under this agreement, FIA granted ISC for 14 years the exclusive broadcasting rights to 18 FIA championships for ISC’s own use and benefit. ISC also submitted copies of agreements it had concluded with organisers of events and with broadcasters. In April 2000, an Ecclestone family trust sold the entire share capital of ISC to a conglomerate led by Mr David Richards who informed the Commission that prior to the transaction, FIA had modified its contract with ISC which now only holds the rights to the FIA World Rally and Regional Rally (European, African, etc.) Championships.”

  79. Van Rompuy (2015a).

  80. Infra, 3.9.

  81. Notice COMP/35.163, COMP/36.638, COMP/36.776, 13/06/2001 (fn 58), p. 8.

  82. Ibid., p. 8.

  83. Ibid., p. 7: “FIA proposes to enter into a 100-year agreement with a commercial rights holder for the marketing of FIA rights in relation to the formula one championship. All rights to organise and receive revenues from the championship will be transferred to this company for a fixed fee. FOA will not be automatically named as successor to the existing agreement. The draft agreement provides for the separation of commercial and regulatory functions in relation to formula one, allows FIA to use its logos etc. for regulatory purposes, acknowledges FIA as the sole regulator of the championship and does not contain any provision requiring FIA to favour this specific championship over others. FIA proposes to adopt a similar approach to the FIA World Rally Championship (FIA/ISC Agreement) and to any other commercially viable FIA series. FIA will enter into arms’-length commercial agreements which will provide for fixed payments to be made to FIA removing thus any incentive for FIA to discriminate in favour of any series for commercial purposes.”.

  84. Ibid., p. 8.

  85. Infra, 4.2.

  86. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato: Intese e abuso di posizione dominante. A378—Federazione Italiana Sport Equestri (FISE). Provvedimento n° 18285. Bollettino n°19 del 28 luglio 2008,

    http://www.agcm.it/component/joomdoc/bollettini/19-081.pdf/download.html, S. 5-12.

  87. Van Rompuy (2015a).

  88. Piau (fn 16).

  89. AGCM, Provvedimento n° 18285 (fn. 86), p. 6.

  90. Ibid., p. 12.

  91. Ibid., p. 8.

  92. Unofficial translation.

  93. AGCM, Provvedimento n° 18285 (fn. 86), p. 9.

  94. Ibid., p. 9.

  95. Ibid., p. 10.

  96. Ibid., p.10.

  97. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato: A396—Gargono Racing. Provvedimento n° 19946. 11 giugno 2009. Bollettino n°23, (http://www.agcm.it/component/joomdoc/bollettini/23-09.pdf/download.html), p. 5-28. Cf. Van Rompuy (2015a).

  98. KKV Beslut 2011-05-13 Dnr 709/2009 1 (52). http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/aktuellt/nyheter/beslut-svenska-bilsportsforbundet-2.pdf.

  99. Gemensamma regler (G) Utgåva 2011/2, inkl. Officiella Meddelanden t.o.m. vecka 50/2010, ab 110, dnr 709/2009.

  100. KKV: Beslut 2011-05-13 (fn 98), p. 5, at 1.

  101. 2 kap. 1 § konkurrenslagen (2008:579)) (KL).

  102. KKV: Beslut 2011-05-13 (fn 98), at 3.

  103. Ibid., p. 6.

  104. SEC (2007) 935, sec. 3.4. COM(2007) 391, p. 18 (fn 19).

  105. 3 kap. 1 § KL i.V.m. 6 kap. 1 § KL.

  106. KKV: Beslut 2011-05-13 (fn 98), p. 1, at 1:” […] utöver vad som är nödvändigt och proportionerligt för att säkerställa att bilsporttävlingar inom ramen för Svenska Bilsportförbundet ska kunna anordnas och genomföras på ett säkert, rättvist och välordnat sätt, eller ett därmed jämförbart erkänt legitimt syfte.”

  107. Ibid., p. 2, at 2:” […] ska berörda licensinnehavare ha möjlighet att begära motiverade beslut i enskilda fall och få beslut överprövade av en opartiskt sammansatt instans, såsom Riksidrottsförbundets skiljenämnd eller allmän domstol.”.

  108. Ibid., p. 2, at 3-5.

  109. Marknadsdomstolens Beslut 2012:16. 2012-12-20 Dnr A 5/11. http://avgoranden.domstol.se/Files/MD_Public/Avgoranden/Domar/Dom2012-16.pdf.

  110. More should be able to organise motor racing events. PRESS RELEASE 23 May 2011. http://www.konkurrensverket.se/en/news/more-should-be-able-to-organise-motor-racing-events/: “In May 2011, the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) ordered the Swedish Automobile Sports Federation to change its loyalty rules because it was considered as an unjustified restriction on competition, thus constituting an infringement of Art. 101 TFEU and its equivalent in the Swedish Competition Act.”.

  111. KKV: Beslut 2011-05-13 (fn 98), p. 42, at 207–208 refers directly to the Meca Medina ruling (fn 14), reaffirming the need to assess every individual case on its own merits.

  112. SCA PRESS RELEASE 23 May 2011 (fn 110).

  113. Competition and Consumer Protection Commission Case (reference number not available)—Date 01 May 2012—Name CASE SJI, Ireland. http://www.ccpc.ie/show-jumping-ireland-amend-allegedly-restrictive-rule.

  114. Van Rompuy (2015a).

  115. SJI 01 May 2012 (fn 113).

  116. Ibid.: “Following an investigation which commenced in 2011, the Authority formed the opinion that the Rule amounted to a decision of an association of undertakings which was likely to restrict, on the one hand, the participation of SJI members at unaffiliated show jumping events and, on the other hand, the organisation of such unaffiliated events in Ireland. The Authority considered the Rule to be disproportionate in relation to SJI's stated justification and took the view that the Rule was likely to infringe Irish and European law.”.

  117. Ibid.: “The amendment of the Rule reads as follows: ‘Members of SJI who enter unaffiliated shows with a prize fund above €50/£50 will be penalised if the show: (i) Has not signed up to the specified Health and Safety Standards; and, (ii) Has not provided SJI with evidence of adequate insurance.’”.

  118. KKV Case 590/2013.

  119. Cf. ECN Letter of 03/2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/03_2014/sv_body.pdf); ECORYS et al. (2016), 34–35; Van Rompuy (2015a).

  120. ECN Letter 03/2014 (fn 119).

  121. ECORYS et al. (2016), p. 35.

  122. Fn 14.

  123. Belgian Competition Authority, decision No.ABC-2015-V/M-68, 24 November 2015. See also Global Champions Tour, press release of 2 December 2015, "FEI Gives Go-Ahead To Riders For Global Champions League Following Order By Belgian Competition Authority", www.globalchampionstour.com//news/2015/1441/fei-gives-go-ahead-to-riders-for-global-champions-league-following-order-by-belgian-competition. Cf. Verdonk (2017), 84.

  124. Ibid., 18-19: Réglementations Générales de la FEI (version 2015): “An Athlete and/or Horse, even if registered with the FEI, is not eligible to participate in an International Event or National Event (and so may not be invited by an OC to such Event or entered by an NF in such Event) if that Athlete and/or Horse has participated, in the six (6) months prior to the first day of the International Event or National Event in question, in an Unsanctioned Event.”.

  125. Le Collège de la concurrence de l’Autorité belge de la concurrence. Décision n° ABC-2015-V/M-23 du 27 juillet 2015 en application de l’article IV.64, § 1 CDE. Affaire no CONC-V/M-15/0016. Demande de mesures provisoires de Global Champions League sprl et Tops Trading Belgium sprl contre la Fédération Equestre Internationale. https://www.abc-bma.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/2015vm23-abc-pub.pdf.

  126. Ibid.,, pp. 30-31: “Même si le concours ou la série respecte toutes//les règles et réglementations de la FEI – tel que le fait la Global Champions League – la FEI peut refuser de donner son accord pour toute raison arbitraire et commerciale, à son entière discrétion.” [Original emphasis].

  127. Ibid., p. 31, 76.

  128. Ibid., at 78: «Le processus d’approbation doit être transparent et objectif, d’autant plus que la FEI est par définition dans une situation de conflit d’intérêts lorsqu’elle donne son approbation à un concours international ou une série internationale d’organisateurs ou promoteurs indépendants qui lui font concurrence.» (Original emphasis).

  129. Ibid., p. 31, at 79. «Le processus d’approbation actuel de la FEI n’offre pas ces garanties. Il possède les caractéristiques indiquées ci-dessus (points et suivants): la FEI peut déterminer à son entière discrétion d’approuver ou non les concours et les séries de concours de ces concurrents, de fixer des règles d’invitation spécifiques et de travailler sans délais établis.»

  130. Ibid., at 80: «Par conséquent, le processus d’approbation de la FEI, appliqué dans le contexte de la Clause d’Exclusivité de la FEI, permet à la FEI d’abuser de sa position de régulateur sportif afin de promouvoir ses propres intérêts commerciaux aux dépens de ceux d’organisateurs et de promoteurs indépendants, ce qu’elle fait vis-à-vis de la Global Champions League.»

  131. Ibid., p. 159, at 2.

  132. Ibid., at 3.

  133. Ibid., at 4.

  134. Arrêt définitif de la Cour d'appel de Bruxelles. Dossier n°: VM-15-016. Décision n°: 15-VM-23. https://www.belgiancompetition.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/20160428_cab_2015mr1_fei_ad.pdf.

  135. Verdonk (2017), p. 80: “In contrast, several NCAs have conducted investigations into exclusivity clauses adopted by sports associations in a range of sports. Interestingly, the outcome of their approaches differ from the outcome of the Commission’s approach taken in the FIA case. While the NCAs shared a critical view towards exclusivity clauses, they did not consider the mere existence of sports associations with commercial interests as incompatible with EU competition law. They recognised the incumbent sports associations’ conflicts of interests developed on their side due to perceived competitive forces from the (attempted) establishment of a rival association (in particular as an organiser of professional sporting events), but exclusivity clauses, deriving from these conflicts, are not necessarily violating EU competition law. As a consequence, the current status of sports associations and their exclusivity clauses under EU competition law is unclear. From a perspective of legal certainty, the divergence between the Commission’s approach and the decentralised approach is obviously undesirable.” See also ibid., p. 84.

  136. Pijetlovic (2018), p. 355.

  137. Not found in the relevant DG COMP database (https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/), but mentioned on the website of Euroleague (https://www.euroleaguebasketball.net/euroleague-basketball/news/i/6p8c54yjk66qsitp/euroleague-basketball-presents-a-complaint-before-the-european-commission-against-fiba-and-fiba-europe) and discussed by Engelhard and Milanovic (2018).

  138. Pijetlovic (2018), p. 355: “[…] against FIBA and FIBA Europe for putting pressure on clubs, players and referees to force them to abandon the Euroleague and the Eurocup organised by Euroleague Commercial Assets (ECA) and only participate in FIBA competitions. National federations that took no steps to discipline their clubs and domestic leagues in this regard would lose their national team rights to participate in 2016 Rio Olympic Games and EuroBasket 2017 organised by the respondents. Two months later, FIBA launched an equivalent.”.

  139. Ibid., p. 356: “[…] against ECA for breaches of Article 102 TFEU, referring to the legal action against itself and FIBA Europe as a ‘smokescreen’ intended to mask ECA’s own anti-competitive behaviour. Specifically, FIBA’s complaint related to: (i) abusive compliance by ECA that imposed undue pressure on leagues and clubs and threatened them with exclusion from Euroleague; (ii) the undermining of any commercial and sporting value of domestic leagues and the competitive balance in European basketball by arbitrarily cherry-picking clubs for Euroleague and Eurocup, and; (iii) abusively discriminating against financially weaker clubs, thereby placing them at a further competitive disadvantage. In sum, and according to FIBA: ‘ECA wished to reap the benefits of the basketball ecosystem developed by national federations (players, coaches, referees, thousands of other clubs) without contributing to the foundations of the sport’s pyramid and holding the national teams hostage to serve the interests of six commercially powerful clubs.’”.

  140. Fenerbahce Spor Kulübu (Turkey), Maccabi Tel Aviv Basketball Club (1995) Ltd. (Israel), Olympiacos SFP BSA (Greece), Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (Spain), Club Baloncesto Gran Canaria Claret (Spain), Kosarkaski Club Olimpjia Lubljana, represented by its president Jani Moderndorfer, Vojkova Cesta 100 (Slovenia), Krepšinio Rytas VšĮ (Lithuania), Kosarkaski Club Cedevita (Croatia), Grono Sportowa S.A. (Poland), Balconesto Málaga S.A.D. (Spain), Jadranska Kosarkaska Asocijacija—Aba Liga j.t.d. (Croatia), Asociación de Clubs de Baloncestro (ACB) (Spain), Euroleague Properties S.A. (Luxembourg), Euroleague Commercial Asssets S.A. (Luxembourg).

  141. Munich Regional Court I Case no.: 1 HK 0 8126/16. 2 June 2016. Convenience translation by Gleis Lutz, https://www.euroleague.net/rs/6xk9sj4v9aybwosi/84bd1f8d-134d-42a0-a8ee-cd688d29aaa2/dbc/filename/munich-court-decision-english.pdf.

  142. Ibid., at 1, p. 3 (unpaginated).

  143. Pijetlovic (2018), p. 357: “The EU Commission will hopefully join the two cases and open the full investigation leading to a formal decision and it is hoped, provide clarification on an acceptable way to organise an alternative sporting structure.”.

  144. Pijetlovic (2018), p. 357: “The EU Commission now has an option to open a formal investigation into this dispute(s), or to reject the complaint(s) on the basis of there being no sufficient EU interest. As far as predicting the outcome of the potential investigation, both complaints have merit. ECA would be forced to revamp the rules on access to their competitions (to become open, transparent and non-discriminatory), and release the clubs from obligation to play in both Euroleague and Eurocup. At the same time, FIBA would be required to remove the threat of sanctions against any of the parties taking part in ECA organised competitions. However, if FIBA can prove that the manner in which ECA competitions are organised jeopardises domestic leagues, and that the chosen sanctions are the least restrictive method capable of protecting domestic leagues, it is not inconceivable that it might prevail in both cases.”.

  145. Infra, 4.2.

  146. Including by Bosman (2015), Heermann (2016), Kolasiński (2019), Kornbeck (2019c), Szyszczak (2018, 2019), Van Rompuy (2015a, b) and Verdonk (2017).

  147. This is the overarching argument in Kornbeck (2019c).

  148. Decision C (2017) 8240 final. Commission Decision of 8.12.2017 Case AT.40208. International Skating Union's Eligibility rules. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40208/40208_1384_5.pdf.

  149. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance). OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, pp. 1–25.

  150. Supra, 3.4.

  151. Supra, 3.7.

  152. Supra, 3.8.

  153. International Skating Union Constitution and General Regulation 2016 as accepted by the 56th Ordinary Congress June 2016 (https://www.isu.org/inside-speed-skating/speed-skating-rules/constitution-regulations-ss/file) (Accessed 18 May 2018), Rule 102(1)(c): “Participation of Skaters and Officials in national competitions and in non-competitive events, e.g. appearances, endorsements, exhibitions shows and other events with a recreational or show type character are subject to respective rules and conditions of their ISU Members only. Such rules and conditions are not part of the ISU eligibility rules under this Rule 102. However, ISU Members may not unduly restrict their Skaters to participate in non-competitive events. They may share payments received by their Skaters for participation in such non-competitive events in consideration of past and present support of such Skaters, but with no more than 10%. ISU Members shall monitor their Skaters to ensure that they do not participate in competitions that would render them ineligible.” See also Communication No. 1853. Betting/Gambling in ISU Sports. Milano, Ottavio Cinquanta, President. March 6, 2014. Lausanne, Fredi Schmid, Director General (https://www.isu.org/communications/214-isu-communication-1853/file) (Accessed 18 May 2018): “Regardless of the format of an international ice skating competition, the ISU reminds Members that participation i[n] any international ice skating competition not sanctioned by the ISU will result [in] the loss of ISU eligibility of the participants (See Rule 102 for eligibility and Rule 104 paragraph 14 & 15 of the ISU General Regulations as well as the ISU Event Calendar on the ISU website relating to ISU sanctioned competitions).”—Note that, as a result of the Commission’s Decision, and without prejudice as to ISU’s lawsuit of 19 February 2018 (Case T-93/18), the current text is: International Skating Union Constitution and General Regulation 2018 as accepted by the 57th Ordinary Congress June 2018 (see https://www.isu.org/isu-statutes-constitution-regulations-technical).

  154. Ibid., Art. 102(1).

  155. Decision C (2017) 8240 final (fn 6), Rec. 220: “[…] the protection of economic and/or financial interests does not, however, constitute a legitimate objective that can justify a restriction of competition. Such interests have also not been recognised by the Court of Justice as a legitimate objective capable of restricting the economic freedoms granted to undertakings operating in the EEA under Internal Market or competition rules. In particular, the Court has held that imperative requirements that can be invoked to justify limited restrictions to such rules can only be of a non-economic nature. […] Concerning the ISU's argument that it uses part of the revenues it generates through commercial activities for the development of the sport, the Commission notes that these funds are, however, also redistributed to the ISU's own Members for the organisation of international competitions (as indicated in recital (164)), thus putting third party event organisers at competitive disadvantage.”.

  156. Supra, 3.2-3.8.

  157. Decision C (2017) 8240 final (fn 6), Rec. 348.

  158. Ibid., Rec. 246: “With regard to the ISU's claim that the Eligibility rules are necessary to ensure the preservation of the solidarity model and of volunteering in skating, the Commission notes that the ISU mentions that this model is ‘at the heart of the ISU's objectives’ without providing any concrete details. In particular, it appears that the ISU does not refer to vertical solidarity (between professional and grassroots sport) but rather to horizontal solidarity (between richer and poorer participants in a given competition). The reference to the ISU Development Programme in this respect points to a very narrow and specific form of solidarity, that is, solidarity amongst the different ISU Members (so that all Members, including smaller Members or Members with fewer affiliates are able to develop skating and host and organise skating competitions).”

  159. Ibid., Rec. 247: “The ISU does not convincingly substantiate how preventing skaters from participating in speed skating events organised by third party organisers would be necessary to preserve the ISU's solidarity model. If the purpose is to foster and develop the sport of speed skating, a solidarity contribution to be requested from third party organisers of skating events may under certain circumstances be accepted but such a contribution should be fair and reasonable, be used to finance grassroots sports activities and not have exclusionary effects (a solidarity contribution should for instance not be used to cross-subsidise the events organised by the governing body collecting the contribution—or its Members—to the detriment of events organised by third party organisers).”

  160. Supra, 1.2.

  161. Decision C (2017) 8240 final (fn 6), Rec. 248: “The Commission notes that ISU Communication No 1974 refers to a solidarity contribution to be paid by applicants for the organisation of Open International Competitions to the ISU in favour of the developments of the ISU sport, but leaves the amount of the contribution unspecified. During the Oral Hearing, the ISU acknowledged that it does not apply any objective criteria to set the amount of the solidarity contribution, but decides on a case-by-case basis. This leaves a wide margin of discretion to the ISU to set the level of the contribution at an arbitrary and discriminatory level without any link to the development of the sport at a grassroots level.”

  162. Kornbeck (2019c), p. 76.

  163. SEC(2007) 935, sec. 3.4. COM(2007) 391, p. 18, fn 19.

  164. CJEU, 18 July 2006. David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission, Case C-519/04 P. ECR 2006 I-06991. ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, at 42–43.

  165. CJEU, 19 February 2002. J.C.J. Wouters, J.W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Case C-309/99. ECR 2002 I-01577. ECLI:EU:C:2002:98.

  166. PR 1—FINA meets with NFs on Athlete participation in international competitions. 15 Jan 2019. http://www.fina.org/news/pr-1-fina-meets-nfs-athlete-participation-international-competitions.

  167. Supra, 3.9.

  168. Case 3:18-CV-7393. United States District Court. Northern District of California. Thomas A. Shields, Michael C. Andrew and Katinka Hosszu v Fédération Internationale de Natation. Class action complaint for violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and the common law. Jury Demand. https://cdn.swimswam.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-12-07-Class-Action-Complaint-1.pdf.

  169. PR 1 (fn 166).

  170. BL 12, FINA By Laws 2017–2021. https://www.fina.org/sites/default/files/fina_by_laws_-_16032018_new.pdf.—VC. BL 12.10: “Failure to comply with BL 12 may lead to possible sanctions in accordance with C 12.6.”

  171. GR 4, FINA General Rules Approved by the FINA Congress on 29 November 2014. https://www.fina.org/sites/default/files/fina_generalrules.pdf—Cf. GR 4.5: “Any individual or group violating this Rule shall be suspended by the affiliated Member for a minimum period of 1 year, up to a maximum period of 2 years. FINA retains the right to review the suspension made by the affiliated Member and to increase it up to the maximum of 2 years in accordance with the circumstances involved. […] The affiliated Member shall abide by any such increase made on review.”

  172. PR 1 (fn 166): “FINA recognises the right of athletes to participate in any swimming event. However, this participation should respect the frame of sport structure. FINA’s business is not to punish athletes, although if the FINA rules are not met, the results of the competition will not be recognised by FINA”.

  173. Supra, 3.6.

  174. PR 1 (fn 166): “British Swimming was pleased to have been part of today’s meeting and we welcome the clarifications that were given by FINA,” said British Swimming Chairman Maurice Watkins CBE. “Our swimmers currently live, train and compete in the context of support systems that are focused on success at FINA’s flagship competitions: the swimming events at the Olympic Games, the World Swimming Championships, and our Continental Championships. Careful coordination will be required to ensure that any changes or additions to the competition calendar are complementary to preparation for those flagship events, so we can best support our athletes moving forward.”

  175. Ibid.: “We work hard to make sure that swimmers are at the heart of everything we do at USA Swimming,” said USA Swimming President and CEO Tim Hinchey. “Our athletes are extremely dedicated to our sport and deserve every opportunity to reap the rewards of their hard work. It’s been great to work with FINA to learn more about the new opportunities that will be provided thanks to the FINA Champions Swim Series. With around USD $ 4 million in prize money and appearance fees, the Series is a great addition and we look forward to U.S. swimmers prospering at each of the three legs.”

  176. Supra, 3.9.

  177. Communication No. 2156, Agenda of the 57th Ordinary Congress. Seville—2018, https://www.isu.org/communications/17037-isucommunication-2156/file), Sec. 38, p. 20:”Rule 102, paragraph 1. […] Reason: To fulfil the Council’s commitments to the European Commission to amend the Rule in this manner.”

  178. Case T-93/18, International Skating Union c Commission. Registered 19.02.2018. OJ C 142, 23.4.2018, p. 55.

  179. Case 3:18-CV-7393 (fn 168).

  180. Heermann (2016), p. 1057.

  181. Thus Agafonova (2019), p. 101: “It is true that despite the increasing complexity of business models and rise in revenues, SGB stay, first and foremost, regulatory institutes with unmodified mission and objectives. But the European sports model as a system definitely does not measure up to the realities of sports industry anymore and should evolve accordingly because, as it was fairly said, ‘the more the models stay the same, the more they change’.”

  182. Supra, 1.2: AG Kokott in MOTOE (fn. 11).

  183. Supra, 2.1–2.2.

  184. Pijetlovic (2018), pp. 358-9: “Sporting federations that maintain clauses in their rulebooks designed to block competing organisers will be forced to make necessary amendments and comply with the newly clarified legal environment if and when//challenged. The possibilities of entry into the organisational market for potential competitors, as well as the possibility of expansion for the existing market, must exist. This is bound to bring about a recharacterisation of the sports industry making it even more attractive for potential investors and opening even more commercial opportunities.”

  185. Supra, 3.1–3.9.

  186. Brocard et al. (2019).

  187. House of Lords: The Treaty of Lisbon: an Impact Assessment. Vol. I: Report (2008) HL Paper 62-I, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf, p. 63, sec. 4.99.

  188. Supra, 4.1-4.2.

  189. Depenalisation is a distinct policy option. Although Belgium decided to allow euthanasia explicitly, later even removing age restrictions, the initial solution had been to depenalise doctors performing it; see Burette et al. (2008). Obviously, this is an option which may clash with many citizens’ perception of justice (need for uniform application), and it may even be instrumentalised as a polite way of allowing a social practice without admitting it, while maintaining respectability. The latter might apply to the British Prime Minister’s announcement that he would consider depenalising failure to pay the BBC licence fee (Singh, 2020). The announcement was made at a time when Mr Johnson was known for having vented frustration with BBC coverage of the 2019 General Election which he perceived as anti-Tory.

  190. 1974 BGH, Az. II ZR 78/72, „Deutscher Sportbund“. See also Fischer (2018), p. 182.

  191. BGH, 02.12.1974, Az.: II ZR 78/72, Deutscher Sportbund, at 22: “Lehnt ein Monopolverband die Aufnahme eines Mitgliedschaftsbewerbers unter Berufung auf eine satzungsmäßige Aufnahmebeschränkung ab, deren Zweck an sich sachlich berechtigt ist, so kann die Aufnahmebeschränkung gleichwohl unwirksam sein, wenn jener vom Monopolverband verfolgte Zweck auch durch eine andere, ‚mildere‘Satzungsgestaltung erreicht werden kann, die die Mitgliedschaft des Bewerbers ermöglichen würde.” This may also account for the fact that German legal literature seems to be more advanced than that of other legal orders in terms of addressing this principle (which seems a reality of sports law and politics around the globe, though the exact extent still needs to be mapped by legal scholars), including by having developed a specific vocabulary to capture the complex issues at stake.

  192. Pijetlovic (2018), p. 358.

  193. Supra, 5.1.

  194. Van Rompuy (2015a).

  195. T.M.C. Asser Institute. Centre for International and European Law (undated).

  196. Van Rompuy (2015a).

  197. Van Rompuy (2015b), p. 207.

  198. Supra, 4.2.

  199. See e.g. 2018 LG München I, Urt. v. 25. 4. 2018, Az. 37 O 7111/17 (SpuRt 4/2018, 165).

  200. Ibid., Leitsatz 3: “[a]llein der Umstand, dass das Ein-Platz-Prinzip im Weltsport verbreitet Anwendung findet, begründet kein berechtigtes Interesse […] an dessen Aufrechterhaltung.”

  201. Cf. Geeraert and Drieskens (2017).

  202. Whereas Greenleaf (2012) had observed that the European model was being followed by more countries worldwide than the US model and called for a more confident European approach on the world stage, Greenleaf (2019), p. 50 noted, for the period 2014–2019, “at least 40 instances of ‘3rd generation’ principles typified by the innovations of the EU’s GDPR being adopted in Asian laws, the most popular being data breach notification requirements.”.

  203. Pollard (2014).

  204. Supra, 1.4, for the risk of Eurocentric bias.

  205. Supra, 1.2.

  206. Supra, fn 23.

  207. Esposito (2014), p. 185.

  208. Mataija (2016), p. 264.

  209. Reuters (2019).

  210. Terraz (2019a).

  211. Terraz (2019b).

  212. Meca Medina (fn 14).

  213. Supra, 1.4, for the risk of Eurocentric bias.

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    Jacob Kornbeck

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Kornbeck, J. What can sports governing bodies do to comply with EU antitrust rules while maintaining territorial exclusivity?. Int Sports Law J 20, 203–226 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-020-00171-x

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