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ABSTRACT
This paper examines patterns of intra-organisational evolution and reform of Fianna Fáil as a party organisation before and after the 2011 Dáil election, widely considered an ‘earthquake election’ that fundamentally undermined Fianna Fáil’s status as the dominant party in the Irish party system. Electoral losses had triggered reform in Fianna Fáil prior to 2011, but such reforms tended to be minor, as the party expected its opposition status to be temporary. This orientation changed after 2011, as the party’s very foundation seemed threatened, having suffered a historic decline of its electoral support and membership. We argue that the post-2011 re-orientation can be usefully characterised as a movement away from organisational characteristics associated with the ‘cartel model of party organisation’ towards characteristics echoing more ‘traditional mass party structures’, an organisational model less dependent on state resources, and more able to generate loyalty through organisational means. Whether the 2011 reforms will lead to lasting change is likely to depend on whether, and if so how quickly, Fianna Fáil can reclaim its position as the major party of government.
Acknowledgement
We thank all participants of the authors' workshop that took place in Dublin in spring 2016 for their helpful comments. particular thanks go to Sean McGraw and Eoin O'Malley, the editors of this special issue, who repeatedly commented on earlier drafts as well as the two IPS referees who helped to improve the final version of this article. All remaining errors are ours.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. The ‘cartel party’ as a party organisational model defined by intra-organisational features – which we refer to here – needs to be distinguished from the concept of a cartel party system as defined by inter-party relations (see Bolleyer, Citation2009) not dealt with in this paper.
2. There is a debate about whether mass parties require a ‘mass’ (i.e. a large number of members), a question that, for instance, has been asked with regard to the French Communist Party that has relatively few members compared to left-wing parties in other countries. Treating a mass party as an organisational model, however, what we consider decisive is the structural relationships cultivated between members and the different arms of the party organisation (e.g. central office, public office-holders).
3. See for a critique of the concept Koole (Citation1996).
4. The characterization of Fianna Fáil does not mean that the party did not define itself as a community, but that it did not use organisational means to demarcate its boundaries.
5. This is not meant to suggest that Fianna Fáil policies were implemented when the party was out of office, but that this continuity helped to stabilize the party’s support base.
6. Murphy and Farrell point out, based on data from 1998, that Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin were the parties that received the highest amounts of private funding (Citation2002: 230–231).
7. In 1966, it employed six full-time staff on a combined salary of £5,000. In 1977, the party employed 10 staff on a budget of £40,000. In 1973 it appointed a research director and a press officer. By 1985, there were 18 working in head office and 12 in the Oireachtas offices of the party (Mair, Citation1987a: 108).
8. In the Dublin South-East constituency, for example, it was estimated that just three out of 30 cumann were active.
9. This is distinct from OMOV being used as a means to disempower activists in favour of more passive (and easy to manipulate) rank and file members, a feature associated with the cartel party model (Katz & Mair, Citation1995).
10. We understand power here as the intra-organisational control over core arenas of intra-party decision-making considered in light of the party’s opposition status. The assessment might change if the party enters government office, as then a new set of actors – ministers and possibly a Taoiseach – come in, who might start again to dominate areas such as policy-making.