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Abstract
This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in 1993, however, Heydar Aliyev – like many post-Soviet leaders – inherited a genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijan's rulers have taken a different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50 original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the mechanisms by which the government has “hidden the opposition in plain sight” by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects – including noncompetitive elections by default and a politically disengaged society – that sustain long-term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in sustaining many of these regimes.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by a fellowship from the International Dissertation Research Fellowship Program of the Social Science Research Council. For helpful comments on previous versions of this paper, I am grateful to Margaret Hanson, Danielle Lussier, Neil MacFarlane, Ben Noble, Dann Nasseemullah, and Jessica Rich.
Notes
1. Azerbaijan is among the top 20 oil exporters in the world; by 2012, the government held an estimated $33 billion in the state oil fund (U.S. Energy Information Administration Citation2013).
2. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 6905), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
3. Author's interview with journalist (Respondent 1641), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
4. Author's interviews with country directors of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Respondents 5277 and 8995), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
5. Author's interview with opposition party leader (Respondent 2861), April 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
6. Author's interview with opposition party leader (Respondent 8189), March 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
7. See, for example, annual “Attacks on the Press” reports for Azerbaijan from the Committee to Protect Journalists, available at www.cpj.org.
8. Author's interview with journalist (Respondent 8900), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
9. The individual cases are too numerous to document here. For an overview, see Freedom House's “Freedom of the Press” reports (www.freedomhouse.org), the Committee to Protect Journalists (www.cpj.org), and Reporters without Borders (www.rsf.org).
10. Author's interview with opposition politician (Respondent 4511), December 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
11. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 9706), December 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
12. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 6905), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
13. Author's interview with country director of international NGO (Respondent 6107), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
14. Author's interview with country director of international NGO (Respondent 6107), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
15. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 9706), December 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
16. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 9706), December 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
17. Author's interview with journalist (Respondent 1641), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
18. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 6498), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
19. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 5158), November 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
20. More specifically, 5.9% of respondents said that the Musavat Party represented their interests, 1.7% mentioned the Popular Front Party, and 0.8% identified with the Azerbaijan Democratic Party. The same question was asked in the 2004 and 2006 iterations of the survey, with nearly identical results.
21. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 6905), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
22. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 7642), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
23. Author's interview with political analyst (Respondent 9706), December 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
24. Author's interview with political consultant (Respondent 8480), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
25. Author's interview with country director of international NGO (Respondent 8964), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
26. Author's interview with opposition politician (Respondent 4511), December 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
27. Author's interview with opposition politician (Respondent 9035), November 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
28. Author's interview with country director of international NGO (Respondent 6107), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
29. Author's interview with country director of international NGO (Respondent 6107), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
30. Author's interview with opposition politician (Respondent 4511), December 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
31. Author's interview with opposition politician (Respondent 8804), December 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
32. Author's interview with Azerbaijani academic (Respondent 5546), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
33. Author's interview with journalist (Respondent 1641), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
34. Author's interview with government official (Respondent 2247), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
35. Author's interview with Azerbaijani academic (Respondent 5506), February 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
36. Author's interview with foreign diplomat (Respondent 7056), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
37. Author's interview with Azerbaijani academic (Respondent 7943), October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
38. “Region” here refers to the non-Baltic post-Soviet countries.
39. Author's interview with country director of international NGO (Respondent 6107), February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
40. The average for non-Baltic post-Soviet countries is 15.9%. The largest youth cohorts (aged 15–24) in the region are found in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, where youth compose slightly over 20% of the population (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Citation2013).
41. These laws were further refined in 2002, when Georgia's Constitutional Court annulled the portion of this law that allowed local government to reject a notification.
42. Mubarak was elected with 99% support in 1981 after President Anwar Sadat's assassination. He was re-elected through referendum in 1987, 1991, 1999, and 1999, each time winning over 90% of the votes cast. In 2005, he was re-elected with 81% of the vote in a multicandidate election.