ABSTRACT
The theory of party institutionalization (PI) developed in classical party literature has been a crucial tool for analyzing political parties. This paper aims to introduce how alternative models have emerged in developing democracies, suggesting the main dimensions of PI (‘autonomy’ and ‘systemness’) are not always positively correlated like initially suggested. One of these coined the ‘trade-off’ model, represents a dilemma of leadership where one dimension needs to be traded off to enhance the other. This may occur in parties that have radically motivated activists. Strategic difficulties that it brings, affect ‘professionalization’ of parties and their survivability. The last model (the ‘non-democratic’ model) is an extreme version of the tade-off model and it occurs when ‘autonomy’ is maximized and ‘systemness’ is minimized – a phenomenon that occurs easier under dominant party systems. Last section of this paper focuses on a case study (Turkey) to illustrate these models using primary and secondary sources; theoretical works on parties, the Turkish party system, and empirical data relating to the Turkish case.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Some scholars (Birnir, Citation2005; Goldfrank, Citation2007; Hoskin, Citation1997; Yardımcı-Geyikçi, Citation2015) believe investigating participation, party membership, and financial records of parties can be imperative to understand the level of institutionalization in a country. Turkish party membership numbers are often bloated because fees are not collected properly and records are not kept. Clientelistic tradition of parties, the habit of local party officials of increasing the number of delegates they control by enrolling friends and relatives and the absence of any obligation on members to pay dues result in exceptionally large party memberships (Bosco & Morlino, Citation2006, p. 333).
2. Environment refers to the political system as a whole and all the actors it contains.