The human condition is an ineluctably temporal condition, and yet political theory has rarely and indirectly grappled with concepts, practices, and problems regarding time. Two notable recent exceptions are books by Julie L. Rose and Nichole Marie Shippen, both of which argue that free or discretionary time ought to be included in political considerations of justice. While their respective projects are valuable in themselves, their limitations also provide valuable illustrations of several fundamental problems that any political treatment of time must eventually consider. Drawing upon work on time from elsewhere in the social sciences and humanities, this essay critically examines three aspects of Rose’s and Shippen’s projects: 1) their unquestioning embrace of clock-time; 2) their neglect of phenomena of social acceleration; and 3) their attempts to secure greater individual autonomy through temporal practices that are essentially disciplinary in nature. While the “fight for (free) time” is indeed worth waging, doing so successfully requires a deliberate pluralism that acknowledges concepts and practices of time beyond the hegemony of the clock and calendar.