Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies
HANNA BÄCK,
MARC DEBUS,
PATRICK DUMONT,
HANNA BÄCK
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, Germany
Search for more papers by this authorMARC DEBUS
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, Germany
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
PATRICK DUMONT
Faculté des Lettres, des Sciences Humaines, des Arts et des Sciences de l'Education, Programme Gouvernance Européenne, Université du Luxembourg
Patrick Dumont, Research Programme on European Governance, University of Luxembourg, Route de Diekirch/BP 2, Office 2.21, Building 10, L-7201 Walferdange, Luxembourg. Tel.: (00352) 46 66 44 6743; Fax: (00352) 46 66 44 6401; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author
HANNA BÄCK,
MARC DEBUS,
PATRICK DUMONT,
HANNA BÄCK
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, Germany
Search for more papers by this authorMARC DEBUS
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, Germany
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
PATRICK DUMONT
Faculté des Lettres, des Sciences Humaines, des Arts et des Sciences de l'Education, Programme Gouvernance Européenne, Université du Luxembourg
Patrick Dumont, Research Programme on European Governance, University of Luxembourg, Route de Diekirch/BP 2, Office 2.21, Building 10, L-7201 Walferdange, Luxembourg. Tel.: (00352) 46 66 44 6743; Fax: (00352) 46 66 44 6401; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies.
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