Original Article
Economic development and democracy: An electoral connection
CARL HENRIK KNUTSEN,
JOHN GERRING,
SVEND-ERIK SKAANING,
JAN TEORELL,
MATTHEW MAGUIRE,
MICHAEL COPPEDGE,
STAFFAN I. LINDBERG,
Corresponding Author
CARL HENRIK KNUTSEN
University of Oslo, Norway
Address for correspondence: Carl Henrik Knutsen, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Moltke Moes vei 31, 0851 Oslo, Norway. Email: [email protected].Search for more papers by this author
CARL HENRIK KNUTSEN,
JOHN GERRING,
SVEND-ERIK SKAANING,
JAN TEORELL,
MATTHEW MAGUIRE,
MICHAEL COPPEDGE,
STAFFAN I. LINDBERG,
Corresponding Author
CARL HENRIK KNUTSEN
University of Oslo, Norway
Address for correspondence: Carl Henrik Knutsen, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Moltke Moes vei 31, 0851 Oslo, Norway. Email: [email protected].Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Scholars continue to debate whether economic development affects regime type. This article argues that a clear relationship exists between development and the electoral component of democracy, but not – or at least less so – between development and other components of broader understandings of democracy. This is so because development enhances the power resources of citizens and elections provide a focal point for collective action. The theory is tested with two new datasets – Varieties of Democracy and Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy – that allow us to disaggregate the concept of democracy into meso- and micro-level indicators. Results of these tests corroborate the theory: only election-centred indicators are robustly associated with economic development. This may help to account for apparent inconsistencies across extant studies and shed light on the mechanisms at work in a much-studied relationship. Further analysis shows that development affects electoral democracy by reducing electoral fraud, election violence and vote buying.
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