Do indicators influence treaty ratification? The relationship between mid-range performance and policy change
Corresponding Author
SHAINA D. WESTERN
Politics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland
Address for correspondence: Dr. Shaina D. Western, Lecturer, Politics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh, 15a George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, Scotland.
Email: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
SHAINA D. WESTERN
Politics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland
Address for correspondence: Dr. Shaina D. Western, Lecturer, Politics and International Relations, University of Edinburgh, 15a George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LD, Scotland.
Email: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Treaties are a valuable tool for policymakers because they are both legally binding on, and symbolically powerful signals of, commitments of states that ratify. Why states choose to ratify treaties is unclear, although social pressures appear to play some role. This article argues that global performance indicators can influence the ratification process, but that the effect varies depending on where states fall on these measures. In the mid-range of a scale, fast ratification has significant benefits and relatively few costs. However, indicators have less of a catalysing effect at the extreme ends of the scale, where the costs are higher and the benefits are lower. This article uses policy performance indicators as independent variables in duration analyses of the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003) and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (2000). It finds states in the mid-range of the indicator are faster to ratify than states that are not ranked, whereas the other categories are statistically insignificant. These findings imply that indicators matter for those in the middle, but not as much for those at the extremes. This finding enriches our understanding of treaty ratification and has potential implications for performance metrics as a tool to promote policy change for those states in the middle, highlighting the strengths and limitations of indicators as a force for change.
Supporting Information
Filename | Description |
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ejpr12476-sup-0001-SuppMat.dta4 MB | APPENDIX |
ejpr12476-sup-0002-SuppMat.do6.8 KB | Supporting Information |
ejpr12476-sup-0003-SuppMat.docx32.4 KB | TABLE S1. Analysis of ratification of the PHT with a separate category for states included in the report but not given a score TABLE S2. Analysis of ratification of the PHT combining Tier 2 Watch List and Tier 3 TABLE S3. Analysis of ratification of the protocol on human trafficking with Polity IV as the measure of democracy TABLE S4. Analysis of ratification of the protocol on human trafficking world ratification also included TABLE S5. Analysis of ratification of the CAC, smaller categorical groupings of CPI TABLE S6. Analysis of ratification of the CAC with Polity IV as the measure of democracy TABLE S7. Ratification of the corruption treaty with global ratification included |
ejpr12476-sup-0004-SuppMat.dta4.6 MB | Supporting Information |
Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
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