The Origins of Democracy in England
Abstract
This article uses a rational choice model of the origins of democracy to analyze the political history of medieval England from the Norman conquest to the Hundred Years War. Why did a country just taken over by a ruler more autocratic than his predecessors develop a political system increasingly dominated by the rule of law and protodemocratic institutions? The authors argue that protodemocratic institutions such as the Magna Carta, Parliament, and an independent judiciary evolved as unintended consequences of the self-interested wealth-maximizing behavior of rulers and some of their subjects. The evolution of contractual relations between rulers and nobles, towns, and Jewish financiers is shown to be consistent with the theory. The article concludes with a discussion of why the rule of law was more secure and protodemocratic institutions were stronger and more enduring in England than in Continental monarchies.
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1.
1. Several recent rational choice models of politics have analyzed relations between rulers and subjects as evolving contractual bargains and have discussed some of the determinants of the type of bargains reached (North 1982; Bates and Lein 1985; Levi 1988; North and Weingast 1989; Root 1989). This body of work has also explored the creation of credible commitments through the evolution of institutional mechanisms of contract enforcement. The theoretical model used in this article (Barzel 1991a) differs from previous work in two main ways. First, instead of slicing into ongoing relations between rulers and subjects, the model begins with the creation of an autocratic state. Second, the model is more general than those proposed in previous work. For example, Levi (1988) and Bates and Lien (1985) focus only on taxation (in the latter, the discussion concerns only the distinction between mobile and immobile assets), Root (1989) is concerned only with loans, and North and Weingast (1989) combine the two. Barzel's (1991a) model attempts to explain these as well as many other relations.
2.
2. No pure autocracy has ever existed, and medieval England is no exception. The assumption of autocracy is used to give the model a precise starting point, but none of the arguments we present require that the state is, in fact, totally autocratic.
3.
3. Unless otherwise noted, all arguments in this section are from Barzel (1991a).
4.
4. Although we have focused only on the issue of how heirs produce continuity in relationships between rulers and subjects, they have other effects as well. First, hereditary systems of government are prone to royal minorities (periods in which a minor must inherit the crown). Although it is impossible to predict when these will occur, we can be certain that they will, and that when they do, the balance of power between rulers and dominant classes will be temporarily tipped toward the latter (Kiser 1986-87, 1987 analyzes the effects of royal minorities on politics in early modern Europe). On this issue, two questions are of central importance: How did the ruler's associates attempt to protect their interests during the minority? How were regents prevented from exercising full power? Second, our stress on the advantage of having heirs should not obscure the fact that heirs sometimes try to take power before the current ruler dies. Moreover, in an era of high mortality, more than one heir is often necessary, but this leads to conflicts between potential heirs. Unfortunately, there has been no systematic study of the role of heirs in the relationship between rulers and subjects.
5.
5. Norman England was only relatively free from external threats. For the early part of the period we cover, the French possessions had to be defended, and Scotland was also periodically threatening.
6.
6. William split the land he gave to each of the Norman nobles into several small manors scattered throughout the country. It is plausible that security was the rationale for the splitting. Since dispersed manors are more costly to manage than unitary ones, this entailed a trade-off of wealth for security. The wisdom of this decision is indicated by the fact that three of the four largest land areas (earldoms) that William did give intact to Norman nobles were the site of revolts during the next 50 years (Stenton 1908).
7.
7. Rulers also entered into contracts with the church. Since complications raised by three-party interactions involving rulers, popes, and the English clergy would require a detailed analysis beyond the scope of this paper, we will not provide a systematic discussion of relations between rulers and the church. However, some aspects of this relation suggest that our model may also be useful for analyzing this phenomenon. The cooperation between rulers and the church in England began with the conquest, when the pope supported William's claim to the English crown. Most of the contracts between rulers and the English church concerned property rights. In return for the land that rulers granted to them, the church initially provided military service to the crown and later was given the right to provide the monetary equivalent. The contracts stipulate that when church land was left vacant (e.g., following the death of a bishop), it, and all the income from it, temporarily reverted to the crown. The rulers were obligated also to appoint a successor as soon as possible. Two opportunities for exploitation, however, arose from this situation: Rulers could maintain the vacancy and keep the income from the land themselves, or they could sell profitable offices in the church. Clauses prohibiting these practices appear often in contracts with the church, but violations of the contract seem to have been frequent (Barlow 1983; Warren 1973). It seems that the main reason why contracts with the church were violated so often is that they lacked adequate enforcement mechanisms. King John's dispute with the pope over the election of the archbishop of Canterbury illustrates the problem well (see Warren 1961). Attempting to curb John's power in the matter, the pope used the two main enforcement mechanisms at his disposal: He called a general strike of the English clergy (putting all of the souls in England in jeopardy), and he excommunicated John. The pope, however, overplayed his hand. John's response was to confiscate church property. In retrospect, it transpired that the contract with the church was self-enforcing, as John was unable to gain from the confiscation: His inability to manage the property efficiently led to its return.
8.
8. Perhaps because the enforcement mechanism was so crude, these sanctions were dropped in subsequent versions of the Magna Carta.
9.
9. An ongoing debate concerns the interests of the nobles who drafted the Magna Carta (see Treharne 1969, 63-65). We obviously do not subscribe to the view that they were early constitutionalists furthering the national interest.
10.
10. Neither the initial confiscatory taxation of Jews in 1239 nor the termination of their relations with rulers in 1290 occurred during periods in which rulers lacked heirs.
11.
11. We agree with Tilly (1990) and Rasler and Thompson (1990) that war facilitated “state making.” We attempt to elaborate their arguments by specifying microlevel causal mechanisms and by disaggregating the concept of state making into the development of specific protodemocratic institutions.
12.
12. The conquest of England had no doubt demonstrated that some wars could be very profitable for all parties on the winning side. Of course, not all wars are intended to produce gains; some are necessary just to avoid great losses. Nobles in the council had to decide whether particular proposed wars could be justified on either of these grounds.
13.
13. In addition to those already discussed, rulers contracted with several other groups. As the specialization and differentiation of the economy increased, the number of groups with whom rulers could profit by contracting with increased. Edward I (1272-1307) created a contract - the Charta Mercantoria - with foreign merchants trading in England. This contract gave many privileges to foreign merchants, in exchange for an increase in the rate of customs duties they paid (Bourne 1866, 24). In the 14th century, Edward III signed charters granting privileges to many guilds (including the Fishmongers Company in 1363 and Drapers in 1364; Bourne 1866, 34). The privileges granted included internal democracy and control of justice in guild matters, along with monopolistic positions in the economy (Bourne 1866, 37). It is not clear whether or not these were the first such contracts. Carus-Wilson (1954) indicates that money was taken from guilds as early as the reign of Henry I but does not specify what was given in return. Trading companies were also beginning to emerge in the 14th century. The earliest of these, the Merchants of the Staple, was recognized by the crown in 1313 and became a chartered company later (Bourne 1866, 39).
14.
14. In spite of this, the English judiciary after the conquest was not very independent. Interference by the king in local courts became more systematic and more frequent after the conquest, and the will of the king “generally... prevailed” (Taylor 1889, 241), especially in the reign of the heirless William Rufus (Barlow 1983).
15.
15. It seems that the same factors that caused an increase in the violation of contracts by Richard and John also caused this regression in the rule of law discussed earlier.
16.
16. Medieval Japan provides another interesting contrast, as both the rule of law and the autonomy of towns developed without any accompanying representative institutions (Hall 1906). A comparative study that includes the Japanese case may thus be able to separate the factors responsible for the development of legal institutions from those that promote protodemocratic representative assemblies.
17.
17. The fact that Swiss mountain cantons had the most democratic form of government in medieval Europe (Blockmans 1978) also supports the notion that isolation may facilitate the development of democracy.
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