Introduction
Europe’s party systems are in flux, as indicated by functionalist and structuralist perspectives on party competition. The functionalists point to aspects such as declining party identification and increasing electoral volatility (e.g.
Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000), which skyrocketed in countries hardest hit by the Great Recession (e.g.
Dassonneville, 2018). The structuralists, by contrast, emphasize emerging cleavages and the role of challenger parties in articulating new oppositions (e.g.
Bornschier, 2010;
de Wilde et al., 2019;
Kriesi et al., 2012). Recent work in this tradition shows how Europe’s latest crises have reinforced long-term trends of part system transformation (e.g.
Hooghe and Marks, 2018;
Rovny and Whitefield, 2019).
However, both perspectives neglect that the key driving forces may not only have changed in programmatic terms but also in organizational form and action repertoire. That is, political parties seem to increasingly blur the lines between electoral and protest politics. Following
McAdam and Tarrow’s (2010) forceful call almost a decade ago, social movement scholars have thus returned to study the manifold interactions between electoral and protest dynamics (for an overview, see
Hutter et al., 2019). Among the Europeanists, we can identify two main strands: On the one hand, some authors have taken up
Kitschelt’s (2006: 280) concept of “movement parties,” defined as coalitions of activists who emanate from social movements and try to apply movements’ organizational and strategic practices in the electoral arena. Studying cases from the political left—such as Podemos or Syriza (e.g.
della Porta et al., 2017)—and from the political right—such as Jobbik or the Alternative for Germany (e.g.
Caiani and Císař, 2019;
Pirro et al., 2019)—these scholars aptly describe the fuzzy empirical boundaries between political parties and social movements, while indicating the transitional status of such hybrid entities. On the other hand, other scholars have approached the topic from a more systemic and programmatic perspective, linking the study of issue agendas in protest and electoral politics (e.g.
Císař and Vráblíková, 2019;
Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2018;
Walgrave and Vliegenthart, 2019). This research provides ample evidence on the close yet varying coupling of protest agendas and parties’ activities during electoral campaigns and in parliament.
Missing from this emerging field of research is
a large-scale comparative analysis that maps and explains the varying extent of party-movement interactions. A key reason for the absence of such large-
N work is the lack of comparable cross-national data. Another one is the lack of established standardized measures to examine the phenomenon at hand. In this article, we innovate by providing a standardized indicator of the extent to which protest and electoral politics relate to each other across 30 European democracies and over 16 years (2000–2015). More specifically, we concentrate on the extent to which political parties sponsor protest activities in the streets. Following
Rucht (1998: 41), we broadly define sponsorship as (co-)organizing, taking part in and/or calling for participation in a protest event. As any standardized indicator for large-scale cross-national comparisons, the extent of party-sponsored protests comes at the cost of reducing complexity. Most importantly, the indicator emphasizes the action component over more organizational or ideational relations.
1 Nevertheless, we consider our study an important complement to the cited case studies on movement parties and the small-
N cross-national comparisons of issue agendas.
We innovate, moreover, by embedding our original empirical endeavor in a theoretical framework that builds on
Kitschelt’s (2003) ideas of ever-more differentiated modes of interest intermediation in advanced democracies. It is under such conditions that the emergence of movement parties is seen as atypical and transitional (
Kitschelt, 2006: 280). We elaborate on the scope conditions of Kitschelt’s argument to explain the varying extent of party-sponsored protests across European countries. We also deduce expectations about differences in the type of sponsored protests (“what?”) and the type of sponsoring party (“by whom?”) depending on the level of party-sponsored protests, that is, on the level of arena differentiation. Our related
research questions are as follows: To what extent do parties mobilize in the protest arena? What types of protest events do parties sponsor? What does the typical “protesting party” in Europe look like? And how do the types of events and parties differ depending on the level of party-sponsored protests?
Our results underscore that party-sponsored protests are an important feature of contemporary protest politics in Europe. However, the extent to which political parties are major players in the protest arena varies considerably across countries, mirroring differences in democratic history and the strength of civil society. In line with parties’ incentives, we also find significant differences in the types of events sponsored by parties. Compared to the average protest in a country, they are less radical, larger, and more likely to address the so-called cultural issues or the functioning of the political system. This difference is most pronounced in highly differentiated contexts, that is, in contexts where party-sponsored protests are relatively rare. Similarly, the type of protesting party varies across contexts. In highly differentiated contexts, the typical protesting party in Europe mirrors the “outsider image” of movement parties much more than in less differentiated ones. Overall, our study adds quantitative insights on cross-national variations for a better understanding of party–movement interactions which should be incorporated into more case study-based designs.
Data and methods
Having outlined why the extent of party-sponsored protests may differ across European countries and how that may affect the type of sponsored events and the type of political party we observe in the streets, we now turn to the strategy used to test our claims. One of the main reasons why party-sponsored protests have not yet been studied comparatively is the lack of large-scale protest event data sets covering multiple countries over time. For this reason, we collected an original protest event data set based on the coverage of English-language newswires. In general, protest event analysis—as a type of content analysis of media sources—has been one of the major advances in the field of protest and social movement research as it allows for quantitative analysis of protest in a cross-sectional and longitudinal setting (for a review, see
Hutter, 2014).
Data were collected with semi-automated tools in a joint effort by the ERC project “Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON)” at the European University Institute and the SNF project “Years of Turmoil” at the University of Zurich. It is based on the coverage of 10 English-language newswires (on the data collection, see
Kriesi et al., forthcoming, and Online Appendix A). The data set covers protests in 30 European countries: all European Union member states (apart from Croatia), Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland during a 16-year period from 2000 to 2015. The data set covers 17,048 protest events with an organizational sponsor which involved around 268 million participants. The data set includes information on the date, the size, the form (demonstration, petition, strike, violent, blockade), the claim (economic, culturally libertarian/conservative, political in terms of a close connection to the functioning of the political system, e.g., anti-corruption rallies), and the organizer (parties, unions, other organizations) of the event. Based on the date of the event, we create two indicators to identify protest events which happened in the half a year period before a national parliamentary or presidential election or during the half-year after. We also created an indicator of “big events” to identify the events attended by more than 100,000 participants.
As stated initially, we adopt a broad definition of sponsorship referring to instances when parties (co-)organize, take part in, and/or call for participation in a protest event. Such a definition goes clearly beyond the support of the claims of protests and includes support of the action form as well. Thus, it represents a standardized measure to get closer to the extent to which protest and electoral politics are related to each other. However, it does not allow us to differentiate whether parties play a significant role in the organization of the protest event or not. As
Rucht (1998: 41) highlighted some time ago, such fine-grained measures are beyond the scope of a protest event analysis based on media reports.
Overall, 13% of all protest events in our data set have been sponsored by parties. We matched each of the sponsoring parties with the ParlGov data set (
Döring and Manow, 2018) to gain further information about the vote share, ideology, party family, as well as opposition/government status of each party. More specifically, we rely on three ideological scales: a general left–right scale, an economic left–right scale, and a cultural libertarian–authoritarian scale.
3 We code parties as mainstream if they were classified by ParlGov as Christian-democrat, conservative, liberal, or social democrat. To gain information on the extent to which a party organization resembles that of a mass party, we rely on an expert survey conducted by
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) in 2008/2013.
4 We replicate their indicator and rely on an additive index of four, equally weighting items in which experts are asked to evaluate (1) how strong the party apparatus and (2) the party membership is in determining policy (seven-point scale), (3) whether the party has a “significant membership base” relative to the other parties in the system (dichotomous), and (4) whether the party is organizationally affiliated with any interest/civil society group, including, but not limited to trade unions, business associations and church groups (dichotomous).
To measure the two contextual features introduced before, we rely on the period of democratization and the strength of civil society. We distinguish Northwestern European countries which democratized before or in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War from Southern European and Eastern European countries included in the second and respectively third wave of democratization. To measure the strength of civil society, we rely on the expert survey-based “core” civil society index of V-Dem (
v2xcs_ccsi, see
Coppedge et al., 2017). The measure is an aggregate index of three indicators: civil society entry/exit, civil society repression, and civil society participatory environment. The index was designed to reflect the robustness of civil society understood as an autonomous sphere where citizens are active and free to pursue their political and/or civic goals, however conceived.
Empirical results
To begin with,
Figure 1 shows the level of party-sponsored protest as a function of the context in which they take place. To do so, we show the average share of party-sponsored protests depending on the strength of civil society and democratic history. For the latter, we broadly distinguish between Northwestern, Southern, and Eastern European countries.
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As the results show, relative to a context with strong civil society (where parties are only present in a little over 10% of all protests), the share of party-sponsored protests doubles in a context where civil society is comparatively weak, and it reaches over 20%. Regarding the timing of democratization, the results are very similar in Northwestern and Southern Europe. In both regions, parties are on average sponsoring a little over 10% of all observed protest events. Based on this result, Southern Europe passed the threshold of having a differentiated landscape of interest intermediation. In contrast, the share of party-sponsored protests is substantially higher in Eastern Europe, where parties are present in 23% of the protest events. To examine the interaction of the strength of civil society and the timing of democratization, we checked the extent to which the weakness of civil society leads to a larger share of party-sponsored protests in each region individually. The result included in Online Appendix E shows that the two factors have a separate, additive effect on the level of party-sponsored protest.
Turning to country differences and the relationship between parties’ involvement and overall levels of protest mobilization, we examine the share of party-sponsored protests relative to the total number of events per country. As
Figure 2 indicates, the relationship between the share of party-sponsored protests and the overall protest mobilization in a country is curvilinear. Parties are unlikely to dominate the protest arena in countries where protest is rare
and in countries where protest is frequent. The figure also reveals the suspected regional clusters. While Northwestern European countries are diverse regarding the level of protest, the share of party-sponsored protests is relatively low. The Southern European countries are even more diverse regarding the overall level of protest—with Greece, Spain, and Italy having the highest and Cyprus, Malta, and Portugal the lowest level of mobilization—but are very similar in having an average level of party presence. The Eastern European countries have a low-to-average level of protest, but they are the ones where the share of party-sponsored protest reaches its highest levels. Overall, our results indicate a limited ability for parties to ride the wave of mobilization: for parties to become the dominant actors in protest, there needs to be some level of protest mobilization, but above a certain threshold they are crowded out (also confirmed when looking at participation numbers, see Online Appendix E).
We now turn to the type of protest event that parties sponsor. As previously discussed, we expect party-sponsored protests to differ from other protest events, especially in a context of high differentiation (= low levels of party sponsorship). To examine the moderating role of a differentiated landscape of interest intermediation, we split our sample into two groups. We consider countries where the share of party-sponsored protest is above the 11% median threshold as
weakly differentiated, whereas we code countries below the median as
strongly differentiated (see Online Appendix C).
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To map the characteristics of party-sponsored protests, we calculated the share of different event characteristics among all party-sponsored events (see
Figure 3). In general, the results indicate that party-sponsored protests share important features across both contexts. First, most party-sponsored protests are addressing cultural demands, and only a smaller fraction of them address economic issues. Second, over 85% of them are non-confrontational or violent (with over two-third taking the form of public demonstrations). Third, party-sponsored protests are sometimes co-organized with other organizations, but in more than 70% of the cases parties are reported as the only organizational sponsor. Finally, a substantive share of the party-sponsored events falls into the category of “big events”, defined as events with more than 100,000 participants. The most pronounced cross-context differences refer to the larger share of co-organized (29% vs. 18%) and big events (28% vs. 18%) in more differentiated contexts.
To what extent and how do party-sponsored protests differ from non-party-sponsored events? To answer this question, we ran logistic regression models with party-sponsorship as the dependent variable. All models include country fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country. As a function of the level of party sponsorship, we split the sample between contexts of high and low differentiation, but we also conducted models with interactions. To ease the interpretation of the results, we present coefficient plots and include the regression tables in Online Appendix B.
The results of the regression analysis in
Figure 4 support the expectation that party-sponsored protests are more likely to center on cultural and political issues than economic ones. Also, political parties are likely to organize protests alone, and these protests take the form of demonstrations or petitions rather than strikes (for details, see Online Appendix B). In line with our expectations, we find a more clear-cut picture in highly differentiated contexts, where party-sponsored protests are less prominent in the protest arena. In such contexts, party-sponsored protests are also less confrontational or violent than non-party-sponsored events, and they are more in sync with the electoral cycle. More specifically, our results suggest that political parties are more likely to take it to the streets shortly before and after Election Day in highly differentiated contexts, whereas we find no statistically significant electoral cycle effects in less differentiated contexts. We also modeled the likelihood of party-sponsored protests as a function of the overall flow of protest mobilization over time. Similar to the cross-national pattern in
Figure 2, we observe a curvilinear relationship in countries with low differentiation (see the results in Table 1 of Online Appendix B). In differentiated contexts, by contrast, party-sponsored protests seem to develop independently from the overall dynamics of protest mobilization. We take these results as evidence of our two key expectations: party-sponsored protests are systematically different from other types of protest events, and the differences we expected regarding form, issues, and timing are stronger in a context of high differentiation (=low levels of such party-sponsored events).
Turning to the type of political parties that are sponsoring protests, we again start with some descriptive findings. This time we calculated the share of different party characteristics among all party-sponsored events.
7 Figure 5 shows that most protests are sponsored by parties that do not belong to the political mainstream in terms of their party family or which have no government experience.
8 Importantly, in contexts of low differentiation, 44% of all party-sponsored protest events are organized by mainstream parties, whereas in highly differentiated contexts, their share only reaches 33%. The share of parties with executive experience also drops from 26% to 20%. Moreover, more than 80% of all party-sponsored events are being organized by parties in opposition.
The descriptive findings tend to support our expectations of the typical protesting party in Europe. However, we had to construct a party-level data set to systematically compare the involvement of different parties across contexts. To do so, we calculated the number of times a particular party sponsored an event during a cabinet.
9 We find that a large number of parties sponsor protest: overall, there are 266 parties from the 30 countries under scrutiny which at some point from 2000 to 2015 protested. Unfortunately, only 137 of them were included in the expert survey on party organizations. The estimates presented in
Figure 6 are based on this subset of the sample, but the effects for the other variables remain the same for the larger sample of 266 protesting parties (see Online Appendix D). To explore the variation of the types of parties protesting, we ran OLS regression models with country-fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country. The units of analysis are political parties and the dependent variable is the number of events a party sponsored during the term of a government. We also controlled for the duration of the government.
Figure 6 presents the results graphically (for the regression tables, see Online Appendix B).
Our key expectation regarding the profile of protesting parties referred to their resemblance to movement parties, that is, they belong to the green or radical right party family, are in opposition, without government experience, and adopt a mass-party organization. In general, the regression results in
Figure 6 reinforce our descriptive findings. We find that parties are more likely to take it to the streets if they belong to non-mainstream party families and are in the opposition. At the same time, the results underline that the effects for government experience and mass-party organization only point to the expected direction in more differentiated contexts. In less differentiated contexts, political parties with a wider variety of organizational models tend to sponsor protest events, and having a history of government participation even shows a small positive effect. Interestingly, the opposite holds when looking at the effects of the current configuration of power. It turns out that opposition status has an even larger positive effect on protest sponsorship in less differentiated systems. The finding points to the importance of strategic factors rather than the more structural features associated with movement parties in explaining which parties are likely to take it to the streets in such a context.
Conclusion
In this article, we presented the first large-scale comparative analysis of parties’ involvement in protest politics, covering 30 countries and the years 2000–2015. In doing so, we aimed to contribute to the literature on party system change. This literature highlights the transformations that party organizations and systems have witnessed since the 1970s, and it argues that we are faced with an ever-more complex party landscape. However, it tends to give short shrift to parties’ activities outside the electoral arena. More specifically, we contributed to the emerging scholarly literature on party-movement interactions in three respects: First, by proposing a standardized indicator for the extent to which protest and electoral politics relate to each other; second, by showing that parties’ involvement in protests differs across political contexts; and third, by mapping the profile of a typical party-sponsored event and a typical protesting party.
Using parties’ relative presence in protest as a standardized indicator of the relationship between electoral and protest politics, we were able to test and qualify
Kitschelt’s (2003,
2006) argument about increasingly differentiated landscapes of interest intermediation. Overall, we find that a relatively diverse set of parties does take it to the streets. We also highlight that parties’ protest activities differ across contexts in terms of its level and character. The differentiation of interest intermediation is a development specific to established democracies with a strong civil society. In contrast, parties are more dominant outside of their home arena in Eastern Europe, where democratization happened later and participation in civil society organizations is lower.
In highly differentiated contexts, where parties are less significant protest sponsors, party-sponsored events are predominantly peaceful demonstrations, often well-attended, co-organized, concern cultural issues, and are in sync with the electoral cycle. Although a relatively large variety of parties protests in this context as well, the typical protesting party mirrors the outsider image of movement parties (
Kitschelt, 2006): it does not belong to a mainstream party family and has no government experience. Therefore, the typical protesting party we find in this context corresponds to the profile of parties described in the literature as challenger parties (e.g.
de Vries and Hobolt, 2020) and as main agents of cleavage transformation (e.g.
Kriesi et al., 2012).
In less differentiated contexts, where parties are more likely to be dominant actors in protest politics, the type of party-sponsored events and the character of protesting parties are more diverse. The events are more likely to be confrontational, often rather small, and organized by the parties alone. Parties in less differentiated contexts mobilize when there is some protest on the streets, but protest activity has not yet reached its peak. Their presence also appears to be fairly independent of the electoral calendar. Protesting parties in this region are more often from the political mainstream, with some governing experience, but currently in opposition. In this regard, parties tend to follow a more strategic logic in deciding when to mobilize on the streets than the outsider image of movement parties would suggest.
We believe that by showing what type of protest events parties sponsor, which type of parties choose to protest, and under what conditions, the article provides a useful model for reconnecting party and social movement research. In a time of high volatility, decreasing turnout, and growing mistrust in parties, protests and social movements are ever-more seen as a potential source of democratic innovation. By showing the blurred boundaries between arenas of interest intermediation, our study highlights the interdependence and strategic use of protest mobilization by political parties. While parties may be able to channel the demands of the street in institutionalized decision-making processes, their presence threatens to appropriate the claims of protest movements and to narrow the space for radical political alternatives. At the same time, protest sponsorship might add to the resilience of political parties, providing them with one foot on the street and another in parliament. However, future research should account for the strong cross-context variations revealed by our study when interpreting specific cases of party-movement interactions and their consequences.