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Social Organizations, Risk-sharing Institutions, and Economic Development

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Institutions and Comparative Economic Development

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

Economic, legal, and political institutions are important determinants of economic development (see, for example, North 1990). Economic institutions govern interactions among economic agents, legal institutions govern contractual relations and the private use of force, and political institutions govern the political decision-making process. Economic and political developments thus require institutions that support impersonal exchange and align the incentives of political decision-makers and the public.1

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University, USA

    Avner Greif

  2. University of Colorado, USA

    Murat Iyigun

  3. Goldman Sachs, USA

    Diego Sasson

Authors
  1. Avner Greif
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  2. Murat Iyigun
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  3. Diego Sasson
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University, USA

    Masahiko Aoki

  2. Duke University, USA

    Timur Kuran

  3. University of California, Berkeley, USA

    Gérard Roland

Copyright information

© 2012 International Economic Association

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Greif, A., Iyigun, M., Sasson, D. (2012). Social Organizations, Risk-sharing Institutions, and Economic Development. In: Aoki, M., Kuran, T., Roland, G. (eds) Institutions and Comparative Economic Development. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137034014_3

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