Armed conflicts, 1946–2013

Violence in Syria continued on a massive scale throughout 2013, pitting the Assad government against a large number of rebel groups and affecting most areas of the country. Among high profile battles, the early March fighting over the town of al-Raqqah in the north deserves a special mention since it was the first provincial capital lost by the government to the rebels. During subsequent months the fortunes of war changed, however, something that became palpably clear with the fall of strategically located al-Qusayr to government troops, heavily assisted by Hezbollah (from Lebanon). Since 2012, the government has made use of air strikes to target locations controlled by the rebels. A notable example of such air campaigns could be seen in Aleppo in the latter half of December 2013, when bombs resulted in great numbers of victims. One of the most well-known events of the year was the chemical attack on suburban Damascus on 21 August. These attacks have been subject to substantial debate and available evidence seems to indicate that the government was responsible.⁸ During the year, the opposition’s side became increasingly fragmented and reports speak of up to 1,200 armed opposition groups (Lund, 2013), with often complex and fluid relationships. Indeed, the groups are diverse in terms of ideology; some secular and others – such as the originally Iraqi organization ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, alternatively Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) – Islamist extremists.

When coding the 2013 violence in Syria, UCDP came across a series of problems that led to the decision to not include any of its fatality estimates for 2013 in this article. Some issues are specific to Syria and others apply to a small subset of conflicts and require a more in-depth discussion. A major issue when coding has been that violence is on such a massive scale that it is impossible to cover it entirely for any reporters, most independent media and most watchdog organizations. In a situation where daily summaries (when given) indicate between at least 100 and 150 fatalities, no one seems to be able to provide disaggregated information on this, which UCDP coding guidelines require, in order to distinguish between state-based conflict, one-sided violence and non-state conflict. However, an attempt to solve this was made by creating special coding rules for Syria, by which summary figures were recorded in the high estimate for state-based violence.

While this coding rule allows UCDP to include much of the information that was published in news reports, another – probably even bigger – problem is that much of the violence has been under-, or even un-reported. The other sources systematically used by the UCDP are helpful in filling some gaps, but they cannot provide the daily reporting that is the hallmark of news media. Under reporting was especially obvious when other high-profile international events overshadowed developments in Syria – a phenomenon commonly referred to as ‘issue crowding’. For instance, attempts to initiate a negotiation process were made throughout the year, finally resulting in the early 2014 Geneva II talks. During these initiatives, the media frequently chose to report the ups and downs in international diplomacy, only mentioning the ongoing violence in passing and typically at the end of articles. However, issue crowding was only part of the problem; reporting on the number of people killed seems to have declined overall during 2013. Even when there were no competing developments, there were spells of limited reporting. This was most probably a result of so-called ‘issue fatigue’, which is a phenomenon that has been observed by UCDP in a small number of other, high intensity conflicts.⁹ Experience suggests that it is usually possible to get better fatality information as time passes and reliable organizations have had a chance to investigate what really happened. A good example of this is the case of one-sided violence in DR Congo in 1996–1997; massive violence took place in the eastern part of the country, but numbers more or less ceased to be reported. Well aware of this, UCDP used figures for these years cautiously and kept searching for better information. When this became available (mainly through UN’s so-called Mapping Report¹⁰) numbers were substantially revised. Elements of this could also be seen in Iraq and Afghanistan in earlier periods.

In the few cases where UCDP’s conventional method proved problematic, it was normally possible to supplement this with other sources. However, in the Syrian case, there simply are no available reliable alternatives. While there exist organizations dedicated solely to reporting on the Syrian conflict (e.g. the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and Violations Documentation Centre), it is difficult to determine their neutrality, as they are often perceived to be connected to the opposition side. In fact, the UN stopped updating its numbers in July 2013, explaining in early 2014 that due to the difficulties in verifying and cross-checking information, the organization would no longer provide fatality estimates for Syria (Pizzi, 2014).

As previously noted, in 2013, seven conflicts reached the level of war, up by one since 2012. Even though the number of wars has seen an uneven increase since the four that were recorded for 2007, the number remains at a low level in the perspective of the post-1946 period (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Syria was most probably the most violent conflict (see above), followed by the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, South Sudan and DR Congo.

Fighting over government power in Afghanistan continued to escalate in 2013, causing over 8,000 battle-related deaths. Violence of this magnitude has only been recorded once before during the post-1989 period – in 1994. During 2013 the NATO-led forces formally handed over security control to Afghan forces, which appears related to an increase in the number of fatalities among Afghan police and soldiers. The draw-down of the international forces continued, and at the end of 2013 the total number of ISAF troops in the country was roughly 87,000, down from 100,000 at the beginning of the year. As previously, the Taliban mainly relied on road-side bombings, suicide bombings and ambushes as their main tactics. The widespread use of improvised explosive devices continued in 2013. Most of the violence was concentrated in the Taliban strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with provinces such as Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Ghazni bearing the brunt of the fighting.

After four consecutive years of decreasing conflict activity, 2013 saw fighting between the Iraqi government and ISIS intensify once more, especially during the second half of the year. As in previous years, the group carried out large-scale, often coordinated, attacks involving suicide bombers or car bombs and also continued to target Sahwa members (Awakening councils), Sunni tribal militias that sided with the government. At the same time the group expanded, both in terms of its aims and its geographical reach, to also include Syria.

In 2013, the conflict over government power pitted the Pakistani government against two Islamist groups; TTP (Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan: Taliban Movement of Pakistan) and Lashkar-e-Islam, with fighting against the former making up the bulk of the violence. Recorded as a war for the sixth year running, a look at the number of battle-related deaths reveals a distinct decline between 2012 and 2013, as the number of fatalities decreased by half. One factor that has been mentioned for the relative lull in fighting was that TTP appeared to have been weakened by US drone strikes reducing the Taliban leadership;¹¹ another factor referred to was the ‘talks about talks’ that took place during the year. Although formal negotiations failed to materialize, there were reports asserting that TTP held back its attacks intentionally. It remains unclear whether this was due to a genuine wish to initiate talks, or a strategic choice in order to regroup.

The conflict between the Nigerian government and the Islamist Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) escalated markedly in 2013 and was for the first time recorded as a war, with over 1,600 battle-related deaths. When Boko Haram succeeded in establishing its authority over some areas of the Borno state in the country’s far north-east, President Goodluck Jonathan imposed a state of emergency in the three north-eastern states and launched a large-scale military offensive. The group was subsequently forced to retreat into semi-arid land on the northern border with Niger, and to the Mandara Mountains along the border with Cameroon, and violence temporarily declined. However, Boko Haram proved resilient and attacks and killings soon intensified again.

South Sudan has seen consistent conflict since it gained its independence on 9 July 2011. However, compared to developments in late 2013, the first two years of the country’s history were relatively calm. What caused the conflict to reach a new level of intensity was the outbreak of fighting between two factions of the ruling SPLM/A (Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army). By mid-December, factions of the Presidential Guard battled one another in the capital Juba; one loyal to the sitting President Salva Kiir and the other to the former Vice-President Riek Machar who had been ousted from his position in July. Fighting rapidly spread from Juba to other areas, being particularly fierce in the states of Bor, Maklakal and Unity. Fighting was largely along ethnic lines, with Salva Kiir’s followers mainly coming from South Sudan’s largest ethnic group Dinka, and Riek Machar’s – taking the name SPLM/A in Opposition – from the second largest group, Nuer. This distinction is far from clearcut, however.

In 2013, the conflict over governmental power in DR Congo escalated and was recorded as a war in UCDP data for the first time since 2000. This increase in conflict intensity was by and large due to developments between the government and M23 (Mouvement du 23-Mars: March 23 Movement), but two additional groups were active during the year: APCLS (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain: Alliance of the People for a Free and Sovereign Congo) and a small group consisting of followers of Pastor Joseph Mukungubila Mutombo. M23 was defeated in November, after heavy fighting pitting the group against government troops that were supported by the MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) intervention brigade. The latter were able to remove the rebels from Nyiragongo and Rutshuru Territories in North Kivu, areas that had been out of government reach since the late 1990s. Remnants of the group were forced to flee across the border into Uganda, where negotiations were initiated. On 12 December the parties signed separate documents declaring the war to be over.

One new conflict erupted in 2013: Malaysia (Sabah). Following a business deal with a British company in the 19th century, the UK acquired control of Sabah and after World War II handed the territory to what is today Malaysia. Yet, the Sultanate of Sulu has a historical claim over the area, which originates back in the 17th century. In 2013, a force called Royal Soldiers of Sulu Sultanate arrived by boat in Sabah from the Philippines, which has been a long-time supporter of the Sultan’s claim. A three-week standoff followed during which Malaysia tried to convince the Sulu force to leave the area. However, on 1 March shooting began and after a month of clashes almost 70 people had been killed. When the Sultan died in October, the group vowed to continue to claim Sabah but only through diplomatic and legal means.

Two previously registered conflicts were resumed by new actors: DR Congo (Katanga) and India (Bodoland).

The conflict over the status of the Congolese mineral-rich province of Katanga has a long history, dating back to the early 1960s. In 1960, only 11 days after Congo gained its independence, the creation of the State of Katanga was announced and fighting ensued. While the rebels were defeated by 1963, other separatist movements emerged over the years. However, it was not until 2013 that the fighting crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold again. This time government forces clashed repeatedly with a group called Kata Katanga, a loose alliance of small groups fighting for the liberation of Katanga.

After a two-year lull in fighting, the conflict over the north-eastern Indian territory referred to as Bodoland resumed in 2013. Four years after the separatist NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland) signed a ceasefire in 2004, one of the group’s top leaders – Ranjan Daimary – vowed to continue fighting for independence. His faction subsequently fought the government intermittently through 2009 and 2010. In June 2013 NDFB–RD entered into negotiations with the government, leading to, in November, the signing of an agreement for the suspension of belligerent operations. Ranjan Daimary’s decision to negotiate with the Indian state spawned the creation of a further splinter group, NDFB-S, led by Daimary’s Lieutenant I K Songbijit. Songbijit's new faction clashed on numerous occasions with Indian security forces in 2013, and this fighting caused 29 fatalities.

Four conflicts were restarted by previously registered actors: Myanmar (Karen), Myanmar (Shan), Mozambique and Uganda.

The status of the Karen territory has been an issue of contention since Burma, now Myanmar, gained its independence. A number of different armed organizations representing the Karen ethnic minority have fought the Myanmar government, the most notable being KNU (Karen National Union). In late 2011, DKBA 5 (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Brigade 5), a group that had broken away from KNU in 1994, agreed to a ceasefire with the government and in early 2012, KNU followed suit. Negotiations were held through 2012 and 2013, but in April fighting erupted between government forces and DKBA 5, with both sides determined to control the territory around the Hat Gyi Dam Project. The fighting was brief, but caused a little over 40 fatalities before it ended. The two parties subsequently met in May to discuss methods of preventing further clashes.

Like its Karen counterpart, the territorial conflict over the Shan area in eastern Myanmar has a long history. In late 2011 and early 2012, the government signed ceasefire agreements with the two active rebel groups and these were largely respected through 2012. However, in 2013 the conflict escalated again, with the most intense fighting taking place in the first half of the year. Talks were held between the parties on several occasions, and while they did produce agreements on resettlement of refugees and peacebuilding plans, they failed to end the violence.

The peace and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) processes in Mozambique have often been hailed as successes. Indeed, the 1992 comprehensive peace agreement was able to terminate a 16-year long and extremely bloody conflict, followed by 20, mostly peaceful years. However, the fighting between the government and Renamo resumed in 2013, albeit on a far smaller scale than previously. Tensions between the two parties were reignited as Afonso Dhlakama, long-time leader of Renamo, rejected the legitimacy of the country’s political institutions and threatened to restart the conflict. A Renamo military base was subsequently re-established and the last armed remnant of the group – the Renamo Presidential Guard – was remobilized. The background to this was the accusation by Renamo that the Frelimo-run authorities were breaking the 1992 peace agreement through rigging elections, establishing unfair electoral laws and harassing Renamo members. Analysts also point to increasing internal problems within Renamo. The trigger was a police raid on Renamo's party headquarters in early April 2013, after which a series of skirmishes ensued, continuing sporadically throughout the year.

In Uganda, the conflict over government power, involving the two groups ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) and LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army), became active once more in 2013. Both groups are based outside Uganda – ADF in DR Congo and LRA in DR Congo, as well as in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave on the border between Sudan and South Sudan – and Kampala is therefore dependent on the assistance of neighboring governments to be able to confront the rebels. Many analysts agreed that ADF displayed improved fighting abilities during the year, as well as increased strength. Its increasingly brazen attacks caused large flows of refugees to cross the border into Uganda. As for LRA, the group appeared to continue to weaken and there were no major attacks on civilians, which has been one of their signature activities over time. The regional task force charged with tracking down and dealing with LRA, AU-RTF (African Union-Regional Task Force) became both more forceful and effective during the year. However, the crises in CAR and South Sudan caused major setbacks for its operations, causing draw-backs in troop deployment and restrictions in its geographical reach.

Five conflicts recorded for 2012 were not active in 2013: Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), India (Garoland), Israel (Palestine), Mali (Azawad) and Rwanda.

The conflict between Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh has been active intermittently since the ceasefire in 1994. And even though the agreement ended the bloodiest phase of the conflict, the situation along the ad-hoc ceasefire line has remained tense. There have indeed been relatively frequent skirmishes and clashes, causing between ten and 30 battle-related deaths yearly. Consequently, UCDP’s inclusion threshold, while met occasionally, was not so in 2013.

The conflict between the Indian government and the separatist rebel group GNLA (Garo National Liberation Army), which erupted in 2012, was not active in 2013. However, the decrease in violence was in fact small; the two sides clashed regularly during the year and at 21, the number of battle-related deaths recorded was just below UCDP’s inclusion level.

After a violent period with tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Hamas, an open-ended ceasefire was agreed on 21 November 2012. The relative calm that ensued continued into 2013 and the conflict was not recorded as active. In July the USA initiated a new round of peace talks between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, but by the end of the year they had yet to yield substantial results.

With the rebel group FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda: Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) based outside the borders of Rwanda, in eastern DR Congo, the Rwandan government’s ability to carry out attacks has been closely tied to its relationship to the regime in Kinshasa. At some points, Rwanda has been allowed to enter Congolese territory and at other times it has had to rely on Congolese troops to carry out the fighting. This has all been played out in the context of Kigali occasionally accusing Kinshasa of actually supporting FDLR, and the Congolese regime claiming that Rwandan troops are aiding Congolese rebel groups. As a result of these dynamics, Rwanda was forced to withdraw its forces from Congolese territory on 30 August 2012. Subsequently, Rwandan forces were not able to engage FDLR in 2013, and given the break-down in relations with Kinshasa, neither did the latter. The conflict thus ceased, at least temporarily.

2013 was a violent year in Mali, with fighting taking place between the government and its allies (mainly France, but also an ECOWAS-organized military mission that later in the year handed over to a UN mission) and Islamist rebel groups striving to implement an Islamic state. In UCDP terminology, the conflict was fought over government power. However, the conflict fought over the status of the Azawad area, which had pitted the government against the separatist Touareg rebel group MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in 2012, was not active in 2013. MNLA took the opportunity to re-establish control over parts of northern Mali when the intervening forces pushed the Islamists out of all urban centres, and even though the relationship between the separatist group and the Bamako regime was tense, large-scale fighting did not reappear. Instead, a negotiation process was initiated, but at the end of the year it had failed to yield tangible results.

During the year, six peace agreements were concluded, three in the Philippines, one in the Central African Republic, one in DR Congo and one in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

In the Philippines, negotiations between the government and the rebel group MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) over the status of the Mindanao territory have taken place over several years and a peace agreement was signed in late 2012. The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro resolved a number of things, but at the start of 2013, there were important outstanding issues. Thus, during the year, three annexes were hammered out; one on the creation of a Transition Committee tasked with drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law and proposing constitutional amendments; one on wealth-sharing; and one on power-sharing.

In the Central African Republic, the year 2013 started with peace talks between the Seleka rebels and the government in Gabon under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States. The talks resulted in the signing of the Libreville Agreement on 11 January, providing for transitional and power-sharing measures as well as a ceasefire.

Also in the conflict between the DR Congo government and M23, the year began with peace talks. They resulted in the signing of the ‘Agenda for the Dialogue between the Government of the DRC and the M23 on the situation in Eastern Congo’ on 16 January. However, as the name indicates, the accord only sets the agenda for future talks and failed to resolve any issues.

In 2012 an armed conflict was fought between South Sudan and Sudan, caused largely by ambiguities pertaining to the two countries’ common border, which had yet to be demarcated. After involvement by the African Union, a peace agreement was signed on 27 September 2012, under which the two parties agreed, for instance, to create a demilitarized zone and principles on border demarcation. However, there were a number of matters remaining and hostilities persisted during the rest of the year. In 2013 negotiations continued and on 12 March the ‘Implementation Matrix for Agreements between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan’ was signed in order to facilitate the coordinated implementation of the 27 September accord. No fighting between the two parties was recorded during the year and the implementation of the accord progressed.

While the number of peace agreements increased from four to six in 2013, the results of the accords were not encouraging. In the Central African Republic, fighting resumed a little over two months after the signing of the Libreville Agreement and Seleka succeeded in ousting the sitting president, seizing power. This, in turn, spawned the outbreak of even fiercer fighting that still continues. In DR Congo the accord signed in January failed to curtail the violence, and fighting intensified during the rest of the year, causing over 1,000 battle-related deaths for the first time since 2000. As for the Philippines, the group involved in the negotiation process remained committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but three other rebel groups continued their armed struggle, one of which was a splinter from MILF that rejected the talks.

External third parties played an important role in all of these processes. African regional organizations were involved in CAR and in Sudan–South Sudan processes. Furthermore, neighbours played a role in DRC (Uganda, Rwanda) as well as in the Philippines (Malaysia). Although the issues of conflict may be seen as internal, solutions seem to require external mediation capacity and possibly support also in implementation.

An armed conflict¹⁹ is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state.

The incompatibility is the stated (in writing or verbally) generally incompatible positions. A more detailed definition can be found on UCDP’s webpage, at http://www.ucdp.uu.se.

The conflicts are divided according to type of conflict.²⁰

The conflicts are also divided according to their intensity into two categories:

Battle-related deaths are those fatalities that can be related to combat in a conflict dyad. Typically, battle-related deaths occur in what can be described as ‘normal’ warfare involving the armed forces of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run attacks/ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities and villages, etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its installations, or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians killed in crossfire, indiscriminate bombings, etc. All deaths – military as well as civilian – incurred in such situations are counted as battle-related deaths.

UCDP codes three different fatality estimate – low, best and high – based on the reliability of reports and the conflicting number of deaths that can be reported for any violent event.

It is the best estimate of battle-related deaths that determines both whether or not a dyad will be included in the UCDP data (i.e. the best estimate needs to be 25 or higher) and whether the intensity is recorded as minor armed conflict or war.

Cases that have been completely rejected on the grounds that they definitely do not meet the criteria of armed conflict are not included in the list below. For the conflicts listed here, the available information suggests the possibility of the cases meeting the criteria of armed conflicts, but there is insufficient information concerning at least one of the three components of the definition: (a) the number of deaths, (b) the identity or level of organization of a party or (c) the type of incompatibility. The list of unclear cases for the entire 1946–2013 period is currently under review, but will be published at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ later this year. The unclear aspect may concern an entire conflict or a dyad in a conflict that is included in Appendix 1.