A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government
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1. See, as well, Charles Lindbloom, "The Market as Prison," The Journal of Politics and Markets 44, no. 2 (May 1982): 324-36; and idem, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
2. See, for example, Margaret Levi, "The Predatory Theory of Rule," Politics & Society 10, no. 4 (1981): 431-65; Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1981). Further refer ences to Levi's work are given below.
3. Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1981). See also Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York: International Publishers, 1972); Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); and B. Hindes, "Marxism and Parliamentary Democracy," in Marxism and Democracy, ed. A. Hunt (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980).
4. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959): 69-105. See also James Coleman's concluding essay in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review 61 (March 1967): 72-79. See also the critique in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968).
5. Michael Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1972), 13.
6. Ibid., 18. See also J. G. Edwards, "The Personnel of the Commons in Parliament under Edward I and Edward II," in Essays in Medieval History Presented to Thomas Frederick Tout, ed. Andrew G. Little and Frederick M. Powicke (Man chester : Books for Libraries Press, 1967), 197-214; Albert F. Pollard, The Evolu tion of Parliament (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1926); and May McKisack, The Parliamentary Representation of the English Boroughs during the Middle Ages (London: Frank Cass, 1932).
7. John Bell Henneman, Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War Financing 1322-1356 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 22.
8. Ibid., vii.
9. Aristide R. Zolberg, "Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modem States: France and England," International Social Science Journal 32, no. 4 (1980): 695.
10. Ibid.
11. Zolberg also stresses the importance of the French monarch's need to main tain a standing army; Britain's strategic position enabled it to rely upon naval forces, which could not be turned inward, as it were.
An important related issue that we do not examine in this paper is the taxation of the wool trade in England. See, for example, T. H. Lloyd, The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) and P. J. Bowden, The Wool Trade in Tudor and Stuart England (London: Macmillan and Company, 1962).
12. James Field Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property 1290 to 1334: A Study in Medieval English Feudal Administration (Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of America, 1934), 3.
13. Sydney Knox Mitchell, Taxation in Medieval England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), 6.
14. Joseph R. Strayer, "Introduction," in The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, ed. William A. Morris and Joseph R. Strayer (Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of America, 1947), 8. Note also that Prestwich concludes: "Taxes on moveables had been developed into an essential financial expedient. The attempts to make use of taillage and a feudal aid in the last years of the reign had shown that there was little future in prerogative forms of taxation. It was clear that the consent and goodwill of the community of the realm was essential if ade quate supplies of funds were to be forthcoming, and the importance of Edward's financial expedients in promoting a system of parliamentary representation is self evident." Prestwich, War, 222-23.
15. Henneman, Royal Taxation, 25-26.
16. Ibid., 169.
17. Ibid., 166.
18. See also the important pieces, Margaret Levi, "Towards a Theory of Rule and Revenue Production: The Fiscal Basis of the Early Modern State of France and Britain," manuscript, April 1983 ; and William Brustein and Margaret Levi, "Rulers, Rebels and Regions, 1500-1700" (Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Public Choice Society, Atlanta, March 1983). See also Joseph Schumpeter, "The Crisis of the Tax State," in International Economic Papers, ed. A. Peacock et al. (New York: Macmillan, 1954); and Otto Hintze, "The Formation of the State and Constitutional Development: A Study in History and Politics," in The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, ed. Felix Silbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).
19. Thus Henneman notes: "The brief memorandum submitted to the King in 1339 certainly suggests that the government would have preferred to negotiate taxes with assemblies rather than doing so locally." Henneman, Royal Taxation, 326.
20. Ibid., 319.
21. The enforcement of agreements also imposed costs on monarchs. They therefore demanded that those with whom they negotiated be in a position to make commitments that were binding. Thus, again and again, scholars note that mon archs, in calling for representative assemblies, demanded that the delegates who were sent to negotiate taxes be fully empowered to make binding pledges. See, for example, Henneman, Royal Taxation, 167ff; Prestwich, War, 179ff; and Morris and Strayer, The English Government, passim.
22. Mitchell, Taxation, 163. The argument thus far covers the taxation of all similarly situated agents-all members of a common trade or occupation, and so on. Insofar as the spread and completion of markets led to the broader mobility of assets, then the span of the binding agreements could be expected to broaden. The movement of tax negotiations to the level of the great council in England (Mitchell, Taxation, 206ff) and the establishment of national tax rates as opposed to ones for locales (Willard, Parliamentary Taxes, 65ff) suggest the operation of such forces. Their slower operation in France suggests the slower evolution of national markets there. See also David Friedman, "A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations," Journal of Political Economy 85 (February 1977): 59-77.
23. As can be seen in the specification of the model, the validity of these asser tions depends upon the assumption of private rights in property. In this connection, it is notable that medieval monarchs clearly did not confer influence over policy to foreigners, such as Italians or Jews. Being foreigners, these groups lacked secure property rights and thus the "leverage" achieved by other groups who controlled taxable assets.
In constructing the model, we have represented the preferences of the monarch as diverging from those of the taxpayer; in this way, we have been able to explore the impact of bargaining. Were the case degenerate-that is, were V+ precisely equal to V--then the monarch would simply become an agent of the private interests for purposes of policy making. The model would then represent the classic instrument alist-Marxist theory of the state, and taxation would represent the financing of a government that supplies policies embodying the interests of the privileged classes.
24. Quoted in Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 60.
25. Ibid., 72-73.
26. Ibid., 94-95.
27. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
28. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1961).
29. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56 (1962): 947-52.
30. Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politics of Air Pollution (Baltimore: Johns Hop kins University Press, 1971).
31. Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago and London: The University of Chi cago Press, 1981).
32. See, for example, Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of Cali fornia, 1973).
33. For a review of the materials on international corporations and their impact on developing societies, see Peter Evans, "Recent Research on Multinational Corporations," Annual Review of Sociology 7 (1981): 199-223.
34. A vigorous statement of this position is Mike Warren, "Imperialism and Cap italist Industrialization," New Left Review 81 (September-October 1973): 3-44.
35. Fernando H. Cardoso, "Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Authoritarian Brazil, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), 142-76.
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