

Supplementary Appendix

1. Additional Information on Solt's Data

As discussed in the main text, most Gini coefficient datasets are plagued with problems of comparability (see Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; Solt 2009). Gini coefficient observations contained in the same datasets are calculated from national surveys. Different countries use different methods, units of reference and definitions of income, rendering observations non-comparable across countries. For example, while some surveys use individuals as their unit of analysis, others use households. Gini coefficients are likely to differ widely depending on how they have been calculated (see Galbraith 2012; Jenkins 2015; Solt 2009).

Some authors have tried to solve this issue simply by adding constants to account for the average gap between different types of surveys (e.g., Deininger and Squire 1996). For example, they estimate the average difference between Gini indexes calculated based on individuals and households and add fixed adjustments. However, this approach has many problems (see Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; Galbraith 2012; Solt 2009). In general, the effect of using different units of reference and definitions of income depends among other things on the family structure, the details of the tax laws, and the propensity to save; all of which vary widely across countries (Solt 2009).

The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) dataset is probably the Gini coefficient dataset in which observations are the most fully comparable across countries and within countries over time. But, unfortunately its coverage is highly limited. For example, Table A1 below, which employs the LIS data, covers only 111 country-year observations on 31 countries. The small coverage has at least two main consequences. First, it prevents us from studying the causes and consequences of inequality and redistribution in a vast number of countries. For example, the LIS has only a

handful of observations on developing countries. The LIS, for instance, does not have a single observation on sub-Saharan Africa apart from a few recent observations on South Africa. Yet studying the causes and consequences of inequality outside the small number of rich democracies covered by the LIS is of substantive interest. For example, as explained in the text, a vast recent literature on inequality and regime transition builds on the logic of the RRMR model. Since most autocracies are from the developing world, it may be more appropriate to test the assumptions on which such model relies using countries that are similar to them. The relationship between inequality and redistribution in developing countries is also interesting in its own right. Yet the relationship may not be the same among developed democracies and democracies that have emerged in the developing world. Therefore, testing the relationship in datasets that cover developing countries is important.

Second, the fact that the number of observations within countries is so low reduces the capacity of scholars to adopt the most appropriate estimation strategy. For example, as explained in the main text, there are good reasons to believe that one should include country fixed effects when estimating the effect of inequality on redistribution. However, our capacity to include country fixed effects is limited by the low number of observations on most countries in the LIS (which may explain why few previous authors have done so). Many countries have only a single observation, meaning that it is impossible to estimate the effect of within-country variations in inequality in such countries.

The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), created by Frederick Solt, provides “income inequality data that seek to maximize comparability while providing the broadest possible coverage of countries and years” (Solt 2014, p.1). Solt (2009, 2014) uses the LIS dataset as his gold standard and develops an algorithm to standardize Gini indexes from other

sources, such as the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). It is important to note that he does not impute missing observations (i.e. those on which no data source is available). In this paper, I employ version 5 of the dataset.

His procedure is as follow. First, he classifies each observation in eleven combinations depending on the method, unit of reference and definition of income used. For each country-year (on which data source is available), he then estimates the ratios between each combination. Finally, he uses these ratios to standardize the observations.

The method he uses to estimate the ratios rests on the argument that cultures, family structures, tax laws, propensity to save, etc., tend to be relatively persistent within countries over time. Therefore, arguably the best predictor of a given ratio for a country at one point in time is that same ratio for that country at a proximate time (however, see below). Whenever sufficient information on a given ratio is unavailable for a country, Solt (2009, 2014) uses information on that ratio from other countries within the same region (he defines eight regions).¹ The resulting dataset contains market and net Gini indexes on 174 countries (including autocracies).

As explained in the main text, the measures of redistribution used in this paper capture the difference between market and net inequality of a country in a given year. For some countries, however, Solt (2009, 2014) has limited information on either net or market inequality. In these cases, his estimates of market or net inequality rely not only on information from the country itself but also from countries from the same region. Therefore, I use two different samples: an extended sample and a restricted sample. The extended sample contains all the country-years for which Solt (2009, 2014) provides estimates of market and net inequality. The restricted sample covers only

¹ More detail on the procedure used by Solt (2009, 2014) is available at <http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/papers/Solt2014.pdf>.

observations for which Solt (2009, 2014) has data source on both net and market inequality. The choice of the sample is subject to a trade-off. The additional observations contained in the extended sample are of lower quality, but the use of the restricted sample reduces the substantive interest of the findings for questions related to developing countries, since most countries that are dropped from the sample are from the developing world. The best option is to do the analysis with both samples. Therefore, while the main analysis uses the extended sample, results are reproduced with the restricted sample in the supplementary appendix (Tables A12-A14).

The dataset of Solt (2009, 2014) does not reach the same level of comparability as the one of the LIS – although it is (arguably) higher than that of other datasets with similar coverage – notably because the standardization process introduces uncertainty. The data quality problem is particularly serious for developing countries. Data on inequality are based on information collected by national governments. The capacity of a country to collect such information accurately increases with its level of economic development. The data of the LIS, which is the goal-standard employed by Solt (2009, 2014), are overwhelmingly from developed countries. It is therefore important to remember that the new countries/observations covered by the analysis reported in the main text are precisely those for which data quality is the poorest.

Jenkins (2015) and Wittenberg (2015) uncover additional limitations with the SWIID, especially regarding the imputation model. For example, as explained above, whenever information on the ratios for a given country is missing, Solt relies on the ratios available for other countries from the same region. The eight regions defined by Solt are very broad, and so the information on the ratios for different members of the group may not be related. For example, Turkey and China are in the same group, as well as Egypt and South Africa. Factors that influence the ratios, such as the tax structures, may differ significantly in Turkey than in China, for instance.

Moreover, the ratios may also change within countries over time. For example, Wittenberg (2015) argues that one should not use information on South Africa during the post-Apartheid period to impute observations in the Apartheid period. Wittenberg (2015) also argues that many of the observations employed by Solt are of low quality. For example, the observations used to impute the Gini index of South Africa in 1965 are based on samples that underrepresent the Black population. According to Wittenberg (2015), this, as well as the imputation problems discussed above, explains why the inequality estimate of Solt for South Africa in 1965 is implausibly low. Jenkins (2015) and Wittenberg (2015) point to other problems, such as the decision of Solt to smooth the estimates, and Jenkins (2015) condemns the lack of information at different stages of the imputation process.

Based on these limitations, Jenkins (2015) recommends that scholars using world samples rely on the WIID rather than the SWIID. However, for this paper, I cannot follow this advice since the WIID does not report market and net Gini coefficients for the same country during the same year, which prevents me from constructing measures of redistribution.

Despite these limitations, I believe that studying the effect of inequality on redistribution using the SWIID is worthwhile, notably because it enables us to examine a question of substantive interest for developing countries. Therefore, there is an “inevitable trade-off between country coverage and data quality” (Jenkins 2015, p.668). My position, in this paper, is that both types of analyses are worthwhile and ultimately complementary. They both have advantages and disadvantages, and they both provide information about the relationship between inequality and redistribution. Given that most of the previous tests on inequality and redistribution use the LIS dataset – which has high quality data but very limited coverage – this paper maximizes coverage.

Table A1: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (LIS)

	(1)	(2)
Market Inequality	0.0908** (0.0339)	0.109** (0.0443)
Fractionalized Poor		0.0398* (0.0198)
Market Inequality * Fractionalized Poor		-0.0349 (0.0470)
GDP pc (logged)	0.0145** (0.00559)	0.0157*** (0.00450)
Growth	-1.49e-05 (0.000412)	-0.000738* (0.000410)
Polity	0.00213 (0.00329)	-0.00168 (0.00245)
Ethnic diversity	0.000101 (0.000123)	-0.000472*** (0.000112)
Electoral turnout	0.000304* (0.000167)	0.000631*** (0.000153)
% Elderly	-0.000484 (0.000767)	-0.000596 (0.000609)
% Muslim	0.00107*** (0.000361)	0.00377 (0.00237)
% Catholic	-4.75e-05 (7.17e-05)	-1.75e-05 (5.34e-05)
Proportional Representation	0.00429 (0.00386)	0.00277 (0.00279)
Presidential	-0.00741 (0.00846)	-0.0222*** (0.00501)
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-0.0163 (0.0102)	-0.00317 (0.00560)
# Democracies	31	28
Observations	111	97
R-squared	0.624	0.718

Note: OLS Estimates. Uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Regression 1 redoes regression 1 of Table 2, and regression 2 examines whether the effect of inequality depends on the ethnic structure of the poor by including an interaction term between *Market Inequality* and *Fractionalized Poor*. ‘Poor’ refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

However, it is crucial to make sure that the results are robust to the use of higher quality data, especially since most observations contained in the SWIID are the product of a model. Therefore, below I redo the main estimations using the LIS dataset. The dependent variable – absolute redistribution – has also been constructed from the data of the LIS.

Regression 1 redoes column 1 of Table 2 of the main text. Given that the number of observations for each country is very low, I do not include a lagged dependent variable. Results suggest that market inequality increases redistribution. This finding is consistent with the previous literature that relied on the LIS. Regression 2 tests whether the effect of market inequality is

conditional on the ethnic structure of the poor. Given that the number of observations is very low and that the data is not imputed, I do not split the sample as in the main text. Instead, I include an interaction term between *Market Inequality* and *Fractionalized Poor*. I find that, as expected, the coefficient on *Market Inequality* is positive and that on the interaction term negative, although the latter is not statistically significant. In democracies with a unified poor, an increase in the market Gini coefficient increases redistribution by 0.109 units. In democracies in which the poor is fractionalized, the same increase in the Gini index increases redistribution by 0.073 units.

2. Alternative Measures of Inequality

One limitation with the analysis performed in the main text is that my independent variable – the market Gini coefficient – does not directly capture the concept of inequality that is most relevant to the RRMR model. The predictions from the RRMR model are driven by the difference between the income of the median voter and the mean income of the country. When the mean-to-income ratio is high, the median voter becomes more likely to vote for more redistribution. Unfortunately, the data required to calculate a measure of the mean-to-median ratio for countries outside a small group of advanced industrialized countries is simply unavailable. The WIID, for example, does include income shares data. However, as most inequality datasets, the observations it contains use different methods, units of reference and definitions of income, and therefore lack comparability. Moreover, as explained above, it does not contain information on net and market inequality for all observations.

In order to address this problem, in this section I redo the main analysis using measures of inequality that are more closely related to the concept of inequality that is most relevant to the RRMR model. I use the data of the LIS to construct two alternative measures of inequality: the

mean-to-median income ratio, and the ratio of the income of the 90th to 50th percentile. Both measures are constructed from data on market income (i.e. before tax and transfers). The first measure is most directly related to the RRMR model. The second one measures the level of inequality between the income of 90th percentile (which can be considered as the upper class) and the median income. As in Section 1, the dependent variable – absolute redistribution – has also been constructed from the data of the LIS.

Results are reported in Table A2. Regression 1 estimates the effect of the *Mean-to-Median Ratio* on redistribution. *Mean-to-Median Ratio* increases redistribution but its effect is not statistically significant (p-value= 0.116). However, as shown in regression 2, when I include an interaction term between *Mean-to-Median Ratio* and *Fractionalized Poor*, we find that in democracies with a unified poor (i.e. when *Fractionalized Poor* is equal to zero) *Mean-to-Median Ratio* increases redistribution and its effect is statistically significant at the one percent level. Among democracies with a fractionalized poor, however, the effect of the *Mean-to-Median Ratio* is much weaker (.033 vs. 0.054) and not statistically significant (p-value= 0.101).

Regressions 3 and 4 redo regressions 1 and 2 using the *90/50* ratio rather than the *Mean-to-Median Ratio*. In regression 3, I find that the *90/50* ratio increases redistribution and that the relationship is now statistically significant at the five percent level. Regression 3 adds the interaction term between *90/50* and *Fractionalized Poor*. Increasing *90/50* by one unit increases redistribution by 0.018 units in democracies with a unified poor, and the relationship is statistically significant at the one percent level. Its effect drops to 0.009 units in democracies with a fractionalized poor, and the effect is only significant at the ten percent level.

Table A2: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Alternative Measures of Inequality)

	Mean-to-Median Ratio		90/50	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mean-to-Median Ratio	0.0308 (0.0190)	0.0544*** (0.0154)		
90/50			0.0119** (0.00530)	0.0178*** (0.00517)
Fractionalized Poor		0.0551* (0.0306)		0.0467** (0.0176)
Mean-to-Median Ratio * Fractionalized Poor		-0.0208 (0.0227)		
90/50 * Fractionalized Poor				-0.00796 (0.00643)
GDP pc (logged)	0.0137** (0.00607)	0.0165*** (0.00442)	0.0146** (0.00571)	0.0167*** (0.00432)
Growth	0.000322 (0.000422)	-0.000507 (0.000387)	0.000131 (0.000418)	-0.000691* (0.000400)
Polity	0.00253 (0.00361)	-0.00215 (0.00237)	0.00219 (0.00341)	-0.00223 (0.00237)
Ethnic diversity	9.90e-05 (0.000132)	-0.000520*** (0.000106)	9.00e-05 (0.000125)	-0.000525*** (0.000110)
Electoral turnout	0.000329* (0.000172)	0.000676*** (0.000159)	0.000308* (0.000170)	0.000657*** (0.000155)
% Elderly	-0.000669 (0.000780)	-0.000646 (0.000618)	-0.000555 (0.000778)	-0.000612 (0.000621)
% Muslim	0.00132*** (0.000423)	0.00369 (0.00231)	0.00118*** (0.000396)	0.00379 (0.00239)
% Catholic	-3.97e-05 (7.76e-05)	-7.21e-07 (5.21e-05)	-3.98e-05 (7.48e-05)	-6.65e-06 (5.14e-05)
Proportional Representation	0.00127 (0.00389)	-0.000334 (0.00266)	0.00255 (0.00390)	0.00129 (0.00268)
Presidential	-0.00541 (0.00892)	-0.0225*** (0.00510)	-0.00610 (0.00878)	-0.0224*** (0.00519)
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-0.0159 (0.0111)	-0.00222 (0.00588)	-0.0168 (0.0107)	-0.00241 (0.00562)
# Democracies	31	28	31	28
Observations	111	97	111	97
R-squared	0.599	0.715	0.611	0.719

Note: OLS Estimates. Uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Regressions 1 and 3 redo regression 1 of Table 2, and regressions 2 and 4 examine whether the effect of inequality depends on the ethnic structure of the poor by including an interaction term between inequality and *Fractionalized Poor*. Regressions 1 and 2 measure inequality with the *Mean-to-Median Ratio*, and regressions 3 and 4 with the ratio of the income of the 90th percentile to the income of the 50th percentile. ‘Poor’ refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

3. Isolating the Effect of Each Improvement

My results on the RRMR model are different than those of most of the previous literature. As explained in the main text, my analysis differs from that of previous authors in that it combines four elements: (1) it employs redistribution – measured as the difference between pre- and post-

redistribution inequality – as its dependent variable; (2) it uses an indicator of inequality before tax and transfers as its independent variable; (3) it accounts for country-specific unobserved factors; and (4) contrary to most tests that are restricted to advanced industrial democracies, it covers a large number of developed and developing democracies worldwide.

In this section, I look at which of these four elements explains why my results differ from those of most previous authors. Table A3 redoes the analysis with none of the ‘improvements’ discussed in the main text: (1) the dependent variable captures social and welfare spending rather than redistribution; (2) the independent variable is net rather than market inequality; (3) country fixed effects are not included; and (4) the sample only includes Western democracies.

I use three measures of social and welfare spending: public education spending (% GDP), public health spending (% GDP), and tax on income, capital gains and profits (% GDP). To calculate public education spending (% GDP), I use data from the World Development Indicators (WDI). The data on public health spending (% GDP) are also from the WDI. The WDI has data on health spending (% GDP). However, these data include both public and private health spending. Therefore, I also use data on the proportion of total health spending that is public, which is also taken from the WDI. Using these two series, I am able to calculate public health spending (% GDP). Finally, I use the measure of tax revenues (% GDP) of Slater, Smith and Nair (2014). This indicator only includes taxes on personal income, capital gains and profits, which are disproportionately extracted from the wealthy. Importantly, it does not include revenues from consumption taxes.

My independent variable is *Net Inequality* – which is a Gini coefficient – taken from Solt (2009, 2014). As can be seen in Table A3, inequality is found to have no effect on redistribution, which is consistent with the inconclusive results of the previous literature (see Table 1 of the main text).

Table A3: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (None of the Improvements)

	Education Spending (% GDP)	Public Health Spending (% GDP)	Tax Revenues (% GDP)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.925*** (0.0149)	0.959*** (0.0379)	0.963*** (0.0107)
Market Inequality	-0.00451 (0.00344)	0.00849 (0.00983)	-0.00946 (0.00602)
GDP pc (logged)	0.0892* (0.0492)	0.387** (0.157)	0.290 (0.209)
Growth	0.00978** (0.00429)	-0.00513 (0.00775)	0.0169 (0.0215)
Polity	0.00961* (0.00537)	0.0224 (0.0585)	0.0259 (0.0191)
Ethnic diversity	-0.000722* (0.000417)	0.000196 (0.00104)	-0.00426 (0.00299)
Electoral turnout	0.000646 (0.00124)	0.00139 (0.00273)	0.0104*** (0.00300)
% Elderly	0.00170 (0.00522)	0.00566 (0.0108)	-0.0379* (0.0203)
% Muslim	0.00168 (0.00304)	-0.00940 (0.00570)	-0.0279*** (0.00906)
% Catholic	-0.000576 (0.000349)	0.000411 (0.000403)	-0.00116 (0.00118)
Proportional Representation	0.0167 (0.0308)	0.0449 (0.0628)	0.0451 (0.0953)
Presidential	0.00529 (0.0319)	-0.116 (0.0675)	0.00308 (0.114)
Presidential*Proportional Representation	0.0118 (0.0556)	0.0963 (0.147)	0.348** (0.129)
# Democracies	20	20	20
Observations	653	260	641
R-squared	.947	.947	.973

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Includes none of the ‘improvements’: (1) the dependent variable captures social and welfare spending rather than redistribution; (2) the independent variable is net inequality rather than market inequality; (3) country fixed effects are not included; and (4) the sample only includes Western countries.

Next, I redo the analysis without each of these improvements in turn. First, Table A4 redoes the analysis with the three measures of social and welfare spending: public education spending (% GDP), public health spending (% GDP), and tax on income, capital gains and profits (% GDP). Remember that in my main analysis redistribution is measure as the difference between inequality

before and after tax and transfers. Table A4 uses *Market Inequality*, includes developed and developing countries, and does the analysis both with and without country fixed effects. As shown in Table A4, when using any of these measures, I find that inequality is unrelated to redistribution, regardless of whether country fixed effects are included or not. These findings are consistent with those of the previous literature.

Table A4: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Social and Welfare Spending)

	Education Spending (% GDP)		Public Health Spending (% GDP)		Tax Revenues (% GDP)	
	(1)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(4)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.942*** (0.00954)		0.968*** (0.0113)		0.962*** (0.0131)	
Market Inequality	-0.000521 (0.00192)	-0.00389 (0.0174)	-0.000870 (0.00173)	-0.0230 (0.0186)	-0.00210 (0.00565)	-0.0423 (0.0409)
GDP pc (logged)	0.0101 (0.0165)	0.802* (0.414)	0.0327 (0.0224)	1.237*** (0.362)	0.187** (0.0750)	3.840*** (1.069)
Growth	0.00574* (0.00330)	-0.0107* (0.00581)	0.00177 (0.00414)	-0.0193*** (0.00524)	0.0148 (0.0106)	-0.0118 (0.0181)
Polity	-0.00109 (0.00515)	0.0474*** (0.0161)	-0.00118 (0.00554)	-0.0229 (0.0212)	0.00746 (0.00919)	0.0338 (0.0521)
Ethnic diversity	-0.000203 (0.000516)		-0.000115 (0.000608)		-7.30e-05 (0.00167)	
Electoral turnout	-0.00105* (0.000530)	0.00207 (0.00439)	-0.000286 (0.000856)	-0.00290 (0.00366)	0.00337* (0.00177)	0.0161 (0.0263)
% Elderly	0.00339 (0.00360)	-0.0251 (0.0776)	0.00540 (0.00451)	0.113* (0.0656)	-0.0153 (0.0119)	-0.145 (0.204)
% Muslim	-0.000715 (0.000630)		0.000292 (0.000437)		-0.00301** (0.00138)	
% Catholic	-0.000231 (0.000305)		-6.60e-06 (0.000311)		-0.00136 (0.000994)	
Proportional Representation	0.0226 (0.0229)		0.0166 (0.0302)		-0.00291 (0.0770)	
Presidential	0.0568 (0.0371)		0.0325 (0.0435)		-0.138 (0.104)	
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-0.101*** (0.0374)		-0.0477 (0.0481)		0.0445 (0.107)	
Country FEs	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
# Democracies	85	85	87	87	80	81
Observations	1,607	1,641	977	1,047	1,480	1,520
R-squared	.941	.806	.968	.942	.963	.903

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Measures redistribution with indicators of social and welfare spending. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Next, I look at how the choice to use market inequality – as oppose to net inequality – affects the results. Table A5 redoes the analysis with the measure of net inequality of Solt (2009, 2014).

Interestingly, inequality’s effect becomes *negative* and highly statistically significant when

country fixed effects are omitted (regression 1). The relationship remains negative but fails short of statistical significance when country fixed effects are added (regression 2).

Table A5: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Net Inequality)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.866*** (0.0233)	
Net Inequality	-0.0533*** (0.0123)	-0.0781 (0.0850)
GDP pc (logged)	0.165 (0.115)	0.744 (1.276)
Growth	-0.00693 (0.0147)	-0.00454 (0.0257)
Polity	0.00511 (0.0275)	-0.0365 (0.0649)
Ethnic diversity	0.00324 (0.00319)	
Electoral turnout	-0.00221 (0.00362)	-0.00632 (0.0150)
% Elderly	0.0545 (0.0340)	0.444** (0.213)
% Muslim	-0.00263 (0.00254)	
% Catholic	0.00297 (0.00192)	
Proportional	0.276 (0.192)	
Presidential	-0.0107 (0.191)	
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-0.338 (0.239)	
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	87	89
Observations	1,966	2,049
R-squared	.925	.936

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate' command in Stata. Uses net inequality. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Comparing regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 (of the main text) already demonstrates that including country fixed effects strengthens the relationship. However, inequality's effect is positive and highly statistically significant even when country fixed effects are omitted (see regression 1 of Table 2 of the main text). It must be noted that the difference in the magnitude of the relationship in regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 is not due to the fact that regression 1 has a lagged dependent

variable, but not regression 2. When regression 2 is redone with a lagged dependent variable in Table A16, the difference in the magnitude of the effect of inequality remains substantial.

Table A6: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Western)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.694*** (0.0474)	
Market Inequality	0.206*** (0.0419)	0.641*** (0.0624)
GDP pc (logged)	0.480 (0.388)	1.713 (1.074)
Growth	-0.0442 (0.0315)	-0.0788* (0.0404)
Polity	-0.00902 (0.0749)	-0.00636 (0.128)
Ethnic diversity	0.0155** (0.00734)	
Electoral turnout	0.0195 (0.0123)	0.0961** (0.0336)
% Elderly	0.0614 (0.0521)	-0.115 (0.228)
% Muslim	-0.0952 (0.0572)	
% Catholic	-0.0165*** (0.00497)	
Proportional Representation	0.902*** (0.276)	
Presidential	-0.970*** (0.308)	
Presidential*Proportional Representation	0.252 (0.509)	
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	20	20
Observations	815	843
R-squared	.892	.857

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 with only Western countries. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Finally, Table A6 redoes the analysis with only Western countries (Western Europe, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia). Comparing regressions 1 and 2 of Table A6 with regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 of the main text, we see that the effect of inequality on redistribution is actually stronger when one excludes developing countries. One possibility is that developing countries have weaker states than developed countries and therefore are less capable to redistribute. However, as shown in Tables A19-A21, I find that inequality still increases

redistribution when I exclude Western countries. So, my results apply to both developed and developing democracies.

In sum, the most impactful ‘limitation’ of some previous studies is the use of net rather than market inequality, since doing so suggests that the effect of inequality is actually negative (and highly significant). The choice of the dependent variable is also highly impactful; the results do not hold when using measures of social and welfare spending (the estimated relationship becomes insignificant). The inclusion of country fixed effects strengthens the relationship but omitting country fixed effects does not change the results. Finally, the last contribution – about the wide coverage – does not influence the results. It simply says that the results can be applied to a larger set of countries.

4. System GMM

Endogeneity is one of the key concerns when studying the effect of redistribution on inequality. For example, a country’s level of inequality is influenced by its past redistributive policies which are themselves related to current redistributive policies. Failing to account for this is likely to bias the results. Notice, however, that in this example endogeneity would bias results *against* the RRMR model, since countries that have redistributed heavily in the past – and so that are more likely to redistribute heavily today – are likely to have lower market inequality levels today.

In this section, I address this issue by using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of Blundell and Bond (1998). One alternative would have been to use the difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). However, the system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) is preferable when the independent and dependent variables are highly

persistent within country over time (Heid, Langer and Larch 2012), which is clearly the case here. I employ the two-step system GMM with the corrected standard errors of Windmeijer (2005). System GMM uses internal lags of the independent variables as instruments. One problem with system GMM is that the number of instruments tends to increase exponentially with the number of time periods which increases the likelihood of false positive. Therefore, I follow the recommendations of Roodman (2009) and limit the number of instruments by collapsing the instrument matrix and by limiting the number of lags such that the number of instruments is always below the number of units (countries).

Table A7: System GMM Estimations of the Effect of Inequality on Redistribution

Lagged Dependent Variable, one year	0.853*** (0.0859)
Lagged Dependent Variable, two years	0.0368 (0.0774)
Lagged Dependent Variable, three years	-0.295*** (0.0628)
Market Inequality	0.143*** (0.0458)
GDP pc (logged)	0.531** (0.257)
Growth	-0.00883 (0.00680)
Polity	0.00878 (0.0285)
Electoral turnout	0.0176 (0.0109)
% Elderly	0.406*** (0.0817)
# Instruments	86
AR(2)	[0.530]
Hansen J-test	[0.304]
Diff-in-Hansen Test	[0.300]
# Democracies	87
Observations	1,845

Note: System GMM Estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. P-values in brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A7 shows that market inequality is associated with more redistribution. Table A7 also reports some standard tests. The Hansen *J*-test is an overidentification test. The difference-in-Hansen test tests the validity of the additional moment restrictions made by system GMM. Arellano-Bond test suggests that there is no AR (2) autocorrelation.

5. Additional Information on the Measures of BGI and WGI

The measures of between-ethnic group inequality (BGI) and within-ethnic group inequality (WGI) are constructed from survey data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), the Afrobarometer, the World Values Survey (WVS), the Latinobarometer, the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the Comparative Study of the Electoral Systems (CSES). These surveys provide information about the ethnicity of each respondent as well as his/her income or wealth. Table A8 lists the surveys available for each county.

Table A8: List of Surveys

Country	Survey (year)
Albania	DHS (2008); WVS (2002)
Argentina	Latinobarometer (2011)
Armenia	DHS (2000); WVS (1997)
Australia	WVS (1995, 2005, 2012)
Bangladesh	DHS (1993, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2007); WVS (1996)
Belgium	ISSP (2011)
Benin	DHS (1996, 2001, 2006, 2011); Afrobarometer (2005, 2008)
Bolivia	DHS (2003); Latinobarometer (2011)
Brazil	DHS (1991, 1996); WVS (2006); Latinobarometer (2007); ISSP (2002, 2004); CSES (2002, 2010)
Bulgaria	WVS (1997); ISSP (1995, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2010); CSES (2001)
Burundi	Afrobarometer (2013)
Canada	WVS (2000); ISSP (1994, 1998, 1999, 2001)
CAR	DHS (1994)
Chile	WVS (1990, 1996, 2000, 2006, 2011); Latinobarometer (2007); ISSP (2010)
Colombia	DHS (2010); Latinobarometer (2007)
Congo	DHS (2005, 2009)
Costa Rica	Latinobarometer (2011)
Croatia	ISSP (2010); CSES (2007)
Czech Republic	ISSP (2011)
Ecuador	WVS (2013); Latinobarometer (2007)
Estonia	WVS (2011); ISSP (2009); CSES (2011)
Finland	ISSP (2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008); CSES (2003, 2007, 2011)
Georgia	WVS (1996)
Ghana	DHS (1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2007); WVS (2007, 2011); Afrobarometer (2002, 2005, 2008)
Guatemala	DHS (1987, 1995, 1998); Latinobarometer (2007)
Greece	CSES (2009)
Honduras	DHS (2011); Latinobarometer (2007)
Hungary	WVS (2009); ISSP (1994, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008); CSES (2002)
India	DHS (1992, 1998, 2005); WVS (1995, 2001)
Indonesia	WVS (2001, 2006)
Kenya	DHS (1989, 1998, 2003, 2008); Afrobarometer (2003, 2005, 2008)
Kyrgyzstan	DHS (1997, 2012); WVS (2011)
Latvia	WVS (1996); ISSP (1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008)
Liberia	DHS (1986, 2009); Afrobarometer (2008, 2012)

Lithuania	WVS (1997); ISSP (2010); CSES (1997)
Macedonia	WVS (1998, 2001)
Madagascar	Afrobarometer (2005, 2013)
Malawi	DHS (1996, 2000, 2004, 2010); Afrobarometer (2003, 2005, 2008)
Mali	DHS (1995, 2001, 2006); WVS (2007); Afrobarometer (2002, 2005)
Mexico	WVS (2000, 2005, 2012); Latinobarometer (2007); CSES (2000, 2003, 2009)
Moldova	DHS (2005); WVS (2002, 2006)
Nepal	DHS (1996, 2001, 2006, 2011)
Netherlands	WVS (2012); ISSP (2008)
New Zealand	WVS (2011); ISSP (1992, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008); CSES (1996, 2002, 2008)
Nicaragua	Latinobarometer (2007)
Niger	DHS (1992, 1998, 2006, 2012); Afrobarometer (2013)
Nigeria	DHS (1990, 2003, 2008); WVS (2011); Afrobarometer (2003, 2005, 2013)
Pakistan	DHS (1990, 2006, 2012); WVS (2001, 2012)
Panama	Latinobarometer (2007)
Paraguay	DHS (1990); Latinobarometer (2007)
Peru	DHS (1991, 2000, 2004, 2009); WVS (2006); CSES (2011)
Philippines	DHS (2003, 2008); WVS (2001, 2012); ISSP (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008); CSES (2004, 2010)
Romania	WVS (1998, 2012); CSES (1996, 2004, 2009)
Senegal	DHS (1986, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2005, 2006, 2008); Afrobarometer (2002, 2005, 2013)
Sierra Leone	DHS (2008)
Slovakia	WVS (1998); ISSP (1995, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008); CSES (2010)
Slovenia	WVS (2011); ISSP (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2010); CSES (1996)
South Africa	WVS (1996, 2001, 2006); Afrobarometer (2002, 2006, 2008)
Spain	WVS (2011)
Sri Lanka	DHS (1987)
Sudan	DHS (1989)
Switzerland	WVS (1996, 2007); ISSP (1996, 1997, 1998); CSES (1999, 2003)
Taiwan	WVS (2012); ISSP (2004, 2005, 2010); CSES (1996, 2001, 2008)
Thailand	DHS (1987); WVS (2007)
Trinidad and Tobago	DHS (1987); WVS (2006, 2010)
Turkey	DHS (1993, 1998, 2003); WVS (2011); ISSP (2008)
Uganda	DHS (1995, 2009); WVS (2001); Afrobarometer (2002, 2005, 2008)
Ukraine	DHS (2007); WVS (2011); ISSP (2008); CSES (1998)
United Kingdom	WVS (2005)
United States	WVS (1981, 1995, 1999, 2006, 2011); ISSP (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006); CSES (1996, 2004, 2008)
Uruguay	WVS (2006, 2011); Latinobarometer (2007)
Venezuela	WVS (1996, 2000); Latinobarometer (2007); ISSP (2012); CSES (2009)

Ethnic groups are identified using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which is widely used to identify ethnic groups.² The main advantage of using the EPR is that it only reports *politically relevant* ethnic groups. Ethnicity is a subjective concept that is difficult to define using objective criteria, such as language or race for example. Also, ethnicity is a fluid concept that changes

² Examples of well-cited studies using the EPR dataset include Cederman et al. (2010) and Roessler (2011).

through time (Posner 2004). Instead of using such objective criteria, the authors of the EPR report only ethnic groups that are believed to be relevant by their members. The EPR defines an ethnic group as politically relevant “if at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests of that group in the national political arena or if members of an ethnic category are systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics” (Codebook, p.2). The EPR also provides the size of each group. Ethnic groups that represent less than one percent of the population of their country are omitted from the analysis, because survey observations are often insufficient for such groups.

One possible disadvantage to only include politically relevant groups is that groups may become relevant due to long-standing distributive conflicts. However, it is difficult to see how exactly this would affect the results. If distributional conflicts render ethnic groups relevant, we would expect countries with many ethnic groups to have high levels of redistribution whenever a poor ethnic group is in power. Yet, inequality’s effect on redistribution is weakest among countries that are highly fractionalized (regression 1, Table A48).

Moreover, the problems caused by the use of groups that are politically irrelevant are even more serious. First, many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, have more than a dozen ethnic groups. For example, Nigeria has 389 ethnic groups. Calculating WGI and BGI values using all of these groups would be difficult because many groups would only have a few respondents. Moreover, very few developing democracies would be coded as having a unified poor group because the number of ethnic groups would be so large that almost none of them would account for 50 percent of the population of their country. Therefore, the variable *Fractionalized Poor* would almost always take the value one for developing countries. The problem is much less serious when we restrict ourselves to politically relevant groups. For example, Nigeria has only

five politically relevant groups according to the EPR (Tiv, Ijaw, Yoruba, Fulani-Muslims and Igbo).

Second, as argued above, ethnicity is a subjective concept. Individuals can choose between different types of identities. In many instances, individuals view themselves as being from different groups even though there are little objective differences between them (e.g., Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi). In other instances, individuals can view themselves as being of the same group even if they have different languages or religion, for example. For instance, Posner (2004) shows that in Zambia Chewas and Tumbukas are allies (and perceived themselves as members of the same group), while the same groups are adversaries in Malawi. He argues that the difference between the two countries stems from difference in the relative size of the groups across countries. Simply using objective criteria would not enable us to differentiate between these different realities.

Third, the exact criterion (or criteria) used to define ethnicity differs across countries. For example, in some countries, the groups identified by the EPR are linguistic groups (e.g., Canada), religious groups (e.g., Bangladesh), regions (e.g., some, but not all, groups in Uganda), races (e.g., United States), etc. Using a single objective criterion (e.g., language), or a pre-determined set of objective criteria, may not be relevant for all countries.

The procedure used to calculate BGI and WGI is explained in the main text. Unfortunately, for most countries, I only have a few surveys (see Table A8). Therefore, I use linear interpolation to fill in the missing values for years between surveys, and the survey that is closest in time for years before (after) the first (last) survey.

Supplementary Appendix

After having filled in the missing values, I standardize the data from the different surveys by taking advantage of the fact that many countries are covered by multiple surveys. Since the DHS is the survey that covers countries from the most regions, I standardize observations from the other surveys, except the Afrobarometer, to make them comparable to those from the DHS. Like the DHS, the observations from the Afrobarometer are ABW scores and there is not enough overlap between the two surveys to calculate the systematic differences between them. I create new variables for BGI and WGI that take the value given in the DHS. When there are no surveys on the DHS, I use observations from the Afrobarometer. For the other surveys, I run OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is this new variable and the independent variable is the observations from the other surveys. I then calculate the predicted values. The variables BGI and WGI used in the analysis take the value of the DHS or Afrobarometer, if available, and that of the standardized values based on the ISSP, CSES, WVS and Latinobarometer when surveys on the DHS and Afrobarometer are not available.

6. Additional Tables

Table A9: Summary Statistics

	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	St. Dev. w/in Countries	Min.	Max.
Absolute Redistribution	7.447	9.089	7.129	2.18	-14.73	26.924
Relative Redistribution	17.487	20.287	15.847	3.656	-38.07	56.121
Market Inequality	45.136	44.869	6.401	3.436	24.774	66.306
Between-Group Inequality	.086	.442	.829	.309	0	6.224
Within-Group Inequality	.182	2.282	4.524	1.131	.033	23.66
GDP pc (logged)	9.001	8.75	1	.26	6	10.353
Growth	2.468	2.112	4.309	4.028	-31.18	26.886
Polity	9	8.268	2.69	1.815	-8	10
Ethnic Diversity	16	23.628	21.11	0	0	79
Electoral Turnout	72.42	69.38	15.599	7.985	2.14	107.61 ^a
% Elderly	9.727	9.417	4.74	1.494	2.422	21.64
Proportional Representation	1	.569	.495	.175	0	1
Presidential	0	.317	.465	.035	0	1
Natural Resources	.012	.04	.074	.041	0	.751
Population (logged)	16.13	16.434	1.432	.142	13.263	20.863
Age of Democracy	23	38.593	35.859	10.89	1	138
Muslim	0	8.164	22.419	0	0	99.7
Roman Catholic	46.5	46.924	39.06	0	0	99
Protestant	3.4	19.722	28.07	0	0	90.6
Trade Openness	59.785	66.097	34.032	13.74	7.04	184.308
Capital Openness	75	71.061	23.346	15.662	12.5	100

^a There is one election (Malawi, 1999) in which more than 100 percent of the voting age population voted (107.61 percent). However, when looking at the percentage of registered voters who actually voted this proportion drops to 92.28 percent.

Table A10: Data Sources

	Main Sources	Alternative Sources Used in the Supplementary Appendix
Absolute Redistribution	Solt (2009, 2014)	Luxembourg Income Study
Relative Redistribution	Solt (2009, 2014)	
Market Inequality	Solt (2009, 2014)	Luxembourg Income Study
Mean-to-Median Ratio	Luxembourg Income Study	
90/50	Luxembourg Income Study	
Democracy	Cheibub et al. (2010)	Boix et al. (2013)
GDP per capita (logged)	Treisman (2015)	
Growth	Treisman (2015)	
Ethnic Diversity	Przeworki et al. (2000)	
Polity score	Polity IV	
Trade Openness	Penn World Tables	
Electoral Turnout	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	
% Elderly	World Bank	
PR	Bormann and Golder (2013)	
Presidential	Cheibub et al. (2010)	
Natural Resources	Haber and Menaldo (2011)	
Population (logged)	World Bank	
Age of Democracy	Cheibub et al. (2010)	
Muslim	Przeworki et al. (2000)	
Roman Catholic	Przeworki et al. (2000)	
Protestant	Przeworki et al. (2000)	
Capital Openness	Freeman and Quinn (2012)	

Table A11: Unified vs. Fractionalized Poor

Dem. with a Unified Poor		Dem. with a Fractionalized Poor	
Albania	Philippines	Belgium	Uganda
Argentina	Poland	Benin	Ukraine
Armenia	Portugal	Brazil	United States
Australia	Romania	Canada	**Venezuela
Austria	Slovenia	Central African Republic	
Bangladesh	South Africa	Colombia	
Bolivia	South Korea	Congo	
Bulgaria	Spain	Ecuador	
Burundi	Sudan	Estonia	
Chile	Sweden	Ghana	
Costa Rica	Taiwan	Guatemala	
Croatia	Thailand	India	
Czech Republic	United Kingdom	Indonesia	
Denmark	Uruguay	Kenya	
El Salvador		Latvia	
Finland		Liberia	
*Georgia		Macedonia	
Germany		Madagascar	
Greece		Malawi	
Honduras		**Mali	
Hungary		**Mexico	
Ireland		Nepal	
Italy		**Netherlands	
Japan		Nigeria	
Kyrgyzstan		Pakistan	
Lithuania		Peru	
Moldova		Senegal	
New Zealand		Sierra Leone	
Nicaragua		Slovakia	
Niger		Sri Lanka	
Norway		Switzerland	
Panama		Trinidad and Tobago	
Paraguay		Turkey	

*Classified as having a unified poor when using the alternative indicator (used in Table A41) but as having a fractionalized poor when using the main indicator (used in Table 3).

**Classified as having a fractionalized poor when using the main indicator (used in Table 3) but as having a unified poor when using the alternative indicator (used in Table A41).

Table A12: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Restricted Sample)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.781*** (0.0420)	
Market Inequality	0.150*** (0.0311)	0.631*** (0.0648)
GDP pc (logged)	0.700*** (0.248)	0.141 (1.266)
Growth	-0.0318 (0.0191)	0.00682 (0.0258)
Polity	0.0173 (0.0538)	-0.00943 (0.0706)
Ethnic diversity	0.00199 (0.00714)	
Electoral turnout	0.0618* (0.0359)	0.0456*** (0.0161)
% Elderly	-0.00768 (0.00627)	-0.0910 (0.188)
% Muslim	-0.0307 (0.0235)	
% Catholic	-0.00745** (0.00309)	
Proportional Representation	0.732*** (0.274)	
Presidential	-0.957** (0.371)	
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-1.129** (0.458)	
Country FEs	55	55
# Democracies	N	Y
Observations	1,282	1,298
R-squared	.934	.953

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes Table 2 using the restricted sample. The restricted sample includes only the observations for which Solt has information on both net and market inequality. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A13: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (Restricted Sample)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.707*** (0.103)	0.717*** (0.0568)
Market Inequality	0.150** (0.0679)	0.214*** (0.0481)
GDP pc (logged)	0.890 (0.718)	0.314 (0.306)
Growth	-0.00483 (0.0355)	-0.0408* (0.0217)
Polity	0.123 (0.119)	0.0660 (0.0678)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00747 (0.0188)	-0.0591*** (0.0193)
Electoral turnout	0.0247 (0.0168)	0.00493 (0.0100)
% Elderly	0.0727 (0.0760)	0.0149 (0.0486)
% Muslim	-0.140 (0.102)	-0.0108 (0.0169)
% Catholic	-0.0168 (0.0100)	-0.0137** (0.00547)
Proportional Representation	1.452 (0.977)	0.976** (0.369)
Presidential	-0.644 (0.905)	-2.000*** (0.525)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-1.392 (1.038)	-1.684*** (0.573)
# Democracies	17	35
Observations	370	827
R-squared	.935	.935

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes Table 3 using the restricted sample. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. The restricted sample includes only the observations for which Solt has information on both net and market inequality. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A14: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (Restricted Sample)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	1.122 (0.764)
Between-Group Inequality	-1.077 (1.333)
GDP pc (logged)	4.308*** (1.538)
Growth	-0.0981* (0.0513)
Polity	0.201 (0.183)
Ethnic diversity	-0.000247 (0.0392)
Electoral turnout	0.0106 (0.0335)
% Elderly	0.348 (0.233)
% Muslim	-0.121 (0.136)
% Catholic	0.0119 (0.0255)
Proportional Representation	2.201 (2.185)
Presidential	-2.968* (1.739)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-3.112 (2.354)
# Democracies	41
Observations	887
R-squared	.656

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes Table 4 using the restricted sample. The restricted sample includes only the observations for which Solt has information on both net and market inequality. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A15: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (No LDV)

	(1)
Market Inequality	0.367*** (0.0667)
GDP pc (logged)	2.009*** (0.671)
Growth	-0.0157 (0.0254)
Polity	-0.0228** (0.0111)
Ethnic diversity	-0.0531 (0.0334)
Electoral turnout	-0.0370 (0.0936)
% Elderly	-0.00592 (0.0258)
% Muslim	0.0272 (0.0228)
% Catholic	0.606*** (0.162)
Proportional Representation	2.673** (1.049)
Presidential	-1.747 (1.086)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-4.074*** (1.291)
# Democracies	89
Observations	2,049
R-squared	.725

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 2 without a lagged dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A16: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Country Fixed Effects with LDV)

	(1)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.421*** (0.0608)
Market Inequality	0.359*** (0.0412)
GDP pc (logged)	0.161 (0.597)
Growth	-0.00406 (0.0145)
Polity	-0.00889 (0.0373)
Electoral turnout	0.0168* (0.00924)
% Elderly	0.00933 (0.110)
Country FEs	Y
# Democracies	87
Observations	1,966
R-squared	.954

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regression 2 of Table 2 with a lagged dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A17: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (No LDV)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Market Inequality	0.280*** (0.0860)	0.569*** (0.0716)
GDP pc (logged)	2.116* (1.250)	0.594 (0.942)
Growth	-0.0327 (0.0388)	-0.0842* (0.0431)
Polity	0.134 (0.158)	0.00203 (0.133)
Ethnic diversity	0.0808* (0.0457)	-0.130*** (0.0386)
Electoral turnout	0.0410 (0.0271)	0.0249 (0.0273)
% Elderly	0.728** (0.271)	0.225 (0.188)
% Muslim	-0.00744 (0.0252)	-0.0569** (0.0259)
% Catholic	-0.0197 (0.0255)	-0.0404*** (0.0125)
Proportional Representation	3.841* (2.223)	2.940*** (0.944)
Presidential	1.140 (1.626)	-6.530*** (1.480)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-5.970** (2.370)	-3.791*** (1.249)
# Democracies	35	44
Observations	733	1,118
R-squared	.736	.803

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 without a lagged dependent variable. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A18: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (LDV)

	(1)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.880*** (0.0278)
Within-Group Inequality	0.0443* (0.0254)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.0388 (0.0932)
GDP pc (logged)	0.315* (0.162)
Growth	-0.00452 (0.0170)
Polity	0.00289 (0.0309)
Ethnic diversity	0.00323 (0.00407)
Electoral turnout	0.000983 (0.00421)
% Elderly	0.0644* (0.0344)
% Muslim	-0.00261 (0.00284)
% Catholic	0.000110 (0.00283)
Proportional Representation	0.272 (0.282)
Presidential	-0.151 (0.181)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-0.440 (0.299)
# Democracies	66
Observations	1,378
R-squared	.922

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 with a lagged dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A19: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Non-Western)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.798*** (0.0384)	
Market Inequality	0.100*** (0.0263)	0.390*** (0.0601)
GDP pc (logged)	0.147 (0.152)	-1.273 (0.810)
Growth	-0.00693 (0.0167)	0.0148 (0.0187)
Polity	-0.0315 (0.0316)	0.00974 (0.0547)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00956 (0.00630)	
Electoral turnout	0.000317 (0.00580)	0.0131 (0.0137)
% Elderly	0.146*** (0.0530)	0.275* (0.140)
% Muslim	0.000199 (0.00531)	
% Catholic	-0.00138 (0.00427)	
Proportional Representation	0.259 (0.405)	
Presidential	-0.303 (0.352)	
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-0.701 (0.465)	
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	67	69
Observations	1,151	1,206
R-squared	.854	.891

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 without Western countries. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A20: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (Non-Western)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.738*** (0.0778)	0.768*** (0.0556)
Market Inequality	0.120*** (0.0425)	0.171*** (0.0526)
GDP pc (logged)	0.211 (0.286)	0.244 (0.360)
Growth	-0.00128 (0.0279)	-0.0198 (0.0222)
Polity	-0.00234 (0.0644)	-0.01000 (0.0424)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00348 (0.0147)	-0.0376** (0.0152)
Electoral turnout	-0.00264 (0.00842)	0.0155 (0.00981)
% Elderly	0.161* (0.0913)	0.0296 (0.0582)
% Muslim	-0.00119 (0.00667)	-0.00793 (0.00942)
% Catholic	-0.00887 (0.00780)	-0.000428 (0.00729)
Proportional Representation	0.880 (0.725)	0.686 (0.575)
Presidential	0.546 (0.559)	-2.216** (0.889)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-1.406* (0.787)	-1.140 (0.706)
# Democracies	29	30
Observations	498	540
R-squared	.819	.899

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 without Western countries. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A21: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (Non-Western)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	0.227** (0.109)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.0994 (0.407)
GDP pc (logged)	0.530 (0.761)
Growth	-0.0191 (0.0433)
Polity	0.0514 (0.119)
Ethnic diversity	0.00746 (0.0314)
Electoral turnout	-0.0233 (0.0282)
% Elderly	0.705*** (0.263)
% Muslim	0.00630 (0.0183)
% Catholic	0.0352 (0.0265)
Proportional Representation	0.0212 (2.261)
Presidential	-0.766 (1.746)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-1.156 (2.225)
# Democracies	57
Observations	976
R-squared	.442

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 without Western countries. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A22: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Boix et al. 2013)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.832*** (0.0261)	
Market Inequality	0.0915*** (0.0176)	0.541*** (0.0504)
GDP pc (logged)	0.368** (0.142)	0.264 (0.889)
Growth	-0.00860 (0.0166)	-0.0105 (0.0189)
Polity	-0.00433 (0.0322)	-0.0271 (0.0550)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00328 (0.00498)	
Electoral turnout	0.00484 (0.00529)	0.0202 (0.0162)
% Elderly	0.119*** (0.0326)	0.0574 (0.172)
% Muslim	-5.68e-05 (0.00546)	
% Catholic	-0.00417* (0.00224)	
Proportional Representation	0.397** (0.198)	
Presidential	-0.305 (0.235)	
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-0.762** (0.296)	
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	89	91
Observations	1,879	1,964
R-squared	.927	.945

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 with the measure of democracy of Boix et al. (2013). Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A23: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (Boix et al. 2013)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.810*** (0.0481)	0.786*** (0.0415)
Market Inequality	0.0967*** (0.0309)	0.136*** (0.0291)
GDP pc (logged)	0.478 (0.304)	0.152 (0.214)
Growth	-7.56e-05 (0.0288)	-0.0159 (0.0199)
Polity	0.0126 (0.0623)	0.0127 (0.0482)
Ethnic diversity	0.0148 (0.0123)	-0.0374*** (0.0124)
Electoral turnout	0.00794 (0.00703)	0.00437 (0.00843)
% Elderly	0.149** (0.0577)	0.0735* (0.0422)
% Muslim	0.000151 (0.00590)	-0.00769 (0.00682)
% Catholic	-0.00506 (0.00513)	-0.00685* (0.00375)
Proportional Representation	0.585 (0.495)	0.512** (0.248)
Presidential	0.132 (0.431)	-1.323*** (0.420)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-1.083* (0.614)	-0.981** (0.372)
# Democracies	35	45
Observations	652	1,046
R-squared	.927	.929

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 with the measure of democracy of Boix et al. (2013). 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A24: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (Boix et al. 2013)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	0.407*** (0.142)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.642** (0.262)
GDP pc (logged)	2.620** (1.057)
Growth	0.0199 (0.0394)
Polity	0.182 (0.129)
Ethnic diversity	0.0218 (0.0330)
Electoral turnout	0.0123 (0.0275)
% Elderly	0.479** (0.222)
% Muslim	-0.0233 (0.0185)
% Catholic	-0.000675 (0.0219)
Proportional Representation	2.431 (1.885)
Presidential	-0.931 (1.237)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-3.468* (1.888)
# Democracies	70
Observations	1,355
R-squared	.631

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 with the measure of democracy of Boix et al. (2013). Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A25: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Year Dummy Variables)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.817*** (0.0285)	
Market Inequality	0.111*** (0.0225)	0.532*** (0.0503)
GDP pc (logged)	0.350** (0.157)	0.0926 (1.173)
Growth	-0.0104 (0.0151)	0.00685 (0.0179)
Polity	-0.0205 (0.0303)	0.0143 (0.0530)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00154 (0.00479)	
Electoral turnout	0.00330 (0.00541)	0.0219 (0.0144)
% Elderly	0.143*** (0.0358)	0.0382 (0.165)
% Muslim	-5.67e-05 (0.00612)	
% Catholic	-0.00609** (0.00246)	
Proportional Representation	0.450** (0.209)	
Presidential	-0.243 (0.265)	
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-0.841*** (0.310)	
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	87	89
Observations	1,966	2,049
R-squared	.931	.938

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 with year dummy variables. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A26: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (Year Dummy Variables)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.804*** (0.0503)	0.753*** (0.0464)
Market Inequality	0.0981*** (0.0310)	0.186*** (0.0399)
GDP pc (logged)	0.413 (0.283)	0.193 (0.287)
Growth	0.000748 (0.0259)	-0.0207 (0.0204)
Polity	-0.0164 (0.0627)	-0.0108 (0.0452)
Ethnic diversity	0.0183 (0.0140)	-0.0325*** (0.0116)
Electoral turnout	0.00671 (0.00699)	0.00189 (0.00837)
% Elderly	0.190** (0.0706)	0.0681 (0.0501)
% Muslim	0.00287 (0.00655)	-0.0122 (0.00942)
% Catholic	-0.00430 (0.00509)	-0.0124*** (0.00454)
Proportional Representation	0.556 (0.531)	0.744*** (0.272)
Presidential	0.294 (0.448)	-1.672*** (0.560)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-1.109* (0.616)	-1.101** (0.457)
# Democracies	34	43
Observations	695	1,083
R-squared	.932	.936

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 with year dummy variables. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A27: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (Year Dummy Variables)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	0.366** (0.138)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.368 (0.466)
GDP pc (logged)	2.257** (1.066)
Growth	-0.0170 (0.0394)
Polity	0.120 (0.127)
Ethnic diversity	0.0289 (0.0328)
Electoral turnout	0.0114 (0.0256)
% Elderly	0.586** (0.247)
% Muslim	-0.0150 (0.0207)
% Catholic	0.00299 (0.0230)
Proportional Representation	2.134 (1.934)
Presidential	-0.742 (1.267)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-3.494* (1.897)
# Democracies	68
Observations	1,444
R-squared	.645

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 with year dummy variables. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A28: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (State Capacity)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.814*** (0.0278)	
Market Inequality	0.109*** (0.0207)	0.522*** (0.0495)
State Capacity	0.298* (0.165)	0.371 (0.320)
GDP pc (logged)	0.197 (0.180)	-0.176 (1.066)
Growth	-0.0130 (0.0147)	-0.00150 (0.0181)
Polity	-0.0289 (0.0296)	-0.0146 (0.0543)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00312 (0.00481)	
Electoral turnout	0.00462 (0.00520)	0.0200 (0.0155)
% Elderly	0.101*** (0.0335)	0.0739 (0.170)
% Muslim	-0.00321 (0.00594)	
% Catholic	-0.00536** (0.00246)	
Proportional Representation	0.574*** (0.210)	
Presidential	-0.454* (0.257)	
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-0.910*** (0.300)	
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	86	88
Observations	1,951	2,034
R-squared	.929	.934

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 with a control variable for state capacity. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A29: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (State Capacity)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.807*** (0.0463)	0.751*** (0.0454)
Market Inequality	0.0925*** (0.0293)	0.184*** (0.0371)
State Capacity	0.359 (0.325)	0.0252 (0.200)
GDP pc (logged)	0.245 (0.340)	0.183 (0.301)
Growth	-0.00450 (0.0245)	-0.0313 (0.0194)
Polity	-0.0130 (0.0619)	-0.0201 (0.0425)
Ethnic diversity	0.0144 (0.0110)	-0.0346*** (0.0127)
Electoral turnout	0.00614 (0.00686)	0.00605 (0.00851)
% Elderly	0.131** (0.0595)	0.0455 (0.0480)
% Muslim	-0.00102 (0.00590)	-0.0150* (0.00801)
% Catholic	-0.00434 (0.00495)	-0.0126*** (0.00434)
Proportional Representation	0.693 (0.511)	0.801*** (0.278)
Presidential	0.140 (0.390)	-1.865*** (0.537)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-1.227** (0.603)	-1.090** (0.437)
# Democracies	34	43
Observations	695	1,083
R-squared	.928	.933

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 with a control variable for state capacity. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A30: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (State Capacity)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	0.333*** (0.125)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.373 (0.442)
State Capacity	2.213** (0.840)
GDP pc (logged)	0.726 (1.111)
Growth	-0.0273 (0.0366)
Polity	0.0106 (0.110)
Ethnic diversity	0.0265 (0.0303)
Electoral turnout	0.00105 (0.0246)
% Elderly	0.416* (0.215)
% Muslim	-0.0228 (0.0194)
% Catholic	0.00463 (0.0219)
Proportional Representation	2.632 (1.849)
Presidential	-1.151 (1.177)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-3.599** (1.791)
# Democracies	68
Observations	1,444
R-squared	.649

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate:’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 with a control variable for state capacity. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A31: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (No Interaction between PR and Presidentialism)

	(1)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.833*** (0.0258)
Market Inequality	0.100*** (0.0198)
GDP pc (logged)	0.386*** (0.145)
Growth	-0.0132 (0.0147)
Polity	-0.0229 (0.0290)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00234 (0.00479)
Electoral turnout	0.00669 (0.00531)
% Elderly	0.116*** (0.0335)
% Muslim	-0.00162 (0.00524)
% Catholic	-0.00619** (0.00235)
Proportional Representation	0.205 (0.146)
Presidential	-0.769*** (0.253)
# Democracies	87
Observations	1,966
R-squared	.928

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 2 without an interaction term between PR and Presidentialism. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A32: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (No Interaction between PR and Presidentialism)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.831*** (0.0429)	0.765*** (0.0426)
Market Inequality	0.0967*** (0.0301)	0.172*** (0.0374)
GDP pc (logged)	0.382 (0.287)	0.239 (0.265)
Growth	0.000570 (0.0249)	-0.0302 (0.0197)
Polity	0.00257 (0.0610)	-0.0212 (0.0413)
Ethnic diversity	0.0115 (0.0112)	-0.0307** (0.0125)
Electoral turnout	0.0106 (0.00653)	0.00744 (0.00829)
% Elderly	0.170*** (0.0558)	0.0435 (0.0451)
% Muslim	0.00124 (0.00531)	-0.0142* (0.00789)
% Catholic	-0.00526 (0.00488)	-0.0115** (0.00430)
Proportional Representation	-0.0377 (0.229)	0.513*** (0.238)
Presidential	-0.268 (0.309)	-2.447*** (0.558)
# Democracies	34	43
Observations	695	1,083
R-squared	.927	.932

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 without an interaction term between PR and Presidentialism. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A33: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (No Interaction between PR and Presidentialism)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	0.355** (0.137)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.356 (0.467)
GDP pc (logged)	2.246** (1.035)
Growth	-0.0291 (0.0389)
Polity	0.0866 (0.118)
Ethnic diversity	0.0332 (0.0342)
Electoral turnout	0.0200 (0.0271)
% Elderly	0.575** (0.218)
% Muslim	-0.0163 (0.0198)
% Catholic	0.00128 (0.0235)
Proportional Representation	0.762 (1.332)
Presidential	-2.780** (1.160)
# Democracies	68
Observations	1,444
R-squared	.623

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 without an interaction term between PR and Presidentialism. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A34: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Additional Control Variables)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.806*** (0.0280)	
Market Inequality	0.104*** (0.0213)	0.543*** (0.0575)
GDP pc (logged)	0.374** (0.177)	-0.514 (0.973)
Growth	-0.0113 (0.0182)	-0.0142 (0.0218)
Polity	-0.0387 (0.0348)	-0.0101 (0.0732)
Ethnic diversity	-0.000278 (0.00491)	
Electoral turnout	0.00453 (0.00630)	0.0218 (0.0188)
% Elderly	0.122*** (0.0393)	0.0644 (0.161)
% Muslim	-0.000853 (0.00694)	
% Catholic	0.000250 (0.00366)	
% Protestant	0.00962** (0.00445)	
Proportional Representation	0.536* (0.274)	
Presidential	-0.509* (0.277)	
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-0.815** (0.333)	
Trade openness	0.00156 (0.00278)	0.0166 (0.0105)
Capital openness	-0.00772* (0.00454)	0.00595 (0.0110)
Natural resource (% GDP)	-0.958 (1.118)	2.465 (2.377)
Population (logged)	0.0308 (0.0837)	-2.037 (1.224)
Age democracy	0.00498 (0.00323)	0.0182 (0.0157)
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	62	62
Observations	1,563	1,641
R-squared	.938	.936

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 with additional control variables. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A35: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (Additional Control Variables)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.759*** (0.0563)	0.682*** (0.0540)
Market Inequality	0.0835*** (0.0291)	0.215*** (0.0407)
GDP pc (logged)	-0.152 (0.413)	0.451 (0.392)
Growth	-0.00562 (0.0299)	-0.0137 (0.0226)
Polity	-0.0133 (0.0713)	0.0167 (0.0440)
Ethnic diversity	0.000897 (0.0133)	-0.0435*** (0.0146)
Electoral turnout	0.0129 (0.00914)	-0.0102 (0.00899)
% Elderly	0.238** (0.110)	0.0636 (0.0551)
% Muslim	0.00356 (0.00759)	-0.00877 (0.0113)
% Catholic	0.00879 (0.0100)	-0.00622 (0.00611)
% Protestant	0.0389** (0.0148)	0.0162** (0.00693)
Proportional Representation	1.071* (0.618)	0.598 (0.449)
Presidential	-0.461 (0.442)	-1.935*** (0.666)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-1.114 (0.702)	-1.370** (0.656)
Trade openness	0.00766 (0.00736)	-0.00779* (0.00454)
Capital openness	-0.00777 (0.00631)	-0.00426 (0.00700)
Natural resource (% GDP)	0.905 (1.809)	-1.336 (1.428)
Population (logged)	0.0317 (0.135)	-0.144 (0.117)
Age democracy	0.00189 (0.00886)	-0.00389 (0.00756)
# Democracies	33	43
Observations	540	881
R-squared	.946	.943

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 with additional control variables. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A36: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (Additional Control Variables)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	0.0977 (0.123)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.0841 (0.501)
GDP pc (logged)	-0.415 (0.943)
Growth	-0.00501 (0.0383)
Polity	-0.105 (0.101)
Ethnic diversity	0.0369 (0.0226)
Electoral turnout	0.0606** (0.0291)
% Elderly	0.638** (0.250)
% Muslim	0.0289 (0.0217)
% Catholic	0.0760** (0.0283)
% Protestant	0.149*** (0.0339)
Proportional Representation	2.531 (1.757)
Presidential	-3.167*** (1.159)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-2.096 (1.758)
Trade openness	0.0301** (0.0130)
Capital openness	-0.0105 (0.0193)
Natural resource (% GDP)	-6.097 (5.760)
Population (logged)	0.287 (0.366)
Age democracy	0.0331* (0.0168)
# Democracies	46
Observations	1,105
R-squared	.787

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 with additional control variables. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A37: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution in Low and High Turnout Democracies

	Low Turnout (1)	High Turnout (2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.807*** (0.0380)	0.792*** (0.0408)
Market Inequality	0.100*** (0.0257)	0.130*** (0.0296)
GDP pc (logged)	0.346* (0.194)	0.530*** (0.207)
Growth	-0.00309 (0.0214)	-0.0290 (0.0212)
Polity	-0.00978 (0.0376)	-0.0353 (0.0422)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00674 (0.00657)	0.00421 (0.00570)
Electoral turnout	-0.000359 (0.00927)	0.0113 (0.0128)
% Elderly	0.145** (0.0599)	0.0906** (0.0390)
% Muslim	0.00557 (0.00543)	-0.0177** (0.00866)
% Catholic	-0.000531 (0.00383)	-0.0118*** (0.00318)
Proportional Representation	0.165 (0.331)	0.782*** (0.236)
Presidential	-0.414 (0.339)	-0.540 (0.477)
Presidential* Proportional Representation	-0.613 (0.415)	-1.163** (0.509)
# Democracies	72	59
Observations	984	982
R-squared	.91	.936

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 and 2 of Table 2 for low (below the median) and high (above the median) turnout democracies separately. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A38: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Outliers)

	Redis.>5 th perc.	Redis.<95 th perc.	Ineq.>5 th perc.	Ineq.<95 th perc.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.811*** (0.0280)	0.806*** (0.0288)	0.821*** (0.0262)	0.819*** (0.0279)
Market Inequality	0.0987*** (0.0198)	0.102*** (0.0206)	0.0957*** (0.0203)	0.119*** (0.0222)
GDP pc (logged)	0.356** (0.145)	0.455*** (0.154)	0.340** (0.144)	0.385** (0.155)
Growth	-0.00299 (0.00553)	-0.00245 (0.00578)	-0.00341 (0.00558)	-0.00360 (0.00597)
Polity	-0.00651*** (0.00241)	-0.00603** (0.00240)	-0.00652*** (0.00230)	-0.00668*** (0.00241)
Ethnic diversity	-0.0127 (0.0159)	-0.0141 (0.0149)	-0.0138 (0.0156)	-0.0154 (0.0149)
Electoral turnout	-0.0128 (0.0293)	-0.0280 (0.0290)	-0.0166 (0.0295)	-0.0214 (0.0310)
% Elderly	-0.000643 (0.00463)	-0.00495 (0.00481)	-0.00251 (0.00482)	-0.00376 (0.00496)
% Muslim	0.00539 (0.00536)	0.00361 (0.00519)	0.00410 (0.00521)	0.00482 (0.00555)
% Catholic	0.126*** (0.0331)	0.107*** (0.0338)	0.129*** (0.0352)	0.102*** (0.0339)
Proportional Representation	0.536** (0.208)	0.470** (0.215)	0.549*** (0.208)	0.528** (0.205)
Presidential	-0.439 (0.265)	-0.411 (0.263)	-0.305 (0.250)	-0.433* (0.255)
Presidential* Proportional Representation	-0.840*** (0.292)	-0.815*** (0.304)	-0.864*** (0.296)	-0.917*** (0.316)
# Democracies	86	87	86	86
Observations	1,867	1,867	1,865	1,871
R-squared	.929	.917	.932	.93

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 2 without outliers. Regression 1 excludes observations with redistribution level below the 5th percentile; regression 2 excludes observations with redistribution level above the 95th percentile; regression 3 excludes observations with inequality level below the 5th percentile; regression 4 excludes observations with inequality level above the 95th percentile. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A39: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (Outliers)

	Redis.>5 th perc.		Redis.<95 th perc.		Ineq.>5 th perc.		Ineq.<95 th perc.	
	Fractionalized	Unified	Fractionalized	Unified	Fractionalized	Unified	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.787*** (0.0546)	0.741*** (0.0446)	0.799*** (0.0500)	0.735*** (0.0483)	0.816*** (0.0462)	0.743*** (0.0429)	0.817*** (0.0465)	0.753*** (0.0465)
Market Inequality	0.0853*** (0.0277)	0.183*** (0.0364)	0.0939*** (0.0298)	0.178*** (0.0371)	0.0842*** (0.0265)	0.178*** (0.0377)	0.112*** (0.0355)	0.184*** (0.0381)
GDP pc (logged)	0.318 (0.302)	0.158 (0.264)	0.476 (0.316)	0.308 (0.272)	0.392 (0.274)	0.0512 (0.264)	0.396 (0.285)	0.185 (0.263)
Growth	0.00796 (0.0269)	-0.0285 (0.0196)	-0.00500 (0.0248)	-0.0288 (0.0201)	0.00284 (0.0259)	-0.0337 (0.0210)	-0.00321 (0.0245)	-0.0315 (0.0200)
Polity	0.0454 (0.0634)	-0.0181 (0.0427)	0.00210 (0.0602)	-0.0216 (0.0435)	-0.00146 (0.0614)	-0.00602 (0.0441)	-0.00151 (0.0671)	-0.0231 (0.0439)
Ethnic diversity	0.0129 (0.0115)	-0.0346** (0.0129)	0.0110 (0.0119)	-0.0326** (0.0128)	0.0138 (0.0106)	-0.0356*** (0.0123)	0.0124 (0.0112)	-0.0356** (0.0146)
Electoral turnout	0.0103 (0.00727)	0.00446 (0.00815)	0.00485 (0.00660)	0.00670 (0.00835)	0.00897 (0.00671)	0.00213 (0.00789)	0.00870 (0.00759)	0.00724 (0.00863)
% Elderly	0.159** (0.0590)	0.0641 (0.0427)	0.148** (0.0607)	0.0330 (0.0481)	0.158** (0.0722)	0.0809* (0.0433)	0.157** (0.0589)	0.0420 (0.0468)
% Muslim	-0.00322 (0.00599)	-0.0163* (0.00818)	-0.000734 (0.00579)	-0.0140* (0.00813)	-0.00108 (0.00540)	-0.0179** (0.00861)	0.000420 (0.00587)	-0.0153* (0.00807)
% Catholic	-0.00572 (0.00524)	-0.0133*** (0.00420)	-0.00612 (0.00549)	-0.0113** (0.00439)	-0.00430 (0.00495)	-0.0143*** (0.00421)	-0.00385 (0.00473)	-0.0127*** (0.00438)
Proportional Representation	0.780 (0.579)	0.842*** (0.271)	0.469 (0.531)	0.819*** (0.289)	0.573 (0.550)	0.878*** (0.277)	0.433 (0.502)	0.820*** (0.279)
Presidential	-0.0236 (0.432)	-1.817*** (0.534)	0.116 (0.424)	-1.974*** (0.553)	0.138 (0.415)	-1.709*** (0.518)	0.0768 (0.399)	-1.838*** (0.539)
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-1.199* (0.645)	-1.175*** (0.421)	-0.970 (0.611)	-1.061** (0.442)	-1.042* (0.613)	-1.198*** (0.427)	-0.880 (0.600)	-1.110** (0.445)
# Democracies	33	43	34	43	34	43	34	43
Observations	614	1,075	662	1,027	669	1,018	639	1,052
R-squared	.932	.933	.91	.923	.933	.935	.928	.932

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 without outliers. Regressions 1 and 2 exclude observations with redistribution level below the 5th percentile; regressions 3 and 4 exclude observations with redistribution level above the 95th percentile; regressions 5 and 6 exclude observations with inequality level below the 5th percentile; regressions 7 and 8 exclude observations with inequality level above the 95th percentile. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A40: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (Outliers)

	Redis.>5 th perc.	Redis.<95 th perc.	BGI>5 th perc.	BGI<95 th perc.	WGI>5 th perc.	WGI<95 th perc.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Within-Group Inequality	0.310** (0.130)	0.349*** (0.125)	0.373*** (0.137)	.377*** (.137)	0.367** (0.141)	0.950** (0.419)
Between-Group Inequality	0.0648 (0.436)	-0.384 (0.408)	-0.340 (0.457)	-1.061 (1.266)	-0.363 (0.440)	-1.257* (0.740)
GDP pc (logged)	1.821* (0.978)	2.434** (0.947)	2.338** (1.097)	2.277** (.996)	2.326** (1.055)	3.074** (1.187)
Growth	-0.0176 (0.0375)	-0.0389 (0.0389)	-0.0248 (0.0360)	-.03 (.038)	-0.0383 (0.0403)	-0.0418 (0.0369)
Polity	0.135 (0.116)	0.0489 (0.114)	0.134 (0.127)	.107 (.127)	0.0910 (0.135)	0.0369 (0.135)
Ethnic diversity	0.0292 (0.0298)	0.0138 (0.0271)	0.0223 (0.0322)	.027 (.033)	0.0214 (0.0329)	0.0214 (0.0315)
Electoral turnout	0.0106 (0.0252)	0.000160 (0.0220)	0.0186 (0.0266)	.013 (.026)	0.0156 (0.0262)	0.0140 (0.0269)
% Elderly	0.480** (0.213)	0.418** (0.206)	0.542** (0.251)	.486** (.222)	0.493** (0.232)	0.485** (0.216)
% Muslim	-0.0250 (0.0175)	-0.0202 (0.0177)	-0.0179 (0.0196)	-.022 (.019)	-0.0178 (0.0198)	-0.0194 (0.0211)
% Catholic	-0.00182 (0.0213)	-0.00162 (0.0193)	0.00424 (0.0234)	.0002 (.023)	0.00368 (0.0227)	0.00704 (0.0234)
Proportional Representation	2.400 (1.777)	1.982 (1.666)	2.094 (1.984)	2.226 (1.905)	2.138 (1.897)	2.411 (1.855)
Presidential	-1.830* (1.092)	-0.962 (1.106)	-1.160 (1.201)	-1.202 (1.18)	-0.841 (1.171)	-1.294 (1.312)
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-3.449* (1.766)	-3.141* (1.699)	-3.210 (1.989)	-3.516* (1.844)	-3.433* (1.857)	-3.433* (1.906)
# Democracies	68	68	65	66	65	63
Observations	1,376	1,376	1,341	1,372	1,372	1,372
R-squared	.657	.618	.636	.632	.638	.641

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 without outliers. Regression 1 excludes observations with redistribution level below the 5th percentile; regression 2 excludes observations with redistribution level above the 95th percentile; regression 3 excludes observations with BGI level below the 5th percentile; regression 4 excludes observations with BGI level above the 95th percentile; regression 5 excludes observations with WGI level below the 5th percentile; regression 6 excludes observations with WGI level above the 95th percentile. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A41: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (Alternative Measure of Fractionalized Poor)

	Fractionalized (1)	Unified (2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.803*** (0.0505)	0.782*** (0.0448)
Market Inequality	0.0958*** (0.0328)	0.161*** (0.0350)
GDP pc (logged)	0.394 (0.341)	0.561** (0.251)
Growth	-0.00283 (0.0272)	-0.0288 (0.0187)
Polity	0.00200 (0.0617)	-0.0268 (0.0395)
Ethnic diversity	0.0105 (0.0134)	-0.00899 (0.00771)
Electoral turnout	0.00440 (0.00765)	0.00681 (0.00749)
% Elderly	0.166** (0.0747)	0.0111 (0.0422)
% Muslim	8.95e-05 (0.00697)	-0.00662 (0.00869)
% Catholic	-0.00325 (0.00637)	-0.0103** (0.00397)
Proportional Representation	0.487 (0.564)	0.824*** (0.287)
Presidential	0.261 (0.424)	-1.702*** (0.606)
Presidential* Proportional Representation	-1.249* (0.711)	-0.875** (0.409)
# Democracies	32	45
Observations	595	1,183
R-squared	.908	.938

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1-2 of Table 3 with the alternative measure of fractionalized poor. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A42: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (No Control for Turnout)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.813*** (0.0339)	
Market Inequality	0.111*** (0.0254)	0.519*** (0.0465)
GDP pc (logged)	0.449*** (0.167)	0.477 (0.815)
Growth	-0.0148 (0.0165)	-0.00864 (0.0199)
Polity	-0.0136 (0.0280)	0.00105 (0.0530)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00467 (0.00492)	
% Elderly	0.111*** (0.0367)	0.0102 (0.160)
% Muslim	-0.00180 (0.00586)	
% Catholic	-0.00641** (0.00265)	
Proportional Representation	0.537** (0.227)	
Presidential	-0.445 (0.269)	
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-0.879*** (0.325)	
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	87	89
Observations	1,989	2,073
R-squared	.923	.934

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 without controlling for turnout. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A43: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (No Control for Turnout)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.814*** (0.0473)	0.727*** (0.0639)
Market Inequality	0.0950*** (0.0336)	0.202*** (0.0516)
GDP pc (logged)	0.433 (0.287)	0.263 (0.299)
Growth	-0.00470 (0.0232)	-0.0264 (0.0229)
Polity	0.0284 (0.0604)	-0.0210 (0.0411)
Ethnic diversity	0.0108 (0.0105)	-0.0392*** (0.0145)
% Elderly	0.139** (0.0573)	0.0486 (0.0549)
% Muslim	0.000406 (0.00575)	-0.0160* (0.00853)
% Catholic	-0.00473 (0.00526)	-0.0141** (0.00538)
Proportional Representation	0.655 (0.497)	0.925** (0.364)
Presidential	0.0672 (0.393)	-1.971*** (0.609)
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-1.150* (0.585)	-1.256** (0.539)
# Democracies	34	43
Observations	707	1,093
R-squared	.923	.926

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 without controlling for turnout. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A44: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (No Control for Turnout)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	0.381*** (0.139)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.337 (0.466)
GDP pc (logged)	2.390** (1.052)
Growth	-0.0195 (0.0394)
Polity	0.124 (0.113)
Ethnic diversity	0.0228 (0.0290)
% Elderly	0.472** (0.224)
% Muslim	-0.0196 (0.0188)
% Catholic	0.00141 (0.0223)
Proportional Representation	2.371 (1.855)
Presidential	-1.075 (1.241)
Presidential*Proportional Representation	-3.672* (1.861)
# Democracies	68
Observations	1,467
R-squared	.626

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 without controlling for turnout. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A45: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (No Control for Growth)

	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.825*** (0.0267)	
Market Inequality	0.104*** (0.0202)	0.522*** (0.0481)
GDP pc (logged)	0.400*** (0.148)	0.195 (0.896)
Polity	-0.0234 (0.0286)	-0.0120 (0.0530)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00284 (0.00473)	
Electoral turnout	0.00521 (0.00525)	0.0203 (0.0154)
% Elderly	0.109*** (0.0333)	0.0820 (0.167)
% Muslim	-0.00230 (0.00562)	
% Catholic	-0.00601** (0.00234)	
Proportional Representation	0.476** (0.206)	
Presidential	-0.396 (0.253)	
Presidential* Proportional Representation	-0.792*** (0.295)	
Country FEs	N	Y
# Democracies	87	89
Observations	1,968	2,060
R-squared	.928	.934

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate:' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 2 without controlling for growth. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A46: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (No Control for Growth)

	Fractionalized	Unified
	(1)	(2)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.814*** (0.0456)	0.754*** (0.0446)
Market Inequality	0.0942*** (0.0291)	0.183*** (0.0372)
GDP pc (logged)	0.459 (0.289)	0.152 (0.264)
Polity	0.00898 (0.0602)	-0.0210 (0.0432)
Ethnic diversity	0.0139 (0.0112)	-0.0334** (0.0126)
Electoral turnout	0.00765 (0.00676)	0.00716 (0.00845)
% Elderly	0.143** (0.0570)	0.0507 (0.0475)
% Muslim	-0.000198 (0.00568)	-0.0156* (0.00803)
% Catholic	-0.00520 (0.00488)	-0.0126*** (0.00438)
Proportional Representation	0.577 (0.505)	0.791*** (0.273)
Presidential	0.126 (0.399)	-1.839*** (0.540)
Presidential* Proportional Representation	-1.080* (0.589)	-1.075** (0.426)
# Democracies	34	43
Observations	695	1,085
R-squared	.927	.932

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 without controlling for growth. 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A47: Effect of Between- and Within-Group Inequality on Redistribution (No Control for Growth)

	(1)
Within-Group Inequality	0.363*** (0.135)
Between-Group Inequality	-0.334 (0.449)
GDP pc (logged)	2.357** (1.046)
Growth	0.0866 (0.126)
Ethnic diversity	0.0249 (0.0315)
Electoral turnout	0.0122 (0.0256)
% Elderly	0.484** (0.220)
% Muslim	-0.0207 (0.0192)
% Catholic	0.00142 (0.0222)
Proportional Representation	2.251 (1.869)
Presidential	-1.252 (1.187)
Presidential* Proportional Representation	-3.421* (1.849)
# Democracies	68
Observations	1,452
R-squared	.633

Note: OLS Estimates. Includes a dummy variable to account for whether the observation is from the Afrobarometer or DHS – which uses ABW scores – or another survey (not reported). Estimated using the ‘mi estimate.’ command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 4 without controlling for growth. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A48: Effect of Market Inequality on Redistribution in Democracies Conditional on the Structure of the Poor (Refined Groups)

	Fractionalized		Unified	
	1 st Group	2 nd Group	1 st Group	2 nd Group
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.596*** (0.131)	0.769*** (0.0634)	0.726*** (0.0795)	0.725*** (0.0535)
Market Inequality	0.0793 (0.0569)	0.125*** (0.0401)	0.161** (0.0654)	0.210*** (0.0459)
GDP pc (logged)	0.155 (0.672)	0.674 (0.456)	0.204 (0.452)	0.339 (0.349)
Growth	-0.0205 (0.0408)	0.0108 (0.0303)	-0.0194 (0.0384)	-0.0292 (0.0219)
Polity	-0.00782 (0.0951)	0.0852 (0.0942)	-0.0185 (0.0665)	-0.0210 (0.0524)
Ethnic diversity	0.0248 (0.0351)	0.0105 (0.0158)	-0.0329 (0.0205)	-0.0212 (0.0229)
Electoral turnout	-0.00273 (0.0169)	0.0101 (0.0105)	0.0299 (0.0199)	0.00291 (0.0102)
% Elderly	0.0332 (0.560)	0.0865 (0.0631)	0.0999 (0.105)	0.0209 (0.0545)
% Muslim	0.00681 (0.0121)	-0.0134 (0.0116)	0.00125 (0.0118)	-0.0168 (0.0101)
% Catholic	-0.00321 (0.0162)	-0.0110 (0.00731)	-0.0154* (0.00773)	-0.0155*** (0.00538)
Proportional Representation	1.373 (1.572)	0.209 (0.500)	1.937* (0.980)	0.833** (0.350)
Presidential	0.832 (0.888)	-1.217** (0.532)	-0.0845 (0.900)	-2.356*** (0.617)
Presidential * Proportional Representation	-2.176 (1.879)	-0.411 (0.629)	-1.529 (1.142)	-1.198* (0.602)
# Democracies	14	20	11	32
Observations	191	504	209	874
R-squared	.586	.935	.949	.928

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate' command in Stata. Redoes regressions 1 and 2 of Table 3 with refined groups. There are two groups with fractionalized poor: (1) democracies in which no ethnic group represents at least 50% of the population (e.g., Kenya); and (2) democracies in which one rich ethnic group represents at least 50% of the population and there is at least one poor ethnic group that represents at least 10% of the population (e.g., the United States). There are two groups with unified poor: (1) democracies in which a poor ethnic group represents at least 50% of the population (e.g., Burundi); and (2) democracies in which one rich ethnic group represents at least 50% of the population and there is no poor ethnic group that represents at least 10% of the population (e.g., Sweden). 'Poor' refers to people with income below the median. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A49: Effect of Inequality on Redistribution (Interaction)

Lagged Dependent Variable	0.815*** (0.0292)
Market Inequality	0.147*** (0.0269)
Fractionalized Poor	3.325*** (1.164)
Market Inequality* Fractionalized Poor	-0.0721*** (0.0255)
GDP pc (logged)	0.468** (0.196)
Growth	-0.0150 (0.0154)
Polity	-0.0259 (0.0326)
Ethnic diversity	-0.00655 (0.00820)
Electoral turnout	0.00317 (0.00526)
% Elderly	0.0698** (0.0336)
% Muslim	-0.00713 (0.00617)
% Catholic	-0.00908*** (0.00271)
Proportional Representation	0.691*** (0.230)
Presidential	-0.640** (0.310)
Presidential* Proportional Representation	-1.011*** (0.332)
F-test <i>Fractionalized Poor + Market Inequality* Fractionalized Poor</i>	4.12**
# Democracies	77
Observations	1,778
R-squared	.933

Note: OLS Estimates. Estimated using the 'mi estimate.' command in Stata. Redoes regression 1 of Table 2 with an interaction term between *Fractionalized Poor* and *Market Inequality* Fractionalized Poor*. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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