Online Appendix for "Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development Since 1815"

Michael K. Miller

The following pages display the additional results referenced, but not shown, in the text of "Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development Since 1815." For convenience, I list here a summary of these checks:

- **Table 6** lists summary statistics.

- **Table 7** displays alternative duration models for the main results (Cox Proportional Hazard, Weibull, and lognormal).

- **Table 8** shows the main results with different control variables (including the Geddes autocracy categories), using the paper's dynamic probit method.

- **Table 9** shows the main results with different control variables, including year fixed effects.

- **Table 10** shows the main results for democratic survival, restricting variation in the electoral histories to autocratic experience.

- **Table 11** shows the main results with electoral history lagged by 5 and 10 years.

- **Table 12** shows the main results with four alternative values for the lower threshold on contestation.

- **Table 13** shows the main results with four alternative values for the higher threshold on contestation.

- **Table 14** shows the main results with four alternative values for the threshold on participation.

Table 6 lists summary statistics for the variables included in the main models. The sample is limited to the country-years for which *Contestation* is defined.

Table 7 shows that the main results are highly robust to alternative duration models. Specifically, I use Cox Proportional Hazard, Weibull, and lognormal models. A total of 30 models are summarized, in the style of Table 5. If anything, the results are stronger for these models, especially the findings for $\Sigma Multiparty\ Elections$ and $\Sigma Contestation$. The key results for $\Sigma Competitive\ Oligarchy$ (for democratization) and $\Sigma Closed\ Authoritarianism$ (for democratic survival) are also robust across all three estimation strategies.

Table 8 alters the control variables used for the main models. A total of 25 regressions are summarized. Model 1 adds dummy variables for the Geddes autocracy categories coded in Geddes et al. (2012): military, monarchy, party-based, personalist, and other.[1] Since these relate to autocracies alone, only the democratic transition models are shown. Consistent with past work, I find that military regimes are the most likely to democratize. Monarchies are the least likely, followed by party-based regimes. Models 2–3 of Table 8 add a control for the year of the country's independence. Models 4–5 remove the *Past Democratic Breakdowns* variable, out of concern that this may be partly obscuring the lagged effects of the regime types. The only meaningful change in Table 8 is that the history of multiparty elections is only significant at the 0.1 level when the Geddes types are controlled for. Both $\Sigma Contestation$ and $\Sigma Competitive\ Oligarchy$ remain strongly predictive of democratization.

Table 9 also alters the control variables used for the main models. A total of 20 regressions are summarized. Models 1–2 add year fixed effects. Models 3–4 omit the *Military Size* variable, the control that removes the most data points from the main models. Results are largely unchanged, although the finding for elected legislatures becomes insignificant when *Military Size* is removed.

Table 10 shows the main models for democratic survival, but restricts the weighted historical variables to only pick up experience under autocracy. As a result, variables like weighted contestation are unaffected by democratic deepening. Model 1 fixes the value at the point of democratization. Model 2 removes the handful of countries that enter the dataset as democracies and never experience breakdown. Results are unchanged.

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[1] Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2012. Authoritarian regimes: A new data set. Working paper.

Table 11 shows the main models for both transition and survival with the electoral histories lagged by 5 years (Models 1 and 2) and 10 years (Models 3 and 4). The results are highly robust, especially for the hybrid regime types. The key finding for Σ*Closed Authoritarianism*'s effect on democratic survival is also robust to lagging by up to 30 years (coefficient $= -1.210$, $t = -2.35$).

Tables 12–14 alter the thresholds on participation and contestation that define the regime types. Table 12 shows results for four alternative values of the low threshold on contestation. Table 13 alters the high threshold on contestation. Table 14 alters the threshold on participation. Note that changes to the high contestation threshold and the participation threshold alter the definition of democracy. As discussed more fully in the paper (p.23), the main results are highly robust to these shifts in the thresholds.

Table 6: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Contestation	0.443	0.338	0	1	12,871
Participation	0.448	0.274	0	1	12,863
Democracy	0.259	0.438	0	1	12,863
ΣMultiparty Elections	0.065	0.128	0	1.005	11,436
ΣElected Legislature	0.774	0.323	0	1	12,314
ΣLegislature	0.844	0.246	0	1	11,412
ΣContestation	0.391	0.272	0	0.998	12,871
ΣParticipation	0.368	0.220	0	0.865	12,863
ΣContestation + ΣParticipation	0.760	0.438	0	1.816	12,863
ΣContestation − ΣParticipation	0.023	0.231	−0.745	0.548	12,863
ΣDemocracy	0.160	0.299	0	1	12,863
ΣElectoral Oligarchy	0.308	0.348	0	1	12,863
ΣCompetitive Oligarchy	0.072	0.181	0	1	12,863
ΣPlebiscitary Authoritarianism	0.088	0.212	0	1	12,863
ΣElectoral Authoritarianism	0.076	0.201	0	1	12,863
ΣClosed Authoritarianism	0.295	0.352	0	1	12,863
Democratic Breakdowns	0.163	0.465	0	4	12,871
Region Polity	0.466	0.243	0	0.998	12,871
Military Size	0.706	0.830	0	21.130	10,665
Resource Dependence	3.582	9.561	0	100	12,400
GDP/capita (ln)	7.813	1.059	5.139	11.343	12,626
GDP Growth	1.589	6.683	−68.938	189.741	12,475
British Colony	0.189	0.391	0	1	12,871
Never Colonized	0.397	0.489	0	1	12,871
Year	1941.029	51.252	1815	2004	12,871

Table 7: Alternative Duration Models for Transition and Survival

	Cox Proportional Hazard		Weibull		Lognormal	
	(1) Dem. Transition	(2) Dem. Survival	(3) Dem. Transition	(4) Dem. Survival	(5) Dem. Transition	(6) Dem. Survival
$\Sigma Multiparty$ Elections	2.555* (2.21)	6.901** (2.96)	2.710* (2.19)	7.206** (2.97)	3.082* (1.99)	2.891** (2.69)
$\Sigma Elected$ Legislature	0.364 (0.56)	2.396 (1.48)	0.377 (0.54)	2.001 (1.10)	0.772 (1.14)	1.085 (1.29)
$\Sigma Legislature$	−0.198 (−0.30)	−0.191 (−0.17)	−0.246 (−0.35)	0.206 (0.16)	−0.802 (−1.24)	0.010 (0.21)
$\Sigma Contestation$	4.491*** (4.15)	7.020** (2.69)	4.693*** (4.06)	7.155** (2.67)	5.019*** (4.13)	3.627** (2.64)
$\Sigma Participation$	−1.260 (−1.35)	2.526 (0.87)	−1.300 (−1.35)	2.197 (0.75)	−1.525 (−1.42)	0.429 (0.27)
$\Sigma Contestation +$ $\Sigma Participation$	1.616* (2.50)	4.773** (2.60)	1.697* (2.48)	4.676* (2.45)	1.747* (2.53)	2.028* (2.51)
$\Sigma Contestation -$ $\Sigma Participation$	2.875** (3.77)	2.247 (1.09)	2.996*** (3.69)	2.479 (1.20)	3.272*** (3.57)	1.599 (1.27)
$\Sigma Electoral$ Oligarchy	0.902 (1.16)	1.596 (0.62)	0.777 (0.94)	0.825 (0.30)	1.038 (1.19)	1.053 (0.98)
$\Sigma Competitive$ Oligarchy	3.967*** (4.26)	4.958* (1.96)	4.140*** (4.21)	4.390+ (1.69)	4.392*** (3.86)	2.150+ (1.94)
$\Sigma Plebiscitary$ Authoritarianism	0.114 (0.18)	6.430+ (1.90)	0.001 (0.00)	6.278+ (1.81)	0.189 (0.28)	3.184** (2.63)
$\Sigma Electoral$ Authoritarianism	0.391 (0.55)	3.702* (2.42)	0.358 (0.49)	3.587* (2.25)	0.296 (0.37)	1.517* (2.17)
$\Sigma Closed$ Authoritarianism	−0.768 (−1.41)	−3.630** (−2.60)	−0.712 (−1.28)	−3.316* (−2.30)	−0.872 (−1.38)	−1.854** (−2.64)

Notes: The table presents alternative duration models for the main results. The columns correspond to the different model types (Cox Proportional Hazard, Weibull, and lognormal) for democratic transition and survival. Horizontal lines separate the 30 total models. Control variables are included, but not shown. The results display the coefficients, not the the hazard ratios. t-values (based on robust standard errors clustered by country) are in parentheses.
$+ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001$

Table 8: Robustness Checks for Democratic Transition and Survival

	Geddes Types	Independence		Past Transitions Removed	
	(1) *Dem. Transition*	(2) *Dem. Transition*	(3) *Dem. Survival*	(4) *Dem. Transition*	(5) *Dem. Survival*
Σ*Multiparty Elections*	1.044$^+$ (1.82)	1.105* (2.38)	2.086** (3.11)	1.044* (2.20)	2.152** (3.06)
Σ*Elected Legislature*	0.250 (0.90)	−0.073 (−0.34)	1.687** (2.76)	0.039 (0.19)	1.870** (2.87)
Σ*Legislature*	0.118 (0.51)	0.016 (0.08)	−0.440 (−1.02)	−0.048 (−0.23)	−0.545 (−1.22)
Σ*Contestation*	1.337** (3.02)	1.740*** (4.79)	2.346* (2.22)	1.710*** (4.65)	2.319* (2.35)
Σ*Participation*	−0.262 (−0.77)	−0.664* (−2.06)	1.819$^+$ (1.91)	−0.579$^+$ (−1.75)	1.928$^+$ (1.85)
Σ*Contestation* + Σ*Participation*	0.537* (2.03)	0.538* (2.52)	2.083** (3.25)	0.566** (2.59)	2.123*** (3.55)
Σ*Contestation* − Σ*Participation*	0.800** (2.72)	1.202*** (4.46)	0.263 (0.34)	1.145*** (4.18)	0.195 (0.24)
Σ*Electoral Oligarchy*	0.354 (1.02)	0.308 (1.10)	1.824* (2.37)	0.331 (1.23)	1.680* (2.53)
Σ*Competitive Oligarchy*	1.465** (3.28)	1.444*** (4.38)	1.777* (2.24)	1.477*** (4.44)	1.690* (2.24)
Σ*Plebiscitary Authoritarianism*	0.414 (1.49)	0.138 (0.54)	3.054*** (3.52)	0.164 (0.65)	2.430** (2.86)
Σ*Electoral Authoritarianism*	0.292 (0.94)	0.123 (0.49)	1.989*** (3.55)	0.159 (0.59)	1.805*** (3.39)
Σ*Closed Authoritarianism*	−0.417 (−1.62)	−0.306 (−1.52)	−2.039*** (−4.01)	−0.329 (−1.61)	−1.848*** (−3.94)

Notes: The table presents robustness checks for the main results. Model 1 adds dummy variables for the five Geddes autocracy categories. Models 2–3 add a control for the year of independence. Models 4–5 remove the control for past democratic breakdowns. Horizontal lines separate the 25 total regressions. Control variables are included, but not shown. t-values (based on robust standard errors clustered by country) are in parentheses. $+ = p < 0.1$, $* = p < 0.05$, $** = p < 0.01$, $*** = p < 0.001$

Table 9: Robustness Checks for Democratic Transition and Survival

	Year Fixed Effects		Military Size Removed	
	(1) *Dem. Transition*	(2) *Dem. Survival*	(3) *Dem. Transition*	(4) *Dem. Survival*
ΣMultiparty Elections	1.202* (2.25)	2.510*** (3.71)	1.304** (2.87)	2.106** (2.90)
ΣElected Legislature	0.123 (0.53)	2.484*** (3.45)	0.049 (0.24)	0.805 (1.51)
ΣLegislature	−0.012 (−0.05)	−1.069* (−2.20)	0.000 (0.00)	−0.179 (−0.48)
ΣContestation	2.072*** (5.25)	3.054** (2.72)	1.962*** (5.61)	2.348* (2.57)
ΣParticipation	−0.595$^+$ (−1.68)	2.318* (2.35)	−0.488 (−1.45)	1.007 (1.12)
ΣContestation + ΣParticipation	0.739** (3.19)	2.686*** (4.18)	0.737*** (3.74)	1.677** (3.07)
ΣContestation − ΣParticipation	1.334*** (4.52)	0.368 (0.44)	1.225*** (4.37)	0.670 (0.92)
ΣElectoral Oligarchy	0.378 (1.39)	1.427$^+$ (1.78)	0.260 (1.07)	1.061$^+$ (1.68)
ΣCompetitive Oligarchy	1.880*** (5.00)	1.906* (2.23)	1.680*** (5.63)	1.377* (1.99)
ΣPlebiscitary Authoritarianism	0.109 (0.42)	2.485** (2.62)	0.148 (0.60)	1.515* (2.04)
ΣElectoral Authoritarianism	0.295 (1.11)	2.132*** (3.51)	0.199 (0.80)	1.149* (2.10)
ΣClosed Authoritarianism	−0.421* (−2.01)	−1.978*** (−3.51)	−0.357$^+$ (−1.94)	−1.229** (−2.92)

Notes: The table presents robustness checks for the main results. Models 1–2 add year fixed effects. Models 3–4 remove the control for military size. Horizontal lines separate the 20 total regressions. Control variables are included, but not shown. t-values (based on robust standard errors clustered by country) are in parentheses. $+ = p < 0.1$, $* = p < 0.05$, $** = p < 0.01$, $*** = p < 0.001$

Table 10: Robustness Checks for Democratic Survival

	(1) Dem. Survival	(2) Dem. Survival
$\Sigma Multiparty$ Elections	1.676* (2.10)	2.053** (2.94)
$\Sigma Elected$ Legislature	1.733** (3.18)	1.703* (2.55)
$\Sigma Legislature$	−0.408 (−1.08)	−0.232 (−0.58)
$\Sigma Contestation$	2.022* (2.47)	2.089$^+$ (1.80)
$\Sigma Participation$	0.660 (0.86)	2.709* (2.53)
$\Sigma Contestation +$ $\Sigma Participation$	1.341*** (3.33)	2.399*** (3.68)
$\Sigma Contestation -$ $\Sigma Participation$	0.681 (1.00)	−0.318 (−0.34)
$\Sigma Electoral$ Oligarchy	0.939 (1.50)	1.388$^+$ (1.87)
$\Sigma Competitive$ Oligarchy	1.686** (2.79)	1.906* (1.97)
$\Sigma Plebiscitary$ Authoritarianism	2.212** (2.81)	2.599** (2.71)
$\Sigma Electoral$ Authoritarianism	1.489*** (3.98)	2.150*** (3.55)
$\Sigma Closed$ Authoritarianism	−1.812*** (−3.83)	−1.959*** (−3.49)

Notes: The table presents robustness checks for the main results on democratic survival. Model 1 fixes the weighted historical variables at the point of democratization. Model 2 removes the countries that never experience autocracy. Horizontal lines separate the 10 total regressions. Control variables are included, but not shown. t-values (based on robust standard errors clustered by country) are in parentheses. $+ = p < 0.1$, $* = p < 0.05$, $** = p < 0.01$, $*** = p < 0.001$

Table 11: Robustness Checks for Democratic Transition and Survival

	5-Year Lag		10-Year Lag	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Dem. Transition	*Dem. Survival*	*Dem. Transition*	*Dem. Survival*
$\Sigma Multiparty$ $Elections$	0.633 (1.40)	0.848 (1.13)	1.032^+ (1.90)	0.528 (0.72)
$\Sigma Elected$ $Legislature$	−0.043 (−0.20)	1.501^{**} (2.95)	0.015 (0.06)	1.072^* (2.13)
$\Sigma Legislature$	−0.132 (−0.60)	−0.092 (−0.26)	−0.015 (−0.07)	0.189 (0.51)
$\Sigma Contestation$	0.900^* (2.40)	1.615^* (1.97)	0.698^+ (1.74)	2.004^* (2.05)
$\Sigma Participation$	−0.415 (−1.24)	1.682^+ (1.84)	−0.123 (−0.36)	1.530^+ (1.58)
$\Sigma Contestation +$ $\Sigma Participation$	0.242 (1.06)	1.648^{***} (3.73)	0.288 (1.14)	1.767^{**} (3.19)
$\Sigma Contestation -$ $\Sigma Participation$	0.658^* (2.41)	−0.033 (−0.04)	0.411 (1.49)	0.237 (0.30)
$\Sigma Electoral$ $Oligarchy$	0.220 (0.89)	1.071^+ (1.69)	0.206 (0.84)	1.101^+ (1.85)
$\Sigma Competitive$ $Oligarchy$	0.823^* (2.50)	1.544^* (2.46)	0.741^* (2.31)	1.601^* (2.51)
$\Sigma Plebiscitary$ $Authoritarianism$	0.126 (0.51)	2.057^{**} (2.67)	0.188 (0.71)	1.681^* (2.11)
$\Sigma Electoral$ $Authoritarianism$	0.012 (0.04)	1.525^{***} (3.52)	0.127 (0.41)	1.436^{**} (2.73)
$\Sigma Closed$ $Authoritarianism$	−0.148 (−0.73)	-1.495^{***} (−3.59)	−0.208 (−0.98)	-1.431^{**} (−3.05)

Notes: The table presents the main results lagging each of the historical election measures. Models 1–2 lag by 5 years. Models 3–4 lag by 10 years. Horizontal lines separate the 20 total regressions. Control variables are included, but not shown. t-values (based on robust standard errors clustered by country) are in parentheses. $+ = p < 0.1$, $* = p < 0.05$, $** = p < 0.01$, $*** = p < 0.001$

Threshold =	0.1		0.15		0.25		0.3	
	(1) Dem. Transition	(2) Dem. Survival	(3) Dem. Transition	(4) Dem. Survival	(5) Dem. Transition	(6) Dem. Survival	(7) Dem. Transition	(8) Dem. Survival
ΣMultiparty Elections	1.044* (2.27)	2.269*** (3.37)	1.050* (2.27)	2.269*** (3.37)	1.038* (2.21)	2.269*** (3.37)	1.044* (2.25)	2.269*** (3.37)
ΣElected Legislature	0.211 (0.99)	1.771** (2.88)	0.201 (0.94)	1.771** (2.88)	0.081 (0.38)	1.771** (2.88)	0.070 (0.33)	1.771** (2.88)
ΣLegislature	−0.027 (−0.13)	−0.575 (−1.34)	−0.026 (−0.13)	−0.575 (−1.34)	−0.040 (−0.19)	−0.575 (−1.34)	−0.018 (−0.09)	−0.575 (−1.34)
ΣContestation	1.646*** (4.37)	2.415* (2.41)	1.701*** (4.59)	2.415* (2.41)	1.702*** (4.54)	2.415* (2.41)	1.693*** (4.54)	2.415* (2.41)
ΣParticipation	−0.400 (−1.22)	1.789+ (1.72)	−0.418 (−1.27)	1.789+ (1.72)	−0.550 (−1.67)	1.789+ (1.72)	−0.588 (−1.80)	1.789+ (1.72)
ΣContestation + ΣParticipation	0.623** (2.87)	2.102*** (3.50)	0.641** (2.93)	2.102*** (3.50)	0.576** (2.59)	2.102*** (3.50)	0.552* (2.48)	2.102*** (3.50)
ΣContestation − ΣParticipation	1.023*** (3.67)	0.313 (0.38)	1.059*** (3.87)	0.313 (0.38)	1.126*** (4.11)	0.313 (0.38)	1.141*** (4.21)	0.313 (0.38)
ΣElectoral Oligarchy	0.287 (0.84)	1.410+ (1.77)	0.514+ (1.72)	1.521* (2.45)	0.233 (0.96)	1.029 (1.59)	0.469+ (1.88)	0.449 (0.65)
ΣCompetitive Oligarchy	1.493*** (3.85)	2.057* (2.30)	1.669*** (4.53)	1.936* (2.46)	1.419*** (4.26)	1.177+ (1.65)	1.492*** (4.63)	1.085 (1.44)
ΣPlebiscitary Authoritarianism	0.012 (0.02)	2.655* (2.01)	0.477 (1.41)	2.748** (2.99)	−0.014 (−0.06)	1.943* (2.43)	−0.042 (−0.20)	1.956* (2.46)
ΣElectoral Authoritarianism	0.293 (1.02)	2.045*** (3.49)	0.328 (1.18)	1.814*** (3.51)	0.174 (0.67)	1.464** (2.61)	0.248 (1.01)	1.064+ (1.89)
ΣClosed Authoritarianism	−0.395 (−1.41)	−1.951*** (−3.32)	−0.492* (−2.03)	−1.807*** (−3.89)	−0.303+ (−1.74)	−1.362** (−2.84)	−0.367* (−2.19)	−1.084* (−2.15)

Table 12: The table presents the main results with alternative values for the lower threshold on contestation, which is used to categorize the regime types. The threshold is varied across columns as 0.1, 0.15, 0.25, and 0.3. Horizontal lines separate the 40 total regressions. Control variables are included, but not shown. t-values (based on robust standard errors clustered by country) are in parentheses. $+ = p < 0.1, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001$

Threshold =	0.56		0.61		0.71		0.76	
	(1) Dem. Transition	(2) Dem. Survival	(3) Dem. Transition	(4) Dem. Survival	(5) Dem. Transition	(6) Dem. Survival	(7) Dem. Transition	(8) Dem. Survival
ΣMultiparty Elections	1.057* (2.05)	2.918** (3.03)	0.818+ (1.79)	2.463** (3.14)	0.968* (2.01)	2.494** (2.96)	0.592 (1.31)	1.796+ (1.78)
ΣElected Legislature	0.211 (1.02)	0.893* (2.38)	0.246 (1.20)	1.411** (2.92)	−0.034 (−0.15)	1.425* (2.54)	0.175 (0.66)	0.289 (0.47)
ΣLegislature	0.035 (0.19)	−0.466 (−1.43)	0.028 (0.15)	−0.723+ (−1.94)	−0.091 (−0.42)	−0.554 (−1.20)	−0.143 (−0.55)	−0.342 (−0.57)
ΣContestation	2.040*** (4.77)	1.546* (2.10)	1.638*** (4.19)	1.751+ (1.79)	1.737*** (4.58)	1.192 (1.32)	1.759*** (4.21)	−0.774 (−0.77)
ΣParticipation	−0.018 (−0.06)	1.236 (1.53)	−0.093 (−0.29)	1.840+ (1.90)	−0.880* (−2.50)	2.261* (2.03)	−0.556 (−1.35)	1.787 (1.31)
ΣContestation + ΣParticipation	1.011*** (4.07)	1.391** (2.62)	0.773** (3.27)	1.795* (2.55)	0.429* (2.06)	1.727*** (3.53)	0.601** (2.73)	0.507 (0.81)
ΣContestation − ΣParticipation	1.029*** (3.57)	0.155 (0.28)	0.866** (3.20)	−0.045 (−0.07)	1.308*** (4.35)	−0.534 (−0.60)	1.158** (3.29)	−1.280 (−1.25)
ΣElectoral Oligarchy	0.455 (1.60)	0.171 (0.31)	0.298 (1.12)	0.918 (1.52)	0.279 (1.06)	0.697 (0.98)	0.296 (1.06)	0.133 (0.16)
ΣCompetitive Oligarchy	1.237*** (3.82)	0.965+ (1.72)	1.451*** (4.42)	1.541* (2.49)	1.737*** (4.00)	1.154 (1.47)	1.766*** (3.71)	1.025 (1.12)
ΣPlebiscitary Authoritarianism	0.339 (1.48)	0.970 (1.49)	0.360 (1.59)	2.052* (2.48)	−0.032 (−0.13)	1.902* (2.12)	0.176 (0.64)	1.644 (1.62)
ΣElectoral Authoritarianism	0.431 (1.58)	0.968 (1.55)	0.296 (1.13)	1.455* (2.21)	0.000 (0.00)	1.630** (3.26)	0.294 (1.03)	0.226 (0.33)
ΣClosed Authoritarianism	−0.515** (−2.67)	−0.757+ (−1.91)	−0.419* (−2.20)	−1.368** (−2.92)	−0.248 (−1.24)	−1.295** (−2.86)	−0.397+ (−1.79)	−0.323 (−0.55)

Table 13: The table presents the main results with alternative values for the higher threshold on contestation, which is used to categorize the regime types. The threshold is varied across columns as 0.56, 0.61, 0.71, and 0.76. Horizontal lines separate the 40 total regressions. Control variables are included, but not shown. t-values (based on robust standard errors clustered by country) are in parentheses. $+ = p < 0.1$, $* = p < 0.05$, $** = p < 0.01$, $*** = p < 0.001$

Threshold =	0.4		0.45		0.55		0.6	
	(1) Dem. Transition	(2) Dem. Survival	(3) Dem. Transition	(4) Dem. Survival	(5) Dem. Transition	(6) Dem. Survival	(7) Dem. Transition	(8) Dem. Survival
ΣMultiparty Elections	1.206* (2.39)	1.310 (2.53)	1.489** (2.91)	1.423** (2.65)	1.009* (2.30)	2.488** (3.19)	0.973$^+$ (1.88)	2.506** (3.27)
ΣElected Legislature	0.267 (1.37)	0.746 (1.35)	0.192 (0.98)	0.886 (1.45)	0.107 (0.51)	2.985*** (3.77)	0.066 (0.28)	2.965** (3.28)
ΣLegislature	−0.130 (−0.62)	0.089 (0.26)	0.047 (0.21)	−0.170 (−0.44)	−0.121 (−0.61)	−1.278* (−2.26)	−0.137 (−0.61)	−1.040$^+$ (−1.84)
ΣContestation	1.621*** (3.65)	3.315*** (3.55)	1.678*** (4.43)	2.278* (2.53)	1.741*** (4.92)	2.254** (2.81)	1.506*** (4.69)	1.834* (2.29)
ΣParticipation	−0.158 (−0.45)	0.446 (0.58)	−0.203 (−0.60)	0.680 (0.75)	−0.515 (−1.56)	2.324* (2.12)	−0.488 (−1.46)	1.436 (1.36)
ΣContestation + ΣParticipation	0.731** (2.95)	1.881*** (4.19)	0.738** (3.16)	1.479** (3.23)	0.613** (2.84)	2.289*** (3.97)	0.509* (2.42)	1.635** (3.13)
ΣContestation − ΣParticipation	0.889** (2.83)	1.435* (1.97)	0.941*** (3.45)	0.799 (1.03)	1.128*** (4.25)	−0.035 (−0.05)	0.997*** (3.97)	0.199 (0.26)
ΣElectoral Oligarchy	0.215 (0.88)	1.491* (2.49)	0.364 (1.49)	1.138* (2.08)	0.362 (1.33)	0.829 (1.15)	0.206 (0.77)	1.276$^+$ (1.69)
ΣCompetitive Oligarchy	1.496*** (3.82)	2.506* (2.56)	1.498*** (4.39)	1.413* (2.20)	1.447*** (4.75)	1.120* (2.04)	1.236*** (4.31)	1.149* (2.32)
ΣPlebiscitary Authoritarianism	0.201 (0.76)	2.038* (2.46)	0.270 (1.04)	1.887* (2.20)	−0.032 (−0.12)	1.355* (2.01)	0.013 (0.05)	1.363$^+$ (1.84)
ΣElectoral Authoritarianism	0.459$^+$ (1.84)	1.363** (2.93)	0.424$^+$ (1.70)	1.367** (2.77)	0.068 (0.26)	1.219* (2.40)	0.060 (0.21)	0.909$^+$ (1.72)
ΣClosed Authoritarianism	−0.423* (−2.00)	−1.626*** (−3.47)	−0.444* (−2.14)	−1.379** (−3.06)	−0.256 (−1.29)	−1.140** (−2.84)	−0.249 (−1.20)	−1.137** (−2.74)

Table 14: The table presents the main results with alternative values for the threshold on participation, which is used to categorize the regime types. The threshold is varied across columns as 0.4, 0.45, 0.55, and 0.6. Horizontal lines separate the 40 total regressions. Control variables are included, but not shown. t-values (based on robust standard errors clustered by country) are in parentheses. $+ = p < 0.1$, $* = p < 0.05$, $** = p < 0.01$, $*** = p < 0.001$