Online Appendix
"Voting Rights and Immigrant Incorporation: Evidence from Norway" (BJPS)

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Online Appendix

The 27 municipalities within the sample are (ordered by population size, from large to small): Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Bærum, Fredrikstad, Drammen, Sandnes, Sarpsborg, Asker, Skien, Skedsmo, Bodø, Sandefjord, Larvik, Tønsberg, Karmøy, Porsgrunn, Haugesund, Ålesund, Mandal, Vefsn, Hammerfest, Re, Tynset, Radøy, and Bremanger. As seen in the table below, the immigrants in these 27 municipalities had on average higher earnings and much higher employment levels in 2013 than immigrants residing elsewhere in Norway. These differences partly reflect labor market differences (there are differences in the same direction if we compare native Norwegians), but the main reason is that the cities attract a much higher number of labor immigrants.

Table A-1: Characteristics of immigrants born before 1994 which arrived in Norway in 2008. Outcomes are measured in 2013.

	Municipality included in our sample	Rest of Norway
Employed	.63	.39
Total earnings (NOK)	255106	141019
University level education	.33	.18
Age	36.49	37.24

Employed is defined as having earnings above 1 G. G (grunnbeløp) is a cut-off point used to calculate pension benefits. The number is adjusted by the Norwegian Storting each year. In 2013 it was 85245 NOK.

Table A-2: RD on pre-determined covariates using the optimal bandwidth from the voting analysis

Covariate	Bandwidth (Days)	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-value
Age	63	-0.476	0.611	.44
Male	63	0.015	0.033	.46
Unmarried	63	-0.022	0.031	.49
European country	63	-0.033	0.031	.29
East European country	63	-0.040	0.033	.23
African country	63	0.018	0.015	.22
Asian country	63	0.027	0.028	.34
Expected turnout	63	-0.005	0.006	.40

Local polynomial (single order).

Table A-3: Descriptive statistics for outcomes in tables 1-6

	Eff. N	Mean	Std. Dev.
Tables 1-2.			
Vote	4,092	.22	.41
Male	3,498	.54	.50
Age	3,032	38	9
Unmarried	4,203	.31	.46
European country	2,439	.65	.48
East Eur. country	2,915	.49	.50
Asian country	3,929	.21	.41
African country	2,653	.06	.23
Expected turnout	3,032	.29	.09
Weak democratic culture, tables 3-5.			
Vote	4,656	.17	.37
Social assistance	6,538	.10	.30
Union member	9,990	.12	.32
Employment	7,528	.62	.49
Continuing education	6,303	.11	.31
Strong democratic culture, tables 3-5.			
Vote	1,407	.36	.48
Social assistance	964	.06	.24
Union member	1,907	.13	.33
Employment	2,792	.64	.48
Continuing education	1,868	.10	.30
Not born in democracy, tables 3-5.			
Vote	4879	.17	.38
Social assistance	6,325	.09	.29
Union member	7,970	.12	.32
Employment	7,607	.62	.49
Continuing education	6,139	.11	.31
Born in democracy, tables 3-5.			
Vote	897	.37	.48
Social assistance	1,088	.06	.23
Union member	1,659	.10	.30
Employment	1,113	.65	.47
Continuing education	1,052	.10	.30
Survey data, Table 6.			
Political interest	564	.41	.49
Contacted local politician	567	.05	.21
Influence municipal council	554	.07	.26
Political trust	567	.47	.50
Civic participation	571	.11	.12

Table A-4: Voter turnout for selected immigrant countries, 2003-2015.

	2003	2007	2011	2015
Total turnout	59	62	65	60
Foreign nationals (all)	34	36	32	29
Western nationals	39	42	33	28
Non western nationals	25	30	30	28
Large sending countries				
Afghanistan	-	32	35	32
Bosnia-Herzegovina	20	18	18	15
France	45	45	46	50
Germany	51	48	39	40
Iraq	19	23	23	27
Iran	23	24	-	30
Netherlands	47	53	56	-
Pakistan	40	36	44	33
Poland	25	23	8	7
Russia	20	27	26	21
Serbia and Montenegro	17	16	16	-
Somalia	23	36	51	48
Thailand	23	31	33	33
Turkey	24	22	23	32
United Kingdom	40	41	46	43
United States	46	45	46	42

Source: Election statistics, Statistics Norway. The sample size for each election is between 200-250 for each country group.

Figure A-1: RD on pre-determined covariates, first order polynomials. Optimal bandwidths (CCT)



Figure A-2: RD on pre-determined covariates, second order polynomials. Optimal bandwidths (CCT)



Figure A-3: RD on the probability of voting in the 2015 election (All Immigrants)



Shaded regions represent loess fits; blue lines indicate first and second order polynomials fit with MSE Optimal Bandwidths.

Figure A-4: RD on the probability of voting in the 2015 election (Multiple bandwidths)



Thick lines: 90% confidence intervals. Thin lines: 95% confidence intervals. The optimal bandwidth according to the CCT algorithm is 63.

Figure A-5: Loess fits: discontinuities for democratic subsets



Note that due to changing immigrant flows over time, the expected level of turnout is not stable across the full distribution. Immigrant background characteristics are only balanced in close proximity to the eligible date.

Table A-5: RD on pre-determined covariates - Subset Analysis

Covariate	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val
Weak democratic culture				
Male	99	0.019	0.032	.55
Age	111	-0.541	0.549	.32
Unmarried	89	-0.020	0.030	.51
Not Born in a Democracy				
Male	97	- 0.001	0.030	.96
Age	104	-0.806	0.536	.13
Unmarried	84	-0.026	0.030	.38

Local polynomial (single order). Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). We exclude the nation of origin dummies given that we subset directly on national characteristics.

Figure A-6: Subset Results (Multiple bandwidths)



Thick lines: 90% confidence intervals. Thin lines: 95% confidence intervals.

Table A-6: Subset Results with Covariates

Polynomial order	Criteria	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val
		Weak democratic culture			
1	MSE	97	0.079***	0.022	.00
2	MSE	124	0.070**	0.029	.02
1	CER	60	0.072**	0.029	.01
		Not Born in a Democracy			
1	MSE	99	0.078***	0.021	.00
2	MSE	129	0.081**	0.028	.02
1	CER	61	0.067**	0.028	.02

Second order local polynomials. Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). Covariates include age, gender, and marital status. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A-7: Subset Results when sample is restricted to young immigrants

	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val
Weak democratic culture	89	0.092***	0.031	.00
Strong democratic culture	94	0.007	0.082	.93
Not Born in a Democracy	87	0.100***	0.032	.00
Born in a Democracy	135	-0.009	0.080	.91

Local polynomials. Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). Young is defined as below the mean age of immigrants (38 years of age). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A-8: Placebo Tests

Placebo Cutoff	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val
Panel A: Weak democratic culture				
Right side placebo	74	0.001	0.042	.97
Left side placebo	49	-0.058	0.037	.12
Panel B: Not Born in a Democracy				
Right side placebo	58	0.007	0.027	.81
Left side placebo	44	-0.049	0.039	.21
Panel C: Nordic immigrants				
Sept 11, 2008 placebo	90	-0.015	0.073	.83

Local polynomial (single order). Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). In Panels A and B we follow Imbens and Lemieux (2008: 632) closely and conduct placebo cut-off analyses at both sides of the cut-off. In the right (left) side cut-off analysis we include only observations from the right (left) side of the cut-off to avoid including the true discontinuity in the analysis. The fake cut-off is the median value at each side, which ensures that we maximize the power of the test. In Panel C we estimate the treatment effect for Nordic immigrants. This is a placebo analysis because Nordic citizens were not affected by the cutoff.

Table A-9: Mobilization: RD on alternate outcomes

Outcome	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val	Effective N
Weak democratic culture					
Social assistance	98	-0.019	0.015	.23	6538
Union member	149	0.015	0.013	.25	9990
Strong democratic culture					
Social assistance	51	0.033	0.025	.18	964
Union member	111	0.025	0.032	.44	1907
Not Born in a Democracy					
Social assistance	91	-0.011	0.015	.48	6325
Union member	119	0.007	0.015	.61	7970
Born in a Democracy					
Social assistance	108	-0.033	0.027	.22	1088
Union member	158	0.035	0.032	.27	1659

Local polynomial. Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This sample is based on the total population of immigrants (arriving around the cut-off date in 2008) who lived in Norway in the beginning of 2013. This sample is larger than the one used in the analysis of turnout because of out-migration between January 2013 and September 2015, and because of the eligibility criteria of continued residency in the 2015 sample.

Table A-10: Survey Evidence: Political and Social Integration, 2008 Arrivals (OLS)

	Political interest	Contacted local politician	Influence municipal council	Political trust	Civic participation
Early Access	0.099	0.024	0.061	0.132*	0.045**
	(0.079)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.078)	(0.021)
Observations	180	181	176	180	182
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include controls for age, gender, level of education, and a survey-year dummy. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Alternate Measures of Democratic Exposure

We use Varieties of Democracy's "electoral regime index" (Coppedge et al. 2016) to classify country years as being electoral democracies in each year. Using this classification of democratic years, we follow Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2015) closely and derive an individual level measure of democratic capital in 2008. This stock variable is the accumulated years of democracy over ones' lifetime, but where previous years of democratic experience depreciates by two percent each year.

Table A-11: RD on the probability of voting in the 2015 election

Polynomial order	Criteria	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	p-val
Low level of democratic capital				
1	MSE	67	.091*	.06
2	MSE	77	.073	.27
1	CER	67	.091*	.06
High level of democratic capital				
1	MSE	56	.021	.69
2	MSE	84	.020	.72
1	CER	37	.018	.83

Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Examining the last 30 years, we use the Boix-Miller-Rosato (2013) dichotomous dataset to code countries as dictatorships (0 years of democracy), stable democracies (30 years of democracy), or new democracies (>0, <30 years of democracy).

Table A-12: RD on the probability of voting in the 2015 election.

Polynomial order	Criteria	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val
Dictatorships					
1	MSE	81	0.109	0.067	.11
2	MSE	112	0.153*	0.086	.08
1	CER	70	0.200*	0.111	.07
New Democracies and Dictatorships					
1	MSE	99	0.077***	0.022	.00
2	MSE	123	0.063**	0.030	.03
1	CER	61	0.065**	0.029	.02
Stable Democracies					
1	MSE	56	0.023	0.054	.66
2	MSE	84	0.037	0.065	.57
1	CER	37	0.039	0.065	.54

Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Alternate Cutoffs for EIU Index

We use a cutoff of '6.5' on the EIU Democratic Culture Index. This classifies the following origin countries within our sample as having a weak democratic culture:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Congo, Democratic Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Figure A-7: Distribution of EIU Scores



Moving the cutoff to a more inclusive definition of democractic culture (6) or more exclusive (7) does not affect the results.

Table A-13: EIU Cutoff of 6

Polynomial order	Criteria	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val
		Weak democratic culture			
1	MSE	100	0.079***	0.023	.00
2	MSE	180	0.063*	0.032	.05
1	CER	61	0.068**	0.030	.03
		Strong democratic culture			
1	MSE	110	-0.027	0.044	.54
2	MSE	128	-0.012	0.060	.84
1	CER	71	-0.010	0.055	.86

Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A-14: EIU Cutoff of 7

Polynomial order	Criteria	Bandwidth	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val
		Weak democratic culture			
1	MSE	102	0.079***	0.022	.00
2	MSE	119	0.059*	0.030	.05
1	CER	62	0.066**	0.028	.02
		Strong democratic culture			
1	MSE	93	0.000	0.058	.99
2	MSE	129	0.016	0.071	.82
1	CER	71	0.015	0.070	.84

Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Nationality Balance

Immigrants within our sample arrived from 153 origin countries. Although the sample sizes are too small to test balance for a majority of these nationalities, in the following table we test balance for nationalities with at least 100 immigrants within the sample. The patterns are inconsistent with clustered arrivals around the eligibility threshold.

Table A-15: Balance by national origin (optimal bandwidths)

Country	estimate	se	p-val
Afghanistan	-0.006	0.016	0.72
Brazil	-0.008	0.008	0.32
Bulgaria	-0.002	0.014	0.89
China	0.021	0.028	0.45
Eritrea	-0.018	0.017	0.31
France	0.005	0.016	0.89
Germany	-0.034	0.028	0.23
Great Britain	0.038	0.021	0.08
India	0.024	0.023	0.31
Iran	0.021	0.013	0.11
Iraq	0.024	0.020	0.22
Latvia	0.004	0.012	0.77
Lithuania	-0.008	0.029	0.79
Netherlands	0.005	0.009	0.54
Pakistan	-0.010	0.017	0.55
Philippines	0.015	0.024	0.54
Poland	-0.077	0.051	0.13
Romania	0.021	0.020	0.31
Russia	0.017	0.019	0.39
Slovakia	-0.010	0.010	0.37
Somalia	0.004	0.007	0.56
Thailand	-0.034	0.018	0.05
Turkey	0.011	0.011	0.30
USA	-0.010	0.007	0.13

Table A-16: RD on the probability of voting in the 2015 election (Only nationalities with > 100 immigrants in the sample)

Criteria	Bandwidth (Days)	Treatment coefficient	SE	p-val	Effective N
1 Year Window	183	0.030*	0.017	.09	8648
MSE	73	0.063**	0.027	.02	3709
CER	46	0.070*	0.035	.05	2449

Local polynomial. Optimal bandwidths selected according to Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Survey Evidence: Length of Stay

The specification for the Citizen Survey includes a linear trend for the length of time within Norway. However, in the results that follow, we demonstrate that the number of years spent in the country does not predict an increase in the level of engagement, given that engagement trends are fairly flat across years of arrival. Given heterogeneity in voting eligibility, we restrict our analysis to either the treatment or control group. We report several different windows for each group. Observations in 2008 are separated into treatment and control on the basis of self-reported eligibility.

Table A-17: Effect of Additional Year in Norway

	Political interest	Contacted local politician	Influence municipal council	Political trust	Civic participation
Treated					
2007-2008	-0.054	-0.003	0.011	-0.113	-0.028
	(0.069)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.018)
2006-2008	-0.038	-0.030**	-0.022	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.037)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.011)
2005-2008	0.019	0.022	-0.005	-0.018	-0.008
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.006)
Control					
2008-2009	-0.025	-0.014	-0.030	-0.118*	-0.000
	(0.063)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.062)	(0.015)
2008-2010	-0.006	-0.017	-0.016	-0.037	0.006
	(0.030)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.006)
2008-2011	-0.013	-0.010	0.001	-0.014	-0.000
	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.004)

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients represent the estimated effect of one additional year within Norway. All regressions include controls for age, gender, level of education, and a survey-year dummy. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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