## Supplemental Appendix for "Do Term Limits 'Limit' the Speaker? Examining the Effects of Legislative Term Limits on State Speaker Power"

This appendix includes additional models demonstrating the robustness of the results presented in the main paper. The appendix proceeds with four sections. First, in Appendix A, I estimate a model with state and year fixed effects. Second, I report the results with a Tobit estimator. Third, I report some descriptive statistics for our dataset. Finally, I provide a graph that summarizes the relationship between legislative term limits and Speaker power.

#### **Appendix A: Fixed Effects**

In the main text, I present the results from a model with a linear time trend and a random effect for each. An alternative model specification that I could potentially employ would involve state and year fixed effects. The state fixed effects also account for the differences between term-limited and non-term-limited states. In other words, this analysis examines the changes within a given state, thus, I am comparing the change/level of Speaker power before and after term limits are implemented. The year fixed effects account for any potential trend in Speaker power. Taken together, the state and year fixed effects compares the changes before and after term limits in states with term limits to the same changes in states without term limits.

Included below in Table A are the results from a model with year and state fixed effects. It should be noted that the citizen initiative variable is dropped due to perfect collinearity with the fixed effects parameters. The legislative term limits variable is still significant and correctly signed. I rely on random effects model due to concerns associated with collinearity and overfitting the model.

Table A. State and Year Fixed Effects

	Coefficient	
Variable	(Robust S.E.)	
Legislative Term Limits	0.299*	
	(0.124)	
State Ideology	0.007	
	(0.016)	
Legislative Professionalism	0.366	
	(0.313)	
Party Competition	0.384	
	(0.236)	
Majority Party Size	0.287	
	(0.288)	
Chamber Turnover	-0.002	
	(0.002)	
Unemployment Rate	-0.011	
	(0.015)	
Chamber Size	0.014*	
	(0.005)	
Population	0.397	
	(0.422)	
Constant	-1.561	
	(2.830)	
AIC	1,127	
Number of Observations	847	

<sup>\*</sup> $p \le 0.05$  (all one-tailed tests). The models are estimated using linear regression with fixed effects for each state and year. Reported are robust standard errors.

### **Appendix B: Tobit Model**

My dependent variable is bound between zero and five. Estimating a linear model with a bounded dependent variable can result in my findings being biased and inconsistent. As a robustness test, I estimate coefficients with a Tobit Model. A Tobit Model can account for left and right censoring. I also include a random effect for each state. The results are presented in Table B. The results are consistent with those presented in the manuscript. I rely on the linear model because the results are easier to interpret.

Table B. Tobit Model

	Coefficient	
Variable	(S.E.)	
Legislative Term Limits	0.299*	
_	(0.128)	
State Ideology	0.001	
	(0.016)	
Legislative Professionalism	0.237	
	(0.390)	
Party Competition	0.424*	
	(0.229)	
Majority Party Size	0.347	
	(0.270)	
Chamber Turnover	-0.002	
	(0.002)	
Unemployment Rate	0.004	
	(0.009)	
Chamber Size	0.003*	
	(0.002)	
Population	0.160	
	(0.200)	
Citizen Initiative	-0.020	
	(0.034)	
Time Trend	-0.008*	
	(0.002)	
Constant	0.861	
	(1.342)	
AIC	1,273	
Number of Observations	847	

<sup>\*</sup> $p \le 0.05$  (all one-tailed tests). The models are estimated using Tobit regression with a random effect on each state.

### **Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics**

Reported below, in Table C, are some descriptive statistics.

Table C. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
Speaker	2.712	0.793	0.000	4.280
Legislative Term Limits	0.068	0.196	0.000	0.997
State Ideology	4.868	2.401	1.401	7.362
Legislative Professionalism	0.200	0.126	0.027	0.659
Party Competition	0.868	0.099	0.601	1.000
Majority Party Size	0.637	0.099	0.500	0.951
Chamber Turnover	24.19	10.49	2.00	60.00
Unemployment Rate	6.066	2.097	2.30	17.80
Chamber Size	110.45	56.50	40.00	400.00
Population	6.532	0.451	5.622	7.594
Citizen Initiative	2.263	2.723	0.000	9.000


### Appendix D: Graphing Speaker Power and Term Limits

In Figure D, I present a graph similar to Hall (2014). Specifically, I have created graphs for all term limited states and non-term limited states (averaged together). The top graph shows the average Speaker power in term-limited states, in the years directly preceding and following the implementation of term limits. Although most states implement term limits in different years, I re-center and re-code the data as the number of legislative sessions before and after term limits are implemented. The bottom figure represents the average amount of speaker power for states that never implement or adopt term limits. I do not re-code the data for the non-term-limited states.

This graph is shown in Figure D. Several patterns are immediately obvious here. As the figure shows, in term limited states there is a noticeable decline in the amount of power delegated to the Speaker right before the implementation of term limits. However, Speakers in term-limited states experience a pronounced increase in power via the delegation of institutional tools to control the lawmaking process following the implementation of term limits. However, states without term limits did not experience an increase in Speaker power. Instead, states without term limits tended to receive little change in Speaker power. However, there is a slight decline over time. This evidence hints that a relationship between legislative term limits and the delegation of institutional tools to the Speaker may in fact exist.

Figure D. Average Speaker Power for Term Limited and Non-Term Limited States

# **Term Limited States**



## Non-Term Limited States

