

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

The Andaluçia-Hawaii-California Migration: A Study in Macrostructure and Microhistory

Author(s): Beverly Lozano

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 305-324

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/178613>

Accessed: 06/12/2012 14:53

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Cambridge University Press and Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Comparative Studies in Society and History*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

The Andalusia-Hawaii-California Migration: A Study in Macrostructure and Microhistory

BEVERLY LOZANO

University of California, Davis

The development of world-systems theory enables us to explain human migration without resorting to the theoretically barren lists of “push-pull” factors and personal motivations that characterize previous studies. Although individuals still make private decisions to move, the patterned movement of groups is better understood as an essential component in a global economic order with shifting demands for labor.¹ National migration policies can also be interpreted within this global context. Since migration plays a central role in moving workers to regions where their labor is needed, governmental legislation regulating these movements has reflected capitalists’ needs for a free labor force. It is with this in mind that Aristide Zolberg summarizes the behavior of one nation-state in the world-system as “an element in the interest-calculus of others.”²

However, when we concentrate exclusively on the significance of global economic factors in structuring migration, our attention tends to remain fixed on the ways in which capital realizes its interests at the macrostructural level. The marketplace is raised to the status of an independent causal variable, and labor, cast in the role of capital’s exploited object, is quietly obliterated as an active force in shaping the world-system. The cultural understandings regarding work that migrant groups carry with them are not accounted for, and we overlook their impact as intervening variables that explain the actual consequences of migration for both workers and their employers.³ This oversight

I am deeply grateful to Gary Hamilton for his generous comments on an earlier version of this paper. My thanks also go to John Walton, who provided several critical insights.

¹ Michael Burawoy, “The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor: Comparative Material from South Africa and the United States,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 81:5 (1976), 1050–88.

² Aristide Zolberg, “Migration Policies in a World System,” in *Human Migration: Patterns and Policies*, William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, eds. (Bloomington, Indiana, 1978), 241–86.

³ See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966), 485, for a discussion of this issue.

0010-4175/84/2606–2582 \$2.50 © 1984 Society for Comparative Study of Society and History

leads to generalizations such as Zolberg's that "all classes in the countries of the core become as one bourgeoisie in relation to all classes elsewhere, which become as one proletariat."⁴ Class relations thus simplified, the dominant class appears to possess uncontested power to orchestrate the movements of workers in its inexorable search for profits. At this level of abstraction, it is impossible for us to see how the strategies of the migrants themselves shape the conditions under which their labor is utilized, much less the conditions under which profits may be threatened.

The members of the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association, however, were men who dealt with practical matters, and in 1921 they struggled with the same problem they had faced since the 1850s. Despite the fact that in a period of over seventy years they had spent nearly \$18,000,000 inducing laborers to migrate to the Hawaiian cane fields,⁵ they were now confronted with a shortage of 6,000 workers and the loss of crops worth \$5,000,000. Claiming on behalf of the sugar planters that there was practically no country in the world to which they had not gone for a labor supply, Walter Dillingham, chairman of the Hawaiian Emergency Labor Commission, described the dimensions of the labor problem to the United States Senate Committee on Immigration in the following way:

As a result of this shortage and the restless, independent attitude of the field laborer, a lack of business control has developed, and a shifting of laborers from place to place has directly followed efforts on the part of planters to urge the laborers to greater efficiency. . . . It is obvious that the possibility of conducting the business efficiently is destroyed. . . .⁶

Perhaps Dillingham exaggerated the consequences that resulted from the tendencies of these restless and independent workers to shift from place to place. But as he went on to enumerate the planters' impressions of each successive wave of workers, it seemed that none could satisfy the need for a stable force of field workers. The Japanese, for example, constituting 60 percent of the work force, had "ceased to appreciate the opportunities given them as individuals," and aimed "collectively to revolutionize the control of agricultural industries" by becoming planters themselves.⁷ The Chinese coolies were "not so kind and tractable as it was anticipated they would be."⁸ Even the few Siberians who came to Hawaii turned out to have "socialist tendencies."⁹ And above all, the laborers were "restless," constantly shifting in a way that threatened a loss of business control.

⁴ Zolberg, "Migration Policies," 280.

⁵ Edward Johannessen, *The Hawaiian Labor Movement* (Boston, 1956), 27.

⁶ U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Immigration, *Hearings on Immigration into Hawaii before Committee on Immigration*, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D. C., 1921), 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

According to Dillingham, competition for labor with capitalists located in the eastern United States, Latin America—indeed, in places as far-flung as the prospective workers themselves—required Hawaiian planters to offer wages, bonuses, and other subsidies so substantial relative to other opportunities that laborers were not only attracted to Hawaii but, paradoxically, could afford to leave after several years.¹⁰ For instance, in 1920 workers earned a large bonus above their regular wages. “Finding themselves with money sufficient to the purpose,” Dillingham explained, “laborers have availed themselves of the opportunity to leave the less attractive field occupations.”¹¹

It is likely that many did so. However, just as it is empirically risky to generalize about the effectiveness and results of the strategies of the bourgeoisie, so it is with respect to the proletariat that worked for them. In this article, I will present the turn-of-the-century journey made by one group of agricultural workers who answered the call to Hawaii, the Spaniards from Andalusia. Because all but 1,200 of the original 7,735 moved on to California following a brief stay in the islands, they appear to fall into that category of “restless worker” that left the fields for pursuits the planters might consider more attractive. But as we shall see, this was not to be their strategy at all, and in discovering what these people actually did, we may better understand the causes of the disturbing lack of business control complained of by the Hawaii sugar planters.

THE METHODOLOGICAL TASK

What we wish to discover is an explanation of the causes and consequences of migration that neither reifies macrostructural factors nor trivializes individual motivations. In order to do so, we must reconcile (1) the historical-comparative perspective which locates the migration within the context of the broad structural developments leading up to it with (2) migrants’ accounts of how they incorporated these developments into their own migration strategies. By identifying the group’s shared understandings of the migration as revealed in the personal accounts of the members, we can then cast these understandings against the historical backdrop in which structural elements come into play. Migration is then interpreted as a complex social process involving factors at *each* level of analysis, rather than as the inevitable workings of disembodied structures such as “the market” or “the system,” or the mere agglomeration of infinitely varied private reasons.

Furthermore, this approach addresses the basic theoretical issue of tem-

¹⁰ As Alejandro Portes and John Walton point out, “for immigrants to be useful to an expanding capitalist economy, the situation had to be arranged so that the means they initially received would *not* be sufficient for their survival” (*Labor, Class and the International System* (New York, 1981), 52).

¹¹ U. S. Congress, *Hearings*, 4.

porality in the analysis of social action. Structural factors such as changes in patterns of land tenure or demand for labor transform the conditions of social life over time. The historical period in which these changes exercise their effects may coincide with the life span of the migrants acting in response to them. When this is so, individuals can take conscious account of these structural factors as they articulate their reasons for migrating and their plans for achieving their goals. On the other hand, the structural forces encouraging migration may have developed and converged over a long historical period extending back to a time inaccessible to the migrants' memories or awareness. In this case, individuals are likely to explain their movements in terms of highly varied private factors that bear no obvious relationship to the structural context in which the theorist locates the migration. This apparent discontinuity between structural and individual data is stressed by Giddens:

The micro- versus macro-sociological distinction puts an emphasis upon contrasting small groups with larger collectivities or communities; but a more profound difference is between *face-to-face interaction and interaction with others who are physically absent (and often temporally absent also).*¹²

In other words, because the structural framework that shapes options and constraints is only partially visible to any generational cohort, it becomes impossible to get at the most determining level of analysis with a method that depends solely upon the articulated responses of immigrants. However, when such responses are placed in their historical context, that is, when the "absent" actors are given a voice in the analysis, their significance can be inferred in such a way as to breach the apparent discontinuity between the individual and structural levels of analysis.

In this article, I introduce both macro- and microhistorical data to explain the ways in which structural forces shaped the decisions of Andalusian agricultural day laborers as they migrated to Hawaii and, subsequently, to California. In discussing this movement, I present the social and economic conditions in southern Spain at the time of migration in the context of their historical development. Historical factors related to the pattern of recruitment and to the region of final settlement are also examined. Finally, information based on thirteen oral histories related to me by members of the group will provide the microhistorical context that locates the group within the macrostructural framework. The histories will be supplemented with case studies obtained by another investigator in 1940. By comparing similarities and differences between settings, I show the ways in which the group's movements are indeed grounded in macrostructural factors, but in a distinctive manner, conditioned by the group's own cultural perspective on work, and with consequences that acted back upon the macrostructure.

¹² See Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (Berkeley, 1979), 203.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ANDALUCIAN RURAL SOCIETY

Agriculture has long been a primary productive base of the Spanish economy. During the first sixty years of the twentieth century, it represented the largest single source of the Spanish national income. Accounting for 43 percent of the nation's economic base in 1900, agricultural production engaged more than half of Spain's total population in forty-six of the fifty provinces. In the southern region of Andalusia, where the migration discussed here originated, from 70 to 80 percent of the population was engaged in agricultural labor.¹³ However, an analysis of the development of this activity reveals the establishment of distinct systems of land tenure that resulted in differing class structures between the northern and southern regions of the country.

In northern Spain, small peasant proprietors emerged as the dominant rural class, whereas in the south, holdings were much larger and their value much greater. Here, medium-sized holdings that would support but not enrich a peasant family were rare: 33 percent of the estates in Andalusia were larger than 125 acres, and 22 percent of all estates larger than 250 acres were located there.¹⁴ Moreover, while these large-sized holdings occupied two to three times as much land as in the agricultural central region, they earned from three to four times the income.¹⁵

Though the immigrants interviewed in this study referred to the lands they had worked in Spain in a variety of ways—*cortijo*, *hacienda*, *vega*—depending on what area they were from, the term most frequently employed in the literature on rural Spain to discuss the large estates is *latifundio*.¹⁶ Their prevalence in the southern provinces has historical roots that go back to the time of the reconquest of this region at the end of the fifteenth century. When the land was taken back from the Moorish invaders, attempts were made to colonize the area which had become depopulated during the Moorish occupation. The Spanish Crown offered small holdings as inducements to prospective settlers, but early in the colonization process, the recipients of these grants began to subdivide or to concentrate the plots, depending on the need of poorer farmers to sell what they had for cash and the capacity of wealthier farmers to buy up such holdings. This resulted in a pattern of land distribution that even then foreshadowed the social and economic inequalities that prompted the Andalusia-Hawaii-California migration of the early 1900s.

By the eighteenth century, the Council of Castile had denounced the tyranny of the upper classes and suggested expropriation of the lands, but it was not

¹³ Edward Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain* (New Haven, 1970), 96.

¹⁴ Spanish Institute for Agrarian Reform, *Agrarian Reform in Spain* (London, 1937), 38–40.

¹⁵ Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*, 22.

¹⁶ For example, see Pascual Carrion, *Los Latifundios en España: Su importancia, origen, consecuencias y solución* (Barcelona, 1932); Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*; Juan Martínez-Alier, *Labourers and Landowners in Southern Spain* (London, 1971); and Jaime Vicens Vives, *An Economic History of Spain* (Princeton, 1969).

until the establishment of a constitutional monarchy at the beginning of the nineteenth century that liberal reformers managed to legislate new agrarian measures in the form of disentailment. Not only did this land reform promise to help amortize Spain's national debt by providing a broader base of taxable property, but it instituted the possession of property as an individual right and made property subject to exchange on the market rather than through patrimonial arrangements.¹⁷ Furthermore, reformers reasoned, disentailment "would at the same time [serve] to tear down the whole defective privileged social structure, which was based on an unjust distribution of landed property."¹⁸

According to Jaime Vicens Vives in his *Economic History of Spain*, the national economy did in fact recover as lands went into economic circulation.¹⁹ However, the "unjust distribution of landed property" was not so easily remedied. Whether one believes accounts claiming the land to have been bought up by "*una burguesía especuladora*,"²⁰ or by a bourgeoisie consisting of "merchants, speculators and financiers,"²¹ or by a combination of "aristocrats and capitalists,"²² redistribution of the land to the poor was not to occur.²³ Not only did the resulting organization of a neolatifundio system frustrate the hopes of peasants who had expected to gain from the land reforms, but it left many who had labored for the old feudal owners unemployed. Finally, the mid-1800s saw substantial growth in population. These factors combined to create a rural society in which a few large landowners dominated an agricultural region inhabited by a growing pool of landless day laborers. The traditional arrangements of the displaced feudal system which had defined rights and obligations between peasant and lord did not exist for the day laborers, and their increasing numbers operated to depress the wages on which they now depended for a living.

It is tempting to characterize the social and economic relations that resulted from this transition in labor and land tenure as modern and capitalistic, that is, as impersonal and rationalized. Indeed, Juan Díaz del Moral refers to the mid-nineteenth-century workers in this region as a rural proletariat.²⁴ However, a more careful examination of the social relations of production must be undertaken in order to appreciate the specific understandings brought by such laborers to their work situations.²⁵

¹⁷ Miguel Artola, *La Burguesía Revolucionaria (1808–1874)* (Madrid, 1974), 149.

¹⁸ Spanish Institute for Agrarian Reform, *Agrarian Reform*, 17.

¹⁹ Jaime Vicens Vives, *Economic History*, 613.

²⁰ J. A. Oddone, *La Emigración Europea al Río de la Plata* (Montevideo, 1966), 39.

²¹ Artola, *La Burguesía Revolucionaria*, 165.

²² Vicens Vives, *Economic History*, 637.

²³ Carrion, *Los Latifundios en España*, 16.

²⁴ Juan Díaz del Moral, *Historia de las Agitaciones Campesinas Andaluzas* (Madrid, 1969).

²⁵ In a comparative study suggesting how one should go about investigating agrarian class societies, Juan Martínez-Alier cautions that "a proper theory of the [various] social formations

The Andalucian latifundios were owned by individuals rather than corporations. This rural oligarchy included members of the nobility, but was primarily made up of untitled persons, many of them related by blood or by marriage. Absenteeism was common, and large estates not managed by owners were usually leased intact to a single large tenant, the *arrendador*, or *labrador*, who might sublease it in small plots to tenants, but who tended more often to cultivate it with hired labor.²⁶

Because of the incentives resulting from such a pattern of management, agriculture was often inefficient and unproductive. Where farming was conducted by an administrator producing profits for a distant owner, minimizing wages by leaving certain tasks unperformed might work as well as maximizing production by applying more labor. Resident owners could prefer to farm their lands extensively rather than intensively where heavier capital investment and labor costs would minimize the attractiveness of the extra margin of profit.²⁷ And the minority of small tenants had little incentive and fewer means to improve production when their rents were subject to frequent negotiation and capital was supplied at usurious rates by the owners themselves. As summarized by Edward Malefakis:

The latifundio system did not bring the optimal production that both the capitalist and socialist worlds associate with large-scale operations. Rather than stimulating him to farm them well, the size of the latifundista's properties merely provided him sufficient reserves so that he could afford the luxury of farming them badly.²⁸

The working class in such a system of agrarian production was varied and its segments tended to overlap. At the bottom of the social hierarchy were those who worked the land for others and members of this group can be differentiated on the basis of whether or not they were permanently employed by an owner. Such an arrangement was highly desired, for it minimized the insecurity faced by the worker and his family, and among the day laboring class there were many individuals who sought to accommodate themselves to the field bosses and owners who might help them get permanent jobs.²⁹ At the same time, tenant farmers might engage in occasional wage labor to supplement their income in bad years. In 1902, the average income for all employed

will include an industrial sociology or a sociology of work in the different rural settings'' ('Peasants and Labourers: Spain, Cuba and Highland Peru,' *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1:2 (1974), 154). In other words, theory about rural class relations must be grounded not on typologies based on feudal-capitalistic or traditional-modern dichotomies, but on a firm understanding of peasant or laborer attitudes toward work and systems of remuneration and on accurate investigations of the specific social milieux in which these operate. See also A. Stinchcombe, 'Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations,' *The American Journal of Sociology*, 67:2 (1961), 165-76.

²⁶ Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*, ch. 5.

²⁷ Carrion, *Los Latifundios en España*, 343.

²⁸ Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*, 91.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 98.

individuals in Spain was 4 pesetas a day, but in Andalucia, the average income that year was 1.75 pesetas a day.³⁰ At these low rates, collective family labor in which all family members searched for work was the rule, and a permanent position for one family member increased the likelihood that others would find work in the same enterprise through the personal contacts thus generated.

Despite the complexity of the class structure that existed, it is not uncommon to see the traditional patron-client model of social relations applied to this region when interactions between the classes are discussed. For example, J. A. Pitt-Rivers characterizes contacts between workers and owners as belonging to a patron-client system based on cordial and reciprocal face-to-face encounters.³¹ In emphasizing the strength of patron-client bonds, Michael Kenny too comments with reference to the Spaniards:

Its potency is more understandable among a people whose stoic consideration of this transient life comes perilously close to fatalism, whose traditional class structure of the many poor and few rich is changing but slowly, and whose dependence on moral and material support in this largely barren land of the mystics is an almost instinctive "just-in-case" type of insurance.³²

While a traditional system of reciprocal relations between the landowner and those who worked the land may have existed at one time, David Gilmore's study of this area asserts that "historical data show that the modern class system (wage labor employed within an 'impersonal bourgeois latifundism') took form at the turn of the last century."³³ In fact, insurrections and strikes of agricultural workers were recorded for the years 1861, 1871, 1881, and 1903, because laborers were not guaranteed any special rights to traditionally held privileges, but rather were faced with high unemployment rates and low wages.

Nonetheless, while historical analysis points to a socioeconomic system in which the impersonal sale of labor power predominated, it is still necessary to refer to patron-client relations in a discussion of turn-of-the-century Andalucia. From 1903 to 1905, two years before the migration studied here began, agricultural workers engaged in slowdowns, sabotage, and crop burnings in their struggle for higher wages in the face of severe unemployment. But the 1905 drought which ruined that year's crop and resulted in famine dashed their hopes of gaining concessions from the landowners. In his account of the strikes and subsequent disaster, Diaz del Moral tells us:

The enthusiasm of the masses had been slowly declining since the failure of the general strikes. Nevertheless, they maintained a strong solidarity until 1905. Then, when

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 100.

³¹ J. A. Pitt-Rivers, Introduction, *Mediterranean Countrymen* (Paris, 1963), 21.

³² Michael Kenny, "Patterns of Patronage in Spain," in *Friends, Followers and Factions*, Steffen W. Schmidt, James C. Scott, Carl Lande, and Laura Guasti, eds. (Berkeley, 1960), 356.

³³ David Gilmore, "Patronage and Class Conflict in Southern Spain," *Man*, 12:3/4 (1977), 446-58.

overcome by the crisis, they began to desert. Deceitfully, *they renewed some of the broken ties of the patron-client relationship with the master* to save themselves from the terrible calamity: the large majority confessed that they had been mistaken. ³⁴ (Emphasis added.)

Whether they did so in deceit or in despair, the point is that, for some of the laborers, a familiarity with the old patron-client ties remained. While day labor for wages was the rule, the social system was still sufficiently flexible that some people could take advantage of the personal acquaintance with their landlords in order to survive. Always, in the towns where the laborers lived, there had been some workers related to or familiar with the more privileged permanent workers of the employer. Some of these patron-client ties went back through several generations of a family, and while not all in the town could benefit from them, certainly all were familiar with the social norms and etiquette that governed them.

In other words, the rural society abandoned by the Andalusian immigrants at the turn of the century would be most accurately characterized as one based primarily on the impersonal social relations of production between wage laborers and employers, but one with which an understanding of patron-client relations coexisted and was sometimes preferred.

HAWAIIAN AGRICULTURE AND THE SEARCH FOR LABORERS

By the mid-nineteenth century, the effects of a declining whaling industry were being reflected in the falling profits of Hawaiian Island mercantilists, principally Americans and Europeans, whose trade depended on the outfitting of ships sailing from Honolulu. At the same time, important changes were taking place in the Hawaiian landholding system. Both Crown and public lands comprising more than half of the islands were declared inalienable in 1865, and Hawaii's monarchs derived income by offering these lands for use under long-term lease.³⁵ This, coupled with the increased demand for staple tropical crops such as sugar and coffee presented by growing communities along North America's Pacific coast, provided the incentive for businessmen to transfer their investments to agricultural production. Between the years 1860 and 1866, sugar exports advanced from less than a million and a half pounds to more than seventeen million pounds, a trend that was to continue for many years.³⁶

The industry was highly organized. Plantation owners formed associations

³⁴ Diaz del Moral, *Historia*, 217.

³⁵ Legislative Reference Bureau, *Public Land Policy in Hawaii; An Historical Analysis*, Report no. 5 (Honolulu, 1959), 4. Under such a system of long-term leasing in which agriculturists didn't actually have to purchase the land they farmed, capital obtained through the use of the same leases as collateral could be employed for other purposes such as plantation development and improvement.

³⁶ Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874: Twenty Critical Years* (Honolulu, 1953), 143.

through which they lobbied for favorable treaties, tariffs, and finally, in 1898, annexation to the United States. Another important feature was the agency system in which business houses in Honolulu furnished capital and served as agents both for marketing the product and for recruiting labor.

In this island society whose native population had been declining, the question of labor recruitment among the planters was one that went hand in hand with the issue of racial balance in the population as a whole. In a process that began as early as 1851 with the importation of 195 Chinese coolies, the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association brought workers from places as diverse as Micronesia and Norway to labor in the fields. However, it was the Japanese who provided the bulk of the work force—by 1900, Japanese made up one half of the adult male population of the islands, and American planters, who dominated the growing industry, were concerned about the apparent tendencies of this group toward collective action.³⁷ Though the Planters' Labor and Supply Company had encouraged immigration from Japan in 1889, claiming that "the Japanese make good house, farm and plantation servants,"³⁸ by 1900, striking Japanese workers were described as "taking up a very independent attitude."³⁹ From then on, a sharp distinction was to be made between immigration for labor supply and immigration for population upbuilding.⁴⁰ Walter Dillingham, speaking two decades later, summarizes the difference:

The solution of these two problems . . . must be founded on a frank differentiation between labor intended to relieve the present crisis and labor intended for permanent population. For the former, Hawaii needs the most efficient labor available, regardless of race or color; for the latter she needs a carefully selected agricultural people who can continue her industries, be assimilated into her population, and constitute the base on which to build a body politic essentially American.⁴¹

As early as 1899, special inducements such as sharecropping and racial wage differentials had been considered by planters, who looked to Europe for white labor⁴² from among those they termed "Latin peasants."⁴³ In addition to published reports regarding "the state of labor . . . in European countries,"⁴⁴ favorable reports had been received "concerning the success in Cuba of Spanish laborers as cane planters,"⁴⁵ and in 1907, planters impelled their agents to "investigate the possibilities in the district of Malaga, South Spain, where sugar planting is conducted."⁴⁶

³⁷ John Reineke, *Feigned Necessity: Hawaii's Attempt to Obtain Chinese Contract Labor, 1921–23* (San Francisco, 1979), 20.

³⁸ "Japanese Immigrants," *The Planters Monthly*, 8:4 (1889), 149.

³⁹ "Report of Committee on Labor to the President and Members of the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association," *The Planters Monthly*, 19:11 (1900), 515.

⁴⁰ Kuykendall, *Hawaiian Kingdom*, 181.

⁴¹ U. S. Congress, *Hearings*, 17.

⁴² "State of Labor on the Hawaiian Islands," *The Planters Monthly*, 18:12 (1899), 562.

⁴³ "President's Address," *Hawaiian Planters Record*, 2:1 (1910), 4.

⁴⁴ "State of Labor," 562.

⁴⁵ U. S. Congress, *Hearings*, 43.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

THE MIGRATION TO HAWAII

In 1907, agents for the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association posted handbills around the Andalusian countryside announcing a migration with one-way passage paid to "the State of Hawaii, United States of America."⁴⁷ Following a description of the islands filled with appealing adjectives extolling the climate and scenery, conditions of eligibility were detailed. First, immigrants had to be certified agricultural workers with families. The men could be no older than forty-five years of age, the women no older than forty. Families with male offspring older than seventeen were specifically recruited, and the salaries ranged from \$20 gold per month for the head of the household to \$12 gold per month for the wives and \$10 for female children over age fifteen. Upon signing up to work in the cane fields, they were promised, in addition to their wages, a house worth \$500, water, wood, free schooling for the children, and a garden plot. There was no contract required, contract labor having been forbidden once Hawaii became a United States territory.

The first migration included 2,269 Andalusians. In 1911, 1912, and 1913, five more groups sailed to Hawaii, bringing the total number of immigrants to 7,735. In 1914, World War I broke out and no additional passages were made thereafter.⁴⁸ Who were the laborers that answered the planters' advertisements? At this point, we will turn to the microhistorical accounts in which the immigrants describe themselves.

I personally obtained thirteen oral histories from members of the Andalusia-Hawaii-California migration. Five had been born in Spain, six in Hawaii, and two following their family's arrival in California. Four of the interviews were conducted in Spanish, and the rest in some mixture of Spanish and English. At the time of this study, all the subjects were living in California; the interviews were tape recorded in their homes and lasted a minimum of an hour and a half.

Those from whom the histories were obtained had indeed been, or were descended from, landless day laborers. When asked what they and their families had done for a living in Spain, they responded with comments such as the following: "We lived in a little town and walked to work in the countryside. We'd work two days here, three days there, wherever we could find something."

⁴⁷ "Emigració con pasaje gratuito al estado de Hawai," reproduced in *Winters Express* [Winters, California], Centennial Edition (1975), 76.

⁴⁸ George Schnack, "Subjective Factors in the Migration of Spanish from Hawaii to California" (M. A. thesis, Stanford University, 1940). One cannot help but note the small size of this migration, given the fact that other regions of Spain had emigration rates as high as 20.6 per thousand, mostly bound for Latin America. The highest rate from the latifundio region was found in Granada, and only amounted to 8.0 per thousand. Malefakis suggests that this may result from the southern farm laborer's preference to "combat the injustice of his situation rather than flee from it." Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform*, 105. See also J. S. MacDonald, "Agricultural Organization, Migration and Militancy in Rural Italy," *The Economic History Review*, 16:1 (August 1963), 61-75, on this point.

All described large landholdings as predominating in the area they came from—*cortijos*, *haciendas*, *ranchos*, etcetera. “The men would go out and talk with the rich. If they had work for a day or so, you’d get paid. If not, what could you do?”

To supplement earnings gained in this way, family members would engage in various activities they referred to with the phrase, “*buscarse la vida*.” Literally translated, this means “to seek out a living,” and according to those interviewed, it implies to live by one’s wits. Such activities included gleaning the fields by the women and children, with the owner’s permission, after male family members had harvested the crop for wages. One woman explained, “One wouldn’t be paid to do that, because the owner of the land would just give it outright, to help out.” Other things mentioned were wood collecting and the gathering of dung. The former could be used or sold as kindling, the latter as fertilizer.

When asked to describe their employers and their relations with them, most claimed that they worked for the “*señorito*,” a term meaning “little lord” and conveying a somewhat negative connotation. (The use of the term persists in the area to this day and refers to owners of large estates.) Other frequently used terms included *los ricos* (the rich), *los dueños* (the owners), or *los patrones* (the bosses or owners). Some whose families had maintained close relations with their employers—the women working as servants or wet nurses in the house, the men as permanent laborers—spoke about them in mixed terms. For example:

We worked for the rich—people we knew. They were rich people, good people. My mother was raised in the house of the *señoritos*, who were my godparents. They were good to me, but when they had no work, there was nothing we could do about it. We would have to work for other families.

At such times, the family would rely solely on day wages for labor on other owners’ lands. While referring to the family she worked for as “good people,” this woman also described the requirements as being harsh. “It’s not like here. There, you work like a panting dog until your tongue hangs out. There, you don’t sit down!” When asked why she and her family left Spain, despite the fact that, more than many in their town, they were in a position to enjoy some of the benefits of the patron-client relationship, she stated: “Life in Spain was very bad. The one who had didn’t help the one who didn’t have. If he had something, it was for himself and not for anybody else.”

A number of respondents mentioned that at one time their families had owned a small plot of land, but that as times worsened they had had to sell it and rely on day labor: “My father’s family had owned a little farm. But in later years, they had to sell it and go out to work. Things got tougher economically.” Others had never owned any property: “You’re born and raised on a *cortijo*. That’s where my parents stayed. The people who worked it lived there and the owners came up on the weekends.”

It is clear from the responses that the Andalusian immigrants indeed displayed knowledge of both the wage labor system and the system of patron-client relations. While the latter offered a modicum of security, it could not always be relied upon. One can see their attitudes about the *patrones*, as well as their primary orientation toward wages, in the reasons given for deciding to migrate. Both a resentment toward the element of social control exercised by the *señoritos* and the promise of higher wages elsewhere figure into the responses. When asked why the family left Spain, respondents made statements like the following:

One of the worst conditions for them was religion. The big ranches had churches and if you didn't go to church, they'd fire you.

The church thing. When they told my father he had to go, it made him angry. The *dueño* would be at the door and he would eye who was coming in and who wasn't. If you weren't there, you'd have to have a good excuse or he'd reprimand you.

It is important to note the relationship between the Church and the landowners at this time, for the connection between religion and the local economy is not immediately apparent in the individual responses of these immigrants. At the turn of the century, the Church hierarchy organized, under the auspices of the landowners, Catholic worker associations. Members were taxed to provide funds for the poorest laborers in the area in the hope of pacifying those elements of the agricultural labor force that were striking for higher wages or asking outright for land redistribution.⁴⁹ It is at this political juncture that the Church and the *señoritos* come together in the immigrants' stated reasons for leaving. Enforced church attendance was one of the means that landowners employed in attempting to control the work force and to collect tribute.

Another reason occasionally mentioned as a motive to migrate was the military draft—*la quinta*. Spain was at war with Morocco and to families whose sons were eligible for military service, migration provided a sometimes clandestine means of escape. Several respondents indicated that they smuggled themselves onto the ships waiting to depart from Malaga or Gibraltar, saying that they migrated “*de contrabando*”—as contraband.⁵⁰ It is ironic that the young men the families concealed from the port authorities were an asset to them on this migration, for the sugar planters offered these sons a wage just below that of the fathers and slightly above that of the mothers—\$15 gold per month. But in every case, the promise of higher wages was given in addition to the other factors mentioned as reasons for migrating.

⁴⁹ Diaz del Moral, *Historia*, 145.

⁵⁰ It has been reported that the Andalusia-Hawaii-California migration was a clandestine migration, since apparently it is not recorded anywhere in the Spanish records. See Rosendo A. Gomez, “Spanish Immigration to the United States,” *Americas*, 19:1 (1962), 59–78. A number of people I interviewed confirmed that, indeed, they came without knowledge of the authorities, but it is doubtful that this was the case for all of them.

Having addressed the questions of who the immigrants were and why they left Spain, we may now observe their activities in the setting they found on the first leg of the migration, Hawaii. Here was the promise of higher wages, guaranteed employment, and what they hoped would be an alternative to a life in which “things were very bad.”

The migration to Hawaii was to have been a permanent one. The agricultural workers recruited by the sugar planters were indeed provided with the benefits promised in the advertisements. Initially, they went to work in the fields cutting cane. When asked in general terms to describe their lives in Hawaii, however, an interesting pattern of response developed, both among those who relied on their parents’ memories and among those who had given elaborate first-hand accounts of life in Spain. Very little could be recalled about Hawaii. Responses might include descriptions of the scenery or the climate, but as to their lives as workers there, they had little spontaneous comment. They were asked specific questions focusing on the same details that they had reported unprompted in their accounts of life in Spain: for example, where did you work, who did you work for and what were they like, how did you go about finding work?

Their brief answers revealed that in Hawaii, as in Spain, they worked on large landholdings, the plantations, and were paid a wage. However, rather than working for landowners who were visible, if socially distant, in Hawaii they worked for sugar companies under the supervision of a *luna*, or foreman. Impressions about the persons who directed their work seemed to be neutral and, at the time of my study, memories of their contacts with them almost nonexistent.

George Schnack complained of a similar pattern of response to a survey he conducted in 1940 among Andalucian immigrants in California.⁵¹ When asked to rate the *lunas*’ treatment of them as workers, two of his respondents claimed to have liked it, two to have disliked it, and thirteen respondents rated the treatment they received as neither good nor bad. From his survey results, Schnack concluded that conditions on the plantations were not a factor in the Andalucians’ decision to migrate again to California.

However, in addition to the survey, Schnack conducted open-ended interviews with these and six other respondents. A close examination of his twenty-three case studies reveals that in over one third of their *spontaneous* accounts, certain features characteristic of the plantation system of agriculture were mentioned in a negative light—particularly the *lunas*. The incomes of the *lunas* were calculated according to how much labor they could extract from gangs of workers, and the effect of this arrangement was reflected in these more detailed interviews. Field bosses were described as “inconsiderate” and “rough and mean” people who had to learn that “they could not

⁵¹ Schnack, “Subjective Factors,” 35.

treat the Spanish in that manner.” These “slave drivers” prodded their workers and instigated antagonisms among them so that “each group worked feverishly and even fought to keep another from getting ahead.” One of Schnack’s respondents actually rose to the position of *luna* for a time. According to him, his job was to “see that laborers did the proper amount of work,” even if he had to be “tough.” Because he could not stand “mistreating other human beings,” he quit the job and left Hawaii. In addition to the system of labor management, several of those interviewed in 1940 recalled their dealings with the company stores. One person pointed out that the stores “managed to keep [the workers] always in debt so that they couldn’t leave the plantation.”

Although the Andalucians had known little but agricultural work, and would continue as day laborers for years following their arrival in California, the plantation system of Hawaii violated their cultural understanding of what tolerable working relations should involve. By the time of my study, the most common response to questions about why they left Hawaii was a shrug and the comment, “I don’t know—we just didn’t like it there.” As with their responses about leaving Spain, they nearly all mentioned that they had heard they could earn higher wages in California; with this information only, it might seem that the prospect of economic gain was the most consistent driving force behind their extensive movements. And yet, Hawaii was not without opportunities for earning better wages, for some of the workers had already found jobs away from the fields at even higher rates of pay.⁵² Thus, while wages were given as a reason for migration both from Spain to Hawaii and from Hawaii to California, where they finally established permanent settlements, we must look at what the Andalucians did once they reached California to understand the social structural elements that enabled them to fashion those settlements.

THE MIGRATION TO CALIFORNIA

It is not clear how the first members of the group found their way to the West Coast of the United States. However, by 1909, several hundred families who had gone to Hawaii in 1907 were reported to be working in the fruit orchards of the Vaca, Suisun, and Santa Clara valleys of California.⁵³ Word reached subsequent immigrants to Hawaii that wages on the California ranches were good and that employment was plentiful enough to support families. Most of the Andalucians working in Hawaii chose to move on, again with the under-

⁵² In 1910, there were 1,990 Andalucians in Hawaii, of whom 515 worked on plantations. Even allowing for a number of women and children who might not be employed, this still suggests that a considerable number of workers from the 1907 passage had already made their way off the plantations and into other occupations. Schnack, “Subjective Factors,” 52.

⁵³ Ronald Limbaugh and Walter Payne, *Vacaville: The Heritage of a California Community* (Vacaville, 1978).

standing that they would be employed as agricultural laborers. It should be noted that a couple of those interviewed mentioned that they and others spent a brief time working in factories in San Francisco and Seattle, two debarkation points on the West Coast. Nonetheless, they too kept moving until at last they found themselves living and working in conditions strikingly similar to, and yet in some respects critically different from those they had left behind in Spain. Though, over the years, the children were to move into new occupations and life styles, the people of the Andaluçia-Hawaii-California migration settled into communities from which they did not move again. It is the process of that final settlement that will be discussed in the following pages.

As noted, the Andaluçians in Hawaii heard from the first few who had preceded them to the mainland of the United States that there was work in the northern California fruit orchards. This time, as in their accounts of life in Spain, their answers to my questions were spontaneous and detailed.

We knew some people in Fairfield. They let us stay with them a few days and my father and brother went out to the ranches. Wherever they saw a ranch and a house, they'd go up to the door and ask for the owner of the land. If he had work, they'd stay. If not, they'd try at the next place.

My dad went to San Francisco. The *compadre* said, "Things aren't so good here—it's all factories." My dad said he didn't want any part of San Francisco, except to visit. He came back to Vacaville and the next day, he went out to the ranches with my brother. That's how he found a job.

I interviewed people who had settled in Vacaville, Stockton, Fairfield, and the Santa Clara area, and all gave reports similar to these. Moreover, many claimed to have lived on the ranch itself at one time or another. After the rancher became acquainted with the workers, he might offer them a permanent position. At this point, the family would occupy a small house near the main ranch house, and while the laborer worked in the orchards, his wife might help in the care of the rancher's children.

At first glance, one sees in these accounts an establishment of ties similar to the ones that in Spain had provided the laborer and his family with a desirable security, desirable at least in comparison to the lot of those who did not have it. But at the same time, the Andaluçians did not necessarily stay on any one ranch if it seemed they could earn more on another. In fact, most families were able to save enough from the collective family earnings to buy a house in a nearby town and, in time, restricted their relations with their employers to the economic sphere.

When asked how life in California compared with that in Spain, the people interviewed found the new life preferable for the following reasons. While one could, as in Spain, go out and find seasonal work on a permanent basis from year to year with the *patrones* with whom they had become acquainted, the social monitoring of employee behavior was absent in California. In a

sense, these loosely structured patron-client ties could be drawn upon in the early days by the new arrivals as a means of establishing a secure work position within a modern wage system. While close face-to-face interaction and personal acquaintance provided the initial basis of security, when the laborer wanted to move on, there were no socially or politically institutionalized bonds of loyalty that bound him to any one rancher. In fact, most of the Andalucian immigrants spent most of their lives as day laborers, living entirely from their wages, rather than as permanent clients of any particular patron. However, they did tend to work for the same three or four ranchers each year.

People were asked to compare their social and economic relations with their new employers to those they'd left behind in Spain.

We still worked for the rich. For us, it was the same, because you had to work for this one and that one. But because they were good to us, we were satisfied. Also, in Spain, you'd only work a day or two in one place—not like here, where you go to a ranch and stay until the work is done.

It was the same as in Spain. We still worked for the same people. And if you complied, they paid you. If not, you got fired—same thing. But here, all they looked at was your work. They treated everyone the same. If you worked, you ate. No one had to beg. And there was enough work.

In every case, while the respondent recalled working for the same employers over a period of years, and perhaps had even lived for a time on the ranch, the quality of the relationship was expressed in terms that encompassed both a social and an economic assessment: an honest day's work for a just employer at a fair day's wage. This, coupled with the fact that fruit culture in California used more modern techniques of cultivation than in Spain (frequent pruning, spraying, irrigation, etcetera), which generated more tasks for longer periods of time, made agricultural work a means to family survival in a way that the Andalucian *latifundio* system did not. And yet, until the 1940s, they found themselves still working as day laborers in a seasonal agricultural economy in which they were paid wages by people with whom, in some ways, they had secured some of the guarantees associated with patron-client relations.

In later years, when the canneries and war industries offered more attractive wages and opportunities, the children of these immigrants would leave ranch work altogether. But for nearly forty years following their induced exodus from Andalucia, they continued to apply their knowledge and skills to the structural constraints they encountered, moving until they established themselves in situations congenial enough to allow them to approximate their own conceptions of life and work. While the Hawaiian sugar planters perceived the disruptive loss of their laborers as due to some restlessness inherent among those who worked in the fields, we can better understand their movements and

final settlement in terms of a persistent struggle to restructure constraining economic realities in ways that allowed for the formation of improved social realities. These improvements were judged in terms of what had been considered desirable, but difficult to establish, in Spain. It was this, and not the restlessness of the worker, that the sugar planters did not account for when they saw the failure of their generous financial inducements to the immigrants.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN SETTINGS COMPARED

In both Hawaii and southern Spain, the agricultural economy was based on landholdings large relative to the size associated with peasant family farming—in Spain the *latifundios*; in Hawaii, the plantations. In neither instance did the Andalucians work their own lands. In Hawaii, however, as in Spain, the setting did allow for the establishment of a household economy in which vegetables could be grown, a few animals and fowl kept, and the countryside scoured for wild-growing foodstuffs or fuel that could be traded or used at home.

What differences might account for the fact that the Andalucians did not make this a permanent home, despite the fact that their original desire for higher wages seems to have been substantially met? A few people claimed that adjustment to the climate proved difficult, but an equal number recalled vividly how much they enjoyed the natural beauties of Hawaii and stated that the climate did not affect them adversely. Again, some professed dislike for the Hawaiian ethnic mixture, which included many Asians; but in California, they also found themselves in contact with ethnic groups they had not met in Spain. In fact, many of them were the same groups they had worked with in the fields of Hawaii—the Japanese, Filipinos, and Chinese. And yet, they did not leave California.

A structural difference which the Andalucians do not dwell upon, but which is suggestive when one considers their pattern of final settlement, has to do with the system of management on the large plantations compared with that of the *latifundios*. As mentioned above, in Spain, the laborers knew the *señoritos*, and were often supervised directly by them. Certainly, the personal nature of these contacts caused frequent resentment toward the Spanish employers, and this resentment was sometimes given as one of the reasons for leaving. But on the other hand, the Andalucians knew how to manage this type of relationship to their advantage if the opportunity presented itself. Probably the greatest advantage represented by these ties was the fact that a relatively permanent position minimized the need to travel from place to place in order to earn a living.

In Hawaii, however, none of the laborers knew the owners, who were, in fact, bureaucratically organized corporations. The workers were supervised

by overseers about whom, if they remember them at all, their attitudes remain largely neutral. While the wages were better than they had been in Spain, the work involved considerable relocation from plantation to plantation. There was no opportunity to stabilize a family life in one area or village since the placement of labor was dictated solely by the needs of the plantations as assessed by the sugar companies and implemented by the overseers. Though this factor was not specifically mentioned by the people interviewed as a reason for leaving Hawaii, when we compare the structural similarities and differences between Spain and California, it appears to be one of the important features besides acceptable wages the latter setting offered that Hawaii did not.

First, it has often been remarked that the climate and topography of Spain and California are strikingly similar. Interestingly, however, this was not mentioned by any of those interviewed as a reason for staying in California. Second, both the Spanish latifundios and the California orchards represented relatively large landholdings and though, in the latter case, there was probably a greater proportion of small plots than in the former, holding out to the Andalusians the possibility of someday owning land, the majority did not become ranchers themselves.

The pattern of California landholding did, however, lend itself to a kind of social arrangement that in southern Spain had ensured a greater security of job tenure, but which had become ever more difficult to establish. In California, however, the Andalusians were successful in developing contacts which enabled them to work for one or two ranchers on a fairly permanent, if still seasonal, basis. Here, they could maximize both their wages and their security within a geographical range that allowed them to settle in small towns like the ones they had known in Spain. That this factor, missing in Hawaii, is significant is attested to in the comment of one woman who said, when asked why she liked it in California, "Because, if they treat you well here—well, here you stay! Why go looking around here and there?" (In other words, contradicting Walter Dillingham, why shift restlessly from place to place?)

If the setting was similar in some essential respects to that of southern Spain, it also differed in several ways that made it a more desirable home to the Andalusians. The system of agriculture was modernized, and for a time at least, the techniques of intensive cultivation ensured a greater degree of more regular employment. The orchard industry was well linked by the railroad, with its refrigerated cars, to an expanding eastern market.⁵⁴ It was also linked with a growing local canning industry. These combined structural features made for a vital agricultural system in which the Andalusians could both earn satisfactory wages and establish the stable form of community and family life that neither Spain nor Hawaii could provide them.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 127.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

To focus exclusively on the macrostructural level of analysis is to miss important and determining aspects of social action. A theoretical approach that explains migration solely in terms of the migrants' reactions to wages and policies set by others powerful enough to maximize their own "interest-calculus" fails to capture the ways in which migration strategies may represent significant undercurrents running counter to dominant structures of exploitation.⁵⁵ As Alejandro Portes and John Walton point out:

Contrary to the usual image, the response of the exploited to conditions created for them by the capitalist system is seldom passive acquiescence. Their effort to manipulate, in turn, these conditions is based on the two resources left in the absence of capital: one's own labor and social bonds of solidarity and mutual support within the working class. [Migration] is a way through which the exploited contribute to ever-expanding structures of economic domination and, simultaneously, the form in which they react to their constraints.⁵⁶

World-systems theorists have revealed to us a global economic structure in which exploitation and inequality are dominant features subject to modification only through class struggle and active resistance by the working class. While the most dramatic instance of such struggle may well be proletarian revolution, we must be cautious not to overlook other aspects of class and cultural life that through their persistence and development make problematic the final and complete domination of capital.

⁵⁵ See Alejandro Portes for his discussion of what he terms the "microstructures of migration." "Migration and Underdevelopment," in *Latin American Immigration Project: Occasional Papers* (Durham, North Carolina, 1978), 53.

⁵⁶ Portes and Walton, *Labor, Class*, 64.