Anna Borghi

Verifying different sensory modality properties for concepts results in a processing cost known as the modality-switch effect. It has been argued that this cognitive cost is the result of a perceptual simulation. This paper extends this argument and reports an experiment investigating whether the effect is the result of an activation of sensory information which can also be triggered by perceptual linguistically described stimuli. Participants were first exposed to a prime sentence describing a light or a sound's perceptual property (e.g., "The light is flickering", "The sound is echoing"), then required to perform a property-verification task on a target sentence (e.g., "Butter is yellowish", "Leaves rustle"). The content modalities of the prime and target sentences could be compatible (i.e., in the same modality: e.g., visual-visual) or not (i.e., in different modalities). Crucially, we manipulated the stimuli's presentation modality such that half of the participants was faced with written sentences while the other half was faced with aurally presented sentences. Results show a cost when two different modalities alternate, compared to when the same modality is repeated with both visual and aural stimuli presentations. This result supports the embodied and grounded cognition view which claims that conceptual knowledge is grounded into the perceptual system. Specifically, this evidence suggests that sensory modalities can be pre-activated through the simulation of either read or listened linguistic stimuli describing visual or acoustic perceptual properties.

Abstract concepts ("freedom") differ from concrete ones ("cat"), as they do not have a bounded, identifiable, and clearly perceivable referent. The way in which abstract concepts are represented has recently become a topic of intense debate, especially because of the spread of the embodied approach to cognition. Within this framework concepts derive their meaning from the same perception, motor, and emotional systems that are involved in online interaction with the world. Most of the evidence in favor of this view, however, has been gathered with regard to concrete concepts. Given the relevance of abstract concepts for higher-order cognition, we argue that being able to explain how they are represented is a crucial challenge that any theory of cognition needs to address. The aim of this article is to offer a critical review of the latest theories on abstract concepts, focusing on embodied ones. Starting with theories that question the distinction between abstract and concrete concepts, we review theories claiming that abstract concepts are grounded in metaphors, in situations and introspection, and in emotion. We then introduce multiple representation theories, according to which abstract concepts evoke both sensorimotor and linguistic information. We argue that the most promising approach is given by multiple representation views that combine an embodied perspective with the recognition of the importance of linguistic and social experience. We conclude by discussing whether or not a single theoretical framework might be able to explain all different varieties of abstract concepts

Abstract In this paper, we outline the embodied perspective of language comprehension indicating some of its limitations. We claim that the notions of language as a tool (CLARK 2006a, 2006b), might be useful to overcome a view focused only on referential aspects of language. Words, in quality of tools, can: a. facilitate communication among speakers; b. influence categorization; c. have a different impact on concrete and abstract words; d. allow us to construct an inner speech.

The paper focuses on concepts and words referring to odors and to objects that have an odor. We argue that odors are an interesting object of study since they are evanescent, and since odor words do not refer to concrete and manipulable objects, but to scents evoked by objects. A second reason why odors are interesting is that some languages, as the Western ones, lack a specific odor lexicon, comparable in richness and variety to the color lexicon, and that performance on odors naming is typically worse than performance in color naming. In this work we discuss three main issues. First, we illustrate literature showing that, even if odor words do not have concrete referents, many languages encode them quite easily: the case of odors suggests that word meaning cannot be exhausted by the relationship with a referent, and highlights the importance of the social sharing of meaning. Second, we have discussed the peculiar status of odor concepts and words. Given their ambiguous status, their simple existence poses problems both to theories according to which concrete and abstract concepts do not differ, and to theories according to which they represent a dichotomy. Finally, we present an experiment in which we show that names of objects evoke their smell, and that these smells evoke approach and avoidance movements, in line with theories according to which words are grounded in both sensorial and motor systems.

In the last 10–15 years, the embodied and grounded (E and G) cognition approach has become widespread in all fields related to cognitive (neuro) science, and a lot of evidence has been collected. The approach proposes that cognitive activity is grounded in sensory–motor processes and situated in specific contexts and situations. This special topic had two aims: first, give an idea of the field in its broadness. Second, focus on some challenges for E and G theories.

In a categorization experiment we assessed whether seeing objects automatically activates information on how to manipulate them. The experiment also aims at investigating the role played in a categorization task by online, visual information (i.e., of information mediated by the dorsal system), and by information stored in memory (i.e., information mediated by the ventral system). Participants categorized photographs of objects manipulable either with a power or a precision grip into artifacts or natural kinds. Target-objects were preceded by primes consisting of photographs of hands in either grasping postures (precision or power grip) or in a neutral posture (grip). Target-objects could be presented either in their real size or in modified size, so that they activated a different kind of grip. For example, a strawberry was presented both in its real size and with the size of an apple, so that it activated a power grip. Results confirm that visual stimuli activate motor information. More importantly, they suggest a crucial role of online, visual information even in a categorization task. Results are discussed in the framework of theories on the role of online and offline memory features.

Learning about the function and use of tools through observation requires the ability to exploit one's own knowledge derived from past experience. It also depends on the detection of low-level local cues that are rooted in the tool's perceptual properties. Best known as ‘affordances’, these cues generate biomechanical priors that constrain the number of possible motor acts that are likely to be performed on tools. The contribution of these biomechanical priors to the learning of tool-use behaviors is well supported. However, it is not yet clear if, and how, affordances interact with higher-order expectations that are generated from past experience – i.e. probabilistic exposure – to enable observational learning of tool use. To address this question we designed an action observation task in which participants were required to infer, under various conditions of visual uncertainty, the intentions of a demonstrator performing tool-use behaviors. Both the probability of observing the demonstrator achieving a particular tool function and the biomechanical optimality of the observed movement were varied. We demonstrate that biomechanical priors modulate the extent to which participants' predictions are influenced by probabilistically-induced prior expectations. Biomechanical and probabilistic priors have a cumulative effect when they ‘converge’ (in the case of a probabilistic bias assigned to optimal behaviors), or a mutually inhibitory effect when they actively ‘diverge’ (in the case of probabilistic bias assigned to suboptimal behaviors).

Both evolutionary and developmental research indicate that humans are adapted to respecting property rights, independently (and possibly orthogonally) of considerations of fairness. We offer evidence from psychological experiments suggesting that enforcing one’s rights and respecting others’ possessions are basic cognitive mechanisms automatically activated and grounded in humans’ sensory-motor system. This may entail an independent motivation that is more profound than considerations of fairness and impartiality.

"Embodied cognition (EC) underlines that cognition is constrained by the kind of body we possess, and
stresses the importance of action for cognition. In this perspective the body is always considered as an
acting body. Here, we review EC literature discussing studies that show that body parts are not considered
independent of their involvement in action. We propose to extend EC perspective through studying the
body independently from its direct involvement in goal-directed action. Through this we aim to avoid the
risk of limiting the notion of “sense of the body” to the restricted boundaries of the flesh of brain–body
system. In our extended perspective language is considered as a form of action too. We propose that:
(a) internal language (i.e. social language used as an internal medium for thought and planning) can
contribute to form a unitary sense of our body, and (b) language can help to reshape the way we implicitly
perceive our own body. Namely, it can modify our sense of body by extending its boundaries beyond the
boundaries of the anatomical body. We argue for an integrated notion of bodily self-suggesting that the
internal sense and the boundaries of the human body coincide with the extensions that linguistic tools
allow. In sum, the basic idea we hold is that human body is a social entity."

Qual è il rapporto tra lingue, linguaggio e pensiero? Si può parlare del linguaggio in astratto, senza considerare le differenze tra le lingue che parliamo? Si può parlare del pensiero in generale, senza parlare della diversità dei corpi e dei contesti in cui viviamo? In che modo il tipo di corpo che possediamo influenza il nostro modo di pensare, di conoscere, di parlare? Il nostro corpo è un'entità soltanto biologica o anche sociale? In che misura le lingue che parliamo influenzano il nostro modo di pensare? La tesi di questo libro è che non si possono studiare la mente e il linguaggio umani se non li si radica nell'esperienza corporea. Questo significa, però, che poiché questa esperienza non si dà se non in una situazione, in una cultura, entro una specifica forma di vita, non esiste qualcosa come la cognizione umana, o il linguaggio umano. Di qui l'enfasi che il libro pone, ed è la sua caratteristica più originale, sulla differenza tra linguaggio e lingue.