Phantasia

1. Wie lässt sich die Geisteshaltung kontrollieren und steuern? 2
2. Veränderungsarbeit                                                                         2
3. Die sieben grundlegenden Ängste                                                 3
4. Unsere unsichtbaren Führer                                                         4
4.1 Die acht Führungsprinzen                                                                 4
4.2 Weitere unsichtbare Führer                                                                 8
5. Möglichkeiten zur Nutzung und zum Wohle                                 9
6. Die zwölf großen Reichtümer des Lebens                               10
7. Ein Fehlschlag kann ein Segen sein - Sechstes Wunder des Lebens
                                                                                                                      14
7.1 Die vierundfünfzig Hauptursachen von Fehlschlägen               14
7.2 Trauer, der Weg zur Seele - Siebtes Wunder des Lebens       16
8. Die Zweckbestimmtheit der Natur                                               16
8.1 Das gründliche Buchführungssystem der Natur                       17
8.2 Zeit, das Universalheilmittel der Natur für alle Leiden - Zehntes
      Wunder des  Lebens                                                                       17
9. Die neun Gaben des menschlichen Geistes                               18
10. Wie Sie das Unterbewusstsein erreichen und beeinflussen können
                                                                                                                      22
10.1 Das Unterbewusstsein nutzen                                                       22
10.2 Wie Sie sich körperlich und geistig auf einen notwendigen Eingriff
                                                                                                                      22
10.3 Fasten                                                                                               23
11. Was Sie zu glauben vermögen, das können Sie auch verwirklichen!
                                                                                                                      24

I argue that Barack Obama’s immediate, imaginary, and discursive deictic references to the actions and character of ordinary citizens, specific geographical markers within the “landscape of American history,” and sacred moments in U.S. history extended and enlarged the relational, spatial, and temporal contours of the national narrative in his 2015 speech on the fiftieth anniversary of Bloody Sunday. In so doing, the president offered a compelling (re)definition of patriotism, civic responsibility, and “the true meaning of America.” More broadly, I argue for an expanded notion of deixis within rhetorical scholarship. Beyond a linguistic “pointing” to bodies, places, and objects within the audience’s immediate vicinity, I detail how indexicals bring various images before the eyes of the audience, link individual texts to their political, historical, social, and cultural contexts, and direct our attention to the most important parts of the national narrative even as they deflect our attention from other parts of the story. Ultimately, I suggest that deixis illuminates theories of rhetorical vision in ways that have gone unnoticed, and it is only when we recognize the psychological and cognitive effects of deictic speech that we can fully appreciate the central role phantasia plays in persuasion, deliberation, and moral judgment.

En el presente estudio vamos a abordar la figura y función del mago medieval como agente moral y custodio del saber mágico a través del análisis de la actuación de don Illán en el relato ejemplarizante número XI de El conde Lucanor de Don Juan Manuel. Para ello vamos a contextualizar a tal mago y su actividad en el marco de las ideas y los procesos mágicos que conocemos sobre la época y a plantearnos en primer lugar qué tipo de mago es y qué magia realiza don Illán, y en segundo lugar cómo se corresponde esto con su perfecta inclusión –como personaje altamente positivo– dentro de la obra didáctica a la que pertenece. Veremos que la exposición de una lección didáctica para la educación de un príncipe pasa aquí para su ejemplarización por el uso y la defensa de cierta magia generadora de fantasías, ejecutada y sancionada por don Illán como un arte experimental de apariencias con el que ejercer un acto de sabiduría, prudencia y moralidad pública, al desenmascarar la mera ambición política y las falsas promesas de agradecimiento de un deán aspirante a ese mismo poder mágico.

The article offers a comparative analysis of Ovid's stories of Narcissus and Pygma-lion. The analysis highlights the intertextual link between the two narratives, and uses it as the basis for comparison, focusing on the single aspect: who creates what, and how. The paper concludes that what is at stake in the two texts at a fundamental level can be found in the sphere of aesthetics.

In this paper I will delineate the psychological operations and faculties required for linguistic apprehension within a Thomistic psychology. This will require first identifying the proper object of linguistic apprehension, which will then allow me to specify the distinct operations and faculties necessary for linguistic apprehension. I will argue that the semantic value of any linguistic term is a type of incidental sensible and that its cognitive apprehension is a type of incidental sensation. Hence, the faculties necessary for the apprehension of any linguistic term’s semantic value will be the cogitative power and the intellect. The cogitative power, because it is the faculty of particular intentions, and the intellect, because it is the faculty of universal intentions.

This paper focuses on the reciprocity between visual and verbal that characterizes ancient ekphrasis. According to the authors of the Progymnasmata (Aelius Theon, Hermogenes, Nicolaus, Aphtonius), a major feature of ekphrasis is its vividness (enargeia), i.e. its ability to "bring before the eyes" what is absent.  Ekphrasis is not aimed at the imitation of a given object, but at the effect this very object produces on the audience. This ecphrastic shift, according to which the fictive object is more vivid, and hence more persuasive, than the real object, is a key feature of Philostratus' Eikones. Philostratus himself defines his own work as a logos graphes, i.e. as a "speech on verbal images," which is paradigmatic for the mutual dependence between visual and verbal in ancient ekphrasis.

In several of his works, Immanuel Kant insists on the transcendental role of imagination in perception. In the Kantian scholarship, this claim has been interpreted in at least three ways: it is believed that the imagination is necessary to solve the riddle of the amodal character of perception, to justify the possibility of perceptual identity across time, and to explain the possibility of perceiving particular objects as such, viz. as belonging to a specific class of objects. The paper aims to show how E. Husserl inherited these sets problems without however having recourse to the imagination at all. In the last section, I will briefly analyse two types of mixed acts where perception and imagination unite, namely image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) and what Husserl calls perceptual phantasy (perzeptive Phantasie). I here argue that these analyses do not contradict, but rather strengthen the argument defended throughout the paper, namely that in Husserl's phenomenology, and contrary to Kant's, the imagination does not assume a synthetic or transcendental function in perception.

Dass Bilder zwischen dem Regime der Dinge und dem Regime der Zeichen niemals einen angestammten Platz erhielten und nicht Gegenstand einer eigenen Wissenschaft wurden, ist keinem wiedergutzumachenden Vergessen geschuldet, sondern Ausdruck eines anfänglichen Skandalons, das historisch auch die Geburtsstunde der Philosophie einläutete. Bilder lassen sich nicht einmal als reine Erscheinungen absondern, weil in ihnen als Wasserzeichen stets durchscheint, was sie sichtbar werden ließ. An Husserls Grundlegung einer Phänomenologie des Bildes lässt sich das obstinate Unterfangen verfolgen, die Bilderscheinung von jeder medialen Kontamination freizuhalten. Emmanuel Alloas Archäologie der Medienvergessenheit legt jenes Doppelparadigma frei, das die westliche Tradition seit Anbeginn begleitet – Transparenz und Opazität – und sich vor jenen Begriff schiebt, den es zu übersetzen beanspruchte: In der aristotelischen Wahrnehmungstheorie bezeichnet das Diaphane die Fähigkeit eines Mediums, die Form von etwas anzunehmen, ohne es zu sein. Auf unerwartete Weise wird durch Aristoteles’ Lehre vom Diaphanen erhellt, worin die Macht von Bildern liegt.

φαντασία is employed in postaristotelian poetics and rhetorics in relation to the author’s capacity to shape a mental image of those things he or she is speaking about. Although φαντασία is not attested in Aristotle’s Poetics, this concept can be traced in several passages of the work. This contribution proposes that Aristotle is aware of the importance of this notion; the reasons why he does not develop this theme are explained.

The aim of this study is twofold: to elaborate on Aristotle's nexus of memory, "mental speech," and phantasia in relation to sensation pursuing the implications of such view, i.e., the relevance of the individual's experience and the consequent individualization of memory and its content (section 1), and to look at a selection of Euripides' tragedies (namely, Trojan Women, Iphigenia in Aulis, and Medea) where this nexus is made explicit in the characters' utterances and exploited for the creation of pathos (section 2). I will show that Euripides uses the tragic characters' awareness of past happy experiences (i.e., their personal memory) to deepen the sense of loss and misery that accompany their fall into misfortune; and he does this in a nontechnical way that anticipates the Aristotelian linking of memory and imagination.

Este artículo busca presentar el proyecto
de refundación (en el doble sentido de
refundir para fundar de nuevo) de la fenomenología
acometido por Marc Richir. A
este efecto, trataremos algunos temas
nodales de su fenomenología, empezando
por la ampliación arquitectónica del concepto
de concretud. Más adelante, insistiremos
en la crucial importancia de la phantasia
(en su diferencia, por lo pronto estructural,
con otro tipo de actos como la
imaginación y la conciencia de imagen).
Nos centraremos luego en la afectividad y
en la temporalización vinculados a algunos
“objetos” resultantes de esta ampliación
arquitectónica de la fenomenología y, por
último, volveremos sobre la idea de una
arquitectónica fenomenológica en sentido
fuerte, es decir, como pluralidad de registros
de fenomenalización.                                                                                           




This article aims at presenting Marc Richir’s
project of a re-foundation of phenomenology
(both in the sense of founding again
and doing so by melting down and thus
recasting preexisting materials in order to
set new foundations). We will therefore
deal with some nodal points of Richir’s
recasting of phenomenology, which will be,
at first, the architectonical enlargement of
the concept of concreteness. Moreover, we
will particularly insist in the crucial importance
of fantasy (in its difference, yet
from a structural point of view, with other
types of acts such as imagination or image
consciousness). We will then focus our
interest in affectivity and the kind of temporalization
connected to some of the
“objects” resulting from Richir’s architectonical
enlargement of phenomenology.
We will end up displaying the idea of phenomenological
architectonics in its strong
sense: as a plurality of phenomenalization
levels or registers.

The word "ἀρετή" (virtue, goodness) was translated by the Latin word "virtus" (virtue; strength / courage) when translating the ancient Greek philosophical texts into Latin. Through Plato’s doctrine of the aretê-eidos, the Latin concept of "virtus", and then the concept of "virtual", turned out to be connected with the Platonic senses of the concept of "εἶδος", and therefore with Plato’s doctrine of three types of images: εἶδος, εἰκών, φάντασμα / εἴδωλον. In the context of Plato’s doctrine, the word image can be interpreted in three ways: 1) as an image-eidos, or prototype-sample; 2) as an image-icon, or a true likeness; 3) as an image-idol, or a seeming likeness.
The word "εἶδος" derives from the verb "εἴδω" / "εἶδον" – "to see"; "εἶδος" means not only that which is visible by physical sight, but also that which is visible by mental beholding. However, in the philosophy of Plato, the eidos, staying at the top of the hierarchy of images, is purely speculative, the perfect eternal prototype created by the Divine Mind. At the “foot” of the hierarchy of images is an eidolon, or a seeming likeness of eidos. As distinct from eidos, the true and seeming likenesses of eidos (eikon and eidolon) can be both mentally contemplated objects (for example, imprints in the “wax” of memory, paintings on the “canvas” of the soul), and things observed by physical vision (paintings, sculptures, shadows, and reflections). Thus, through Plato’s doctrine of the three types of images, the concepts of "virtus" and "virtual" turned out to be connected not only with the concept of "εἶδος", but also with the concepts of "φάντασμα", "εἴδωλον".
Since in Plato’s doctrine eidolon is an illusory, imaginary, seeming likeness of eidos, the result of falling away from the Truth (and in this sense, it is a source of lies), under the influence of the senses of the Platonic concept of "εἴδωλον", the sense "imaginary" emerged in the concept of "virtual" (among the meanings of the word "imaginary" there are such as: 1) seeming; 2) false, feigned). Perhaps the Latin verb "videre" (to see; to seem), which is connected with the verb "εἴδω" / "εἶδον" (in the form "οἶδα" it means “I see in the mind’s eye”), is also connected (through one of its meanings "to seem") with the sense "imaginary" in the concept of "virtual".

Considering the interrelations between sight, touch, and imagination, this book surveys classical, late antique, and medieval theories of vision to elaborate on how various spheres of the Byzantine world categorized and comprehended sensation and perception. Revisiting scholarly assumptions about the tactility of sight in the Byzantine world, it demonstrates how the haptic language associated with vision referred to the cognitive actions of the viewer as they grasped sensory data in the mind in order to comprehend and produce working imaginations of objects for thought and memory. At stake is how the affordances and limitations of the senses came to delineate and cultivate the manner in which art and rhetoric was understood as mediating the realities they wished to convey. This would similarly come to contour how Byzantine religious culture could also go about accessing the sacred, the image serving as a site of desire for the mediated representation of the divine.

Ce livre développe, à partir de Merleau-Ponty, Henry et Sartre, une phénoménologie décrivant la vie perceptive du point de vue du désir d'éprouver qui s'y déploie. L'auteur interroge, selon différents chemins tout à la fois opposés et noués les uns aux autres, le rapport de la vie perceptive à l'imaginaire et à la théâtralité originaire du corps. Il montre comment chaque expérience perceptive est la mise en jeu d'un désir de vivre, comment elle est susceptible d'accroître ou d'affaiblir la capacité des individus à se laisser affecter en profondeur par leur situation, à l'endurer, à y ouvrir du possible.

Contenu : Maurice Merleau-Ponty : La perception comme toucher à distance - La texture imaginaire du réel - Violence et événementialité de la vision - La théâtralité originaire du corps - Michel Henry : La vulnérabilité intrinsèque du pâtir - Affectivité, sensibilité, temporalité - Vie et possibilité - Impression et réalité - La texture imaginaire des impressions - Jean-Paul Sartre : Immanence, affectivité et intentionnalité - L'imaginaire et le retard originaire de la conscience - Émotion et imagination - Liberté et théâtralité.

What is Aristotle’s conception of thumos? This question can be broken down into two separate but related questions: (a) what is the object of desire for thumos, and (b) in which faculty of the soul is thumos grounded? The latter question is the focus of this paper. In this paper, “grounded in” is to be taken physiologically; the second question can be rephrased as “Which faculty of the soul is thumos a function of?” As a general rule Aristotle employs both a colloquial and a technical sense of thumos throughout the corpus. When I ask “What is thumos?,” I am interested in the technical sense that appears primarily in On the Soul and in the Nicomachean Ethics, where thumos is defined as a category of desire (a subset of orexis). The main argument of this paper is that Aristotle’s thumos is grounded in the faculty of phantasia – specifically, a sub-faculty called definite phantasia.

According to the traditional view, the notion of imagination in early modern aesthetics was a rather marginal and subsidiary concept within the classical doctrine of mimesis dominated by rules and reason. The present paper raises some doubts about this well-established opinion. It argues that even if imagination in early modern aesthetics did not play as prominent role as in Romantic poetics, the concept had significant relevance. It presents one important episode from the Renaissance debate on imagination, which arose from the sixteenth century literary quarrel over the artistic quality and the uncertain genre of Dante's Commedia. Its main distinctive category was " fantastic imitation " — a concept derived from Plato, yet misunderstood and thus transformed.

Apenas hace un cuarto de siglo (1980) que la fenomenología husserliana de
la imaginación, que se completa – como habremos de ver – con una fenomenología
de la phantasia (Phantasie, término que no tiene, [ni] en francés [ni en español],
equivalente satisfactorio), se ha hecho accesible al lector en sus pormenores :
desde la publicación, por E. Marbach, en la serie Husserliana (Hua) de obras póstumas, bajo la tutela de los Archivos Husserl de Lovaina, del volumen XXIII titulado
Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung, y traducido en francés en las ediciones
Jérôme Millon (Coll. Krisis, Grenoble, 2002), por J.F. Pestureau, bajo el
título Phantasia, conscience d'image, souvenir. Cierto es que existían pasajes de la obra publicada en vida por el propio Husserl atinentes a estas cuestiones, pero,
como con muchas otras problemáticas sucede, no adquieren éstas todo su relievey, también por ello, toda su profundidad, si no es desde dicha publicación. Será
pues a esta última a que hagamos referencia exclusiva.

Bien sopesado este volumen que es Hua XXIII, se desprende que tras las
primeras investigaciones de Husserl sobre matemáticas y lógica, la obra del fundador
de la fenomenología experimenta un giro absolutamente capital con el curso
del semestre de invierno 1904/05 titulado “Elementos fundamentales de fenomenología y teoría del conocimiento”, y que contaba con cuatro partes, la primera
dedicada a la percepción (Wahrnehmung), la segunda a la atención
(Aufmerksamkeit)3 , la tercera a la phantasia y a la conciencia de imagen, y la
cuarta al tiempo (única que, en 19284 será publicada bajo la forma que le dará
Édith Stein, y que Heidegger se limitará a retomar tal cual en el Jahrbuch de
Husserl acompañándola de una breve introducción). Se trataba, en dicho curso,
de “elementos fundamentales” en la medida en que, como de su solo enunciado
de inmediato se desprende, la pregunta de Husserl tras Investigaciones Lógicas
era la del carácter intuitivo de las representaciones, luego también la de aquello
que, en la vida de la conciencia, es intuitivo. Así, este curso constituyó, en cierto
modo, la entrada de Husserl en fenomenología propiamente dicha, bajo horizonte
epistemológico, cierto es, pero donde la preocupación por la teoría del conocimiento
no será ya la preocupación central.

The present work aims to highlight the impact that Synesius of Cyrene had on Ficino and Pico della Mirandola in the formation process of the Renaissance concept of rhetoric and the anthropology connected
thereto. Special attention will be drawn to the close link between rhetoric and phantasia, both imaginative and creative forces that are present in all three authors. The master of these forces is the rhetorician, who assumes in this respect an exemplary anthropological function. In fact, if
on the one hand he is an ambiguous manipulator of shady speeches, on the other hand he is able to fully express the variety of human nature. This makes him an alter deus, that is, a demonic being whose nature is superior to any other. It is no accident that the demigod Proteus is a
theme in all three authors and is the symbol of a positive human nature, which reveals itself as amphibious, multiple and, above all, highly characterised on the verbal level and the imaginative level.

La crítica ha asumido por lo general que el petrarquismo y el neoplatonismo característicos de la poesía amorosa del seiscientos español, canónicamente representada por Garcilaso de la Vega, impiden una interpretación ampliamente erótica de la obra de este. En el presente artículo intento demostrar que desde esa necesidad paradigmática de la obra garcilasiana, no obstante, el poeta plantea la posibilidad de un contacto erótico mediante el sentido de la vista, proceso en el que la fantasía juega un papel clave en la búsqueda constante del encuentro amoroso. Un análisis detallado del soneto VIII (‘‘De aquella vista pura y excelente’’), inspirado en el tópico del enamoramiento por la vista y con apoyo en la teoría fisiológica que lo sustenta en la época, ofrece las claves para el inicio de esta relectura sobre la práctica erótica en la obra de Garcilaso de la Vega.

Taking its cue from a biographical anecdote reported by Eustathios of Thessalonike in the introduction to his Commentary on the Odyssey (Homer allegedly found the material for his poems in some book rolls penned by one Lady Phantasia), this paper investigates the entanglements between Eustathios’ exegetical work on Homer and the Byzantine re - vival of fiction in the XIIth century. The first section explores the way in which Eusta - thios presents Homer’s compositional practices, construed as akin to fictional narrative. 286 «MEG» 14, 2014 Abstracts The second section delves into the associations sparkled by mythical female authorial agents. Finally, in the third section, the paper shows how the story selected by Eustathios could easily evoke in the Byzantine reader images related to the writer’s activity and imaginative craftiness – the latter not devoid of risks.

In this article, derive from a lecture done in Oviedo in November 2015, the question of the imagination (which I indicate, in the Introduction, the central role in any phenomenological approach) is examined from three different points of view: the imagination as schematism (Kant, Fichte, Richir), the imagination as “consciousness of image” (Bildbewusstsein) (Husserl, Sartre), the imagination as “Phantasie” (Husserl, Richir), finishing with the delicate and essentilal issue of the “perceptual Phantasie” (Husserl, Richir, R. Ortiz de Urbina).

En este artículo, que retoma el texto de una conferencia impartida en Oviedo en noviembre de 2015, la cuestión de la imaginación (de la cual empiezo por mostrar  el papel central en cualquier enfoque fenomenológico) es examinada a partir de cuatro interpretaciones diferentes: la imaginación como esquematismo (Kant, Fichte, Richir), la imaginación como conciencia de imagen (Husserl, Sartre), la imaginación como la phantasía (Husserl, Richir), terminando con el problema tanto crucial como difícil de la "phantasia perceptiva" (Husserl, Richir, R. S. Ortiz de Urbina).

Dans cet article, qui reprend le texte d'une conférence prononcée à Oviedo en novembre 2015, la question de l'imagination (dont j'indique, en introduction, le rôle central dans toute démarche phénoménologique) est examinée à partir de trois interprétations différentes : l'imagination comme schématisme (Kant, Fichte, Richir), l'imagination comme conscience d'image (Husserl, Sartre), l'imagination comme phantasia (Husserl, Richir), pour terminer avec la question aussi délicate qu’essentiel de la "phantasia perceptive" (Husserl, Richir, R. Ortiz de Urbina).

O presente estudo pretende analisar a relação que o artista estabelece com a realidade durante a produção da obra de arte, sobretudo da pintura, levando em conta que a obra de arte, antes de ser representação, é apresentação em si mesma, isto é, depois de acabada, tem autonomia e estatuto ontológico, é coisa entre coisas. Ou seja, pretende-se investigar como nos tempos atuais se vê e se lida com o pressuposto de que a produção da arte é imitação e ao mesmo tempo invenção que funda uma nova realidade. Para tanto, acreditamos que a Teoria da Formatividade de Luigi Pareyson fornece algumas chaves fundamentais para se pensar estas problemáticas que se destacam na arte contemporânea, em especial, na pintura, com o foco na produção pictórica de Gerhard Richter. E, partindo da premissa de que a implicação da arte como mímesis [imitação], e, consequentemente sua pertinência, inicia-se nos primórdios do pensamento sobre arte na Grécia Antiga (em especial as contribuições de Platão e de Aristóteles). E considerando que o próprio Pareyson mostra como ambos, sobretudo Aristóteles, ainda são fundamentais, mesmo quando se trata de focar o olhar para uma teoria da arte atual, bem como para a produção artística contemporânea, a presente pesquisa estuda a intersecção de pontos centrais advindos dos filósofos gregos citados com os pontos centrais do pensamento pareysoniano sobre Arte. A proposta é construir uma ponte de intersecção entre os pensamentos de Pareyson, Aristóteles e Platão, e, ancorando-a nos conceitos cunhados na Teoria da Formatividade, expor como o filósofo italiano relê as problemáticas colocadas pelos filósofos gregos antigos. E, consequentemente, entender de que maneira esta interseção de pensamentos e conceitos contribuem para uma reflexão sobre arte na atualidade e em particular para a análise da produção pictórica de Gerhard Richter.

In this article, the relationship of art with the concept of fantasia which is often the subject of debate in Ancient Greek Philosophy and its reflections in Renaissance art paintings will be examined. For this purpose, firstly the meaning of the concept and content will be focused. Then, in which means the concept fantasia was used in ancient Greek philosophy, what were its nature and functions… These topics will be examined in the framework of the opinions of philosophers in this period. In the last part, the Renaissance painters who can be engaged with fantasia concepts and their works related with the topic will be examined. During this study, Fantasia' effects on art painting and in which dimension it was an intermediary in artistic creativity of art will be explained. Özet Bu makalede Antik Yunan Felsefesinde sıkça tartıĢma konusu olan fantasia kavramının sanat ile iliĢkisi ve Rönesans resim sanatındaki yansımaları incelenecektir. Bu amaçla önce kavramın anlamı ve içeriği üzerinde durulacaktır. Ardından fantasia kavramının Antik Yunan Felsefesinde hangi anlamlarda kullanıldığını, doğasının ve iĢlevinin ne olduğunu bu dönem filozoflarının görüĢleri çerçevesinde incelenecektir. Son bölümde ise fantasia kavramıyla iliĢkilendirilebilecek Rönesans ressamları ve konu ile iliĢkili yapıtları incelenecektir. Bu çalıĢma süresince fantasia'nın resim sanatına etkileri ve sanatsal yaratıcılığa hangi boyutta aracılık ettiği açıklanmaya çalıĢılacaktır.

In the Origin of the work of art, Heidegger claimed that the work of art opens to us the truth of Being, the opening of the world. Two problematics arise from this. First, his idea of "world-disclosure" evoked a sense of everydayness (which captures, for me, the idea of credulism in perception). Second, the senses of truth, Being, and world are metaphysically condensed. Hence the question: how then could the "truth of Being" or the "world" that artworks reveal be experienced? Among other ways (mimesis, imagination, perception, etc.) by which artworks are experienced, I choose to examine perception since it confirms this idea of everydayness. The questions that confront us to this effect are: can perception lead us into, to encounter, this world opened by artworks? Does the nervous/visual system suffice to enter into that world in which the artist invites us? This is where Richir becomes important. In response to the first problem, he shows that the "perception" (experience) of artworks is beyond mere everydayness since artworks open for us a world that "never was" and "never will be" (i.e., "virtuality" and not a veridical sense of everydayness as captured in the perceptive act that is objectrelated). This is because the material stuff or object given in perception is neutralized by the phantasia to become what Richir calls Sache. This Sache is in itself a phenomenon that is disclosed in artworks. In response to the second problem, Richir shows how artworks cannot disclose just metaphysical categories of Being, truth, or world. The disclosure has to be phenomenological, corporeal, and affective. He therefore proposes another mode of "perception" beyond mere perception in a revolutionary interpretation of the husserlian "perceptive" phantasia. With this, he shows how the aforementioned metaphysical condensations are liveable in experience. I concretize this with an illustration from the theater. Finally, I suggest participation as a phenomenological approach that can make both Heidegger's and Richir's intuitions meaningful.

This article explores Thomas Aquinas's interrelated views of rhetoric and deliberation, particularly through his commentaries on Aristotle and his Summa theologiae. It argues that while articulating a largely Boethian understanding of rhetoric as consideration of uncertain matters, Aquinas also advances a theory of deliberation indebted to Aristotelian theories of sensation and phantasia. Building from previous work on phantasia in Aristotle's works, I argue that, in Aquinas's view, rhetorical deliberation is dependent on sensory information experienced through phantasia. Gathered through time and experience, sensory information serves as the foundational material for other forms of reasoning, such as deliberation and practical wisdom. In articulating Aquinas's views of rhetoric and deliberation, I suggest that the relationship between rhetoric and logic within Aquinas's system of thought be reconsidered, with rhetoric playing a prominent role in the consideration of variable and human phenomena.

This is a pre-publication proof copy; please let me know if you would like a copy of the final published essay.

Che pensare di un futuro apocalittico, nel quale, per risolvere la crisi economica, si decide la soppressione in massa delle persone anziane? Com'è possibile che una decisione tanto mostruosa viene accettata e legalmente avallata? Come reagiranno le vittime? E i loro parenti?

The devil and the demons are true co-stars of Antonio’s Life. Their most fearsome weapon is to be able to create phantasiae able to mislead their victims and arouse shocking passions. The article focuses on this aspect of demonology, highlights its peculiar features both with regard to the previous Christian tradition, both with regard to the stoic concept of phantasia and  suited to that the rhetorical concept of phantasia is able to better explain the thought of Athanasius on diabolical phantasiae.

La reticenza della filosofia moderna e postmoderna ad inoltrarsi sulla strada della nominazione del principio della trascendenza solleva la domanda circa la dignità filosofica dell’interrogativo teologico. La corrente fenomenologica, nel prendere in conto la dinamica concreta dell’attuazione antropologica, non può esimersi dal considerare l’eccedenza originaria e incondizionata che genera la coscienza e la abilita a decidere radicalmente di sé. Nondimeno, permane anche nella fenomenologia un agnosticismo di fondo, che impedisce di identificare l’Alterità fondante con Dio. Dal canto suo, la teologia non può ignorare la forma pratica dell’esistenza, dal momento che il principio cristologico dell’auto-comunicazione divina implica in maniera costitutiva l’umano. Per il discorso teologico risulta perciò decisivo il riferimento alla fenomenologia la quale, uscendo dall’astrazione di una idealità psicologica e di una idealità metafisica che rimangono estrinseche alla coscienza e alla libertà in atto, crea le condizioni per una messa in rapporto del tema di Dio con l’istanza dell’unicità personale.  Il presente lavoro intende procedere precisamente in questa direzione. Prendendo in esame la fenomenologia ermeneutica di Paul Ricoeur e la fenomenologia trascendentale di Marc Richir secondo la rilettura teologica di Duilio Albarello e Dario Cornati, esso mette in luce l’intima correlazione della fede cristiana con un’antropologia della libertà di essere-sé.  Il primo capitolo è perciò dedicato all’interpretazione della fenomenologia dell’uomo capace, che Ricoeur sviluppa nella seconda parte del saggio postumo Percorsi del riconoscimento. Dopo aver restituito fedelmente il pensiero ricoeuriano, Albarello procede oltre, dischiudendo la dimensione teologica già presente tacitamente al suo interno. Ponendo a fondamento dell’homme capable la capacitas Dei, il teologo individua nel fenomeno religioso e nel suo inveramento cristologico il proprio dell’umano. Il secondo capitolo è invece consacrato alla fenomenologia genetica richiriana. Ampliando la nozione husserliana di intenzionalità, Richir individua nella Phantasia ciò che fa di un uomo un uomo. È infatti la percezione – non immediatamente il cogito – ad intuire il senso del mondo e la verità dell’affezione. Tale tesi non è priva di implicazioni antropologico-teologali, che Cornati evidenzia nel riferimento all’antica sapienza greca e cristiana. 
La conclusione vuol essere una ripresa critica del percorso svolto. Mettendo in luce i guadagni e i limiti delle proposte degli autori presi in esame, si rifletterà ulteriormente sulla fecondità del dialogo filosofico-teologico.

The book Kłopot z wyobraźnią. Pojęcie phantasia-imaginatio w teorii twórczości renesansu i baroku [The Problem with Imagination. The Concept of Phantasia-Imaginatio in Renaissance and Baroque Art Theory] presents the history and significance of the categories of imagination and fantasy in early modern theoretical discussions on poetics, rhetoric and arts. The monograph argues that the idea of phantasia-imaginatio had considerable relevance in early modern aesthetics and, consequently , challenges the stereotypical conviction that the notion of imagination did not play an important role in the aesthetic thought of that period, i.e. that it was only a rather marginal concept subordinated to the obligatory doctrine of mimesis, with its prevailing principle of rational creation, which should engage higher cognitive capacities, and, above all, intellect and reason. The primary sources discussed in the book include predominantly 16 th and 17 th century theories of literature, while philosophical reflection and early modern theories of art (especially of arti del disegno) provide them with an important and indispensable frame of reference. In Renaissance and Baroque discussions on art and poetry the terms fantasy and imagination are used interchangeably. In different approaches they can signify: the faculty of the soul responsible for creating images, the capacity of retention and re-composing sensible images and the power enabling the production of imaginary beings. The latter function of imagination is particularly stressed in Late Renaissance vanguard theories of artistic creation. Phantasia-imaginatio is defined also as the inventive power of the artist, as a necessary ability, which makes possible the process of visualisation (i.e. seeing images 'in the mind's eye'), and, finally,

The contradictory function of imagination could be noticed as early as in Plato’s Sophist – eikon and phantasma dialectics reveals the process of confusion by which we are unable to unambiguously diagnose truth or deceit and accurately draw the line between reality and unreality. Both Sartre and Husserl admit that imagination is necessary to phenomenology and brings up new data that are important of the understanding of truth. The provision by Husserl also recognizes the nature of simulacrum experience and a dynamic cocktail of ontological tumult within imagination. However, phenomenology is concerned with safeguarding the craggy authority of the human mind directed towards ideal of universality. Conversely, as Heidegger notices in his interpretation of Kant, the deepest transcendental structures permit recognition of the primordial temporality characteristic of imagination. Thereby the grasp on the processes of the functioning of imagination assumes its most important and the most ambivalent role. It seems that what offers an unreliable view of the world – termed by Husserl as the “protean character of fantasy” – can provide a basis of pathways to form a relationship with a weakening or even a nearly disappearing ontology.

https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp23/content/wcp23_2018_0027_0107_0111

Draught version. A look at the statue in Renaissance literature, artistry, philosophy, and psychology through the Hypnerotomachia Poliphili (1499) as a symbol of the intertwining of the body and architecture, with special reference to the works of Alberto Pérez-Gómez and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
This essay is dedicated to Alberto Pérez-Gómez and the final version is published for his Festschrift in a new volume called Architecture's Appeal: How Theory Informs Architectural Praxis, edited by Marc Neveu and Negin Djavaherian (Routledge, 2015)

Aristotle's theory of human happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics explicitly depends on the claim that contemplation (theôria) is peculiar to human beings, whether it is our function or only part of it. But there is a notorious problem: Aristotle says that divine beings also contemplate. Various solutions have been proposed, but each has difficulties. Drawing on an analysis of what divine contemplation involves according to Aristotle, I identify an assumption common to all of these proposals and argue for rejecting it. This allows a straightforward solution to the problem and there is evidence that Aristotle would have adopted it.