



The impact of cartel strategies in France, Greece, Denmark and Ireland

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Keele European Parties Research Unit
(KEPRU)

Working Paper 35

© Gemma Loomes, 2012

ISSN 1475-1569

ISBN 1-899488-82-0

**KEPRU Working Papers are published by:
School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy (SPIRE)
Keele University
Staffs
ST5 5BG, UK**

Fax +44 (0)1782 73 3592

www.keele.ac.uk/kepru

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KEPRU Working Papers are available via SPIRE's website.

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- to expand postgraduate training in the study of political parties, principally through Keele's MA in Parties and Elections and the multinational PhD summer school, with which its members are closely involved;
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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to explore the relationship between engagement in cartel strategies and the fate of established parties in Europe. The paper explores four dimensions of ‘institutional’ or cartel strategies: electoral laws; the electoral system; television advertising and state subsidies, and analyses the extent to which high or low levels of engagement in these strategies impacts upon the electoral and governmental success of ‘established’ political parties across Europe during the post-war period.

Based on four country case studies where the highest (France and Greece) and lowest (Denmark and Ireland) levels of strategies are demonstrated, the paper hypothesises that, in line with the cartel thesis, established parties in France and Greece should enjoy the greatest levels of success, whereas established parties should be weaker in Ireland and Denmark. The findings of the study are mixed; in Greece, there is clear evidence of established parties’ enduring success, whereas in France, evidence is weaker. In Denmark, the weakness of engagement in cartel strategies does not appear to have substantially undermined the strength of the established parties, whereas in Ireland, the post-1989 party system has seen the growth in support for, and emergence of, smaller parties, destabilising the party system. The paper concludes that although there does appear to be a relationship between cartel strategies and established parties’ success, the use of cartel strategies must be considered alongside the strategic behaviours of parties in relation to other parties and the electorate, to understand the relationship between party law and electoral success.

INTRODUCTION

Political parties are central actors within western European political systems, and the choices they make can significantly influence their success or failure as political actors. It may be a truism that parties compete for ‘policy, office and / or votes’ (Müller and Strøm 1999), but exactly *how* political parties compete and more specifically, what impact the competitive choices made by political parties have on their own fate, and the party systems in which they compete, remains an understudied area of research. The significance of party strategies has been highlighted in the work of Müller and Strøm (1999) and Katz and Mair (1995) among others, and the role that political parties can play in the process of party system change has also been highlighted, most notably by Peter Mair (1997, 2002). However, the work of Müller and Strøm does not consider the systemic impact of a party’s strategic choice and the impact that these choices can have on party competition. In contrast, the work of Mair focuses on the role of political parties in the process of party system change, but does not consider in detail the strategic decisions and actions that influence party behaviour, ultimately influencing the shape of the party system. This paper seeks to explore the strategies that parties engage in, and crucially to explore the impact these strategies have on the party systems in which they compete, focusing on the seminal cartel thesis of Katz and Mair (1995). The cartel thesis argues that we should find higher levels of engagement in cartel strategies in some countries than in others, and furthermore, the use of these strategies should have certain systemic impacts. This paper attempts to test these assumptions by comparing the impact of high and low levels of cartel strategies on party systems in four western European countries.

The paper will begin by highlighting four key areas central to Katz and Mair’s work. The cartel thesis argues that parties can use the resources of the state in order to improve their own systemic position, and this paper assesses four such strategies: electoral laws, electoral systems, television advertising and state subsidies, by assessing the extent of their use in eight western European countries. The extent to which established parties engage in these strategies is measured, with the results suggesting that the highest levels of strategies are found in France and Greece and the lowest in Ireland and Denmark. The cartel thesis is then assessed to determine whether the high or low use of these strategies has had a positive or a negative impact on the success of established parties in these countries. The paper concludes by suggesting that although there does appear to be a relationship between cartel strategies

and established parties' success, the use of cartel strategies must be considered alongside the strategic behaviours of parties in relation to other parties to understand the relationship between party law and electoral success.

THE CARTEL THESIS AND PARTY STRATEGIES

The importance of party strategies has become an increasingly pertinent research question since the 1970s, when the dawning of the 'post-industrial' age (Bell 1973) substantially changed the political landscape in which political parties acted and competed. Sustained peace in western Europe, unparalleled prosperity, a vast expansion in higher education and increased travel and communication between countries (Crewe and Denver 1985: 5) led to changes at the societal level that significantly altered electoral behaviour. The votes of parties' core supporters were no longer assured, and the erosion of societal cleavages facilitated the process of party system fragmentation. Indeed, since the 1970s, there has been an increase in the fragmentation of party systems (Wolinetz 1979), electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979), partisan dealignment (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984), decreasing electoral turnout (Franklin 2004) and declining party membership (van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2011) across western Europe. However, this is not to say that political parties have acted solely as passive victims of the process of radical change.

The shift away from the traditional mass party model of party organisation and the era of stable voting patterns has led to established parties¹ seeking ways in which to consolidate their dominant systemic positions. Parties have become increasingly catch-all in their organisation and appeal (Kirchheimer 1966) and adopt more professionalised campaigning methods (Panebianco 1988), but the ways in which parties compete within their national party systems has also changed significantly. Following on from these shifts in the relationship between parties and the electorate, the relationship between the state and party strategies became an important research question in the mid-1990s, with the cartel thesis of Katz and Mair emerging alongside the work of Müller (1993, 2002), laying a foundation for the study of the importance of state institutions for party competition.

¹ When addressing party strategies, only those parties with significant systemic positions can engage in strategies relating to the manipulation of the resources of the state. These parties will generally be governing parties, who are able to modify or introduce legislation to ensure they remain the dominant actors within their party systems.

Institutions play a major role in shaping the way that political parties operate and can facilitate or restrict certain activities, ultimately playing a role in determining the success of certain parties. Rules and regulations for the maintenance of the institutional structure are set out in most western European democracies' constitutions, yet governing parties are not always compelled to abide by rules concerning the operation of institutions. If the rules disadvantage certain parties, they can change the rules: 'political parties' motivation for playing the political game is not the Olympic principle; their rationale is not mere participation in the game, but winning it' (Müller 2002: 251).

This position reflects the cartel thesis of Katz and Mair, which focuses specifically on the ways in which parties have moved away from the electorate and closer to the state, thus attempting to consolidate their own systemic positions. Parties thus engage in cartel 'strategies' in order to move themselves closer to the institutions of the state, with Müller commenting that 'parties can...win the political game by two strategies. They can play according to the existing rules of the game, or they can change the rules of the game' (2002: 251). This approach raises the possibility of partisan institutional manipulation by parties seeking to benefit their own cause. From this perspective, political institutions can play a vital role in influencing the fate of established parties, with political parties often being the guiding forces behind institutional changes in the pursuit of office-seeking goals.

Several specific ways in which political parties can manipulate the institutional set-up feature in the work of Katz and Mair (1995). Katz and Mair argue that some political parties have now become part of the state bureaucracy and hence political parties can more effectively manipulate state institutions. Their cartel thesis argues that environmental change is far from exogenous to the parties as it is parties who are ultimately responsible the rules regarding state subventions as well as the amounts of money and resources that are made available (1995: 15). Katz and Mair similarly cite the electronic media as another area that is subject to a large degree of state control with political parties able to manipulate rules in their own interests (1995: 15). Thus, 'the state, which is invaded by political parties and the rules of which are determined by the parties, becomes a fount of resources through which these parties not only help to ensure their own survival, but through which they can also enhance their own capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilised alternatives' (1995: 16).

Eight countries will be considered in order to assess the extent to which countries engage in

cartel strategies: France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Greece, Ireland and Denmark. This range of European countries in terms of size, length of EU membership and geographic position, should allow for a sufficient sample of European countries to be examined to draw valid conclusions.

Established parties in these eight European countries, acting in line with the cartel thesis, should seek to utilise the resources of the state and modify institutions to ensure that the institutional set-up in which they operate favours them. Various dimensions, taken from the work of Müller, and Katz and Mair, are measured to assess the extent to which established parties engage in cartel strategies: electoral laws, electoral systems, television campaigning airtime and state subsidies. Electoral laws and electoral systems are the first hurdles for parties when embarking on an election campaign and the pursuit of votes, policy and office (Müller and Strøm 1999), whereas television campaigning airtime and state subsidies relate to the campaign process itself and the rewards that parties can expect to receive, often because of the share of the vote received at the election.

Electoral laws

Although not explicitly addressed in the cartel thesis of Katz and Mair (1995), electoral laws nonetheless provide an important opportunity for established parties to engage in institutional strategies. Electoral laws are those that specifically govern the conduct of elections *before* elections take place and the system of electoral laws in place within a country is a major determinant of whether non-established parties can challenge established parties and is the first hurdle that parties seeking to compete in elections must face. If the barriers put in place by a system of electoral laws are too high for some parties wishing to take part in elections, the possibility of challenging the established parties is reduced and cartel-like behaviours are in operation.

In order to assess the extent to which established parties create systems that are favourable to themselves, that is, the extent to which established parties engage in institutional strategies, the factors proposed by Bowler et al. (2003) can be assessed. Where laws for ballot access are restrictive and campaign finance weigh strongly in favour of the established parties, established parties should achieve high levels of centrality within their national party systems. Conversely, where laws governing ballot access are permissive and campaign

finance is relatively equally distributed, competition may be more open within a given country and established parties may achieve low levels of systemic centrality.

Ballot access and campaign finance are therefore two areas of particular importance within the field of electoral laws. Each area of study is broken down into sub-sections in order to produce comparable data. Within the area of ballot access, the deposit and signature requirements for political parties and candidates to stand at elections are significant, as are rules governing independent candidates. In relation to campaign finance, the system of campaign subsidies in place (if any) is relevant, in addition to limits to campaign expenditure. These five areas should provide thorough and comparable data to show in which countries the system of extant electoral laws is the most and least restrictive.

Where deposit and signature requirements are high, independent candidates are not allowed, campaign subsidies favour the established parties and where campaign expenditure limits are not present, parties are engaging in high levels of cartel strategies, attempting to limit opportunities for other parties. Table 1 (see Appendix 1) shows the extent to which the system of electoral laws in place favours established parties in eight western European countries, revealing that the highest levels of engagement in strategies relating to electoral laws occurs in Denmark, whereas the lowest levels of engagement occur in Ireland, Spain and Belgium.

Electoral systems

An electoral system is a set of rules that structures how votes are cast at elections for a representative assembly and how these votes are then converted into seats in that assembly (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 3). The type of electoral system can strongly influence the shape of the party system and competitive relations found within party systems. Established parties may put a restrictive electoral system in place in order to restrict opportunities for non-established parties, in line with the cartel thesis. A permissive electoral system, which does not favour the established parties to the same extent as a restrictive electoral system, can be seen as an indication of the engagement by established parties in low levels of institutional strategies.

Measuring disproportionality provides an indication of the restrictive or permissive nature of

electoral systems for non-established parties. The higher the distortion that occurs between votes cast and seats received, the more disproportional an electoral system is, and the higher the levels of engagement in cartel strategies. The most widely used and commonly accepted measure for calculating the disproportionality of electoral systems is Michael Gallagher's least squares method (1991), which can provide comparable data through which various electoral systems can be compared. Table 2 (see Appendix 1) shows the extent to which electoral system favour established parties in eight western European countries, showing that the most restrictive systems are found in France, Greece and Spain and the least restrictive electoral system is found in Denmark. In France and Greece, it is also interesting to note that frequent changes to the electoral systems have taken place, with the French system undergoing five changes since 1958 and the Greek system changing on four occasions since 1975. These frequent changes reinforce the argument that French and Greek established parties have engaged in high levels of institutional strategies, as not only is the present system restrictive for non-established parties, the electoral system is regarded as a 'political football' by the established parties, with proportional representation in Greece regarded as 'a useful tool for...short-term tactics' (Dimitras 1994: 155).

Television campaigning airtime

This dimension investigates to what extent the system regulating access to television campaigning airtime is restrictive for non-established parties. Although other media outlets such as radio campaigning, written press advertising or any form of internet communication are also important avenues through which parties can communicate with voters, television advertising is the principal political communication medium and parties that wish to compete successfully in elections must make use of this vital media tool. The restrictive or permissive nature of television advertising systems for non-established parties focuses on key areas derived from the literature on media and campaigning (see, for example, Kaid and Holtz-Bacha 1995; Plasser and Plasser 2002; Gunther and Mughan 2000; Ansolabehere et al. 1993). The four areas are paid television spots in addition to free airtime availability, criteria for eligibility and the method of allocation. Where paid television spots are available and free airtime is restricted, established parties engage in cartel strategies in order to limit the availability of television campaigning airtime to non-established parties. Table 3 (see Appendix 1) shows the extent to which the system of television advertising favours established parties in eight western European countries, showing that the most restrictive

systems are in place in Greece and Germany, whereas the most permissive system for non-established parties is found in Denmark.

State subsidies

State subsidies are found at the core of the cartel thesis, with the thesis emerging from Katz and Mair's studies on party organisations (1992, 1994), which concluded that parties were increasingly reliant on state subsidies as a form of party income to compensate for declining party membership. According to Katz and Mair, cartel parties create systems of state subsidies to reinforce the cartel, that is, to support those within and to penalise those outside. Katz and Mair note that 'because these subventions are often tied to prior party performance or position, they help to ensure the maintenance of existing parties while at the same time posing barriers to the emergence of new groups' (1995: 15).

'State subsidies' include money awarded to parliamentary groups, central party organisations and youth groups, as well as funds that may have been awarded for general party organisation or as 'non-earmarked' (Austin and Tjernström 2003). Furthermore, only direct subsidies are included as part of this dimension; indirect subsidies that the state may provide such as funding to auxiliary organisations are not included. The restrictive or permissive nature of state subsidies for non-established parties focuses on the method of allocation of subsidies and also the payout threshold². Where the method of allocation is restrictive for parties, and where the payout threshold is high, cartel strategies can be observed to be in operation. Table 4 (see Appendix 1) shows the extent to which the state subsidy systems favour established parties in eight western European countries, showing that the most restrictive systems are found in Switzerland and Belgium, whereas the most permissive systems are found in Germany and Denmark.

Based on these four areas relating the cartel thesis, we can suggest that the low use of institutional strategies should negatively influence the fate of established parties, whereas the high use of institutional strategies should enable established parties to continue to dominate their party systems, strongly influenced by the cartel thesis of Katz and Mair (1995). To provide a more detailed analysis of the impact of institutional strategies on the fates of

² The 'payout threshold' is a figure that corresponds to the minimum percentage of the vote that parties require to be eligible for state funds (see Scarrow 2006).

established parties, the countries where the highest and lowest levels of institutional strategies have been found will be assessed in greater detail. This will allow comparisons to be made between those countries with varying but also similar levels of strategies. Based on the results obtained, the countries in which the highest levels of institutional strategies are found are France and Greece (receiving total scores of 11 and 14 respectively) and the lowest levels are found in Denmark and Ireland (receiving total scores of 25 and 23 respectively)³. We can therefore hypothesise that the engagement in cartel strategies found in France and Greece should provide more secure systemic positions for established parties than in Denmark and Ireland.

THE IMPACT OF CARTEL STRATEGIES

France

In the French case, we expect to find that the high level of use of cartel strategies by established parties should result in secure positions for them within the French party system. The central parties under consideration in the French case are the Socialists, the Gaullists and the NGMR (Non-Gaullist Moderate Right) group, following the grouping of French political parties according to Andrew Knapp (2004). These three groups are considered to be the ‘parties of government’ in the French example and these parties have historically had the opportunity to engage in cartel strategies in order to secure their systemic positions. The success of these parties between 1958 and the present is shown in Table 5 (see Appendix 2), with reference to the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas in order to provide a full assessment of the enduring success of these established parties.

Table 5 shows that the levels of electoral centrality for the established French parties have been consistently low and have declined over recent decades, although the parliamentary areas paints a very different picture of centrality, with centrality in this arena consistently high. The governmental arena, in contrast, reveals only moderate levels of centrality for the established parties. The three established parties have been unable to monopolise the governmental arena, with the PCF (French Communist Party) entering a coalition with the

³ Scores are calculated through a simple addition of the country’s ‘position’ in each table, with 1 awarded to the country where the greatest level of cartel strategies are observed, and 8 to the countries where the lowest levels of strategies are seen.

Socialists in 1981 and the Greens and PCF participating in a broad left-wing coalition in 1997. The number of relevant actors within the governmental arena has increased over time and has not been restricted to the three ‘parties of government’. Independent and non-party actors have also been prevalent within governments in the Fifth Republic.

The French case study paints a picture of instability and flux in terms of the centrality of the French established parties. Established parties within France demonstrate low levels of centrality within the electoral arena, moderate levels within the governmental arena, but high levels within the parliamentary arena, suggesting a differentiation in terms of the success of established parties in France. In order to provide an assessment of the implications of the engagement of French established parties in cartel strategies and the overall impact this has had on their systemic success, the Greek example can also be addressed to see if there are any similarities between the countries in which the highest levels of engagement in cartel strategies were observed.

Greece

In Greece, we also expect to find high levels of success for established parties due to their high levels of engagement in cartel strategies. The two central parties in the Greek case are ND (New Democracy) and PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), both founded in 1974, with both parties playing a significant role in the democratic consolidation of the Greek system, and also ‘determining the direction of the party system’ (Spourdalakis 1996: 173). Table 6 (see Appendix 2) summarises the levels of centrality within the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas for the two established parties. Within the electoral arena, the two established parties have achieved very high levels of centrality, with similarly high levels found in the parliamentary arena, although the governmental arena demonstrates slightly lower levels of centrality for the established parties than the other arenas.

Overall, Greek established parties have obtained consistently high levels of centrality within all three arenas throughout most of the period covered, except for the first democratic election held in Greece after 1975, and with a slight decrease in centrality evident in the 2000s. These levels of centrality are even more exceptional when Greece’s ruptured recent democratic history is taken into account. Karamanlis was able to lay the foundations for a liberal political system and to hold free elections within a year of the fall of the military

dictatorship (Trantas et al. 2003: 376) and the party system appears to have consolidated exceptionally quickly based around ND and PASOK, the major centre-right and centre-left parties within Greece. The high levels of centrality experienced by the established parties are all the more extraordinary as the parties retained high levels of centrality throughout all stages of the consolidation of the Greek party system and through the strategies adopted, have helped to shape and secure a stable party system for Greece.

In France and Greece, established parties have engaged in high levels of institutional strategies, therefore we would expect established parties in these countries to have achieved considerable success. Yet, the results have shown that levels of centrality for the established parties varies considerably, both between countries and also within countries between arenas, with established parties in Greece experiencing greater levels of success than those in France.

The importance of institutional factors in French politics must not be underestimated. In order for the cartel thesis to hold, established parties themselves must engage in institutional strategies. However, the semi-presidential system in place in France restricts opportunities for political parties to take these decisions. Hanley (2002: 167) argues that the French president often imposes institutional changes on parties, with the president playing a leading role in initiating legislation. Parties must often react to the institutional changes made, as opposed to initiating changes themselves. It is important to note that when the impact of institutional strategies in the French case is discussed, parties are often only acting as passive receivers of the president's will and are more reactive than proactive in terms of shaping the institutional system.

The presidency itself has played a vital role in the development of the French party system. De Gaulle's vision for the Fifth Republic was to restrict the role of parties to 'contributing to the expression of suffrage' (Thiébaud 2003: 327) and to play only a minimal role in legislation. There was no place for the 'normal' activity of parties in western Europe and parties were pushed to the sidelines with the intention of excluding them (Bell 2000: 198). It is unsurprising that the levels of centrality experienced by the established parties under the Fifth Republic are low, simply because the centrality of *all* parties within the political process *as a whole* is low. The institution of the presidency also encourages systemic instability, as parties are viewed as 'rallies' around their presidential leader (Cole 1990: 4) and presidential elections often lead to a recomposition of the party political landscape (Knapp 2004: 233),

resulting in frequent splits within parties, changing of party names and identities and party mergers, producing instability and systemic discontinuity.

The French electoral system also has a significant impact on the unstable nature of French politics, as a side effect of the two-ballot electoral system is to foster divisions within blocs and create tension between the electoral and parliamentary arenas. The electoral system fosters multipartism within the electoral arena, by allowing voters to select the candidate of their choice at the first ballot, but 'forced bipolarity' within the parliamentary arena, as options are restricted on the second ballot, with voters often faced with a choice between only two parties. The tension between the multipartism that emerges from the first ballot and the bipolarity present within the second ballot has important implications for the party system and the fate of the established parties. One of the major reasons for the decline in established party support since the 1980s has been 'dissatisfaction with the bipolar basis of competition, which no longer corresponds to the electors' aspirations' (Wilson 1988: 19). Alistair Cole (2003: 20) echoes this sentiment, highlighting the 'ever increasing gap between formal bipolarity and the underlying fragmentation of electoral choice'.

The low levels of centrality for the established parties within the electoral arena and general systemic instability has emerged in France as a result of the institution of the presidency, the concomitant low importance of parties institutionally and also the unwanted effects of a disproportional electoral system that fosters alliances, but also encourages divisions. In other western European nations, it is generally the parties themselves that shape the institutions that govern the country, but in France, largely, the president puts these institutions in place, restricting the role that political parties can play. Therefore, although cartel strategies are present in France, established parties have not enjoyed domination of the French party system due to intervening institutional factors, largely outside of the parties' control.

The similarities between establishment of the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle in 1958 in France and the role of Karamanlis in Greece is, at first glance, striking, but the vision of Karamanlis was very different to the vision of de Gaulle. De Gaulle sought to reduce the role of political parties within the new system, but Karamanlis argued that 'it is political parties rather than governments to which peoples attach themselves and...a regime's fortune is more affected by the number and behaviour of political parties than by its formal framework' (Spourdalakis 1996: 169). The difference in attitude towards the role played by political

parties within France and Greece is obvious and partially explains why the Greek established parties have been able to achieve higher levels of centrality than their French counterparts have, simply because political parties have an institutionally important role to play in Greece as opposed to France. Political parties were key factors in the democratisation and consolidation processes (Spourdalakis 1996: 167), further increasing their important position within Greek politics.

The institution of the presidency is one of the most important features encouraging systemic instability and low levels of established party centrality in France. In Greece, the 1975 constitution created a similar semi-presidential system giving the Greek president important powers such as the right to dissolve parliament and to call a national referendum without the counter-signatures of the cabinet. However, a constitutional revision in 1986 distributed most of these rights between the prime minister, cabinet and parliament (Trantas et al. 2003: 376), downgrading the role of the president in favour of political parties. A different relationship exists between political parties and the president in Greece compared to France, and the important position of political parties vis-à-vis the presidency within Greece is an important reason for systemic stability and the consistently high levels of systemic centrality experienced by ND and PASOK.

The second important institutional feature noted in the French case was the electoral system. This feature in Greece can help indicate why the party system is stable and levels of centrality for established parties are high. In both countries, electoral systems are highly disproportional, explaining the high levels of parliamentary centrality achieved in both countries. Yet, despite the high levels of disproportionality found in both electoral systems, the systems operate in very different ways. The Greek electoral system of 'reinforced proportional representation', a variant of which has been used for most elections during the period covered, was designed to produce a stable, one-party government and to penalise either the third party or the second party depending on the variant of formula used (Dimitras 1994: 172). The Greek electoral system has played a major role in shaping the party system, providing a two-party structure of competition with strong single-party government and high levels of centrality for the established parties.

The French and Greek cases suggest that although the electoral system has proved to be an important tool through which established parties can restrict opportunities for non-established

parties, the high level of the use of cartel strategies does not necessarily mean that established parties will dominate their party systems. In both countries, non-established parties have featured in government, suggesting that where cartel strategies are prevalent, control over the governmental arena is not complete. Furthermore, despite engagement in cartel strategies, established parties in France have achieved only low levels of success in the electoral arena, suggesting that the use of cartel strategies may be beneficial for established parties success in some arenas, but other factors such as the importance of institutional factors (such as a semi-presidential system) and the overall status of political parties within a country, may also be important determinants of the success of established parties. In order to provide a more complete picture of the impact of cartel strategies on party success, we can assess the two countries in which the lowest levels of strategies have been found, Denmark and Ireland, to assess whether established parties in these countries have achieved lower levels of success than their French and Greek counterparts.

Denmark

The dominance of social democracy and the prevalence of minority governments strongly influences the way in which the Danish party system has developed. The supremacy of social democracy is a Scandinavian phenomenon and comprises an important part of the ‘traditional’ five-party model of party competition dominant in Scandinavia, advanced by Sten Berglund and Ulf Lindström (1978). David Arter (1999) argues that a four party model is perhaps more applicable in the Danish case due to the weakness of the DKP (Communist Party) and it is these four ‘old’ parties that comprise the established group of parties for this study. The SD (Social Democrats), V (the Liberal Party), KF (the Conservative People’s Party) and the RV (Radical Liberals) are the core parties that came to dominate the Danish party system around Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) crucial period of the 1920s and have continued to structure the pattern of Danish party competition ever since, justifying their positions as established parties.

Table 7 (see Appendix 2) summarises the levels of centrality within the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas for the four established parties. It shows that the centrality of Danish established parties within the electoral arena has progressed through three distinct stages, with the earthquake election of 1973 ending the previously high levels of electoral centrality experienced by the established parties, before centrality has increased

again until the present day. Due to the proportional nature of the Danish electoral system, levels of centrality within the parliamentary arena strongly mirror the patterns found within the electoral arena, but levels of centrality within the governmental arena have progressed through different stages from the other arenas, with established parties governing between 1950 and 1981 (with the exception of the Justice Party's participation in government in 1957), and also since 1996, suggesting high levels of governmental centrality. Mixed levels of centrality are therefore found in the Danish case, suggesting that the low levels of use of institutional strategies have not necessarily negatively affected the success of established parties.

Ireland

In Ireland, since the 1920s, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael have been the two key actors in Irish politics, with the Labour party the third party in Irish politics. These three parties are the established parties within the Irish party system; they were the dominant parties at the time of systemic crystallisation in the 1920s and continue to be the leading parties today.

Table 8 (see Appendix 2) shows the levels of centrality experienced by the established Irish political parties. Levels of centrality for the established Irish parties within the electoral arena have been exceptionally high throughout much of the period covered, although 1987 marks a significant shift in terms of reducing levels of centrality. In common with the Danish example, the relatively proportional nature of the Irish electoral system ensures that patterns of centrality within the parliamentary arena generally mirror those found within the electoral arena. Within the governmental arena, 1987 also marks a significant turning point in Irish politics, with non-established parties featuring in government only after this point in time, suggesting a contrast in terms of levels of governmental centrality in Denmark (which have increased since 1986) and in Ireland, where levels have decreased since 1987.

The Irish example is therefore interesting as levels of centrality for the established parties were high in all three arenas until the 1987 election, which significantly affected levels of centrality within all arenas, especially the electoral and governmental arenas. This contrasts with the Danish case, where the 1973 election did not appear to alter significantly the levels of centrality experienced by the established parties within the governmental arena, but made a considerable (albeit relatively short-term) impact within the electoral and parliamentary

arenas.

In Ireland and Denmark, established parties have engaged in low levels of institutional strategies, therefore we would expect established parties in these countries to have achieved relatively low levels of success, at least in comparison with the French and Greek cases. Yet, the results have shown that levels of centrality for the established parties in Denmark have proved to be remarkably resilient despite the 1973 election, whereas in Ireland, established parties have struggled to dominate the party system post-1987, with the 2011 election in particular decimating the 'traditional' Irish party system of Fianna Fáil dominance.

In the late 1970s, Berglund and Lindström argued that the Danish party system was 'ultra stable' (1978: 74) and that deep social cleavages and a commitment to national unity and democratic principles were the principal reasons for this stability (Sundberg 2002: 181). The underlying class basis for competition, combined with the dominance of the Social Democrats shaping the structure of competition in Denmark, helps to explain why, until 1973, established parties enjoyed high levels of centrality in all three arenas and the party system demonstrated a remarkable degree of consensus and stability (Bille 1989: 42). However, the 1973 election showed the importance of low levels of engagement by the established parties in institutional strategies, as the party system was accessible. Unprecedented levels of volatility occurred at the 1973 election, with the Christian Democrats and Progress Party gaining a combined 23.7 per cent of the vote at their first elections. Factors such as structural dealignment, a decline in class loyalties, the rapid expansion of the public sector and economic recession (Bille and Pedersen 2004: 211) are reasons why the earthquake election occurred in 1973, but the Danish institutional setting played a role in assisting these parties. A permissive electoral system, equitable distribution of television advertising airtime and a generous state subsidy regime for new and smaller parties ensured that new parties had a relatively easy passage into parliament and would receive support to remain in parliament. Although the institutional setting cannot fully explain why the electoral earthquake occurred in 1973, it can help to explain why the new parties were able to achieve almost instantaneous success.

The most interesting point to consider as far as the impact of the low use of institutional strategies is concerned is to assess why the 1973 earthquake election had a major impact on the parliamentary and electoral arenas, but did not dramatically affect the governmental

arena. The low use of institutional strategies applies predominantly to the electoral and parliamentary arenas as the electoral system, electoral laws, state subsidies and television advertising assist smaller and newer parties *to enter the electoral and parliamentary arenas*, as the regimes in place are relatively permissive, but cannot assist the parties to gain access to the governmental arena; this depends on the strategies that parties adopt in relation to each other as opposed to relations with the state.

The combination of two features of the Danish party system helps to explain the continued dominance of the established parties in the governmental arena. The first is the prevalence of minority governments. In the post-war period, all but one Danish government has relied on the support of non-governmental parties to pass legislation. The enormous decline in the share of the vote received by the established parties in 1973 did not alter the structure of competition because government formation in Denmark was not based on the achievement of a parliamentary majority by one party or parties. The shift in electoral preferences seen in 1973 influenced the governmental structure far less than would have been expected in a country where majority governments were the norm, as minority governments containing the same established parties could continue, albeit perhaps with slightly more of a 'minority' status than before, particularly the 1973 Liberal minority government controlling only 22 out of the 179 seats in parliament.

The second important factor is the distribution of seats between the left and right blocs. Berglund and Lindström (1978: 174) argue that the 'two main blocs...did remain pretty stable during the 1970s', but acknowledge a slight shift to the right following the 1973 election. Bille (1989: 55) comments on 'the remarkable stability of the distribution of seats in parliament between the bourgeois bloc...and the non-bourgeois bloc...and the delicate balance which existed between the two blocs' and observes that most electoral volatility takes place *within* blocs and not *between* blocs. The 1973 election did not affect the balance between the blocs and the high levels of intra-bloc volatility did not have a major impact on the structure of competition within the party system.

The Irish case resembles the Danish in important ways, as outlined earlier, but the Irish earthquake election of 1987 had a greater impact on the governmental arena and the structure of competition than in the Danish example. In both countries, the party systems before the electoral earthquakes were very stable with one party dominating. Until 1987, there was a

lack of competition in Ireland as Fianna Fáil held the key to alternation in government. If Fianna Fáil achieved a parliamentary majority, the party would govern alone. If the party failed to achieve a majority, the 'rest' of the parties would form a coalition government, with divisions between the parties comprising the 'rest' sometimes leading to the formation of a Fianna Fáil minority government. Mair (1987: 60) highlights the crucial importance for the stability of the party system of the choices made by Fianna Fáil: 'the potential for major post-war change was frustrated by the strategic decisions of the parties themselves and as a consequence of the logistics of government formation'. The STV electoral system further reinforced the lack of competition present in the pre-1987 Irish party system, as often candidates from the same party contested the final seat in a constituency (Mair 1987: 64). The dominance of Fianna Fáil and the party's decision to eschew coalitions, effectively closing competition in the party system, combined with the STV electoral system strongly contributed to the stability found in the pre-1987 party system.

The 1987 election was notable for the entrance of the Progressive Democrats onto the electoral scene, achieving 11.8 per cent of the vote at the party's first election. As with the Danish example, the Irish institutional set-up and the low levels of institutional strategies in which the established parties engaged facilitated the entrance of this new party. However, the electoral shock of 1987 in Ireland had a more profound and enduring impact on the governmental arena than in Denmark. In Denmark, the bloc structure of competition and the prevalence of minority governments were factors that prevented electoral arena changes from influencing the governmental arena. In Ireland, majority governments are the norm and although Ireland has experienced several minority administrations, majority governments have been more common and there was no bloc system in operation. The electoral changes that occurred in 1987 introduced new actors into the electoral market and raised the possibility the Fianna Fáil may never again achieve a majority in parliament due to the new crowding of the electoral market.

Following the 1989 election, Fianna Fáil entered a coalition for the first time, destroying the previously stable structure of competition in the Irish party system. The entrance of a new actor had forced Fianna Fáil to reconsider its place within the party system. It could either continue to govern alone, almost certainly only as a minority administration or it could form a coalition and potentially (as the largest party) remain permanently in government (Mair 1999: 145). Fianna Fáil chose the latter option, opening up the governmental arena in Ireland in a

way that never occurred in Denmark following the 1973 election.

The electoral shock of 1987, assisted by the permissive institutional setting for new and smaller parties, had a dramatic impact on the Irish party system. The importance of the strategies engaged in by Fianna Fáil has also been highlighted, with the decision to open up the Irish party system following decades of a lack of competition brought about by the dominance of Fianna Fáil single-party rule. The actions of the established parties mediated the impact of the two electoral earthquakes in Denmark and Ireland, highlighting the vital importance of acknowledging the interplay between institutional strategies and the strategies established parties employ in relation to their systemic competitors.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought firstly to highlight the countries in which the highest and lowest levels of institutional strategies are found in western Europe, and secondly to assess the impact of these strategies on the established parties of Greece and France, and Ireland and Denmark. In line with the cartel thesis, established parties that engaged in the highest levels of institutional strategies were moving themselves closer to the state and attempting to restrict competition within the party system, and therefore should have achieved the highest levels of success.

This hypothesis was only partially borne out by this study. In the Greek party system, the two established parties achieve high levels of centrality in all three arenas and the party system is extremely stable, supporting the hypothesis. However, in France, low levels of centrality occurred within the electoral arena, moderate levels within the governmental arena and high levels within the parliamentary arenas. In Denmark, despite the earthquake election of 1973, the party system remains relatively stable, whereas in Ireland, the consequences of the 1989 earthquake election are still being felt, due to Fianna Fáil's decision to open up the structure of competition.

The importance of the interplay of institutional strategies and the strategic inter-party choices made by established actors is an explanation for the minimal impact of the 1973 Danish election on the governmental arena. Although the institutional setting may be favourable for the smaller parties, this would only allow these parties opportunities to enter the electoral and parliamentary arenas; entry to the governmental arena remained controlled by the inter-party

strategies of the established parties. Although institutions can help to shape a country's political systems, the strategic actions of political parties are crucially important. These actions solidified the pre-1987 Irish party system, as Fianna Fáil governed alone or not at all. Similarly, it was the change in strategy of Fianna Fáil in 1989 that opened up the Irish party system, suggesting that although institutions have proved to be permissive for non-established parties in both Denmark and Ireland, established parties can still shape the party system by controlling the structure of competition and access to the governmental arena.

Acknowledging the interplay of institutional strategies and inter-party strategies explains many of the anomalies found in the results, but cannot explain the French established parties' moderate levels of centrality, despite high levels of institutional strategies. France is a unique case in this study as in the other seven countries studied, political parties shape institutions, make legislation and the prime minister is the most important political figure in the country. This is not the case in France, as the institution of the presidency ensures that party politics is of secondary importance compared to presidential politics. France is as an outlier in this study, but the case study did produce many interesting findings, especially when compared to the Greek case.

The theories of Katz and Mair in relation to the cartel thesis have underpinned this article, and it is interesting to reflect on the extent to which the four party systems studied resemble cartel party systems. Katz and Mair (1995) argue that parties put restrictive institutional settings in place in order to maintain the cartel and prevent entry into the system of outsider parties. The systems of Greece and France should most strongly resemble cartel party systems, whereas the Danish and Irish party systems would have few features in common with a cartel party system. The party system of Greece appears to fit the model the closest. ND and PASOK have monopolised government except for a brief period in 1989 and 1990, have achieved exceptionally high levels of centrality within all three arenas and the party system has proved to be exceptionally stable. None of the other three countries considered fit the cartel model as well as the Greek case. In France, the system is in flux and the established parties have achieved only moderate levels of systemic centrality within the three arenas. In Denmark, the structure of competition has always been relatively open and fluid, in contrast to the structure of competition expected within a cartel party system. The present day Irish system does not conform to the cartel system model, as established parties have not closed entry to the system to non-established parties. The cartel thesis thus finds some support as

Greece conforms closely to cartel party system and Denmark and Ireland do not, in line with the hypotheses generated.

Overall, this paper has argued that in order to understand the impact of the institutional or cartel strategies in which parties engage, we need also to understand the relations that exist between political parties and also institutional features over which political parties have no control. Although political parties can, to a certain extent, shape the institutional environment in which they compete and move themselves closer to the state, strategic inter-party choices are also a significant influence on the success established parties can achieve.

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Appendix 1: Measuring engagement in institutional strategies in western Europe

Table 1: Electoral laws and non-established parties in western Europe

	<i>Registration requirements for parties</i>		<i>Independent candidates?</i>	<i>Campaign subsidies criteria</i>	<i>Limit on campaign expenditure?</i>	<i>Overall</i>
	<i>Deposit</i>	<i>Signatures</i>				
Denmark	(1) No deposit required	(3) Need a number of signatures equal to 1/175 of the previous votes cast (approximately 20,000)	(2) Independent candidates need 150-200 petitions from their district	No campaign subsidies	(3) No expenditure limit	(2.25) Restrictive system
France	(3) 1,000 FF (\$200 in 1965, worth \$1,100, £700 today) per candidate, returned if the candidate receives 5%+ of the vote	(1) Candidates must draw up a signed declaration giving their personal details and those of their substitutes. These are lodged with the prefect	(1) Independent candidates allowed	(3) Since 1988, candidates winning more than 5% of the vote are reimbursed FF 50,000 (\$9,200, £5,100 today)	(1) Since 1993, FF250,000 (\$48,478, £25,500) per candidate plus FF1 (\$0.19, £0.10) per inhabitant (previously FF500,000 (\$96,957, £51,000) per candidate)	(1.8) Neutral system
Germany	(1) No deposit required	(2) 200 signatures in each single-member constituency and 0.1% of eligible voters within the state to submit a candidate list at state level (up to a maximum of 2000 voters)	(1) Independent candidates allowed in single-member constituencies	From 1989 until 1993, parties winning 2%+ of the vote were eligible for a modest reimbursement. Declared unconstitutional in 1994	(3) No expenditure limits	(1.75) Neutral system
Switzerland	(1) No deposit required	(2) Since 1994, between 100 and 400 signatures required depending on size of canton. Previously 50 signatures in cantons with two or	(1) Independent candidates allowed	No campaign subsidies	(3) No expenditure limits	(1.75) Neutral system

		more seats				
Greece	(3) Deposit of \$180, £120 per candidate to be paid. Non-refundable. Previously, until 1990, Dr. 8,000 (worth \$70, £40 today)	(1) 12 signatures required, but must formally register with the Supreme Court	(1) Independent candidates allowed	(2) Since 1984, parties receive funding in proportion to their share of the vote if they receive 3% of the vote (5-6% in coalition) and presented a list in 2/3 of electoral districts	(1) Expenditure limits for candidates	(1.6) Neutral system
Belgium	(1) No deposit required	(2) 200-500 voters per district, or, since 1976, 3 outgoing MPs' support	(1) Independent candidates allowed	No campaign subsidies	(1) Expenditure limits for individual candidates and parties (€1 million per election cycle, \$1.3 million, £669,071)	(1.25) Permissive system
Spain	Candidates are nominated by registered political associations, federations and coalitions, or		(1) Independent candidates allowed	(2) Since the late 1970s, parties receive 101 pesetas (\$0.74, £0.40 today) for each vote won in a district where the party wins a seat (effective threshold of 3%). Parties also receive 2.692 million pesetas (\$20,400, £11,200) for each seat obtained in the two houses	(1) Expenditure limits for candidates (established for each electoral cycle by the General Accounting Court)	(1.2) Permissive system
	(1) No deposit required	(1) Candidates must receive the support of at least 0.1% (and no fewer than 500) of the constituency's electorate				
Ireland	Candidates may nominate themselves or are nominated by a registered elector of the constituency, or		(1) Independent candidates allowed	(2) Campaign subsidies introduced in late 1990s. Parties must win 2%+ of the vote to be eligible. Partial reimbursement of election expenses up to a maximum of £5000 for every candidate who contested the election without losing his or her deposit	(1) Expenditure limits for individual candidates (IR£14,000 (\$22,717, £12,044) in a three-seat constituency, IR£17,000 (\$27,586, £14,625 in a four-seat constituency, £IR20,000 (\$32,463, £17,208 in a five seat constituency)	(1.2) Permissive system
	(1) Deposit of IR£300 (\$350, £240), refundable if candidate receives more than a quarter of the quota	(1) No signature requirements				

Sources: Administration and Cost of Elections (2010); Austin and Tjernström (2003); Bowler and Farrell (1992); Bowler et al. (2003); Carter (2005); Casas-Zamora (2005); Centre for European Constitutional Law – Themistokles and Dimitris Tsatsos Foundation (2010); Clift and Fisher (2004); Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database (2010); Laver and Marsh (1999); Müller and Sieberer (2006); Norris (2005); Papathanassopolous (2000); Plasser and Plasser (2002); Van Biezen (2004)

Note: Each aspect for each country is examined in turn and a score is given according to whether the aspect is permissive, restrictive or neutral for non-established parties. The coding categories for each aspect are as follows:

<i>Aspect considered</i>	<i>(1) Permissive</i>	<i>(2) Neutral</i>	<i>(3) Restrictive</i>
Deposit requirements	No deposit required (or nomination by party)	Deposit of under £300 required	Deposit of more than £300 required, or deposit is non-refundable
Signature requirements	Under 200 signatures required (or nomination by party)	200-500 signatures required	More than 500 signatures required
Independent candidates	Independent candidates allowed	Independent candidates allowed but with signature / deposit requirement	Independent candidates not allowed
Campaign subsidies	Campaign subsidies awarded to parties with a maximum threshold of 2%	Campaign subsidies awarded to parties with a threshold of between 2% and 4%	Campaign subsidies awarded with a threshold of 4% or more in place
Expenditure limits	Campaign expenditure limit in place	Category not applicable	No campaign expenditure limit in place

These figures are shown in brackets at the start of the data for each aspect for each country. Scores are added together and an average taken, with all aspects carrying equal weight. The countries are then ranked according to their average scores, reflecting the overall nature of the electoral laws regime, with a low score reflecting a permissive system, and a high score indicating a restrictive system. The classification for the final column is as follows: if a country's average score is between 1 and 1.4, the regime is classified as permissive. A score of between 1.5 and 1.9 indicates a system of electoral laws that is neutral and a score of between 2 and 3 indicates a restrictive system of electoral laws.

Table 2: Electoral systems and non-established parties in western Europe

	<i>Current electoral system</i>	<i>Changes to the electoral system</i>	<i>Average disproportionality of elections held under each electoral system</i>	<i>Overall</i>
France	Majority-plurality	<p>*1958: introduction of two-ballot majority-plurality system replacing a system that varied between Paris and the rest of the country. Vote share equating to 5% of the electorate required to progress to next round</p> <p>*1967: threshold to progress to next round increased to 10% of the electorate</p> <p>*1978: threshold to progress to next round increased to 12.5% of the electorate</p> <p>*1986: introduction of a department-based list proportional representation system, replacing the two-ballot system</p> <p>*1988: re-introduction of two-ballot majority-plurality system</p>	<p>*1956-8: 3.75 (n=1)</p> <p>1958-66: 17.91 (n=2)</p> <p>*1967-76: 14.89 (n=3)</p> <p>*1978-85: 10.88 (n=2)</p> <p>*1986: 6.71 (n=1)</p> <p>*1988-present: 18.92 (n=5)</p>	Restrictive system
Greece	Proportional (highest-average d'Hondt)	<p>*1977: change in formula to Hagenbach-Bischoff from Hare. Change in distribution of seats between tiers biased in favour of first round seats</p> <p>*1985: barriers for inclusion in post-first round seat allocations (17% threshold) abandoned. Change in formula to d'Hondt</p> <p>*1989: abolition of the third tier and introduction of proportional representation system instead of reinforced proportional representation. Change to the Droop quota for the decisive tier</p> <p>*1993: reversion to reinforced proportional representation with a 3% legal threshold and a 4 tier system, using d'Hondt for most tiers</p>	<p>*1975-7: 15.76 (n=1)</p> <p>*1977-85: 10.95 (n=2)</p> <p>*1985-9: 7.12 (n=1)</p> <p>*1989-90: 4.07 (n=3)</p> <p>*1993-present: 7.82 (n=6)</p>	Restrictive system
Spain	Proportional (highest-average d'Hondt)	No major changes	*1977-present: 7.18 (n=10)	Restrictive system
Belgium	Proportional (highest-average d'Hondt)	<p>*1995: reduction in number of constituencies from 30 to 20</p> <p>*2003: simplified the allocation of seats by applying the d'Hondt system in every constituency and enlargement of these constituencies. Abolition of the second tier of allocation.</p>	<p>*1950-1995: 3.00 (n=14)</p> <p>*1995-2003: 2.80 (n=2)</p> <p>*2003-present: 5.70 (n=2)</p>	Neutral system

		Introduction of 5% threshold		
Ireland	Proportional (Single Transferable Vote)	No changes made to the electoral system, despite two referendums regarding a change taking place in 1959 and 1968	*1950-present: 3.95 (n=17)	Neutral system
Germany	Mixed Member Proportional (corrective) (largest-remainder Hare)	*1953: equalisation of candidates elected from single member districts and party lists (instead of 60:40), each voter given two votes instead of one, threshold changed: 5% of the national vote or one direct district mandate required to qualify for list seats instead of 5% requirement in any Land *1957: threshold changed to 5% of the national vote or three direct district mandates *1987: change in formula from d'Hondt to Hare *1990: change for the first all-German elections to 5% requirement in either the former West or East Germany. *1994: reversion to 5% of the national vote or three direct district mandates as a threshold *2002: number of constituencies reduced from 328 to 299	*1949-53: 4.09 (n=1) *1953-6: 4.06 (n=1) *1957-1987: 2.29 (n=8) *1987-90: 0.74 (n=1) *1990-4: 4.83 (n=1) *1994-8: 2.66 (n=2) *2002-present: 2.92 (n=3)	Neutral system
Switzerland	Proportional (Hagenbach-Bischoff)	No major changes in the period covered. The extension of suffrage to women in 1971 increased the numbers of voters, but did not alter the system per se	*1950-present: 2.88 (n=15)	Neutral system
Denmark	Proportional (largest-remainder Hare)	*1953: reduction in the percentage of compensatory seats awarded, change in the formula for the allocation of lower tier seats from d'Hondt to Modified Sainte Laguë *1964: 2% formal legal threshold introduced *1971: number of multi-member constituencies reduced from 23 to 17	*1950-53: 0.28 (n=1) *1953-61: 1.08 (n=4) *1964-70: 1.56 (n=3) *1971-present: 1.55 (n=15)	Permissive system

Sources: Administration and Cost of Elections (2010), Baum and Freire (2002), Blais and Massicotte (2002), Bowler et al. (2003), Carter (2005), Dimitras (1994), Gallagher and Mitchell (2005), Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline Database (2010), Katz (2003), Leonard (1983), Lijphart (1994), Mackie and Rose (1991), Scarrow (2006), Shugart (1992), Taagepera (1984)

Note: The permissive or restrictive nature of the system is based on the average disproportionality figures for elections held under the present electoral system. Where the average value of disproportionality is under 2, the system is classified as permissive for non-established parties. Where the value is between 2 and 7, the system is neutral and where the value is over 7, the system is noted as restrictive for non-established parties.

Table 3 Television advertising regimes and non-established parties in western Europe

	<i>Paid political television spots</i>	<i>Free airtime available</i>	<i>Criteria for eligibility for free airtime</i>	<i>Method of allocation of free airtime</i>	<i>Overall</i>
Greece	(3) Yes. Greek parties have unlimited access to private spots	(1) Yes	(2) Eligibility based on parliamentary representation, although parties with no representation in parliament but with a list of candidates in 75% of electoral districts are entitled to 5 minutes of free airtime per week	(3) Proportional to seats obtained at previous election	(9) Restrictive system
Germany	(3) Yes, but only on private television stations (since the early 1980s)	(1) Yes	(2) New and previously unsuccessful parties allocated a minimum amount of airtime	(2) Proportional to parties' percentage of the vote at the previous election	(8) Restrictive system
Spain	(3) Yes, although total expenditures on paid television advertising must not exceed 25% of the parties' overall expenditure on political advertising	(1) Yes	(1) No criteria for eligibility. Since 1985, all parties receive free airtime	(2) Proportional to parties' vote share in previous elections. Parties fielding candidates in 75%+ of electoral districts receive additional broadcasting time	(7) Neutral system
France	(1) No (since 1994)	(1) Yes	(2) Parties must hold parliamentary seats, although parties not represented in parliament can receive a minimal amount of airtime if they nominate at least 75 candidates for the first ballot	(3) Since 1986, proportional to seat share at the previous election. Previously, airtime was distributed equally between all parties represented in parliament	(7) Neutral system
Ireland	(1) No	(1) Yes (since 1968)	(2) Election broadcasts are available to any group or party fielding at least 7 candidates	(2) Proportional to share of the vote at the previous election	(6) Neutral system
Switzerland	(1) No	(1) Yes	(2) Parliamentary representation. Small parties without parliamentary representation are entitled to free airtime if they have had success in the previous cantonal elections	(2) Proportional to vote share at the previous election. Equal coverage is given to the four main parties and smaller parties are accorded less free airtime	(6) Neutral system
Belgium	(1) No	(1) Yes	(2) French-speaking: only groups with more	(2) French-speaking:	(6) Neutral

			than 2% of the seats are eligible for free airtime Dutch-speaking: groups with a minimum of two members in the Culturrad can create a broadcasting organisation. Since 1982, every group with more than three members in the Vlaamse Raad can create a broadcasting organisation	proportionate to number of seats in the Conseil Culturel Dutch-speaking: half the time is allocated equally and half allocated proportionally	system
Denmark	(1) No	(1) Yes, mainly leader debates	(1) No criteria for eligibility. All parties participating in the ballot are eligible for free airtime	(1) Equal	(4) Permissive system

Sources: Administration and Cost of Elections (2010); Austin and Tjernström (2003); Bergman et al. (2003); Bowler et al. (2003); Carter (2005); Casas-Zamora (2005); Farrell (2002); Farrell and Webb (2000); Gunther and Mughan (2000); Kaid and Holtz-Bacha (1995); Müller and Sieberer (2006); Nassmacher (2001); Norris (2000); Plasser and Plasser (2002); personal communication with Professor Kurt Richard Luther

Note: The coding categories for this table are as follows:

<i>Aspect considered</i>	<i>(1) Permissive</i>	<i>(2) Neutral</i>	<i>(3) Restrictive</i>
Paid political television spots allowed	Paid political television spots not allowed	Not applicable	Paid political television spots allowed on private television channels
Availability of free airtime	Free airtime available for parties	Not applicable	Free airtime not available for parties
Criteria for eligibility to free airtime	No criteria for eligibility to free airtime	Non-parliamentary parties have access to only a minimal amount of free airtime, or parties must present candidates in a certain number of districts or must have received a certain percentage of the vote at previous elections	Parties must already be represented in parliament. No free airtime to parties not represented in parliament
Method of allocation of free airtime	Equal allocation for all parties	Proportional allocation of airtime based on vote share at previous election	Proportional allocation of airtime based on seat share at previous election

If a country scores 4 or 5, the regime is permissive. A score of 6 or 7 indicates television advertising rules are neutral and a score of 8 or more indicates a restrictive system of television advertising for non-established parties. Cumulative scores are presented as all countries score on all dimensions. The lower the score, the more permissive a system and the higher the score, the more restrictive a system, with all columns carrying equal weight. The countries are ranked from high to low, from most restrictive to most permissive.

Table 4 State subsidies and non-established parties in western Europe

	<i>Method of state subsidies allocationⁱ</i>	<i>Payout threshold (weighted double)ⁱⁱ</i>	<i>Overallⁱⁱⁱ</i>
Switzerland	(2) An annual sum and a sum per member for parliamentary groups. In 2000, the amounts received were CHF 90,000 (\$56,750, £38,620) as an annual sum and CHF 16,500 (\$10,400, £7,080) per member	(3) 8.6%	(8) Restrictive system
Belgium	(2) A sum per group and a sum per MP are awarded to the parliamentary group Central party organisations receive a fixed amount and an amount per valid vote cast at the last election on its list. In 1995, the fixed amount was BEF 5 million (\$113.700, £77,350) and the amount per vote BEF 50 (\$1.14, £0.77)	(3) 5%	(8) Restrictive system
Spain	(2) Since 1978, a fixed amount paid to parliamentary party central organisations for each seat, with additional funds for each vote. 1987 change: central organisation is awarded one third of the funding according to seats in parliament and the other two-thirds according to previous election vote share Since 1978, all parliamentary groups receive a base amount of funding, with additional funds according to number of seats.	(2) 3%	(6) Neutral system
France	(2) Distributed in two equal parts. Since 2003, funds are allocated to parties that have received at least 1% of the vote in at least 50 districts (previously 75), distributed in proportion to vote won by candidates on the first ballot (previously with a 5% threshold in place). Funds also allocated to parties on basis of their parliamentary representation. Some extra help for smaller parties that do not meet threshold criteria	(2) 1%	(6) Neutral system
Ireland	(2) Party leaders with over 7 MPs in their parties eligible for funds. Parties continue to receive the 'Oireachtas' grant, which is weighted in favour of the opposition parties, but since 1996 has also taken into account the number of MPs belonging to each party 2% of the vote at the previous election to be eligible for party organisation subsidies. Qualified parties are entitled to share approximately IR£1 million annually, distributed in proportion to first preference votes received	(2) 2%	(6) Neutral system
Greece	(1) More than 3% of the vote needed to receive a flat grant with additional funds according to votes received at the previous election. Parties must have presented candidates in two-thirds of constituencies	(2) 3%	(5) Neutral system
Germany	(2) Since 1994, each party annually receives €0.70 (US\$0.89, £0.47) for each valid vote cast on its list, or €0.70 or each valid vote cast for it in a constituency or polling district in a Land where its list was not approved and €0.38 (US\$0.49, £0.26) for each euro obtained through membership fees, deputy fees or rightfully obtained donations. Parties annually receive €0.85 (US\$1.08, £0.58) (rather than €0.70) for the first 4 million valid votes it wins. Parties are eligible for this money if they win	(1) 0.5%	(4) Permissive system

	0.5% of the valid votes cast for lists at the last election, or if have obtained 10% of the valid votes cast in a constituency or polling district. Previously, a set sum per eligible voter was shared out proportionally among the parties according to their vote percentage. Parties had to win 0.5% of the second list votes to be eligible for these funds		
Denmark	(2) To parliamentary groups based on the numbers of seats held and since 1969 the grant for expert assistance is based on a sum per month per seat plus a sum for opposition parties in parliament. Change in 1986: each group receives DKK 15,000 (US\$1,840, £1,250) per month per seat plus DKK 60,000 (US\$7,360, £5,010). Central party organisations receive DKK 5 (US\$0.61, £0.42) per vote if minimum of 1,000 votes received. From 1995, the amount was raised to DKK 19.50 (US\$2.39, £1.63) per vote	(1) 1000 votes	(4) Permissive system

Sources: Austin and Tjernström (2003); Bowler et al. (2003); Carter (2005); Casas-Zamora (2005); Clift and Fisher (2004); Katz and Mair (1992, 1994); Koss (2010); Ladner (2001); Nassmacher (2001, 2006); Pierre et al. (2000); Scarrow (2006); Van Biezen (2000, 2004); Webb et al. (2002)

Notes:

ⁱ Where different methods of allocation to different parts of the party exist, an average score is taken. If a country allocates funding as a base amount plus an amount per vote (1) to central party organisations, but in proportion to seats won at the previous election (3) to parliamentary groups, then an average score of 2 is allocated.

ⁱⁱ Where different payout thresholds exist, the lowest threshold is cited, as this value represents the minimum percentage of the vote that parties need to be eligible for any funding. Figures in brackets denote the 'effective' threshold cited in the absence of a legal threshold, or a threshold in place as part of the eligibility criteria for state funding

ⁱⁱⁱ The coding categories for this table are as follows:

















<i>Aspect considered</i>	<i>Permissive (1)</i>	<i>Neutral (2)</i>	<i>Restrictive (3)</i>
Method of allocation	Base amount plus an amount per vote	Base amount plus an amount per seat, or proportional to number of votes won at the previous election	Proportional to number of seats won at the previous election
Payout threshold (weighted double)	Less than 1%	Between 1% and 4%	4% or more

A cumulative score of between 7 and 9 indicates a restrictive system for non-established parties, 5 or 6 a neutral system and a score of 4 or less indicates a permissive system.

Appendix 2: The impact of institutional strategies in western Europe











Table 5: Centrality of established parties in the French party system, 1958–2007






	1958	1962	1967	1968	1969	1973	1974	1978	1981a
Percentage share of the vote	Gau: 20.6 NGMR: 31.1 Soc: 15.5 Total: 67.2%	Gau: 36.0 NGMR: 19.4 Soc: 12.4 Total: 67.8%	Gau: 38.5 NGMR: 17.4 Soc: 18.9 Total: 74.8%	Gau: 46.4 NGMR: 12.4 Soc: 16.5 Total: 75.3%		Gau: 37.0 NGMR: 16.7 Soc: 20.8 Total: 74.5%		Gau: 22.8 NGMR: 26.6 Soc: 25.0 Total: 74.4%	
Percentage share of seats	Gau: 39.1 NGMR: 38.6 Soc: 8.0 Total: 85.7%	Gau: 48.3 NGMR: 26.8 Soc: 13.7 Total: 88.8%	Gau: 41.1 NGMR: 17.0 Soc: 24.8 Total: 82.9%	Gau: 60.2 NGMR: 19.3 Soc: 11.7 Total: 91.2%		Gau: 37.3 NGMR: 24.3 Soc: 20.8 Total: 82.4%		Gau: 31.4 NGMR: 25.1 Soc: 23.4 Total: 79.9%	
Largest party within parliament (seats)	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists
Time spent in government									
Gaullists									
NGMR									
Socialists									
Median legislator	Gaullists	Gaullists	NGMR	Gaullists	Gaullists	NGMR	NGMR	NGMR	NGMR
Percentage share of government positions	Gau: 30.0 NGMR: 35.0 Ind: 35.0	Gau: 61.9 NGMR: 14.3 Ind: 23.8	Gau: 73.9 NGMR: 8.7 Ind: 17.4	Gau: 73.7 NGMR: 15.8 Ind: 10.5	Gau: 66.7 NGMR: 33.3	Gau: 73.7 NGMR: 26.3	Gau: 37.5 NGMR: 43.8 Ind: 18.8	Gau: 28.6 NGMR: 52.4 Ind: 23.8	Soc: 89.5 NGMR: 10.5
Prime minister's party	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Gaullists	Socialists
Ratio of portfolios obtained to share of seats	Gau: 0.8:1 NGMR: 0.9:1	Gau: 1.3:1 NGMR: 0.5:1	Gau: 1.8:1 NGMR: 0.5:1	Gau: 1.2:1 NGMR: 0.8:1	Gau: 1.1:1 NGMR: 1.7:1	Gau: 2.0:1 NGMR: 1.1:1	Gau: 1.0:1 NGMR: 1.8:1	Gau: 0.9:1 NGMR: 2.1:1	Soc: 3.6:1 NGMR: 0.4:1

	1981b	1984	1986	1988a	1988b	1993	1997	2002	2007
Percentage share of the vote	Gau: 21.2 NGMR: 22.4 Soc: 39.5 Total: 83.1%		Gau: 21.0 NGMR: 21.1 Soc: 31.6 Total: 73.7%		Gau: 19.2 NGMR: 18.5 Soc: 37.6 Total: 75.3%	Gau: 20.4 NGMR: 19.1 Soc: 20.3 Total: 59.8%	Gau: 15.6 NGMR: 14.3 Soc: 27.7 Total: 57.6%	Gau / NGMR: 45.0 Soc: 25.3 Total: 70.3%	Gau / NGMR: 49.5 Soc: 26.0 Total: 75.5%
Percentage share of seats	Gau: 17.9 NGMR: 12.8 Soc: 58.0 Total: 88.7%		Gau: 26.9 NGMR: 22.7 Soc: 36.7 Total: 86.3%		Gau: 22.7 NGMR: 22.9 Soc: 47.1 Total: 92.7%	Gau: 44.7 NGMR: 37.3 Soc: 9.9 Total: 91.9%	Gau: 24.3 NGMR: 19.6 Soc: 43.3 Total: 87.2%	Gau / NGMR: 71.4 Soc: 24.4 Total: 95.8%	Gau / NGMR: 58.8 Soc: 33.4 Total: 92.2%
Largest party within parliament (seats)	Socialists	Socialists	Socialists	Socialists	NGMR	Gaullists	Socialists	Gaullists NGMR	Gaullists NGMR
Time spent in government									
Gaullists									
NGMR									
Socialists									
PCF									
Les Verts									
MPF									
NC									
Median legislator	Socialists	Socialists	NGMR	NGMR	Socialists	NGMR	Socialists	Gau / NGMR	Gau / NGMR
Percentage share of government positions	Soc: 75.8 PCF: 12.1 Ind: 12.1	Soc: 100	Gau: 56.5 NGMR: 30.4 Ind: 13.0	Soc: 83.3 NGMR: 16.7	Soc: 81.0 NGMR: 19.0	Gau: 43.3 NGMR: 46.7 Ind: 10.0	Soc: 70.6 PCF: 11.8 Verts: 17.6	Gau / NGMR: 81.0 Ind: 19.0	Gau / NGMR: 73.3 NC: 7.0 Ind: 20.0
Prime minister's party	Socialists	Socialists	Gaullists	Socialists	Socialists	Gaullists	Socialists	Gau / NGMR	Gau / NGMR
Ratio of portfolios obtained to share of seats	Soc: 1.3:1 PCF: 1.3:1	Soc: 1.7:1	Gau: 2.1:1 NGMR: 1.3:1	Soc: 2.3:1 NGMR: 0.7:1	Soc: 1.7:1 NGMR: 0.8:1	Gau: 1.0:1 NGMR: 1.3:1	Soc: 1.6:1 PCF: 1.9:1 Verts: 3.1:1	Gau / NGMR: 1.1:1	Gau / NGMR: 1.2:1 NC:1.8:1

Sources: Hanley (1999); Knapp (2002; 2004); Ministère de L'intérieur (2010); Thiébauld (2000); Woldendorp et al. (2000); Ysmal (2003)

Table 6: Centrality of established parties in the Greek party system, 1975-2009























	1977	1981	1985	1989a	1989b	1990	1993
Percentage share of the vote	PASOK: 25.3 ND: 41.9 Total: 67.2%	PASOK: 48.1 ND: 35.9 Total: 84.0%	PASOK: 45.8 ND: 40.8 Total: 86.6%	PASOK: 39.1 ND: 44.3 Total: 83.4%	PASOK: 40.7 ND: 46.2 Total: 86.9%	PASOK: 38.6 ND: 46.9 Total: 85.5%	PASOK: 46.9 ND: 39.3 Total: 86.2%
Percentage share of seats	PASOK: 31.0 ND: 57.0 Total: 88.0%	PASOK: 57.3 ND: 38.3 Total: 95.6%	PASOK: 53.7 ND: 42.0 Total: 95.7%	PASOK: 41.7 ND: 48.3 Total: 90.0%	PASOK: 42.7 ND: 49.3 Total: 92.0%	PASOK: 41.7 ND: 50.0 Total: 91.7%	PASOK: 56.7 ND: 37.0 Total: 93.7%
Largest party within parliament (seats)	ND	PASOK	PASOK	ND	ND	ND	PASOK
Time spent in government							
PASOK							
ND							
SYN							
Median legislator	ND	PASOK	PASOK	PASOK	PASOK	ND	PASOK
Percentage share of government positions	ND: 100.0	PASOK: 100.0	PASOK: 100.0	ND: 89.5 SYN: 10.5	PASOK: 31.6 ND: 31.6 SYN: 5.3 Ind: 31.6	ND: 100.0	PASOK: 100.0
Prime minister's party	ND	PASOK	PASOK	ND	Ind	ND	PASOK
Ratio of positions obtained to share of seats	ND: 1.8:1	PASOK: 1.7:1	PASOK: 1.9:1	ND: 1.9:1 SYN: 1.1:1	PASOK: 0.7:1 ND: 0.6:1 SYN: 0.8:1	ND: 2.0:1	PASOK: 1.8:1

	1996	2000	2004	2007	2009
Percentage share of the vote	PASOK: 41.5 ND: 38.1 Total: 79.6%	PASOK: 43.8 ND: 42.7 Total: 86.5%	PASOK: 45.4 ND:40.6 Total: 86.0%	PASOK: 38.1 ND:41.8 Total: 79.9%	PASOK: 43.9 ND:33.5 Total: 77.4%
Percentage share of seats	PASOK: 54.0 ND: 36.0 Total: 90.0%	PASOK: 52.7 ND: 41.7 Total: 94.3%	PASOK: 39.0 ND: 55.0 Total: 94.0%	PASOK: 34.0 ND:50.7 Total: 84.7%	PASOK: 53.3 ND:30.3 Total: 83.6%
Largest party within parliament (seats)	PASOK	PASOK	ND	ND	PASOK
Time spent in government					
PASOK					
ND					
Median legislator	PASOK	PASOK	ND	ND	PASOK
Percentage share of government positions	PASOK: 100.0	PASOK: 100.0	ND: 100.0	ND: 100.0	PASOK: 100.0
Prime minister's party	PASOK	PASOK	ND	ND	PASOK
Ratio of positions obtained to share of seats	PASOK: 1.9:1	PASOK: 1.9:1	ND: 1.8:1	ND: 2.0:1	PASOK: 1.9:1

Sources: Mavrogordatos (2005); Greek Ministry of Internal Affairs (2010); Woldendorp et al. (2000)

Table 7: Centrality of established parties in the Danish party system, 1950-2007

	1971	1973	1975	1977	1978	1979	1981	1982	1984	1987
Percentage share of the vote	SD: 37.3 V: 15.6 KF: 16.7 RV: 21.4 KF: 17.8 RV: 8.2 Total: 84.0%	SD: 25.6 V: 12.3 KF: 9.2 RV: 11.2 Total: 58.3%	SD: 29.9 V: 23.3 KF: 5.3 RV: 22.1 KF: 17.3 RV: 8.6 Total: 65.8%	SD: 37.0 V: 17.0 KF: 8.5 RV: 23.1 KF: 16.8 RV: 7.8 Total: 61.1%	SD: 39.1 V: 25.1 KF: 16.6 RV: 7.8 Total: 68.7%	SD: 38.3 V: 12.5 KF: 12.5 RV: 5.4 KF: 17.9 RV: 5.8 Total: 63.8%	SD: 32.9 V: 11.3 KF: 14.5 RV: 5.1 KF: 17.9 RV: 5.8 Total: 63.8%	SD: 41.9 V: 20.8 KF: 20.1 RV: 5.3 Total: 72.6%	SD: 31.6 V: 12.1 KF: 23.4 RV: 5.5 KF: 20.1 RV: 5.3 Total: 72.6%	SD: 29.3 V: 10.5 KF: 26.8 RV: 6.2 KF: 20.4 RV: 15.0 Total: 66.8%
Percentage share of seats	SD: 40.0 V: 86.9%	SD: 26.3 V: 12.6	SD: 30.3 V: 88.4%	SD: 37.1 V: 89.0%	SD: 40.0 V: 88.9%	SD: 38.9 V: 86.9%	SD: 33.7 V: 86.9%	SD: 43.4 V: 88.1%	SD: 32.0 V: 82.9%	SD: 30.9 V: 88.2%
Percentage share of seats	SD: 39.6 V: 21.5 KF: 15.4 RV: 10.1 KF: 10.2 RV: 8.1 Total: 80.2%	SD: 39.6 V: 21.5 KF: 15.4 RV: 10.1 KF: 10.2 RV: 8.1 Total: 80.2%	SD: 40.9 V: 22.1 KF: 7.4 RV: 17.4 KF: 8.7 RV: 8.7 Total: 67.4%	SD: 42.2 V: 24.0 KF: 17.1 RV: 8.0 Total: 61.1%	SD: 42.2 V: 24.0 KF: 17.1 RV: 8.0 Total: 61.1%	SD: 42.6 V: 25.7 KF: 17.1 RV: 8.0 Total: 69.8%	SD: 43.4 V: 21.7 KF: 18.3 RV: 6.3 Total: 65.1%	SD: 43.4 V: 21.7 KF: 20.6 RV: 5.7 Total: 74.3%	SD: 39.4 V: 20.0 KF: 19.4 RV: 7.4 Total: 74.3%	SD: 35.1 V: 19.2 KF: 21.1 RV: 15.4 Total: 69.8%
Largest party within parliament (seats)	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD
Largest party within parliament (seats)	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD
Time spent in government										
Time spent in government										
SD										
SD										
V										
KF										
SD										
RV										
CPP										
IP										
Median legislator	RV	RV	RV	CD	CD	CD	CD	CD	CD	CD
Median legislator	RV	RV	RV	RV	RV	RV	RV	RV	RV	RV
Percentage share of government positions	SD: 94.1 Ind: 5.9 Ind: 7.7	KF: 61.5 V: 38.5	KF: 61.5 V: 38.5	SD: 100	SD: 63.2 V: 36.8	SD: 100	SD: 66.7 Ind: 6.7	SD: 100 V: 42.1 CD: 21.1 CPP: 10.5	KF: 26.3 V: 42.1 CD: 21.1 CPP: 10.5	RV: 26.3 V: 29.4 KF: 32.6 CD: 15.8 RV: 33.3 CPP: 3.3
Prime minister's party	SD	V	V	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	KF	RV
Ratio of positions obtained to share of seats	SD: 2.3:1 SD: 2.4:1	KF: 3.4:1 V: 1.8:1	KF: 3.5:1 V: 1.7:1	SD: 2.7:1 SD: 2.4:1	SD: 1.7:1 V: 3.1:1	SD: 1.5:1 RV: 3.7:1 JP: 2.3:1	SD: 2.6:1 SD: 1.5:1 RV: 4.2:1	SD: 2.3:1 KF: 1.8:1 V: 3.7:1 CD: 2.5:1	SD: 2.5:1 KF: 1.1:1 V: 3.3:1 CD: 4.6:1	V: 1.5:1 KF: 2.4:1 RV: 1.5:1 CD: 3.1:1
								CPP: 4.6:1	CPP: 3.6:1	CPP: 2.3:1

	1988	1990	1993	1994	1996	1998	2001	2005	2007
Percentage share of the vote	SD: 29.8 V: 11.8 KF: 19.3 RV: 5.6 Total: 66.5%	SD: 37.4 V: 15.8 KF: 16.0 RV: 3.5 Total: 72.7%		SD: 34.6 V: 23.3 KF: 15.0 RV: 4.6 Total: 77.5%		SD: 36.0 V: 24.0 KF: 8.9 RV: 3.9 Total: 72.8%	SD: 29.1 V: 31.3 KF: 9.1 RV: 5.2 Total: 74.7%	SD: 25.8 V: 29.0 KF: 10.3 RV: 9.2 Total: 74.3%	SD: 25.5 V: 26.3 KF: 10.4 RV: 5.1 Total: 67.3%
Percentage share of seats	SD: 31.4 V: 12.6 KF: 20.0 RV: 5.7 Total: 69.7%	SD: 39.4 V: 16.6 KF: 17.1 RV: 4.0 Total: 77.1%		SD: 35.4 V: 24.0 KF: 4.6 RV: 4.6 Total: 68.6%		SD: 36.0 V: 24.0 KF: 9.1 RV: 4.0 Total: 73.1%	SD: 29.7 V: 32.0 KF: 9.1 RV: 5.1 Total: 75.9%	SD: 26.9 V: 29.7 KF: 10.1 RV: 9.1 Total: 75.8%	SD: 25.1 V: 25.7 KF: 10.1 RV: 5.0 Total: 65.9%
Largest party within parliament (seats)	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	SD	V	V	V
Time spent in government									
SD									
V									
KF									
RV									
CD									
CPP									
Median legislator	CD	CD	CD	RV	RV	CD	KF	KF	KF
Percentage share of government positions	V: 29.4 KF: 41.2 RV: 29.4	V: 55.6 KF: 44.4	SD: 63.2 RV: 15.8 CD: 10.5 CPP: 10.5	SD: 73.7 RV: 15.8 CD: 10.5	SD: 75.0 RV: 25.0	SD: 75.0 RV: 25.0	V: 67.0 KF: 33.0	V: 61.1 KF: 38.9	V: 62.5 KF: 37.5
Prime minister's party	KF	KF	SD	SD	SD	SD	V	V	V
Ratio of positions obtained to share of seats	V: 2.3:1 KF: 2.1:1 RV: 5.2:1	V: 3.3:1 KF: 2.6:1	SD: 1.6:1 RV: 4.0:1 CD: 2.1:1 CPP: 4.6:1	SD: 2.1:1 RV: 3.4:1 CD: 3.6:1	SD: 2.1:1 RV: 5.4:1	SD: 2.1:1 RV: 6.3:1	V: 2.1:1 KF: 3.6:1	V: 2.1:1 KF: 3.6:1	V: 2.4:1 KF: 3.7:1

Sources: Bille (2002); Damgaard (2000); Official Website of Denmark (2010); Woldendorp et al. (2000)

Table 8: Centrality of established parties in the Irish party system, 1951-2011

	1951	1954	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977	1981	1982a
Percentage share of the vote	FF: 46.3 FG: 25.8 Lab: 11.4 Total: 83.5%	FF: 43.4 FG: 32.0 Lab: 12.1 Total: 87.5%	FF: 48.3 FG: 26.6 Lab: 9.1 Total: 84.0%	FF: 43.8 FG: 32.0 Lab: 11.6 Total: 87.4%	FF: 47.7 FG: 34.1 Lab: 15.4 Total: 97.2%	FF: 45.7 FG: 34.1 Lab: 17.0 Total: 96.8%	FF: 46.2 FG: 35.1 Lab: 13.7 Total: 95.0%	FF: 50.6 FG: 30.5 Lab: 11.6 Total: 92.7%	FF: 45.3 FG: 36.5 Lab: 9.9 Total: 91.7%	FF: 47.3 FG: 37.3 Lab: 9.1 Total: 93.7%
Percentage share of seats	FF: 46.9 FG: 27.2 Lab: 10.9 Total: 85.0%	FF: 44.2 FG: 34.0 Lab: 12.9 Total: 91.1%	FF: 53.1 FG: 27.2 Lab: 8.2 Total: 88.5%	FF: 48.6 FG: 32.6 Lab: 11.1 Total: 92.3%	FF: 50.0 FG: 32.6 Lab: 15.3 Total: 97.9%	FF: 52.1 FG: 34.7 Lab: 12.5 Total: 99.3%	FF: 47.9 FG: 37.5 Lab: 13.2 Total: 98.6%	FF: 56.8 FG: 29.1 Lab: 11.5 Total: 97.4%	FF: 47.0 FG: 39.2 Lab: 9.0 Total: 95.2%	FF: 48.8 FG: 38.0 Lab: 9.0 Total: 95.8%
Largest party within parliament (seats)	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF
Time spent in government										
FF										
FG										
Lab										
CnT										
Median legislator	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF
Percentage share of government positions	FF: 100	FG: 60.0 Lab: 33.3 CnT: 6.7	FF: 100	FF: 100	FF: 100	FF: 100	FG: 56.3 Lab: 43.7	FF: 100	FG: 64.7 Lab: 35.3	FF: 100
Prime minister's party	FF	FG	FF	FF	FF	FF	FG	FF	FG	FF
Ratio of positions obtained to share of seats	FF: 2.1:1	FG: 1.8:1 Lab: 2.6:1 CnT: 2.0:1	FF: 1.9:1	FF: 2.1:1	FF: 2.0:1	FF: 1.9:1	FG: 1.5:1 Lab: 3.3:1	FF: 1.8:1	FG: 1.7:1 Lab: 3.9:1	FF: 2.0:1

	1982b	1987	1989	1992	1994	1997	2002	2007	2008	2011
Percentage share of the vote	FF: 45.2 FG: 39.2 Lab: 9.4 Total: 93.8%	FF: 44.1 FG: 27.1 Lab: 6.4 Total: 77.6%	FF: 44.1 FG: 29.3 Lab: 9.5 Total: 82.9%	FF: 39.1 FG: 24.5 Lab: 19.3 Total: 82.9%		FF: 39.3 FG: 27.9 Lab: 10.4 Total: 77.6%	FF: 41.5 FG: 22.5 Lab: 10.8 Total: 74.8%	FF: 41.6 FG: 27.3 Lab: 10.1 Total: 79.0%		FF: 17.4 FG: 36.1 Lab: 19.4 Total: 72.9%
Percentage share of seats	FF: 45.2 FG: 38.0 Lab: 9.6 Total: 92.8%	FF: 48.8 FG: 30.7 Lab: 7.2 Total: 86.7%	FF: 46.4 FG: 33.1 Lab: 9.0 Total: 88.5%	FF: 41.0 FG: 27.1 Lab: 19.9 Total: 88.0%		FF: 46.4 FG: 32.5 Lab: 10.2 Total: 89.1%	FF: 48.8 FG: 18.7 Lab: 12.7 Total: 80.2%	FF: 47.0 FG: 30.7 Lab: 12.0 Total: 89.7%		FF: 11.4 FG: 45.8 Lab: 22.3 Total: 79.5%
Largest party within parliament (seats)	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FG
Time spent in government										
FF										
FG										
Lab										
PD										
DL										
GP										
Median legislator	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FF	FG
Percentage share of government positions	FG: 60.0 Lab: 40.0	FF: 100	FF: 83.3 PD: 16.7	FF: 61.1 Lab: 38.9	FG: 47.1 Lab: 52.9	FF: 83.3 PD: 16.7	FF: 86.7 PD: 13.3	FF: 81.2 PD: 6.3 GP: 12.5	FF: 81.2 GP: 12.5 Ind: 6.3	FG: 64.7 Lab: 35.3
Prime minister's party	FG	FF	FF	FF	FG	FF	FF	FF	FF	FG
Ratio of positions obtained to share of seats	FG: 1.6:1 Lab: 4.2:1	FF: 2.0:1	FF: 1.8:1 PD: 1.7:1	FF: 1.5:1 Lab: 2.0:1	FG: 1.7:1 Lab: 2.7:1	FF: 1.8:1 PD: 7.0:1	FF: 1.8:1 PD: 2.8:1	FF: 1.7:1 PD: 5.3:1 GP: 3.5:1	FF: 1.7:1 GP: 3.5:1	FG: 1.4:1 Lab: 1.6:1

Sources: Irish Government Homepage (2011); Mitchell (2000); O'Malley and Marsh (2003); Woldendorp et al. (2000).

Note: The composition of the Irish government changed in 2008 following the dissolution of the Progressive Democrat party. The PD's cabinet minister, Mary Harney, remained in cabinet as an Independent.