Abstract

A single-elimination (SE) tournament is a popular way to select a winner both in sports competitions and in elections. A natural and well-studied question is the tournament fixing problem (TFP): given the set of all pairwise match outcomes, can a tournament organizer rig an SE tournament by adjusting the initial seeding so that the organizer's favorite player wins? We prove new sufficient conditions on the pairwise match outcome information and the favorite player, under which there is guaranteed to be a seeding where the player wins the tournament. Our results greatly generalize previous results. We also investigate the relationship between the set of players that can win an SE tournament under some seeding (so-called SE winners) and other traditional tournament solutions. In addition, we generalize and strengthen prior work on probabilistic models for generating tournaments. For instance, we show that every player in an $n$ player tournament generated by the Condorcet random model will be an SE winner even when the noise is as small as possible, $p=\Theta(\ln n/n)$; prior work only had such results for $p\geq \Omega(\sqrt{\ln n/n})$. We also establish new results for significantly more general generative models.

Keywords

  1. sports scheduling
  2. single-elimination tournament
  3. knockout tournament
  4. manipulation

MSC codes

  1. 05C20
  2. 91B14

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Information & Authors

Information

Published In

cover image SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Pages: 1751 - 1764
ISSN (online): 1095-7146

History

Submitted: 16 February 2016
Accepted: 19 June 2017
Published online: 17 August 2017

Keywords

  1. sports scheduling
  2. single-elimination tournament
  3. knockout tournament
  4. manipulation

MSC codes

  1. 05C20
  2. 91B14

Authors

Affiliations

Virginia Vassilevska Williams

Funding Information

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