The Southern Strategy: Britain's Conquest of South Carolina and Georgia, 1775-1780

America's popular memory of the Revolutionary War casts New England minutemen facing off against redcoats at Concord Bridge and George Washington's frostbitten soldiers huddled together at Valley Forge, but David K. Wilson's new study challenges the generally accepted notion that the war was fought primarily in the North. Recalling that the ramparts of Savannah were no less bloodstained than Bunker Hill and the siege of Charleston no less important than the battle for New York, Wilson considers the waging of war in the southern colonies during the critical and often overlooked period from 1775 to the spring of 1780. He suggests that the paradox of the British defeat in 1781 - after Crown armies had crushed all organized resistance in South Carolina and Georgia - makes sense only if one understands the fundamental flaws in what modern historians label Britain's Southern Strategy. Wilson closely examines battles and skirmishes in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia to coristruct a comprehensive military history of the American Revolution in the South through May 1780. battle maps and orders of battle for each engagement. Appraising the strategy and tactics of the most significant conflicts, he tests the thesis that the British could raise the manpower they needed to win the war in the South by tapping a vast reservoir of southern Loyalists. According to Wilson, the policy was flawed in both its conception and execution. The sheer amount of empirical data Wilson has amassed here distinguishes this work and makes Wilson's recounting an invaluable guide to the war in the South.