area handbook series Persian Gulf States country studies Persian Gulf States country studies Federal Research Division Library of Congress Edited by Helen Chapin Metz Research Completed January 1993 On the cover: Symbol of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to which Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates belong Third Edition, First Printing, 1994. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Persian Gulf States : country studies / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 3rd ed. p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA Pam; 550-185) "Supersedes the 1984 edition of Persian Gulf States : country studies, edited by Richard F. Nyrop" — T.p. verso. "Research completed January 1993." Includes bibliographical references (pp. 417-433) and index. ISBN 0-8444-0793-3 1. Persian Gulf States. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA Pam ; 550-185. DS247.A13P47 1994 93-46476 953.6-dc20 CIP Headquarters, Department of the Army DA Pam 550-185 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C 20402 Foreword This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this book list the other published studies. Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisci- plinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and political order. The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. Louis R. Mortimer Chief Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, DC 20540-5220 iii Acknowledgments The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the writers of the 1984 edition of Persian Gulf States: Country Studies, edited by Richard F. Nyrop. Their work provided general back- ground for the present volume. The authors are grateful to individuals in various govern- ment agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, research materials, and expertise in the production of this book. These individuals included Ralph K. Benesch, who over- sees the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army The authors also wish to thank mem- bers of the Federal Research Division staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These people included Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all graphic and tex- tual material and served as liaison with the sponsoring agency; Marilyn L. Majeska, who supervised editing; Andrea T. Merrill, who managed book production; Ramon Miro, who assisted with bibliographic research and other aspects; Barbara Edger- ton and Izella Watson, who did the word processing; and Stephen C. Cranton and David R Cabitto, who prepared the camera-ready copy. Also involved in preparing the text were Sheila L. Ross, who edited the chapters and performed the pre- publication editorial review, and Joan C. Cook, who compiled the Index. Special thanks are due Eric Hooglund, who kindly served as reader for the book as a whole. Graphics were prepared by David R Cabitto. Tim Merrill pre- pared map drafts, and David R Cabitto and the firm of Green- horne and O'Mara prepared the final versions. Special thanks are owed to Marty Ittner, who prepared the illustrations on the title page of each chapter, and to Wayne Home, who did the cover art. Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of individu- als and public and private agencies, especially the embassies of the countries concerned, who allowed their photographs to be used in this study. v Contents Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xv Introduction xix Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 William Smyth TRADE IN THE GULF 4 THE GULF IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 8 EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM 9 Sunni Islam 12 Shia Islam 13 The Spread of Islam 17 THE GULF IN THE MIDDLE AGES 17 THE AGE OF COLONIALISM 20 WAHHABI ISLAM AND THE GULF 24 TREATIES WITH THE BRITISH 25 DISCOVERY OF OIL 29 INDEPENDENCE 30 DEVELOPMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 35 TRIBAL NATURE OF GULF SOCIETY 37 Chapter 2. Kuwait 41 Jill Crystal COUNTRY PROFILE 43 GEOGRAPHY 47 SOCIETY 51 Population 51 Education 54 Health and Welfare 56 ECONOMY 57 Oil Industry 58 vii Diversification 64 Agriculture and Fishing 67 Transportation and Telecommunications 68 Banking and Finance 69 Foreign Investment 71 Foreign Aid and Trade 72 POLITICAL SYSTEM 73 Ruling Family 73 Bureaucracy 79 Legislature 80 Constitution 84 The Media 86 FOREIGN RELATIONS 87 Persian Gulf War 88 Post-Persian Gulf War Foreign Policy 92 RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 93 Postwar Society 93 Economic Reconstruction 96 Politics 100 Chapter 3. Bahrain 105 Eric Hooglund COUNTRY PROFILE 107 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION 114 Geography 114 Climate 117 Population 118 SOCIETY. 120 Education 120 Health and Welfare 121 THE ECONOMY 122 Agriculture and Fishing 1 22 Petroleum Industry 124 Other Industry 129 Labor 129 Transportation and Telecommunications 132 Banking and Finance 1 34 Budget 135 Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments 135 viii GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 136 The Constitutional Experiment 137 Legal System 142 The Media 143 FOREIGN RELATIONS 143 Chapter 4. Qatar 147 Anthony Toth COUNTRY PROFILE 1 49 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 153 GEOGRAPHY 162 POPULATION 163 EDUCATION 164 HEALTH 166 THE ECONOMY 167 Oil and Natural Gas 167 Industry 173 Labor 175 Agriculture and Fishing 177 Transportation and Telecommunications 178 Money and Banking 180 Budget 180 Trade 182 GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 182 TheAlThani 188 The Merchant Families 189 Opposition 190 The Media 191 FOREIGN RELATIONS 191 Chapter 5. United Arab Emirates 197 Eric Hooglund and Anthony Toth COUNTRY PROFILE 199 GEOGRAPHY 204 POPULATION 208 RELIGION 209 EDUCATION 210 STATUS OF WOMEN 211 HEALTH AND WELFARE 212 ix ECONOMY 214 Oil and Natural Gas 218 Industry 223 Electricity and Water 228 Labor 228 Transportation 229 Telecommunications 230 Agriculture and Forestry 232 Fishing 233 Banking and Finance 234 Budget 236 Trade 238 GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 239 Executive and Legislative Branches 239 The Judiciary 242 Ruling Families 243 The Media 246 FOREIGN RELATIONS 246 Chapter 6. Oman 251 Fareed Mohamedi COUNTRY PROFILE 253 GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION 259 Geography 259 Climate 262 Population 263 SOCIETY. 264 Religion 264 Education 265 Health 266 THE ECONOMY 268 Public Finance and the Five-Year Development Plans 269 Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments 272 Hydrocarbon Sector 274 Agriculture and Fishing 281 Non-oil Minerals 285 Industry 286 Tourism 289 Transportation 289 x Telecommunications 290 Labor 291 Water and Power 292 Banking 293 GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 296 Historical Patterns of Governance 296 Faisal ibn Turki, 1888-1913 299 Taimur ibn Faisal, 1913-32 300 Said ibn Taimur, 1932-70 300 Qabus ibn Said: The Emergence of a Modern State 302 Government Institutions 310 The Media 312 FOREIGN RELATIONS 312 Regional Relations 313 International Relations 314 Chapter 7. Regional and National Security Considerations 319 Jean R. Tartter HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 323 Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88 325 Persian Gulf War, 1991 326 TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 328 REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS 331 COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL 333 MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF STATES 337 KUWAIT 340 Background 340 Organization and Mission of the Forces 342 Role of Kuwaiti Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf War 344 Personnel, Training, and Recruitment 345 Internal Security 346 Police and the Criminal Justice System 347 Human Rights Practices 348 BAHRAIN 350 Role in the Persian Gulf War 353 xi Internal Security 353 QATAR 355 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 360 Background 360 Organization and Equipment 363 The Role of the United Arab Emirates in the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War 365 Internal Security Problems 366 OMAN 367 Background 367 Mission of the Armed Forces 369 Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces 370 Omani Role in the Persian Gulf War, 1991 372 Internal Security 374 Appendix. Tables 379 Bibliography 417 Glossary 435 Index 441 Contributors 469 List of Figures 1 Persian Gulf States: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, 1993 xviii 2 Persian Gulf States: Topography 6 3 Kuwait, 1993 50 4 Kuwait: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and Refineries, 1993 60 5 Kuwait: Abbreviated Genealogy of the Al Sabah, with Government Positions, Mid-1992 76 6 Bahrain, 1993 116 7 Lower Gulf States : Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and Refineries, 1993 126 8 Bahrain: Government Structure, 1992 138 9 Qatar, 1993 156 10 Qatar: Abbreviated Genealogy of the Al Thani, with Government Positions, 1992 184 11 United Arab Emirates, 1993 206 xii 12 United Arab Emirates: Government Structure, 1992 240 13 Oman, 1993 260 14 Oman: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and Refineries, 1993 276 15 Oman: Government Structure, 1992 308 1 6 Strait of Hormuz, 1 993 324 xiii Preface This edition of Persian Gulf States: Country Studies replaces the previous edition, published in 1984. Like its predecessor, the present book attempts to treat in a compact and objective man- ner the dominant historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects of the five contemporary states of the Persian Gulf covered in this volume — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and monographs; official reports and documents of government and international orga- nizations; and foreign and domestic newspapers and periodi- cals. Available economic data for these countries are not always complete or may be inconsistent. xv Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some of the more valuable sources for further reading appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measure- ments are given in the metric system; a conversion table is pro- vided to assist those who are unfamiliar with the metric system (see table 1, Appendix). The Glossary provides brief defini- tions of terms that may be unfamiliar to the general reader, such as the use of amir/amirate, shaykh/shaykhdom, and Al/ al. The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases posed a par- ticular problem. For many of the words — such as Muhammad, Muslim, Quran, and shaykh — the authors followed a modified version of the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geo- graphic Names for British Official Use, known as the BGN/ PCGN system; the modification entails the omission of all dia- critical markings and hyphens. In numerous instances, how- ever, the names of persons or places are so well known by another spelling that to have used the BGN/PCGN system might have created confusion. The reader will find Mecca rather than Makkah, Oman rather then Uman, and Doha rather than Ad Dawhah. In addition, although the five govern- ments officially reject the use of the term Persian Gulf— as do other Arab governments — and refer to that body of water as the Arabian Gulf, the authors followed the practice of the United States Board on Geographic Names by using Persian Gulf or gulf. The body of the text reflects information available as of Jan- uary 1993. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have occurred since the completion of research; the Coun- try Profiles include updated information as available; and the Bibliography lists recently published sources thought to be par- ticularly helpful to the reader. xvi 54 a SAUDI ARABIA / f E M E N ' Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the es, 1993 60 30 IRAN Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative Introduction THE COUNTRIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF covered in this volume — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates — have assumed added prominence as a result of Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and the Persian Gulf War in 1991. These states share certain characteristics while simulta- neously differing from one another in various respects. Islam has played a major role in each of the Persian Gulf states, although Kuwait and Bahrain reflect a greater secular influ- ence than the other three. Moreover, the puritanical Wahhabi (see Glossary) Sunni (see Glossary) sect prevails in Qatar; Bah- rain has a majority population of Shia (see Glossary), a denom- ination of the faith that constitutes a minority in Islam as a whole; and the people of Oman represent primarily a minor sect within Shia Islam, the Ibadi. The beduin heritage also exerts a significant influence in all of the Persian Gulf states. In the latter half of the twentieth cen- tury, however, a sense of national identity increasingly has superseded tribal allegiance. The ruling families in the Persian Gulf states represent shaykhs (see Glossary) of tribes that origi- nally settled particular areas; however, governmental institu- tions steadily have taken over spheres that previously fell under the purview of tribal councils. Historically, Britain exercised a protectorate at least briefly over each of the Persian Gulf states. This connection has resulted in the presence of governmental institutions estab- lished by Britain as well as strong commercial and military ties with it. Military materiel and training in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, were being provided by other countries in addition to Britain. Because of the extensive coastlines of the Persian Gulf states, trade, fishing, shipbuilding, and, in the past, pearling have rep- resented substantial sources of income. In the early 1990s, trade and, to a lesser extent, fishing, continued to contribute major amounts to the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- sary) of these states. Of the five states, Oman has the least coastal area on the Per- sian Gulf because its access to that waterway occurs only at the western tip of the Musandam Peninsula, separated from the remainder of Oman by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). xix xviii Partly as a result of this limited contact with the gulf and partly because of the mountains that cut off the interior from the coast, Oman has the most distinctive culture of the five states. In general, the gulf has served as a major facilitator of trade and culture. The ancient civilization of Dilmun, for example, in present-day Bahrain existed as early as the fourth millen- nium B.C. The Persian Gulf, however, also constitutes a ready channel for foreign conquerors. In addition to Britain, over the centu- ries the gulf states have known such rulers as the Greeks, Parthians, Sassanians, Iranians, and Portuguese. When England's influence first came to the area in 1622, the Safavid shah of Iran sought England's aid in driving the Portuguese out of the gulf. Britain did not play a major role, however, until the early nineteenth century. At that time, attacks on British shipping by the Al Qasimi of the present-day UAE became so serious that Britain asked the assistance of the ruler of Oman in ending the attacks. In consequence, Britain in 1820 initiated treaties or truces with the various rulers of the area, giving rise to the term Trucial Coast. The boundaries of the Persian Gulf states were considered relatively unimportant until the discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1932 caused other gulf countries to define their geographic limits. Britain's 1968 announcement that in 1971 it would aban- don its protectorate commitments east of the Suez Canal accel- erated the independence of the states. Oman had maintained its independence in principle since 1650. Kuwait, with the most advanced institutions — primarily because of its oil wealth — had declared its independence in 1961. Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE followed suit in 1971. In the face of the Iranian Revolu- tion of 1979, all of the Persian Gulf states experienced fears for their security. These apprehensions led to their formation, together with Saudi Arabia, of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981. Of all the gulf states, Kuwait clearly has the greatest security concerns. By early 1994, Kuwait largely had succeeded in rebuilding its damaged infrastructure and oil industry facilities ravaged by Iraq in the course of its August 2, 1990, invasion and subsequent scorched-earth policy concerning Kuwait's oil wells. By June 1993, Kuwait had increased its oil production to such an extent that it refused the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota of 1.8 million barrels per xx day (bpd — see Glossary); instead, it demanded parity with the UAE at 2.2 million bpd, which OPEC refused. The war and the occupation left significant scars on the Kuwaiti population. The war caused the departure of more than half the population, including two-thirds of the foreign- ers, many of them Palestinians and other Arabs. In the postwar period, most citizens returned, but the government apparently decided not to allow foreigners to exceed 50 percent of the population, and the number of Palestinians permitted to return dropped sharply. The war also did away with most of the financial reserves from foreign investments that Kuwait had prudently accumu- lated in its Reserve Fund for Future Generations. War costs were estimated at a minimum of US$20 billion, a reconstruc- tion figure less than originally feared. Economic progress in 1993, however, was such that a projected current account sur- plus of US$3.2 billion was predicted, together with GDP growth of 11.5 percent in 1994. Kuwait's willingness to implement World Bank (see Glossary) recommendations concerning the strengthening of its economy appeared questionable, however. The bank recommended that Kuwait eliminate subsidies, encourage government workers to move to the private sector to reduce serious government overstaffing, liberalize business reg- ulations to promote private-sector growth, and privatize a num- ber of state assets. Various of the recommendations would affect significantly members of the ruling family, many of whom engage in the business sector. Kuwait's life is connected intimately with the Al Sabah, who have ruled Kuwait since 1756; the rule has alternated between the Jabir and Salim branches, descendants of two sons of the ruler Mubarak the Great. In 1963 the ruler took the first step of any gulf state to create a popular assembly. The narrow elector- ate and the ruler's right to dissolve the assembly have limited the influence of the legislature, and the assembly has been dis- solved twice, in each case for a number of years. In October 1992, the National Assembly was reconstituted. However, only 15 percent of the Kuwaiti population was able to vote. Freedom of the press, which had been suspended in 1976, was restored in early 1992. Despite the existence of several liberal opposi- tion movements and some Islamist (also seen as fundamental- ist) pressures, the postwar government represents little change, and the ruling family continues to hold all major ministerial posts. xxi Apart from development of its oil industry, which dominates its economy despite attempts at diversification, Kuwait's main concern continues to be the threat from Iraq to its national security. In late 1993, incidents continued to occur along the Kuwait-Iraq border, and Iraqi media persisted in referring to Kuwait as the "nineteenth province" of Iraq. As of late 1993, Iraq was believed to hold more than 800 Kuwaiti prisoners of war. Kuwait has taken several steps to counter the ongoing men- ace of Iraq. Although Kuwait sought help from its GCC allies when Iraq invaded, it recognized that the GCC states lacked the military strength to provide effective assistance. Kuwait's postwar army was reportedly down to about 8,000 from a pre- war total of about 16,000 personnel. Kuwait therefore deter- mined to build up and indigenize its own armed forces. Accordingly, a new military conscription law was enacted in December 1992. Furthermore, to upgrade materiel, a postwar 1992 decree authorized the expenditure of US$11.7 billion on military equipment over twelve years. Immediate orders included 218 M-1A2 United States main battle tanks, forty F/ A-18 United States Hornet fighter aircraft, five United States Patriot missile fire units with missiles, 200 British Warrior armored personnel carriers, and miscellaneous French mate- riel. Kuwait also contracted in January 1993 with the United States Hughes Aircraft Company for an early warning system. In 1993, however, the National Assembly demonstrated its intent to review arms contracts and, if feasible, to reduce expenditures, in particular by eliminating commission pay- ments to members of the royal family. Other major steps included the signing of a security agree- ment and a Foreign Military Sales agreement with the United States in 1991, defense agreements with Britain and France in 1992 — followed by additional materiel purchases in 1993 — and an agreement with Russia in 1993. These agreements, as well as participation in the GCC, involve joint training exercises, thus strengthening the capabilities of the Kuwaiti armed forces. In line with its closer relations with the West, Kuwait took immedi- ate action against perpetrators of the alleged Iraqi-inspired assassination attempt on former United States president George H.W. Bush during his attendance at Kuwait's April 1993 celebration of its liberation. In a further defense measure, with private donations, Kuwait in 1993 began construction of a defensive wall along its 240-kilometer border with Iraq. xxii With regard to regional relations, Kuwait in 1993 made con- ciliatory gestures toward some of the Arab countries that sup- ported Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Statements by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sabah al Ahmad Al Sabah in late June 1993 and by Crown Prince and Prime Minister Saad al Abd Allah Al Sabah in late October 1993 set forth conditions for such states to mend relations with Kuwait. The conditions covered support of United Nations (UN) resolutions condemning Iraqi aggres- sion and pressure on Iraq to comply with UN resolutions, par- ticularly those concerning border demarcation and release of prisoners. These statements, which did not name countries or organizations concerned, appear directed primarily at Tunisia and Yemen and to a lesser degree at the Palestine Liberation Organization. Relations with Jordan, however, continued to be chilly, and Kuwait's relations with Qatar cooled over the latter's rapprochement with Jordan in August and its restoration of diplomatic links with Iraq. Bahrain, the only island state of the five Persian Gulf states, came under the rule of the Al Khalifa (originally members of the Bani Utub, an Arabian tribe) in 1783 after 180 years of Ira- nian control. Prior to 1971, Iran intermittently reasserted its claim to Bahrain, two-thirds of whose inhabitants are Shia Mus- lims although the ruling family is Sunni Muslim. Because of sectarian tensions, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its after- math had an unsettling effect on the population; the govern- ment believed that a number of Shia plots during the 1980s received clandestine support from Iran. In 1992 the island's predominantly urban population (85 percent) consisted of 34 percent foreigners, who accounted for 55 percent of the labor force. The exploitation of oil and natural gas — Bahrain was the first of the five Persian Gulf states in which oil was discovered — is the island's main industry, together with the processing of aluminum, provision of drydock facilities for ships, and opera- tion of offshore banking units. The Al Khalifa control the government of Bahrain and held eight of eighteen ministerial posts in early 1994. A brief experi- ment in limited democracy occurred with the December 1972 elections for a Constituent Assembly. The resulting constitu- tion that took effect in December 1973 provided for an advi- sory legislative body, the National Assembly, voted for by male citizens. The ruler dissolved the assembly in August 1975. The new Consultative Council, which began debating labor matters xxiii in January 1993, is believed to have had an impact on the provi- sions of the new Labor Law enacted in September 1993. Bahrain's historical concern over the threat from Iran as well as its domestic unrest prompted it to join the GCC at the organization's founding in 1981. Even within the GCC, how- ever, from time to time Bahrain has had tense relations with Qatar over their mutual claim to the island of Hawar and the adjacent islands located between the two countries; this dispute was under review by the International Court of Justice at The Hague in early 1994. Bahrain traditionally has had good rela- tions with the West, particularly Britain and the United States. Bahrain's cordial association with the United States is reflected in its serving as homeport for the commander, Middle East Force, since 1949 and as the site of a United States naval sup- port unit since 1972. In October 1991, following participation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Bahrain signed a defense cooper- ation agreement with the United States. Bahrain's relationship with Qatar is long-standing. After the Al Khalifa conquered Bahrain in 1783 from their base in Qatar, Bahrain became the Al Khalifa seat. Subsequently, tribal ele- ments remaining in Qatar sought to assert their autonomy from the Al Khalifa. Thus, in the early nineteenth century, Qatar was the scene of several conflicts involving the Al Khalifa and their rivals, the Al Thani, as well as various outsiders, including Iranians, Omanis, Wahhabis, and Ottomans. When the British East India Company in 1820 signed the General Treaty of Peace with the shaykhs of the area designed to end piracy, the treaty considered Qatar a dependency of Bahrain. Not until the signing of a treaty with Britain by Abd Allah ibn Qasim Al Thani in 1916 did Qatar enter into the trucial system as an "independent" protectorate. Britain's 1971 withdrawal from the Persian Gulf led to Qatar's full independence in that year. In preparation for independence, Qatar enacted a provi- sional constitution in 1970 that created an Advisory Council, partly elected. Twenty members are selected by the ruler from nominees voted on in each of the ten electoral districts; fifteen members are appointed directly by the ruler. In January 1992, fifty leading Qataris petitioned the ruler for an elected council "with legislative powers" and "a permanent constitution capa- ble of guaranteeing democracy and determining political, social, and economic structures"; as of early 1994, no action had been taken on these requests. Governmental control has xxiv clearly remained in Al Thani hands; in January 1994, ten of the eighteen members of the Council of Ministers belonged to the family. Exploitation of the oil discovered in Qatar in 1939 was delayed until after World War II. The petroleum industry has grown steadily, and in 1991 the North Field natural gas project was inaugurated; the North Field, a 6,000-square-kilometer off- shore field considered to be the world's largest, extends slightly into Iranian territorial waters. The Qatari government, how- ever, has sought to encourage diversification and investment in such industries as steel, fertilizers, and petrochemicals. The work force is predominantly foreign; in 1992 Qataris were esti- mated to represent only 20 percent of the approximately 484,000 total population. In part because most Qataris belong to the Wahhabi sect that originated in the Arabian Peninsula, Qatar historically has enjoyed close relations with Saudi Arabia, with which it settled its 1992 border dispute in 1993. Although Qatar supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, it subsequently improved its relations with Iran, undoubtedly in part because of its shared gas field. As a GCC member, Qatar sent forces against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War but continued to maintain a diplomatic link with Iraq. Qatar's relations with the United States improved following Operation Desert Storm, and the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement in June 1992 that includes a provision for the pre-positioning of sup- plies. The UAE represents an independent state created by the joining together in the winter of 1971-72 of the seven former Trucial Coast states of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayn. In early 1993, UAE citizens constituted about 12 percent of the total popula- tion of nearly 2 million. Oil is the major source of income for the federation, but it is found in a significant amount only in Abu Dhabi and to a lesser extent in Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah, and Sharjah. In principle, each amirate is required to contrib- ute to the federation's budget (according to the provisional constitution, each state's natural resources and wealth are its own), but in practice only Abu Dhabi and, to a lesser degree, Dubayy have financed the federation. The resulting disagree- ment over budget contributions as well as over the integration of defense measures and forces led to the recurring renewal at five-year intervals of the 1971 provisional constitution, rather xxv than the intended adoption of a permanent constitution. In fact, the separation of powers is nominal; UAE organs consist of the Supreme Council of the Union (SCU) composed of the rulers of the seven amirates (Abu Dhabi and Dubayy have a veto right on proposed measures), the Council of Ministers, and the presidency. The chairman of the SCU is the president of the UAE. In addition, there is an advisory Federal National Council (FNC) of forty members appointed by the rulers of the amirates, based on proportional representation; members serve two-year terms. Following a one-year delay in naming members, the FNC met with UAE citizens in January 1993, after which it held several sessions. FNC actions included a call for private firms to employ more UAE citizens and the estab- lishment of a federal housing loan program for UAE nationals. Like other gulf states, the UAE has security concerns, of which one is its dispute with Iran over the islands of Abu Musa, Tunb al Rubra (Greater Tumb), and Tunb as Sughra (Lesser Tumb). This dispute flared anew in early 1992, after lying dor- mant for twenty years, when Iran took actions on Abu Musa that violated a shared sovereignty agreement. The UAE was concerned that Iran intended to extend its control over the entire island. However, in November 1992 the two countries agreed to abide by the provisions of the 1971 memorandum. The UAE would prefer a final resolution of this dispute and has expressed a willingness to have its sovereignty claims arbitrated by the International Court of Justice or the United Nations. Militarily, the UAE participated in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and contributed personnel to the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia in 1992. The UAE's experience in the Persian Gulf War led it to consider itself inadequately prepared in terms of materiel; consequently, in February 1993 it ordered Leclerc main battle tanks and other equipment from France. Oman is the only one of the Persian Gulf states whose ruler bears the title of sultan instead of shaykh. Until 1970 the ruler was known as the sultan of Muscat (the coastal area) and Oman (the rugged interior imamate), reflecting the diverse parts of the country. To Ibadi Muslims, the political ruler is also the imam (see Glossary); the title sultan, taken from Ottoman usage, indicates a Muslim ruling sovereign combining religious and political connotations. The present sultan, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, began his rule in 1970 and immediately started emphasizing economic devel- opment and modernization. Such an emphasis was essential xxvi because Oman's oil, first produced commercially in 1967, had a relatively limited production span; 1992 estimates projected seventeen more years of output at the 1992 production rate. National development plans, therefore, have focused on reduc- ing the dependence on oil and on confronting problems occa- sioned by the dramatic rural-to-urban population shift, the accompanying social transformation, and the large number of foreign workers, all in the interests of promoting stability. Oman never has had a census, but in 1992, for planning pur- poses, the government estimated the population at 2 million persons (the actual figure may be closer to 1.5 million), of whom about 350,000 were foreigners. The latter constituted approximately 60 percent of the labor force. Oman faces a number of problems. The government must attempt to provide adequate housing and utilities, especially water; stimulate agriculture to increase food production; and discourage urban migration. Specific development goals include establishing new industries and industrial estates; train- ing indigenous personnel; developing minerals other than oil; encouraging agriculture, fishing, and tourism; increasing priva- tization of state-controlled enterprises; and diminishing regional imbalances, particularly in the Dhofar region. On coming to power, Qabus ibn Said confronted the rebel- lion in the Dhofar region, which had begun in 1964. To counter the revolt, he concentrated on establishing develop- ment projects in this neglected area of the country and on improving the transportation and communications infrastruc- ture. With the assistance of Iran, Jordan, and several gulf states, he also took military action to repress the rebellion. The sultan was aided in these efforts by the fact that the bureaucracy and major posts were largely in the hands of ruling family mem- bers. Leading government posts continued to be in the hands of ruling family members into the 1990s. For example, in early 1994 the sultan also served as prime minister, minister of defense, minister of finance, minister of foreign affairs, and chairman of the central bank. Other members of the ruling family served as deputy prime minister for legal affairs, deputy prime minister for security and defense, and minister of national heritage and culture. Still other ruling family mem- bers served as special advisers and as governors of the capital and of the Dhofar region. Close cooperation occurs between the ruling family and the merchants; tribal shaykhs now play a lesser role. Following the example of other gulf states, in 1991 xxvii Qabus ibn Said created the Consultative Council, which has representatives from the forty-one wilayat, or governorates, but no government officials, in contrast to the State Consultative Council, established in 1981, which the new council replaced. In the area of foreign relations, Oman has been closely aligned with Britain and the United States; it first signed a mili- tary accord with the latter in 1980. This "facilities access" agree- ment was most recently renewed in 1990. In the region, Oman has sought to play an independent, nonconfrontational role. In late October 1992, Oman ended a twenty-five-year border dispute with Yemen by signing a border demarcation agree- ment; it also concluded a border agreement with Saudi Arabia in March 1990 as a result of which Oman began demarcating the boundary between the two countries. Moreover, Oman has acted as mediator between the United States and Iran and between Britain and Iran. Meanwhile, Oman has been increas- ing its arms purchases and building up its armed forces. Oman's purchase of military materiel is consonant with the general pattern of Persian Gulf states, which have been spend- ing heavily on military equipment since at least the early 1980s, primarily to compensate for their limited manpower. In most instances, women are not included in the armed forces. Lack- ing domestic arms production capability, the gulf states mainly need aircraft, air defense missile systems, early warning sys- tems, and small missile attack craft, as well as main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers. The gulf countries recognize the potential threats they face, particularly from Iraq and possi- bly from Iran. In addition, they have experienced the need to counter domestic insurgencies, protect their ruling families and oil installations, and possibly use military force in pursuing claims to disputed territory. A partial solution to their defense needs lay in the formation of the GCC in 1981. The Persian Gulf War brought with it, however, the realiza- tion that the GCC was inadequate to provide the gulf states with the defense they required. As a result, most of the states sought defense agreements with the United States, Britain, France, and Russia, more or less in that order. Concurrently, the gulf countries have endeavored to improve the caliber and training of their armed forces and the interoperability of mili- tary equipment through joint military exercises both within the GCC framework and with Western powers. The United States has sought to complement GCC collective security xxviii efforts and has stated that it does not intend to station forces permanently in the region. At a November 1993 meeting, GCC defense ministers made plans to expand the Saudi-based Peninsula Shield force, a rapid deployment force, to 25,000. The force is to have units from each GCC state, a unified command, and a rotating chair- manship. The ministers also agreed to spend up to US$5 bil- lion to purchase three or four more AWACS aircraft to supplement the five the Saudi air force already has and to cre- ate a headquarters in Saudi Arabia for GCC defense purposes. The UAE reportedly considered the proposed force increase insufficient; furthermore, Oman sought a force of 100,000 members. In addition to these efforts, directed at the military aspects of national security, declining oil revenues for many of the states and internal sectarian divisions also have led the gulf countries to institute domestic efforts to strengthen their national security. Such efforts entail measures to increase the role of citizens in an advisory governmental capacity, to allow greater freedom of the press, to promote economic develop- ment through diversification and incentives for foreign invest- ment, and to develop infrastructure projects that will increase the standard of living for more sectors of the population, thereby eliminating sources of discord. The ruling families hope that such steps will promote stability, counter the possible appeal of radical Islam, and ultimately strengthen the position of the ruling families by constituting some form of limited con- stitutional monarchy. January 26, 1994 Helen Chapin Metz xxix Chapter 1. Historical Setting Sharjah Mosque, built in the 1 980s in traditional THE FIVE COUNTRIES covered in this volume— Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates — are all Arab states on the Persian Gulf that share certain characteris- tics. Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia share the coastline as well, and they too shared in the historical development of the area. Of the five states covered in this volume, Oman has a unique culture and history that distinguish it from its neighbors. It also is the state with the shortest coastline along the Persian Gulf. Most of Oman lies along the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea (see fig. 1). The main element that unites the five countries is their involvement with people and nations beyond the region. The gulf has been an important waterway since ancient times, bringing the people who live on its shores into early contact with other civilizations. In the ancient world, the gulf peoples established trade connections with India; in the Middle Ages, they went as far as China; and beginning in the eighteenth cen- tury, they became involved with the European powers that sailed into the Indian Ocean and around Southeast Asia. In the twentieth century, the discovery of massive oil deposits in the gulf made the area once again a crossroads for the modern world. Other factors also bring these countries together. Their indigenous populations are mostly Arab and, with the excep- tion of Oman and Bahrain, are mostly Sunni (see Glossary) Muslim. Because they live in basically tribal societies, family and clan connections underlie most political and economic activity. The discovery of oil and the increasing contact with the West have led to tremendous material and social changes. Important distinctions exist, however, among the five coun- tries. Bahrain is an island with historical connections to Iran. Kuwait is separated from the others by Saudi Arabia. In Oman high mountain ranges effectively cut off the country's hinter- land from the rest of the region (see fig. 2). Moreover, various tribal loyalties throughout the region are frequently divisive and are exacerbated by religious differences that involve the major sects of Islam — Sunni and Shia (see Glossary) — and the smaller Kharijite sect, as well as Muslim legal procedures. 3 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Trade in the Gulf The Persian Gulf lies between two of the major breadbaskets of the ancient world, the Tigris-Euphrates area (Mesopotamia, meaning "between the rivers") in present-day Iraq and the Nile Valley in Egypt. Mesopotamia, a part of the area known as the Fertile Crescent, was important not only for food production but also for connecting East to West. Rivers provided the water that made agriculture possible. Agriculture, in turn, enabled people to settle in an area and to accumulate a food surplus that allowed them to create a civili- zation. They chose leaders such as kings and priests, they built monuments, they devised systems of morality and religion, and they traded. Mesopotamia became the linchpin of ancient international trade. The fertile soil between the Tigris and the Euphrates produced a large surplus of food, which was traded for other goods. For example, early inhabitants of Mesopotamia found copper at Magan, an ancient city that lay somewhere in the contemporary state of Oman, and, via Magan, they traded with people in the Indus Valley for lumber and other finished goods. Trade between Mesopotamia and India was facilitated by the small size of the Persian Gulf. Water provided the easiest way to transport goods, and sailors crossed the gulf fairly early, moving out along the coasts of Persia and India until they reached the mouth of the Indus. Merchants and sailors became middlemen who used their position to profit from the move- ment of goods through the gulf. The people of Magan were both middlemen and suppliers because the city was a source of copper as well as a transit point for Indian trade. Over time, other cities developed that were exclusively entrepots, or com- mercial way stations. One of the best known of these cities was Dilmun. Dilmun probably lay on what is now the island state of Bah- rain. Excavations on the island reveal rich burial mounds from the Dilmun period (ca. 4000 to 2000 B.C.). Scholars believe the monuments on the island indicate that residents, in addition to farming, earned money from the East-West trade and that other cities on the gulf coast survived similarly. The trading cities on the gulf were linked closely to Mesopo- tamia, reflected in the similarities between the archaeological finds in the two areas. The similar finds suggest that the people 4 SAUDI ARABIA \es: Topography International boundary Administrative line Undefined boundary x x Boundary in dispute ® National capital A Spot elevation in meters 50 100 150 200 Kilometers I 1 — H h 1 1 50 100 150 Miles Historical Setting of the gulf coast and the people of the Tigris and Euphrates val- ley developed increasingly complex societies and beliefs. The people of the gulf coast differed from those of the inte- rior of the Arabian Peninsula. Many of the people in the inte- rior were organized in tribes and pursued nomadic lifestyles. When the desert provided insufficient food for their flocks, the tribes pushed into the date groves or farmlands of the settled towns. Centers on the gulf coast were subject to such nomadic incursions, as were the people of Mesopotamia. As a result, after the second millennium B.C. the gulf began to take on an increasingly Arab character. Some Arab tribes from the interior left their flocks and took over the date groves that ringed the region's oases, while others took up sailing and began to take part in the trade and piracy that were the region's economic mainstays. These nomadic incursions periodically changed the ethnic balance and leadership of the gulf coast. Meanwhile, trade flourished in the second millennium B.C., as reflected in the wealth of Dilmun. In about 1800 B.C., how- ever, both the quality and the amount of goods that passed through Dilmun declined, and many scholars attribute this to a corresponding decline in the Mesopotamian markets. Concur- rently, an alternate trade route arose that linked India to the Mediterranean Sea via the Arabian Sea, then through the Gulf of Aden, thence into the Red Sea where the pharaohs had built a shallow canal that linked the Red Sea to the Nile. This new route gave access not only to Mediterranean ports but also, through the Mediterranean ports, to the West as well. One of the ways that rulers directed goods toward their own country was to control transit points on the trade routes. Oman was significant to rulers in Mesopotamia because it provided a source of raw materials as well as a transshipment point for goods from the East. Although a valuable prize, Oman's large navy gave it influence over other parts of the gulf. When Mesopotamia was strong, its rulers sought to take over Oman. When Oman was strong, its rulers pushed up through the gulf and into Mesopotamia. One of the basic conflicts in gulf his- tory has been the struggle of indigenous peoples against out- side powers that have sought to control the gulf because of its strategic importance. Competition between Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade routes was complicated by the rise of new land routes around 1000 B.C. Technological advances in the second and first millennia B.C. made land routes increasingly viable for moving goods. 7 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies The domestication of the camel and the development of a sad- dle enabling the animal to carry large loads allowed merchants to send goods across Arabia as well. As a result, inland centers developed at the end of the first millennium B.C. to service the increasing caravan traffic. These overland trade routes helped to arabize the gulf by bringing the nomads of the interior into closer contact with peoples on the coast. The Gulf in the Ancient World Archaeological evidence suggests that Dilmun returned to prosperity after the Assyrian Empire stabilized the Tigris- Euphrates area at the end of the second millennium B.C. A powerful ruler in Mesopotamia meant a prosperous gulf. Ashurbanipal, the Assyrian king who ruled in the seventh cen- tury B.C., was particularly strong. He extended Assyrian influ- ence as far as Egypt and controlled an empire that stretched from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. The Egyptians, however, regained control of their country about a half-century after they lost it. A series of other conquests of varying lengths followed. In 325 B.C., Alexander the Great sent a fleet from India to follow the eastern, or Persian, coast of the gulf up to the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and sent other ships to explore the Arab side of the waterway. The temporary Greek presence in the area increased Western interest in the gulf during the next two centuries. Alexander's successors, however, did not control the area long enough to make the gulf a part of the Greek world. By about 250 B.C., the Greeks lost all territory east of Syria to the Parthians, a Persian dynasty in the East. The Parthians brought the gulf under Persian control and extended their influence as far as Oman. The Parthian conquests demarcated the distinction between the Greek world of the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Empire in the East. The Greeks, and the Romans after them, depended on the Red Sea route, whereas the Parthians depended on the Persian Gulf route. Because they wanted to keep the merchants who plied those routes under their con- trol, the Parthians established garrisons as far south as Oman. In the third century A.D., the Sassanians, another Persian dynasty, succeeded the Parthians and held the area until the rise of Islam four centuries later. Under Sassanian rule, Persian control over the gulf reached its height. Oman was no longer a threat, and the Sassanians were strong enough to establish agri- 8 Historical Setting cultural colonies and to engage some of the nomadic tribes in the interior as a border guard to protect their western flank from the Romans. This agricultural and military contact gave people in the gulf greater exposure to Persian culture, as reflected in certain irrigation techniques still used in Oman. The gulf continued to be a crossroads, however, and its people learned about Persian beliefs, such as Zoroastrianism, as well as about Semitic and Mediterranean ideas. Judaism and Christianity arrived in the gulf from a number of directions: from Jewish and Christian tribes in the Arabian desert; from Ethiopian Christians to the south; and from Mesopotamia, where Jewish and Christian communities flour- ished under Sassanian rule. Whereas Zoroastrianism seems to have been confined to Persian colonists, Christianity and Juda- ism were adopted by some Arabs. The popularity of these reli- gions paled, however, when compared with the enthusiasm with which the Arabs greeted Islam. Early Development of Islam Islam is a system of religious beliefs and an all-encompassing way of life. Muslims believe that God (Allah) revealed to the Prophet Muhammad the rules governing society and the proper conduct of society's members. It is incumbent on the individual, therefore, to live in a manner prescribed by the revealed law and incumbent on the community to build the perfect human society on earth according to holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no distinctions between the religious institu- tion and the state. The distinction between religious and secu- lar law is a recent development that in part reflects the more pronounced role of the state in society and Western economic and cultural penetration. The impact of religion on daily life in Muslim countries is extensive. The area that constitutes the present-day Persian Gulf states was on the immediate periphery of the rise of Islam. In A.D. 610, Muhammad, a merchant from the Hashimite branch of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations that Muslims believe was granted him by God through the angel Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, Muhammad denounced the polytheism of his fel- low Meccans. Because the town's economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage trade to the shrine called the Kaaba and to numerous other pagan religious sites in the area, his censure 9 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies earned him the enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he and a group of followers accepted an invitation to settle in the town of Yathrib, later known as Medina (the city), after it became the center of Muhammad's activities. The move, or hijra (see Glos- sary), sometimes seen as the hegira, marks the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam as a force in history; the Islamic calendar begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued to preach, and he eventually defeated his detractors in battle. He consolidated the temporal and the spiritual leadership in his person before his death in 632. After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam. Others of his sayings, recalled by those who had known him, became the hadith (see Glossary). The precedent of Muham- mad's deeds is called the sunna. Together they form a compre- hensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of an orthodox Sunni Muslim. The major duties of Muslims are found in the five pillars of Islam, which set forth the acts necessary to demonstrate and reinforce the faith. These are the recitation of the shahada ("There is no god but God [Allah], and Muhammad is his prophet"), daily prayer (salat), almsgiving (zakat) , fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj). The believer is to pray in a pre- scribed manner after purification through ritual ablutions each day at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Pre- scribed genuflections and prostrations accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites while facing toward Mecca. When- ever possible, men pray in congregation at the mosque with an imam (see Glossary), and on Fridays they are required to do so. The Friday noon prayers provide the occasion for weekly ser- mons by religious leaders. Women also may attend public wor- ship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, although most frequently women pray at home. A special func- tionary, the muezzin, intones a call to prayer to the entire com- munity at the appropriate hour. The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muham- mad's receipt of God's revelation. Throughout the month, all but the sick and the weak, pregnant or lactating women, sol- diers on duty, travelers on necessary journeys, and young chil- dren are enjoined from eating, drinking, or smoking during the daylight hours. Those adults excused are obliged to endure an equivalent fast at their earliest opportunity. A festive meal 10 Historical Setting breaks the daily fast and inaugurates a night of feasting and cel- ebration. The pious well-to-do usually do little or no work dur- ing this period, and some businesses close for all or part of the day. Because the lunar year is about ten days shorter than the solar year, Ramadan rotates through the seasons. A consider- able test of discipline at any time of the year, a fast that falls in summer imposes severe hardship on those who must do physi- cal work. All Muslims, at least once in their lifetime and if circum- stances permit, should make the hajj to Mecca to participate in special rites held there during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. Muhammad instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom, to emphasize sites associated with God and Abraham (Ibrahim), founder of monotheism and father of the Arabs through his son, Ismail. The lesser pillars of the faith, which all Muslims share, are jihad, or the permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on earth, and the requirement to do good works and to avoid all evil thoughts, words, and deeds. In addition, Muslims agree on certain basic principles of faith based on the teach- ings of the Prophet Muhammad: there is one God, who is a uni- tary divine being in contrast to the trinitarian belief of Christians; Muhammad, the last of a line of prophets begin- ning with Abraham and including Moses and Jesus, was chosen by God to present God's message to humanity; and there is a general resurrection on the last, or judgment, day. During his lifetime, Muhammad held both spiritual and temporal leadership of the Muslim community. Religious and secular law merged, and all Muslims traditionally have been subject to the sharia, or religious law. A comprehensive legal system, the sharia developed gradually through the early centu- ries of Islam, primarily through the accretion of interpretations and precedents set by various judges and scholars. During the tenth century, legal opinion began to be codified into authori- tative schools of interpretation. After Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim com- munity consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in- law and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that time, some persons favored Ali ibn Abu Talib, Muhammad's cousin and the husband of his daughter, Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the Shiat Ali, or Party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. The next two caliphs (successors) — Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman, who took power in 644 — enjoyed the recognition of the entire community. When 11 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, gover- nor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman, Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to Iraq, where he was murdered shortly thereafter. Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphs and the period in which the entire community of Islam recognized a single leader. Muawiyah proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali refused to recognize him or his line, the Umayyad caliphs, and withdrew in the great schism of Islam to establish the dissident sect, known as the Shia, who supported the claims of Ali's line to the caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger faction, the Sunnis, adhered to the position that the caliph must be elected, and over the centuries they have represented them- selves as the orthodox branch. Sunni Islam Although originally political in nature, the differences between Sunni and Shia interpretations rapidly took on theo- logical overtones. In principle, a Sunni approaches God directly: there is no clerical hierarchy. Some duly appointed religious figures, such as imams, however, exert considerable social and political power. Imams usually are men of impor- tance in their communities, but they need not have any formal training. Committees of socially prominent worshipers usually are responsible for managing major mosque-owned lands. In most Arab countries, the administration of awqaf (religious endowments) has come under the influence of the state. Qadis (judges) and imams are appointed by the government. The Muslim year has two major religious festivals: Id al Adha, a sacrificial festival held on the tenth day of Dhu al Hij- jah, the twelfth, or pilgrimage, month; and Id al Fitr, the festi- val of breaking the fast, which celebrates the end of Ramadan on the first day of Shawwal, the tenth month. To Sunnis these are the most important festivals of the year. Each lasts three or four days, during which time people put on their best clothes and visit, congratulate, and bestow gifts on each other. In addi- tion, cemeteries are visited. Id al Fitr is celebrated more fes- tively because it marks the end of Ramadan. Celebrations also take place, although less extensively, on the Prophet's birthday, which falls on the twelfth day of Rabi al Awwal, the third month. 12 Historical Setting With regard to legal matters, Sunni Islam has four orthodox schools that give different weight in legal opinions to prescrip- tions in the Quran, to the hadith, to the consensus of legal scholars, to analogy (to similar situations at the time of the Prophet), and to reason or opinion. Named for their founders, the earliest Muslim legal schools were those of Abd Allah Malik ibn Anas (ca. 715-95) and An Numan ibn Thabit Abu Hanifa (ca. 700-67). The Maliki school was centered in Medina, and the lawbook of Malik ibn Anas is the earliest surviving Muslim legal text, containing a systematic consensus of Medina legal opinions. The Hanafi school in Iraq stressed individual opin- ion in making legal decisions. Muhammad ibn Idris ash Shafii (767-820), a member of the tribe of Quraysh and a distant rel- ative of the Prophet, studied under Malik ibn Anas in Medina. He followed a somewhat eclectic legal path, laying down the rules for analogy that were later adopted by other legal schools. The last of the four major Sunni legal schools, that of Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal (780-855), was centered in Bagh- dad. The Hanbali school, which became prominent in Arabia as a result of Wahhabi (see Glossary) influence, gave great emphasis to the hadith as a source of Muslim law but rejected innovations and rationalistic explanations of the Quran and the traditions (see Wahhabi Islam and the Gulf, this ch.). Shia Islam Shia Muslims hold the fundamental beliefs of other Muslims (see Sunni Islam, this ch.). In addition to these tenets, however, the largest of the Shia denominations believe in the imamate, a distinctive institution. Whereas Sunni Muslims view the caliph as a temporal leader only and consider an imam to be a prayer leader, Shia Muslims known as Twelve Imam Shia hold a hered- itary view of Muslim leadership. They believe the Prophet Muhammad designated Ali to be his successor as Imam (when uppercase, Imam refers to the Shia descendant of the House of Ali), exercising both spiritual and temporal leadership. Only those who have walayat (spiritual guidance) are free from error and sin and have been chosen by God through the Prophet. Each Imam in turn designated his successor — through twelve Imams — each holding the same powers. The imamate began with Ali, who is also accepted by Sunni Muslims as the fourth of the "rightly guided caliphs" to succeed the Prophet. Twelve Imam Shia revere Ali as the First Imam, and his descendants, beginning with his sons Hasan and 13 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Husayn, continue the line of the Imams until the twelfth. Shia point to the close lifetime association of the Prophet with Ali. When Ali was six years old, he was invited by the Prophet to live with him, and Shia believe Ali was the first person to make the declaration of faith in Islam. Ali also slept in the Prophet's bed on the night of the hijra, when it was feared that the house would be attacked by unbelievers and the Prophet stabbed to death. He fought in all the battles the Prophet did, except one, and the Prophet chose him to be the husband of one of his favorite daughters, Fatima. Among Shia, the term imam traditionally has been used only for Ali and his eleven descendants. None of the twelve Imams, with the exception of Ali, ever ruled an Islamic government. During their lifetimes, their followers hoped that they would assume the rulership of the Islamic community, a rule that was believed to have been wrongfully usurped. Because Sunni caliphs were cognizant of this hope, Imams generally were per- secuted under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. Therefore, the Imams tried to be as unobtrusive as possible and to live as far as was reasonable from the successive capitals of the Islamic empire. During the eighth century, Caliph Al Mamun, son of and successor to Harun ar Rashid, was favorably disposed toward the descendants of Ali and their followers. He invited Imam Reza, the Eighth Imam (765-816), to come from Medina to his court at Marv (Mary in present-day Turkmenistan). While Reza was residing at Marv, Al Mamun designated him as his succes- sor in an apparent effort to avoid conflict among Muslims. Reza's sister, Fatima, journeyed from Medina to be with her brother but took ill and died at Qpm, in present-day Iran. A major shrine developed around her tomb, and over the centu- ries Qom has become a major Shia pilgrimage site and theolog- ical center. Al Mamun took Reza on his military campaign to retake Baghdad from political rivals. On this trip, Reza died unexpect- edly in Khorasan. Reza was the only Imam to reside in, or die in, what is now Iran. A major shrine, and eventually the city of Mashhad, grew up around his tomb, which is the major pil- grimage center in Iran. Several theological schools are located in Mashhad, associated with the shrine of the Eighth Imam. Reza's sudden death was a shock to his followers, many of whom believed that Al Mamun, out of jealousy for Reza's increasing popularity, had the Imam poisoned. Al Mamun's 14 Historical Setting suspected treachery against Imam Reza and his family tended to reinforce a feeling already prevalent among his followers that Sunni rulers were untrustworthy. The Twelfth Imam is believed to have been only five years old when he became Imam in 874 on the death of his father. Because his followers feared he might be assassinated, the Twelfth Imam was hidden from public view and was seen only by a few of his closest deputies. Sunnis claim that he never existed, or that he died while still a child. Shia believe that the Twelfth Imam never died, but disappeared. Since then, the greater occultation of the Twelfth Imam has been in force, which will last until God commands the Twelfth Imam to mani- fest himself on earth again as the mahdi, or messiah. Shia believe that during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, he is spiritually present — some believe that he is materially present as well — and he is besought to reappear in various invocations and prayers. His name is mentioned in wedding invitations, and his birthday is one of the most jubilant of all Shia religious observances. The Twelve Imam Shia doctrine of the imamate was not fully elaborated until the tenth century. Other dogmas devel- oped still later. A characteristic of Shia Islam is the continual exposition and reinterpretation of doctrine. A significant practice of Shia Islam is that of visiting the shrines of Imams in Iraq and in Iran. In Iraq, these include the tomb of Imam Ali in An Najaf and that of his son, Imam Husayn, in Karbala, because both are considered major Shia martyrs. Before the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), tens of thousands made the visits each year. Other principal pilgrimage sites in Iraq are the tombs of the Seventh Imam and the Ninth Imam at Kazimayn near Baghdad. In Iran, pilgrimage sites include the tomb of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad and that of his sister in Qom. Such pilgrimages originated in part from the difficulty and the expense of making the hajj to Mecca in the early days. In commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn, killed near Karbala in 680 during a battle with troops supporting the Umayyad caliph, processions are held in the Shia towns and vil- lages of southern Iraq on the tenth day of Muharram (Ashura), the anniversary of his death. Ritual mourning (taaziya) is per- formed by groups of five to twenty men each. Contributions are solicited in the community to pay transportation for a local group to go to Karbala for taaziya celebrations forty days after 15 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Ashura. There is great rivalry among groups for the best per- formance of the taaziya passion plays. Shia practice differs from Sunni practice concerning divorce and inheritance in that it is more favorable to women. The reason for this reputedly is the high esteem in which Fatima, the wife of Ali and the daughter of the Prophet, was held. Shia Islam has developed several sects. The most important of these is the Twelver, or Ithna-Ashari, sect, which predomi- nates in the Shia world generally. Not all Shia became Twelvers, however. In the eighth century, a dispute arose over who should lead the Shia community after the death of the Sixth Imam, Jaafar ibn Muhammad (also known asjaafar as Sadiq). The group that eventually became the Twelvers followed the teaching of Musa al Kazim; another group followed the teach- ings of Musa's brother, Ismail, and were called Ismailis. Ismailis are also referred to as Seveners because they broke off from the Shia community over a disagreement concerning the Seventh Imam. Ismailis do not believe that any of their Imams have dis- appeared from the world in order to return later. Rather, they have followed a continuous line of leaders represented in early 1993 by Karim al Husayni Agha Khan IV, an active figure in international humanitarian efforts. The Twelver Shia and the Ismailis also have their own legal schools. Another group, the Kharijites, arose from events surround- ing the assassination of Uthman, the third caliph, and the transfer of authority to the fourth caliph, Ali. In the war between Ali and Muawiyah, part of Ali's army objected to arbi- tration of the dispute. They left Ali's camp, causing other Mus- lims to refer to them as "kharijites" (the ones who leave). The term Kharijites also became a designation for Muslims who refused to compromise with those who differed from them. Their actions caused the Sunni community to consider them assassins. In the eighth century, some Kharijites began to moderate their position. Leaders arose who suppressed the fanatical political element in Kharijite belief and discouraged their fol- lowers from taking up arms against other Islamic leaders. Khar- ijite leaders emphasized instead the special benefits that Kharijites might receive from living in a small community that held high standards for personal conduct and spiritual values. One of these religious leaders, or imams, was Abd Allah ibn Ibad, whose followers founded communities in parts of Africa 16 Historical Setting and southern Arabia. Some of Abd Allah's followers, known as Ibadis, became the leaders in Oman. The Spread of Islam The early Islamic polity was intensely expansionist, fueled both by fervor for the faith and by economic and social factors. After gaining control of Arabia and the Persian Gulf region, conquering armies swept out of the peninsula, spreading Islam. By the end of the eighth century, Islamic armies had reached far into North Africa and eastward and northward into Asia. Traditional accounts of the conversion of tribes in the gulf are probably more legend than history. Stories about the Bani Abd al Qais tribe that controlled the eastern coast of Arabia as well as Bahrain when the tribe converted to Islam indicate that its members were traders having close contacts with Christian communities in Mesopotamia. Such contacts may have intro- duced the tribe to the ideal of one God and so prepared it to accept the Prophet's message. The Arabs of Oman also figure prominently among the early converts to Islam. According to tradition, the Prophet sent one of his military leaders to Oman to convert not only the Arab inhabitants, some of whom were Christian, but also the Iranian garrison, which was Zoroastrian. The Arabs accepted Islam, but the Iranians did not. It was partly the zeal of the newly converted Arabs that inspired them to expel the Iranians from Oman. Although Muhammad had enjoined the Muslim community to convert the infidel, he had also recognized the special status of the "people of the book," Jews and Christians, whose scrip- tures he considered revelations of God's word and which con- tributed in some measure to Islam. By accepting the status of dhimmis (tolerated subject people), Jews and Christians could live in their own communities, practice their own religious laws, and be exempt from military service. However, they were obliged to refrain from proselytizing among Muslims, to recog- nize Muslim authority, and to pay additional taxes. In addition, they were denied certain political rights. The Gulf in the Middle Ages In the Islamic period, the prosperity of the gulf continued to be linked to markets in Mesopotamia. Accordingly, after 750 17 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies the gulf prospered because Baghdad became the seat of the caliph and the main center of Islamic civilization. Islam brought great prosperity to Iraq during this period, thus increasing the demand for foreign goods. As a result, gulf mer- chants roamed farther and farther afield. By the year 1000, they were traveling regularly to China and beyond, and their trading efforts were instrumental in spreading Islam, first to India and then to Indonesia and Malaya. The Islam they spread, however, was often sectarian. Eastern Arabia was a center for both Kharijites and Shia; in the Middle Ages, the Ismaili Shia faith constituted a particularly powerful force in the gulf. Ismailis originated in Iraq, but many moved to the gulf in the ninth century to escape the Sunni authorities. Whereas the imam was central to the Ismaili tradition, the group also recognized what they referred to as "missionaries" (dua; sing., dai), figures who spoke for the imam and played major political roles. One of these missionaries was Hamdan Qarmat, who sent a group from Iraq to Bahrain in the ninth century to establish an Ismaili community From their base in Bahrain, Qarmat's followers, who became known as Qarma- tians, sent emissaries throughout the Muslim world. The Qarmatians are known for their attacks on their oppo- nents, including raids on Baghdad and the sack of Mecca and Medina in 930. For much of the tenth century, the Ismailis of Bahrain were the most powerful force in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. They controlled the coast of Oman and col- lected tribute from the caliph in Baghdad as well as from a rival Ismaili imam in Cairo, whom they did not recognize. By the eleventh century, Ismaili power had waned. The Qar- matians succumbed to the same forces that had earlier threat- ened centers on the gulf coast — the ambitions of strong leaders in Mesopotamia or Iran and the incursion of tribes from the interior. In 985 armies of the Buyids, an Iranian dynasty, drove the Ismailis out of Iraq, and in 988 Arab tribes drove the Ismailis out of Al Ahsa, an oasis they controlled in eastern Ara- bia. Thereafter, Ismaili presence in the gulf faded, and in the twentieth century the sect virtually disappeared. Ibadis figured less prominently than the Shia in the spread of Islam. A stable community, the Ibadi sect's large following in Oman has helped to distinguish Oman from its gulf neighbors. Ibadis originated in Iraq, but in the early eighth century, when the caliph's representative began to suppress the Ibadis, many left the area. Their leader at the time, Jabir ibn Zayd, had come 18 Historical Setting to Iraq from Oman, so he returned there. Jabir ibn Zayd's pres- ence in Oman strengthened the existing Ibadi communities; in less than a century, the sect took over the country from the Sunni garrison that ruled it in the caliph's name. Their leader, Al Julanda ibn Masud, became the Ibadi imam of Oman. In the Ibadi tradition, imams are elected by a council of reli- gious scholars, who select the leader that can best defend the community militarily and rule it according to religious princi- ples. Whereas Sunnis and Shia traditionally have focused on a single leader, referred to as caliph or imam, Ibadis permit regions to have their own imams. For instance, there have been concurrent Ibadi imams in Iraq, Oman, and North Africa. Because of the strong sense of community among Ibadis, which resembles tribal feelings of community, they have pre- dominated in the interior of Oman and to a lesser degree along the coast. In 752, for example, a new line of Sunni caliphs in Baghdad conquered Oman and killed the Ibadi imam, Al Julanda. Other Ibadi imams arose and reestablished the tradition in the interior, but extending their rule to the coastal trading cities met opposition. The inland empires of Iran and Iraq depended on customs duties from East-West trade, much of which passed by Oman. Accordingly, the caliph and his successors could not allow the regional coastal cities out of their control. As a result, Oman acquired a dual nature. Ibadi leaders usu- ally controlled the mountainous interior while, for the most part, foreign powers controlled the coast. People in the coastal cities often have been foreigners or have had considerable con- tact with foreigners because of trade. Coastal Omanis have profited from their involvement with outsiders, whereas Oma- nis in the interior have tended to reject the foreign presence as an intrusion into the small, tightly knit Ibadi community. Ibadi Islam thus has preserved some of the hostility toward outsiders that was a hallmark of the early Kharijites. While the imam concerned himself with the interior, the Omani coast remained under the control of Iranian rulers. The Buyids in the late tenth century eventually extended their influence down the gulf as far as Oman. In the 1220s and 1230s, another group, the Zangids — based in Mosul, Iraq — sent troops to the Omani coast; around 1500 the Safavids, an Iranian dynasty, pushed into the gulf as well. The Safavids fol- lowed the Twelve Imam Shia tradition, which they had taken 19 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies over from the Arabs, and imposed Shia beliefs on those under their rule. Oman's geographic location gave it access not only to the Red Sea trade but also to ships skirting the coast of Africa. By the end of the fifteenth century, however, an Iranian ruler, the shaykh (see Glossary) of Hormuz, profited most from this trade. The shaykh controlled the Iranian port that lay directly across the gulf from Oman, and he collected customs duties in the busy Omani ports of Qalhat and Muscat. Ibadi imams con- tinued to rule in the interior, but until Europeans entered the region in the sixteenth century, Ibadi rulers were unable to reclaim the coastal cities from the Iranians. The Age of Colonialism During the Middle Ages, Muslim countries of the Middle East controlled East-West trade. However, control changed in the fifteenth century. The Portuguese, who were building ships with deep hulls that remained stable in high seas, were thereby able to make longer voyages. They pushed farther and farther down the west coast of Africa until they found their way around the southern tip of the continent and made contact with Mus- lim cities on the other side. In East Africa, the Portuguese enlisted Arab navigators there to take them across to India, where they eventually set themselves up in Calicut on the Mala- bar Coast. Once in India, the Portuguese used their superior ships to transport goods around Africa instead of using the Red Sea route, thus eliminating the middlemen in Egypt. The Portu- guese then extended their control to the local trade that crossed the Arabian Sea, capturing coastal cities in Oman and Iran and setting up forts and customs houses on both coasts to collect duty. The Portuguese allowed local rulers to remain in control but collected tribute from them in exchange for that privilege, thus increasing Portuguese revenues. The ruler most affected by the rise of Portuguese power was the Safavid shah of Iran, Abbas I (1587-1629). During the time the shaykh of Hormuz possessed effective control over gulf ports, he continued to pay lip service and tribute to the Safavid shah. When the Portuguese arrived, they forced the shaykh to pay tribute to them. The shah could do little because Iran was too weak to challenge the Portuguese. For that the shah required another European power; he therefore invited the 20 Ar Rustaq fort, Oman, restored by Omani Ministry of National Heritage and Culture Building a dhow in Sur, Oman's ancient port; ship construction is a major enterprise of Persian Gulf states. Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 21 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies English and the Dutch to drive the Portuguese out of the gulf, in return for half the revenues from Iranian ports. Both countries responded to the shah's offer, but it was England that proved the most helpful. In 1622 the English, along with some of the shah's forces, attacked Hormuz and drove the Portuguese out of their trading center there. Initially, the Dutch cooperated with the English, but the two European powers eventually became rivals for access to the Iranian mar- ket. The English won and by the beginning of the nineteenth century had become the major power in the gulf. Struggles between Iranians and Europeans contributed to a power vacuum along the coast of Oman. The English attacks on the Portuguese coincided with the rise of the Yarubid line of Ibadi imams in the interior of Oman. The Yarubids took advantage of Portuguese preoccupation with naval battles on the Iranian side of the gulf and conquered the coastal cities of Oman around 1650. The imams moved into the old Portu- guese stronghold of Muscat and so brought the Omani coast and interior under unified Ibadi control for the first time in almost 1,000 years. A battle over imamate succession in the early eighteenth century, however, weakened Yarubid rule. Between the 1730s and the 1750s, the various parties began to solicit support from outside powers. The Yarubid family eventually called in an Ira- nian army, which reestablished Iranian influence on the Omani coast. This time the Iranian hold on Oman was short- lived. In 1742 the Al Said, an Ibadi family from one of the coastal cities, convinced the local population to help it expel the Iranians; this put the leader, Ahmad ibn Said Al Said, in control of the Omani coast. His success sufficiently impressed the Ibadi leaders that they made him imam several years later. The title of imam gave Ahmad ibn Said control over all of Oman, and under him and his successors the country pros- pered for more than a century. The Omanis extended their influence into the interior and into part of the present-day United Arab Emirates (UAE), consisting of the states of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayn. They also collected tribute from as far away as present-day Bahrain and Iraq. The Omanis conquered the Dhofar region, which is part of present-day Oman but was not historically part of the region of Oman. Oman also strengthened its hold on the Muslim cities of East Africa. These cities had been established by Omani traders 22 Historical Setting in the tenth and eleventh centuries, but their connection to Oman had grown somewhat tenuous. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the Al Said reasserted Omani authority in the area. Said ibn Sultan (1806-56) encouraged Omanis to settle in Zanzibar, an island off the African coast that had retained strong connections with Oman, and, from Zanzibar, he sent expeditions to take over several cities on the mainland (see Historical Patterns of Governance, ch. 6). Although Ahmad ibn Said had succeeded in uniting Oman under an Ibadi imamate, the religious nature of his family's authority did not last long. His son, Said ibn Ahmad Al Said, was elected to the imamate after him, but no other family member won the official approval of the religious establish- ment. As a result, the Al Said called themselves sultans, a secu- lar title having none of the religious associations of imam. They further distanced themselves from Ibadi traditions by moving their capital from Ar Rustaq, a traditional Ibadi center in the interior, to the trading center of Muscat. As a result of the move, the dichotomy between coast and interior that had tradi- tionally split Oman was reinstituted. The relationship between coast and interior was becoming a major feature within the gulf. In the eighteenth century, tribes from the interior increasingly began to move and settle into the coastal centers. Although the economy on the Arab side of the gulf did not match past prosperity, coastal conditions remained better than those in central Arabia. Limited agricul- ture existed, and the gulf waters were the site of rich oyster beds for harvesting pearls. The area's easy access to India, a major market for pearls, made the pearling industry particu- larly lucrative, and this drew the attention of tribes in the inte- rior. The tribal migrations that occurred around 1800 put in place the tribes and clans that in 1993 controlled Kuwait, Bah- rain, Qatar, and the UAE. The Bani Utub moved from central Arabia into the north- ern gulf in the early 1800s, and one of its families, the Al Sabah, established itself as leaders of present-day Kuwait; another family, the Al Khalifa, established itself in present-day Bahrain. In the early 1800s, a number of other tribes were liv- ing along the gulf. Thus, Al Sabah and Al Khalifa control meant that these families ruled loosely over other tribes. Before taking Bahrain, the Al Khalifa first had established a set- tlement across the water on the peninsula that is present-day Qatar. Although the Al Khalifa were successful in taking Bah- 23 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies rain, they were unable to hold Qatar. They lost the peninsula to the Al Thani, the leading family from another tribe that, like the Bani Utub, had recently moved into the area. The exact origins of the Al Thani are unknown, but they were already in Qatar when the Al Khalifa came. The origins of the Bani Yas tribe and the Al Qasimi family that rule in the present-day UAE are somewhat clearer. The Bani Yas origi- nated in central Arabia and probably established themselves on the coast at Abu Dhabi around 1700; they later extended their influence to Dubayy. Historical evidence indicates that the Al Qasimi lived along the gulf during the pre-Islamic period and engaged in trade, pearling, and piracy. Wahhabi Islam and the Gulf The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a turbulent time for Arabia in general and for the gulf in particular. To the southeast, the Al Said of Oman were extending their influence northward, and from Iraq the Ottoman Turks were extending their influence southward. From the east, both the Iranians and the British were becoming increasingly involved in Arab affairs. The most significant development in the region, however, was the Wahhabi movement. The name Wahhabi derived from Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, who died in 1792. He grew up in an oasis town in central Arabia where he studied Hanbali law, usually considered the strictest of Islamic legal schools, with his grandfather. While still a young man, he left home and continued his studies in Medina and then in Iraq and Iran. When he returned from Iran to Arabia in the late 1730s, he attacked as idolatry many of the customs followed by tribes in the area who venerated rocks and trees. He extended his criti- cism to practices of the Twelve Imam Shia, such as veneration of the tombs of holy men. He focused on the central Muslim principle that there is only one God and that this God does not share his divinity with anyone. From this principle, his students began to refer to themselves as muwahhidun (sing., muwahhid), or "unitarians." Their detractors referred to them as "Wah- habis." Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab considered himself a reformer and looked for a political figure to give his ideas a wider audience. He found this person in Muhammad ibn Saud, the amir (see Glossary) of Ad Diriyah, a small town near Riyadh. In 1744 the two swore a traditional Muslim pledge in 24 Historical Setting which they promised to work together to establish a new state (which later became present-day Saudi Arabia) based on Islamic principles. The limited but successful military cam- paigns of Muhammad ibn Saud caused Arabs from all over the peninsula to feel the impact of Wahhabi ideas. The Wahhabis became known for a fanaticism similar to that of the early Kharijites. This fanaticism helped to intensify conflicts in the gulf. Whereas tribes from the interior had always raided settled communities along the coast, the Wah- habi faith provided them with a justification for continuing these incursions to spread true Islam. Accordingly, in the nine- teenth century Wahhabi tribes, under the leadership of the Al Saud, moved at various times against Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. In Oman, the Wahhabi faith created internal dissension as well as an external menace because it proved popular with some of the Ibadi tribes in the Omani interior. Wahhabi thought has had a special impact on the history of Qatar. Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab's ideas proved popular among many of the peninsula tribes, including the Al Thani, before the Al Khalifa attempted to take over the area from Bah- rain at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a result, Wahhabi beliefs motivated Al Thani efforts to resist the attempt of the Al Khalifa, who rejected Wahhabism, to gain control of the peninsula. In the early 1990s, Wahhabism distinguished Qatar religiously from its neighbors. Wahhabi fervor was also significant in the history of the present-day UAE. The Al Qasimi tribes that had controlled the area since the eighteenth century adapted Wahhabi ideas and transferred the movement's religious enthusiasm to the piracy in which they had traditionally engaged. Whereas Wahhabi thought opposed all that was not orthodox in Islam, it particu- larly opposed non-Muslim elements such as the increasing European presence in the Persian Gulf. Treaties with the British The increased European presence resulted in large part from commercial competition between Al Qasimi merchants and British merchants for the lucrative trade between India and the Persian Gulf in the early nineteenth century. British merchants enlisted the British navy to assist them by launching attacks on Al Qasimi strongholds in the present-day UAE as early as 1809. The navy did not succeed in controlling the situa- tion until 1819. In that year, the British sent a fleet from India 25 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies that destroyed Ras al Khaymah, an Al Qasimi port at the east- ern end of the gulf. From Ras al Khaymah, the British fleet destroyed Al Qasimi ships along both sides of the gulf. The British had no desire to take over the desolate areas along the gulf; they only wished to control the trading cities. The British decided to leave most tribal leaders in power and concluded a series of treaties with them. As a result of these truces, the Arab side of the gulf came to be known as the "Trucial Coast." This area had previously been under the nominal control of the sultan in Oman, although the Trucial Coast tribes were not part of the Ibadi imamate. The area has also been referred to as "Trucial Oman" to distin- guish it from the part of Oman under the sultan that was not bound by treaty obligation. In 1820 the British seemed primarily interested in control- ling the Al Qasimi, whose main centers were Ras al Khaymah, Ajman, and Sharjah, which were all small ports along the southeastern gulf coast. The original treaties, however, also involved Dubayy and Bahrain, which were entrepots. The inclu- sion of these ports brought two other extended families, the Bani Yas and the Al Khalifa, into the trucial system. During the next 100 years, the British signed a series of trea- ties having wide-ranging provisions with other tribes in the gulf. As a result, by the end of World War I, leaders from Oman to Iraq had essentially yielded control of their foreign relations to Britain. Abu Dhabi entered into arrangements similar to those of Dubayy and Bahrain in 1835, Kuwait in 1899, and Qatar in 1916. The treaty whose terms convey the most repre- sentative sense of the relationship between Britain and the gulf states was the Exclusive Agreement of 1882. This text specified that the signatory gulf states (members of the present-day UAE) could not make any international agreements or host any foreign agent without British consent. Because of these concessions, gulf leaders accepted the need for Britain to protect them from their more powerful neighbors. The main threat came from the Al Saud in central Arabia. Although the Ottomans had defeated the first Wahhabi empire of the Al Saud around 1820, the family rose up again about thirty years later; it threatened not only the Al Qasimi, who by this time had largely abandoned Wahhabi Islam, but also the Al Khalifa in Bahrain and the Ibadi sultan in Oman. In the early 1900s, the Al Saud also threatened Qatar despite its 26 Boys playing on cannon at Az Zubarah fort, Qatar Courtesy Anthony Toth Restored ancient fort at Az Zubarah, Qatar; similar forts exist in most Persian Gulf states. Courtesy Anthony Toth Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Wahhabi rulers. Only with British assistance could the Al Thani and other area rulers retain their authority. The Al Saud were not the only threat. Despite its treaty agreement with Britain, Bahrain on several occasions had claimed Qatar because of the Al Khalifa involvement on the peninsula. The Omanis and Iranians had also claimed Bahrain because both have held the island at various times. Further- more, the Ottomans claimed Bahrain occasionally and tried throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century to estab- lish their authority in Kuwait and Qatar. The British wished to maintain security on the route from Europe to India so that merchants could safely send goods between India and the gulf. Britain also sought to exclude the influence in the area of other powers, such as the Ottoman Empire and France. East-West trade through the Persian Gulf dried up in the nineteenth century after the opening of the Suez Canal, which provided an all-water route to the Mediterranean Sea. Gulf merchants continued to earn substantial income from the slave trade, but international pressure, mostly from Britain, forced them to abandon this by 1900. Thereafter, the region contin- ued to profit from the gulf pearl beds, but this industry declined in the 1930s as a result of the world depression, which reduced demand, and as a result of the Japanese development of a cheaper way to "breed" pearls, or make cultured pearls. Oman, which was technically cut off from the gulf after it lost the Musandam Peninsula, which fell under British influ- ence between 1853 and 1914, fared little better during the late nineteenth century. The fifth sultan in the Al Said line, Said ibn Sultan, ruled for almost the entire first half of the nine- teenth century, increasing Omani influence and revenue tre- mendously. The resulting prosperity, however, was short-lived. The Omani fleet could not compete with the more technologi- cally advanced European ships; thus the sultan gradually lost much of the income he had earned from customs duties on the Indian trade. At the same time, the increasing pressure to restrict the slave trade eliminated much of the revenue the Omanis had earned from East Africa. The final blow to Oman's economic and political viability came after the death of Said ibn Sultan. When the Al Said could not agree on a successor, the British acted. They divided the Al Said holdings and gave Oman proper to one of the claimants to the throne and awarded Omani possessions in 28 Historical Setting East Africa to another. Thus, after 1856 there were two Al Said rulers. The one in Muscat, with a weakened merchant fleet and no East African revenues, was left with little support. Because of the different centers of power, the country became popularly known as Muscat and Oman. The sultan's financial weakness contributed to his difficulty in maintaining his hold on the interior. The devout Ibadi pop- ulation of the interior had long resented the more secular ori- entation of the coastal centers. As the sultan grew weaker, groups in the interior raised revolts against him on several occasions. Only with British help could the sultan remain in control, and his growing dependence on outsiders caused his relations with the Ibadi population to deteriorate. Whereas other gulf rulers used the British to protect them from their more powerful neighbors, the sultan needed the British to pro- tect him from his subjects. Discovery of Oil At the end of World War I, the Arab states of the gulf were weak, with faltering economies and with local rulers who main- tained their autonomy only with British assistance. The rulers controlled mainly the small port cities and some of the hinter- land. The sultan in Oman claimed a somewhat larger area, but resistance to his rule made it difficult for him to exert his authority much beyond Muscat. The discovery of oil in the region changed all this. Oil was first discovered in Iran, and by 1911 a British concern, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), was producing oil in Iran. The British found oil in Iraq after World War I. In 1932 Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) discovered oil in commercial quantities in Bahrain. Socal then obtained a con- cession in Saudi Arabia in 1933 and discovered oil in commer- cial quantities in 1938. A flurry of oil exploration activity occurred in the gulf in the 1930s with the United States and Britain competing with one another for oil concessions. One reason for the increased activity was that in 1932 the new Iranian government of Reza Shah Pahlavi revoked APOC's concession. Although the shah and the British later agreed on new terms, the threat of losing Iranian oil convinced the British in particular that they must find other sources. The small states of the Persian Gulf were a natural place to look. Geological conditions were similar to those in Iran, and, because of treaties signed between 1820 and 29 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 1916, the British had substantial influence and could restrict foreign access. Oil exploration did not mean immediate wealth for Arab rulers of the area. Although the oil companies struck large deposits of oil in Bahrain almost immediately, it took longer in other countries to locate finds of commercial size. Oman, for instance, was unable to export oil until 1967. World War II delayed development of whatever fields had been discovered in the 1930s; so it was not until the 1950s that countries still tech- nically dependent on Britain for their security began to earn large incomes. The oil fields in Kuwait were developed the most quickly, and by 1953 that nation had become the largest oil producer in the gulf. Considerably smaller fields in Qatar came onstream in commercial quantities in the 1950s, and Abu Dhabi began to export offshore oil in 1962. Dubayy began to profit from offshore oil deposits in the late 1960s. Until the 1970s, foreign companies owned and managed the gulf oil industry. In most cases, European- and United States-based concerns formed subsidiaries to work in specific countries, and these subsidiaries paid fees to the local rulers, first for the right to explore for oil and later for the right to export the oil. When the first arrangements were made, local rulers had a weak bargaining position because they had few other sources of income and were eager to get revenues from the oil companies as fast as possible. Moreover, in 1930 no one knew the size of gulf oil reserves. As production increased and the extent of oil deposits became known, indigenous rulers improved their terms. In the 1950s, rulers routinely demanded an equal share of oil com- pany profits in addition to a royalty fee. By the 1970s, most of the gulf countries, which by then were independent of British control, bought major shares in the subsidiary companies that worked within their borders. By the early 1990s, many of these subsidiaries had become completely state-owned concerns. They continued to employ Western experts at the highest deci- sion-making levels, but the local government had ultimate responsibility and profits. Independence With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Arab coast of the gulf is ruled by ten families: in Kuwait the Al Sabah; in Bahrain the Al Khalifa; in Qatar the Al Thani; in the present- day UAE the Al Nuhayyan in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuaimi in 30 Historical Setting Ajman, the Al Sharqi in Al Fujayrah, the Al Maktum in Dubayy, the Al Qasimi in Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, and the Al Mualla in Umm al Qaywayn; and the Al Said in present-day Oman. These families owe their positions to tribal leadership. It was on this traditional basis that the British had negotiated treaties with their leaders in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. A major provision of these treaties was the recognition of sovereignty. The British were concerned that rulers of the weaker gulf families would yield some of their territory under pressure from more powerful groups, such as the Al Saud or the Ottomans. Accordingly, the treaties signed between 1820 and 1916 recognized the sovereignty of these rulers within cer- tain borders and specified that these borders could not be changed without British consent. Such arrangements helped to put tribal alliances into more concrete terms of landowner ship. This meant that the Al Nuhayyan of Abu Dhabi, for example, not only commanded the respect of tribes in the hinterland but also owned, as it were, the land that those tribes used — in this case, about 72,000 square kilometers of Arabia. Controlling, or owning, land became more important with the discovery of oil. When oil companies came to explore for oil, they looked for the "owner" of the land; in accordance with British treaties, they went to the area's leading families and agreed to pay fees to the heads of these families. As oil reve- nues increased, the leaders became rich. Although the leaders spent much of their new wealth on themselves, they also dis- tributed it in the area they controlled according to traditional methods, which initially consisted mostly of largesse: gifts for friends, and food for whomever needed it. As time passed, the form of largesse became more sophisticated and included, for example, the construction of schools, hospitals, and roads to connect principal cities to towns in the interior. Oil revenues did not change traditional tribal ideas about leadership. New money, however, increased the influence of area leaders by giving them more resources to distribute. Because of oil exploration, tribal boundaries became clearer, and areas were defined more precisely. Distinctions among tribes also became more evident. A new sense of identity appeared in gulf shaykhdoms and aroused a growing expecta- tion that they should rule themselves. To do this, shaykhs had to cut themselves off from British control and protection. 31 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies By the early 1960s, this was something to which the British had little objection. India and Pakistan won their indepen- dence in 1947, meaning that Britain no longer had to worry about protecting the western flank of the subcontinent. Britain was also burdened by the tremendous sacrifices it made during World War II and could not be as globally involved as it had been before the war. Therefore, Britain yielded many of its stra- tegic responsibilities to the United States in the postwar period or gave them up entirely. However, the British were bound to the gulf by treaties and so remained in the region, but it was clear by the 1960s that they sought to leave the gulf. Kuwait was the first state to terminate the agreement con- necting it with Britain. Oil production in Kuwait had devel- oped more quickly than in neighboring states; as a result, Kuwaitis were better prepared for independence. They declared independence in 1961 but ran into immediate trou- ble when Iraq claimed their territory. The Iraqis argued that the British had recognized Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait before World War I and, because the Ottomans had claimed to rule Kuwait from what was then the province of Iraq, the terri- tory should belong to Iraq. The British immediately sent troops to Kuwait to deter any Iraqi invasion. British and Kuwaiti positions were supported by the newly formed League of Arab States (Arab League), which recognized the new state and sent troops to Kuwait. The Arab League move left the Iraqis isolated. Accordingly, when a new Iraqi government came to power in 1963, one of its first steps was to give up its claim and recognize the independence of Kuwait. The experience of Kuwait may have increased the anxiety of other gulf leaders about declaring their independence. Even into the 1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to make claims on territory in Bahrain and the UAE, although by the end of 1971 those states were independent, and nothing came of the claims. Gulf leaders also faced uncertainty about the form their states should take. Should they all, with the excep- tion of Oman, whose situation was different in that its treaty relationship with Britain did not guarantee its borders as did treaties of the other gulf states, band together in the largest entity possible? Or should they break up into nine separate states, the smallest of which had little territory, few people, and no oil? 32 Historical Setting British action forced gulf leaders to decide. Because of domestic financial concerns, Britain decided in the late 1960s to eliminate its military commitments east of Suez. As a result, the gulf shaykhs held a number of meetings to discuss indepen- dence. Initially, leaders considered a state that would include all nine shaykhdoms; Qatar had even drawn up a constitution to this effect. Various obstacles existed, however, to the creation of a "superstate." The ruler of Bahrain especially and to a lesser degree the ruler of Qatar were not satisfied with the political and economic status that their countries would enjoy in such an arrangement. They wished to have a preeminent position and therefore decided that independence would be preferable to federation. Accordingly, Bahrain declared its independence on August 15, 1971, and Qatar followed suit on September 3, 1971. With regard to the other gulf shaykhdoms, their political options were limited. The only one with significant oil revenues was Abu Dhabi; Dubayy had only just begun to receive income from its oil. The five southern shaykhdoms — Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayh — had at the time no mineral resources to provide revenues. Therefore, realistically, their only choice was to join in a federa- tion in which they would be strengthened by the collective resources of their neighbors. Abu Dhabi and Dubayy consid- ered such a federation advantageous to themselves because of their small size and limited population. Thus, in 1971 soon after Qatar became independent, the remaining shaykhs, with the exception of the Al Qasimi in Ras al Khaymah, took the preliminary constitution that Qatar had originally drawn up for a nine-member confederation and adapted it to a six-member body. On December 2, 1971, one day after the British officially withdrew, these six shaykhdoms declared themselves a sovereign state. Ras al Khaymah originally refused to join the confederation. The Al Qasimi, who ruled the area, claimed a number of islands and oil fields within the gulf to which Iran laid claim as well. In the negotiations to form the UAE, the Al Qasimi sought support for their claims from Arab states on the penin- sula as well as from some Western powers. When their efforts proved unsuccessful, the Al Qasimi pulled out of the negotia- tions. They quickly realized, however, that they could not exist on their own and joined the union in February 1972. 33 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Oman, which traditionally regarded itself as an independent state, had not contemplated joining the federation. Oman had experienced considerable British involvement in its affairs since the latter half of the nineteenth century. By taking over Zanzibar and other areas of East Africa formerly controlled by Oman, Britain had destroyed much of Oman's trade. The trade loss created resentment on the part of the Omanis, which grew in the twentieth century when the ruler granted oil conces- sions to British companies. The increasing British presence caused tensions that resulted in charges of foreign interference in Omani affairs. Many Omanis blamed the Al Said sultan for allowing foreign influence, which they considered detrimental to the religious and cultural life of the sultanate. In 1958 the sultan withdrew to his palace in the coastal city of Salalah in Dhofar, the southern region that the Al Said had annexed in the nineteenth century, but took little interest in maintaining stability in the country. While keeping his military relationship with the British, he restricted Oman's contacts with the rest of the world, discouraged development, and pro- hibited political reform. In the end, the Al Said control over a united Oman sur- vived, but Said ibn Taimur did not. Although the sultan had partially reestablished his authority in the Omani interior, he was unable to handle the increasing complexity of domestic politics. By the 1960s, Omani affairs had become international issues. Western oil companies sought to work in the interior of the country, and foreign governments, such as the Marxist state of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, were send- ing arms to the rebels in Dhofar. The Al Said hold over the region remained problematic, however, and in 1964 a rebellion arose, this time in Dhofar. The Dhofar rebellion, which was not brought under control until late 1975, obliged the sultan to seek foreign military assis- tance; therefore, British forces, particularly the air force, resumed activity in the country. The rebels pointed to British involvement as an indication of the sultan's illegitimacy and brought their case to the United Nations (UN), which eventu- ally censured Britain for its continuing involvement in Oman. Said ibn Taimur's policies frustrated many, not only in Oman but also in Britain, whose citizens were heavily involved in the sultan's military and intelligence apparatus. By 1970 these elements decided they could bear with the situation no longer; a coalition of Omani military and civilian forces, as well 34 Historical Setting as British forces, attacked the palace and forced Said ibn Taimur to abdicate. They replaced him with his son, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, who had played no role in Said ibn Taimur's gov- ernment. The sultan had actually locked his son in the palace for fear that Qabus ibn Said, who had been educated in Britain, would challenge his archconservative policies. On his release, Qabus ibn Said consolidated the sultanate's hold over the interior and then solicited regional rather than British help to put down the rebellion in Dhofar. Other Arab leaders, as well as the shah of Iran, sent troops to Oman in response to Qabus ibn Said's requests; with the help of this coa- lition, by late 1975 the sultan ended the Dhofar rebellion. Qabus ibn Said was not an Ibadi imam as the first rulers in his line had been, but in 1970 this was less important than it had been in earlier times. Only about 60 percent of Oman's population was Ibadi, concentrated in the northern moun- tains. Furthermore, the Dhofar region had a relatively short history of association with the rest of Oman. Developments since Independence Since the early 1970s, increased oil production and regional instability have dominated events in the Persian Gulf. Revenues from the oil industry grew dramatically after oil producers raised their prices unilaterally in 1973; as a result, funds avail- able to gulf rulers increased. Governments began massive development projects that brought rapid material and social change. As of 1993, the turmoil that these changes caused had not yet stabilized. Those states that had benefited longest from oil money, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, made the greatest progress in adjusting to the new oil wealth. Oman — which has used its oil reserves only since the early 1970s and which had suffered under the repressive policies of Said ibn Taimur — saw substantially less progress. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 challenged gulf stability. Many gulf leaders agreed with some of the social goals of the revolution and its efforts to tie Iran more firmly to its Islamic roots. But Iran's desire to spread the movement beyond its bor- ders clearly threatened gulf leaders. Furthermore, several gulf states have significant Shia or Iranian minorities (Bahrain has a Shia majority although the ruling family is Sunni), and gulf rul- ers feared that Iran would use ethnic or sectarian loyalties to stir up such minorities. 35 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies As of 1993, however, Shia of the gulf had not responded enthusiastically to the Iranian call. Kuwait and Bahrain, which have the largest Shia populations, experienced some limited pro-Iranian demonstrations in 1979. Iran was perhaps more threatening to gulf stability because of its strong anti-Western stance in world and regional politics. The new Iranian position stood in stark contrast to the gulf amirs' long history of involvement with the British and the close ties to the West that the oil industry entailed. Thus, the Iranian political worldview was one to which rulers in the gulf states could not subscribe. In 1980 the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War made the Iranian threat more concrete. The gulf states supported Iraq both in the Arab League, beginning in 1980, and through loans, begin- ning in 1981. The tanker war began in 1984 with Iraqi air attacks on neutral ships carrying oil and other goods from Iran. Iran, in turn, responded with mine laying and attacks on merchant shipping, causing added concern among the states of the region. In 1981, partly as a result of such concerns, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (see Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council, ch. 7). The goal of the GCC has been to provide for regional defense and to coordinate policy on trade and economic issues. Although the GCC has taken steps to increase the military capabilities of various members, the region has remained dependent to a great extent on the protection of the Western powers. For instance, when the Iran- Iraq War made the gulf unsafe for oil tankers in 1987-88, it was ships from Europe and the United States that protected ship- ping and cleared the area of mines. Whereas broader, regional alliances in the gulf have changed dramatically since the 1970s, individual political sys- tems have remained relatively unchanged. All the gulf coun- tries grant ultimate power to a single family, whose leading member rules as amir, but they also provide for an advisory body whose members are drawn from outside the royal family. Kuwait and Bahrain have gone beyond this and have set up sep- arate parliaments with limited power to draft legislation. How- ever, the Al Sabah and the Al Khalifa have sometimes dissolved these bodies; thus, it remains uncertain whether parliaments will become a permanent feature of gulf politics. 36 Historical Setting The ruling families' hold on power has been challenged at various times. More problematic is the manner in which the gulf states have distributed individual citizenship. Since the 1930s, the population has increased dramatically because of the oil boom, but the number of citizens has not increased cor- respondingly. Most of the gulf states place restrictions on citi- zenship, requiring that an individual trace his or her roots in the country to before 1930. Accordingly, the millions of people that have poured into the region since the 1940s have only par- tial legal status and lack political rights in the countries in which they reside. Although they may have lived there for two generations, they can be asked to leave at any time. Tribal Nature of Gulf Society The gulf states have not granted citizenship freely for two reasons: first, they are reluctant to share wealth with recent arrivals; second, the tribal nature of gulf society does not admit new members easily. A tribe usually traces its lineage to a partic- ular eponymous ancestor. The standard Arabic reference to tribe is banifulan, or "the sons [bani] of so-and-so." The Bani al Murrah in Saudi Arabia, for example, trace their line back to a figure named Murrah, who lived some time before the Prophet. Over a period of 1,500 years, the sons of Murrah, or any other ancient figure, have tended to become numerous, mak- ing further distinctions necessary. Accordingly, tribes are divided into clans and then into households (fukhud; sing., fakhd). Households include groups of single families. Together this extended group of families calls itself a tribe. Each tribe has certain characteristics, such as different speech, dress, and customs. But since the 1950s, speech has become less of a dis- tinguishing factor because of the fluidity of gulf society. The name of a tribe may also reflect some past event. For example, the name Utub — the tribe to which the Al Sabah of Kuwait and the Al Khalifa of Bahrain belong — comes from the Arabic word for wander (atab). In 1744 the tribe "wandered" out of the desert and into the gulf area and became the Utub. Two of the most important tribal groups in Arabia are the Qahtan and the Adnan, whose roots stem from the belief that tribes in the north of the peninsula were descended from Adnan, one of Ismail's sons, and that tribes in the south were descended from Qahtan, one of Noah's sons. People in the gulf often attribute the structure of tribal alliances to this north- 37 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies south distinction, and many still classify their tribes as Adnani or Qahtani. Historically the tribal nature of society has occasioned petty warfare in the gulf Arab tribes have attacked each other since before the Islamic era, but tribal customs have prevented these attacks from turning into random violence. Clans, however, have defected from their tribe and made alliances with other tribes, and tribes have sometimes banded together to form a more powerful group. Moreover, although some tribes may trace their lineage to some heroic figure, the real identity of the tribe lies in the peo- ple that currently compose it. In the tribe, an individual bases his or her sense of self-esteem on the honor of the tribe as a whole. In Arabia it was impossible to survive in the desert alone, and so families banded together to find water and move their flocks to new grazing lands. Once they established the neces- sary resources through collective effort, they guarded them jealously and refused to share them with outsiders. It therefore became necessary to set up boundaries between members of the group or between the tribe and outsiders. The tribe worked to restrict membership in order to preserve its sense of solidar- ity. As a result, birth into the right family tended to be the only way to become a member of a tribe. Marriage sometimes extended the tribal line beyond blood lines, but, in general, people tended to marry within the tribe and only went outside to establish alliances with other tribes. The emphasis on the group precluded the rise of a strong leader. Accordingly, tribal leadership is often described as "the first among equals," suggesting a collective leadership in which one among a number of leaders is recognized as the most authoritative. This principal leader must continue to consult with his lesser colleagues and so rules by consensus. An extension of this pattern of leadership is the concept of leading families within the tribe. Although tribalism tends to discourage inherited authority, traditions of leadership are nev- ertheless passed down, and tribes expect that certain families will furnish them with leaders generation after generation. This pattern occurred when tribes that were previously nomadic settled down in oases or coastal areas. It then became more likely that certain families would accumulate wealth, whether in food or in goods, and with this wealth would increase their authority. In this way, the individual families that 38 Historical Setting in the 1990s controlled the gulf states established themselves around 1800. Relations with the British and the discovery of oil continued that process. The existence of these ruling families is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of Arab tribalism in gulf society in 1993. Another manifestation is the collective manner in which these families rule. In most of these states, the position of amir is not passed from father to son but rotates among different parallel patrilineal lines. This makes the appointment of the next amir an open issue and something on which the entire family must agree. The family also participates in the various consultative bodies that exist to advise the leader. Such bodies, which include figures outside the ruling family, help to institutional- ize the first among equals system in these states. The way that government officials are appointed reflects the importance of tribal connections. Members of the ruling family are accommodated first, followed by families and tribes with whom the rulers have been traditionally allied. In Bahrain, for example, the ruling Al Khalifa have given the major positions in the bureaucracy to Sunni Arabs from tribes that helped them rule the island in the nineteenth century. The Al Khalifa have given lesser positions to Shia Arabs from merchant fami- lies with whom they engaged in the pearl industry but with whom they had no tribal alliances. Tribal cohesiveness is also reflected in the efforts of the gulf states to restrict citizenship. The gulf has always been relatively cosmopolitan, and its port cities have included Arab Shia from Iraq, freed slaves from Africa, Indian pearl traders, and Iranian merchants, in addition to tribal Sunni Arabs. (In 1939, for example, before the oil boom started, 39 percent of Qatar's population was non-Arab.) The dominant Arab tribes have accommodated many of these groups, and those who arrived in the region before 1930 became full citizens of the gulf states, albeit without the connections of tribal Arabs. The tremendous influx since 1940 has caused the naturally restrictive nature of tribal society to reassert itself to prevent a further dilution of tribal identities. Modern Arab politics, however, often speaks of a single Arab nation in which all Arabs might be citizens. This has led to the notion that Arabs should have rights in the gulf states simply because of their ethnicity. The continuing exodus of millions of Palestinian Arabs since 1948, and their subsequent residence throughout the Arab world, has added urgency to the demand 39 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies that individual Arab states define their qualifications for citi- zenship. Many Arabs argue that Palestinians in particular, but other Arabs as well, should be accepted as citizens in the gulf. Gulf leaders have understandably opposed this for fear that nontribal Arabs would challenge traditional ruling institutions. Although people from all over the world may come to the gulf to work, sovereignty and citizenship are closely guarded by the predominantly tribal population that has its roots in the Ara- bian Peninsula. In this way, the Persian Gulf coast has pre- served its ties with the Arab interior that form the essence of its identity. * * * The literature on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE may be divided into two groups: books on Oman and books on the rest of the gulf states. Calvin Allen has a relatively brief study of the modern history of Oman entitled Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate. John C. Wilkinson has written a number of scholarly studies on Oman, including his recent work, The Imamate Tradition of Oman. This is an excellent and detailed study of most aspects of Omani history. For the rest of the gulf, a number of brief studies exist, of which the most recent is The Arab Gulf and the Arab World, a col- lection of articles on various aspects of modern gulf life edited by B.R. Pridham; it contains little on the history of the region. For more historical background, the reader may consult an older but more substantial collection edited by Alvin Gottrell entitled The Persian Gulf States. Further history can be found in Donald Hawley's The Trucial States. Of books on particular countries or issues, among the best are Fuad Khuri's Tribe and State in Bahrain, which considers the social, religious, and ethnic divisions of the island nation; Fred H. Lawson's Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy; and Jill Crystal's Oil and Politics in the Gulf and Kuwait: The Transforma- tion of an Oil State. A recent brief work on the UAE by Malcolm C. Peck, The United Arab Emirates, is very good. Abdulrasool al- Mossa's study, Immigrant Labor in Kuwait, provides a description of the situation of foreign workers in the gulf. Religious distur- bances in the gulf are discussed in relevant chapters of Robin Wright's Sacred Rage. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 40 Chapter 2. Kuwait Crest of the State of Kuwait Country Profile Country Formal Name: State of Kuwait. Short Form: Kuwait. Term for Citizens: Kuwaiti(s); adjectival form, Kuwaiti. Capital: Kuwait (city of Kuwait frequently used to distinguish it from country). Date of Independence: June 19, 1961. Geography Size: About 17,818 square kilometers. Topography: Almost entirely flat desert. Climate: Hot, dry, desert climate; sandstorms in June and July; some rain, mainly in spring. Boundaries: Mostly defined; United Nations post-Persian Gulf War 1992 boundary settlement accepted by Kuwait but rejected by Iraq. Society Population: March 1992 estimate 1,175,000, of whom 53 percent Kuwaiti; a decline from preinvasion population of 2,155,000 (mid-1990 estimate), of whom 27 percent Kuwaiti. Education: Free from preschool through university and compulsory to age fourteen. Adult literacy rate 74 percent in 1990. Health: National comprehensive health care system extensive and continuing to expand and improve. Life expectancy in 1990 seventy-two years for males and seventy-six for females. NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 43 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Ethnic Groups: Majority of population Arab. Noncitizen population shifted from predominantly Arab to predominantly Asian in 1980s. After 1990-91 Iraqi occupation, exodus of about 370,000 of the 400,000 Palestinians. Religion: Most Kuwaitis are Sunni Muslims. About 20 percent of citizens are Shia Muslims. Most foreigners are also Muslims, the majority Sunni. Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1990 United Nations Development Programme estimated US$15,984 per capita GDP. Oil Industry: Provided 41 percent of GDP and 87 percent of government revenues in 1989, 58 percent of government revenues in 1990, and 11 percent of government revenues in 1991, showing effects of Persian Gulf War. Crude oil production in 1992 (after oil well restoration during year) about 41 million barrels, compared with about 387 million barrels in 1985. Industry: About 14 percent of GDP in 1989. Largest industries petrochemicals and building materials. Agriculture: Little farming — mostly vegetables and fruits. Most food imported. Some fishing. Exports: US$11.5 billion in 1989; mostly crude oil and refined products. Asia and Western Europe main markets. Imports: US$6.3 billion in 1989 — largely such finished products as appliances and vehicles from industrialized nations, particularly Japan, United States, and Western Europe. Currency and Exchange Rate: Kuwaiti dinar. On March 1, 1994, exchange rate US$1 = KD3.55. Fiscal Year: July 1 to June 30. Transportation and Telecommunications Transportation: In 1993 more than 3,900 kilometers of roads, of which 3,000 kilometers paved. Three major ports: Ash Shuaybah, Ash Shuwaykh, and Mina al Ahmadi. Airlines use 44 Kuwait Kuwait International Airport. Telecommunications: Prior to Persian Gulf War, excellent telecommunications system; all telecommunications severely damaged during Iraqi occupation and being restored. Government and Politics Government: 1962 constitution specifies "hereditary amirate" and fixes succession among male "descendants of the late Mubarak Al Sabah." Ruler in 1994 was Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir Al Sabah, who became amir in 1977. Sixty-member (fifty elected, ten appointed) National Assembly created in 1963, suspended from 1976 to 1980 and again in 1986; replaced in 1990 with partially elected National Council. National Assembly reconstituted by October 1992 elections. Opposition and independent candidates — including some nineteen Islamists — won thirty to thirty-five seats. Politics: Al Sabah family dominates political events, but several prominent merchant families also powerful. Opposition, independent, and Islamist elements becoming stronger in early 1990s. Political parties illegal. Foreign Relations: As result of Iraqi invasion of August 2, 1990, and 1991 Persian Gulf War, Kuwait's relations with the West and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi Arabia, strengthened to prevent future Iraqi incursion. In addition to GCC, Kuwait belong to more than twenty international organizations, including United Nations, League of Arab States, Nonaligned Movement, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. National Security Armed Forces: In mid-1993, according to The Military Balance, 1993-94, personnel strength 13,700, including 1,000 central staff: army, 9,000; navy, 1,200 (including coast guard); and air force, 2,500. Materiel of all services largely destroyed or captured in Persian Gulf War; being renewed by large-scale foreign arms purchases. 45 KUWAIT CAPTURED THE WORLD'S ATTENTION on August 2, 1990, when Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the country, catalyzing a series of events that culminated in military intervention and ultimate victory by United States-led coalition forces in February 1991. In 1993 it appeared that the invasion and its aftermath would have a lasting effect on the people, the economy, and the politics of Kuwait. Once a small gulf shaykh- dom known locally as a center for pearl diving and boat con- struction, Kuwait came to international prominence in the post-World War II era largely because of its enormous oil reve- nues. Yet its history as an autonomous political entity is much older, dating back to the eighteenth century. At that time, the town of Kuwait was settled by migrants from central Arabia who arrived at what was then a lightly populated fishing village under the suzerainty of the Bani Khalid tribe of Arabia. Mem- bers of one family, the Al Sabah, have ruled Kuwait from that time. Since 1977 Kuwait has been ruled by Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir Al Sabah and his designated successor, Shaykh Saad al Abd Allah as Salim Al Sabah, the prime minister and crown prince. In the postwar period, these men have supported, with some ambivalence, the strengthening of popular participation in decision making as provided for in the constitution. Geography Kuwait is located at the far northwestern corner of the Per- sian Gulf, known locally as the Arabian Gulf (see fig. 3). It is a small state of about 17,818 square kilometers, a little smaller than the state of New Jersey. At its most distant points, it is about 200 kilometers north to south and 170 kilometers east to west. Shaped roughly like a triangle, Kuwait borders the gulf to the east, with 195 kilometers of coast. Kuwait includes within its territory nine gulf islands, two of which, Bubiyan (the largest) and Warbah, are largely uninhabited but strategically impor- tant. The island of Faylakah, at the mouth of Kuwait Bay, is densely inhabited. It is believed to be the outermost point of the ancient civilization of Dilmun, which was centered in what is present-day Bahrain. Faylakah is the site of an ancient Greek 47 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies temple built by the forces of Alexander the Great. Kuwait's most prominent geographic feature is Kuwait Bay, which indents the shoreline for about forty kilometers, providing nat- ural protection for the port of Kuwait and accounting for nearly one-half the state's shoreline. To the south and west, Kuwait shares a long border of 250 kilometers with Saudi Arabia. The boundary between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was set by the Treaty of Al Uqayr in 1922, which also established the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone of 5,700 square kilometers. In 1966 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia agreed to divide the Neutral Zone; the partitioning agreement making each country responsible for administration in its por- tion was signed in December 1969. The resources in the area, since then known as the Divided Zone, are not affected by the agreement, and the oil from onshore and offshore fields con- tinues to be shared equally between the two countries. The third side of the triangle is the 240 kilometers of histor- ically contested border to the north and west that Kuwait shares with Iraq. Although the Iraqi government, which had first asserted a claim to rule Kuwait in 1938, recognized the borders with Kuwait in 1963 (based on agreements made ear- lier in the century), it continued to press Kuwait for control over Bubiyan and Warbah islands through the 1960s and 1970s. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and, shortly thereafter, formally incorporated the entire country into Iraq. Under United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 687, after the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1991, a UN commis- sion undertook formal demarcation of the borders on the basis of those agreed to in 1963. The boundary was demarcated in 1992, but Iraq refuses to accept the commission's findings. Kuwait has a desert climate, hot and dry. Rainfall varies from seventy-five to 150 millimeters a year across the country; actual rainfall has ranged from twenty-five millimeters a year to as much as 325 millimeters. In summer, average daily high tem- peratures range from 42°C to 46°C; the highest recorded tem- perature is 51.5°C. The summers are relentlessly long, punctuated mainly by dramatic dust storms in June and July when northwesterly winds cover the cities in sand. In late sum- mer, which is more humid, there are occasional sharp, brief thunderstorms. By November summer is over, and cooler win- ter weather sets in, dropping temperatures to as low as 3°C at night; daytime temperature is in the upper 20s°C range. Frost 48 IRAQ / I SAUDI \ International boundary Expressway Paved road ® National capital • Populated place + Airport •I Major port 5 10 15 20 Kilometers I L ^ 5 10 15 20 Miles ARABIA 47 Boundaryjepresem Figure 3. Kuwait, 1993 50 Kuwait rarely occurs; rain is more common and falls mostly in the spring. The land was formed in a recent geologic era. In the south, limestone rises in a long, north-oriented dome that lies beneath the surface. It is within and below this formation that the principal oil fields, Kuwait's most important natural resource, are located. In the west and north, layers of sand, gravel, silt, and clay overlie the limestone to a depth of more than 210 meters. The upper portions of these beds are part of a mass of sediment deposited by a great wadi whose most recent channel was the Wadi al Batin, the broad shallow valley form- ing the western boundary of the country. On the western side of the Ar Rawdatayn geological formation, a freshwater aquifer was discovered in 1960 and became Kuwait's principal water source. The supply is insufficient to support extensive irriga- tion, but it is tapped to supplement the distilled water supply that fills most of the country's needs. The only other exploited aquifer lies in the permeable zone in the top of the limestone of the Ash Shuaybah field south and east of the city of Kuwait. Unlike water from the Ar Rawdatayn aquifer, water from the Ash Shuaybah aquifer is brackish. Millions of liters a day of this water are pumped for commercial and household purposes. The bulk of the Kuwaiti population lives in the coastal capi- tal of the city of Kuwait. Smaller populations inhabit the nearby city of Al Jahrah, smaller desert and coastal towns, and, prior to the Persian Gulf War, some of the several nearby gulf islands, notably Faylakah. Society Population In the summer of 1990, Kuwait had an estimated population of 2,1^5,000. The most dramatic division in this preinvasion population was that between the national population of Kuwaiti citizens and the larger population, more than 70 per- cent of the total population, of foreign workers (see table 2, Appendix). The percentage of foreigners in the population grew steadily after World War II, following the rise in oil revenues and the consequent government development programs with their sudden need for substantial labor. The labor market came to consist increasingly of foreigners for a number of reasons. The most important factor was the small size of the indigenous 51 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies population and, in the early years, their low level of education. As oil revenues and government investment in education pro- duced a generation of highly educated Kuwaitis, they began to replace foreigners at the highest levels of employment, but even this highly educated population was small. The low partic- ipation rates of women in the work force also contributed to the reliance on foreign workers. Restrictions on female dress and behavior in public and consequently on labor force partic- ipation are not as strong as they are elsewhere in the gulf, nota- bly in Saudi Arabia. Customary norms, however, coupled with higher family incomes, which reduce the need to employ more family members and lessen the incentive for individuals to undertake the more unpleasant sorts of work, combine to pro- mote a lower labor force participation rate in the national pop- ulation. The importance of foreign workers to the economy in the post-World War II period is difficult to exaggerate. Most of these foreigners were male. Most were employed by the state. Most were in Kuwait for relatively short periods (40 percent used to stay less than five years); Arabs used to stay somewhat longer than non-Arabs. Historically, Arabs constituted the bulk of the non-Kuwaiti population. In addition to a large number of Palestinian workers, estimated at 400,000 in 1990, there were numerous Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians, and Lebanese. A smaller but significant and growing number of workers came from Asia. In the early 1980s, the composition of the work force shifted, and by 1985 slightly more than one-half the foreign workers (52 percent) were Asian and less than one-half (46 per- cent) were Arab. Africans, Europeans, and United States citi- zens constitute the remainder. The government favors Asian workers because of their lower labor costs, and, because they are unable to speak Arabic or lay a claim to oil revenues on the basis of Arab nationalism, Asian workers are more apt to return home in a few years, thus raising fewer social and political issues. The foreign population does not enjoy the economic and political rights of the national population. Not being citizens, they can neither vote nor run for seats in the National Assem- bly. They are not allowed to own real property. They cannot form their own unions; although they can join Kuwaiti unions, they are prohibited from voting or running for union offices. Acquiring Kuwaiti citizenship is very difficult, and the number of naturalized citizens remains low. 52 Traditional dhow, characteristic of Persian Gulf fishing and trading Courtesy Aramco World The large number of foreigners creates social tensions between foreigners and the indigenous population. Foreign workers, particularly those who have worked many years in Kuwait, resent the discrimination against them. Citizens often view foreign workers with suspicion, if not hostility. Even before the Persian Gulf War, public debate often focused on a per- ceived compromise between Kuwait's economic needs and its security needs. Although the most important social division in the country is between citizens and foreigners, the indigenous population is internally divided along a number of lines as well. The first is sectarian. The majority of Kuwaiti nationals are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims; the minority are Shia (see Glossary). Fig- ures have never been published on the number of Shia, but estimates in the 1980s ranged from 15 to 25 percent of the national population. Shia are a diverse group. Some are Arab, many the descendants of immigrants from Ash Sharqiyah (Eastern Province) in Saudi Arabia or from Bahrain. Others come from Arab families who moved from the Arabian side of the gulf to Iran, stayed awhile, and then returned. Others are of Iranian origin, who often speak Farsi as well as Arabic at home and sometimes maintain business or family ties with Ira- nians across the gulf. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, this Shia community 53 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies experienced a renewed sense of sectarian identification. The identification resulted from sympathy with their revolutionary coreligionists in Iran and from increasing government and social discrimination. During the 1980s, the tension between Sunnis and Shia, which had erupted occasionally in the past, became somewhat sharper. Kuwaitis are also divided to a certain extent along class lines. Although the national population is generally well off because of the state's generous employment policies regarding nation- als and its extensive social services, important divisions none- theless exist between the country's economic elite and the rest of the population. The wealthiest Kuwaitis are members either of the ruling family or of what was once a powerful and still dis- tinct merchant class. Many of these are descendants of the Bani Utub, the original central Arabian tribe that settled Kuwait in the eighteenth century. The most important and wealthiest of the Bani Utub are members of the Al Sabah, the ruling family of Kuwait. The economic elite is largely Sunni. However, some Shia families and individual Shia are also wealthy. Despite these internal divisions, the national population is also characterized by a strong sense of national identity. There are no important ethnic divisions: the national population is overwhelmingly Arab. The major sectarian divisions are sub- sumed in the larger shared Islamic identity. Unlike many of its neighbors, Kuwait is not a twentieth-century colonial fabrica- tion. It has been an autonomous political and social unit since the eighteenth century. In the intervening years, a strong sense of local identity has arisen. This national sense was deeply rein- forced by the Iraqi occupation. Education In 1993 Kuwait's population was highly educated, both in comparison to other states in the region and in comparison to its pre-oil education levels. The impressive education system was brought about by a conscious government decision, made possible by revenues from oil that began in the 1950s, to invest heavily in human resources. Although the pre-oil education system was modest by 1993 standards, it was still impressive, given the limited finances at the time. In the early 1900s, education consisted largely of Quran schools, offering basic literacy training in the context of religious instruction. This system provided some formal school- ing for nearly all boys and some girls. Wealthy families often 54 Kuwait sent sons abroad for further education. In the first decades of the twentieth century, merchants anxious for more extensive training for their sons opened a few private schools, notably the Mubarakiyyah School in 1911 and the Ahmadiyyah School in 1921. In the 1930s, merchants established the Education Council and expanded the system to include four new primary schools, including one for girls. The government soon took over this growing system and, with new oil revenues after World War II, rapidly expanded the system. In 1956 the government laid down the basis of the education system that still existed in 1993: kindergarten and primary, middle, and secondary schools. A 1965 law, largely enforced, made education compul- sory until the age of fourteen. A small system of private schools also developed. Public education, including preschool and higher education, was from the beginning free for all nation- als. The government absorbs not only the costs of schools but also those of books, uniforms, meals, transportation, and inci- dental expenses. In preinvasion Kuwait, the majority of the stu- dents in the education system were non-Kuwaitis (see table 3, Appendix). The apex of the public education system is Kuwait Univer- sity, which the government established in 1966. More than half the students at Kuwait University are women, in part because families are more likely to send boys abroad for study. The gov- ernment also subsidizes hundreds of students in university study abroad, many in the United States. As a result of these efforts, the school population and the lit- eracy rate increased steadily. By the mid-1980s, literacy and education rates were high. Although only 55 percent of the cit- izen population was literate in 1975, by 1985 that percentage had increased to 73.6 percent (84 percent for males and 63.1 percent for females). In 1990 the overall literacy rate was 74 percent. The total number of teachers increased from just under 3,000 at independence in 1961 to more than 28,000 in academic year 1988-89; the number of schools increased from 140 to 642 during the same period (see table 4, Appendix). The education system has its problems, however. For exam- ple, it relies heavily on foreign teachers. In the late 1950s, almost 90 percent were non-Kuwaitis. Despite a long-standing government effort to indigenize education, the system contin- ues to rely heavily on foreigners. The system also often fails to train graduates in fields that correspond to Kuwait's most press- ing labor needs. Especially in higher education, the system pro- 55 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies duces many graduates with training in liberal arts and few with training in vocational subjects. Health and Welfare The health care system and health conditions also improved dramatically in the years after oil revenues brought wealth to the country. Kuwait's first attempts to introduce a modern health care system date back to the first years of the twentieth century when the ruler, Shaykh Mubarak Al Sabah the Great, invited doctors from the Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church in the United States to establish a clinic. By 191 1 the group had organized a hospital for men and in 1919 a small hospital for women. In 1934 the thirty-four-bed Olcott Memorial Hospital opened. Between 1909 and 1946, Kuwait experienced gradual, albeit limited, improvement in health conditions. General mortality stood between twenty and twenty-five per 1,000 population and infant mortality between 100 and 125 per 1,000 live births. After the government began receiving oil revenues, it expanded the health care system, beginning with the opening of the Amiri Hospital in 1949. The Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) also opened some small health facilities. By 1950 general mortality had fallen to between sev- enteen and twenty-three per 1,000 population and infant mor- tality to between eighty and 100 per 1,000 live births. In the 1950s, the government introduced a comprehensive health care system offering free services to the entire popula- tion. Free health care was so extensive that it even included vet- erinary medicine. Expenditures on health ranked third in the national budget, after public works and education. As with edu- cation, the system relied heavily on foreigners. Most of the phy- sicians were foreigners, particularly Egyptians. Critics charged the designers of the system with paying undue attention to acquiring the most modern and expensive medical equipment, without regard to the country's health priorities, and favoring treatment over prevention. Nonetheless, improvements in available health care and in public health were dramatic (see table 5, Appendix). The number of doctors grew from 362 in 1962 to 2,641 in 1988. The doctor-to-patient ratio improved from one to 1,200 to one to 600. Infant and child mortality rates dropped dramatically; in 1990 the infant mortality rate was fifteen per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy increased ten years in the postindependence years, putting Kuwait at a level comparable to most industrialized countries. In 1990 life 56 Kuwait expectancy for males was seventy-two years and for females sev- enty-six years. In addition to a comprehensive system of health care, the government provides residents with one of the world's most encompassing social service systems. Not only does it indirectly support the national population through guaranteed state employment and subsidized services (such as water and elec- tricity), but it also supports those most in need through direct subsidies. These include the disabled, the elderly, the unem- ployed, students and their families, the widowed, the unmar- ried, and even the families of prisoners. By 1990 Kuwait had an extensive welfare program, exceeded perhaps by no other country. Citizens receive free medical ser- vices from highly trained practitioners in modern facilities; free education through the university level; subsidized food, hous- ing, utilities, and transportation; and various other benefits. For all this, they pay no taxes: the system is supported by oil rev- enues from outside the country. On the eve of the Iraqi inva- sion, the United Nations Development Programme placed Kuwait at the top of its annual human development index with a life expectancy of 73.4 years, an adult literacy rate of 73 per- cent, and a real per capita gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) of US$15,984. The benefits of the welfare system, however, are unevenly distributed among the population. Non- citizens in particular benefit much less, and many, especially those from Arab states and those who have worked many years in Kuwait, resent their disadvantaged position. Economy In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Kuwait's econ- omy was based on trade. The city of Kuwait rivaled Basra in Iraq as an entrepot for trade between India and parts of the Middle East. Kuwait became a conduit for commerce from the gulf to Asia, Africa, and Europe. It was Kuwait's fine natural harbor that first attracted the Bani Utub settlers, and they made much of this maritime advantage. In the nineteenth and early twenti- eth centuries, the economy relied primarily on pearl diving, and merchants and sailors harvested the gulfs natural pearl banks, which were among the richest in the world. In the first decades of the twentieth century, Kuwait had about 700 boats, employing approximately 15,000 men. When the pearl-diving season (mid-May to mid-September) ended, Kuwaiti merchants used their ships for long-distance trade. From this trade, a ship- 57 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies building industry developed, and Kuwaiti craft became known throughout coastal Arabia for their quality. Fishing was also a small but important industry. The tradition of seafaring and trade gave Kuwait a thriving merchant class and an outward ori- entation that remained important into the 1990s. Although prosperous by regional standards, Kuwait's econ- omy offered only a meager existence to most of the population, especially those outside the ruling families and the merchant families. Even this meager existence began to suffer with the decline of pearling. That industry, the basis of Kuwait's econ- omy, came to a sudden end in the 1920s with the development of the process of making cultured pearls in Japan and then the Great Depression. Fortuitously, the pearl industry declined just as a new source of revenue was emerging. In 1938 oil was dis- covered in Kuwait. Once oil exports began in the immediate post-World War II years, economic development became nearly continuous. Oil Industry For centuries, oil seepages in the desert had indicated oil below the surface. This oil came to the attention of European and United States developers. In 1911 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), which was developing oil fields in Iran, requested permission to negotiate a concession from Kuwait. The British government refused the request (as it was entitled to do so under an 1899 treaty that granted Britain substantial control of Kuwait's foreign policy), but two years later the Brit- ish government commissioned a geological survey of the area. In 1913 the British government signed an agreement with Kuwait's Shaykh Mubarak the Great in which he promised to grant concessions only to companies approved by the British government, clarifying and reaffirming the agreement of 1899. World War I interrupted another effort to negotiate a conces- sion. By this time, the British government had purchased 51 percent ownership in APOC as part of an effort to ensure oil supplies for the Royal Navy. After W T orld War I, interest in oil grew. APOC continued attempts to obtain a Kuwait concession. Meanwhile, in the 1920s, Gulf Oil of the United States began to seek concessions in the gulf to overcome its lack of crude oil sources. British treaties with most rulers in the gulf, including Kuwait, made it difficult for non-British companies to gain access, although the United States government pressured the British to provide 58 Kuwait equal treatment to United States oil firms. In 1932 Gulf Oil and APOC formed a joint company to negotiate a concession in Kuwait, and this effort received British government approval. In 1934 Kuwait's ruler, Shaykh Ahmad al Jabir Al Sabah, signed a concession agreement with the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), the firm jointly owned by APOC and Gulf Oil. KOC began surveying in 1935. Drilling started in 1936 on the north shore of Kuwait Bay, but no oil was found. The sec- ond attempt, in the desert, struck a gusher in 1938 in an area that subsequently was called the Al Burqan field, one of the largest and most productive fields in the world (see fig. 4). World War II slowed the development of the industry, but at the end of the war, pipelines and other facilities were com- pleted that could handle 30,000 barrels per day (bpd — see Glossary) of crude oil. Commercial export of crude oil began in June 1946. Production amounted to 5.9 million barrels in 1946 and 16.2 million barrels in 1947. KOC subsequently dis- covered seven additional oil fields, and production continued to increase until it peaked in 1972. (In 1954 KOC's parent com- pany, APOC, was renamed British Petroleum — BP.) In the years after World War II, other companies received smaller concessions, in particular for offshore oil, but KOC, which the government nationalized in 1976 (retroactively to 1975), retained the lion's share. Subsequent concessions con- tained progressively better terms for Kuwait, partly because of the entrance of small oil companies anxious to acquire crude oil sources and partly because of the activities and exchanges of information among oil-producing states. Payments were sub- stantially higher, the length of concessions was shorter, sched- ules for relinquishing underdeveloped areas were established, and opportunities for Kuwaiti participation in the companies were increased. The American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) was the successful bidder for Kuwait's rights in the Neutral Zone, receiving in June 1948 a sixty-year concession for exploration and production. Aminoil, which was owned by a number of small United States oil companies, had a joint operation with the Getty Oil Company, which held the Saudi rights in the Neu- tral Zone. The Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco, the main developer of Saudi Arabia's oil fields) reportedly viewed the terms given Kuwait by Aminoil as unfavorable and relin- quished its concession in the Neutral Zone, which Getty won. Aminoil started exploratory drilling in 1949 but did not strike 59 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Figure 4. Kuwait: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and Refineries, 1993 oil until 1953. Production began in 1954. Production from the Neutral Zone was shared between the two countries, and Amin- oil paid royalties and taxes to Kuwait, whereas Getty paid royal- ties and taxes to Saudi Arabia. The zone was partitioned in 1969, but the partitioning did not affect the concession arrangements. A group of Japanese companies formed the Arabian Oil Company (AOC), which obtained concessions from both Saudi Arabia (1957) and Kuwait (1958) for exploration and produc- tion in the offshore area of the zone. AOC started drilling in 1959, and production of crude oil began in 1961. Production was shared between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Some AOC pro- duction was from the northern tip of Saudi Arabia's As Saf- faniyah field, the world's largest offshore field. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait each purchased 10 percent ownership of AOC soon after its formation. From the beginning of the development of the oil industry, Kuwait's leaders had wanted to participate actively in oil policy and company management. BP and Gulf Oil rejected the demands of the amir (see Glossary) for a Kuwaiti on the KOC 60 Kuwait board of directors, but the Kuwaiti government obtained some participation in the AOC concession agreement, although it was more symbolic than real. Frozen out of oil operations by the major oil companies, Kuwait started to develop its own proficiency in the oil indus- try. The Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) was formed in 1960 with the expressed intention of becoming an integrated oil company. Its founding charter allowed it to engage in almost any activity concerning oil at home or abroad. It began with 60 percent government ownership; the remaining shares were held by private Kuwaiti investors. The government bought out private investors in 1975. KNPC started operations on a small scale, in part because of Kuwait's acute shortage of skilled workers. It bought out KOC's local oil distribution facilities and became the sole supplier of oil in Kuwait. It participated in foreign refinery operations and established subsidiaries and facilities abroad for marketing oil products. Departments for exploration and other aspects of field operations were established within KNPC to work with for- eign companies in the concession area that KNPC had received from the government. Using foreign expertise and equipment, KNPC built a mod- ern refinery to use gas in the Al Burqan field, which would otherwise have been flared, in a hydrogenation process to con- vert crude oil into products and to produce sulfur as a useful by-product. Kuwait's crude is heavy and contains considerable sulfur, so the design of the refinery was excellently fitted to the local circumstances to turn out a product superior to that of a regular refinery. The refinery at Ash Shuaybah was completed in 1968, but technical problems initially caused an unprofitable mix of products. Between cost overruns during construction and a poor range of products, KNPC lost money until the prob- lems were corrected. Nonetheless, KNPC provided useful train- ing for Kuwaitis in upper levels of oil company management. As oil revenues began to mount, officials increasingly favored investing a larger part of the funds in downstream (see Glossary) and upstream (see Glossary) oil operations. The petrochemical industry offered fewer obstacles to industrial development than most other industries. It needed relatively few workers, large capital investments, and substantial oil and gas sources — requirements that fit the country's circumstances well. Yet despite the apparent advantages, the government moved slowly, perhaps for good reason. In 1963 the Petrochem- 61 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies icals Industries Company (PIC) was formed, with 80 percent state ownership. It began with modest facilities but acquired additional plants over the years through purchase of other companies and construction of new facilities. In 1976 the gov- ernment bought out private investors, and PIC became wholly government owned. PIC's chemical complexes were the coun- try's largest manufacturing plants. A key ingredient was a gas- gathering system to use the gases produced in association with crude oil. Until the late 1970s, a considerable part of the gases had been flared. In addition to the gas-gathering system, the government expanded its investment in oil-refining capacity and petrochemical facilities. Kuwait's goal of real participation in and control over its oil industry was achieved in 1976 when the government bought KOC, including the refinery and other installations. BP and Gulf Oil continued to provide technical services and personnel in return for access to oil supplies and service fees. In 1976 Kuwait concluded negotiations to purchase 60 percent of its one-half share of AOC's offshore operations. Negotiations for 60 percent of Aminoil foundered over the value of assets. In 1977 Kuwait nationalized the firm, paying compensation on the basis of an official estimate of the value of assets. Aminoil became the Kuwait Wafrah Oil Company. In 1978 operations of the Al Wafrah field passed to KOC, and KNPC took over the former Aminoil refinery and shipping terminal at Mina Abd Allah. As oil revenues rose in the 1970s, the Kuwaiti government continued its upstream and downstream expansion, establish- ing the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) as a semiautono- mous state organization in January 1980 to rationalize the organizational structure of its oil industry. KPC became the country's national integrated oil company, with KOC, KNPC, PIC, the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, and the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company among its more important wholly owned subsidiaries. KOC remained primarily responsi- ble for domestic exploration and production of oil and gas, and KNPC was mainly the refining subsidiary. KPC also entered into joint ventures with and purchased shares in foreign com- panies involved in various aspects of the oil business. In 1981 KPC bought the Santa Fe International Corporation, a United States drilling and energy engineering firm. Other KPC activi- ties abroad included part ownership in refineries and petro- chemical plants, exploration and drilling in foreign concession 62 Laboratory technician at the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences Courtesy Embassy of Kuwait, Washington areas, and purchase of retail outlets for petroleum products. By the late 1980s, Kuwait was producing 20,000 bpd in overseas holdings, primarily in the United States and in the North Sea. It was exporting 614,000 bpd as refined products. Initially, Kuwait sold this oil primarily to Japan and Pakistan, but begin- ning in the late 1980s, it also sold through a large West Euro- pean retail network it purchased, selling oil under the logo Q8. Oil production levels fluctuated in the period after World War II (see table 6, Appendix). At first, production of crude oil rose rapidly, peaking at nearly 1.1 billion barrels in 1970 before falling to more modest levels. Until 1972 much of the expan- sion resulted from increasing crude oil production. For the rest of the 1970s, oil production was substantially lower, but higher revenues per barrel financed continued economic growth. With regard to prices, Kuwaiti officials followed moderate policies between conflicting objectives. Initially, Kuwait actively supported the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun- tries (OPEC), which at times required oil production levels below that necessary to cover government expenditures. Kuwait, for example, reduced oil production and exports dur- ing the Arab oil embargo associated with the October 1973 War. The Kuwaiti government believed that oil in the ground 63 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies was worth more to future generations than holding such paper claims as securities and corporate shares that were subject to price inflation, exchange-rate risks, and sequestration. In 1973 the Kuwaiti government set an oil production limit of 3 million bpd under pressure from the National Assembly. In 1976 the production ceiling was reduced to 2 million bpd. In the 1980s, a surplus of oil relative to demand began to emerge on the world market, and oil prices fell dramatically. As surplus oil supplies grew, Kuwait's production ceiling was further reduced to 1.5 million bpd, although actual production was appreciably lower. But as oil prices fell, and with it revenues, Kuwait increas- ingly resisted OPEC's efforts to limit its production. In 1986 Kuwait reluctantly agreed to an OPEC limit of 1.25 million bpd (not counting, however, output of the Divided Zone that, dur- ing this period, was earmarked as aid for Iraq). In 1989 it refused an OPEC level of just under 1.1 million bpd. In early 1990, Kuwait produced nearly 2 million bpd, a factor that the Iraqi government cited in its decision to invade Kuwait in August. In the 1950s and 1960s, Kuwait economically had been little more than an oil well: oil was the source of most of its revenues, and the bulk of its exports were oil, mostly crude oil. But in the 1970s, officials increased refining capacity, and by the 1980s, refined products gained in value relative to crude oil exports. By the 1980s, Kuwait controlled its hydrocarbon resources and had created an international oil company, KPC, that was among the world's largest corporations. Through its subsidiar- ies, KPC was involved in all aspects of the oil industry and in many countries of the world. This was a remarkable achieve- ment in view of the fact that only twenty-five years had passed since Kuwait entered the oil industry. Diversification Industrial development in Kuwait has always faced formida- ble obstacles. Kuwait, so rich in oil, is poor in most other resources, which limits the manufacturing industries that can be established. No metallic minerals and few suitable non- metallic minerals are locally available. Most raw materials for the early industries — for example, cement — had to be imported. The limited supply of fresh water is another con- straint. In a country without streams and with few under- ground sources, water is crucial to industrial development. The pre-oil system, where local sailing boats carried water from Iraq 64 Waterfront project that extends along twenty-one kilometers of the Kuwaiti coast Courtesy Embassy of Kuwait, Washington 65 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies to Kuwait, could not meet manufacturing needs. The small size of the domestic market restricts production for local consump- tion to small-scale operations. The open economy, which was maintained before and after the discovery of oil, provided little protection from foreign competition. The small Kuwaiti labor force, possessing limited skills, is another constraint. After the discovery of oil, labor costs escalated, and in a few years wages in Kuwait were higher than those in almost any other area of the Middle East, further hindering industrial development. Also, the commercial tradition in the country predisposes most entrepreneurs to invest in trade rather than manufacturing. As a result of these obstacles, industry, excluding oil-related indus- try, expanded very slowly. The discovery of oil created a demand for new industries, initially satisfied by the oil company itself. Oil operations par- ticularly needed water, electricity, and refined petroleum prod- ucts, and these were the first modern industries created in the state. The government took over production of water and elec- tricity, expanding the systems and subsidizing their use. Air conditioning provided the largest demand, with peak summer loads more than five times minimum winter loads, creating substantial idle capacity for about six months of the year. The need for larger and more regular supplies of water, no matter how costly, compelled KOC to install the first desalination plant. In 1953 the government installed the first unit, which had a capacity of 3.8 million liters per day. Subsequently, the government claimed that it had developed the most advanced continuously operating desalination facilities in the world. Although oil spurred the first industries in Kuwait, after the initial push, oil did not generate much in the way of new indus- tries locally. As a result of the many obstacles that industry faced and in light of the massive oil revenues, the government began to play a major role in all industrial development. The government undertook some efforts at diversification in the 1950s, but the first major push for industrialization occurred with the establishment of the Ash Shuaybah Industrial Zone in 1964. The zone comprised electricity and water distillation plants, expanded port facilities, metalworks, and plants manu- facturing chlorine, asphalt, cement, pilings, and prefabricated housing. The government provided such necessary facilities as roads, gas, electricity, water, sewerage, port facilities, communi- cations, and rented or leased industrial sites at nominal rates. Most of the larger industrial facilities were located in the zone. 66 Kuwait Other small manufacturing establishments were located in the populated parts of the country. The government provided a range of incentives to private manufacturers, who were predominantly local; 51 percent Kuwaiti ownership was required of all businesses. In addition to infrastructural support, financial aid included equity capital and loans. In 1974 the government created the Investment Bank of Kuwait to provide medium- and long-term industrial financing at low interest rates. The government also gave local industry preference in government purchases, protection from imports in some cases, and exemption from customs duties and taxes. In the 1970s, the government's Industrial Development Committee and the Industrial Bank of Kuwait established a number of incentives for private-sector participation, such as technical aid and preferential guaranteed markets in state industry. Nonetheless, industry in Kuwait never enjoyed the same level of state support that it did in other gulf states. The government, having made a conscious decision to invest its rev- enues overseas and locally in such human resources as educa- tion and health care, gave only minimal support, by the standards of other oil-producing countries, to non-oil manufac- turing. Agriculture and Fishing Agriculture has also seen minimal development. Kuwait's desert climate sustains little vegetation. Kuwait has no rivers, only a few wadis that fill with winter and spring rain. Scant rain- fall, little irrigation water, and poor soils have always limited farming in Kuwait. Before the discovery of oil, several occupa- tions contributed to the economy — nomads moving livestock to the sparse forage in the desert, pearling, and fishing — but none of these occupations provided much beyond subsistence. Once the government began receiving oil revenues, the contri- bution of other sectors to national income was reduced still fur- ther (see table 7, Appendix). Economic growth and welfare measures since World War II drew workers away from historical pursuits and lessened the role of agriculture. In the late 1980s, fewer than 10,000 people were employed in agriculture. The government invested some money in developing hydroponics to increase vegetable production. Kuwait's most important crops in 1989 were tomatoes (40,000 tons), dried onions (25,000 tons), melons (7,000 tons), dates (1,000 tons), and smaller amounts of cucumbers and eggplants. Some of these 67 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies crops are grown hydroponically. Although Kuwait manages to export some vegetables, its agricultural potential remains lim- ited. Fishing provides a minor but important economic contribu- tion. Much of the fishing for the local market was historically from small boats, including many native dhows. Large-scale commercial fishing is mostly confined to the United Fisheries of Kuwait, which operates a fleet of vessels as far afield as the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean. United Fisheries is a large, international firm that processes and exports part of its catch, particularly frozen shrimp. However, in the 1970s overfishing in the gulf by many states considerably reduced catches of fish and shrimp. In 1989 Kuwait had a catch of approximately 4,700 tons of fish and 3,000 tons of shrimp and prawns. In the late 1980s, war and environmental damage, including oil spills, also reduced the attractiveness of the gulf fishing industry Transportation and Telecommunications Kuwait has a modern, well-maintained transportation sys- tem. The entire system suffered extensive damage in the Per- sian Gulf War, but by 1993 repairs had brought most facilities back to their prewar condition. The highway system comprised more than 3,900 kilometers of roads in 1993. About 3,000 kilo- meters are paved, and the rest are gravel or graded earth. Expressways extend south and west from the city of Kuwait to neighboring cities. Paved highways link Kuwait with Iraq to the north and Saudi Arabia to the west and south. Despite the excellent network of roads in populated areas, traffic conges- tion is a growing problem. Plans to build a causeway across Kuwait Bay were delayed by the Iraqi invasion in 1990. Three ports handle all commercial shipping and petroleum exports. The principal port for nonpetroleum products in 1993 was Ash Shuwaykh, several kilometers west of the downtown section of the city of Kuwait. Built in 1960, Ash Shuwaykh is one of the busiest ports in the Middle East, with twenty-one deep- water berths. In 1988 more than 1,100 vessels carried 3.7 mil- lion tons of cargo through Ash Shuwaykh. Ash Shuaybah was built in 1967, fifty kilometers south of the city of Kuwait, to develop the Ash Shuaybah Industrial Zone. By 1988, however, it rivaled Ash Shuwaykh in size and traffic with twenty berths and 3.5 million tons of cargo transported. Mina al Ahmadi, just north of Ash Shuaybah, handles most of Kuwait's petroleum 68 Kuwait exports. Twelve offshore berths can load more than 2 million bpd of oil and can accommodate the largest oil tankers. Kuwait International Airport, sixteen kilometers south of the city of Kuwait, handles all international flights. The latest expansion to the airport, a new terminal, was completed in 1979. Kuwait Airways, the national carrier, has regularly sched- uled service to more than twenty-four cities worldwide. Like its transportation system, Kuwait's modern telecommu- nications system was heavily damaged during the Iraqi occupa- tion. The government has made strides at reconstruction, but in 1993 work remained to restore the system to its prewar level of excellence. In 1989 there were 285,000 telephones, or four- teen telephones per 100 inhabitants. High-capacity coaxial cables and radio-relay systems linked Kuwait with its neighbors. In 1993, however, the coaxial cable to Iraq was still inoperable. Before the war, the country had four ground satellite stations working with the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) and the Arab Satellite Communication Organization (Arabsat) system. All four stations were destroyed in the war, however, and smaller mobile satellite ground sta- tions currently handle international telephone calls, data trans- mission, and live television broadcasts. The city of Kuwait has three AM radio stations, three FM radio stations, three televi- sion transmitters, and a powerful shortwave transmitter for international service. Banking and Finance Before independence in 1961, foreign monies, largely the Indian rupee in the period between 1930 and 1960, circulated in Kuwait. At independence the Kuwaiti dinar was introduced, and a currency board was established to issue dinar notes and to maintain reserves. In 1959 the Central Bank of Kuwait was created and took over the functions of the currency board and the regulation of the banking system. The first bank in Kuwait was established in 1941 by British investors. Subsequent laws prohibited foreign banks from con- ducting business in the country. When the British bank's con- cession ended in 1971, the government bought 51 percent ownership. In 1952 another bank, the National Bank of Kuwait, the largest commercial bank, was founded. The establishment of several other banks, all under Kuwaiti ownership, followed. Some specialized financial institutions also emerged: the Credit and Savings Bank, established in 1965 by the govern- 69 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies ment to channel funds into domestic projects in industry, agri- culture, and housing; the Industrial Bank of Kuwait, established in 1974 to fill the gap in medium- and long-term industrial financing; and the private Real Estate Bank of Kuwait. By the 1980s, Kuwait's banks were among the region's largest and most active financial institutions. Then came the Suq al Manakh stock market crash in 1982. The large revenues of the 1970s left many private individu- als with substantial funds at their disposal. These funds prompted a speculation boom in the official stock market in the mid-1970s that culminated in a small crash in 1977. The government's response to this crash was to bail out the affected investors and to introduce stricter regulations. This response unintentionally contributed to the far larger stock market crash of the 1980s by driving the least risk-averse speculators into the technically illegal alternate market, the Suq al Manakh. The Suq al Manakh had emerged next to the official stock market, which was dominated by several older wealthy families who traded, largely among themselves, in very large blocks of stock. The Suq al Manakh soon became the market for the new investor and, in the end, for many old investors as well. Share dealings using postdated checks created a huge unregulated expansion of credit. The crash of the unofficial stock market finally came in 1982, when a dealer presented a postdated check for payment and it bounced. A house of cards collapsed. Official investigation revealed that total outstanding checks amounted to the equivalent of US$94 billion from about 6,000 investors. Kuwait's financial sector was badly shaken by the crash, as was the entire economy. The crash prompted a recession that rippled through society as individual families were disrupted by the investment risks of particular members made on family credit. The debts from the crash left all but one bank in Kuwait technically insolvent, held up only by support from the Central Bank. Only the National Bank of Kuwait, the largest commercial bank, survived the crisis intact. In the end, the government stepped in, devising a complicated set of policies, embodied in the Difficult Credit Facilities Reset- tlement Program. The implementation of the program was still incomplete in 1990 when the Iraqi invasion changed the entire financial picture (see Economic Reconstruction, this ch.). 70 Kuwait Foreign Investment From the very beginning, government officials were keenly aware that oil was a depletable asset, that the country had few other resources, and that preparations had to be made for the day when there would be no more oil. As soon as the govern- ment began to receive oil revenues, officials spent less than the treasury received, leaving a surplus in the state's general reserve to be invested. Because of limited domestic investment opportunities, most investments were made abroad. World Bank (see Glossary) economists estimate that about 25 percent of revenues were placed in foreign assets during the 1950s, although the Kuwaiti government's published data have always been vague about reserves as well as about some other eco- nomic variables. In the 1950s and 1960s, Kuwait began investing overseas in property and businesses in Britain. In 1952 Kuwait established an office in London, staffed with experienced British invest- ment counselors who guided the government's placement of funds. In the same year, Kuwait created investment relations with a large New York bank. Because of the vastly expanded oil revenues of the 1970s, Kuwait's overseas investment program grew tremendously. In 1976 the government established the Reserve Fund for Future Generations, into which it placed an initial US$7 billion. It resolved to invest 10 percent of its reve- nues annually in the reserve fund. Money from the fund, along with other government revenues, was invested in overseas prop- erty and industry. In the 1970s, most of these funds were invested in the United States and in Western Europe: in Ger- man firms (such as Hoechst and Daimler-Benz, in each of which Kuwait owned 25 percent), in property, and in most of the United States Fortune Five Hundred firms. In the 1980s, Kuwait began diversifying its overseas investments, placing more investments in Japanese firms. By the late 1980s, Kuwait was earning more from these overseas investments than it was from the direct sale of oil: in 1987 foreign investments gener- ated US$6.3 billion, oil US$5.4 billion. The Financial Times of London estimated Kuwait's overseas investments in early 1990 at more than US$100 billion, most of it in the Reserve Fund for Future Generations. The Iraqi invasion proved the importance of these invest- ment revenues. With oil revenues suspended, the government and population in exile relied exclusively on investment reve- nues, including sales of investments for sustenance, for their 71 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies share of ongoing coalition expenses and for postwar recon- struction and repair of the vital oil industry. Foreign Aid and Trade Foreign trade has always dominated Kuwait's economy. Before the discovery of oil, merchants developed large trans- shipment and reexport businesses that, along with the sale of pearls to foreign dealers, yielded a substantial part of the popu- lation's income. The discovery of large quantities of oil pro- vided a new and increasingly important export because Kuwait needed only small amounts of oil products domestically. None- theless, even after the discovery of oil, Kuwait's merchants con- tinued to develop transshipment and reexport businesses with neighboring countries. During the Iran-Iraq War, goods for Iraq passed through Kuwaiti ports. Oil, however, overwhelm- ingly dominated Kuwait's exports (see table 8, Appendix). Kuwait's significant foreign-exchange earnings from oil exports and investment income largely removed any con- straints on imports in the pre-invasion period. Almost any com- modity could be imported, and most import duties were modest. Imports for Kuwait's high-income economy were mainly finished products because of the small domestic manu- facturing sector (see table 9, Appendix). These imports came predominantly from Asian countries, followed by those from European countries. Imports of all kinds came primarily from Japan and the United States. After the Persian Gulf War, imports from the United States increased dramatically (see table 10, Appendix). Huge oil revenues, paid in foreign cur- rencies, freed Kuwait for the most part from balance of pay- ments worries (see table 11, Appendix). The government accumulated surplus funds that were invested abroad. A large part of these reserve investments abroad, however, were cashed in during the Iraqi occupation and the liberation period that followed in order to pay the expenses of Kuwait and the allied coalition. Historically, Kuwait also invested part of its revenues in for- eign aid, primarily to Arab states. This foreign aid increased substantially as oil revenues rose in the 1970s. It took many forms, such as loans, joint financing, equity participation, and direct grants, particularly in support of Arab causes. In the 1960s, the government began placing funds in the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), established in 1961. The best known of Kuwait's investment organizations 72 Kuwait and one that was used as a model by other oil exporters, KFAED functioned as both an investment and an aid agency, providing loans for specific projects, often on concessionary terms. KFAED's charter was changed in 1974, when capitaliza- tion was increased to KD1 billion (for value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary), and the fund began expanding its provi- sion of funds to developing countries worldwide. Most KFAED aid went to development projects, especially in agriculture, to provide basic services such as electricity, water, and transporta- tion and to develop human resources through education and health care. A large amount of aid went directly from the gov- ernment to other states. In per capita terms, Kuwait's aid pro- gram was one of the most generous in the world. In the early 1980s, when oil prices were high, nearly 4 percent of Kuwait's gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) went to the aid program. But in the late 1980s, the levels of aid declined along with declining revenues. After the Iran-Iraq War started, in 1980, Kuwait increasingly directed its aid toward Iraq. During the 1980s, Kuwait lent Iraq an estimated US$13 billion. Kuwait's foreign aid slowed considerably after the Iraqi inva- sion in August 1990 and is expected to remain limited as Kuwait deals with the costs of reconstruction. Political System Ruling Family The modern political history of Kuwait began in the early eighteenth century when a number of families of the Bani Utub section of the Anaizah tribe migrated from central Ara- bia, settling eventually in Kuwait. Once in Kuwait, they estab- lished a self-governing political unit. The date of 1756 is conventionally chosen as the year when the settlers decided to select as their leader Sabah, an Al Sabah shaykh (see Glossary), who was succeeded by his son Abd Allah, in turn succeeded by his son Jabir. All subsequent rulers historically have come from the Al Sabah line, chosen by family council, in consultation with the leading merchant families who, along with the tribal elite, exercise some restriction over the shaykhs" political autonomy. The shaykh's primary task was to represent his community in foreign policy, negotiating with Ottoman Turkey and with neighboring tribes. The one major and unsuccessful challenge to this system of rule occurred in the 1760s when the Al Khalifa 73 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies family disagreed with the Al Sabah and in consequence left Kuwait for Qatar, and then Bahrain, where the Al Khalifa con- tinue to rule. Despite the rift, the two settlements maintained good relations, including close trade ties. In the nineteenth century, members of the Al Sabah over- saw the growing trade and pearling settlement in Kuwait. The rulers also developed a cordial relationship with Britain, begin- ning with the first contacts with the British East India Company in 1775. As members of a small, vulnerable settlement, Kuwait's rulers attempted to maintain a polite but distant relationship with all the local powers, notably the British, the Wahhabis (see Glossary) of Arabia, and the Ottomans. It was only under Abd Allah Al Sabah II, who ruled from 1866 to 1892, that Kuwait began to edge away from this policy of neutrality. Abd Allah developed close ties with the Ottomans, even taking the Otto- man title, albeit largely as a formality, of provincial governor (qaimaqam) in 1871. In practical terms, Kuwait's domestic poli- tics remained unchanged because the Ottoman government did not interfere in the selection of rulers and laws. In any event, this tilt was completely reversed when, following the four-year rule of Muhammad Al Sabah, Mubarak Al Sabah the Great ruled from 1896 to 1915. Kuwait came into the British sphere of influence at the end of the nineteenth century when Mubarak sought British sup- port against Ottoman forces. The Ottomans were backing allies of Mubarak's brothers, Kuwait's previous rulers, whom Mubarak had killed on taking power in 1896. Uneasy about Ottoman intentions, Mubarak reversed his predecessors' pro- Ottoman policy and approached Britain, seeking a more for- mal alliance. Britain, concerned with growing European inter- ests and notably with an Ottoman concession to Germany for construction of a Berlin-to-Baghdad railroad — with a proposed spur line to Kuwait — agreed. Britain signed a treaty with Kuwait in 1899 that promised Mubarak British support and, in return, gave Britain control of Kuwait's foreign policy. This treaty gov- erned relations between the two states until Kuwait's indepen- dence in 1961. It granted Britain tremendous influence, most notably in foreign and economic policy. After Mubarak's death, Kuwait was ruled by two of his sons, JabirAl Sabah (1915-17) and Salim Al Sabah (1917-21) (see fig. 5). Thereafter, with one exception, only descendants of Mubarak through these two sons would rule Kuwait, thus form- ing a major cleavage within the ruling family. After Salim's 74 Kuwait death in 1921, Kuwait was ruled for nearly three decades by Ahmad al Jabir Al Sabah. Ahmad al Jabir's rule witnessed a seri- ous effort to constrain ruling family power. In 1938 a rebellion, known locally as the Majlis Movement, developed. New issues arose. Kuwait was in the midst of a serious recession as a result of the general decline of the pearling industry, the Great Depression, and a trade dispute with Saudi Arabia that prompted a Saudi embargo. Simultaneously, the recently signed oil concession with KOC promised better times ahead if the resulting income were not monopolized by the ruling fam- ily. To prevent that from happening, the leading merchants began petitioning the ruler for a series of reforms. In June the merchants took their protest a step further, holding elections for a legislative assembly to implement the desired reforms using these new revenues. The Legislative Assembly ruled for six months until finally abolished by the ruler and his tribal backers. The assembly, however, came to be viewed as Kuwait's first prodemocracy movement. Its popularity gave the idea of formal representation a place in Kuwaiti popular history. Ahmad al Jabir was succeeded by his cousin Abd Allah as Salim Al Sabah (1950-65), who oversaw the distribution of now substantial oil revenues, the consequent emergence of a large bureaucratic state, and the transformation of Kuwait into a wealthy oil-producing shaykhdom. In terms of internal devel- opments, Abd Allah as Salim made two transformative political decisions. The first was to distribute these new revenues broadly throughout the population, primarily through wide- ranging social services, notably education and health care. The second was to introduce a greater degree of political participa- tion to Kuwait in the form of the newly elected National Assem- bly. This body held its first elections in 1963. Abd Allah as Salim also oversaw Kuwait's transformation into a formally indepen- dent state on June 19, 1961, when he and British representa- tives signed new letters of friendship to replace the treaty of 1899. When Abd Allah as Salim died in 1965, he was succeeded by his brother Sabah as Salim Al Sabah — a somewhat unusual choice in that he, like Abd Allah as Salim, came from the Salim line rather than the Jabir line of the family, breaking the alter- nation between the two sides of the family that had existed since the rule of Mubarak's sons Jabir and Salim. Nonetheless, Sabah as Salim's rule proved to be largely a continuation and consolidation of policies set in place by Abd Allah as Salim. 75 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies SABAH (1756-62) ABD ALLAH (1762-1812) JABIR (1812-59) SABAH (1859-66) ABD ALLAH (1866-92) MUHAMMAD (1892-96) ABD AL AZIZ JABIR MUBARAK JABIR (1915-17) \ AU AHMAD (1921-50) SALIM AHMAD SAUD 6 SABAH KHALID MISHAAL FAHD NAWWAF ' MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH SABAH JABIR (1977- ) 1 Governor, Central Bank of Kuwait 5 Minister of defense 2 Minister of interior 6 Ambassador to the United States 3 Prime minister, crown prince, and heir apparent 7 Minister of social affairs and labor 4 Deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs 8 Minister of amiri affairs Source: Based on information from Alan Rush, Al-Sabah: Genealogy and History of Kuwait's Ruling Family, 1752-1986, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1987; and United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, Washington, 1992, 48-49. Figure 5. Kuwait: Abbreviated Genealogy of the Al Sabah, with Government Positions, Mid-1992 76 Kuwait MUBARAK {1896-1915) 4 OTHER BROTHERS SALIM (1917-21) ABD ALLAH (1950-65) SALIM |j JABIR | SAAD 3 ][ HAMAD ABD ALLAH SALMAN SABAH MUBARAK MUBARAK SABAH (1965-77) DUAIJ | | MUHAMMAD SALIM JABIR SALIM ALI SALMAN IBRAHIM AHMAD Ruler ( ) Rulership period 77 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies When Sabah as Salim died in December 1977, he was suc- ceeded by Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad aljabir Al Sabah, a succes- sion that returned the former pattern of alternation between the lines of Jabir and Salim. The influence of external events has dominated Jabir al Ahmad's rule. The first was the Iran-Iraq War, which rapidly increased the level of political violence in this historically rela- tively peaceful shaykhdom. Major events included the 1983 bombing of the United States embassy and, probably most notable, the dramatic public assassination attempt on the amir in 1985. The tension associated with the war also exacerbated divisions within Kuwaiti society, notably that between Sunnis and Shia, and prompted the amir increasingly to limit public participation in political life. Although in 1980 Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad restored the National Assembly (which Sabah as Salim had abolished in 1976), the increasing political tension prompted him to do away with it again in 1986 and to intro- duce new measures curtailing civil and political rights. These measures prompted a wide range of opposition leaders — including old parliamentarians, Islamists (sometimes seen as fundamentalists), and merchants — to form the Constitutional Movement of 1989-90, a prodemocracy movement calling for the restoration of the National Assembly. The second external event was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, which, for the first time in Kuwait's history, placed the state under direct foreign rule. Although sover- eignty was restored in February 1991, events leading up to the invasion and the amir's behavior during and after the occupa- tion prompted open grumbling about the ruling family itself. The criticism centered on the amir and the fact that most of the ruling family spent the time of the Iraqi occupation in com- fortable exile abroad and delayed their return to the country after the war ended. In 1993 Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad still ruled Kuwait; his desig- nated successor, Prime Minister Saad al Abd Allah as Salim Al Sabah, also came from the Al Sabah ruling family. Although the Al Sabah remained paramount, the family as a ruling insti- tution had changed dramatically since it assumed its leading role in the mid-eighteenth century. First, succession patterns within the family had changed. In the nineteenth century, rule passed regularly from father to son. With the accession of Mubarak in the late nineteenth century, a new pattern was established that excluded all but Mubarak's line from the top 78 Kuwait position. This custom is formalized in the Kuwaiti constitution and in practice created a new pattern of alternation of rulers between the two lines of Mubarak's sons, Jabir and Salim. It was in keeping with this pattern that Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad (from the Jabir line) named as his crown prince and heir apparent Saad al Abd Allah as Salim, from the Salim line. The relationship between the ruling family and Kuwaiti soci- ety also changed in more subtle ways. Members of the family other than the ruler, once first among equals in a society where merchants and other elites played an important role in deci- sion making, became in the years after oil was discovered far wealthier because their wealth was guaranteed by a civil list — a list of sums appropriated to pay the expenses of a ruler and his household. Ruling family members also became socially more prominent and politically more important as they took over many of the state's highest posts. In part, this transformation occurred as a result of the emergence of a large state bureau- cracy and the need Kuwaiti rulers felt to fill the state's highest posts with loyal supporters, notably kin. Bureaucracy Kuwait's large state bureaucracy emerged in the post-World War II period as a result of the vast government revenues gen- erated by oil. Under the first oil concession, oil payments went directly from the oil companies to the amir, who, along with his advisers, decided — initially, rather informally — how much of the oil revenues would be spent and in what ways. The histori- cal elite, especially the merchants, objected to this arrange- ment, most notably in the Majlis Movement of 1938. In time the government instituted ministries, budgets, financial con- trols, and other aspects of modern public administration, partly in response to such public protests and partly from the practical necessities of carrying out a variety of new state func- tions related to oil and to popular distribution of revenues through state services. At the top of this bureaucracy is the cabinet, under the prime minister, a post that historically has been held by the crown prince. The cabinet is appointed by the amir, who has the power to dismiss it along with almost every senior executive official, including the crown prince, local governors, and offic- ers in the armed forces. Members of the Al Sabah play an important role in the cabinet. Twelve of the fifteen members in the original postindependence cabinet appointed in January 79 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 1962 were from the ruling family. Although public criticism led to a reduction in their numbers, in the 1970s and 1980s a large number of ministers, including those in the most important posts, came from the ruling family. The remaining cabinet ministers often came from prominent families and from mem- bers of the National Assembly (see Legislature, this ch.). These ministers were generally young (in their thirties and forties), highly educated (nearly half with college degrees, some with advanced degrees, especially in economics and business, often from United States universities), and mostly Sunni. In addition to the cabinet, Kuwait has several autonomous agencies and public corporations. Their employees and those of the various ministries comprise the bulk of the nation's civil servants. The civil service grew tremendously in the years after independence as the state developed a large bureaucracy devoted to spending oil revenues. The largest state institutions are those providing social services, notably education. Histori- cally, this bureaucracy has been staffed largely by foreigners. Although the government's policy has been to staff the civil ser- vice with Kuwaitis to the extent possible, and although most employed Kuwaitis work for the state, the government none- theless relied heavily on foreigners to fill positions at all levels before the Iraqi invasion. A second factor contributing to the growth of the bureau- cracy is the government's guarantee of jobs to all citizens. Not only does the state guarantee jobs, but it also offers Kuwaitis preferential treatment in employment, including higher sala- ries and preference in advancement over non-Kuwaitis. The government is the largest employer in the country. Many Kuwaitis prefer government employment to other positions even when it means undertaking routine tasks that underuse their skills and time. Others hold jobs in both the public and the private sectors, working in a government office in the morning and working privately in the afternoon. Observers fre- quently have commented on the country's excessive bureau- cracy and overstaffing, to the extent that several people are often assigned to what could be one job. Several efforts to reform the civil service have not reduced the inefficiency and underuse of available labor. Legislature One of the most remarkable aspects of Kuwaiti politics in the postindependence period is the National Assembly — one 80 Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir Al Sabah, ruler of Kuwait Courtesy Embassy of Kuwait, Washington of the few elected legislative bodies in the region. Pre-invasion Kuwait was one of the most politically open states in the region and the most open in the gulf. It had a relatively free press and an assembly elected by a small electorate of adult male citizens. The authors of the postindependence constitution of 1962, aware of the precedent set in the 1938 Legislative Assembly, saw the creation of an elected legislative body as an important means to widen the popular consensus and thereby further legitimize the rule of the Al Sabah, especially at a time when the family's position was threatened by the Iraqi claim to the entire territory of the new state. After the January 1963 elec- tion of the first National Assembly, the body evolved to serve as a broad forum for discussion and dissent. The men who domi- nated this assembly, however, were not the historical elite but, with some exceptions, were Kuwaitis who benefited from the state's generous welfare system. The historical opposition, the merchants on whom the amir relied for money in the lean pre- oil years, refrained from politics, devoting themselves instead to investing the money the amir sent their way. Although the constitution affords the assembly considerable power, the body is limited by two major restrictions: the small size of the electorate as defined by law, which restricts suffrage to most adult male nationals whose ancestors were present in Kuwait in 1920; and the power of the amir to dissolve the 81 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies assembly virtually at will. Nonetheless, the assembly plays a prominent role in raising issues of public importance, review- ing and challenging government policies and programs, and responding to constituent concerns. It helps give Kuwait a much more open and public political life than that in other gulf states. The roots of the National Assembly began in the 1961 elec- tions for the Constituent Assembly, which drafted a constitu- tion and laid the groundwork for elections in 1963 to the first National Assembly. The 1963 elections produced a solid oppo- sition in the National Bloc, which challenged government pol- icy in a number of areas. The opposition was so volatile that when elections were next held in 1967, opponents charged the government with widespread election fraud in an effort to restrict the contentious body. The new assembly indeed proved more pliable. However, the 1971 elections returned a more confrontational assembly, one that devoted much of its ener- gies to the nationalization of the oil company. Elections for the fourth assembly took place in 1975 and produced a body more strongly opposed to the government than its predecessor. In August 1976, Sabah as Salim dissolved the assembly and intro- duced new restrictions on public assembly and speech. But in 1980, because of renewed concern for popular support in light of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the regional tension that accompanied the subsequent Iran-Iraq War, the new amir, Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad, allowed elections to be held. The fifth assembly was highly confrontational, as was the sixth, elected in 1985. When in 1986 the assembly began attacking members of the ruling family, primarily in connection with the handling of the 1982 Suq al Manakh stock market crash, the amir again sus- pended the assembly. The minister of justice, a member of the ruling family, was forced to resign because of allegations he had used public influence for personal gain in resolving the crash. As in 1976, external pressures from Saudi Arabia, which was highly critical of Kuwait's more participatory system, proba- bly played a role in the amir's decision. Opposition to the decision again to suspend the assembly manifested itself in the Constitutional Movement of 1989-90. In 1989 members of the dissolved assembly began organizing and calling for reinstitution of the assembly and articles of the 1962 constitution that the amir had suspended as well in 1986. They were joined by many merchants, previously politically qui- escent — but now alienated by the ruler's inability to provide 82 City of Kuwait, capital of Kuwait Courtesy Embassy of * Kuwait, Washington ■ - • * On Z is < S -h < rm x D 5 _ T3 CL O o o o o c c c c S O 91 O X a £ E a £ e o • 1 I s 5 2 < y- CM CT c ^ be § c : ^ CM v. o> 1 I 5 » -5 o IS CO 00 ^ 03 184 Qatar ent) being Shaykh Abd Allah ibn Khalifa, minister of interior; Shaykh Ahmad ibn Hamad, minister of municipal affairs and agriculture; and Shaykh Muhammad ibn Khalifa, minister of finance, economy, and trade (see fig. 10). In October 1992, of the eighteen Council of Ministers posts, ten were occupied by the Al Thani and eight by commoners. The Council of Ministers is responsible collectively to the ruler, as is each minister individually. The ruler appoints and dismisses ministers (technically on the recommendation of the prime minister when that post is occupied by someone other than the ruler). Only native-born Qataris can become minis- ters, and the constitution prohibits the prime minister and other ministers from engaging in business or commercial activ- ities while holding state office. The Advisory Council debates laws proposed by the Council of Ministers before they are submitted to the ruler for ratifica- tion. If approved by the ruler, a law becomes effective on publi- cation in the official gazette. In 1975 the amir empowered the Advisory Council to summon individuals to answer questions on legislation before promulgation. The Advisory Council also debates the draft budgets of public projects and general policy on political, economic, social, and administrative affairs referred to it by the prime minister. The Advisory Council can request from the Council of Ministers information pertaining to policies it is debating, direct written questions to a particular minister, and summon ministers to answer questions on pro- posed legislation. Ministers have the right to attend and address Advisory Council meetings in which policy matters within their purview are being discussed; in practice, no use has been made of this constitutional guarantee because mem- bers of the Council of Ministers are also members of the Advi- sory Council. As the constitution stipulates, Qatar is divided into ten elec- toral districts for the purpose of forming the Advisory Council. Each district elects four candidates, of whom the ruler selects two, making a total of twenty; they constitute the relatively rep- resentative portion of the council. The members represent all Qataris, not just those in their districts. The Advisory Council was increased to thirty members in December 1975 and to thirty-five members in November 1988. Membership is limited to native-born citizens at least twenty years of age. The constitu- tion states that members are to serve three-year terms, but in May 1975 members' terms were extended for an additional 185 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies three years and then for additional four-year terms in 1978, in 1982, in 1986, and in 1990. Before the implementation of the constitution, the ruler's legislative authority frequently overlapped or encompassed judicial functions because he personally adjudicated disputes and grievances brought before him. The constitution marks the beginning of an attempt to organize the judiciary. The sec- ular courts include a higher and lower criminal court, a civil court, an appeals court, and a labor court. Civil and criminal codes, as well as a court of judicial procedure, were introduced in 1971. All civil and criminal law falls within the jurisdiction of these secular courts. A labor court was created in 1962, prima- rily because few of the country's existing judicial customs and codes were applicable to contemporary labor relations. The sharia court is the oldest element in Qatar's judiciary. The court's law is based on the Hanbali legal school of Islam, wherein judges (qadis) adhere to a strict interpretation of the Quran and sunna, or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (see Sunni Islam, ch. 1). Originally, the sharia court's jurisdic- tion covered all civil and criminal disputes between Qataris and between all other Muslims. Beginning in the 1960s, the court's jurisdiction was successively restricted by decree. In the early 1990s, its responsibilities were confined primarily to family mat- ters, including property, inheritance, divorce, and Islamic eth- ics. Non-Muslims were tried in secular courts unless they were married to Muslims. The constitution establishes the legal presumption of inno- cence and prohibits ex post facto laws. It also stipulates that "judges shall be independent in the exercise of their powers, and no party whatsoever may interfere in the administration of justice." The judiciary is nominally independent, not so much as a result of a constitutional guarantee but because its jurisdic- tion is unlikely to confront the ruler's exercise of power. Secu- lar courts adjudicate on the basis of the ruler's past decrees, and religious courts are restricted to questions of personal sta- tus. No provision exists for judicial review of the constitutional- ity of legislation. According to the preamble to the 1970 constitution, the government was undergoing a transitional stage of develop- ment. The constitution was thus provisional and was to be replaced with a new constitution after the transitional period ended. Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad has usually legitimated gov- ernment changes that he decrees by reference to the constitu- 186 Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani, ruler of Qatar Courtesy Embassy of Qatar, Washington tion. As of early 1993, however, there had been no indication that the full implementation of the constitution was imminent (for example, the electoral aspects of selection to Advisory Council membership) or that the transitional period was end- ing and a new constitution forthcoming. In addition to describing and delineating governmental authority, the constitution sets forth such protections as equal- ity among Qataris regardless of race, sex, or religion; freedom of the press; sanctity of the home; and recognition of both pri- vate and collective ownership of property. Such guarantees, however, are limited by the public interest and must be in accordance with the law — which is determined by the ruler. In practice, freedom of the press means that incoming foreign publications are screened by a government office for poten- tially objectionable material, and the indigenous press exer- cises self-censorship and is subject to sanction if it fails to deal appropriately with political and religious issues (see The Media, this ch.). The constitution also includes a commitment to certain eco- nomic, social, and cultural principles, including state provision of health care, social security, and education. Housing, pen- sion, education, and medical programs were begun in the 1960s and expanded by Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad as oil reve- 187 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies nues permitted throughout the years. There were no state taxes on individuals, and the state subsidized the prices of basic commodities to minimize the effects of inflation. Although these programs appeared to reflect West European statism, they were manifestations of the ruler's sense of duty, based on obligations inherent in Islamic ethics. The Al Thani In the early 1990s, the Al Thani ruling family comprised three main branches: the Bani Hamad, headed by Khalifa ibn Hamad (r. 1972- ); the Bani Ali, headed by Ahmad ibn Ali; and the Bani Khalid, headed by Nasir ibn Khalid (minister of economy and commerce in 1984). The family had 20,000 mem- bers, according to one estimate. The two preindependence rulers, Ali ibn Abd Allah (r. 1949-60) and his son, Ahmad ibn Ali (r. 1960-72), had no par- ticular interest in supervising daily government, content to hunt in Iran and Pakistan and spend time at their villa in Swit- zerland. Thus, somewhat by default, those duties were assumed, beginning in the 1950s, by Ahmad ibn Ali's cousin, Khalifa ibn Hamad, the heir apparent and deputy ruler. By 1971 Khalifa ibn Hamad not only had served as prime minister but also had headed the ministries or departments of foreign affairs, finance and petroleum, education and culture, and police and internal security. On February 22, 1972, with the support of the Al Thani, Khalifa ibn Hamad assumed power as ruler of Qatar. Western sources frequently refer to the event as an overthrow. Qataris regarded Khalifa ibn Hamad's assumption of full power as a simple succession because leading members of the Al Thani had declared Khalifa ibn Hamad the heir apparent on October 24, 1960, and it was their consensus that Ahmad ibn Ali should be replaced. The reasons for the transfer of power were not entirely clear. Khalifa ibn Hamad reportedly stated that his assumption of power was intended "to remove the elements that tried to hinder [Qatar's] progress and modernization." Khalifa ibn Hamad has consistently attempted to lead and to control the process of modernization caused by the petroleum industry boom and the concomitant influx of foreigners and foreign ideas so that traditional mores and values based on Islam can be preserved. He and other influential members of the ruling family are known to have been troubled by the financial 188 Qatar excesses of many members of the Al Thani. Ahmad ibn Ali reportedly drew one-fourth, and the entire Al Thani between one-third and one-half, of Qatar's oil revenues in 1971. The new ruler severely limited the family's financial privileges soon after taking power. Family intrigue may also have played a part in the change of rulers. Factionalism and rivalries are not uncommon, particu- larly in families as large as the Al Thani. Western observers have reported rumors that Khalifa ibn Hamad acted to assume power when he learned that Ahmad ibn Ali might be planning to substitute his son, Abd al Aziz, as heir apparent, a move that would have circumvented the declared consensus of the Al Thani. The Merchant Families The merchant sector in Qatar differed from other gulf Arab countries before the exploitation of oil in its small size (Doha was an insignificant port compared with ports in Kuwait, Bah- rain, or Dubayy), in the absence of foreigners (the Indians were forced out in the late 1800s, leaving Qatar the only gulf amirate without Indians until the 1950s), and in the dominant role of a single family, the Al Thani. Although there were mer- chants before oil, there was no merchant class as in Dubayy or Kuwait. Two important families before oil were the Darwish and the Al Mana, who made their living through trade, pearl- ing, and smuggling and who competed for favor with the ruler. The Darwish and the Al Mana maintained their influence by trading loans and advice to the shaykh for monopolies and concessions. With the arrival of Petroleum Development (Qatar), the Darwish reaped huge profits through their monopoly on sup- plying labor, housing, water, and goods to the oil company. This monopoly ended, however, when workers, small mer- chants, and anti-British Qataris used Abd Allah Darwish, the patriarch of the Darwish family, as one of several convenient targets for an antiregime strike in 1956. By this time, however, with oil revenues growing, the shaykh could remove himself from financial dependence on the merchants, who lost a mea- sure of political influence. A series of citizenship and commercial laws promulgated in the 1960s helped to channel economic benefits in the direc- tion of Qatari nationals in general and the merchants and rul- ing family in particular. Only Qataris were permitted to own 189 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies land, for example, and companies were required to be at least 51 percent Qatari owned. In the 1970s, some laws were enacted that worked against merchant interests by limiting prices and profits. As they had before the discovery of oil, the Al Thani contin- ued engaging in trade and in other enterprises. Sometimes they used their family connections to win lucrative contracts for themselves or for firms in which they had more common busi- ness partners, such as the Jaidah, the Attiyah, and the Mannai families. Opposition Because no public dissent is tolerated in Qatar, opposition usually manifests itself in royal family intrigue or behind-the- scenes grumbling by aggrieved parties. The apparent public tranquillity is cultivated by the amir and by the private but closely controlled media. Incidents in the 1980s, however, dem- onstrated that opposition to the regime existed. In September 1983, for example, a conspiracy to assassinate the ruler or a GCC head of state was uncovered by Qatari authorities, and seventy people were arrested. Contradictory press reports said that either some military people were involved or that the plot reflected a squabble among members of the ruling family. Qatari security forces learned of the plot from Egyptian intelligence via the Saudi Arabians. Informed that the plotters were backed by Libya, Qatar declared the Lib- yan charge d'affaires persona non grata. The target of the plot, according to conflicting reports, was either Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad or one of the GCC heads of state who were coming to Doha for a November summit. Since then, there have been other reported assassination attempts. In August 1985, it was reported that Shaykh Suhaym ibn Hamad Al Thani, one of the amir's brothers, disappointed that the position of crown prince was given to Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad's son, Hamad ibn Khalifa, plotted a coup and main- tained a cadre of supporters and a cache of weapons in the northern part of the country. When Shaykh Suhaym ibn Hamad died suddenly, his sons blamed Minister of Information and Culture Ghanim al Kuwari for not responding promptly to the call for medical help. After supporters of Suhaym ibn Hamad and his sons attempted to kill Ghanim al Kuwari, they were imprisoned. 190 Qatar Soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Palestinians and Ira- qis living in Qatar came under intense government scrutiny. Dozens were deported, and many more were forced to leave after their contracts were not renewed. The Media Qatar has no official censorship, but newspapers recognize the need for self-censorship in not publishing material critical of the ruling family, the government, or religious issues. The privately owned press consists of three Arabic dailies — Ar Rayah (The Banner), AlArab (The Arab), and Ash Sharq (The East) — and an English daily, Gulf Times. The Ministry of Information and Culture operates the Qatar News Agency, the Qatar Broad- casting Service, and the Qatar Television Service. Foreign Relations The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the result- ing threat to other small Persian Gulf states forced Qatar to alter significantly its defense and foreign policy priorities. For example, whereas Qatar had supported Iraq financially in its 1980-88 war against Iran, Qatar quickly joined the anti-Iraq coalition after the invasion. Formerly a political and economic supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Qatar bitterly condemned the alliance between the PLO and many Palestinians on the one hand and Saddam Husayn on the other hand. Moreover, Qatar's previous opposition to super- power naval presence in the gulf turned into an open willing- ness to permit the air forces of the United States, Canada, and France to operate from its territory. The GCC, which for years had been aimed, in part, at deal- ing with a perceived Iranian threat (both external and, in the cases of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, internal), became a forum for condemnation of Iraq and a venue for building a concerted defense against further Iraqi advances. After the Iraqi defeat, Qatar and other GCC members focused their energies on improving cooperation and coordination on mutual defense issues while also continuing to work together in social, cultural, political, and economic spheres. Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, has been historically sensitive to outside military intervention in the gulf and was eager to bolster regional secu- rity measures. 191 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies The war also drew Qatar and other GGC members closer to Egypt and Syria, the two strongest Arab members of the anti- Iraq coalition. The Qatari-Egyptian rapprochement began in 1987 when the two countries resumed diplomatic relations after the League of Arab States (Arab League) summit that adopted the resolution allowing members to reestablish diplo- matic links at their discretion. After the war, Egypt and Syria received large sums from the Persian Gulf states in apprecia- tion for their roles. Qatar and Syria signed an agreement on trade and economic and technical cooperation in January 1991. Even before August 1990, Qatar historically had close rela- tions with its larger and more powerful neighbor, Saudi Arabia. Because of geopolitical realities and the religious affinity of the two ruling families (both adhere to the conservative Wahhabi interpretation of Islam), Qatar followed the Saudi lead in many regional and global issues. Qatar was one of the few Arab coun- tries that observed the full forty-day mourning period after the assassination of Saudi Arabia's King Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud in March 1975 and the death of King Khalid ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud in 1982. The two countries signed a bilateral defense agreement in 1982, and on several occasions Saudi Arabia acted as mediator in territorial disputes between Qatar and Bahrain. Qatar also has had cordial relations with Iran, despite Qatar's support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. In 1991 Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifa welcomed Iranian participation in Persian Gulf security arrangements. Iran was one of the first countries to recognize Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad in 1972. Relations were based partially on proximity (important trade links exist between the two countries, including a ferry service between Doha and Bushehr) and partly on mutual interests. Plans were being formulated in 1992 to pipe water from the Karun River in Iran to Qatar. The Iranian community in Qatar, although large, is well integrated and has not posed a threat to the regime. Iran's claim in May 1989 that one-third of Qatar's North Field gas reservoir lay under Iranian waters apparently was resolved by an agreement to exploit the field jointly. Relations with Bahrain continue to fluctuate between cor- rect and strained, with tensions rising regularly over territorial disputes dating back for decades. Most of the friction involves Hawar and the adjacent islands, which both countries claim. Tensions rose most recently in July 1991 when, according to 192 Qatar reports, Qatari naval vessels violated Bahraini waters, and Bah- raini jet fighters flew into Qatari airspace. The issue was referred in August to the International Court of Justice in The Hague to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the dis- pute. Other disputes have involved the abandoned town of Az Zubarah, on the northwest coast of Qatar. The most serious cri- sis took place in the spring of 1986, when Qatari forces raided Fasht ad Dibal, a coral reef in the gulf north of Al Muharraq in Bahrain that had been artificially built up into a small island. They took into custody twenty-nine workers who were sent by Bahrain to build a coast guard station. The workers were released in May, and installations on the island were destroyed. Qatar submitted the dispute to the International Court of Jus- tice at The Hague, but Bahrain refused the jurisdiction of the court in June 1992. The dispute was ongoing as of early 1993 (see Foreign Relations, ch. 3). Britain's historical role in the Persian Gulf has guaranteed a special relationship with its former protectorates. Qatari-British relations are tempered by a complex blend of suspicion and cordiality. On the one hand, Qataris are wary of the former colonial power because they remember instances when they were ill-served by their "protector," especially regarding the exploitation of oil. On the other hand, the long-term British presence in the gulf has fostered many fruitful political, eco- nomic, and cultural ties between the two countries. The British Embassy in Doha, for example, is the only foreign mission that owns its land outright. In addition, many Britons advise or work for the Qatari government at high levels. British banks and other businesses are well represented in Doha. Many Qataris attend university in Britain, own homes there, and visit regu- larly. Relations with the United States have been generally proper but took a sudden turn for the worse in March 1988 when United States-made Stinger missiles (obtained through unsanc- tioned channels) were observed at a military parade in Doha. When the Qatari government refused to relinquish the weap- ons to the United States or to allow an inspection, the United States instituted a policy of withholding military and economic cooperation. The Stinger issue was settled when Qatar destroyed the missiles in question in 1990. Furthermore, both sides acknowledged the need to cooperate militarily in the face of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Operation Desert Shield and Oper- ation Desert Storm greatly improved Qatar's image of the 193 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies United States as a desirable security partner and resulted in changed bilateral military relations. On June 23, 1992, Qatar and the United States signed a bilateral defense cooperation agreement that provided for United States access to Qatari bases, pre-positioning of United States materiel, and future combined military exercises. Following Saudi Arabia's lead, Qatar refused for many years to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This changed in the summer of 1988, when Qatar announced the opening of relations at the ambassadorial level with the Soviet Union and with China. In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Qatar established relations with newly independent Russia. Qatar became a member of the United Nations in Septem- ber 1971, soon after it proclaimed independence. It is a mem- ber of several of its specialized agencies, including the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and Agri- culture Organization, the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. * * * A number of books on Qatar appeared in the 1980s. The most useful, particularly in its interpretation of history and pol- itics, based largely on British Foreign Office records, is Jill Crys- tal's Oil and Politics in the Gulf. Less analytical but still helpful, especially for understanding the disputes concerning Az Zubarah and Hawar and the adjacent islands, is Rosemarie Said Zahlan's The Creation of Qatar. Information on the oil industry is presented uncritically in Qatar: Energy and Development by Ragaei El Mallakh. Zuhair Ahmed Nafi gives a similarly san- guine appraisal in Economic and Social Development in Qatar. Somewhat more enlightening is Sheikha al-Misnad's The Devel- opment of Modern Education in the Gulf, which contains a wealth of statistical information. Naser al-Othman's With Their Bare Hands gives a Qatari's proud view of his country's history and includes several fascinating interviews with Qataris who worked in the first years of oil exploration. Abeer Abu Saud gives a per- sonal view in Qatari Women, Past and Present. For an encompassing overview of the country, the "Qatar" section in The Middle East and North Africa is an informative annual reference. An excellent source of statistics is the "Qatar" 194 Qatar section in another annual, the Britannica Book of the Year. P.T.H. Unwin compiled the Qatar volume of the World Bibliographi- cal Series and wrote a helpful historical introduction. Up-to- date information on business and economic matters appears in the indispensable Middle East Economic Digest. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 195 Chapter 5. United Arab Emirates Crest of the United Arab Emirates Country Profile Country Formal Name: United Arab Emirates. Short Form: UAE. Term for Citizens: No generally accepted term. Capital: Abu Dhabi. Date of Independence: December 2, 1971. Geography Size: Approximately 77,700 square kilometers (excluding islands), but land borders undemarcated. Topography: Largely flat or rolling desert, although mountains in northeast. Climate: Hot and dry in desert regions; frequent high humidity along Persian Gulf coast. Boundaries: Land boundaries with Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia mostly undefined; several internal boundaries subject of disputes between and among seven constituent amirates. Society Population: Estimated at 2.0 million in mid-1993; 1993 growth rate 5.1 percent. Foreigners, of whom majority male workers, accounted for 88 percent of population. Education: In 1990-91 academic year, more than 388,000 students (half of them female) attended primary and secondary schools. Education compulsory at primary level and free at all levels. Most of 22,000 teachers and administrators foreigners. In 1990-91 academic year, more than 8,900 students, of whom 65 percent women, attended United Arab Emirates University. Note — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 199 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Health: Comprehensive public health care system, free for citizens but charges for some services provided foreigners. Majority of medical personnel foreigners, primarily from Egypt, India, and Pakistan. In 1990 life expectancy at birth 68.6 years for males and 72.9 years for females. Ethnic Groups: Almost all citizens indigenous Arabs. Foreign population included other Arabs (especially Egyptians, Omanis, Palestinians, and Yemenis), Indians, Pakistanis, and Iranians. Religion: Most citizens Sunni Muslims. About 60 percent of foreign population Sunnis; 20 percent Shia Muslims; 20 percent Hindus, Christians, and other. Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$34.9 billion in 1992, about US$14,000 per capita. Oil Industry: Contribution of petroleum sector to GDP dropped from 63 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 1990. Petroleum products accounted for 79 percent of exports in 1990. Abu Dhabi had largest reserves and most of production. Crude oil production in 1992 averaged 2.3 million barrels per day. Industry: Oil refining and gas processing most important, followed by petrochemicals, utilities, and cement, all using oil or gas as fuel and feedstock. Government owned at least one-half interest in these plants. Non-oil manufacturing constituted 7.3 percent of GDP in 1990. Dubai Dry Docks one of world's largest and most modern. Majority of industrial workers foreigners. Agriculture and Fishing: Represented less than 2 percent of GDP in 1990. Production mostly vegetables, fruit, livestock, and poultry. Water shortages restrict farming. Fishing industry being developed. Exports: US$23.4 billion in 1992, of which US$14.0 billion oil and gas. Remainder largely propane and butane and reexports. Japan, Singapore, and Republic of Korea (South Korea) primary petroleum markets. Imports: US$11.2 billion in 1990. Principal imports manufactured goods, machinery, transportation equipment, food, and live animals. Japan, United States, and Western 200 United Arab Emirates Europe major sources of imports. Currency and Exchange Rate: UAE dirham. In 1994 exchange rate US$1 = Dh3.67 (fixed rate). Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Transportation and Telecommunications Transportation: About 2,000 kilometers of roads, of which 1,800 kilometers paved as of 1993. Principal road is highway from Ash Sham via all main coastal cities to Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Dubayy major regional and international sea and air traffic center. UAE has several ports, of which largest is Mina Jabal Ali near city of Dubayy. Dubayy has major international airport, but Abu Dhabi, Al Fujayrah, Ras al Khaymah, and Sharjah also have international airports. Telecommunications: International telecommunications excellent via satellites, radio relay, and telephone. All populated areas receive radio and television transmissions. Government and Politics Government: Federation of seven amirates, as defined in 1971 provisional constitution. Powers divided between federal and amirate governments. Head of state is UAE president, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, chosen by Supreme Council of the Union composed of rulers of seven amirates. Federal National Council has consultative function. Politics: No political parties. Amirs and their families, particularly those of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, most important political actors; technocrats and commercial interests play lesser role. Foreign Relations: Member of United Nations, League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic Conference, Gulf Cooperation Council, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. National Security Armed Forces: Known as Union Defense Force. In mid-1993 personnel strength 57,500: army, 53,000; navy, 2,000; and air 201 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies force, 2,500. Army uses French and Italian main battle tanks and wide assortment of other armored vehicles. In addition to several gun boats, navy operates six Exocet-equipped guided missile boats. Combat aircraft include Mirages, Hawks, and Aeromacchi MB-326s. 202 THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) in 1993 was a federa- tion of seven separate amirates that had joined together in the winter of 1971-72 to form a single independent country. The new nation was created out of the British dependencies that had been known as the Trucial Coast states (also seen as Trucial Oman or Oman Coast) since 1853 when Britain and the local rulers signed the Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, an agreement that ceded to London responsibility for foreign affairs. The individual amirates of the UAE include Abu Dhabi (also seen as Abu Zaby), Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Dubayy (also seen as Dubai), Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah (also seen as Ash Shariqah), and Umm al Qaywayn. The UAE's oil resources make it one of the wealthiest coun- tries in the world. The oil and the revenues it generates, how- ever, are not equitably distributed. Revenues from petroleum exports accrue principally to the government of Abu Dhabi, where more than 80 percent of the oil is located. Three other amirates — Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah, and Sharjah — account for the remainder of the UAE's oil production. Nevertheless, since the formation of the UAE, Abu Dhabi has made significant annual contributions to the federal budget. Federal expendi- tures on development projects in the amirates lacking oil enable them to benefit, albeit modestly, from the overall oil wealth. The UAE's oil-fueled economic growth has been accom- plished with the assistance of thousands of foreign workers. Cit- izens composed only 12 percent of the 2.0 million people living in the UAE in 1993 and constituted only 7 percent of the labor force. The foreign workers come from other Arab countries and from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Britain, India, Iran, Paki- stan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, and Western Europe. The presence of such a large and diverse foreign community provides a cosmopolitan atmo- sphere in the cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy. However, throughout the 1980s, there was growing resentment of for- eigners among many UAE citizens, who felt uncomfortable being a minority, although a very privileged one, within their own country. The rulers have been conscious that their country's small size and population, combined with relatively large oil reve- 203 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies nues, make the UAE vulnerable in the context of regional poli- tics. During the 1980s, the UAE tried to maintain its neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) by providing modest loans for the Iraqi war effort and permitting Dubayy to serve as a major port of entry for goods being transshipped to Iran. The UAE also joined the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a collective security and cooperation association, established in 1981, of the six oil-producing Arabian Peninsula states. After Iraq invaded and occupied fellow GCC member Kuwait in 1990, the UAE joined the international military coalition that opposed and eventually defeated Iraq. In 1992 tensions with Iran over disputed islands in the Persian Gulf induced the UAE to expand its military cooperation with the United States. Geography The UAE lies between 22°50' and 26° north latitude and between 51° and 56°25' east longitude. It shares a nineteen- kilometer border with Qatar on the northwest, a 530-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia on the west, south, and southeast, and a 450-kilometer border with Oman on the southeast and northeast. The land border with Qatar is one over which in 1993 the UAE continued to have a dispute in the Khawr al Udayd area. The total area of the UAE is approximately 77,700 square kilometers. The country's exact size is unknown because of disputed claims to several islands in the Persian Gulf, because of the lack of precise information on the size of many of these islands, and because most of its land boundaries, espe- cially with Saudi Arabia, remain undemarcated. The largest amirate, Abu Dhabi, accounts for 87 percent of the UAE's total area (67,340 square kilometers). The smallest amirate, Ajman, encompasses only 259 square kilometers (see fig. 11). The UAE stretches for more than 1,400 kilometers along the southern shore of the Persian Gulf. Most of the coast con- sists of salt pans that extend far inland. The largest natural har- bor is at Dubayy, although other ports have been dredged at Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and elsewhere. Numerous islands are found in the gulf, and the ownership of some of them has been the subject of international disputes with both Iran and Qatar. The smaller islands, as well as many coral reefs and shifting sandbars, are a menace to navigation. Strong tides and occa- sional windstorms further complicate ship movements near the shore. 204 United Arab Emirates The UAE also extends for about ninety kilometers along the Gulf of Oman, an area known as the Al Batinah coast. The Al Hajar al Gharbi (Western Al Hajar) Mountains, rising in places to 2,500 meters, separate the Al Batinah coast from the rest of the UAE. Beginning at the UAE-Oman border on the Persian Gulf coast of the Musandam Peninsula (Ras Musandam), the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains extend southeastward for about 150 kilometers to the southernmost UAE-Oman frontier on the Gulf of Oman. The range continues as the Al Hajar ash Sharqi (Eastern Al Hajar) Mountains for more than 500 kilometers into Oman. The mountain slopes tend to run right to the shore. Nevertheless, there are small harbors at Diba al Hisn, Kalba, and Khawr Fakkan on the Gulf of Oman. In the vicinity of Al Fujayrah, where the mountains do not approach the coast, there are sandy beaches. South and west of Abu Dhabi, vast, rolling sand dunes merge into the Rub al Khali (Empty Quarter) of Saudi Arabia. The desert area of Abu Dhabi includes two important oases with adequate underground water for permanent settlements and cultivation. The extensive Al Liwa Oasis is in the south near the undefined border with Saudi Arabia. About 200 kilo- meters to the northeast of the Al Liwa Oasis is the Al Buraymi Oasis, which extends on both sides of the Abu Dhabi-Oman border. Prior to withdrawing from the area in 1971, Britain delin- eated the internal borders among the seven amirates in order to preempt territorial disputes that might hamper formation of the federation. In general, the rulers of the amirates accepted the British intervention, but in the case of boundary disputes between Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, and also between Dubayy and Sharjah, conflicting claims were not resolved until after the UAE became independent. The most complicated borders were in the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains, where five of the amirates contested jurisdiction over more than a dozen enclaves. The climate of the UAE generally is hot and dry. The hottest months are July and August, when average maximum tempera- tures reach above 48°C on the coastal plain. In the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains, temperatures are considerably cooler, a result of increased altitude. Average minimum temperatures in January and February are between 10°C and 14°C. During the late summer months, a humid southeastern wind known as the sharqi makes the coastal region especially unpleasant. The aver- 207 International boundary Administrative line Boundary in dispute Internal boundary Paved road National capital • Populated place Airport Port 1 SO 100 Kilometers 50 100 Miles Umm az Zumul (well) 1 Ras al Khaymah 2 Umm al Qaywayn 3 Al Fujayrah 4 Ajman 5 Sharjah 6 Al Fujayrah and Sharjah 7 Dubayy 8 Ajman and Oman 9 Neutral zone 10 Abu Dhabi SAUDI ARABIA 52 Boundary representation | not necessarily authoritative Figure 11. United Arab Emirates, 1993 ) I 56 206 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies age annual rainfall in the coastal area is fewer than 120 milli- meters, but in some mountainous areas annual rainfall often reaches 350 millimeters. Rain in the coastal region falls in short, torrential bursts during the summer months, sometimes resulting in floods in ordinarily dry wadi beds. The region is prone to occasional, violent dust storms, which can severely reduce visibility. Population A harsh environment and marginal economic conditions kept the population of the region low and economically depressed until the exploitation of oil. According to estimates, between 1900 and 1960 there were 80,000 to 95,000 inhabitants in the amirates, mostly in small coastal settlements. Although the population of the amirates probably did not increase a great deal during this period, there were considerable shifts within the territories, caused by changes in economic and political conditions. Whereas Sharjah was dominant in the nineteenth century, by 1939 Dubayy was the most populous amirate, with an estimated population of 20,000, one-quarter of whom were foreigners. The largest minorities were Iranians and Indians in Dubayy and in other amirates. Abu Dhabi's onshore oil exports began in 1963, bringing wealth and a demand for foreign labor. The 1968 census, conducted under the British, was the area's first; it enumerated 180,226 inhabit- ants. Ever greater demands for labor and expertise fueled a population boom throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, but population growth has slowed since 1985. The UAE had an officially estimated population of nearly 2.0 million in early 1993. Only about 12 percent of the total actu- ally were UAE citizens. The number of foreign workers has increased dramatically since 1968, when they constituted 36 percent of the total population. By 1975 foreigners accounted for 70 percent of the population, increasing to 80 percent in 1980 and to 88 percent in 1985. Since 1985, the percentage of foreigners has leveled at 88 percent. Asian workers from the Indian subcontinent (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) constituted about 45 percent of the total population in 1993. Iranians, who accounted for an estimated 17 percent of the population, were the next largest ethnic group. Non-UAE Arabs, primarily Egyptian nationals, accounted for 13 percent of the population. Other Asians and Africans made up 8 per- 208 United Arab Emirates cent of the population, and foreigners from Europe and North America accounted for 5 percent. Although the population density was about twenty-five per- sons per square kilometer in 1991, the population was unevenly distributed among the seven amirates. The three most populous amirates — Abu Dhabi, Dubayy, and Sharjah — together accounted for roughly 84 percent of the total popula- tion. The remaining 16 percent lived in Ras al Khaymah, Ajman, Al Fujayrah, and Umm al Qaywayn (see table 25, Appendix) . The population of the UAE is overwhelmingly urban, with more than 90 percent of the people living in cities. The largest city, Abu Dhabi, the federal capital, had an estimated popula- tion of 530,000 in 1993. Dubayy, the second largest city and the UAE's main port and commercial center, had an estimated population of 402,000. The residential neighborhoods along the Persian Gulf coast north of the center of Dubayy were con- tiguous with those of the city of Sharjah (estimated population of 130,000). Sharjah in turn flowed into the city of Ajman (esti- mated population of 60,000). About fifty kilometers north of Ajman is the city of Ras al Khaymah (estimated population of 45,000). The largest inland population concentration is in the contiguous villages and residential developments at Al Ayn (estimated population of 105,000) in Abu Dhabi's Al Buraymi Oasis. Religion Most of the citizens of the UAE are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims who adhere to the Maliki legal tradition (see Sunni Islam, ch. 1). Some Sunnis of the Wahhabi sect (followers of a strict interpretation of the Hanbali legal school) live in the Al Buraymi Oasis, and some who follow the Shafii legal school live along the Al Batinah coast. The foreign population includes Sunni and Shia (see Glossary) Muslims, Hindus, and Chris- tians. Although varying from amirate to amirate, the degree of religious freedom afforded non-Muslims is greater in the UAE than in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. For example, non-Muslims are permitted to worship but not to proselytize. There are several large Christian churches and schools in the UAE, primarily in Dubayy and Abu Dhabi. 209 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Education In the early 1900s, three major schools were established by pearl merchants in Dubayy, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah. The schools were staffed by foreign teachers who taught reading, writing, and Islamic studies. The economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s forced some of these and other schools to close, but some reopened when the economy improved. The British built the first school offering a comprehensive curriculum in Sharjah in 1953. Staffed by teachers from other Arab countries, the school had 450 boys between the ages of six and seventeen that year. Shortly after, the first modern primary school for girls was established in Sharjah. The British govern- ment also built schools in Abu Dhabi, Ras al Khaymah, and Khawr Fakkan and established an agricultural school in Ras al Khaymah in 1955 and a technical school in Sharjah in 1958. In 1958 Kuwait started to build schools in the amirates, including facilities in Ajman and Umm al Qaywayn. Kuwait also funded teacher trainees from the amirates to go abroad for training. Until the amirates could afford to pay teachers, Bahrain, Qatar, and Egypt paid teachers to work in the amirates. After Abu Dhabi began earning oil revenues in the early 1960s, it developed and funded its own educational system, while the other amirates continued to rely on outside assis- tance. By the 1964-65 academic year, Abu Dhabi had six schools attended by 390 boys and 138 girls, taught by thirty- three teachers. In the same year, there were thirty-one schools outside Abu Dhabi, twelve of which were for girls. Dubayy had 3,572 students in ten schools and 137 teachers, most of whom came from Kuwait and Egypt. After the founding of the UAE, there was tremendous expansion of public education facilities. Section 17 of the con- stitution states that education is fundamental to the progress of society and is to be compulsory at the primary level and free at all levels. Uniforms, books, equipment, and transportation are also free. In the first seven years of the UAE's existence, educa- tion was second only to defense in the federal budget. In 1989 the budget allocated Dh2.0 billion (for value of the the UAE dirham — see Glossary) for education. The education system in the UAE includes six years of pri- mary school and six years of secondary school (see table 26, Appendix). By 1972-73, the first full academic year following the formation of the UAE, the government operated an esti- mated 140 schools, twelve of which offered boarding facilities. 210 United Arab Emirates Most schools are segregated according to gender, but some through the primary level are coeducational. In 1990-91 there were about 760 schools with 49,904 pupils in preschool, 227,083 students in primary school, and 111,611 in secondary school. One-third of the pupils attended private or religious schools. Beginning in the 1991-92 academic year, military courses were compulsory in federal secondary schools. United Arab Emirates University opened in 1977 at Al Ayn with four faculties: arts, science, education and political sci- ence, and business administration. First-year enrollment was 400. A sharia (Islamic jurisprudence) faculty was added in 1978; faculties in agriculture and engineering were added in 1982. In 1988 four higher colleges of technology (two for men and two for women) opened. By the 1990-91 academic year, enrollment stood at 8,941 students. In the previous academic year, 65 percent of university students were women. Many UAE nationals go abroad for university and graduate studies to other Arab countries and to Britain and the United States. In the early 1990s, United Arab Emirates University was being expanded, at an estimated outlay of Dh3 to Dh5 billion, to accommodate up to 16,000 students by the year 2000. The existing campus will become a technical college after the expansion is completed. The Women's Federation of the UAE provides adult literacy classes. There were twenty-six adult education centers in 1992. The United Nations (UN) estimated the UAE's literacy rate in 1988-89 as 53.5 percent overall, 58.4 percent for males and 38.1 percent for females. The government also operates several vocational training centers, which in the 1987-88 academic year had 2,614 students. Status of Women The role of women in UAE society has gradually expanded since the discovery of oil. Before 1960 there were few opportu- nities for them outside the realm of home and family. The pres- ident, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, has acknowledged the validity of women participating in the work force as well as in the home. The president's wife, Shaykha Fatima, heads the Women's Federation and promotes training, education, and the advancement of the status of women. In the early 1990s, there were five women's societies promoting various issues of importance to women, including literacy and health. 211 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Women constituted 6.2 percent of the work force in 1988. A study by the Administrative Development Institute found that a majority of female workers who are UAE citizens work under the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. In 1988 they accounted for 82 percent of UAE national employees in these ministries. Since the late 1980s, women graduates have outnumbered men by a ratio of two to one at United Arab Emirates University. Health and Welfare In the years before the discovery of oil, the health situation in the amirates was poor. Those who could afford it obtained modern treatment abroad; those who could not had to make do with traditional remedies. Britain became interested in the region's welfare when it perceived that the United States would gain local influence in the scramble for oil through the suc- cesses of United States missionary doctors, who, in Muscat and Bahrain, operated the only hospitals in the region. As a result, in 1938 Britain appointed a medical officer for the Trucial Coast and sent an Indian physician to serve in a dispensary in Dubayy the following year. In 1949 the British government built Al Maktum Hospital, a small hospital in Dubayy, and appointed a British physician from the Indian Medical Service to initiate modern medical service. Contributions to health care also came from Kuwait, Iran, and the Trucial States Development Fund. Earlier suspi- cions by the British notwithstanding, in the 1950s and 1960s American Mission hospitals were established in Sharjah, Al Ayn, and Ras al Khaymah. In 1965 the Abu Dhabi government employed one physi- cian; three others were in private practice. The amirate also received technical and material assistance from Egypt. After federation in 1971, rapid, uncoordinated growth characterized the health system. Although cooperation among amirates in the health field had improved by the early 1990s, oil compa- nies and the military continued to have their own medical facil- ities. All residents received free medical care until 1982. In that year, escalating costs, shrinking oil revenues, and a change in attitude toward foreign residents caused the UAE to begin charging noncitizens for all services except emergency and child and maternity care. 212 Student nurses at Abu Dhabi nursing school; the United Arab Emirates has stressed academic and professional education. Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington In 1985 there were 2,361 physicians, 6,090 nurses, 242 den- tists, and 190 pharmacists, almost all of whom were foreigners. In 1986 the UAE had forty public hospitals with 3,900 beds and 119 clinics. In 1990 life expectancy at birth was 68.6 years for males and 72.9 years for females. The major causes of death registered in Abu Dhabi in 1989 per 100,000 population were accidents and poisonings, 43.7; cardiovascular diseases, 34.3; cancer, 13.7; and respiratory diseases, 8.1. As of December 1990, eight cases of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) were reported in the UAE. Infant mortality declined dramatically from 103 per 1,000 live births in 1965 to twenty- three per 1,000 live births in 1990. In 1985 a health worker attended 96 percent of births. In the early 1990s, the UAE had a modern health care sys- tem with facilities and professionals capable of providing excel- lent care and performing advanced procedures such as organ transplants and complex heart surgery. Although facilities are concentrated in the cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, most of the population has access to at least basic facilities. The federa- tion's first hospital specializing in pediatric and maternity care, the 374-bed Al Wasl Hospital in Dubayy, opened in the late 1980s. The New Medical Centre in Abu Dhabi, a private facility, 213 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies is equipped to treat diving accidents. Most hospitals are run by the government. The UAE also has created an extensive social welfare net- work that includes family care centers aimed at solving domes- tic problems and training women in domestic skills and handicrafts. Psychological care is available for troubled youths. The National Assistance Law provides benefits to victims of cat- astrophic illnesses and disasters. Widows, orphans, the elderly, the disabled, and others unable to support themselves receive social security payments. In 1975 nearly 24,000 citizens bene- fited from Dh87.7 million in such social aid; in 1982 approxi- mately 121,000 persons received a total of Dh275 million. Other benefits given UAE citizens are free housing and sub- sidized furnishings. However, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing reported in 1992 that 70 percent of 15,000 govern- ment-built low-income houses had deteriorated to the point of being uninhabitable. Among the causes were damage from groundwater salinity, failure to grant proprietary rights, and withdrawal of a Dhl0,000 per house maintenance grant. Economy Before the discovery of oil, the separate amirates that now constitute the UAE had similar economies. The raw materials of these economies were the fish and pearls of the gulf and the meager soil and scarce water onshore. In this forbidding milieu, the rich and poor fought heat, disease, and famine to make a living. Occupations ranged from slaves who dived for pearls and artisans who hammered coffee pots or stitched san- dals to wealthy pearl merchants and powerful shaykhs. Among the sources of revenue for ruling shaykhs were the collection of customs fees, the issuance of fishing licenses, and the imposi- tion of levies on date groves. Pearl merchants, many of whom were also landholders and moneylenders, gained political influence through their wealth and connections. In addition, there were cultivators of dates in oases, nomadic livestock herd- ers, and small-scale traders. Pearls from the rich banks off the amirates' coast were prob- ably the single largest source of wealth until the 1930s and 1940s. In 1905 the pearling trade involved 22,000 men from the amirates working in about 1,300 boats, and income amounted to £600,000. Trade and fishing were also important maritime activities. Sharjah, the principal port and political power in the nineteenth century, was in the twentieth century 214 United Arab Emirates eclipsed by Dubayy. A large boatbuilding industry, using timber imported from India, developed along the coast; the industry supplied vessels of varying sizes and designs for pearling, fish- ing, and transport. The Great Depression of the 1930s, coincid- ing with the development of the Japanese cultured pearl industry, severely disrupted markets for Persian Gulf pearls. At about the same time, large numbers of men from the amirates began to migrate to work in the fledgling oil industries of Kuwait, Bahrain, and later Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Agriculture is limited to those few locations where fresh water is available. In the Al Buraymi and Al Liwa oases and the plains of Ras al Khaymah, relatively abundant water resources permit settled agriculture, especially the cultivation of date palms and fodder crops. The wells of the oases also provide water for the nomadic population, who migrate with their ani- mal herds throughout the desert areas in search of seasonal forage. British hegemony in the Persian Gulf had positive and nega- tive economic consequences for the inhabitants. British sup- pression of maritime raiding, for example, meant that pearling fleets could operate in relative security. (The fleet had previ- ously been unable to sail during periods of unrest, losing vital income for divers and merchants alike.) Some shaykhs and merchants benefited from regular visits by steamships from Britain and from other countries. For a period of time, local Indian merchants received deferential treatment as a result of Britain's control of India. On the negative side, however, the British prohibition on raiding and trading in slaves and arms meant an important source of income was lost to some shaykhs and merchants. In addition, because non-British powers were kept out of the gulf, trade and development opportunities were lost. British development assistance began piecemeal in the 1940s and 1950s, prompted by fears that the United States and other countries would gain a foothold in the region and compete for oil concessions. Total outlays in 1954-55 were £50,300 and funded a water resources study, an irrigation restoration project, improvements at the hospital in Dubayy, and school construction in Sharjah. In 1961-62 the amount rose to £550,000. The total British investment between 1955 and 1965 was £1 million. Neighboring Qatar provided a freshwater sys- tem for Dubayy and the first bridge across Dubayy Creek. Saudi Arabia built a road from Sharjah to Ras Al Khaymah. Britain 215 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies also paid Sharjah's ruler to allow the establishment of a military base there in 1966. Trade began to grow, especially in Dubayy, in the 1950s and 1960s. Imports increased from £3 million in 1958 to £8 million in 1963 and £41.7 million in 1967. Gold, often smuggled into India, greatly enriched Dubayy merchants and bankers during this period. An estimated 250 tons of gold brought revenues of about £80 million in 1970. The discovery and export of petroleum resulted in a major transformation of the amirates' economies. Before federation, oil revenues enriched the royal families who ruled the amirates in which production occurred and provided funding for local economic development. After the formation of the UAE, oil revenues, especially from Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, continued to fuel local development but increasingly became the main engine of growth for the national economy. Oil revenues became significant in Abu Dhabi in 1963, in Dubayy in 1970, in Sharjah in 1975, and in Ras al Khaymah in 1984. The disparity in resource endowment and timing of oil discoveries led to uneven economic development before and after federation. The governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, which together in 1991 accounted for 99 percent of the UAE's production, expend significant portions of their oil revenues on infrastructure development, including airports, highways, and port facilities. Nonetheless, Abu Dhabi's economic pre- dominance has created tensions with the other amirates. Lack of coordination in economic development and duplication in facilities and industries are problems that political federation had not solved as of 1993. The rapid pace of development brought other problems. In the early and mid-1970s, the distribution system could not keep up with the massive amounts of imports. Shortages resulted, and inflation exceeded 30 percent per year. By 1982, however, the rate of inflation had declined to about 10 percent. Between 1975 and 1980, the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- sary) in constant 1980 prices increased by an average of 16 per- cent per year. Although oil production declined after 1977, sharp increases in world oil prices in the 1979-80 period brought windfall revenues to the amirates, pushing per capita GDP up to US$29,000 in 1981, one of the world's highest. During the early 1980s, the economy began to contract. This economic slowdown was caused by several factors, including lower oil revenues, the completion of several large industrial 216 Offshore oil rig; oil is the major revenue source of the United Arab Emirates. Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington Mina Jabal Ali, southwest ofDubayy, a major port engaged in the transshipment trade Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington 217 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies and infrastructure projects, and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). By 1983 GDP had fallen to an estimated US$26.7 billion, down from US$32.5 billion in 1981. The mid-1980s were a period of recession, with GDP falling from a little less than US$29 billion in 1982 to US$21.5 billion in 1986, caused in large part by a 40 percent drop in oil reve- nues. Exports fell by 33.5 percent in 1986, and the federation's trade surplus dropped 58 percent compared with 1985. As a result of the austere conditions, the 1986 federal budget allo- cated funds mainly for current expenditures, stalling many new projects. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw improving conditions, with oil exports increasing. A spurt in oil prices as a result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait helped push GDP to almost US$34 bil- lion in 1990. Contracts to help rebuild Kuwait after its libera- tion aided the UAE economy. But the invasion also had negative effects. Banks lost between 15 and 30 percent of their deposits, and development projects were halted. Trade declined as a result of uncertainty and higher insurance premi- ums. And the UAE paid out about US$6 billion to the United States and Britain to help defray the military costs of the war and to contribute to a fund that supported countries whose economies were severely hurt by the war. The collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna- tional (BCCI) in the summer of 1991 caused ripples through- out the UAE economy (see Banking, ch. 6). The BCCI collapse became a major international scandal because the bank had become a significant financial institution in several countries, including Britain and the United States, and because members of Abu Dhabi's ruling family were major shareholders in the bank. Oil and Natural Gas Abu Dhabi became a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1966. When the amirates federated in 1971, membership was transferred to the UAE. Although Abu Dhabi officials represented the other amirs, the officials exercised no power over the amirs because each maintained control of his amirate's underground wealth. Each ruler oversaw arrangements for concessions, exploration, and oil field development in his own territory and published limited information about such arrangements. Thus, the fed- eral Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources has limited 218 United Arab Emirates power to set policy and engage in overall planning. In 1988 a presidential decree abolished the Department of Petroleum and dissolved the board of directors of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The functions of these bodies (administration and supervision of the country's petroleum affairs) were taken over by the newly formed Supreme Petro- leum Council, whose eleven members were led by Shaykh Khal- ifa ibn Zayid Al Nuhayyan. Discoveries in the 1980s and 1990s greatly increased the UAE's oil and gas reserves. By 1992 the four oil-producing amirates had total estimated proven crude oil reserves of 98 bil- lion barrels and natural gas reserves of 5.2 trillion cubic meters, with the majority of both reserves lying within Abu Dhabi. Based on the relative size of their reserves and on their long- term development plans, Abu Dhabi and the other oil-produc- ing amirates have pursued differing policies. Abu Dhabi, with massive reserves, has on the whole based its production and economic development plans on long-term benefits, occasion- ally sacrificing production and price to meet this end. The other amirates, less well endowed with oil and gas, have sought to exploit their meager resources to produce short-term gains. In the early 1980s, Abu Dhabi adhered to OPEC production ceilings while Dubayy routinely exceeded them. After 1987, however, both Abu Dhabi and Dubayy habitually produced above OPEC levels. In early 1987, for example, when Abu Dhabi's OPEC quota was set at 682,000 barrels per day (bpd — see Glossary) and Dubayy's at 220,000 bpd, Abu Dhabi pro- duced 1,058,000 bpd (64 percent above quota) and Dubayy produced 365,000 bpd (60 percent above quota) (see table 27, Appendix). As a result, OPEC established a committee to pro- mote greater adherence to quotas by chronic overproducers such as the UAE. For its part, the federation argued that its quotas were too small in relation to its large reserves and to the quotas of other producers. The UAE's quota was raised several times by OPEC, and it was at almost 1.1 million bpd in March 1990. Not recognizing the OPEC figure, UAE production at the time was 2.1 million bpd. By July 1990, oil prices had fallen to US$14 per barrel, and the UAE agreed to a compromise proposal that raised its OPEC quota to 1.5 million bpd. Meanwhile, among Iraq's pub- lic accusations was that both Kuwait and the UAE had deprived 219 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Iraq of much-needed revenues by driving down world oil prices through production above their OPEC quotas. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, OPEC suspended quotas to allow member states to compensate for the lost pro- duction of Kuwait and Iraq. Producing an average of 2.1 mil- lion bpd, the UAE earned US$15 billion in oil revenues in 1990. In the following year, producing an average of about 2.4 million bpd, the federation earned US$14 billion. In March 1992, OPEC raised the UAE's quota to slightly more than 2.2 million bpd, which the UAE appeared to be observing. In March 1991, the UAE announced that it would expand its oil production capacity to 4 million bpd by the mid-1990s as part of a multibillion dollar development program. Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi granted its first oil concession, covering its entire territory, in 1939 to the Trucial Coast Development Oil Com- pany (renamed the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company, or ADPC, in 1962). The company discovered oil in 1960; production and export commenced in 1962 offshore and in 1963 onshore. ADNOC acquired 60 percent of ADPC in the early 1970s. In 1978 ADPC was reconstituted as the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (Adco). In the late 1980s, the remain- der of Adco's shares were divided: British Petroleum (BP), Royal Dutch Shell Oil, and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) received 9.5 percent each; Mobil Oil and Exxon, 4.75 percent each; and Participations and Explorations (Partex), 2.0 percent. The principal onshore fields were Bu Hasa, Bab, and Asab. Onshore production totaled 267 million barrels in 1980. In 1953 the amirate granted a concession to the D'Arcy Exploration Company of Britain to look for oil in offshore and submerged areas not covered in the ADPC concession. Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (AD MA), a multinational consortium, took over this concession in 1955. The company made its first commercial strike in 1958, and production and export started in 1962. In 1977 ADMA and ADNOC agreed to form the Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Operating Company (ADMA-Opco) for offshore work. In the late 1980s, ADNOC owned 60 percent of ADMA-Opco; Japan Oil Development Company, 12.0 percent; BP, 14.7 percent; and CFP, 13.3 percent. Offshore fields included Umm ash Shayf, Az Zuqum, Sath ar Ras Boot, Dalma, 220 United Arab Emirates and Umm ad Dalkh. The island of Das, northeast of the island of Dalma, became the center for offshore operations. Unlike most gulf countries, as of the end of 1992 Abu Dhabi had not claimed 100 percent ownership of its oil industry. ADNOC was established in 1971 and, in addition to holding majority shares in Adco and ADMA-Opco, was involved in pro- ducing, refining, distributing, and shipping gas. ADNOC owned 51 percent of the Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Com- pany, whose Das facility has sent most of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to Japan since 1977. In 1988 the Das facility produced nearly 2.5 million tons of LNG from offshore fields. ADNOC also holds 68 percent of Abu Dhabi Gas Industries, which extracts propane, butane, and condensate at the Ar Ruways plant from associated gas pro- duced by the onshore Bu Hasa, Bab, and Asab fields. Abu Dhabi's refining, at plants in Umm an Nar and Ar Ruways, is also controlled by ADNOC. Total refining capacity in 1991 was 185,000 bpd, of which 100,000 bp d was available for export. Marketing and distribution are carried out by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution, an ADNOC sub- sidiary. To buy refineries and gas stations in Europe and Japan, ADNOC and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority formed a joint venture, the International Petroleum Investment Corpo- ration (IPIC). In 1989 IPIC held a 20 percent share in a Madrid-based refining company. The amirate's exports are pumped through terminals at Jabal az Zannah and on the island of Das. There is a smaller terminal at Al Mubarraz. Dubayy The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) held a concession for Dubayy from 1937 to 1961. CFP and Compahia Espahola de Petroleos (Spanish Petroleum Company — Hispanoil) obtained an onshore concession in 1954 and formed Dubai Marine Areas (Duma). Continental Oil Company acquired the IPC concession in 1963 and formed the Dubai Petroleum Company (DPC). That same year, DPC acquired 50 percent of Duma and released some of its shares to other companies. Oil was discov- ered offshore in 1966, and production commenced in late 1969. The Dubayy government acquired a 60 percent share in Duma-DPC in 1975. Dubayy's oil reserves in 1991 were estimated at 4 billion bar- rels, which will run out by 2016 if 1990 levels of production 221 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies continue. Dubayy's production policy has been to ignore OPEC quotas for the most part, concentrating on exploiting the amirate's fields as efficiently as possible. This has meant pro- ducing at or near capacity most of the time. The principal fields are Fath, Rashid, and Falah offshore, and Margham onshore. The amirate has two refineries, with a third planned for the mid-1990s. The Dubayy government established the Dubai Natural Gas Company (Dugas) in 1975 to process gas from offshore oil fields. By the early 1990s, the company also planned to process associated gas from the onshore Margham field. Dugas's for- eign partner was Scimitar Oils (Dubai), a subsidiary of Can- ada's Sunningdale Oils. The Dugas processing facilities at Mina Jabal Ali came on-line in 1980 with a capacity of 20,000 bpd of natural gas liquids (propane, butane, and heavier liquids) and 2.1 million cubic meters of dry gas (methane) a day. The dry gas is piped to the Dubai Aluminum Company (Dubai), where it fuels a large electric power and desalination plant. A small part of the natural gas liquids is locally bottled and consumed, but most is exported to Japan. A special gas terminal at Mina Jabal Ali that can handle tankers of up to 48,000 tons opened in 1980. The amirate's gas reserves are estimated at 125 billion cubic meters. Sharjah In 1969 the amir of Sharjah granted a forty-year concession for offshore exploration and production to a consortium of small United States oil companies known as Crescent Oil Com- pany. Oil was discovered in 1973 in the Mubarak field off the island of Abu Musa, and production began in 1974. Because of conflicting territorial claims, Sharjah has production and drill- ing rights but shares production and revenue with Iran (50 per- cent), Umm al Qaywayn (20 percent), and Ajman (10 percent). By 1984, Iran reportedly ceased transferring to Sharjah its half- share of oil revenues, presumably because of the financial drain of the war with Iraq, as well as Arab support of Iraq. In 1988 Iran attacked the facilities at Mubarak, causing their clo- sure for two months. In 1980 the American Oil Company (Amoco — later Amoco Sharjah) announced a major discovery onshore of oil and gas in the Saghyah field. By late 1983, output reached 35,000 bpd of condensate, which was exported. In 1984 total production reached 62,000 bpd. In the same year, the Emirates General 222 United Arab Emirates Petroleum Corporation completed a 224-kilometer pipeline to supply dry gas to power plants in the northern amirates. The pipeline had a capacity of 60,000 bpd of condensate and 1.1 million cubic meters per day of gas. After Dubayy and Sharjah settled their border dispute in 1985, a pipeline was built to sup- ply gas from the Saghyah field to the power and desalination plant of the Dubai Electrical Company at Mina Jabal Ali. An LPG processing plant that came on-line in 1986 was producing 11.3 million cubic meters of wet gas per day in 1987. The amirate's outlook was optimistic in 1992, with Amoco Sharjah announcing a new onshore gas and condensate field and increased reserves at existing fields. Other Amirates Ras al Khaymah has limited oil and gas reserves, which were initially exploited in the early 1980s. By 1986 production was about 10,000 bpd, with most of the revenues plowed back into exploration and development. In that year, the amirate had completed pipelines from its offshore As Sila field to the main- land and had established separation and stabilization facilities, storage facilities capable of holding 500,000 barrels, and a 1,000-bpd LPG plant. By 1991 production had plummeted to 800 bpd. Exploration and drilling in Ajman, Umm al Qaywayn, and Al Fujayrah have not yielded significant finds. Some of this activity has been funded by the federal government. Industry Non-oil industries have had a checkered history. On the pos- itive side, federal and local governments have initiated many industrial projects that have aided in the development of the UAE. Local and foreign private capital found numerous oppor- tunities in the friendly business climate of the amirates, with the result that by 1987 manufacturing contributed 9 percent to GDP (see table 28, Appendix). However, because of the lack of a unified planning mechanism and outright competition among amirates, redundancy has been a recurring problem. For example, there are nine cement factories in the UAE with a total capacity of 8.5 million tons per year. Local demand was estimated in 1986 at only 2 million tons. In addition, out of five steel rolling mills, three have had to close. Plastics and cer- tain foods are overproduced. A 1988 study by the Ministry of Economy and Industry reported that local industry suffered 223 224 Downtown Dubayy, capital of the amirate ofDubayy Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington 225 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies from low wage levels, a lack of new technology, and a low level of value added in many industries. In 1983 the Emirates Indus- trial Bank was established; one of its roles is to assist ailing industries financially. Dubayy, with its long history of entrepot trading, has the most developed non-oil industrial sector. Abu Dhabi, however, has focused on using its oil resources in downstream (see Glos- sary) facilities. Some of the northern amirates are developing their mineral resources. By 1990 total manufacturing output had a value of about US$2.6 billion, with 80 percent of the UAE's factories located in Abu Dhabi, Dubayy, and Sharjah. Dubayy The first major factory in the amirate was the aluminum smelter opened by Dubai at Mina Jabal Ali in 1979. It had a capacity of 135,000 tons of aluminum ingots per year, which was reached in 1982. In 1991, after expansion, it produced 290,030 tons of aluminum ingots. The five gas turbines that generate power for the plant are fueled by Dugas's neighboring gas treatment plant. A desalination plant associated with the turbines supplies 40 percent of Dubayy's drinking water requirements. Dubayy became a strong magnet for industries, large and small, with the opening in 1985 of the Mina Jabal Ali Free Zone. Starting with about forty companies in the first year, the zone hosted 382 firms by 1992, including multinational giants Mitsubishi, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Union Car- bide, and Xerox, and scores of small Indian firms, many pro- ducing textiles. Local firms include National Flour Mills and the National Cement Company. Among the inducements to firms are a large pool of cheap labor, no taxes, no import or export duties, the right to 100 percent foreign ownership, and the right to repatriate profits and capital. Another major facility in the free zone is the Dubai Dry Docks, owned by the Dubayy government. One of the largest and most modern in the world, the facility has three dry docks that can handle vessels up to 1 million deadweight tons. The dry docks have well-equipped workshops for plate and pipe, machinery, rigging, and electric repair, as well as a sophisti- cated laboratory. Completed in 1979, the docks lay idle, incur- ring substantial maintenance costs, until 1983 when a contract for an operator was signed. The delay was attributed in part to indecision and the amir's poor health. 226 United Arab Emirates By 1985, however, 111 ships with a total capacity of 10 mil- lion deadweight tons had been repaired. In 1988 the dock was fully occupied by vessels damaged in the Iran-Iraq War. Abu Dhabi The principal industrial facilities are located at Ar Ruways, 224 kilometers from the capital. The Ruways Fertilizer Indus- tries plant came on-line in 1983 and uses natural gas as fuel and feedstock. ADNOC owns two-thirds of the plant, and Total- CFP owns the remainder. The plant was built with a capacity to produce 100 tons per day of ammonia and 1,500 tons per day of urea. Its customers have been mainly India and China. Sul- fur extracted through oil and gas processing is exported from a special bulk terminal. A smaller industrial area exists at Al Mus- allah, just outside the city of Abu Dhabi. The Northern Amirates According to a 1987 study, Sharjah was the site of 35 percent of the UAE's industrial installations. The amirate has an indus- trial zone with factories producing a variety of items, including furniture and household utensils. A fodder factory at Mina Khalid run by the Gulf Company for Agricultural Development opened in 1982. Other plants in the amirate include a cement factory, a plastic pipe factory, and a rope factory. The gulf s first explosives factory opened in Ras al Khaymah in 1980. A pharmaceutical plant opened the following year. The amirate has several factories that use local stone and min- erals. In addition to three cement factories, there is an asphalt company, a lime kiln, and a thriving export business by the Ras al Khaymah Rock Company in aggregate, the stone used in making concrete. Al Fujayrah and Ras al Khaymah have capitalized on resources from the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains, building plants that produce aggregate, marble, tile, asbestos insulation, and concrete blocks. Although lack of local energy sources has hindered industrial development, Al Fujayrah's development plans for the 1990s include provision for investment by other GCC states. Umm al Qaywayn has relied on cement and related indus- tries as a source of revenue but has suffered because of over- production in the UAE. In 1987 it established a free zone modeled on that of Dubayy. Among Ajman's facilities are a dry dock, a ship repair yard, and a cement factory. 227 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Electricity and Water The demands of a rapidly growing population and a devel- oping industrial base have necessitated a concomitantly speedy expansion of the capacity to provide electrical power and pota- ble water. As in other areas, Abu Dhabi and Dubayy have had the funds to provide public utilities at a faster pace than the northern amirates. When the UAE was formed and the Minis- try of Electricity and Water created, Abu Dhabi, Dubayy, Shar- jah, and Ras al Khaymah had their own electric companies. The creation of the federation has seen some progress in unify- ing the national electrical grid and assisting the smaller amirates with power and water supply. Abu Dhabi's generating capacity expanded from eight mega- watts in 1973 to 845 megawatts in 1982. One study found that between 1973 and 1982, Abu Dhabi's demand for electricity expanded by 25 percent per year, while Dubayy's grew by 15 percent per year. The other amirates were not as well supplied with electricity and needed additional generating capacity. Sharjah and Ras al Khaymah suffered power disruptions in 1983 because of overloaded facilities. By 1988 installed generat- ing capacity for the entire UAE had risen to 3,850 megawatts, up from 1,724 megawatts in 1979. Unable to meet demand from natural sources of freshwater, the UAE has had to use desalination plants, many of which run in tandem with power stations. In 1985 there were twenty-two desalination plants in the amirates. Water production in 1989 amounted to about 327 billion liters, up from about 312 billion liters in 1987. Labor There was no significant foreign labor force before the sharp rise in oil revenues in the 1970s. Most work was done by local Arabs, some by slaves brought from Africa; Indians and Irani- ans were mainly merchants. The slave trade, most of which ended by about 1945, was a major point of contention in rela- tions between Britain and the rulers of the Trucial Coast. For example, if the British resident was opposed by a shaykh on a specific matter, the resident in some cases might accuse the shaykh of violating treaty bans on the slave trade and threaten to destroy his pearling fleet or invalidate the travel documents of the shaykh and his subjects. 228 United Arab Emirates The massive influx of foreign workers and professionals in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly from other Arab countries and from India, Pakistan, and Iran, fundamentally changed the face of UAE society. (The UAE's population increased 86 per- cent between 1975 and 1980.) Working conditions of foreign workers in the UAE vary. Professionals, managers, and clerical workers are attracted by contracts offering good salaries, com- prehensive benefits, and high living standards. Unskilled and semiskilled workers are in a more precarious situation. In their home countries, they might be cheated or misled by unscrupu- lous labor contractors who supply workers to the gulf coun- tries. Although many obtain safe work at reasonable wages (much of which they remit to their families abroad), others work long hours in conditions not regulated for safety and health as stringently as they should be. In the 1980s, however, the government attempted to improve the labor law, which cov- ered conditions of employment, compensation, inspection of the workplace, and enforcement procedures. Job security can be capricious, often depending on the whims of the oil market and the national mood. In the early 1980s, for example, during a period of economic decline, authorities increased their efforts to discover foreign workers without proper credentials and deported them as illegal aliens. By 1986, however, Dubayy tried to reverse the outward flow of labor by encouraging immi- grant workers to bring their families with them. In addition, labor is not permitted to organize, strike, or engage in collective bargaining. Individuals or groups of work- ers may bring grievances to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which has been known to settle matters with fairness. Although the law prohibits the employment of youths under eighteen and restricts hours of work to eight hours per day six days per week, the law is widely violated. There is no minimum wage. In 1986, according to one set of government figures, the size of the labor force was 890,941. About 25 percent worked in construction, 14 percent in trade, 7 percent in transportation and communications, and 6 percent in manufacturing. Accord- ing to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, in 1992 UAE cit- izens accounted for 7 percent of the total work force and about 1 percent of the private-sector work force. Transportation Oil revenues have helped finance a modern transportation 229 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies infrastructure consisting of roads, ports, and airports. These facilities have helped make the UAE, and Dubayy in particular, a major hub of regional and international air and sea traffic. The UAE has about 2,000 kilometers of roads, of which 1,800 kilometers were paved as of 1993. The principal road is a high- way via the main coastal cities, from Ash Sham to the north- western border of the UAE, where it connects with roads to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Dubayy's port at Mina Jabal Ali, with sixty-seven berths in 1988, is one of the largest man-made harbors in the world. Located fifty-three kilometers southwest of the city of Dubayy, it handled nearly 10 million tons of cargo in 1989. Mina Rashid, also in Dubayy, in 1984 had thirty-five berths. The Dubayy Ports Authority was established in 1991 to operate the two ports. In addition to Mina Jabal Ali and Mina Rashid in Dubayy, the UAE's other ports are Mina Zayid in Abu Dhabi, Mina Khalid in Sharjah, Mina Saqr in Ras al Khaymah, Khawr Fakkan, and Mina al Fujayrah, the port at Al Fujayrah. During periods of regional conflict, such as the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 and the Persian Gulf War of 1991, high insur- ance premiums for gulf shipping periodically reduce the amount of traffic handled at the UAE's ports, although Mina al Fujayrah and Khawr Fakkan have the advantage of lying out- side the Persian Gulf on the Gulf of Oman. Abu Dhabi National Tankers Company operates about fifty ships, another aspect of UAE port traffic. The international airport in Dubayy is the region's busiest, serving 4.3 million passengers in 1988 and handling 144,282 tons of cargo in 1990. Other international airports, which have had difficulty attracting traffic, operate in Sharjah, Ras al Khay- mah, and Al Fujayrah. The New Abu Dhabi International Air- port opened in 1982, and the Al Ayn International Airport was scheduled to open in the early 1990s. Emirates Airlines is the UAE's international airline. Telecommunications The UAE has a modern telecommunications network that provides its citizens with good telephone and broadcast ser- vices. In 1992 the country had 386,000 telephones, or about eighteen telephones per 100 inhabitants. About one-third of the telephones are in the Dubayy area. Service is entirely auto- matic. International direct dial is available to all customers. A 230 / Bridge across Dubayy Creek; the United Arab Emirates boasts many modern highways. Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington 231 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies domestic network of high-capacity radio-relay stations and coaxial cable links all major towns. International telecommunications are excellent. Radio- relay and undersea cables link the UAE with neighboring coun- tries, and two satellite systems provide links to the rest of the world. Telecommunications to Saudi Arabia and to Bahrain go via high-capacity radio-relay links. Submarine cables laid in the late 1980s carry telephone calls to Qatar, Bahrain, India, and Pakistan. Telephone, television, and data communication to Europe, Asia, and the Americas go via three satellite groundsta- tions, working with the International Telecommunications Sat- ellite Corporation's (Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean satellites. In the early 1990s, television viewers in the UAE and throughout the Persian Gulf began receiving the twenty-four-hour news broadcasts of the Atlanta-based Cable News Network (CNN) via Intelsat. Television transmission and telephone calls to other countries in the Middle East are routed through a ground station linked to the Arab Satellite Communication Organization (Arabsat) satellite. Arabsat pro- vides telephone, data transmission, telex, and facsimile service. Arabsat also is used for live broadcasts of prayers from Mecca and Medina and for viewing inter-Arab sports events. In early 1993, broadcast facilities were adequate, and all pop- ulated areas of the country received television transmissions and radio broadcasts. Eight AM radio stations broadcast in Ara- bic, English, Urdu, and Sinhalese, in addition to three FM radio stations. Two powerful shortwave stations with broadcasts in Arabic and English can be received worldwide. Television broadcasts reach throughout the country via twelve large trans- mitters. The country has an estimated 400,000 radios and 170,000 television sets. Agriculture and Forestry Agriculture, including fishing, was a minor part of the UAE economy in the early 1990s, contributing less than 2 percent of GDP. Since the formation of the UAE, the availability of capital and the demand for fresh produce have encouraged agricul- tural development. The main farming areas are Diqdaqah in Ras al Khaymah, Falaj al Mualla in Umm al Qaywayn, Wadi adh Dhayd in Sharjah, Al Awir in Dubayy, and the coastal area of Al Fujayrah. Total cultivable land is around 70,000 hectares. Most of the UAE's cultivated land is taken up by date palms, which in the early 1990s numbered about 4 million. They are 232 United Arab Emirates cultivated in the arc of small oases that constitute the Al Liwa Oasis. Both federal and amirate governments provide incen- tives to farmers. For example, the government offers a 50 per- cent subsidy on fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides. It also provides loans for machinery and technical assistance. The amirates have forty-one agricultural extension units as well as several experimental farms and agricultural research stations. The number of farmers rose from about 4,000 in the early 1970s to 18,265 in 1988. Lack of arable land, intense heat, periodic locust swarms, and limited water supplies are the main obstacles to agricul- ture. The drive to increase the area under cultivation has resulted in the rapid depletion of underground aquifers, resulting in precipitous drops in water tables and serious increases in soil and water salinity in some areas. As a result, several farms have been forced to cease production. Despite the creation in 1983 of a federal authority to control drilling for water, development pressures in the 1980s and 1990s increased the exploitation of underground water supplies. Between 1979 and 1985, agricultural production increased sixfold. Nevertheless, the UAE imported about 70 percent of its food requirements in the early 1990s. The major vegetable crops, supplying nearly all the country's needs during the sea- son, are tomatoes, cabbage, eggplant, squash, and cauliflower. Ras al Khaymah produces most of the country's vegetables. In addition to dates, the major fruit crops are citrus and mangoes. A vegetable canning facility in Al Ayn has a processing capacity of 120 tons per day. Poultry farms provided 70 percent of local requirements for eggs and 45 percent of poultry meat needed in 1989. Local dairies produced more than 73,000 tons of milk in 1991, meet- ing 92 percent of domestic demand. Considerable revenues have been devoted to forestation, public landscaping, and parks. Trees and shrubs are distrib- uted free to schools, government offices, and residents. Affor- estation companies receive contracts to plant plots in the range of 200 to 300 hectares. The goals are to improve the appear- ance of public places as well as to prevent the desertification process in vulnerable agricultural areas. Fishing The government has supported traditional fishing in the rich waters off the UAE, an activity that has provided livelihood 233 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies for centuries along the coast. The government offers a 50 per- cent subsidy on fishing boats and equipment and has opened marine workshops that offer free repair and maintenance. Cooperatives assist fishermen in marketing their catch. The number of fishermen rose from 4,000 in 1980 to 10,611 in 1990. The total catch in 1989 of 91,160 tons (up from 70,075 tons in 1982) supplied most local demand. Moreover, prawns and fish are raised in fish farms at the National Mariculture Center — operated with Japanese assistance — in Umm al Qay- wayn. Banking and Finance The Indian rupee was the principal medium of exchange in the amirates until 1966, when Abu Dhabi began using the Bah- raini dinar and Dubayy and the northern amirates switched to the Qatar-Dubayy riyal. The federal Currency Board was estab- lished in 1973 to manage the new national currency (the UAE dirham, divided into 100 fils). The UAE dirham was officially linked in 1978 to the special drawing rights (SDR — see Glos- sary) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glos- sary) ; in practice, however, the UAE dirham was pegged to the United States dollar. The rate of Dh3.67 to US$1 has held con- stant since the end of 1980. Reluctant to transfer financial accountability over local banks (including ones in which they had major interests) to outsiders, the ruling amirs refused to give the Currency Board, managed mainly by foreigners, any control over banking. In the midst of an oil boom, banks proliferated, credit expanded, and real estate speculation was rampant, creating a chaotic financial environment. In 1975 a moratorium on the opening of new banks was imposed, temporarily lifted, then reimposed. The board's lack of foreign exchange meant it could not sup- port the UAE dirham in 1977 when a massive run on the cur- rency led to a financial crisis and the collapse of two banks. In late 1980, a law converting the Currency Board into a central bank took effect. Although the Central Bank had more author- ity than the Currency Board, it encountered opposition from various members of amirate ruling families when it attempted to put new policies and regulations in place. The Central Bank's responsibilities include issuing currency, maintaining gold and foreign currency reserves, regulating banks, and controlling credit to encourage balanced economic growth. It also advises the government on monetary and finan- 234 Fisherman and his wares; Persian Gulf waters provide abundant fish. Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington rial policy. In 1981 the moratorium on new banks was lifted once again. But in an effort to rein in the proliferation of banks, the Central Bank announced the same year that foreign banks would receive no new branch licenses and that foreign banks already operating in the country would be restricted to eight branches each by 1984. The Central Bank took several measures in the early 1980s to strengthen the banking structure. It expanded audits and inspections, increased bank reporting requirements, estab- lished a computerized loan risk department, and set minimum capital requirements. The Central Bank also created a regula- tion that limited the size of a bank's loans to its directors. As a result of a violation of this regulation, administrators appointed by the Central Bank in 1983 took over the UAE's third largest bank, the Union Bank of the Middle East. The Central Bank and the Dubayy government bailed out the bank in the amount of US$380 million. Another bank, the Emirates Industrial Bank, was established in 1983 with capital of Dh500 million as a source of loans for new industries. As a result of uncertainty in the wake of Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, between 15 and 30 percent of customer bank deposits were transferred out of the UAE. At least two banks required injections of funds from the Central Bank to 235 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies maintain liquidity, but confidence and deposits gradually returned. The Central Bank's governor was replaced in 1991 in the wake of the failure of the National Investments and Secu- rity Corporation. Another crisis rocked the UAE banking sector in 1991 when the Luxembourg-registered Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was shut down in most of the sixty-nine countries in which it operated. BCCI's troubles began in 1988 when two of its United States subsidiaries were accused of laun- dering profits from the illegal drug trade. Abu Dhabi's ruler and UAE president, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, is a founding shareholder in BCCI and in 1990 had purchased, along with others in Abu Dhabi, a 77 percent share in the bank. Having moved the bank's headquarters from London to Abu Dhabi, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan was in the process of restruc- turing the troubled bank when an audit commissioned by the Bank of England alleged major and systematic fraud by BCCI. That audit triggered the closing of most of BCCI's banks world- wide. The ripples of the crisis spread throughout the UAE busi- ness community. In addition to its massive obligations world- wide, BCCI owed agencies in Abu Dhabi US$1.4 billion and private investors US$600 million. In October 1992, a Luxem- bourg court approved a US$1.7 billion compensation agree- ment between the bank's liquidators and the majority shareholders. The agreement called for the shareholders to pay 30 to 40 cents on the dollar to BCCI depositors. Budget The provisional constitution stipulates that each amirate contribute to the federal budget. In practice, however, Abu Dhabi was the only contributor in the 1970s; Dubayy began to contribute in the early 1980s. In 1991 Abu Dhabi provided 77.5 percent of the federal budget and Dubayy, 8.5 percent. The government levies taxes on oil companies and banks in Abu Dhabi and Dubayy but not on other businesses and individuals. The poorer amirates benefit from federal expenditures on defense, infrastructure, education, and social services, but they draw up their own budgets (which are seldom published) for municipal expenditures and industrial projects. Some of these projects have been motivated more by prestige than practical- ity. For example, Dubayy, Sharjah, and Ras al Khaymah have built large international airports, even though they are a one- 236 United Arab Emirates half-hour drive from each other and less than a two-hour drive from Abu Dhabi's large international airport. Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah have borrowed heavily to finance facilities and industries, resulting occasionally in eco- nomic and political problems. Sharjah, for example, suffered a coup attempt in 1987 carried out by opponents critical of the amir's alleged financial mismanagement. The amirate's debt burden at the time was estimated at US$920 million. The revenue and spending estimates for the UAE's first and only five-year plan (1981-85) were based on strong oil revenues in the late 1970s. Petroleum revenues fell in the early 1980s, however, rendering many of the plan's goals unattainable. The federation's first budget deficit (Dh3.9 billion) occurred in 1982. Since that time, government planners have opted for a more flexible approach, keeping in mind the vagaries of the world oil market and tending to be more conservative in reve- nue and spending projections. Even so, sudden drops in oil revenues have repeatedly forced the government to put new projects on hold and to freeze current projects. Deficits gener- ally are funded by Abu Dhabi and Dubayy and by borrowing from the Central Bank. Although there is no attempt at long-term, coordinated development planning, three main objectives have guided fed- eral government spending. These include strengthening the federation's physical infrastructure and social services network, diversifying the economy, and expanding entrepot trade. Despite slowdowns in world oil markets and amirs jealous of their local sovereignty, the UAE has been able to finance mas- sive infrastructure projects (roads, utilities, communications, ports, and airports); modern education, health, and welfare systems; and improvements in agriculture and fishing. The lion's share of the federal budget, however, goes to defense (see table 29, Appendix). As a result of the continuing poten- tial for conflict in the gulf in the 1990s, defense will probably continue to absorb between 40 and 50 percent of federal out- lays and will not face the same cuts as do other sectors if the economy contracts. After battling budget deficits during most of the 1980s, the UAE saw budget surpluses in 1990 and 1991. Deficits were pro- jected to return in 1992 and 1993, with an almost US$710 mil- lion shortfall expected in 1993 (the figure includes US$245 million rolled over from the previous year's deficit). 237 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Abu Dhabi is one of the world's most generous donors of for- eign aid in terms of GDP and population. In 1981 foreign grants and loans amounted to US$2.7 billion, or 8 percent of GDP. Even in leaner times, aid in 1983 was US$1 billion, or 4 percent of GDP. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, with paid-up capital of US$500 million, extends loans and grants mainly to Arab and Muslim countries. Recipi- ents have included Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen. The level of annual outlays depends on oil revenues. In 1989 the fund's committed capital was US$2.2 billion. Loans in 1988 amounted to US$41.1 mil- lion, up from US$4.2 million in 1987. Trade The UAE, in particular Dubayy, epitomizes trade. The fed- eral government promotes open and free trade as an official policy, and a thriving source of income and full employment has resulted. The oil economy (world prices and demand as well as local production) and regional security strongly influ- ence trade. Oil and gas exports account for about three-fourths of all exports. The UAE's balance of trade surplus grew during the boom years of the 1970s but leveled off in the 1980s with decreased oil production. Although the Iran-Iraq War buffeted the oil economies of the region, Dubayy's fruitful trade links with Iran helped it to have exports and reexports of US$354 million in 1987. The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 led to a 20 percent increase in UAE imports, reducing the trade surplus from its 1987 level of US$5.2 billion (Dhl9 billion) to US$3.7 billion (Dhl3.4 billion) (see table 30, Appendix). But oil price increases and production increases resulting from Iraq's inva- sion of Kuwait in 1990 created a windfall for the UAE and drove the federation's trade surplus to US$9.3 billion (Dh34.1 billion). Administering customs and setting rates are functions reserved to the individual amirates, and duties and regulations therefore vary among them. In 1982 Dubayy and Sharjah reduced their customs duties from 3 percent to 1 percent, bringing them on a par with Abu Dhabi's tariffs. In 1983 a 4 percent general import tariff was imposed to conform to agree- ments among GCC members on minimum duties. Principal imports are manufactured goods, machinery, transportation equipment, food, and live animals. Leading sup- 238 United Arab Emirates pliers in 1988 were Japan, Britain, and the United States. Non- petroleum exports include basic manufactures, aluminum, and cement. The reexport trade overshadows national exports. Federal exports, which consist largely of petroleum, go mainly to Japan (see table 31, Appendix). In 1988 national exports amounted to US$518 million while reexports stood at more than US$2 million. Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are the prin- cipal recipients of reexports. The view along bustling Dubayy Creek gives ample evidence of the vibrant reexport trade. Scores of large, motorized dhows tied up four and five deep line the wharf, their decks and holds packed with refrigerators, television sets, clothing, toys, and even automobiles. In 1991 Dubayy's imports (much of which was destined for reexport) arrived from Japan, the United States, China, Britain, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Government and Politics Executive and Legislative Branches On July 18, 1971, rulers of six amirates from those known as the Trucial Coast states, ratified the provisional constitution of the UAE. A product of more than three years of discussion and debate among the rulers, the document was promulgated on December 2, 1971, on the UAE's independence. (Ras al Khay- mah joined the union in February 1972.) Originally, the provi- sional constitution was to be replaced after five years with a permanent document, pending the resolution of issues stand- ing in the way of full integration among the federation's amirates. These issues included individual amirates' contribu- tions to the federal budget and defense integration. Reflecting a lack of progress in resolving these matters and a grudging preference for the status quo, however, the provisional consti- tution was extended for five-year periods in 1976, 1981, 1986, and 1991. The provisional constitution of the UAE provides for the separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Additionally, it separates legislative and executive powers into federal and amirate jurisdictions. Certain powers are expressly reserved for the central government, including foreign policy, defense, security, immigration, and communica- tions. The individual amirates exercise residual powers. The separation of powers remained nominal in 1993. The Supreme Council of the Union (SCU), also seen as the Federal 239 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies ABU DHABI AL FUJAYRAH RAS AL KHAYMAH UMM AL QAYWAYN SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION * (Amirs of the Seven Amirates) VICE PRESIDENT SUPREME COURT OF THE UNION PRESIDENT UNION COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Union Head of State Commander of the Union Defense Force SECRETARIAT <--, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS PRIME MINISTER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER 23 MINISTERS A I FEDERAL NATIONAL COUNCIL (40 Members Representing Individual Amirates) MEMBERS (Listed in Order of Accession) Ruler of Ras al Khaymah: Ruler of Abu Dhabi: Ruler of Sharjah: Ruler of Al Fujayrah: Ruler of Umm al Qaywayn: Ruler of Ajman: Ruler of Dubayy. SHAYKH SAQR IBN MUHAMMAD AL QASIMI (1948) SHAYKH ZAYID IBN SULTAN AL NUHAYYAN (1966) SHAYKH SULTAN IBN MUHAMMAD AL QASIMI (1972) SHAYKH HAMAD IBN MUHAMMAD AL SHARQI (1974) SHAYKH RASHID IBN AHMAD AL MUALLA (1981) SHAYKH HUMAYD IBN RASHID AL NUAIMI (1981) SHAYKH MAKTUM IBN RASHID AL MAKTUM (1990) Appointive ------ Elective - — — — Advisory Figure 12. United Arab Emirates: Government Structure, 1992 240 United Arab Emirates Supreme Council, functions as the highest federal authority in executive and legislative capacities. Narrowly, the executive branch consists of the SCU, the Council of Ministers (the cabi- net), and the presidency (see fig. 12). The SCU consists of the rulers of the seven amirates; it elects from among its members a chairman and a vice chairman, who serve for a term of five years. Article 150 of the provisional constitution defines the powers of the SCU as formulation of general policy; legislation on all matters of state; ratification of federal laws and decrees, including those relating to the annual budget and fiscal mat- ters; ratification of international treaties and agreements; and assent to the appointment of the prime minister and Supreme Court of the Union judges. The rulers make decisions by a simple majority vote, except on substantive issues. Substantive issues require a two-thirds majority (five of seven rulers), including the votes of both Abu Dhabi and Dubayy. The SCU carries out its work through a sec- retariat and whatever ad hoc committees it chooses to appoint. The president serves as chairman of the SCU, head of state, and commander of the Union Defense Force. The president convenes the SCU and appoints the prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet ministers, and other senior civil and military officials. He has the power to proclaim martial law and to carry out a variety of functions usually associated with the chief executive. The Council of Ministers administers federal affairs. In 1992 there were twenty-five ministers, including the prime minister and deputy prime minister. UAE citizenship is a requirement for appointment as a minister. All ministers are individually and collectively answerable to the president and the SCU. In addition to its executive duties, the Council of Ministers is responsible for drafting bills for formal enactment. Under the provisional constitution, the Federal National Council (FNC) is the principal legislative authority, but its actual role in the governmental process is limited to consulta- tion. Its forty members are appointed for two-year terms by the respective amirate rulers, in accordance with a constitutionally fixed quota that allots proportionately more members to the wealthiest and most populous amirates. Thus, Abu Dhabi and Dubayy each appoint eight members to the FNC; Ras al Khay- mah and Sharjah each appoint six members; and Ajman, Al Fujayrah, and Umm al Qaywayn each appoint four members. Members of the FNC must be citizens of the amirates they rep- 241 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies resent, twenty-one years of age or older, and literate. They may not hold any other public office. The FNC meets in regular session for a minimum of six months, beginning in November. The UAE president may call a special session if necessary. The president opens the regular session with a speech on the state of the union. The FNC can reply to the state of the union address in the form of "observa- tions and wishes," but the reply has no legal effect. The FNC also makes recommendations on legislative matters to the Council of Ministers, the president, and the SCU. The FNC can discuss any government bills drafted by the Council of Minis- ters; it can agree with, amend, or reject such bills, but it cannot veto them. The laws of the UAE are divided into two main categories: union laws and decrees. A bill drafted by the Council of Minis- ters for nonbinding deliberation by the FNC and then submit- ted to the president for his assent and the SCU for ratification becomes a union law when promulgated by the president. Decrees are issued jointly by the president and the Council of Ministers between sessions of the SCU; a decree must be con- firmed by the SCU to remain valid. The Judiciary Article 94 of the provisional constitution guarantees the independence of the judicial branch under the Supreme Court of the Union. This body consists of a president and up to five judges appointed by the UAE president, following approval by the SCU. The Supreme Court is vested with the power of judi- cial review and original jurisdiction over federal-amirate and interamirate disputes. It also is empowered to try cases of offi- cial misconduct involving cabinet and other senior federal offi- cials. The provisional constitution also provides for the establish- ment of union courts of first instance to adjudicate civil, com- mercial, criminal, and administrative cases. Judgments of these courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court. Local courts in each of the seven amirates have jurisdiction over matters that the provisional constitution does not specifically reserve to the union courts. The provisional constitution designates the sharia (Islamic law) as the basis of all legislation. Three of the four legal schools of Sunni Islam have adherents in the UAE. Most citi- zens follow the Maliki legal school, but a minority follow the 242 United Arab Emirates Hanbali and Shafii schools. The Twelve Imam Shia (see Glos- sary) legal school of Shia Muslims also has adherents in the federation (see Sunni Islam; Shia Islam, ch.l). Ruling Families In 1993 the most important political figures in the UAE were the senior members of the ruling families of the individual amirates — the Al Nuhayyan family of Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuaimi of Ajman, the Al Sharqi of Al Fujayrah, the Al Maktum of Dubayy, the Al Qasimi of Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, and the Al Mualla of Umm al Qaywayn. The most powerful amir is Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan (b. ca. 1920), the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the president of the UAE (reelected to a five- year term in 1991). Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan has ruled Abu Dhabi since 1966, when his older brother, Shaykh Shakhbut Al Nuhayyan (r. 1928-66), was deposed by the British. The Al Nuhayyan originally were beduin of the Bani Yas tribe and were based in the Al Liwa Oasis. An ancestor of the current ruler migrated to the island of Abu Dhabi in the late 1770s and established a commercial port there. Prior to 1966, Abu Dhabi remained a small town and residence site of the ruler, but it had not attracted most Al Nuhayyan shaykhs, who preferred to live in the interior oases. Even Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan favored the beduin lifestyle as a young man, and for sev- eral years under his brother's rule he was governor of Al Ayn in the Al Buraymi Oasis. Beginning in the late 1960s, the oil boom-induced transformation of Abu Dhabi into a cosmopoli- tan city prompted politically ambitious Al Nuhayyan members to settle in the capital, where many of them obtained positions in the expanding amirate and federal bureaucracies. Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan designated his son, Shaykh Khalifa ibn Zayid Al Nuhayyan (b. 1949), as crown prince. Khalifa ibn Zayid acquired progressively more responsibilities as he matured. In 1992 he served as president of Abu Dhabi's Execu- tive Council (the amirate equivalent of the Council of Minis- ters) and as head of the Department of Social Services. In addition, he was deputy commander in chief of the federal Union Defense Force. Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan had more than forty-five other children, although most of them were not involved actively in politics; one son was a colonel in the Union Defense Force air force. Several of Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan's cousins were prominent in government, especially the sons of his cousin Muhammad ibn Khalifa Al Nuhayyan: Tahnun ibn 243 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Muhammad Al Nuhayyan was head of ADNOG; Hamdan ibn Muhammad Al Nuhayyan was deputy prime minister; and Sarur ibn Muhammad Al Nuhayyan was chief of the ruler's diwan (court). Until his death on October 7, 1990, Shaykh Rashid ibn Said Al Maktum (b. 1912), as ruler of Dubayy and vice president and prime minister of the UAE, was the second most powerful amir. His eldest son, Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid Al Maktum, succeeded him in all his offices. The Al Maktum are a branch of the same Bani Yas tribe that includes the Al Nuhayyan. The Al Maktum emigrated from Abu Dhabi to Dubayy's creek in the 1830s and established there the port that eventually became Dubayy. The late Shaykh Rashid ibn Said succeeded to the rule of Dubayy in 1958 following the death of his father, Shaykh Said ibn Maktum Al Maktum (r. 1912-58). During the 1960s and 1970s, Shaykh Rashid ibn Said presided over the transfor- mation of Dubayy into a wealthy oil amirate. Since the mid- 1980s, however, his sons effectively have ruled the amirate because of Rashid ibn Said's serious and chronic illnesses. Before taking over his father's offices, Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid (b. 1941) was crown prince and had several other gov- ernmental responsibilities. Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid's brother, Muhammad ibn Rashid Al Maktum, is UAE minister of defense and head of Dubayy's armed forces. Two other broth- ers also hold important positions in the Dubayy or federal administrations. In addition, several of Shaykh Rashid ibn Said's nephews and cousins are politically prominent. Two branches of the Al Qasimi tribe rule Sharjah and Ras al Khaymah. The Al Qasimi, based at Ras al Khaymah, emerged as a major maritime power during the eighteenth century; the Al Qasimi control of trade in the Persian Gulf area led to conflict with Oman and eventually with Britain, which was consolidat- ing its colonial empire in India (see Treaties with the British, ch. 1). Following several naval battles, the British finally defeated the Al Qasimi in 1819, burning their ships and the town of Ras al Khaymah. Because of this history, the Al Qasimi inherited a historical hostility toward the British. The Al Qasimi family of Sharjah is the larger of the two ruling houses. Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad Al Qasimi (b. 1942) of Sharjah became ruler in 1972, following the assassination of his brother, Shaykh Khalid ibn Muhammad Al Qasimi (r. 1965-72), killed in an unsuccessful coup to restore his cousin, Shaykh Saqr ibn Sultan Al Qasimi (r. 1951-65), whom the British had 244 Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, president of the United Arab Emirates and ruler of Abu Dhabi Courtesy Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington { I ' 4 deposed. Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad has a reputation for being relatively progressive and for being an enthusiastic sup- porter of strengthening the powers of the federal government. The ruler also has a reputation for initiating extravagant construction projects for the amirate. Since assuming power, Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad had amassed a debt estimated in 1987 at US$920 million, creating discontent among some members of the royal family and precipitating a coup attempt in June 1987. While Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad was out of the amirate, his elder brother, Shaykh Abd al Aziz Al Qasimi, issued a statement through Sharjah's news agency that Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad had abdicated because he had misman- aged the amirate's economy. Despite initial Abu Dhabi support for the pretender, the coup failed when Dubayy called a meet- ing of the SCU. Through mediation it was decided to return Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad to power, but to give Shaykh Abd al Aziz a seat on the SCU and the title of crown prince. Somewhat chastened, Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad initiated administrative and financial reforms, but he had the last word when, in February 1990, he removed his brother from the post of crown prince, revoked his brother's right to succeed him, and exiled him. 245 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies The Al Qasimi family of Ras al Khaymah is smaller than the branch in Sharjah. Shaykh Saqr ibn Muhammad Al Qasimi (b. 1920) has ruled the amirate since 1948. As do his cousins in Sharjah, he has acquired a reputation for being sympathetic to Arab nationalist issues. He is a contemporary of the former ruler of Sharjah, Shaykh Saqr ibn Sultan, and, like him, tends to be suspicious of the British. In 1971 he refused to accept Britain's compromise for resolving Iran's claims to Tunb al Kubra (Greater Tumb) and Tunb as Sughra (Lesser Tumb), two tiny islands in the Persian Gulf (see Foreign Relations, this ch.). Shaykh Saqr ibn Sultan has designated his son, Khalid ibn Saqr Al Qasimi, as crown prince; Khalid ibn Saqr was educated in the United States. The rulers of the other three amirates have limited influ- ence within the UAE. Ajman, Al Fujayrah, and Umm al Qay- wayn are relatively small, poor, and dependent on their wealthier neighbors for development grants. Shaykh Humayd ibn Rashid Al Nuaimi has ruled Ajman since 1981. Shaykh Rashid ibn Ahmad Al Mualla has ruled Umm al Qaywayn since 1981 as well. In Al Fujayrah, where a majority of the population claims membership in the dominant Al Sharqi tribe, Shaykh Hamad ibn Muhammad Al Sharqi has ruled since 1974. The Media Provided the media do not criticize the ruling families and the government, they are relatively free. Abu Dhabi publishes two dailies, one in Arabic, Al Ittihad (Unity), and one in English, Emirates News, at a government-owned press. The Dubayy government publishes one Arabic daily, Al Bayan (The Official Report) . In addition, the UAE has three other Arabic dailies and two English dailies. The government-owned UAE Broadcasting Service airs radio programs mainly from Abu Dhabi, which also has a televi- sion station, and from Dubayy. Other amirates also have radio stations, and Sharjah airs a small amount of television time. Foreign Relations Since obtaining full independence at the end of 1971, the UAE has focused on security concerns in its foreign relations. Indeed, it was uncertain in the early 1970s whether the UAE would endure as a viable state. Saudi Arabia, for example, refused to recognize the new federation because of a border 246 United Arab Emirates dispute with Abu Dhabi over the Al Buraymi Oasis, subse- quently resolved in 1974. Iran and Oman also contested UAE claims to certain territories. In addition, the discovery of exten- sive petroleum deposits in the 1960s prompted Iraq and other states to challenge the legitimacy of the UAE's ruling families. Because the UAE was a relatively small state, its leaders recog- nized that defending the country's security from both internal and external threats depended on skillful management of dip- lomatic relations with other countries, particularly larger and more powerful neighbors such as Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. A principal goal of the UAE's foreign policy has been to con- tain the spillover effects of various regional crises. For example, during the initial years of UAE independence, a major insur- rectionary movement threatened to overthrow the government in neighboring Oman. This movement also supported a group known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf, which aimed at establishing a republican regime in the UAE. During the mid-1970s, repercussions of the escalat- ing civil war in Lebanon reverberated throughout the Persian Gulf. Subsequently, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the civil war and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War all affected the UAE in various ways. Despite its criticisms of United States policies toward the Pal- estinians, the UAE perceives its evolving relationship with the United States as providing a measure of protection from these crises. Thus, by 1990-91, when it joined with the United States in the military effort to force Iraq out of Kuwait, the UAE already had become a de facto member of the United States strategic umbrella over the region. The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait were a shock to the UAE. Prior to that crisis, the UAE had tried to demonstrate solidarity on inter-Arab issues. In particular, it had supported the cause of Palestinian Arabs, both within the League of Arab States (Arab League), of which it was a member, and within international forums. In practical terms, this meant that the UAE did not recognize Israel. When Egypt signed a separate peace agreement with Israel in 1979, the UAE joined other Arab states in breaking diplomatic relations with Egypt. The UAE did not, however, expel the thousands of Egyptian work- ers in the UAE or interfere with their transfer of remittances home. For the UAE, the crisis over Kuwait demonstrated a lack of Arab unity on a critical Arab issue. The UAE joined the Arab 247 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies states that opposed the Iraqi invasion and supported the use of force to compel Iraq's withdrawal of troops. More fundamental for the UAE, this crisis exposed the fail- ure of the GCC, of which the UAE had been a founding mem- ber in 1981, as a deterrent collective security organization. Although it was not prepared to abandon the GCC — it derived other benefits from this alliance with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia — the UAE believed that new security arrangements were necessary. The UAE initially supported expanding the GCC framework to include formal military ties with Egypt and Syria. When this option seemed unrealistic, the UAE concluded that a security relationship with the United States should be continued. Consequently, negotiations began during the summer of 1991 and continued for more than a year. In late 1992, officials of both countries signed an agree- ment that permitted the United States to use some UAE bases temporarily and to pre-position supplies on UAE territory. The negotiations with the United States may have been a fac- tor in the UAE's 1992 problems with Iran, a country that opposed a continuing United States military presence in the region. Like Iraq, Iran is a large neighbor — and a much closer one — with a recent history of policies that discomfited the UAE. Throughout the 1980s, the UAE had striven with diffi- culty to maintain neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War. That conflict was also a source of internal UAE tension because Abu Dhabi tended to support Iraq while Dubayy was more sympathetic to Iran. After the war ended in 1988, Iran appeared to single out the UAE for special and friendly attention. By 1992 the UAE was the Arab country with which Iran had the closest commer- cial relations. Thus, the crisis that erupted in April 1992 over disputed islands in the Persian Gulf seemed unexpected. The dispute with Iran over the sovereignty of three small islands — Abu Musa, Greater Tumb, and Lesser Tumb — had been dormant for twenty years. It was rekindled in 1992 when Iranian officials on Abu Musa refused to permit UAE contract workers to disembark, in apparent contravention of a shared sovereignty agreement. Iran had claimed all three islands in 1970, before the UAE was formed. On the eve of indepen- dence in 1971, the amirate of Sharjah, which had jurisdiction over Abu Musa, accepted an agreement negotiated between London and Tehran that permitted Iran to establish a military garrison in the northern part of the island and allowed Sharjah to administer the civilian population living in the southern 248 United Arab Emirates part. The agreement provided for Iran and Sharjah to share the proceeds from an offshore oil field but otherwise left the question of ultimate sovereignty to be resolved at some unspec- ified future time. Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb are two uninhabited islands claimed by Ras al Khaymah but occupied by Iran since 1971. Unlike Sharjah, Ras al Khaymah never accepted an Iranian claim to the islands and protested Britain's failure to interfere with Iran's occupation. Indeed, it was the amirate's anger over the 1971 occupation that caused it to refrain from joining the UAE for several months. In the midst of the 1992 crisis over Abu Musa, Ras al Khaymah resurrected its grievance over Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb, thus enflaming an already delicate situation. At the end of the year, Iran and Sharjah qui- etly agreed to a restoration of the status quo ante the crisis, but the incidents left the UAE feeling wary of Iranian intentions. In 1993 the UAE maintained relatively cordial relations with countries outside the Middle East. It was a member of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It also was a mem- ber of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. * * * The body of scholarly literature on the UAE gradually increased in the 1980s. A recent book, Malcolm C. Peck's The United Arab Emirates, provides a good account of UAE society, politics, and economy. Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim's The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates gives a solid introduction to the subject. The history of the region from World War I until inde- pendence is presented with insight by Rosemarie Said Zahlan in her book, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates. A.O. Taryam's The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-85 gives a detailed discussion of the years immediately before and after the UAE's creation. There are also informative chapters about the UAE in sev- eral earlier books, including Ali Mohammad Khalifa's The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation and Enver Khoury's The United Arab Emirates: Its Political System and Politics. (For fur- ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 249 Chapter 6. Oman Crest of the Sultanate of Oman Country Profile Country Formal Name: Sultanate of Oman. Short Form: Oman. Term for Citizens: Omani(s); adjectival form, Omani. Capital: Muscat. Geography Size: About 212,000 square kilometers, although estimates vary. Topography: Mostly desert; 15 percent of land mountainous. Four major regions: Musandam Peninsula, Al Batinah coastal plain, Oman interior, and Dhofar region. Climate: Hot and dry, except for Dhofar, which has light monsoons. Boundaries: Oman and Saudi Arabia signed agreement in 1990 to demarcate borders; Oman and Yemen signed agreement in 1992 to demarcate borders. Society Population: In 1992, for planning purposes, government estimated 2 million; actual figure may be closer to 1.5 million. Growth rate 3.5 percent in 1994. Foreigners estimated at 23.3 percent of population in 1992. Education: Free public schools consist of primary level of six years, lower secondary level of three years, and upper secondary level of three years. Most teachers (60 percent) foreign. NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 253 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Health: Improvement and expansion of health care facilities major ongoing government priority. In 1994 infant mortality estimated at thirty-seven per 1,000 population. In 1994 life expectancy at birth sixty-eight years on average, with sixty-six years for males and seventy years for females. Ethnic Groups: Most Omanis are Arabs, although numerous citizens of non-Arab African origin. Foreign community includes Egyptians, Pakistanis, Indians, and others. Religion: Most Omanis are Muslims; Ibadis constitute largest group. Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1991 GDP about RO4.0 billion, or US$10.5 billion; per capita income R02,696, or US$7,000. Oil Industry: In 1991 accounted for about 43 percent of GDP, 95 percent of export earnings, and 82 percent of government revenues. Agriculture and Fishing: Contributed about 3.8 percent of GDP in 1991. Currency and Exchange Rate: Omani riyal. In 1994 exchange rate US$1 = RO0.3845 (fixed rate) . Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Transportation and Telecommunications Transportation: In 1992 about 6,000 kilometers paved roads and 20,000 kilometers gravel or earthen roads. Four-lane highway from Muscat along Gulf of Oman runs to Dubayy in United Arab Emirates. Major airport As Sib International Airport near Muscat. Major port Mina Qabus, near Muscat, being expanded in 1994; other major port at Raysut. Telecommunications: Telecommunications internationally via satellites; domestic telephone service very limited but being 254 Oman expanded. Television available throughout Oman, but radio broadcast facilities limited. Government and Politics Government: Sultan Qabus ibn Said Al Said as head of state and prime minister presides over Council of Ministers. Consultative Council has advisory role but no legislative powers. No constitution. Politics: No political parties. Important political actors are persons close to sultan, including Western-educated administrators and special advisers. Foreign Relations: Member of United Nations and its specialized agencies, League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Gulf Cooperation Council. June 1980 agreement allows United States use of military facilities in Oman. National Security Armed Forces: In mid-1993 Royal Armed Forces personnel strength 36,700, including 3,700 foreign personnel, as follows: Royal Oman Land Forces, 20,000; Royal Oman Navy, 3,500; Royal Oman Air Force, 3,500; and Royal Household, 6,000 (including Royal Guard of Oman, 4,500; Special Forces, 700; Royal Yacht Squadron, 150; and other, 650). Army primarily infantry force but has some tanks and armored cars. Navy a coastal patrol force, expanding and modernizing by acquiring guided missile (Exocet) craft and new gunboats. Air force has more than fifty combat aircraft, all of British manufacture. 255 SINCE 1970, WHEN OMAN'S RULER, Sultan Qabus ibn Said Al Said, assumed power, the sultanate has moved from a poor underdeveloped country toward a modern nation state. Indexes of development measuring per capita gross national product, infant mortality, literacy rates, and availability of social services validate the government's claim that its policies have effected positive change. Although the government's adminis- trative structure expanded to accommodate public services, change in the political system has been slow. Oman remains a conservative monarchy, with the sultan relying on the support of a traditional political elite comprising the Al Said ruling family, established merchant families, and, to a lesser extent, tribal shaykhs. Until the commercial production and export of oil in 1967, Oman's budget was exclusively dependent on religious taxes (zakat), customs duties, and British loans and subsidies. The bulk of this revenue served as a mechanism through which the sultan could co-opt his traditional allies among the merchant families and tribal shaykhs. By transferring income from the state treasury, the sultan was able to draw in influential seg- ments of Omani society and ensure continuance of Al Said rule. Post-1970 economic developments were in part con- structed on these antecedents. Income distribution remained a principal mechanism for ensuring political stability, but the network involved a state administrative structure rather than the more direct and personal individual-ruler relationship. Also, the system expanded to incorporate the average Omani through the creation of a public sector. The net effect has been the establishment of a salaried middle class whose economic interests are closely tied with the government. Since the development of the country's infrastructure in the 1970s, national development plans have given priority to reduc- ing dependency on oil exports and encouraging income-gener- ating projects in non-oil sectors (diversification), promoting private-sector investment, and effecting a wider geographical distribution of investments to correct regional imbalances. Such a wider distribution is intended to narrow the gap in the standard of living in different regions, develop existing areas of population, and discourage migration to densely populated urban centers, such as Muscat (also seen as Masqat), the capi- 257 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies tal. Equally important are the national goals to develop local human resources, to increase indigenous participation in the private sector, and to improve government management and organization. Constraints on the government in implementing its eco- nomic diversification program include the limited growth potential of alternative sectors, such as agriculture, fishing, and industry. Constraints also include the limited involvement of the private sector in businesses other than trade, the low-skilled labor force, the limited water resources, and the inability of government ministries to manage and expand services. Sultan Qabus ibn Said, therefore, faced different challenges in 1993 than those he confronted when he assumed power in 1970 through a palace coup d'etat. Then, the rebellion of tribes in the southern Dhofar (also seen as Zufar) region and the exploitation of the country's oil reserves had taken prece- dence. Opportunities in urban centers stimulated a rural-urban shift, reducing the number of individuals engaged in agricul- tural labor and contributing to the key role of the oil sector in the economy. On the one hand, an increasingly urbanized pop- ulation has the potential to be better educated and better enu- merated. On the other hand, the small indigenous population has necessitated the presence of a large foreign labor force. This has contributed to an informal caste system, with Omanis clearly ranked highest in the hierarchy, followed by Westerners, with non-Western foreigners at the bottom. Economic development has resulted in social transforma- tion, not only in terms of diminishing the importance of the tribal element in Oman and stratifying Omani society but also in terms of inadvertently engendering a sense of entitlement among the public, common to social welfare states. In doing so, the government has been under increasing pressure to provide suitable employment for new migrants to the cities from village communities and to new graduates from colleges, to expand its social services, and to maintain the security of the country. To fulfill these expectations, the government must ensure sustainable economic growth. Therefore, the policies of diversi- fication and indigenization have taken on greater importance. Diversification is needed to ensure growth in the post-oil era; indigenization potentially eliminates the demand for foreign labor and increases opportunities for Omani nationals. The problems of the 1990s are resistant to change, however. The 258 Oman depletion of the country's proven oil reserves (at the produc- tion rate of 1992, reserves will be depleted within seventeen years) heightens the need for economic diversification, but so far, non-oil sectors have shown limited potential. The net effect of the government's policies has been to link economic conditions with political stability. The suppression of the Dhofar rebellion in the first half of the 1970s provided a lesson for Sultan Qabus ibn Said. By addressing the gross eco- nomic neglect of the south, the government was able to ensure some political quiescence. In providing the majority of Omanis with adequate income through employment in the public sec- tor, health and medical services, education, and other social services, the government has similarly ensured a modicum of public political support. Geography and Population Geography Oman is located in the southeastern quarter of the Arabian Peninsula and, according to official estimates, covers a total land area of approximately 300,000 square kilometers; foreign observer estimates, however, are about 212,000 square kilome- ters, roughly the size of the state of Kansas. The land area is composed of varying topographic features: flat or rolling ter- rain covered with desert accounts for 82 percent of the land mass; mountain ranges, 15 percent; and the coastal plain, 3 percent. The sultanate is flanked by the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Rub al Khali (Empty Quarter) of Saudi Arabia, all of which contributed to Oman's isolation. Historically, the country's contacts with the rest of the world were by sea, which not only provided access to foreign lands but also linked the coastal towns of Oman. The Rub al Khali, difficult to cross even with modern desert transport, formed a barrier between the sultanate and the Arabian interior. The Al Hajar Mountains, which form a belt between the coast and the desert from the Musandam Peninsula (Ras Musandam) to the city of Sur at Oman's easternmost point, formed another barrier. These geo- graphic barriers kept the interior of Oman free from foreign military encroachments (see fig. 13). Natural features divide the country into seven distinct areas: Ruus al Jibal, including the northern Musandam Peninsula; the Al Batinah coastal plain; the Muscat-Matrah coastal area; 259 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Figure 13. Oman, 1993 the Oman interior, comprising Aljabal al Akhdar (Green Mountain), its foothills, and desert fringes; the barren coast- line south to Dhofar; the Dhofar region in the south; and the offshore island of Masirah. The northernmost area, Ruus al Jibal, extends from the Musandam Peninsula to the boundary with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at Hisn Diba. It borders the Strait of Hormuz, 260 Oman which links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and is sep- arated from the rest of the sultanate by a strip of territory belonging to the UAE. This area consists of low mountains forming the northernmost extremity of the Al Hajar al Gharbi (Western Al Hajar) Mountains. Two inlets, Elphinstone (Khawr ash Shamm) and Malcom (Ghubbat al Ghazirah), cleave the coastline about one-third the distance from the Strait of Hor- muz and at one point are separated by only a few hundred meters of land. The coastline is extremely rugged, and the Elphinstone Inlet, sixteen kilometers long and surrounded by cliffs 1,000 to 1,250 meters high, has frequently been com- pared with fjords in Norway. The UAE territory separating Ruus al Jibal from the rest of Oman extends almost as far south as the coastal town of Shinas. A narrow, well-populated coastal plain known as Al Batinah runs from the point at which the sultanate is reentered to the town of As Sib, about 140 kilometers to the southeast. Across the plains, a number of wadis, heavily populated in their upper courses, descend from the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains to the south. A ribbon of oases, watered by wells and an underground channel (falaj) system, extends the length of the plain, about ten kilometers inland. South of As Sib, the coast changes character. For about 175 kilometers, from As Sib to Ras al Hadd, it is barren and bounded by cliffs almost its entire length; there is no cultiva- tion and little habitation. Although the deep water off this coast renders navigation relatively easy, there are few natural harbors or safe anchorages. The two best are at Muscat and Matrah, where natural harbors facilitated the growth of cities centuries ago. West of the coastal areas lies the tableland of central Oman. The Al Hajar Mountains form two ranges: the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains and the Al Hajar ash Sharqi (Eastern Al Hajar) Mountains. They are divided by the Wadi Samail (the largest wadi in the mountain zone), a valley that forms the tra- ditional route between Muscat and the interior. The general elevation is about 1,200 meters, but the peaks of the high ridge known as Al Jabal al Akhdar — which is considered a separate area but is actually part of the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains — rise to more than 3,000 meters in some places. Al Jabal al Akh- dar is the only home of the Arabian tahr, a unique species of wild goat. In the hope of saving this rare animal, Sultan Qabus ibn Said has declared part of Al Jabal al Akhdar a national 261 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies park. Behind the Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains are two inland regions, Az Zahirah and inner Oman, separated by the lateral range of the Rub al Khali. Adjoining the Al Hajar ash Sharqi Mountains are the sandy regions of Ash Sharqiyah and Jalan, which also border the desert. The desolate coastal tract from Jalan to Ras Naws has no spe- cific name. Low hills and wastelands meet the sea for long dis- tances. Midway along this coast and about fifteen kilometers offshore is the barren island of Masirah. Stretching about sev- enty kilometers, the island occupies a strategic location near the entry point to the Gulf of Oman from the Arabian Sea. Because of its location, it became the site of military facilities used first by the British and then by the United States, follow- ing an access agreement signed in 1980 by the United States and Oman and most recently renewed in 1990. The Dhofar region extends from Ras ash Sharbatat to the border with Yemen. Its exact northern limit has never been defined, but the territory claimed by the sultan includes the Wadi Mughshin, about 240 kilometers inland. The southwest- ern portion of the coastal plain of Dhofar is regarded as one of the most beautiful in Arabia, and its capital, Salalah, was the permanent residence of Sultan Said ibn Taimur Al Said and the birthplace of the present sultan, Qabus ibn Said. The high- est peaks are about 1,000 meters. At their base lies a narrow, pebbly desert adjoining the Rub al Khali to the north. Climate With the exception of the Dhofar region, which has a light monsoon climate and receives cool winds from the Indian Ocean, the climate of Oman is extremely hot and dry most of the year. Summer begins in mid-April and lasts until October. The highest temperatures are registered in the interior, where readings of more than 50°C in the shade are common. On the Al Batinah plain, summer temperatures seldom exceed 46°C, but, because of the low elevation, the humidity may be as high as 90 percent. The mean summer temperature in Muscat is 33°C, but the gharbi (literally, western), a strong wind that blows from the Rub al Khali, can raise temperatures from the towns on the Gulf of Oman by 6°C to 10°C. Winter temperatures are mild and pleasant, ranging between 15°C and 23°C. Precipitation on the coasts and on the interior plains ranges from twenty to 100 millimeters a year and falls during mid- and late winter. Rainfall in the mountains, particularly over Al Jabal 262 Oman al Akhdar, is much higher and may reach 700 millimeters. Because the plateau of Al Jabal al Akhdar is porous limestone, rainfall seeps quickly through it, and the vegetation, which might be expected to be more lush, is meager. However, a huge reservoir under the plateau provides springs for low-lying areas. In addition, an enormous wadi channels water to these valleys, making the area agriculturally productive in years of good rainfall. Dhofar, benefiting from a southwest monsoon between June and September, receives heavier rainfall and has constantly running streams, which make the region Oman's most ferule area. Population A comprehensive population census has never been con- ducted, but in 1992 the sultanate solicited help from the United Nations (UN) Fund for Technical and Financial Assis- tance in taking a full census. For planning purposes, the gov- ernment in 1992 estimated the population at 2 million, but the actual figure may be closer to 1.5 million, growing at a rate of 3.5 percent per annum. The population is unevenly distrib- uted; the coastal regions, the Al Batinah plain, and the Muscat metropolitan area contain the largest concentration. Omanis live mainly in rural areas, but urban locations also exist. The major city is Muscat, the capital. In the Al Batinah plain in the north, the largest town is Suhar. Farther south, in the hilly region of Al Jabal al Akhdar, lies the town of Nazwah. Salalah is a major center for the Dhofar region. The population is heterogeneous, consisting of an ethnic and religious mix derived in large part from a history of mari- time trade, tribal migrations, and contacts with the outside world. Although Arabs constitute the majority, non-Arab com- munities include Baluchis — from the Makran coast of Iran and Pakistan — who are concentrated in Muscat and the Al Batinah coast and play a significant role in the armed forces; ex-slaves (a legacy of Oman's slave trade and East African colonies); and Zanzibari Omanis, who are well represented in the police force and the professions. The integration of Omanis of African descent is often circumscribed by a language barrier (they often speak Swahili and English but not always Arabic). The presence of Omanis of Indian descent in Muscat reflects the historical commercial ties between the sultanate and the Indian subcontinent. The Khoja community in Matrah, of Indian origin, is perhaps the richest private group in Oman, 263 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies and its members are among the best educated. The Shihuh of the northern Musandam Peninsula numbered about 20,000 in the early 1990s. They speak Arabic and a dialect of Farsi and engage primarily in fishing and herding. Because of the small indigenous population, the government has been obliged to use foreign labor. In 1992 about 60 percent of the labor force was foreign. Some 350,000 foreign workers and their families (primarily Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Filipinos, and Sri Lankans) live in Oman. The high percentage of foreigners in the work force, combined with improvements in the country's education system, has prompted the government to institute a program of indigenization whereby Omani nation- als gradually replace foreigners (see Labor, this ch.). Society Religion The majority of Omanis are Ibadi Muslims, followers of Abd Allah ibn Ibad (see Shia Islam, ch. 1). Approximately 25 per- cent are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims and live primarily in Sur and the surrounding area and in Dhofar. They form the largest non-Ibadi minority. The Shia (see Glossary) minority lives along the Al Batinah coast in the Muscat-Matrah region. This minority includes the Khoja, the Baharina of Iraqi or Iranian descent, and the Ajam, of vague origin but generally consid- ered to originate in Iran. Ibadism is an outgrowth of the Kharijite movement, a variant form of Islam practiced by descendants of a sect that seceded from the principal Muslim body after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632. Kharijites reject primogeniture suc- cession of the Quraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, and assert that leadership of Islam, the caliphate, should be exercised by an imam (see Glossary) elected by the community from candi- dates who possess spiritual and personal qualities. Ibadi leader- ship is vested in an imam, who is regarded as the sole legitimate leader and combines religious and political authority. The imam is elected by a council of prominent laymen or shaykhs (see Glossary). Adherence to Ibadism accounts in part for Oman's historical isolation. Considered a heretical form of Islam by the majority Sunni Muslims, Ibadis were not inclined to integrate with their neighbors. 264 Oman Education As in other sectors of Omani society, the education system was radically altered after the accession of Sultan Qabus ibn Said. Prior to 1970, there were only three primary schools in the sultanate — in Muscat, Matrah, and Salalah. These were reserved for approximately 900 boys personally selected by the sultan from among many applicants. Additionally, in Muscat there was a religious institute with an enrollment of fifty boys, three private schools for Hyderabadis (Indians), and one United States missionary school serving fifty foreign girls. Sul- tan Qabus ibn Said initiated a shift in the government's policies and priorities from neglect to expansion of the school system, increasing the public's access to general education. The education system is guided by the policy-making body of the Council for Education chaired by the sultan and operated by the Ministry of Education and Youth. General education is divided into three levels: primary (grades 1-6); lower second- ary (grades 7-9); and upper secondary (grades 10-12). Teacher-training colleges provide training programs for pri- mary and lower secondary school teachers. Education accounted for a modest 11.2 percent of the gov- ernment's current expenditures in 1990, up from only 2.4 per- cent in 1975 but still considerably less than the 28 percent planned and less than the proportion recorded by other coun- tries in the process of expanding their school systems. By the 1989-90 academic year, the percentage of students enrolled in primary schools was almost 100 percent in the respective age- group, compared with 53 percent in 1977-78 (see table 32, Appendix). The percentage of girls attending primary schools also rose rapidly during this period, from 37 percent in 1977- 78 to 97 percent in 1989-90. The student-teacher ratio at the primary level was twenty-seven to one in 1988-89. Secondary school enrollment lagged behind primary school attendance and rose from 8 percent of secondary-school-age youth in 1977-78 to 48 percent in 1989-90. In 1986 Sultan Qabus Uni- versity opened at Al Khawd, west of Muscat, with faculties of agriculture, education, engineering, Islamic studies, medicine, and science. Faculties for commerce, economics, and the arts are planned. Rapid expansion and enrollment have exceeded the capac- ity of the ministry to plan and administer the system. This has produced problems in planning, budgeting, curriculum devel- opment, and teacher training. Often, inappropriate sites for 265 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies facilities are selected, and programs are of poor quality or unavailable. Lower secondary education remains underdevel- oped, contributing to the low enrollment rates in upper sec- ondary school, particularly for females. The government emphasizes teacher training for Omanis, in order to create an indigenous teaching force. The dependency on foreign staff, and hence the high turnover rate and lack of continuity, further compromises the quality of education. In the 1980-81 academic year, 618 of a total 5,663, or 11 percent of the teaching staff, were Omanis. By the 1985-86 academic year, the number had increased to 18 percent. The majority of ministry employees (55 percent in 1990) are non-Omanis, of whom more than 70 percent are Egyptians; the balance consists of Jordanians, Pakistanis, Sudanese, Indians, Filipinos, and oth- ers. As of 1990, there were six teacher-training colleges provid- ing a two-year program and enrolling a total of about 700 students. Secondary school teachers receive training at the Fac- ulty of Education at Sultan Qabus University. The government's medium-term objectives are to ensure that all six-year-olds are enrolled in primary school and to expand access to primary and secondary education in rural areas. The government also seeks to expand teacher-training facilities; to increase the number of trained nationals staffing schools by increasing the number of teacher-training colleges; to improve teacher-class ratios and school-building operations; and to introduce student testing and new programs. Health Developments in the health and medical sector paralleled those in education. In 1970 there was one twelve-bed hospital operated by United States missionaries and nine government health centers. In 1990 there was a total of forty-seven hospi- tals, compared with fourteen in 1980. The number of doctors increased from 294 to 994 in the same ten-year period, and the number of nurses more than quadrupled from 857 to 3,512. The government's health policy is directed at achieving a level of health care that approaches its goal of Health for All by the Year 2000. Included among the health priorities of the Min- istry of Health are strengthening curative services, particularly in urban areas, and improving preventive services, with the emphasis on communicable diseases and immunization. The Public Health Department of the Ministry of Health is respon- sible for mass immunizations for smallpox and other infectious 266 Sultan Qabus University at Al Khawd, west of Muscat Sultan Qabus ibn Said Al Said presenting gifts to the first graduates of Sultan Qabus University Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 267 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies diseases. The government stresses delivering maternal and child health care at the village level to decrease the infant mor- tality rate, estimated in mid-1992 at forty-four per 1,000 popula- tion. Life expectancy in mid-1992 was sixty-four years for males and sixty-eight years for females. The government is also expanding its education program, especially with regard to maternal and child health care. In July 1987, the country held its first workshop on acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) to increase awareness of the problem in the medical community. Contraceptives are available at private hospitals and dispensaries and through commercial outlets. Abortion is illegal except when the mother's life is endangered. Although adequate health facilities exist in urban centers, coverage in rural areas remains insufficient. As a result, the government is continuing to develop health services as an inte- gral part of national development. The Fourth Five-Year Devel- opment Plan (1991-95) allocated R048 million (for value of the Omani riyal — see Glossary), which is equivalent to US$124.7 million, for this purpose. Ministry of Health plans include a 100-bed hospital in Al Buraymi and a 200-bed hospi- tal at Ar Rustaq, southeast of Qurayyat, to replace the existing medical facility in Ar Rustaq and to serve as a central, referral hospital for the region. Other projects include replacing all outpatient clinics at the Royal Hospital polyclinic in the capital and building a new 200-bed hospital at Ibri and a 200-bed hos- pital at Tanam, in the interior north of Ibri. The Economy Omani economic development may be divided into three phases: a period of rapid expansion between 1970 and 1986; economic retrenchment and rationalization between 1986 and 1989 as a result of the 1985-86 oil price collapse; and a period of stabilized growth since 1990. Economic growth and struc- tural change have proceeded rapidly in Oman during the rule of Sultan Qabus ibn Said. Oman, however, lagged behind such neighboring gulf amirates as Kuwait and the UAE as a result of the late discovery of oil, financial constraints, and political instability in the first half of the 1970s. Nonetheless, increased government expenditure as a result of the commercial produc- tion and export of oil transformed the standard of living in Oman. By the latter half of the 1980s, Oman emerged as a mid- dle-income country after entering the development process as 268 Oman one of the poorest Arab states. Per capita income rose from US$360 in 1970 to US$3,140 in 1980 and to US$7,000 in 1991. When Sultan Qabus ibn Said assumed power in 1970, he immediately implemented an economic development and modernization program. Priority was given to expanding the country's almost nonexistent infrastructure. In the early 1970s, substantial progress was made in developing physical and social infrastructure, mainly in the form of roads, a new deepwater port, an international airport, electricity-generating plants, desalination plants, and schools, hospitals, and low-cost hous- ing. Government revenue derived almost exclusively from oil receipts made this possible. Economic growth was accompanied by uneven structural development, however. In 1960 agriculture accounted for 75 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary); by Oman's fiscal year 1991, its share had fallen to less than 3 per- cent. By contrast, industry (including petroleum), which accounted for only 8 percent of GDP in 1960, increased to 59 percent by 1985. Manufacturing increased only from 1 percent to 3 percent and services from 18 percent to 38 percent in the same period. As a result, in 1993 Oman's economy was dominated by the petroleum and the services sectors. Aware of the vulnerability produced by dependency on a depletable natural resource, the government has increased funding for sectors based on renew- able natural resources that can provide sustainable economic growth. The government is concentrating on the agriculture and fishing sectors, encouraging tourism, and constructing light industrial parks with the objective of exporting consumer goods to its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. Public Finance and the Five-Year Development Plans Prior to 1970, the financial position of the sultan was virtu- ally synonymous with the public finances of the sultanate. After Qabus ibn Said's accession to the throne, a formal separation was initiated. The first government budget was announced in 1971, and the First Five-Year Development Plan was initiated in 1976. After recovering somewhat in 1987 after the collapse of oil prices in 1986, government revenue fell again in 1988 to R01,198 million (see table 33, Appendix). Iraq's invasion of Kuwait resulted in a sharp rise in oil prices: average crude oil spot prices increased from US$16 per barrel in July 1990 to 269 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies almost US$40 per barrel in September. Higher oil prices resulted in increased 1990 oil revenues, up 38 percent from 1989. The restoration of the Al Sabah monarchy in Kuwait and the defeat of Iraqi forces by an allied coalition stabilized the international oil market's uncertainty about supplies, and prices collapsed to precrisis levels. Omani government reve- nues dropped to ROl,570 million in 1991, from R01,859 mil- lion in 1990. The government budget for 1992 was based on an estimate that total revenues would increase to R01,628 million as a result of slightly higher oil income and as a result of increases in gas revenues and other domestic indirect taxes. Although the government stresses investment, government expenditures are largely current expenditures, suggesting the importance the government places on maintaining its security, against both internal and external threats, and on its civil administration. Public corporations and ministries have pro- vided a mechanism for income distribution and the creation of a salaried middle class. Reducing expenditures through public- sector cuts is regarded as politically sensitive and therefore has been avoided, even after the oil price collapse in the mid-1980s and the associated loss of income. The 4.3 percent per annum increase in total expenditures after 1986 largely resulted from these concerns. Between 1987 and 1991, total government spending rose from R01,576 to R01,853 million. During this period, current expenditures grew at 5 percent per annum. Although barely keeping pace with domestic inflation and increasing at a slower growth rate than that of the preceding ten years — when current outlays rose at 19.7 percent per annum — maintaining domestic income and defense and security expenditures prevented any retrenchment, despite wild fluctuations in income. Capital expenditures, however, had to be reduced between 1987 and 1990 and fell by 4 percent per annum. Higher oil prices in 1991 allowed the government to boost investment spending to pre-1986 levels, with a 37 percent increase over 1990. This adjustment restored the share of capital outlays in total govern- ment spending to 23 percent, after falling to about 12 percent in 1990. The 1992 budget called for further increases in spend- ing to R01,876 million, of which capital expenditures were slated to rise to RO404 million, or 22 percent of the total. With the exception of a short period in the early 1980s, the government budget has registered sizable deficits. During 1986 the deficit (RO700 million) peaked at 28 percent of GDP. It 270 Oman was sharply reduced during the latter half of the 1980s but has continued to hover close to 10 percent of GDP. A lag in increased spending to match the rise in oil revenues late in 1990 permitted the government almost to balance the budget. But in 1991 spending more than offset oil revenues, and the actual budget deficit rose to R0283 million, or 10 percent of GDP. The 1992 budget forecast indicated another deficit of this magnitude. The government has financed these budget deficits by draw- ing down on the Contingency Fund and by small amounts of commercial borrowing. Economic difficulties have compelled the government to raise money on international capital mar- kets. In 1986 the government received a US$500 million syndi- cated Euroloan, the major sponsors of which were Gulf International Bank (in which the government is a shareholder) and Chase Investment Bank. In 1988 the government obtained ajapanese yen-denominated loan valued at US$130 million and a second US$100 million loan. Balanced fiscal conditions permitted the authorities to pay some of Oman's debt out- standing in 1990. During 1991 and 1992, authorities instituted a domestic development bond scheme, which has financed roughly one-half the fiscal shortfall. The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1991-95) pro- jected government revenue at R08,57l million, up 22.8 per- cent from the previous plan. Oil revenue is expected to account for more than 76 percent of total revenue and to increase by an average of about 5 percent each year, reaching R01,785 million in 1995 on a gross basis and R01,429 million on a net basis (that is, gross oil revenues less subventions to the State General Reserve Fund and the Contingency Fund). The plan was based on an assumed average oil price of US$20 per barrel in the five years. During the first two years of the plan, total revenues roughly kept pace with planned earnings because oil prices held at those levels. Expenditures during the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan were set at RO9,450 million, with current expenditures accounting for 76 percent of the total, investment expendi- tures set at 22 percent, and additional support to the private sector set at 1.4 percent. Defense and national security and civil ministries continue to make up the bulk of current expendi- tures. With expenditures exceeding revenues, the government projects a cumulative deficit of R0879 million. The govern- ment plans to finance the deficit by issuing RO430 million in 271 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies government bonds on the Muscat securities market and by fur- ther drawdowns on the Contingency Fund. The State General Reserve Fund is to be strengthened by allocating 15 percent of oil revenues to the fund, up from the previous 5 percent. This policy change was made possible after the creation of the Contingency Fund in 1990, which receives 7.5 percent of net oil revenues if the oil price is US$18 to US$20 per barrel and 10 percent if the oil price rises to US$20 to US$22 per barrel. Both policies are directed toward smooth- ing out the effects of oil price fluctuations and reducing the economy's vulnerability to unexpected changes in the interna- tional oil market. Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments Oman's exports are dominated by oil earnings. Total exports peaked in 1985 at almost US$5.0 billion before the oil price collapse in 1986. During the preceding decade, exports rose by a factor of 3.5, largely because of the higher volume of crude and refined product sales overseas and the sustained rise in international oil prices. Petroleum exports constituted 98 per- cent of foreign merchandise earnings in 1985. Exports declined to US$2.9 billion in 1986 but have steadily risen since then as a result of further increases in the volume of oil shipped and higher oil prices. In 1990 total exports rose to US$5.5 billion, of which oil exports were just under US$5.2 bil- lion (see table 34, Appendix). Non-oil exports accounted for only 3.4 percent of total exports in 1990, up from 2 percent in 1986. The bulk of non-oil exports includes livestock and some metals. Oman also made considerable strides in increasing tex- tile and mineral exports during the early 1990s. Most exports go to other Middle Eastern countries, followed by Japan and other Asian countries (see table 35, Appendix). Domestic government expenditures and rising incomes have stimulated a steady increase in merchandise imports. Total imports rose from US$907 million in 1975 to a peak of US$3 billion in 1985 before economic retrenchment and weaker domestic economic conditions caused a slight reduction in for- eign purchases. After falling to below US$2 billion in 1987, imports increased to US$3.3 billion in 1991 because of the improved oil revenue situation and the onset of the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan. Development goods, notably machinery and transportation equipment, and defense items dominate the imports profile. In 1991 machinery and transpor- 272 Oman tation items constituted 42 percent of the total import bill, and other manufactured goods made up 18 percent. Oman's total food imports fell in 1991 to 18 percent from a mid-1980s aver- age of 20 percent. Imports came mostly from other Middle Eastern countries and from Japan. Despite the vagaries of international oil markets and sharp fluctuations in oil prices, Oman has succeeded in maintaining a surplus on its merchandise trade account, except in 1986. A deficit in the services account, however, continues to constitute a leakage in the government's external position. Workers' remittances and payments on external debt account for more than one-half of the services deficit. Although the net outflow from workers' remittances slowed after the mid-1980s because of the recessionary climate in the region and the reduction in the number of foreign workers, the value of workers' remit- tances constituted just under US$1 billion per annum on the balance of payments. The program of indigenization was intended to reduce this leakage, but limited local manpower skills remain a bottleneck for indigenization. Interest on the foreign debt is the second largest item of services imports. It peaked at US$320 million in 1990 but declined in 1991 as a result of lower international interest rates and some repayment of the foreign debt. Interest receipts on official and commer- cial bank assets abroad (totaling US$350 million in 1991) are insufficient to offset services outflows. During the 1980s, Oman registered sizable surpluses on its current account. In 1981 the surplus reached just over US$1 billion; it tapered off rapidly thereafter with the decline in oil prices. In 1986 Oman registered a deficit just over US$1 billion on its current account, recovered to a US$784 million surplus in 1987, a smaller deficit in 1988, and a surplus in 1989. Higher oil prices in 1990 boosted the balance to a record US$1.2 bil- lion surplus, but a rapid rise in imports and some weakening in external earnings left the current account in balance in 1991. Before 1986 the capital account was dominated by increases in external reserves. The cumulative increase in external assets of the government was US$2.5 billion between 1978 and 1985. Despite a shrinking surplus on the current account, the gov- ernment could raise foreign assets because of a sizable pro- gram of foreign borrowing and direct foreign investment, mainly in the oil sector. In 1986 the government had to reduce foreign reserves by US$612 million to fortify the capital account. This was necessary despite nearly US$765 million in 273 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies loans secured on international markets. Since then, continued access to international loan markets and a steady rise in foreign direct investment, not to mention higher oil prices, have per- mitted the government to replenish foreign assets. At the end of 1991, the government's published foreign assets totaled US$1.6 billion; the World Bank (see Glossary) estimate of Oman's foreign debt at the end of 1990 was US$2.5 billion. Hydrocarbon Sector Since the first commercial field was discovered at Jibal, west of Adam, in 1962, the petroleum industry has dominated the economy. In 1991 the industry contributed about 43 percent of GDP and 82 percent of government revenues. The govern- ment's heavy reliance on crude oil export earnings to maintain its income distribution system and political stability made con- tinued development of this sector a priority. By early 1977, the newly organized Ministry of Petroleum, Fisheries, and Agriculture prematurely assumed that produc- tion had probably peaked at more than 350,000 barrels per day (bpd — see Glossary) and would decline. Exploration activity in the south was insignificant, deterred by political instability in the region, and production at the main fields of Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) in the north, includingjibal, was in decline (see fig. 14). The suppression of the Dhofar rebel- lion in the mid-1970s helped reverse an output decline. For- eign exploration companies, satisfied with the restoration of political stability, began to sign area exploration and produc- tion agreements with the government. Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques at existing fields, combined with new fields coming onstream, raised average output to 708,000 bpd in 1991. The principal problem the government faced in the early 1990s was a diminishing reserve base. Proven reserves were esti- mated at 4.6 billion barrels in 1992, small in comparison with other gulf states. At the mid-1992 rate of production of 725,000 bpd, Oman's crude reserves are sufficient to permit seventeen years of output, compared with nearly 350 years for Saudi Ara- bia. Oil prospecting began in 1924 when the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later renamed British Petroleum) obtained a con- cession; however, unsuccessful exploratory drilling discour- aged further interest. Discoveries in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia during the 1930s stimulated exploration activity. The first con- 274 Oman cession agreement was signed with Petroleum Concessions, a Western consortium formed by the owners of the Iraq Petro- leum Company (IPC). In 1951 the concessionaire's name was changed to Petroleum Development Oman (PDO). In 1993 PDO remained the principal operating company and con- trolled the bulk of oil reserves and output. After several years of costly and unsuccessful exploratory drilling, most IPC partners wanted to withdraw from their con- cession area. In 1960 Royal Dutch Shell acquired an 85 percent interest in PDO; Participations and Explorations (Partex) held the remaining 15 percent share. In 1967 the French firm Total- Compagnie Francaise des Petroles acquired 10 percent of Par- tex's 15 percent interest. In December 1973, the government of Oman, following the participation agreements negotiated by several gulf countries, acquired a 25 percent share of PDO. In July 1974, the government's stake was raised to 60 percent, ret- roactive to January 1, 1974. Since 1974 the remaining 40 per- cent has been held by Royal Dutch Shell with 34 percent, Total- Compagnie Francaise des Petroles with 4 percent, and Partex with 2 percent. PDO operates two main production areas: a group of north- ern oil fields, including Jibal, Fuhud, and Sayh Nuhaydah, that produce lighter grades of crude oil; and a group of southern fields, including Rima, Mamul, Amal, Nimr, Mukhaizna, and Sayyala, that produce heavier crudes. Development of the southern fields took place after the suppression of the Dhofar rebellion and the reestablishment of political stability in the sultanate. Reserves As of January 1992, official proven crude reserves were esti- mated at 4.6 billion barrels, up almost 6 percent from 1991 and up 83 percent from the oil reserve estimate in 1980. The rela- tively gradual increments to Oman's reserve base since 1980 were attributable to the discovery of new, smaller oil fields and revised estimates for existing fields. More than one-half of Oman's total reserves are concen- trated in the northern region, where six fields — Jibal, Natih, Fuhud, Al Huwaysah, Al Khuwayr, and Shaybikah — are part of a single geological structure containing recoverable reserves of more than 2 billion barrels. Similarly, in the south, eight princi- pal producing fields also come from a single geological struc- ture. 275 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies I YEMEN > L Arabian Sea KHURiYA MURIYA Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative Figure 14. Oman: Oil Fields, Gas Fields, and Refineries, 1993 Several foreign companies that are engaged in exploration and production activities, such as France's Elf Aquitaine Oman, the Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Occidental Oman), and the American Oil Company (Amoco), signed agreements in the 1970s. Others, such as the Japan Exploration Company (Japex Oman) and Canada's International Petroleum, followed in 1981 and 1984, respectively. 276 Oman Oil Production and Exports During the period from 1967 to 1980, crude oil production peaked in 1976 at 365,000 bpd but subsequently declined. Pro- ducing fields are concentrated in the northern region around Jibal, Fuhud, and Natih, all three of which were discovered in the 1960s. The Dhofar rebellion inhibited exploration farther south and suspended development activity around Mamul, dis- covered in 1957 and holding 600 million barrels of gross proven and probable oil reserves. Because of the declining pro- duction from northern fields, total output fell. In 1979 average output was 285,000 bpd. Once hostilities ceased in 1975 and confidence in the authority of the central government returned, southern explo- ration and production activities resumed, facilitating new dis- coveries in the late 1970s and 1980s. The Rima field, with gross proven and probable reserves estimated at 270 million barrels, was discovered in 1979; Amal, with 145 million barrels of reserves, was discovered in 1982; and Mukhaizna, with 130 mil- lion barrels, was discovered in 1985. All were brought onstream by PDO. As a result, oil output increased throughout the 1980s. Crude oil production averaged 708,000 bpd in 1991, compared with 685,000 bpd in 1990 (see table 36, Appendix). Output for 1992 averaged 745,000 bpd. Most of this, about 670,000 to 680,000 bpd, was lifted by PDO. According to Minister of Petro- leum and Minerals Said Ahmad ash Shanfari, there are plans to maintain output at that level into the twenty-first century. Apart from PDO, which contributes the bulk of the output, three other groups have interests in the producing fields. These are Occidental Oman (28,000 bpd), Elf Aquitaine Oman (15,000 bpd), andjapex Oman (8,000 bpd). To maintain output at current levels and avoid future declines, the government is pursuing a two-pronged strategy of developing smaller fields and applying EOR and secondary techniques at existing fields. The strategy appears successful because 1992 was the twelfth consecutive year in which produc- tion increased. However, a pattern has emerged whereby the number of fields discovered holding large (greater than 500 million barrels of gross proven and probable) reserves has been declining. The potential for discovering fields with a reserve base and production rates comparable to Jibal appears remote, given Oman's mature exploration history. EOR techniques are applied to the mature fields. In the north, additional wells have been drilled, and water injection 277 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies facilities have been constructed at the Jibal field. Gas injection is used at Fuhud and Natih. At Mamul, in the south, high-pres- sure steam injection techniques have been used since 1985. Most of the increase in output will come from PDO's Al Khu- wayr field in north-central Oman, where a US$500 million development project was designed to increase the field's out- put from 25,000 bpd to more than 120,000 bpd when com- pleted in 1993. The project involves gas lift and water injection facilities. Output will compensate for falling output from exist- ing producing fields. Apart from the pilot waterflood project at Al Khuwayr, near Izki, the Sayh Nuhaydah gas-condensate field is a potential candidate for an analogous waterflood develop- ment program. More than 90 percent of oil production is exported. The majority of Oman's exports are destined for the Far East mar- ket. Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Singapore, China, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines accounted for 85 percent of total crude exports in 1990. Japan accounted for 40 percent of total exports, South Korea for 26 percent, and Sin- gapore for 7 percent. Less than 7 percent of crude exports was destined for the United States market. All crude oil from the northern and southern fields is col- lected and blended into Omani export blend. The country's only refinery and terminal is at Mina al Fahl, near Muscat. The refinery, completed in 1982 with an initial throughput capacity of 50,000 bpd and expanded to 80,000 bpd in 1987, was designed to meet domestic demand for petroleum products. Operated by the Oman Oil Refinery Company, in which the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals holds a 99 percent share and the Central Bank of Oman holds 1 percent, the refinery produces liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), butane, jet fuel, and two grades of gasoline. Foreign Downstream Ventures The Oman Oil Company (OOC), established in the late 1980s, is responsible for the government's foreign petroleum activities. The board of directors consists of former govern- ment officials and private advisers and is responsible to the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals. The OOC engages in international oil trading, including the purchase and sale of Omani crude oil, and in acquiring foreign downstream (see Glossary) holdings. Acquiring foreign downstream holdings is the most recent development in the ministry's oil policies, lag- 278 Oman ging behind such other Arab oil producers as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, which have actively pursued foreign down- stream ventures to ensure a secure market for crude oil sales. As of late 1992, the OOC was negotiating equity interest in a foreign downstream venture, the acquisition of a 20 percent stake in Thailand's fifth refinery, in Rayong Province in the south. The refinery is designed to process up to 120,000 bpd of crude and will cost US$600 million. Operations are scheduled to begin in 1996 and will involve Oman's supplying part of the refinery's feedstock. Also, as a member of a consortium includ- ing Chevron Corporation of the United States, the OOC has committed itself to build an export pipeline to transport oil from the Tengiz and Korolyov fields in Kazakhstan to interna- tional markets. The pipeline complements an agreement signed on June 18, 1992, by the government of Oman with Kazakhstan for exploration and production of oil and gas in the former Soviet republic. The Tengiz and Korolyov fields are said to have a potential output of 700,000 bpd by 2010. Gas Development and Production The depletion of the sultanate's crude oil reserves acceler- ated the government's bid to increase the use of gas in electric power generation and industry. In the early 1970s, the sultan- ate began to use gas in electric power generation. Gas pipelines were laid, and generators were converted from diesel to gas. This was done in the Muscat metropolitan area just before the second oil price shock despite resistance by importers of diesel. Plans were to increase gas use by extending the government gas grid linking the south and the east to the north. Power gen- eration facilities north of Muscat in 1992 were using gas as a feedstock, and plans were to increase gas-fired units elsewhere. Although the government has promoted the industrial use of gas, oil firms remain the principal consumers, using a total of 8.5 million cubic meters per day of associated gas. Gas is required for reinjection, compression fuel, and power genera- tion to support facilities at producing fields. This is likely to continue in the short term, given the slow pace of switching industrial use from petroleum. The government's focus in the 1990s on exploiting natural gas reserves and increasing output to meet rising demand complements its priority in maintaining current oil output levels. It seeks to do this without depleting crude reserves by using gas produced in association with oil output for reinjection at mature fields to increase production 279 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies and, by substituting gas for oil, to release greater volumes of crude oil for export. On February 8, 1992, the Ministry of Petroleum and Miner- als signed a cooperation protocol with Royal Dutch Shell for a comprehensive evaluation of Oman's gas reserves, estimated in June 1992 at 482 billion cubic meters, the bulk of which is in nonassociated form. According to the minister of petroleum and minerals, some studies indicate a reserve base as high as 935 million cubic meters. A preliminary feasibility study con- ducted by Royal Dutch Shell indicated the potential for exploit- ing gas reserves at a rate of 142,000 cubic meters per year as exports over a twenty-year period and for meeting domestic demand for the next fifty years. Most of the gas produced is in associated form and comes from PDO's Jibal field; smaller volumes come from the Natih and Sayh Nuhaydah fields in northern Oman and the Birba field in the south. Gas plants have been constructed in Jibal, Fuhud, Sayh Nuhaydah, Sayyala, and Rima, providing Oman with a gas-processing capacity of almost 18 million cubic meters per day. Despite increased gas production, gas throughput at these plants ran at about one-half of total capacity in 1989. Evaluation of the commercial viability of the northern off- shore Bukha natural gas and condensate field, discovered in 1986 by its concession operator, the International Petroleum Company of Canada, was completed in June 1992. The com- pany estimates the life expectancy of the Bukha field at fifteen years, a capacity of 28 million cubic meters per day of gas and 5,000 to 10,000 bpd of condensate, and a requirement of an approximately US$60 million capital investment to bring the field onstream. Production was scheduled to begin in 1993. The government planned to drill wells in the central fields (Sayh Rawl, Sayh Nuhaydah, Barik, and Mabruk) at a cost of R047 million (US$18 million) between 1992 and 1995. Output from these structures will supply the US$9 billion LNG project, which was finalized on May 6, 1992, by a memorandum of understanding. In this project, the government will be respon- sible for all upstream (see Glossary) activities. A new consor- tium was established, comprising the Omani government at 51 percent, PDO's foreign shareholders (Royal Dutch Shell, Total- Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, and Partex) at 42 percent, and three Japanese firms (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and C. Itoh) at the remaining 7 percent, undertaking downstream operations under a service contract. Deliveries of LNG are not expected to 280 Oman begin before 1999. The Japanese market is expected to be the most probable destination for output. If increasing volumes of gas are lifted, the government may consider new gas-based industries such as methanol, fertilizers, and methyl tertiary-butyl ester (MTBE). During 1992 talks were conducted with Iran concerning joint development of the Bukha and Henjam offshore fields, where limited drilling has indicated a gas and gas liquids potential. Omani officials have also conducted talks with Qatar regarding the purchase of nat- ural gas from Qatar's North Field. The proposal to build a gas line from Qatar to Dubayy may be expanded to include a spur line to Oman. Minister of Petroleum and Minerals Shanfari indicated that Oman is prepared to purchase a volume up to 113 million cubic meters per day of gas from Qatar if an accept- able price can be negotiated. The regional gas line proposal was being considered among gulf countries for much of the 1980s. As of early 1993, a definitive decision on a regional (Ara- bian Peninsula) coordinated, long-term gas plan that would rationalize supply and demand for decades had not been com- pleted. Agriculture and Fishing The government's economic development policy empha- sizes the expansion of such non-oil sectors as agriculture, fish- ing, industry, and mining in its bid to diversify the economy and diminish its dependence on oil exports. The goal is to establish a sustainable economic base in preparation for the time when hydrocarbon reserves are depleted. The govern- ment launched several economic campaigns, naming 1988 and 1989 as Years of Agriculture and 1991 and 1992 as Years of Industry. Through these campaigns, the government has encouraged private-sector investment by allocating generous amounts of cash support for private industry to be disbursed mainly through official development banks. For example, the Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries, created in 1981, extends loans at concessionary rates to individuals for whom farming or fishing is the principal activity. The bank acts as a distributive institution, receiving an interest subsidy from the government. In 1990 there were 1,308 loans, totaling R04.7 million. Development programs also incorporate the govern- ment's policy of indigenization, with a large component of funds allocated for domestic technical training and academic training, often in the United States or in developing countries. 281 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Agriculture Oman has five distinct agricultural regions. Going roughly from north to south, they include the Musandam Peninsula, the Al Batinah coast, the valleys and the high plateau of the eastern region, the interior oases, and the Dhofar region, along the narrow coastal strip from the border with Yemen to Ras Naws and the mountains to the north. In the early 1990s, interior farming areas accounted for more than one-half of the country's cultivated land. Rainfall, although greater in the interior than along the coast, is insuffi- cient for growing crops. Most of the water for irrigation is obtained through the falaj system, in which a vertical shaft is dug from the surface to reach water in porous rock. From the bottom of this shaft, a gently sloping tunnel is dug to tap the water and allow it to flow to a point on the surface at a lower level or into a cistern or underground pool from which it can be lifted by bucket or pump. A falaj may be many kilometers in length and require numerous additional vertical shafts to provide fresh air to the workers digging the tunnels and to permit the removal of the excavated rock and soil. A falaj requires tremendous expendi- ture of labor for maintenance as well as for construction. Because private maintenance efforts during the 1970s and early 1980s proved inadequate, the government initiated repair and maintenance of the falaj system to increase the quantity of water available to cultivated areas. The cooler climate on the high plateau of the Al Jabal al Akhdar enables the growing of apricots, grapes, peaches, and walnuts. The Al Batinah coastal plain accounts for about two- fifths of the land area under cultivation and is the most concen- trated farming area of the country. Annual rainfall along the coast is minimal, but moisture falling on the mountains perco- lates through permeable strata to the coastal strip, providing a source of underground water only about two meters below the surface. Diesel motors are used to pump water for irrigation from these shallow wells. By the mid-1980s, the water table along the Al Batinah coast had dropped to a low level, and salinity of the wells had increased, significantly reducing the water quality. This was caused by the combined effect of cultivating land too close to the sea and pumping more well water than was being recharged by nature, thereby permitting seawater to encroach. 282 Falaj Alin atAl Jabal al Akhdar; the falaj is an ancient underground channel used for irrigation in Oman. Al Jabal al Akhdar, showing terraced farming in one of Oman's main agricultural areas Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 283 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Overfarming and attendant water problems caused the gov- ernment to establish the Ministry of Water Resources in 1990 with the mandate of limiting water consumption and improv- ing irrigation. A freeze on new wells was imposed in addition to delimiting several "no drill zones" in areas where groundwater supplies are low. The ministry is also considering the installa- tion of water meters. Recharge dams are designed to hold rain- water in the wadis for a period of time to facilitate the trickling of water down into the ground; replenishing aquifers have been built mainly in the northeastern Al Batinah region, where the groundwater levels are up to five meters below sea level. Apart from water problems, the agricultural sector has been affected by rural-urban migration, in which the labor force has been attracted to the higher wages of industry and the govern- ment service sector, and by competition from highly subsidized gulf producers. As a result, agriculture and fishing have declined in relative sectoral importance. In 1967 the two sec- tors together contributed about 34 percent of GDP; by 1991 they accounted for 3.8 percent of GDP (see table 37, Appen- dix). The government encourages farming by distributing land, offering subsidized loans to purchase machinery, offering free feedstock, and giving advice on modern irrigation meth- ods. As a result, the area under cultivation has increased, with an accompanying rise in production. But extensive agricultural activity has also depleted freshwater reserves and underground aquifers and has increased salinity. The area under cultivation increased by almost 18 percent to 57,814 hectares over the period from 1985 to 1990. Fruits were grown on 64 percent, or 36,990 hectares, of the area under cul- tivation in crop year 1989-90. Dates accounted for 45 percent of the total area, or 70 percent of the area under fruit cultiva- tion. Grains such as barley, wheat, and corn accounted for 19.2 percent, or 11,092 hectares, and vegetables accounted for 16.8 percent, or 9,732 hectares, of the total area under cultivation. In the same five-year period, overall agricultural production increased by 3 percent to 699,000 tons. Field crops, largely alfalfa, accounted for more than one-half of total production, or 354,300 tons, a 40 percent increase in the five-year period. Fruit production (including dates and limes) was 182,400 tons, up from 154,500 tons. Vegetable production totaled 162,300 tons, an increase of almost 50 percent. 284 Oman Fishing Historically, fishing was second only to farming as an eco- nomic activity in pre-oil Oman. Both the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea offer a variety of catch, including sardines, blue- fish, mackerel, shark, tuna, abalone, lobsters, and oysters. Fish- ermen harvest their catch in the waters near the coast, using the traditional, small seagoing canoe, to which an outboard motor has been added. The fishing sector (along with agriculture) is considered one of the most promising areas for commercial attention and accounts for the highest non-oil export revenue. However, sales in 1990 totaled R017.3 million, dwarfed by oil export earnings of ROl.9 billion. The GCC provided the largest fish export market. The fishing sector also provided employment opportu- nities to 19,296 registered fishermen in 1990, of whom 18,546 were employed in traditional fisheries and 750 in industrial fisheries. Like agriculture, fishing has been affected by the diminishing number of people employed in the sector. As increasing numbers of fishermen turn to more remunerative employment, there has been a gradual decrease in the amount of fish caught. The government has stressed modernizing and expanding the fishing industry and developing its export potential. The Joint United States-Oman Commission funded the Oman Fish- eries Development and Management Project to strengthen the technical, administrative, and management skills of the Direc- torate General of Fisheries Resources (DGFR). In strengthen- ing the DGFR, the government hopes to increase private-sector confidence in the fishing industry and, in the long term, to cre- ate private-sector-led development of the industry. The government is following a dual strategy — internally, to improve the capacity of the DGFR to manage Oman's fishing resources and, externally, to provide incentives for fishermen to remain in their occupations. The government provides sub- sidies to purchase fiberglass boats and outboard engines; to construct workshops, cold storage facilities, and jetties along the coastline; and to establish companies to market fish both domestically and internationally. Non-oil Minerals The sultanate produces copper, chromite, gold, and silver. Oman's main copper reserves are in the Suhar area on the Al Batinah coast. The processing of ore at the Suhar complex, 285 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies operated by the government-owned Oman Mining Company, began in 1983. The production of chromite by the Oman Min- ing Company also began in 1983 in the Suhar area. Exports of the Oman Mining Company are primarily destined to the Far East market. In 1990 Taiwan accounted for 38.5 percent of exports, followed by Japan with 11.1 percent and South Korea with 2.9 percent. In July 1991, the government established the Oman Chrome Company (OCC), in which it holds a 15 percent share. The remainder of the shares are held by the private sector. The OCC was created to develop the country's chromite reserves — estimated by the Robertson Group of Britain and the Bureau des Recherches Geologiques et Minieres of France at 2 million tons of chromite — at 600 sites throughout the country. The public offering of OCC shares reflects the government's official policy of encouraging private-sector participation in industry and manufacturing. Limestone for cement production is mined in both the northern and the southern areas to supply the Oman Cement Company's plant in the Rusayl Industrial Estate near As Sib and the Raysut Cement Corporation's plant near Salalah. Tile and marble are also produced for local construction. Surveys have indicated deposits of numerous other materi- als — asbestos, coal, iron ore, lead, manganese, nickel, silver, and zinc. Large deposits of metal ores are located at the Sayh Hatat area (northeast of Izki) and the Al Jabal al Akhdar area. Substantial deposits of zinc and lead are known to exist in Dho- far, Jalan, and Hawshi Huqf (southwest of Al Ghabah). The fea- sibility of exploiting coal reserves at Al Kamil, near Sur, to replace oil in electric power generation, is being studied. A pre- liminary study on coal completed in 1990 by the UN Depart- ment of Technical Cooperation for Development estimates coal reserves in the sultanate at 22 million tons, a figure consid- ered adequate for domestic use but not for export. Industry The government's program to diversify from the oil industry emphasizes the industrial sector, with a steady increase in small and medium-sized industries based on heavily subsidized indus- trial parks. The first industrial estate, at Ar Rusayl, fifteen kilo- meters from As Sib International Airport, was developed in the mid-1980s and housed about sixty enterprises, including manu- facturers of cement, soap, crackers, and copper cathodes. The 286 Copper mine near Suhar; copper has been mined in Oman since ancient times. View of multiple-highway system near Al Khuwayr, linking the sultanate's major cities Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 287 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies sultanate's second industrial estate, a 100-hectare site at Raysut, was developed in the early 1990s by the local firm of Shanfari and Partners. The sultanate's third industrial estate is a planned fifty-hectare project at Suhar. Other estates are planned at Nazwah, Sur, Al Khasab, and the Al Buraymi Oasis. The government is also studying the feasibility of establishing cottage industries to produce such items as pottery, rose water, and frankincense. As a result of these efforts, by 1991 manufac- turing contributed 3.5 percent of Oman's GDP. A few small-scale traditional industries use primitive meth- ods, such as in the production of ghee (clarified butter) and the drying of fish, dates, and limes. Some handicraft industries remain, but their importance is steadily being eclipsed. Silver- smiths practice their trade, and artisans work with clay at Bahla, just west of Adam, an important center for the production of household pottery. Goldsmiths follow their trade in the Muscat metropolitan area and its environs. In several regions, workers fashion low-quality, hand-made cloth from locally produced wool. The coastal towns remain boat-building centers. Whereas the industrial sector during the 1970s and 1980s was aimed at import-substitution industrialization (see Glos- sary), the objective in the 1990s is to encourage export indus- tries for the Persian Gulf market. However, this assumes that Oman will be able to operate effectively in an increasingly com- petitive market, attract foreign investors, and increase the role of private-sector industry. To increase its ability to compete with its Persian Gulf neigh- bors, particularly Dubayy, where the Mina Jabal Ali Duty-Free Zone permits fully owned foreign subsidiaries, Oman needs to overhaul its commercial and economic laws. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry set up three working teams in early 1992 to recommend amendments to existing laws for discus- sion with the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) and the Consultative Council. The government revised laws to permit GCC nationals to own up to 49 percent of the shares in twenty specified Omani companies, ten of which are banks. The OCCI has introduced an industrial consultations unit, computer-linked with the Vienna-based United Nations Industrial Development Organization, offering investment advice on twenty industrial sectors as well as data on equipment suppliers and training needs. 288 Oman Tourism The government promotes tourism, consistent with its policy of economic diversification, with emphasis on the Muscat met- ropolitan area and on coastal towns where principal hotels are located. The Ministry of National Heritage and Culture is restoring historical sites at Muscat and in the coastal towns. The forts at Nazwah, Ar Rustaq, Al Hazm, Bidbid, and Jabrin in the interior are accessible by automobile. Oman has seven international hotels, the majority located in the Muscat metropolitan area. AZD Enterprises, set up by Qais ibn Tariq Al Said, Sultan Qabus ibn Said's first cousin, is plan- ning a new tourism project at Bandar Jissah, a weekend coastal retreat in the north. The site of the planned hotel and sports facilities, including a large golf course, will be near the Al Bustan Palace Hotel, the most luxurious hotel in Oman. Transportation The Omani transportation system, as with virtually all the sultanate's physical infrastructure, is a post-1970 development. It includes an expanding highway network, two modern deep- water ports, an oil port at Mina al Fahl, and an international airport facilitating international, intraregional, and domestic service. By 1992 there were 6,000 kilometers of paved roads and 20,000 kilometers of gravel or earthen roads, in a contrast to 1970, when there was one ten-kilometer paved highway and limited coastal and air traffic. The sultanate's modern transportation system links all signif- icant populated places within Oman and gives easy access to many international destinations. A four-lane highway runs west from Muscat along the Gulf of Oman to Dubayy in the UAE. A second major paved highway in the interior connects locations from just east of Al Ayn in the UAE to Salalah on Oman's south coast. Good land connections link Oman only with the UAE, however. No roads extend across the Saudi or Yemeni borders. The sultanate's principal airport, As Sib International Airport, has regularly scheduled flights to numerous cities worldwide and also to five domestic destinations. Muscat's natural harbor has long been a haven for ships, and its port facilities are among the best in the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Transportation planning and administration, with the exception of the Muscat metropolitan area highways, are administered by the Ministry of Communications through the 289 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies northern and southern directorates general of roads. The Development Council is responsible for recommending and monitoring overall sectoral objectives and priorities and reports directly to the Council of Ministers. Laying pipelines and certain roads and port facilities related to oil production are under the direction of PDO. With the major infrastructure in place by the mid-1980s, there was a shift from construction to maintenance and improvement of the existing network. Until 1984 ministry bud- gets reflected a marginal outlay for maintenance as a result of the relatively new paved road system. However, starting in 1984, main tenance of paved roads became important, and a program of bituminous surface treatment and regraveling was begun. The emphasis in the early 1990s has been on maintaining and upgrading the present highway infrastructure, but the govern- ment continues to allocate substantial resources to the develop- ment plan for the Muscat metropolitan area, where severe urban traffic problems are being addressed by the construction of interchanges and expansion of some highways to four-lane systems. Further expansion of the existing transportation system includes enlarging both As Sib International Airport and Mina Qabus, the port near Muscat. Mina Qabus is expected to be inadequate to accommodate the projected increase in cargo traffic by the year 2000. An expansion project is designed to increase port capacity from 1.6 million tons to 2.6 million tons. The project involves converting two berths to container berths, building a new berth for the Royal Yacht Squadron, creating a storage area, and building a sea wall. The expansion is partially funded by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. The possibility of a port at Suhar, to be used as a transshipment site for destinations farther up the gulf, is under consideration. Telecommunications Modern telecommunications facilities were introduced in 1975, but major investment in such facilities occurred only after 1982. In 1989 the sultanate had almost 87,000 telephones, or about 6.8 telephones per 100 inhabitants, a figure consider- ably lower than for Oman's Persian Gulf neighbors. Service is unevenly distributed; more than 50 percent of the telephones are in the Muscat area. Service is entirely automatic, with inter- national direct dial available to all customers. 290 Oman International telecommunications to Europe, Asia, and the Americas go via a satellite ground station, working with the International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation's (Intelsat) Indian Ocean satellite. Calls to other countries in the region are routed through a ground station linked to the Arab Satellite Communication Organization (Arabsat) satellite. A third system of eight ground stations is used for domestic calls. In 1992 broadcast facilities were limited. Television service was more widespread than radio. There are only two AM radio stations, one in Muscat and one in Salalah, and three FM radio stations, two in Muscat and the other in Al Khasab in northern- most Oman. A powerful shortwave station that broadcasts in Arabic and English can be received worldwide. Television ser- vice is available throughout the country; seven large transmit- ters are located in major towns, and twenty-five smaller relay stations broadcast in rural areas. The government's priorities in the 1990s are to expand the local telephone facilities in existing telephone switching cen- ters, to provide telephone service to rural communities without service, and to expand domestic long-distance and interna- tional telephone facilities. The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan allocated R093 million (US$242 million) to telecommu- nications projects. Plans of the state-owned General Telecom- munications Organization include launching public paging, data communications, and telephone expansion services. Labor A foreign work force was the key to the development of Oman's physical and administrative infrastructure. In 1992 about 60 percent of the labor force consisted of foreigners. However, indigenization is among the government's principal priorities. Only 23 percent of the private-sector work force is Omani, whereas the public-sector work force is dominated by Omani nationals. In 1990 Omanis made up 80 percent of pub- lic corporation employees, 52 percent of diwan, or court, employees, and 65 percent of the civil service. In certain orga- nizations and ministries — such as the Oman News Agency and the ministries of foreign affairs; interior; justice, awqaf [reli- gious endowments], and Islamic affairs; national heritage and culture; and social affairs and labor — Omanis exceed 90 per- cent of the work force. In the banking sector, 70.8 percent of the work force was Omani in 1990; in the oil sector, it was 61.0 percent, with a 291 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies large disparity between producing and nonproducing compa- nies. Of PDO's work force, 61.0 percent was Omani, compared with 53.4 percent of Elf Aquitaine Oman, 20.0 percent of Occi- dental Oman, and 21.0 percent of Japex Oman (see Hydrocar- bon Sector, this ch.). In non-oil-producing companies, Omanis averaged 31.6 percent of the work force. In 1990 only 24.0 per- cent of insurance-sector workers and 19.0 percent of hotel-sec- tor workers were Omanis. The government hopes that an increasing number of Oma- nis will enter trade and industry, increasing the number of Omanis in the private sector to 45.2 percent by 1995. RO40 million (US$104 million) was allocated to training in 1990, with the intent of training 100,000 individuals and creating 160,000 job opportunities. In March 1991, the Higher Commit- tee for Vocational Training and Labor was established to gener- ate employment for Omanis and to establish other policies for the indigenous and foreign work force. Institution building has been largely a foreign initiative. The professional core of the civil administration has consisted mainly of British and United States citizens, influencing the development of ministries, the judiciary, development plan- ning, and resource management. The dependency on foreign advisers in the 1990s is likely to grow, given increasing Western, notably United States, involvement in the gulf after Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, particularly in defense and security areas. Also, the emphasis of the Joint United States-Oman Commission on institution building and privatization has resulted in sustained foreign influence in the sultanate (see International Relations, this ch.). The government not only faces a skills barrier to its indigeni- zation program but also a psychological obstacle. As a result of the initiation of a civil administrative structure, a sense of enti- tlement has arisen in the public psyche. By ensuring positions in the public sector for Omani nationals, the government inad- vertently created the notion that it was the universal provider for its citizens. This notion may be difficult to reverse and per- haps will become a source of political instability if the govern- ment proves unable to fulfill its obligations should an economic downturn and consequent financial difficulties occur. Water and Power The country's water resources are a key to its economic 292 Oman future, and continued development will require much more water than has been available. Rainfall is so scant that crop pro- duction is impossible without irrigation. Livestock raising is restricted to areas having a dependable supply of drinking water for animals. Any substantial expansion of agricultural production will therefore require developing new water sources. Industrial expansion, increased tourism, and an improved standard of living combine to increase the require- ments for water. In the 1990s, water sources include wells for village water supplies, the falaj system, and desalination plants. Although the Muscat metropolitan area, Salalah, and Raysut are supplied with adequate water distribution and sewerage systems, such systems remain underdeveloped in many rural areas. In 1969 Oman had only one electric power generating sta- tion, which produced one megawatt of electricity for the Mus- cat metropolitan area. Since then, electricity has been introduced in an increasing number of areas: Salahin in 1970; the island of Masirah in 1976; and Nazwah, As Sahm, and Ibri in 1978. In 1990 in the sultanate, 4,503 million kilowatt-hours were produced in comparison with 787 million kilowatt-hours in 1980. The Muscat metropolitan area represents 67.4 percent of the sultanate's electricity consumption, followed by the Al Batinah area at 14.7 percent and Dhofar at 9.4 percent. The government's diversification program and its plans to develop infrastructure across the country to balance economic develop- ment and to correct the regional disparities between the less developed south and interior and the more developed north require greater attention to water and power. Several large infrastructure projects are being considered in the Fourth Five- Year Development Plan: a new power station and grid network for the interior; improvement in Muscat's sewerage network; and construction of another desalination plant, which was completed by 1992. However, the water problem requires greater attention to the management of existing installations. Banking The Omani banking sector is largely the product of a November 1974 banking law that established the Central Bank of Oman (CBO), effective April 1975. The law also facilitated the entry of foreign-owned banks and permitted an increase in the number of local banks in the sultanate. As of September 1992, there were twenty-one commercial banks in comparison 293 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies with three registered in 1972. In addition, there were three spe- cialized development banks: the Oman Development Bank (1977); the Oman Housing Bank (1977); and the Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries (1981). However, the Omani banking market is the smallest in the GCC. Of the twenty-one commercial banks, eleven are foreign owned and concentrate primarily on financing trade. Ten are local banks operating in an increasingly competitive market. Because of competition, the government seeks to encourage consolidation. The expec- tation is that five or six local banks will emerge as the core, with those facing financial difficulties ceasing operations or merg- ing with more profitable institutions. A similar pattern may apply to foreign banks, of which only five or six would continue to undertake significant business. The CBO effectively replaces the Oman Currency Board, which was created in 1972 to issue currency, manage govern- ment accounts, and execute banking transactions with com- mercial banks and international institutions. A board of governors appointed by the sultan manages the CBO. The board's responsibilities include management of the govern- ment's foreign assets. The CBO is empowered to make advances to the government to cover temporary deficiencies in current revenues; to purchase government treasury notes and securities with a maximum maturity of ten years; to make advances to commercial banks; and to buy, sell, discount, and rediscount commercial paper. In 1991 the banking law was amended to empower the CBO to withdraw the license or sus- pend the activities of banks under its jurisdiction, allowing the CBO to liquidate, reorganize, or manage a bank directly. The CBO exercised these expanded powers with regard to the takeover of the Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna- tional (BCCI) branches in the sultanate. BCCI was incorpo- rated in Luxembourg in 1972 and established a presence in Oman in July 1974. After 1974 it expanded its local operations to include twelve branches having total assets of R067 million (US$174 million) as against total deposit liabilities of R057 million (US$148 million). Gross mismanagement of assets resulted in a decision by central banks of various countries to freeze BCCI operations on July 5, 1991. Accordingly, the CBO suspended BCCI operations in the sultanate on July 6, 1991, and its board of governors offered BCCI branches for sale to locally incorporated banks. An agreement was signed with Bank Dhofar al Omani al Fransi, effective February 15, 1992, to 294 Oman assume all assets and liabilities of BCCI Oman. Bank Dhofar al Omani al Fransi received a grant of R015 million to cover BCCI's frozen assets abroad and a guarantee of R04 million against future claims. The arrangement made Bank Dhofar al Omani al Fransi the second largest capitalized bank in the sul- tanate. The sale did not affect the National Bank of Oman, the largest bank in the sultanate, in which BCCI was a 40 percent shareholder. In 1992 this sale was the most recent in a series of restructur- ing arrangements of the Omani banking market. The Union Bank of Oman was restructured in June 1990 and thereafter was called the Omani European Bank. Kuwaiti institutions lost their shares in the bank, the shares of France's Banque Indosuez increased, and several Omani groups held the remaining shares: Zubair Enterprises, Royal Oman Police Pen- sion Trust, Oman International Development and Investment Company, Oman Aviation Services, and the Port Services Cor- poration. In January 1989, the Bank of Muscat purchased the assets and liabilities of the Oman Banking Corporation, which itself was a product of the restructuring of the Bank of Oman and the Gulf. Consumer loans rose to 31.3 percent of total loans in 1990 from 18.8 percent in 1985. There was an accompanying decline in the share of construction and trade to 44.8 percent from 57.3 percent in the same period, reflecting the shift in com- mercial bank lending from commerce and real estate to per- sonal loans. The decline also indicated the different development needs within the sultanate. During the early 1980s, large-scale infrastructural growth prompted banks to extend loan facilities for construction and real estate. The 1986 oil price collapse and the subsequent economic retrenchment contributed to repayment difficulties, and nonperforming loans diminished the net profits of banks. In its declared interest in promoting mergers in the banking industry, in 1991 the government placed a ceiling on the amount banks could lend to their directors. Banks could lend up to 15 percent of their net capital to related individuals or their business interests, in comparison with the previous ceiling of 20 percent. An amendment to the 1974 banking law announced in May 1992, increasing the minimum required capitalization for banks to RO10 million for local banks and R03 million for branches of foreign banks, was similarly 295 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies designed to encourage mergers and rationalization of the banking sector. The three specialized development banks serve as mecha- nisms to promote government policies of economic diversifica- tion, private-sector development, and indigenization of the work force. The Oman Housing Bank is a joint venture devel- oped by the government, Kuwait's Ministry of Finance, and the Oman Development Bank. In 1991 the Oman Housing Bank recorded a net profit of R04.1 million (US$10.7 million), as compared with R03.4 million (US$8.8 million) the previous year. The Oman Development Bank extends loans to industrial development projects. The government holds 40 percent of the shares, and regional and foreign institutions hold 40 per- cent; the remaining 20 percent is open for private Omani sub- scription. In March 1991, the bank offered five- to six-year interest-free loans of up to RO50,000 (US$131,600) for estab- lishing small businesses if all employees were Omanis. Busi- nesses employing foreigners were to be levied 3 percent interest. The government holds 98 percent of the capital of the Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries, which, as its name implies, is authorized to extend loans to individuals or enter- prises to finance activities in agriculture and fishing. By March 31, 1992, the bank had thirteen operating branches. Government and Politics Historical Patterns of Governance Until 1970 the political title for the Al Said rulers was sultan of Muscat and Oman, implying two historically irreconcilable political cultures: the coastal tradition, the more cosmopolitan, secular, Muscat tradition of the coast ruled by the sultan; and the interior tradition of insularity, tribal in origin and ruled by an imam according to the theological tenets of Ibadism (see Religion, this ch.). The more cosmopolitan has been the ascending political culture since the founding of the Al Said dynasty in 1744, although the imamate tradition has found intermittent expression. Several millennia ago, Arab tribes migrated eastward to Oman, coinciding with the increasing presence in the region of peoples from present-day Iran. In the sixth century, Arabs succeeded in repelling encroachments of these ethnic groups; 296 Oman the conversion of Arab tribes to Islam in the seventh century resulted in the displacement of the settlers from Iran. The introduction of Ibadism vested power in the imam, the leader nominated by tribal shaykhs and then elected by public accla- mation. The Ibadis had five imamates before the founding of the Al Said dynasty. The first imamate in the ninth century became the example of the ideal Ibadi state. The fifth imamate, the Yarubid Imamate, recaptured Muscat from the Portuguese in 1650 after a colonial presence on the northeastern coast of Oman dating to 1508. The Yarubid dynasty expanded, acquir- ing former Portuguese colonies in East Africa and engaging in the slave trade. A civil war broke out in the first half of the eighteenth cen- tury between two major tribes: the Hinawi, who claimed descent from an eponymous ancestor Qahtan, and the Ghafiri, who claimed descent from an eponymous ancestor Nizar. The war ended in the 1740s with the election of Ahmad ibn Said Al Said as imam. Ahmad ibn Said had previously served as gover- nor of Suhar under the Yarubid imam, whom he replaced. By 1749 Ahmad ibn Said had become imam of Oman, Zanzibar, and part of what now constitutes Tanzania. Following Ahmad ibn Said's death in 1775, his son, Sultan ibn Ahmad Al Said, became ruler. The successors of Ahmad ibn Said were known initially as sayyids, a title of respect for a Muslim of noble lineage, and later as sultans. Like its predecessors, Al Said dynastic rule has been characterized by a history of internecine family struggle, fratricide, and usurpation. Apart from threats within the ruling family, there was the omnipresent challenge from the indepen- dent tribes of the interior who rejected the authority of the sul- tan, recognizing the imam as the sole legitimate leader and pressing, by resort to arms, for the restoration of the imamate. Schisms within the ruling family were apparent before Ahmad ibn Said's death and were later manifest with the divi- sion of the family into two main lines, the Sultan ibn Ahmad Al Said (r. 1792-1806) line controlling the maritime state, with nominal control over the entire country; and the Qais branch, with authority over the Al Batinah and Ar Rustaq areas. During the period of Sultan Said ibn Sultan Al Said's rule (1806-56), Oman cultivated its East African colonies, profiting from the slave trade. As a regional commercial power in the nineteenth century, Oman held territories on the island of Zanzibar off 297 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies the coast of East Africa, in Mombasa along the coast of East Africa, and until 1958 in Gwadar (in present-day Pakistan) on the coast of the Arabian Sea. But when the British declared sla- very illegal in the mid-1 800s, the sultanate's fortunes reversed. The economy collapsed, and many Omani families migrated to Zanzibar. The population of Muscat fell from 55,000 to 8,000 between the 1850s and 1870s. The death of Sultan Said ibn Sultan in 1856 prompted a fur- ther division: the descendants of the late sultan ruled Oman (Thuwaini ibn Said Al Said, r. 1856—66) and Zanzibar (Mayid ibn Said Al Said, r. 1856-70); the Qais branch intermittently allied itself with the ulama to restore imamate legitimacy. In 1868 Azzam ibn Qais Al Said (r. 1868-71) emerged as self- declared imam. Although a significant number of Hinawi tribes recognized him as imam, the public neither elected him nor acclaimed him as such. Imam Azzam understood that to unify the country a strong, central authority had to be established with control over the interior tribes of Oman. His rule was jeopardized by the Brit- ish, who interpreted his policy of bringing the interior tribes under the central government as a move against their estab- lished order. In resorting to military means to unify Oman, Imam Azzam alienated members of the Ghafiri tribes, who revolted in the 1870-71 period. The British gave Imam Azzam's rival, Turki ibn Said Al Said, financial and political support. Turki ibn Said succeeded in defeating the forces of Imam Azzam, who was killed in battle outside Matrah in January 1871. The deteriorating economy resulting from the suppression of the slave trade rendered Sultan Turki ibn Said's rule suscep- tible to opposition from the interior. For a brief period, Turki ibn Said appeased his opposition with cash payments and Brit- ish backing. His authority extended from the Al Batinah coast to Suhar, with the rest of the country operating autonomously. Sultan Turki ibn Said suffered a stroke in the early 1870s and was incapacitated. He was succeeded in 1888 by his son, Faisal ibn Turki Al Said, who was the first ruler of the Al Said family in the nineteenth century to assume power peacefully, without resort to arms or political subterfuge. Four sultans of the Al Said family have ruled Oman in the twentieth century: Faisal ibn Turki Al Said (1888-1913), Taimur ibn Faisal Al Said (1913-32), Said ibn Taimur Al Said (1932-70), and the present sultan, Qabus ibn Said Al Said 298 Oman (1970- ). In large part, Omani political developments in the twentieth century followed the temperament and priorities of successive sultans. Each, to varying degrees, responded to threats to his authority from the interior; each had to balance independent action with an indirect role by Britain, with which Oman had treaties of friendship. The initial British-Omani treaty, similar to British treaties with other Persian Gulf states, was signed in 1891. The process of state formation in Oman and the centraliza- tion of political power within the ruling family followed the same pattern found in other gulf shaykhdoms, particularly Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Oil revenues and income redistri- bution facilitated a pattern of continuity of political power within the ruling family and the traditional political elite as well as change with the modest creation of new institutions and expanded administration engaging an increasingly diverse seg- ment of Omani society. Faisal ibn Turki, 1888-1913 On assuming power in 1888, Faisal ibn Turki gradually found his authority over the interior weakened as tribal leaders increasingly perceived his dependence on British advisers as an inherent weakness. In 1895 he was forced to seek refuge at Jalali fort after Muscat was captured. British political agents frustrated his efforts to recapture Muscat, compelling him to court the French. He granted the French coaling facilities for their fleet at Bandar Jissah near Muscat. Determined to thwart any growth in French presence in what Britain considered its sphere of influence, Britain pre- sented Faisal ibn Turki with an ultimatum in 1899 ordering the sultan to board the British flagship or Muscat would be bom- barded. Having little recourse, Faisal ibn Turki capitulated. Publicly humiliated, his authority was irreversibly damaged. In 1903 he asked Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, viceroy of India, for permission to abdicate, but his request was denied. Responsibility for the capital was delegated to Said ibn Muham- mad Al Said, while affairs of the interior fell to an ex-slave, Sulayman ibn Suwaylim. By 1913 control over the interior was completely lost, and a reconstituted imamate was again a threat to Muscat. In May 1913, Salim ibn Rashid al Harthi was elected imam at Tanuf and spearheaded a revolt against the sultan that combined both Hinawi and Ghafiri tribal groups. 299 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Taimur ibn Faisal, 1913-32 Taimur ibn Faisal succeeded his father as sultan in October 1913. When he assumed suzerainty over the country, he inher- ited an external public debt and widespread rebellion among the tribes. Between 1915 and 1920, .the sultan's forces were aided by British financial and materiel support against the rebel tribes, ensuring adequate resistance but not total victory. An uneasy situation of no war, no peace existed, with the sultan controlling Muscat and the coastal towns and the imam ruling the interior. This was tacitly codified in the Treaty of As Sib in 1920, brokered by the British political agent in Muscat. The treaty was between the sultan and the tribes, represented by Shaykh Isa ibn Salih al Harthi, leader of the Al Harth tribe. In return for full autonomy, the tribes in the interior pledged to cease attacking the coast. The Treaty of As Sib was, de facto, a partition agreement between Muscat and Oman, serving Britain's interest in preserving its power through the office of the sultan without dispatching British troops to the region. The Treaty of As Sib ensured political quiescence between Muscat and Oman that lasted until the 1950s, when oil exploration in the interior reintroduced conflict. In return for accepting a truncation of his authority, the sultan received a loan from the government of British India with an amortiza- tion period of ten years, sufficient to repay his debts to mer- chants. When Sultan Taimur ibn Faisal abdicated for financial reasons in 1932, the twenty-two-year-old Said ibn Taimur inher- ited an administration that was in debt. A United States Department of State bulletin on the sultan of Muscat and Oman in February 1938 describes the situation in which Sultan Said ibn Taimur found himself after assuming power: "The young Sultan found the country practically bank- rupt and his troubles were further complicated by tribal unrest and conspiracy by certain of his uncles, one of whom immedi- ately profited by the occasion to set up an independent regime. The Sultan tackled the situation with resolution and within a short time the traitorous uncle had been subdued, unrest quelled, and most important of all, state finances put on much more solid footing." Said ibn Taimur, 1932-70 Between 1932 and 1970, Said ibn Taimur ruled Oman and impressed on it his own myopic vision. Said ibn Taimur was an 300 Oman Anglophile who was compelled, in order to alleviate the coun- try's debt, to integrate the interior with Oman and create an independent state. To create a financially independent state, he needed oil export revenues. But the acquiescence of the interior tribes was indispensable for exploration activities. The dilemma materialized in 1954 when the PDO sent exploration teams to the interior. The move was interpreted by the tribal shaykhs as a violation of the 1920 Treaty of As Sib. This coincided with the death of Imam Muhammad ibn Abd Allah al Khalili, who had ruled the interior of the country, and the election in 1954 of a new imam, who led a breakaway move- ment seeking independence from coastal Oman. The new imam's brother solicited political and material support from Saudi Arabia and established a secessionist movement called the Omani Liberation Movement, with the goals of establishing an independent Omani state in the interior and forcing the withdrawal of foreign troops. The British intervened on behalf of the sultan and by 1959 reestablished the sultan's authority. The British abrogated the Treaty of As Sib and ended the office of imam. After 1958 Said ibn Taimur established his residence at Al Hisn near Salalah, in Dhofar, where he remained permanently except for periodic visits to London. By retiring to the south from Muscat, Said ibn Taimur was not only more secure from assassination but was also no longer obligated to meet fre- quently with tribal shaykhs and distribute subsidies and thereby avoided depleting the treasury He married Dhofari wives, one of whom bore him his only son, Qabus ibn Said, and two daughters. Above all, Said ibn Taimur created his personal fief- dom and sought to arrest modernization by enforcing anti- quated laws, public executions, and slavery of people of African descent. The isolation and xenophobia that he forced on the country in general and on Dhofar in particular left Oman grossly underdeveloped, despite increasing oil export revenues in the late 1960s. Qabus ibn Said spent his early years isolated within the royal palace. At the instigation of his father's British advisers, Qabus ibn Said was permitted to go to Britain in 1958 for his educa- tion. He spent two years at a small private school, where he acquired mastery of the English language. In 1960 he was enrolled in the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and, after graduating from a two-year course of study, served for several months with British units stationed in the Federal Republic of 301 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Germany (West Germany). After a world tour and studies in London, he returned to Oman in December 1964. His father, however, refused to entrust him with a responsible role in the government or military and instead sequestered him in the pal- ace in Salalah. Qabus ibn Said's more cosmopolitan and pro- gressive views were incompatible with his father's conservatism and isolationism, which Qabus ibn Said considered detrimental to the country's development. With the tacit endorsement of the British, who saw thirty-year-old Qabus ibn Said as an agree- able alternative, Qabus ibn Said and a number of alienated political elite overthrew Said ibn Taimur in a palace coup d'etat on July 23, 1970. Said ibn Taimur withdrew to London, where he died in 1972. Qabus ibn Said: The Emergence of a Modern State After assuming power in 1970, Qabus ibn Said concentrated on restoring control over the southern Dhofar region, which had been in rebellion against his father's oppressive rule. He used economic and military means, believing that poor eco- nomic conditions had helped motivate the Dhofar rebellion. By 1975 he succeeded in suppressing militarily the Marxist- inspired rebellion, and the sultan could turn to development issues and the establishment of modern governmental and administrative institutions. By the mid-1980s, virtually all regions of the country were linked by a transportation system and a telecommunications network. Ministerial government and the civil service were expanded, and limited participation in the political process was created in 1981 with the establish- ment of the State Consultative Council and in 1991 with the formation of the Consultative Council, an advisory body that superseded the State Consultative Council. The Dhofar Rebellion The Dhofar rebellion combined economic grievances with political ideology. Placed in a regional context, Arab national- ism, the principal ideology of the 1950s and 1960s, indicted the conservative monarchs of the gulf and demanded their over- throw. Oman was susceptible to these populist stirrings, and, given Dhofar's economic backwardness, Dhofar was a tinder- box. Dhofaris resonated with the Marxist ideology of the Peo- ple's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, also seen as South Yemen) during the late 1960s. The primary objective of the Omani liberation movement named the Popular Front for the 302 Sultan Qabus ibn Said Al Said, ruler of Oman Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington (Photo Mohamed Mustafa) Muscat, capital of Oman, with Jilali and Mirani forts in the background Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington it Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (in 1972 renamed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf and in 1974 further renamed the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman) was the removal of Sultan Said ibn Taimur. The government's policies and strategy after Sultan Qabus ibn Said's ascent to power diffused much of this opposi- tion. Pacification occurred through the dual strategy of carrot and stick — military pressure and economic rewards. Qabus ibn Said engaged neighboring states, apprehensive of the growth of left-wing movements in the region, in dispatch- ing economic and military assistance. In 1973 the shah of Iran, fulfilling his self-perceived role as guardian of the Persian Gulf following the departure of the British, dispatched ground forces (eventually numbering more than 3,000) and air units to Dhofar to assist the sultan. Oman received annual financial aid of about US$200 million from Abu Dhabi to assist military and civil development projects and about US$2.5 billion from Saudi Arabia, with which relations had improved. Britain, Jor- dan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan provided training in military schools for armed forces personnel. The UAE and Jor- dan occasionally provided troop units for guard duty in the north, thereby releasing Omani units for service in Dhofar. To erode the Dhofaris' political will, Qabus ibn Said directed a disproportionate percentage of government revenues to the Dhofar region. The shift was designed in part to augment mili- tary capabilities in the event of a resumption of hostilities and in part as economic appeasement. The construction of schools, hospitals, roads, and other infrastructure ameliorated the underprivileged status of the south. Almost 25 percent of the approximately RO600 million (US$1.8 billion) allocated for development between 1971 and 1975 went to Dhofar to improve transportation, education, rural health, and religious facilities. This amount was spent on projects in Dhofar, although the population only numbered about 50,000, in comparison with the population of the rest of Oman of 400,000 in the mid-1970s. The government also benefited from factionalization within the insurrectionary movement. The movement in the region had originally been organized in 1963 under the Dhofar Liber- ation Front, led largely by Arab nationalists and religious con- servatives who could enlist support of tribal shaykhs in a common struggle against Sultan Said ibn Taimur. In 1968 the Marxists took over leadership, having the support of the PDRY, 304 Oman the Soviet Union, and China. Conservative Dhofaris broke with the movement, and when Qabus ibn Said seized power in 1970, many agreed to support him against the insurgency. By the mid-1970s, as many as 2,000 rebels had surrendered and had been retrained and incorporated into the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) as pledged under the terms of the amnesty declared shortly after the 1970 coup. The government based its new administration and distribu- tion networks on preexisting tribal structures. The government established centers headed by local representatives, usually minor tribal leaders elected by the population of their respec- tive districts but who had to be endorsed by the governor of Dhofar before assuming office. In the larger coastal settle- ments, local deputy governors managed the district administra- tion independent of the governor of Dhofar. Most of these were major tribal shaykhs, who received a monthly stipend from the government and additional allowances, usually on state or religious holidays. The government's financial allow- ances to the shaykhs, irrespective of whether or not the shaykh held an administrative position, served to ensure allegiance to authorities in Muscat. Two state institutions distributed these allowances: the finance section of the wall (governor) and the palace administration, popularly known as Diwan Affairs. State Formation and Politically Influential Groups The process of state formation facilitated by Oman's com- mercial production and export of hydrocarbon resources trans- formed the relationship between the ruler and the traditional political elite comprising the ruling family, established mer- chant families, and tribal shaykhs. While reinforcing some link- ages, such as the central role of the Al Said and the political influence of the merchant families, other linkages, particularly the tribes, have diminished in importance. Society outside the capital and urban centers remains tribal, with tribal leaders exercising political authority locally. But the power of tribes as regional pressure groups declined steadily as a result of the incorporation of rural areas into the government-administered sector. Oil revenues facilitated the transfer of some of the income from the state to society, creating a broader base. Pre-oil stratifi- cation of Omani society, wherein the ruler depended on the tribal shaykhs to ensure popular support, has partially been superseded by the establishment of a social welfare state 305 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies through which the government fosters a direct relationship between the state and the individual. Government clinics, agri- cultural and industrial projects, schools, and employment in the public sector reinforce this new linkage. The Al Said Dynasty Members of the Al Said family have historically played a cen- tral role in the state apparatus, not only because of hereditary succession to the sultanate but also because much of the ruler's bureaucracy has consisted of his relatives. Before 1932 there was an implicit division between Muscat and Oman, with the ruler rarely able to extend his authority over the whole geo- graphical area of Oman. Not only was the interior outside his sphere of influence, but frequently the ruler could not exercise authority over the Al Batinah coast. Relatives often controlled towns such as Suhar and Ar Rustaq autonomously, creating individual fiefdoms. By the time Sultan Said ibn Taimur assumed power in 1932, these independent power centers had disappeared, coinciding with an increasing role of family members in the administra- tion of the state. This nepotism has been practiced since the nineteenth century when members of the Al Said served in such positions as representative (wakil), deputy (wazir), gover- nor {wall), field general, and council minister. Yet, the practice was not without its risks, and often rulers were sensitive to the potential for relatives to become contenders for power. Sultan Said ibn Taimur recognized the risk his half-brothers Tariq ibn Taimur Al Said and Fahar ibn Taimur Al Said and his son Qabus ibn Said presented, and he delegated only minor responsibilities, if any, to Qabus ibn Said. Sultan Qabus ibn Said has similarly incorporated members of the Al Said family into the state apparatus, particularly in sensitive ministerial positions. The sultan reserved major minis- terial positions for himself. In 1993 he held the posts of prime minister, minister of defense, minister of finance, and minister of foreign affairs, although the functions of the prime minister were often entrusted to the minister of state for foreign affairs. In the 1993 cabinet, two members of the Al Said served as dep- uty prime ministers: Fahar ibn Taimur Al Said for security and defense and Fahd ibn Mahmud Al Said for legal affairs; Faisal ibn Ali Al Said served as minister of national heritage and cul- ture. The Al Said also controlled the Ministry of Interior, the governorship of Muscat, and the governorship of Dhofar. Sul- 306 Oman tan Qabus ibn Said's cousin, Thuwaini ibn Shihab Al Said, was the sultan's special personal representative, and some consid- ered him the most likely candidate to succeed Qabus ibn Said. Shabib ibn Taimur Al Said, Qabus ibn Said's uncle, assumed the role of special adviser to the sultan for environmental affairs (see fig. 15). Despite his progressive rule on some fronts, Sultan Qabus ibn Said has been slow to delegate real political authority. One of his first acts as sultan was to return his father's half-brother, Tariq ibn Taimur, from exile in West Germany and appoint him prime minister. Tariq ibn Taimur was educated in West Germany, married a German national, and had extensive expe- rience working in the Middle East as the representative of a construction firm. He had been an outspoken critic of Sultan Said ibn Taimur's rule, when forced into exile in 1958. Tariq ibn Taimur formed his first cabinet on August 16, 1970, and brought the notion of political reform. He sup- ported the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and par- liamentary system and as a result came into direct conflict with Sultan Qabus ibn Said, who preferred the status quo, with real power remaining in the office of the sultan. As of 1993, power remained centralized with the Al Said, and, although departing from his father's conviction that to maintain the ruler's power the people must remain uneducated, real decision making remained the exclusive privilege of a narrowly based elite that the Al Said dominated. The centralization of power with the sultan and the absence of a mechanism for succession left speculation open concern- ing Oman after Qabus ibn Said. Qabus ibn Said has no heir, although he was married briefly in 1976 to Tariq ibn Taimur's daughter. The Al Said family is small, numbering fewer than 100 male members. Since the death in 1980 of Tariq ibn Taimur, no individual within the ruling family has distin- guished himself or demonstrated any exceptional ability to rule. Likely candidates to succeed Qabus ibn Said include his two uncles, Fahar ibn Taimur and Shabib ibn Taimur; three cousins, Thuwaini ibn Shibab, Fahd ibn Mahmud, and Faisal ibn Ali; and, among the junior princes, Haitham ibn Tariq Al Said, son of Oman's former prime minister. The issue of succes- sion is sensitive, and, in the absence of a designated crown prince, the door is open for political struggle. 307 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies m « I il i: c c < Vt Q> C O) C O IL 'J < I o — 1 re _ w I x i o o o a> »- >- E £ £ o re •- t/j (fl cd'Ec o> a = S TS m 8' > 1 9 2 i < UJ 1 CD CO I < 111 1 X £ 1 5 S'S 5 is OC I = UJ X QL I H d | O , B (0 1- z _ < OC < 2 I (0 < OD < O 1 r o s -J Si B*3 Tg Pi 2? * Sp < 1 a.~ iPlannin AO AZ _ 3 3 _i menta TAIM P _ £ flJ _i E < c z o m 4) Q i >< OD > 03 UJ < i: II z ffl UJ SH OMAR OC uj u. K O Is o o z -I 3 a - H 5 < (fl — ' — CO 308 Oman Established Merchant Families Among the most important groups, in terms of political influence, are a number of merchant families whose economic wealth is predicated on old, established links with the ruling family. The merchant families live primarily in Muscat and the coastal region and include both Hindus and Muslims from the Indian subcontinent and Shia from Iran. These families consol- idated their power during the reign of Sultan Said ibn Taimur and continued to amass fortunes after 1970, largely through monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic franchises. None is directly involved in the oil business, but together they are the principal suppliers of goods to the government, local contractors, for- eign firms, local consumers, and the oil industry. Valuable dis- tributorships for consumer and capital services are under their aegis. Close cooperation between the merchants and Sultan Said ibn Taimur evolved into a mutually protective relationship with civil servants in the Qabus ibn Said government. Included in this group are the Zawawis, whose roots are in Saudi Arabia. Qais ibn Abd al Munim az Zawawi, for example, as of 1991 served as deputy prime minister for economic and financial affairs. Apart from his ministerial position, Qais ibn Abd al Munim is a prominent Muscat businessman. He was educated in India, has no hereditary relationship with the ruling family, and is well connected in the Arab world. His brother, Omar ibn Abd al Munim az Zawawi, a Harvard-educated physician, is con- sidered the second wealthiest man in Oman next to the sultan. In addition to being president of Omar Zawawi Establishment (the Omzest Group), which comprises about seventy compa- nies and joint ventures, he is special adviser for external liaison to the sultan. The Omzest Group represents multinational companies, such as Daimler-Benz and Mitsui Engineering and Shipping Company, which is contracted to build the oil refin- ery near Muscat. Another example of a merchant family drawn into the minis- terial level is Said Ahmad ash Shanfari, the minister of petro- leum and minerals, whose family origins are Dhofari and who has held the portfolio since 1974. The Shanfari family is related to Qabus ibn Said's mother and controls Shanfari and Partners, a contracting company involved in building infrastructure. Its bid was selected from among six contractors to build the new industrial estate at Raysut. 309 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Khimji Ramdas, who heads the Khimji Ramdas Group, which holds international franchises ranging from consumer products and soft drinks to insurance and construction, is also in this circle. Yahya Muhammad Nasib, chairman of Yahya Enterprises, provides defense and communications equipment to the Ministry of Defense and other ministries. Other influen- tial families include those of Muhsin Haidar Darwish and Suhail Bahwan, chairman of the Bahwan Group, Muscat. Government Institutions Government institutions on the national level include the Council of Ministers and two other bodies: the National Defense Council and the National Development Council. In 1992 the Council of Ministers had twenty-seven members, including the prime minister and three deputy prime minis- ters — for security and defense, legal affairs, and financial and economic affairs. The sultan occupied the sensitive posts of prime minister, minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of finance. Sultan Qabus ibn Said controls all ministerial appointments and cabinet reshuffles. Policy formu- lation remains largely the product of person-to-person negotia- tions between the sultan and individual ministers. The National Defense Council, working in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, coordi- nates the activities of the Royal Armed Forces (formerly called the Sultan's Armed Forces) and the Royal Oman Police. The National Development Council manages national development planning, and all projects involving more than a certain mini- mum expenditure require its review. Consultative Council In 1991 Qabus established the Consultative Council (Majlis ash Shura), a sixty-member body. The Consultative Council superseded the fifty-five-m ember State Consultative Council (SCC; Majlis al Istishari lil Dawlah) created in 1981 with signifi- cant regional and popular as well as official representation. Whereas the concept of consultation is an integral part of Ibadi Islam and the imamate, it was not a tradition incorpo- rated into Oman's contemporary sultanate until Qabus ibn Said established the SCC by royal decree on October 18, 1981. Initially, the SCC consisted of forty-three members but was expanded to fifty-five in 1983 with representation of the seven geographic regions weighted according to population size and 310 Oman development needs. Nineteen members were government offi- cials, and of the nineteen, eleven — undersecretaries of social service ministries — were the only permanent members of the SCC. The remaining seven government officials could serve a maximum of two terms (four years), as could other SCC mem- bers. Like the SCC, the Consultative Council lacks legislative pow- ers but plays a consultative role. Its representatives come from Oman's forty-one wilayat (governorates; sing., wilayah). Candi- dates are selected by the wali (Muscat-appointed governor) and can be nominated by friends or themselves. After the nom- ination process, names of three candidates are submitted to the deputy prime minister for legal affairs in Muscat, who selects the final candidates, who must then be endorsed by the sultan. Unlike the SCC, members of the Consultative Council can- not include government officials or civil servants. Although this condition automatically excludes a pool of politically expe- rienced individuals, it is intended to circumvent potential alle- gations of conflict of interest. The inclusion of eleven undersecretaries in the SCC tended to strengthen it as a body codifying the status quo rather than offering legitimate criti- cism and alternative policies. The SCC's recommendations did not include defense, foreign affairs, or the petroleum sector. It convened three times annually, with each session lasting three days to a week. The restricted format, infrequent meetings, and lack of veto power or legislative role combined to tie the SCC's hands. Despite these shortcomings, the news reports and tele- vised broadcasts of the SCC exposed the public to a limited part of the government structure. It also modestly introduced the concept of accountability, although the ultimate authority of the sultan remained unquestioned. The role of the new Consultative Council can perhaps best be understood in the framework of Oman's graduated develop- ment process. In 1970 Qabus ibn Said rejected a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system in favor of preservation of the status quo. Subsequently, the SCC evolved from an earlier advisory body, the Council on Agriculture, Fisheries, and Industries, established in April 1979. The council was largely successful in serving as an "outside" body offering policy rec- ommendations to the sultan and the ministers, although the scope of its consultation was relatively narrow. It was abolished in October 1981, and seven of its twelve members were incor- 311 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies porated into the SCC. The Consultative Council has modestly opened the political system. Judicial System Oman's legal system is based on the Ibadi interpretation of the sharia (Islamic law), which is similar to that of the four orthodox schools of Sunni Islam (see Sunni Islam, ch. ^.Juris- prudence is administered regionally by the wali, in conjunction with the qadi, a judge who has attained that position either by graduating from an Islamic law college or by taking advanced study with local religious experts. Although primarily guided by the sharia, the system aims at arriving at a fair decision or com- promise acceptable to all parties. Invariably, tribal law has become mixed with religious law. Modern commercial law, bor- rowed from other parts of the Middle East and Europe, also operates in the business sphere. The Media The media sector remained rudimentary in 1993. There are three Arabic-language dailies: Al Watan (The Nation), Khali] Times, and Oman Daily Newspaper. The Muscat daily, Times of Oman, and the Oman Daily Observer are two English-language newspapers. Rather than a forum for open discourse, the media serve primarily as benign commentators on local and international news. Foreign Relations Oman's foreign policy since the 1970s has been influenced by Qabus ibn Said's determination to reverse the isolationism of Sultan Said ibn Taimur's rule and guardedly to integrate Oman both regionally and internationally. The geostrategic position of the country on the southern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, the imperatives of an oil-dependent economy, and the threats posed by stronger, neighboring regimes, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran, have also shaped the sultan's foreign policy. Oman's foreign policy, as a result of the sultan's goals and the regime's ties to Britain and the United States, has been nonconfrontational and conciliatory to Western interests in the region. Nonetheless, the regime has displayed an uncommon inde- pendence of action in comparison with other Arab gulf states. On several occasions, Oman has acted as a broker in regional 312 Oman disputes. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the two belliger- ents conducted cease-fire talks secretly in Muscat. Although no formal agreement resulted, the talks reduced mistrust between the parties. Similarly, after 1988 Oman acted as mediator in the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain and Iran and Saudi Arabia. Regional Relations Since 1970, when Qabus ibn Said assumed power, Oman's role in regional political dynamics has increased. Although remaining outside the Organization of the Petroleum Export- ing Countries (OPEC), it has been a member of the GCC since its formation in May 1981. Relations between Oman and other Persian Gulf countries have improved since 1970 as long-stand- ing territorial disputes have been resolved. Oman and Saudi Arabia signed a treaty in 1974 ending a long-standing territo- rial dispute concerning the Al Buraymi Oasis; in March 1990, the two countries concluded a border agreement. Oman and the UAE resolved a border dispute in 1981. And in 1982, Oman and the PDRY normalized relations; in October 1992, Oman and reunited Yemen signed a border demarcation agreement, ending a twenty-five-year border dispute. The resolution of the Al Buraymi Oasis territorial dispute, concerning a cluster of nine villages claimed by Saudi Arabia and administered by Abu Dhabi and Oman, improved regional relations. With the discovery of oil reserves in the Persian Gulf, the revenue potential for the Al Buraymi Oasis prompted Saudi Arabia to press its claim to the disputed territory. Riyadh dis- patched troops, which occupied the area in 1952. After failing to win their claim in international arbitration, the British, using the sultan's army and the Trucial Oman Scouts, reoccu- pied the oasis in 1955. Although the United States protested the British action, the United States was not prepared to extend military assistance to Saudi Arabia to reverse the situa- tion. From the early 1950s onward, Saudi Arabia provided a base from which the Ibadi imam of the interior continued to challenge the authority of the Al Said dynasty. After the 1970 coup d'etat, Qabus ibn Said sought to improve and normalize relations with Saudi Arabia. Formal relations were established following a state visit by the sultan to the kingdom in December 1971. An agreement on July 29, 1974, among Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE settled the Al Buraymi dispute. It stipulated that Oman would receive three 313 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies villages in the region and Abu Dhabi six and that the two coun- tries would share the oil field at Shaybah. The agreement pro- vided Saudi Arabia with an outlet to the gulf through UAE territory. In the course of the Dhofar rebellion, Oman received sub- stantial financial support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, countries that feared the growth of left-wing, antimon- archist movements in their own territories. In March 1990, Saudi Arabia and Oman formalized a border pact legitimating the existing declared line separating the two countries. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the fear of militant Islam among Arab leaders, combined with the Iran-Iraq War and the potential interruption of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, catalyzed the formation of the GCC, consist- ing of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (see Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council, ch. 7). The GCC is theoretically a means to ensure col- lective security of the member states. In practice, as Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait showed, it proved ineffectual in deterring and responding to aggression by neighboring states. After the Persian Gulf War, Sultan Qabus ibn Said suggested the creation of a multilateral 100,000-strong collective defense force. However, Saudi Arabia scuttled the proposal, which was unpopular in Oman and in other gulf states. Objections ranged from the matter of costs and manpower needs of such a force, given the small populations of GCC member states, to the question of who would command such a force. The smaller gulf states feared a dominant Riyadh dictating terms and for- eign policy. International Relations Reciprocity has characterized Oman's relationship with for- eign powers. Historically, Oman has relied on foreign powers to ensure political stability, domestically and regionally. In turn, Oman's geostrategic location at the entry point of the Strait of Hormuz and its long coastline have guided the inter- ests of foreign powers. Relations with the British date back to 1798 when the first treaty of friendship was concluded between the sultan of Mus- cat and the British government of India. British interests in Oman were predicated on Whitehall's concern with the defense of India and the imperative of maintaining secure trade routes and containing the expansion of other European 314 Oman powers in the Indian Ocean. Following the discovery of the potential for using oil as fuel, and later the conversion of the British naval fleet from coal-fired ships to oil-fired ships in 1911, the security of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hor- muz gained increasing importance. Britain's Royal Air Force had staging and diplomatic telecommunications facilities on the island of Masirah from 1932 to 1977. The British largely facilitated the extensive military buildup and modernization of Oman's armed forces during the course of the Dhofar rebellion in the 1960s and 1970s. Without British military assistance in suppressing the rebellion, the sultanate probably could not have contained the threat, even with troops from Iran and advisers from Jordan. This close military rela- tionship continued after the suppression of the insurrection. The chief of the general staff and the commanders of the air force and navy were British officers through the mid-1980s. United States influence in Oman has been felt more strongly since the 1970s. Britain's disengagement east of Suez in 1971 opened up the region to greater competition for influence, pri- marily from the United States. When Sultan Qabus ibn Said assumed power, there was no United States diplomatic pres- ence in Oman. A United States consular officer made at least an annual visit, with contacts managed by the British, who had full control of Oman's foreign relations and defense matters. A United States missionary medical doctor was prominent in the health program. In addition, a United States archaeologist, explorer, and oilman briefly extended his exploration from the PDRY into Dhofar in the 1970s. United States interests in regional security and in maintain- ing local allies, particularly after the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979, called for the reinforcement of close security links to the sultanate. Since the 1970s, Sultan Qabus ibn Said has quietly asserted his independence and engaged United States petro- leum professionals to advise the government. The selection of United States citizens to manage the development programs in the Musandam Peninsula and the Al Buraymi Oasis and to develop water resources in the sultanate was a dramatic depar- ture from the sultanate's exclusive reliance on British advisers. Relations between Oman and the United States strengthened as Qabus ibn Said supported United States peace initiatives in the Middle East, manifest in Muscat's support of the Camp David Accords signed in 1979 by Egypt and Israel and mediated by the United States. 315 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies United States influence in Oman widened with the signing of a facilities access agreement in June 1980 (most recently renewed in 1990) providing United States military access to Omani bases under specified conditions. This was part of a larger regional strategy that also included facilities in Somalia and Kenya. The air bases at As Sib and Thamarit and on Masirah (the latter abandoned by the British in 1977) were upgraded with United States assistance. The Joint United States-Oman Commission was established in 1980 with the mandate to fund and administer economic assistance programs in the country. Activities funded through the commission reflect sectoral priorities and include a school construction project, a scholarship and training project, a fish- eries development project, a management project, and a water resources project. The activities funded reflect United States Agency for Inter- national Development (AID) priorities. In the 1990s, AID development assistance focused on the agency's interest in privatization and institution building. The annual Omani bud- get proposal for fiscal year 1993 allocated US$5 million (or 33 percent of the total program) to private-sector development, US$9.5 million (or 63 percent) to institution building, and US$8.8 million (or 58 percent) to develop education facilities. Despite these programs promoting economic development and education, Oman faced significant problems in the early 1990s. A wealthier, better-educated population will demand greater participation in the political process. As of early 1993, the sultan was unwilling to relinquish real power, and he care- fully preserved his political autonomy. A new Consultative Council was established in late 1990 but was essentially an advi- sory body without legislative power. To serve as a mechanism for true political reform, the council must be empowered with a legislative role; as of early 1993, this had not occurred. * * * The literature on Oman is scarce and varies in quality. Most works were published in the late 1970s or 1980s and concen- trate on contrasting the periods before and after Qabus ibn Said came to power. Although such comparative analysis is valid, it seems dated because more than twenty years have elapsed since the accession of the sultan. Government publica- tions, such as the annual Statistical Yearbook, provide informa- 316 Oman tion on every sector of the society and economy and are helpful tools in determining economic and social trends. Monographs offer a general framework for understanding Oman's contemporary scene and also provide a detailed his- tory. Among the more useful is John E. Peterson's Oman in the Twentieth Century. Also valuable is a work by John Townsend, former adviser to sultans Said ibn Taimur and Qabus ibn Said, Oman: The Making of a Modern State, which focuses on institu- tion building in the post-1970 period. Various journal articles provide more up-to-date material. General economic information is reported weekly in Middle East Economic Survey and Middle East Economic Digest and period- ically in London's Financial Times country surveys. Current information on the hydrocarbon sector is best found in indus- try journals, particularly the Oil and Gas Journal, Petroleum Intel- ligence Weekly, and Petroleum Economist. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 317 Chapter 7. Regional and National Security Considerations Crossed scimitars ANY THREAT TO THE STABILITY of the Persian Gulf endan- gering the region's oil flow greatly concerns the rest of the world. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the opening stage in more than a decade of upheaval. The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in 1980, the expansion of the war to nonbelliger- ent shipping, and the presence of foreign naval flotillas in the gulf followed. When general hostilities eventually broke out, they arose from an unexpected quarter — Iraq's sweep into Kuwait in August 1990 and the possibility of Iraqi forces con- tinuing down the gulf coast to seize other oil-rich Arab states. The smaller Arab regimes volunteered use of their ports and airfields as bases for the coalition of forces in Operation Desert Storm to defeat Iraq. The overwhelming concentration of military power that enabled Iraq to invade and occupy Kuwait underscored the vul- nerability of the territory and oil facilities of the other gulf states. To the extent that their military resources permitted, each of the Arab states participated in the coalition that defeated Iraq and drove it out of Kuwait. It was clear, nonethe- less, that they played a subordinate role in the vast operation in which the United States, Britain, and France predominated, supported by Egypt and Syria. After its sharp setback, Iraq in early 1993 remained a major regional power and a littoral state of the Persian Gulf, along with Iran and Saudi Arabia. None of the five other Persian Gulf littoral states — Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emir- ates, or Oman — is in a position to defend its borders or territo- rial waters alone. In the face of their fragility, these Persian Gulf states continue to take measures to reinforce their individ- ual and collective security. Relative to size and population, they have been among the world's most lavish spenders on the needs of their armed forces. Nevertheless, their military poten- tial is limited by small manpower pools, sectarian divisions, lim- ited area, and little experience in the effective use of modern weaponry. A few months after the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the six regional nonbelligerents — the five gulf states and Saudi Arabia — in 1981 banded together to form the Gulf Coopera- tion Council (GCC). Although the GCC had economic, social, and political aims, its main purpose was the creation of a defen- sive military alliance. The GCC leaders feared that a decisive 321 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Iranian military victory would fuel the drive of the revolution- ary government of Iran to spread its Islamic revolution. Con- currently, the GCC states accelerated their individual military efforts by purchasing modern aircraft, armored vehicles, air defense systems, and missile-armed naval vessels. The GCC members are determined to construct a collective self-defense system without the direct involvement of foreign powers. For both political and practical reasons, however, the military goals of the GCC — standardization of equipment, coordination of training, integration of forces, and joint plan- ning — have been achieved only to a limited degree. The gulf states have also been forced to restrain their military purchases as a result of declining oil revenues. In the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, agree- ment was reached with the GCC to station Egyptian and Syrian troops in Kuwait to ensure the military stability of the northern gulf. By 1993, however, this plan seemed to have been aban- doned. Instead, Kuwait and most other gulf states turned to cooperation with the West to develop a new security frame- work. The United States concluded agreements to permit pre- positioning of United States equipment for combat units, port access, and joint exercises and training. Britain and France also negotiated military cooperation arrangements. The effect was to spread a Western strategic umbrella over the region without the permanent stationing of foreign forces, although a United States and British naval presence is expected to continue. In early 1993, two years after the gulf war ended, the danger of renewed violence in the region had receded, although no reconciliation among the antagonists had occurred. Iraq has not fully recovered from its humiliating defeat; nevertheless, its reduced army and air force still overshadow the combined forces of the GCC. Iran's military strength was depleted during its eight-year struggle with Iraq, and recovery is proceeding slowly. Although it appears to have shifted to more moderate policies, Iran's ambition to be a factor in regional gulf security has been treated with suspicion. Traditional rivalries and territorial disputes among the smaller gulf states still linger but have steadily diminished as sources of tension. Subversion and terrorist incidents, often linked to Iran, have abated, as has the potential for disruption by foreign workers manipulated by external forces. The police vigilantly control internal dissent that can threaten the stability of the existing regimes. Nevertheless, resistance to democratic reforms by some members of the conservative ruling families 322 Regional and National Security Considerations of the gulf increases the likelihood of future destabilization and upheaval. Historical Overview According to archaeologists, warfare was a common activity 5,000 years ago among the peoples of the area of the Middle East that in modern times became known as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller gulf states. Sargon, Hammurabi, Neb- uchadnezzar II, and Alexander the Great were among the best known kings who led warring armies in the 2,500 years before the birth of Christ. During the centuries of Greek and Roman domination, the gulf region was of limited interest to the major powers, but the area's importance as a strategic and trading center rose with the emergence of Islam in the seventh century A.D. The caliphate's naval strength was concentrated at Hor- muz (present-day Bandar-e Abbas in Iran). Strategically sited at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, its authority extended over ports and islands of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf (see fig. 16). The strategic importance of Hormuz, however, did not sur- vive the appearance of Western powers, initially the Portuguese who came to the gulf in the late fifteenth century after Vasco da Gama's discovery of the route to India via the Cape of Good Hope. The Ottomans and the Iranians also tried to dominate the gulf but faced opposition from local tribes in Bahrain and Muscat, reluctant to cede authority over their territories, which by then were the most important areas on the coast. Increasing British involvement in India beginning in the late eighteenth century quickened British interest in the Persian Gulf region as a means of protecting the sea routes to India. The principal challenge to Britain arose from the Al Qasimi confederation originating in the area of the present-day United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Al Qasimi, who amassed a fleet of about 900 ves- sels, demanded tribute for the passage of merchant vessels and were regarded as pirates by the Europeans. Between 1809 and 1820, British sea power gradually brought about the destruc- tion of the Al Qasimi fleet. This in turn led to the signing of agreements with Britain by the Al Qasimi and other shaykhs (see Glossary; see Treaties with the British, ch. 1). The amirates promised to have no direct dealings with other foreign states and to abstain from piracy. Britain in turn assumed responsibil- ity for the foreign relations of the amirates and promised to protect them from all aggression by sea and to lend its support against any land attacks. Before the end of the century, Britain 323 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Figure 16. Strait ofHormuz, 1993 extended protection to Bahrain and Kuwait. Qatar entered the trucial system as well, in 1916, and received Britain's military protection from Ottoman encroachment in return for relin- quishing its autonomy in foreign affairs and certain other areas. Although Muscat was traditionally a center of the slave trade, its sultan made concessions to the British in this regard in return for British help in building a navy. In the early nine- teenth century, the sultan's efficient fleet of sloops, corvettes, and frigates enabled him to support a maritime empire extend- 324 Regional and National Security Considerations ing from East Africa to the coast of present-day Pakistan. With the eventual decline of this empire, owing in part to its division into two states — Zanzibar and Oman — Britain's influence grew, and it signed a treaty in 1891 similar to those with the gulf amirates. The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf became increasingly apparent as the oil industry developed in the twen- tieth century. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran all claimed some of the territory of the gulf states during the years between World War I and World War II, but Britain's firm resistance to these claims enabled the amirates to maintain their territorial integ- rity without resort to arms. Except for a small force of the Brit- ish Indian Navy to ensure observance of the treaty conditions and maintain maritime peace in the gulf, Britain abstained from direct military involvement. As the wealth of the gulfs oil resources became clear, the size of the British military estab- lishment expanded. By the end of the 1960s, Britain had about 9,000 men in Oman, Sharjah (an amirate of the Trucial Coast states, which became the UAE in 1971), and Bahrain, where British military headquarters was located. The Trucial Oman Scouts, a mobile force of mixed nationality that Britain sup- ported and British officers commanded, became a symbol of public order in the Trucial Coast states until Britain's with- drawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971. Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88 The first major threat to the security of the Persian Gulf states followed the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in 1980. The war began after a period of deteriorating relations between these two historic rivals, dating from the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979 and his replacement as Iranian leader by Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. Full-scale warfare erupted in September 1980 as Iraqi military units swept across the Shatt al Arab waterway — which forms the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers — into the prov- ince of Khuzestan, Iran's richest oil-producing area. Iraqi presi- dent Saddam Husayn hoped to overthrow Khomeini, who had been overtly attempting to spread his Islamist (also seen as fun- damentalist) revolution into Iraq, where the secular Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party regime feared Iran's influ- ence among Iraq's disaffected Shia (see Glossary) Muslims. By November 1980, the Iraqi offensive had lost its momen- tum. Rejecting an Iraqi offer to negotiate, Iran launched a series of counteroffensives in 1982 that resulted in the recap- 325 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies ture of the Iranian city of Khorramshahr. The destruction of huge oil facilities caused both belligerents sharp declines in oil revenues. Iraq was able to obtain substantial financial aid from Saudi Arabia and other gulf states. In early 1986, an Iranian offensive across the Shatt al Arab resulted in the fall of the Iraqi oil-loading port of Faw and the occupation of much of the Faw Peninsula almost to the Kuwait border. But the Iranians could not break out of the peninsula to threaten Basra, and their last great offensive, which began in December 1986, was ultimately repelled with heavy losses. In the spring of 1988, the freshly equipped Iraqi ground and air forces succeeded in retaking the Faw Peninsula. Iranian battlefield losses, com- bined with Iraqi air and missile attacks on Iranian cities, forced Khomeini to accept a cease-fire, which took effect in August 1988. Initially, the fighting between Iran and Iraq only peripher- ally affected the Persian Gulf states. In May 1981, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE banded together in the GCC to protect their interests and, if necessary, to defend themselves (see Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council, this ch.). In 1984 Iran reacted to Iraqi air attacks on its main oil terminal on the island of Khark by attacking ships destined for ports in gulf countries that assisted Iraq's war effort. In addition, the Arab states of the gulf sus- pected Iranian involvement in several destabilizing incidents, including an abortive coup in Bahrain in 1981, terrorist activity in Kuwait in 1983, and the violence in Mecca during the 1987 pilgrimage resulting in the deaths of more than 400 pilgrims. Iran stepped up the tanker warfare in early 198/ by intro- ducing high-speed small craft armed with Italian Sea Killer mis- siles. Kuwait had already sought the protection of United States naval escorts through the gulf for reflagged Kuwaiti vessels. Determined to protect the flow of oil, the United States began tanker convoys in July 1987. Eleven Kuwaiti ships — one-half of the Kuwaiti tanker fleet — were placed under the United States flag. Other Kuwaiti tankers sailed under Soviet and British flags. Although United States escorts were involved in a num- ber of clashes with Iranian forces and one tanker was damaged by a mine, Iran generally avoided interfering with Kuwaiti ships sailing under United States protection. Persian Gulf War, 1991 Despite its huge losses in the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was unchal- lenged as the most powerful military presence in the gulf area. 326 Regional and National Security Considerations Reviving Iraq's old territorial claims against Kuwait, Saddam Husayn demanded leases for the islands of Bubiyan and War- bah at the mouth of the Shatt al Arab to give Iraq a clear pas- sage to the gulf. He also accused Kuwait of illegally siphoning off oil from Ar Rumaylah field, one of the world's largest oil pools, which the two countries shared. Saddam Husayn threat- ened to use force against Arab oil producers, including Kuwait and the UAE, that exceeded their oil quotas, charging them with colluding with the United States to strangle the Iraqi econ- omy by flooding the market with low-priced oil. Although Iraq had accompanied its threats by moving troops to the border area, the world was largely taken by sur- prise when, on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army invaded and occupied Kuwait. A force of about 120,000 soldiers and approx- imately 2,000 tanks and other armored vehicles met little resis- tance. The Kuwaiti army was not on the alert, and those troops at their posts could not mount an effective defense. Some air- craft operating from southern Kuwait attacked Iraqi armored columns before their air base was overrun, and they sought ref- uge in Saudi Arabia. Of the 20,000 Kuwaiti troops, many were killed or captured, although up to 7,000 escaped into Saudi Arabia, along with about forty tanks. Having completed the occupation of Kuwait, the Iraqi armored and mechanized divisions and the elite Republican Guard advanced south toward Kuwait's border with Saudi Ara- bia. Intelligence sources believed that the Iraqis were position- ing themselves for a subsequent drive toward the Saudi oil fields and shipping terminals, possibly continuing toward the other gulf states. In the first of a series of resolutions condemning Iraq, the United Nations (UN) Security Council on August 2 called for Iraq's unconditional and immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. In the ensuing months, a coalition force of more than 600,000 ground, sea, and air force personnel was deployed to defend Saudi Arabia and to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Command of the coalition force was divided: the commander in chief of the United States Central Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, headed United States, British, and French units; his Saudi counterpart, Lieutenant General Khalid ibn Sultan ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, commanded units from twenty-four non-Western countries, including troops from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, and the other Persian Gulf states. In addi- tion to 20,000 Saudi troops and 7,000 Kuwaiti troops, an esti- mated 3,000 personnel from the other GCC states took part in 327 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies the land forces of the coalition offensive, which was known as Operation Desert Storm. When the massive coalition ground assault of Operation Desert Storm got under way on February 24, 1991, troops of the Persian Gulf states formed part of two Arab task forces. The first, Joint Forces Command North, consisting of Egyptian, Saudi, Syrian, and Kuwaiti troops, deployed on Kuwait's west- ern border. Joint Forces Command East deployed along the gulf immediately south of Kuwait and consisted of about five brigades (each well below the strength of a regular Western bri- gade) from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. The main attack was a sweeping movement by United States, Brit- ish, and French forces in the west designed to cut the links between the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and their bases in Iraq. The Saudis and Kuwaitis on the western border of Kuwait, com- posed of about four brigades organized as the Khalid Division, together with an Egyptian regiment, breached Iraqi defenses after allied bombing and engineer operations blasted passages. Iraqi troops, although in strong positions, surrendered or streamed to the north. Units of Joint Forces Command East advanced up the coastal road, capturing the city of Kuwait on the third day of the offensive after light fighting and the sur- render of thousands of Iraqi soldiers. Territorial Disputes Before the oil era, the gulf states made little effort to delin- eate their territories. Members of Arab tribes felt loyalty to their tribe or shaykh and tended to roam across the peninsula's desert areas according to the needs of their flocks. Official boundaries meant little, and the concept of allegiance to a dis- tinct political unit was absent. Organized authority was con- fined to ports and oases. The delineation of borders began with the signing of the first oil concessions in the 1930s. The national boundaries had been defined by the British, but many of these borders were never properly demarcated, leaving opportunities for contention, especially in areas of the most valuable oil deposits. Until 1971 British-led forces maintained peace and order in the gulf, and British officials arbitrated local quarrels. After the withdrawal of these forces and officials, old territorial claims and suppressed tribal animosities rose to the surface. The concept of the modern state — introduced into the gulf region by the European powers — and the sudden importance of boundaries to define ownership of oil deposits kindled acute territorial disputes. 328 Regional and National Security Considerations Iran has often laid claim to Bahrain, based on its seven- teenth-century defeat of the Portuguese and its subsequent occupation of the Bahrain archipelago. The Arab clan of the Al Khalifa, which has been the ruling family of Bahrain since the eighteenth century, in turn expelled the Iranians in 1783. The late shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, raised the Bahrain ques- tion when the British withdrew from areas east of Suez, but he dropped his demand after a 1970 UN-sponsored plebiscite showed that Bahrainis overwhelmingly preferred indepen- dence to Iranian rule. In 1971 Iranian forces occupied the islands of Abu Musa, Tunb al Kubra (Greater Tumb), and Tunb as Sughra (Lesser Tumb), located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf between Iran and the UAE. The Iranians reasserted their historic claims to the islands, although the Iranians had been dislodged by the British in the late nineteenth century. Iran continued to occupy the islands in 1993, and its action remained a source of contention with the UAE, which claimed authority by virtue of Britain's transfer of the islands to the amirates of Sharjah and Ras al Khaymah. By late 1992, Sharjah and Iran had reached agreement with regard to Abu Musa, but Ras al Khaymah had not reached a settlement with Iran concerning Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb. Another point of contention in the gulf is the Bahraini claim to Az Zubarah on the northwest coast of Qatar and to Hawar and the adjacent islands forty kilometers south of Az Zubarah, claims that stem from former tribal areas and dynas- tic struggles. The Al Khalifa had settled at Az Zubarah before driving the Iranians out of Bahrain in the eighteenth century. The Al Thani ruling family of Qatar vigorously dispute the Al Khalifa claim to Az Zubarah, as well as lay claim to the Bah- raini-occupied Hawar and adjacent islands, a stone's throw from the mainland of Qatar but more than twenty kilometers from Bahrain. The simmering quarrel reignited in the spring of 1986 when Qatari helicopters removed and "kidnapped" workmen constructing a Bahraini coast guard station on Fasht ad Dibal, a reef off the coast of Qatar. Through Saudi media- tion, the parties reached a fragile truce, whereby the Bahrainis agreed to remove their installations. However, in 1991 the dis- pute flared up again after Qatar instituted proceedings to let the International Court of Justice in The Hague decide whether it had jurisdiction. (Bahrain refused the jurisdiction of the court, and as of early 1993 the dispute was unresolved.) The two countries exchanged complaints that their respective 329 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies naval vessels had harassed the other's shipping in disputed waters. As one pretext for his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Husayn revived a long-standing Iraqi claim to the whole of Kuwait based on Ottoman boundaries. Ottoman Turkey exer- cised a tenuous sovereignty over Kuwait in the late nineteenth century, but the area passed under British protection in 1899. In 1932 Iraq informally confirmed its border with Kuwait, which had previously been demarcated by the British. In 1961, after Kuwait's independence and the withdrawal of British troops, Iraq reasserted its claim to the amirate based on the Ottomans' having attached it to Basra Province. British troops and aircraft were rushed back to Kuwait. A Saudi-led force of 3,000 from the League of Arab States (Arab League) that sup- ported Kuwait against Iraqi pressure soon replaced them. The boundary issue again arose when the Baath Party came to power in Iraq after a 1963 revolution. The new government officially recognized the independence of Kuwait and the boundaries Iraq had accepted in 1932. Iraq nevertheless rein- stated its claims to Bubiyan and Warbah in 1973, massing troops at the border. During the 1980-88 war with Iran, Iraq pressed for a long-term lease to the islands in order to improve its access to the gulf and its strategic position. Although Kuwait rebuffed Iraq, relations continued to be strained by boundary issues and inconclusive negotiations over the status of the two islands. In August 1991, Kuwait charged that a force of Iraqis, backed by gunboats, had attacked Bubiyan but had been repulsed and many of the invaders captured. UN investigators found that the Iraqis had come from fishing boats and had probably been scavenging for military supplies abandoned after the Persian Gulf War. Kuwait was suspected of having exaggerated the incident to underscore its need for interna- tional support against ongoing Iraqi hostility. A particularly long and acrimonious disagreement involved claims over the Al Buraymi Oasis, disputed since the nine- teenth century among tribes from Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Oman. Although the tribes residing in the several settle- ments of the oasis were from Oman and Abu Dhabi, followers of the Wahhabi (see Glossary) religious movement that origi- nated in Saudi Arabia had periodically occupied and exacted tribute from the area. Oil prospecting began on behalf of Saudi oil interests, and in 1952 the Saudis sent a small constab- ulary force to assert control of the oasis. When arbitration 330 Regional and National Security Considerations efforts broke down in 1955, the British dispatched the Trucial Oman Scouts to expel the Saudi contingent. After new negotia- tions, a settlement was reached in 1974 whereby Saudi Arabia recognized claims of Abu Dhabi and Oman to the oasis. In return, Abu Dhabi agreed to grant Saudi Arabia a land corri- dor to the gulf and a share of a disputed oil field. Other dis- agreements over boundaries and water rights remained, however. The border between Oman and Yemen remained only par- tially defined, and, as of early 1993, border clashes had not occurred since 1988. Improving relations between Oman and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, also seen as South Yemen) — which was reunited with the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, also seen as North Yemen) in 1990 — offered some hope that the border would be demarcated. Earlier, the physical separation of the southern portion of Oman from its territory on the Musandam Peninsula (Ras Musandam) was a source of friction between Oman and the various neighboring amirates that became the UAE in 1971. Differences over the disputed territory appeared to have subsided after the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Regional Security Problems The Persian Gulf is a relatively constricted geographic area of great existing or potential volatility. The smaller states of the gulf are particularly vulnerable, having limited indigenous pop- ulations and, in most cases, armed forces with little more than symbolic value to defend their countries against aggression. All of them lack strategic depth, and their economies and oil industries depend on access to the sea. Conflicts involving the air forces and navies of the larger gulf powers inevitably endan- ger their critical transportation links. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which was threatened but which never actually occurred during the Iran-Iraq War, would have a catastrophic effect on regular ship movements. The oil drilling, processing, and loading facilities of the Per- sian Gulf states, some of them on offshore platforms, are vital to their economies. In an era of highly accurate missiles and high-performance aircraft, the protection of these exposed resources against surprise attack presents enormous difficul- ties. Even those states that can afford the sophisticated weap- onry to defend their installations can ensure their effectiveness only through proper training, manning, and maintenance. 331 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Most of the Arab gulf states, although vulnerable by air and by sea, are relatively immune from ground attack. Because of their geographic position on the Arabian Peninsula, they are exposed on their landward side only to vast desert tracts con- trolled by Saudi Arabia, with which they are linked by security treaties. Potential aggressors in the region, although heavily armed, lack the equipment or experience to project their forces over long distances. The only realistic possibility of over- land attack seems to be in the north, where Kuwait has no natu- ral line of defense and its oil facilities are near both Iran and Iraq. In early 1992, Kuwaiti officials disclosed plans to con- struct an electronic fence stretching more than 200 kilometers along the Kuwait-Iraq border. Although some obstacles might be emplaced to obstruct an Iraqi crossing, the main purpose of the fence is to prevent infiltration. Border guards of Kuwait's Ministry of Interior are to patrol the fence area. In the south, reunited Yemen had inherited large stocks of military equipment from the Soviet Union's earlier support of the PDRY Yemen's political support of Iraq in the Kuwaiti crisis caused the GCC states to regard it as a potentially hostile neigh- bor. Although offensive operations against Oman or Saudi Ara- bia, with which it shared long, undefined borders, seem unlikely, the encouragement of border infiltration by all three countries cannot be ruled out. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 introduced a new threat to stability in the gulf. Shia form a majority of the population of Bahrain and an important part of the foreign labor force in Kuwait and are considered potential dissidents in any future hostilities. Numerous terrorist actions in Kuwait during the 1980s were attributed to domestic Shia instigated by Iran (see Kuwait: Internal Security, this ch.). Iran is one of the strongest military powers of the region and has historically sought to extend its influence to the Arab shore of the gulf. Nevertheless, fears of military confrontation subsided after the Iran-Iraq War ended. The influence of the more extremist elements within the Iranian government appears to have declined; Iran also had opposed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In spite of Iraq's defeat in 1991, Kuwait remains the most vulnerable of the gulf states. Despite the crippling of Iraq's offensive military capabilities, it continues to be a formidable military power in the region. Its postwar manpower strength is estimated at 380,000, including at least three intact divisions of the elite Republican Guard, as well as large stocks of armor, artillery, and combat aircraft. Only with the assurance of out- 332 Regional and National Security Considerations side support can the GCC states be confident that they can suc- cessfully resist renewed Iraqi aggression. The gulf Arabs believe that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict will enhance gulf security. Direct conflict with Israel was a remote contingency in early 1993, although Israel's doc- trine of preemptive attack and its demonstrated ability to hit distant targets must be reckoned with in their strategic plan- ning. Because the northwestern areas of Saudi Arabia are well within range of Israeli attack, air defense units that would otherwise be available to the GCC for gulf defense must be positioned there. Efforts of the Arab gulf states to upgrade their air defense systems have often been viewed by the United States Congress and by the public as hostile to Israeli interests. In early 1993, two years after Saddam Husayn's defeat in the Persian Gulf War, the region's security appeared more stable than in many years. The fear of a communist encroachment or of a superpower confrontation has evaporated. Iran seems to be seeking greater accommodation with its gulf neighbors, although the Tehran government is continuing its military buildup and insists that it has a role in regional mutual security. Iraq, although still hostile, does not present an immediate mili- tary threat. The United States and other Western powers have indicated that they will act against any new instability in the gulf that endangers their interests. Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council The six Persian Gulf states of the Arabian Peninsula — Bah- rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE — formed the GCC in May 1981 with the aim of "co-ordination, integration, and co-operation among the member-states in all fields." Although none of the committees initially established dealt with security, the final communique of the first meeting affirmed the will and the intention of the signatories to defend their security and independence and to keep the region free of international conflicts. Four months later, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces of the six member states met to discuss regional military cooperation. The immediate objective was to protect themselves from the dangers posed by the Iran-Iraq War and the political violence associated with revolutionary Islam. In a series of meetings over the years, the defense minis- ters and chiefs of staff devoted numerous sessions to the improvement of military cooperation and the creation of a 333 334 Rulers of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council pose for a photograph. Courtesy Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman, Washington 335 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies joint command and joint air defense mechanisms. Managing their common security challenges collectively has made progress in some areas, but little in others. Creation of a fully integrated air defense system was far from a reality as of early 1993. The GCC states have not realized plans to develop an arms production capacity, although they have launched a new effort to revive an earlier arrangement with Egypt to create a pan-Arab weapons industry. Political differences among GCC members have been the main obstacles to placing gulf defense on a collective rather than on a bilateral basis, even in such matters as achieving interoperability of equipment and cooperating in training, logistics, and infrastructure. The GCC experienced delays in reaching agreement to cooperate in internal security matters because Kuwait, the chief target of terrorism, feared that its rel- atively liberal domestic security regime might be impaired. Until Kuwait accepted a GCC agreement in late 1987, Saudi Arabia and several other members of the GCC coordinated their efforts bilaterally, including the exchange of equipment, expertise, and training; the extradition of criminals; and the interception of border infiltrators. GCC members have adopted parallel policies on deportation and travel restrictions and share information on suspected terrorists and plots. Ground and air units of the six member states have carried out small-scale combined training exercises. Military assistance, provided mainly by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait under GCC aus- pices, has enabled Bahrain to modernize its stock of combat aircraft and Oman to improve its air and sea defenses around the Strait of Hormuz. In 1984 GCC defense ministers agreed to create the Peninsula Shield force and base it at Hafar al Batin in Saudi Arabia, about sixty kilometers south of the Kuwaiti border. Under the command of a Saudi general, the unit con- sists of one Saudi brigade and a composite brigade with token personnel from the other states. The limited reaction of the GCC to the August 2 Iraqi inva- sion of Kuwait exposed its weakness when faced with direct aggression against a member of the alliance by a much stron- ger power. The GCC immediately condemned the Iraqi action, but when GCC defense ministers met three weeks later, they could only agree on strengthening the Peninsula Shield force. During the Persian Gulf War, national contingents deployed separately as units of Arab task forces. At the conclusion of the war on March 3, 1991, the six mem- bers of the GCC, along with Syria and Egypt, met in Damascus 336 Regional and National Security Considerations to agree on the establishment of a permanent security force to protect Kuwait against future aggression. Syria and Egypt were to contribute troop contingents on a reimbursable basis. The Damascus Declaration soon unraveled when differences emerged over the desirability of a long-term Egyptian and Syr- ian presence in the gulf. However, Egypt and Syria remain com- mitted under the agreement to send military aid to Kuwait and the other gulf states if a threat arises. Kuwait subsequently negotiated defense cooperation agree- ments with the United States, Britain, and France as an addi- tional form of security if its borders were again threatened (see Kuwait: Background, this ch.). At a GCC meeting in late 1991, Oman proposed that the six GCC members develop a 100,000- strong joint security force under a unified military command. The Omani plan was set aside after other defense ministers questioned whether the manpower target was attainable and whether administrative and procedural problems could be overcome. The consensus of the ministers was that the Penin- sula Shield force should be the nucleus of a unified army, the realization of which might be many years in the future. Military Capabilities of the Persian Gulf States During the decade after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, all the gulf states set out to strengthen their armed forces by converting to the most modern weapons they could obtain and assimilate. By 1993 each state had at least a modest inventory of tanks and other armored equipment, air defense missiles, com- bat aircraft, armed helicopters, and missile-armed naval craft with which to deter an intruder. Kuwait is less prepared than the others, not having recovered from the losses it suffered in personnel and equipment during the Persian Gulf War. A fun- damental constraint for all the gulf states has been the limited pool of qualified manpower and, in most countries, the prob- lem of attracting recruits when better employment opportuni- ties exist in the civilian sector. The emphasis on advanced weaponry is part of an effort to minimize the need for person- nel. As stated by a senior Kuwaiti officer, the object is to obtain the best equipment technologically, "easy to maintain, under- stand, and operate . . . the greatest firepower for the smallest human effort." But integrating modern weapons into the gulf armies and ensuring their effective operation create other problems. Such problems include the necessity of continued reliance on foreign officers and foreign maintenance and training of staffs at a time when all gulf states are trying to 337 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies achieve greater self-sufficiency. Dependence on foreign per- sonnel, moreover, implies a degree of loyalty and trustworthi- ness that may not be forthcoming in times of crisis. Although in every case the gulf armies are much larger than the air forces and navies, the ground forces have traditionally been oriented toward counterinsurgency actions and the pro- tection of the ruling families. Most of the armies are organized into one or more combat brigades; actual fighting strengths are generally lower than the brigade structure implies. Except for the officers and men who were briefly exposed to modern mili- tary operations during the Persian Gulf War — and in the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s during Oman's war with Dho- fari guerrillas and their supporters in the PDRY — most have not faced actual combat situations. In recognition of the great strategic importance of their air and sea defenses, the gulf states have all introduced modern combat aircraft and air defense missile systems, such as the United States Hawk surface-to-air missile (SAM). Several of the states have in their inventories or on order attack helicopters to help protect their oil facilities and oil drilling platforms in the gulf. All the gulf states have communications, control, and warning systems for the effective use of their fighter aircraft and antiaircraft missiles. But each air force is small, and, unless integrated with others, the overall effectiveness of the GCC in air defense is marginal. In spite of the attention the problem has received, there is no common network linking all air defense squadrons and SAMs to the Saudi Arabian air defense system and to the Saudi airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Technical difficulties, including the incom- patibility of national communications systems and the reluc- tance to turn control of national air defense over to a unified command structure, account for this weakness. Fast missile attack craft acquired by all of the gulf navies with small but well-trained crews could inflict damaging blows to heavier fleets and discourage hostile amphibious operations. The sixty-two-meter corvettes belonging to Bahrain and the UAE are the largest vessels among the gulf navies. As the Iran- Iraq War demonstrated, the navies lack minesweeping capabil- ity, and their shipboard defense weapons against air attack are also weak. Only Oman has available large amphibious trans- ports to convey troops and vehicles for defending islands or remote coastal areas. Defense expenditures of the gulf states are among the high- est in the world relative to population. According to an analysis 338 Regional and National Security Considerations covering 1989, prepared by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Qatar recorded the highest per cap- ita military expenditures of any country in the world, followed by Israel and the United States. Oman ranked fourth and Kuwait sixth. The UAE was eleventh highest; Bahrain, listed in twenty-seventh place worldwide, had the lowest outlays rela- tively of the gulf states. Military spending as a percentage of central government expenditures also is high, amounting to more than 40 percent in Oman and the UAE, for example. In contrast, military spending in Bahrain is 13 percent of central government expenditure. Military expenditures as a percent- age of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) are more moderate except for Oman, whose military outlays were more than 20 percent of GNP in 1989. Force ratios are also high in Oman and the UAE; both countries had about twenty men in uniform per 1,000 population in 1989. Their respective rankings were eleventh and twelfth highest in the world. Bah- rain and Kuwait had manpower levels of about ten per 1,000 population, whereas the level for Qatar was fifteen per 1,000 in 1989. In spite of the small personnel pools and the desire of all the gulf governments to train nationals to replace foreigners as quickly as possible, constraints found in traditional Islamic soci- eties prevent the widespread recruitment of women to serve in the armed forces. Oman and Bahrain have allowed a few women to enlist. They receive combat-style training and learn how to operate small arms. In Bahrain, however, almost all the women have been assigned to hospital staffs. In 1990 the UAE introduced a five-month training course for female recruits with the assistance of a team of female soldiers from the United States. About 1,200 women applied; only seventy-four were accepted. Two top members of the first class were selected to continue with officer training at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in Britain. The other graduates of the first class were assigned as bodyguards of female members of the ruling fami- lies and as specialists in such fields as military intelligence. Before the Persian Gulf War, some women served in support departments of the Kuwaiti armed forces, including engineer- ing, military establishments, moral guidance, and public rela- tions. In July 1991, noting that a large number of women had volunteered for service in the postwar military, the minister of defense said that some would be accepted for a training period of three to six months but would initially be unsalaried. A role would then be found for them. The minister cautioned that 339 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies acceptance by Kuwaiti society was essential for the government to move ahead with this plan. Kuwait Background From 1899 until 1961, Kuwait remained, in effect, a British protectorate. A succession of amirs of the Al Sabah ruled the country, but the handling of its foreign affairs was a British pre- rogative, and Britain guaranteed the security of the amirate. Kuwaiti forces consisted of the amir's royal guard plus a small domestic police force or constabulary under the British admin- istration. During the 1920s and 1930s, British protection became particularly important in deterring Saudi encroach- ment and later in blocking Iraqi territorial claims. By indepen- dence on June 19, 1961, the British had converted the 600-man constabulary into a combined arms brigade of 2,500 men trained by a British military mission. Small air and naval forces were also established in 1961 under British tutelage. With its small size and enormous oil wealth, Kuwait occupies an uneasy position at the head of the gulf. One of its powerful neighbors, Iran, only forty kilometers away, had proclaimed its aim of exporting its Islamic revolution; another powerful neighbor, Iraq, had repeatedly challenged Kuwait's legitimacy (see Territorial Disputes, this ch.). Fearful of the radical leader- ship in Iran, Kuwait aided Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War by per- mitting the transshipment of goods across its territory and by loans of about US$6 billion. Kuwait responded to terrorist bombings and other violence inspired by Iran by intensifying its military cooperation with the GCC and by building up its own forces. Although formally neutral and reluctant to become involved with the great powers except as a last resort, Kuwait turned to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain for naval protection of its tanker fleet after twenty-one ships were attacked in the gulf in the six months preceding April 1987. Iraq's surprise attack and occupation of Kuwait caused the virtual disintegration of the Kuwaiti armed forces. Large num- bers of personnel were killed, captured, or dispersed, and most Kuwaiti equipment was destroyed or taken over by the Iraqi armed forces. The minister of defense said that 90 percent of military installations had suffered major damage. By early 1992, most army barracks were again usable, and the naval base was in operation but needed rebuilding. The air force flew tem- porarily from the civilian airport near the city of Kuwait while 340 Kuwaiti soldiers in formation during a dignitary's visit to their outpost in Operation Desert Shield Kuwaiti M-84 main battle tank lays a smoke screen in an exercise during Operation Desert Shield. Courtesy United States Air Force 341 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies the air bases were being reconstructed in 1992. Kuwait expected to spend about US$9 billion — six times the prewar defense budget — in 1992 to replace destroyed equipment and installations. In a sharp departure from previous policy, Kuwait entered into a ten-year defense cooperation agreement with the United States in September 1991. The agreement included provisions for United States port access, military equipment storage, and joint training and exercises. The agreement did not provide for the stationing of United States military personnel in Kuwait; 1,500 personnel remaining after the gulf war were scheduled to leave within a few months. Similar but less extensive ten-year cooperation agreements were subsequently concluded with Britain and France. Organization and Mission of the Forces Under the constitution, the amir is the supreme com- mander of the armed forces. The minister of defense directs the armed forces through the chief of general staff. The National Guard has its own commander, who reports directly to the minister of defense. The public security forces are all under the minister of interior. The minister of defense in early 1993, Ali as Sabah as Salim Al Sabah, had been shifted from the Min- istry of Interior as part of the military shakeup after the gulf war. The ruling family maintained a tight grip on the centers of power, including many senior posts in the security services. Before the Iraqi invasion, the army's manpower strength was 16,000 officers and enlisted men. The principal combat forma- tions were three armored brigades, one mechanized infantry brigade, and one artillery brigade with a regiment of self-pro- pelled howitzers and a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) battal- ion. All the combat units were under strength; by one estimate, as of 1988 the army's entire fighting strength was the equiva- lent of only one Western brigade. Kuwait's first-line main battle tanks are M-84s, Yugoslav ver- sions of the Soviet T-72 tank. The army has various models of British armored cars and armored personnel carriers (APCs). Its artillery consists of 155mm self-propelled howitzers, mainly of French manufacture. Kuwait has a large inventory of anti- tank missile systems of British, French, and United States ori- gin, including the improved TOW (tube-launched, optically sighted, wire-guided) missile from the United States. It has pur- chased the Soviet FROG-7, a mobile battlefield missile with a range of sixty kilometers. In 1984, after the United States 342 Regional and National Security Considerations rejected a Kuwaiti order for Stinger shoulder-fired SAMs, Kuwait turned to Moscow for air defense weapons, purchasing SA-7 and SA-8 SAMs and ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns. An estimate of the postwar strength of the Kuwaiti army, published in The Military Balance, 1992-1993, revealed the dev- astating effect of the Persian Gulf War. The disparate ground forces, estimated to number about 8,000, were to be reconsti- tuted into four understrength mechanized and armored bri- gades, a reserve brigade, and an artillery brigade. Little materiel survived the war: some tanks, APCs, and 155mm guns (see table 38, Appendix). Kuwait's postwar equipment orders include 200 M-84 tanks (from Serbia to offset previous Serb oil purchases) and eighteen self-propelled 155mm guns from France. Kuwait also has received United States, Russian, and Egyptian armored vehicles. The air force complement in 1990 before the gulf war was estimated at 2,200, excluding foreign personnel. Its inventory included about eighty combat aircraft, mainly Mirage Fls from France and A-4 Skyhawks from the United States, and more than forty helicopters of French manufacture, some fitted for assault missions with antitank missiles. Ground-based air defense was structured around the United States improved Hawk (I-Hawk) missile system, tied into Saudi air defense to receive data transmitted by United States and Saudi AWACS air- craft that had been operating in the area since the start of the Iran-Iraq War. The Military Balance estimated that the immediate postwar complement of the air force was 1,000, with thirty-four combat aircraft and twelve armed helicopters remaining. By early 1993, however, air force personnel numbered about 2,500, with sev- enty-four combat aircraft, including McDonnell Douglas A-4s and F-18s, and twenty armed helicopters. Its two air bases, at Ahmad al Jabir and Ali as Salim, badly damaged in the war, are being repaired. In addition to Iraq's capture of the four batter- ies of I-Hawk medium-range SAMs, most of the fleet of trans- port aircraft was lost to Iraq. Before the occupation of the amirate, the Kuwaiti air force had ordered forty United States F-18 fighter aircraft plus air-to-air missiles and cluster bombs. Deliveries under this order began in the first half of 1992. Kuwait will acquire the strongest air defense network in the Persian Gulf region under a proposal announced by the United States in March 1992 to transfer six Patriot antiballistic missile SAM firing units (each consisting of up to four quadru- ple launchers, radar, and a control station) and six batteries of 343 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Hawk SAMs. The sale will include 450 Patriot missiles and 342 Hawk missiles. The navy's strength had been estimated at 1,800 in 1990 before the Iraqi occupation. Previously a coastal defense force with police responsibilities, the navy's combat capabilities were significantly enhanced during 1984 with the delivery of eight fast-attack craft armed with Exocet antiship missiles from the West German Lurssen shipyard. The navy also operated a wide variety of smaller patrol craft. According to The Military Balance, the navy was reduced to about 500 personnel in 1992 as a result of the Persian Gulf War and the Kuwaiti policy of removing bidun ("without" — stateless persons without citizenship, many of whom had long-standing stays in Kuwait while others came in the 1960s and 1970s as oil field workers and construction workers) from the armed forces. By early 1993, however, naval personnel numbered about 1,200, including the coast guard. With the exception of two missile boats, the entire fleet was captured and sunk or badly damaged by coalition forces while being operated by the Iraqis. Some ships are believed to be sal- vageable. Five Republic of Korea (South Korea) twenty-four- meter patrol craft were among the vessels lost. However, deliv- ery is expected on an additional four craft under an order pending when the war broke out. Role of Kuwaiti Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf War The Iraqi invasion in the early hours of August 2 was detected by a balloon-borne early warning radar, but the army had insufficient time to mount any organized resistance. Some contingents continued a small-unit defense, including those equipped with Chieftain tanks. About 7,000 soldiers escaped to Saudi Arabia; the remainder were killed or captured or partici- pated in the internal resistance movement. Some Mirage and Skyhawk aircraft carried out attacks on the advancing Iraqi col- umns: when their air base in southern Kuwait was overrun, they flew to Saudi Arabian bases, as did some of the armed heli- copters. According to Norman Friedman, author of a study on the strategy and tactics of the Persian Gulf War, the Kuwaiti forces participating in Operation Desert Storm in February 1991 included the 35th Armored Brigade (renamed Martyr Bri- gade), the 15th Infantry Brigade, and the lightly equipped Lib- eration Brigade, which was armed with .50-caliber machine guns mounted on trucks. One source estimated that 7,000 Kuwaiti troops were involved. The Martyr Brigade was the first 344 Regional and National Security Considerations of the units of Joint Forces Command East in the drive parallel- ing the coast northward when the allied operation began on February 24, 1991. Along with Saudi, Qatari, and Bahraini forces, supported by United States marines on their left flank, their assignment of liberating the city of Kuwait incurred little Iraqi resistance. Of twenty-four Kuwaiti aircraft participating in strikes against the Iraqi forces, one A-4 Skyhawk was lost to enemy fire. The two surviving Kuwaiti missile craft, carrying small marine contingents, were able to retake oil platforms and some of the gulf islands. Kuwait suffered only one combat death, according to an official British source. Kuwait pledged contributions totaling more than US$16 bil- lion to support the United States role in the Persian Gulf War. An additional US$6 billion was promised to Egypt and other member countries of the coalition to help offset the economic effects of the war. Personnel, Training, and Recruitment Unlike other Persian Gulf states, Kuwait has a conscription system that obligates young men to serve for two years begin- ning at the age of eighteen. Educational deferments are granted, and university graduates serve for only one year. In practice, exemptions are liberally granted, and most young Kuwaitis are able to avoid military duty. Estimates are that only 20 to 30 percent of the prewar military ranks were filled by Kuwaiti nationals. Military and security forces had been purged of Shia personnel during the 1980s. At the outbreak of the gulf war, Palestinians filled many technical positions, supported by thousands of Pakistanis, Indians, and Filipinos in maintenance and logistic functions. Officers on detail from Britain, Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan provided military expertise. Lower ranks in the army and security forces were occupied predominantly by bidun, who had taken reasonably well to military life but were poorly prepared to absorb training in operating and servicing modern equipment. In spite of reports that many bidun fought well against the Iraqis, many were expelled from the army in 1991 for alleged collaboration. Because of their removal and the removal of Palestinians and other non-Kuwaitis, the ranks of the services became seriously depleted. Few Kuwaitis volun- teer for military service, and conscription is not regarded as an acceptable option. Under the circumstances, Kuwait will be hard pressed to meet its goal of a postwar armed strength of 30,000. A relaxation of the policy toward bidun was hinted at by 345 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies the statement of the minister of defense that people of "unspecified nationality" may be retained after screening for loyalty and may even be given Kuwaiti citizenship. With respect to conscription, the minister of defense in July 1991 said that the system was being reviewed to make it more effective. Most Kuwaiti officers are members of the ruling family or related tribal groups. Education standards are high — many are graduates of Sandhurst — and living conditions, pay, and bene- fits are excellent. The Kuwaiti Military College accepts second- ary school graduates for eighteen months of cadet training in army, air force, and navy programs. The United States provides pilot training and assistance in developing a flight training facility within Kuwait. United States, British, and French mili- tary missions and civilian contractors provide training for more technologically advanced systems. A small Soviet advisory group provided training in the use of Soviet missile systems before the Persian Gulf War. Traditionally, the officer corps — with its close links to the ruling family — was considered to be a loyal and trustworthy defender of the regime. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, however, there were displays of discontent among officers arising from the inadequate response of the armed forces to the Iraqi invasion and the failure to launch postwar reforms. Many of the 6,000 officers and men taken prisoner by the Iraqis were prevented from rejoining the armed forces and were angered at their treatment by senior officers who fled to Saudi Arabia. In June 1991, some officers of the resistance group known as the Second of August Movement petitioned the amir to dismiss the former ministers of defense and interior from their cabinet posts and to investigate the reason the Kuwaiti army was not mobilized or on the alert when the Iraqis attacked. The petition also called for removal of the army chief of staff and his immediate staff and as many as twenty generals and seventy-five colonels. In July fourteen senior officers were forced into retirement. The amir reportedly met with disaffected officers to tell them that their calls for reform would be considered. Officers threat- ened with dismissal for signing the petition were reinstated, and other reform-minded officers were reportedly promoted. Internal Security Many of the domestic strains in Kuwait arise from the dis- parities between the living standards of Kuwaiti nationals and the majority of Kuwait's foreign population. Palestinian work- 346 Regional and National Security Considerations ers presented problems for the Al Sabah rulers for several decades, but, during the 1980s, militants and terrorists advanc- ing revolutionary Islam overshadowed the Palestinians as trou- blemakers. Kuwait's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War accounted for much of the violence that disturbed internal sta- bility during the 1980s. A series of terrorist bombings in 1983 aimed at Kuwaiti installations and the United States and French embassies were ascribed to events in Lebanon. A net- work of Hizballah terrorists was uncovered, and, in the spring of 1984, seventeen Shia were sentenced to long prison terms, and three were condemned to death. Airplane hijackings, explosions, car bombings, and an assassination attempt against the amir ensued. Kuwait steadfastly rejected demands for release of terrorists in its custody, most of whom were still in jail at the time of the Iraqi invasion and subsequently disappeared. A number of Kuwaiti Shia were sentenced for setting fires at oil installations in 1986 and 1987. The incidents declined after 1988. Police and the Criminal Justice System The Ministry of Interior has overall responsibility for public security and law and order. Under the ministry, the national police has primary responsibility for maintaining public order and preventing and investigating crimes. The National Guard, a semiautonomous body, has guard duties on the border and at oil fields, utilities, and other strategic locations. The guard acts as a reserve for the regular forces and reinforces the metropol- itan police as needed. Police selected for officer rank attend a three-year program at the Police Academy. National Guard officer candidates attend the Kuwaiti Military College, after which they receive specialized guard training. Women work in certain police departments, such as criminal investigation, inquiries, and air- port security. The principal police divisions are criminal investigation, traffic, emergency police, nationality and passports, immigra- tion, prisons, civil defense, and trials and courts-martial. The criminal investigation division is responsible for ordinary crim- inal cases; Kuwait State Security investigates security-related offenses. Both are involved in investigations of terrorism and those suspected of collaboration with Iraq. The Kuwaiti judicial system generally provides fair public tri- als and an adequate appeals mechanism, according to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human 347 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Rights Practices for 1991. Under Kuwaiti law, no detainee can be held for more than four days without charge; after being charged by a prosecutor, detention for up to an additional twenty-one days is possible. Persons held under the State Secu- rity Law can be detained. Bail is commonly set in all cases. The lowest level courts, aside from traffic courts, are the mis- demeanor courts that judge offenses subject to imprisonment not exceeding three years. Courts of first instance hear felony cases in which the punishment can exceed three years. All defendants in felony cases are required to be represented by attorneys, appointed by the court if necessary. Legal counsel is optional in misdemeanor cases, and the court is not obliged to provide an attorney. Kuwaiti authorities contend that the rate of ordinary crime is low, and data available through 1986 tended to bear this out. Of more than 5,000 felonies committed in that year, only 5 per- cent were in the category of theft. The number of misdemean- ors was roughly equal to the number of felonies, but only 10 percent were thefts. Offenses involving forgery, fraud, bribery, assaults and threats, and narcotics and alcohol violations were all more common than thefts. Two separate State Security Court panels, each composed of three justices, hear crimes against state security or other cases referred to it by the Council of Ministers. Trials in the State Security Court, with few exceptions, are held in closed session. They do not, in the judgment of the Department of State, meet international standards for fair trials. Military courts, which ordinarily have jurisdiction only over members of the armed services or security forces, can try offenses charged against civilians under conditions of martial law. Martial law was imposed for the first time after the liberation of the country from Iraqi occupation. About 300 persons suspected of collabo- ration with Iraq were tried by military courts in May and June 1991, and 115 were convicted. Twenty-nine received sentences of death, later commuted to life imprisonment after interna- tional criticism of the trials. Human rights groups drew atten- tion to the failure to provide adequate legal safeguards to defendants and an unwillingness to accept the defense that col- laboration with Iraqi forces had been coerced. Many of the accused alleged that their confessions had been extracted under torture. Human Rights Practices Prior to the occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the principal 348 Regional and National Security Considerations human rights concerns, aside from widespread restriction on the exercise of political expression, were instances of arbitrary arrest and mistreatment of prisoners and lack of due process in security trials. A number of Kuwaitis were arrested between late 1989 and mid-1990 for political reasons and for participating in unlicensed gatherings. Noncitizens could be arbitrarily expelled if deemed security risks and were also subject to deportation if they were unable to find work after being released from their initial employment. Some foreigners reportedly were held in deportation centers for up to five years because they were unable to provide for their own travel out of the country. According to the Department of State, there were plausible reports of occasional torture and violence in appre- hending and interrogating criminal suspects. The seven-month Iraqi occupation subjected Kuwaitis to a systematic terror campaign that included extrajudicial killings, torture and other inhuman treatment, kidnappings, and arbi- trary arrest and detention. There were many credible accounts of killings, not only of members of the Kuwaiti resistance but also of their families, other civilians, and young children. Attacks on Iraqi soldiers resulted in reprisal actions in neigh- borhoods where attacks had taken place and included sum- mary and random execution of innocent civilians. Many Kuwaiti citizens also disappeared at the hands of the Iraqi occu- pation authorities. Large-scale executions of young men by gunfire or by hanging were reported. About 850 Kuwaitis remained unaccounted for in early 1993, many of them pre- sumably killed while in Iraqi detention. Iraq insisted that it had no Kuwaiti prisoners. After the restoration of the amirate government in 1991, there were many reports of beatings and torture to extract con- fessions from suspected collaborators. The Department of State estimated that forty-five to fifty Palestinian and other for- eigners were tortured to death by police or military personnel. As many as 5,800 persons, mostly non-Kuwaitis, were detained on suspicion of collaboration during the four months of mar- tial law that followed the country's liberation. Many arrests were arbitrary, and some detainees were held for months with- out being charged. As of early 1993, about 900 persons were still in detention; these included persons convicted in the State Security Court or martial law courts and those under deporta- tion order but with no place to go. Of the prewar population of about 400,000 Palestinians resident in Kuwait, only about 30,000 remained. Most of the departures occurred during the 349 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Iraqi occupation; the remainder left because of less favorable living circumstances or because of Kuwaiti pressure. Bahrain After more than 100 years of British presence and protec- tion, Bahrain gained full independence on August 15, 1971. The agreement granting independence contained no provi- sion for British defense in an emergency, but it did provide for consultation. British authorities hoped that Bahrain, the most economically and socially advanced of the small gulf states, might take the lead in a federation similar to that of the UAE, but Bahrain opted instead for complete independence. Shaykh Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifa, leader of the Al Khalifa since the death of his father in 1961, became the newly independent country's first amir and continued as the hereditary ruler in 1993. The constitution designates the amir supreme commander of the armed forces. In 1977 Isa ibn Salman chose his eldest son and heir apparent, Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa, to be minis- ter of defense and commander in chief of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF). In 1988 the former chief of staff, Major General Khalifa ibn Ahmad Al Khalifa, was named minister of defense, but Hamad ibn Isa retained the position of commander in chief in 1993. Other members of the Al Khalifa in prominent military positions include the new chief of staff, Brigadier Gen- eral Abd Allah ibn Salman Al Khalifa, as well as the assistant chief of staff for operations, the chief of naval staff, and the commander of the air force. As in other Persian Gulf states, the ruling family keeps a tight hold on important positions in the national security structure. The BDF is principally dedicated to the maintenance of internal security and the protection of the shores of the Bah- rain archipelago. Nevertheless, with the rise of tensions in the Persian Gulf, the force has nearly tripled in size since 1984 and has added significantly to its inventory of modern armaments. Its total personnel strength in 1992 was about 6,150: army, 5,000; navy, 500; and air force, 650. The Bahraini army is orga- nized into one brigade, consisting of two mechanized infantry battalions, one tank battalion, one special forces battalion, an armored car squadron, and two artillery and two mortar batter- ies. Its principal armored weapons are M-60A3 main battle tanks purchased from the United States in the late 1980s. Deliv- eries are awaited on an order for eighty United States M-113 APCs, supplementing a mixed accumulation of older armored 350 A-4KU Skyhawk aircraft of the Kuwaiti air force being serviced in Saudi Arabia in preparation for an Operation Desert Storm mission UH-1W Iroquois helicopter of the Bahrain Defense Force takes part in a training mission following Operation Desert Storm. Courtesy United States Air Force 351 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies vehicles. The army's artillery pieces consist of a few towed 105mm and 155mm howitzers. Its principal antitank weapon is the BGM-71A-TOW wire-guided missile (see table 39, Appen- dix). Until 1979, when its first fast-attack craft were ordered from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Bahrain's maritime force was a coast guard under the supervision of the minister of interior. As of 1992, the navy was equipped with two Lurssen sixty-two-meter corvettes. One Dauphin helicopter armed with an antiship missile has been delivered for use with the corvettes. The navy also has in its inventory four forty-five- meter Lurssen fast-attack craft and two thirty-eight-meter craft. The coast guard operates a variety of patrol craft, as well as three landing craft and a Hovercraft. The Bahraini air force began operations in 1977 with a gradually expanding fleet of helicopters. Its first combat air- craft — United States F-5s — were acquired in 1986, followed in 1990 by more advanced F-16s. As of 1992, it had twelve F-5s and twelve F-16s. Eight Apache attack helicopters were ordered from the United States in 1991 to defend the archipel- ago and offshore oil platforms against incursions or terrorist action. I-Hawk SAMs are on order as the principal air defense weapon. After initially being denied shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs by congressional objections, Bahrain was allowed to pur- chase the weapons on a provisional basis and later to retain them permanently. The main air force base is adjacent to Bah- rain International Airport on Al Muharraq. Another base developed for use in the Persian Gulf War is available near the southern tip of Bahrain; as of 1992, it was being used for servic- ing carrier-based United States aircraft. Defense expenditures, which reached a peak of US$281 mil- lion in 1982, fell off sharply before gradually rising again to US$237 million in 1992. Because of its declining revenue from oil, the amirate has fewer resources available for defense than the more prosperous gulf states. The GCC had allotted Bahrain and Oman a special subsidy of US$1.8 billion between 1984 and 1994. Bahrain's share enabled it to purchase new fighter aircraft and to construct its new air base. At the time of the British withdrawal in 1971, the United States leased port and docking facilities from the government of Bahrain for the United States Middle East Force. This was, in fact, an extension of a United States-British agreement, in effect since the late 1940s, enabling United States naval vessels to use facilities at Al Jufayr, a port section of the capital, Man- 352 Regional and National Security Considerations ama. The agreement was a sensitive one because none of the Arab states of the gulf wanted to appear to be submitting to any new form of colonialism or to be too closely associated with the United States, the main supporter of Israel. In 1977 the amir's government terminated the lease. The headquarters of the United States Middle East Force was compelled to move aboard one of the three ships that constituted the force. Otherwise, lit- tle changed as a result of the termination of the lease. United States ships — with the aid of a support unit staffed by about sixty-five United States naval personnel — were still permitted to use Bahraini port facilities for naval operations in the gulf to ensure the availability of fuel, communications, and supplies. During the Iran-Iraq War, when attacks on gulf shipping threat- ened Bahrain's oil refining and tanker servicing operations, United States personnel and military cargoes were permitted to transit the region via Bahrain International Airport. Large barges in Bahraini waters were used as bases for United States attack helicopters, radar, and air defense weapons. In October 1991, Bahrain signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States similar to that previously concluded between the United States and Kuwait. The agreement provided for port access, equipment storage, and joint exercises. Role in the Persian Gulf War Bahrain played a limited but active role in the Persian Gulf War. Bahraini ground forces were among the 3,000 Peninsula Shield force of the GCC (exclusive of Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti troops) that were assigned to a support role during Operation Desert Storm as part of Joint Forces Command East. Bahrain was the primary coalition naval base and was the point of origin for coalition air operations against Iraqi targets. Bah- raini pilots joined other members of the coalition in flying strikes into Iraq. Three Scud missiles were aimed at Bahrain during the war. Only one landed in the country, and it did not hit a target area. There were no Bahraini combat deaths in the war. Internal Security The Bahraini national police force was believed by most sources to number about 2,000 in 1992. In addition to the usual police functions, the mission of the force is to prevent sectarian violence and terrorist actions. Bahrain has a high pro- portion of native Shia, possibly 65 to 70 percent of the popula- 353 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies tion, who tend to resent their inferior status in the social and economic structure. The government sought to moderate the socioreligious cleavage by appointing Shia to a number of cabi- net posts and senior civil service posts, although generally not in security-related positions. A failed coup d'etat against the Al Khalifa in 1981 resulted in the expulsion or trial of many Shia dissidents. A number of persons were arrested in 1987. In 1989 twenty-two persons were sentenced to prison by the Supreme Court of Appeal, sitting as the Security Court, for plotting to overthrow the government. Two clandestine political groups are active in Bahrain. The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which was respon- sible for the 1981 coup attempt, consists of militant Shia calling for violent revolution. The Islamic Call Party is more moderate, calling for social and economic reforms. Two secular leftist groups that espouse Arab nationalist ideologies are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and the National Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. Their influence appeared to be on the decline as of early 1993. The agencies of the Ministry of Interior, the police force, and the Security and Intelligence Ser- vice (SIS) maintain strict control over political activity. It is thought that their operations are extensive and highly effec- tive. Detention and arrest can result from actions construed as antiregime activity, such as membership in illegal organiza- tions, antigovernment demonstrations, possession or circula- tion of antiregime writings, or preaching of sermons of a radical or extreme Islamist tone. The Department of State reported some loosening of controls in 1991 over actions previ- ously regarded as subversive, reflecting the government's assessment that domestic and foreign threats to its security had receded. Under the State Security Act of 1974, persons can be detained for up to three years, with a right of appeal after a period of three months and thereafter every six months. Arrested persons tried in ordinary criminal courts are provided the usual guarantees, such as public trials, the right to counsel (including legal aid if needed), and the right of appeal. Prison- ers charged with security offenses are tried directly by the Supreme Court of Appeal, sitting as the Security Court. The procedural guarantees of the penal code do not apply: pro- ceedings are in secret, and there is no right of judicial appeal, although cases can be referred to the amir for clemency. According to Department of State human rights studies, there have been credible reports that the SIS engages in tor- 354 Regional and National Security Considerations ture and mistreatment of detainees. Convictions in some cases have been based only on confessions that allegedly have been extracted by torture. There were, however, no confirmed cases of torture in 1991. The independent human rights group Amnesty International claimed that as of 1992, about seventy political prisoners, many with ties to banned Islamic groups, were serving sentences after unfair trials. Between 220 and 270 people were held in Bahraini jails in 1992. Of these, fewer than 100 were thought to be serving sentences for security offenses. Qatar In company with other gulf amirates, Qatar had long-stand- ing ties with Britain but had remained under nominal Otto- man hegemony until 1916, when Qatar formally became a British protected state. During the next five decades, Britain also exercised considerable influence in the internal affairs of the amirate. When the announcement came that Britain would withdraw its military forces from the gulf by 1971, Qatari lead- ers were forced to consider how to survive without British pro- tection. Unable to support a large military establishment, Qatar has placed its reliance on small but mobile forces that can deter border incursions. Nevertheless, the Iran-Iraq War brought attacks on shipping just beyond its territorial waters, underscoring Qatar's vulnerability to interference with oil ship- ments and vital imports. In addition to seeking collective secu- rity through the GCC, Qatar has turned to close ties with Saudi Arabia, entering into a bilateral defense agreement in 1982. The ruler in 1992, Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani, had taken control of the country twenty years earlier, when the leading members of the ruling family decided that Khalifa's cousin, Ahmad ibn Ali Al Thani, should be replaced because of his many shortcomings as amir. As supreme commander of the armed forces, Khalifa ibn Hamad issued a decree in 1977 appointing his son and heir apparent, Hamad ibn Khalifa Al Thani, to the post of commander in chief. The same decree created the Ministry of Defense and named Hamad ibn Khalifa as minister. Hamad ibn Khalifa was a graduate of Sandhurst and had attained the rank of major general. At the time of independence on September 3, 1971, the armed forces consisted of little more than the Royal Guard Regiment and some scattered units equipped with a few armored cars and four aircraft. By 1992 it had grown to a force of 7,500, including an army of 6,000, a navy of 700, and an air force of 800. In addition to the Royal Guard Regiment, the 355 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies army had expanded to include a tank battalion, three mecha- nized infantry battalions, a special forces company, a field artil- lery regiment, and a SAM battery. The combined combat strength of these units, however, is estimated to be no more than that of a reinforced regiment in a Western army. Initially outfitted with British weaponry, Qatar shifted much of its procurement to France during the 1980s in response to French efforts to develop closer relations. The tank battalion is equipped with French-built AMX-30 main battle tanks. Other armored vehicles include French AMX-10P APGs and the French VAB, which has been adopted as the standard wheeled combat vehicle. The artillery unit has a few French 155mm self- propelled howitzers (see table 40, Appendix). The principal antitank weapons are French Milan and HOT wire-guided mis- siles. Qatar had also illicitly acquired a few Stinger shoulder- fired SAMs, possibly from Afghan rebel groups, at a time when the United States was trying to maintain tight controls on Stingers in the Middle East. When Qatar refused to turn over the missiles, the United States Senate in 1988 imposed a ban on the sale of all weapons to Qatar. The ban was repealed in late 1990 when Qatar satisfactorily accounted for its disposition of the Stingers. Three French-built La Combattante III missile craft, which entered service in 1983, form the core of the navy. The missile craft supplement six older Vosper Thornycroft large patrol craft. A variety of smaller craft are operated by the marine police. The air force is equipped with combat aircraft and armed helicopters. Its fighter aircraft include Alpha Jets with a fighter- ground attack capability and one air defense squadron of Mirage Fls, all purchased from France. All of the aircraft are based at Doha International Airport. The planned purchase of Hawk and Patriot missile systems from the United States will give Qatar a modern ground-based air defense. British pilots on detail remain on duty with the air force, and French special- ists are employed in a maintenance capacity. Nevertheless, an increasing number of young Qataris have been trained as pilots and technicians. The lack of sufficient indigenous personnel to staff the armed forces is a continuing problem. By one estimate, Qatari citizens constitute only 30 percent of the army, in which more than twenty nationalities are represented. Many of the officers are of the royal family or members of leading tribes. Enlisted personnel are recruited from beduin tribes that move between 356 " • . wi -fro-" % Lieutenant General Charles Horner, commanding general, United States Central Air Force, congratulates Major Hamad ibn Abd Allah Al Khalifa, commander of Bahrain's Shaykh Is a Squadron, after awarding him the Legion of Merit for his support during Operation Desert Storm. A Qatari air force pilot performs a preflight check on his Mirage Fl aircraft before a mission during Operation Desert Storm. Courtesy United States Air Force 357 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Qatar and Saudi Arabia and from other Arab groups. Many Pakistanis serve in combat units. In 1992 there were still a num- ber of British officers, as well as British, French, Jordanian, and Pakistani advisers and technicians. More young Qataris are being recruited, and the number of trained and competent Qatari officers is steadily increasing. Although official data on military expenditures are not pub- lished, the defense budget estimate of US$500 million for 1989 was 8 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- sary). The estimate of US$934 million for 1991, an increase of 80 percent over 1989, was presumably attributable to the costs of the Persian Gulf War. During the hostilities, the Qatari tank battalion was deployed to the Saudi-Iraqi border as part of Joint Forces Command East. Beginning on January 22, 1991, Qatari aircraft joined other countries in carrying out strikes against Iraqi forces. United States, Canadian, and French fighter squadrons flew daily missions from Doha during the gulf war. Saudi and Qatari forces that had dug in to defend the road leading south from the border town of Ras al Khafji were forced to withdraw when the Iraqis made their only incursion into Saudi territory on January 29, 1991. The three Saudi battalions and the one tank battalion from Qatar maintained contact with the Iraqi forces and participated in the coalition counterattack two days later that drove the Iraqis out of the town with considerable losses. The Qatari contingent, composed mostly of Pakistani recruits, acquitted itself well. The Qatari battalion also formed part of the Arab forces that advanced across Iraqi positions toward the city of Kuwait during the general coalition offensive on Febru- ary 24, 1991. One Qatari tank was lost in the engagement, and a number of Arab soldiers were killed or wounded. No Qatari combat deaths were reported during the war. Although the amirate has experienced little internal unrest, the large number of foreigners — forming 80 percent of the work force — is regarded as a possible source of instability. Qatar is determined to maintain control over their activities and limit their influence. A significant number of resident Pal- estinians, some of whom included prominent businessmen and civil servants, were expelled after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iranian Shia have not been the source of problems but are nev- ertheless looked on as potential subversives. Foreigners are lia- ble to face arbitrary police action and harassment and often complain of mistreatment after their arrest. 358 7 i .A, ML General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief, United States Central Command, with Brigadier General Muhammad ibn Abd Allah al Attiyah of Qatar, whom he presented with the Legion of Merit for his role in Operation Desert Storm General H. Norman Schwarzkopf speaks with Lieutenant General Khamis ihn Humaid ibn Salim al Kilbani, chief of staff , Royal Oman Land Forces, while touring As Sib Air Base during Operation Desert Storm. Courtesy United States Air Force 359 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies The Ministry of Interior has controlled the police force of about 2,500 members since 1990. The local police enforces laws and arrests violators. The General Administration of Pub- lic Security, which in 1991 replaced the Criminal Investigation Department, is a separate unit of the ministry charged with investigation of crimes. The Mubahathat (secret police office), a nearly independent branch of the Ministry of Interior, deals with sedition and espionage. The army's mission does not include internal security, although the army can be called on in the event of serious civil disturbances. Nevertheless, a separate agency, the Mukhabarat (intelligence service), is under armed forces jurisdiction. Its function is to intercept and arrest terror- ists and to keep surveillance over political dissidents. Qatar has both civil and sharia courts, but only sharia courts have jurisdiction in criminal matters. Lacking permanent secu- rity courts, security cases are tried by specially established mili- tary courts, but such cases have been rare. In sharia criminal cases, the proceedings are closed, and lawyers play no formal role except to prepare the accused for trial. After the parties state their cases and after witnesses are examined by the judge, the verdict is usually delivered with little delay. No bail is set, but in minor cases, charged persons may be released to a Qatari sponsor. Most of the floggings prescribed by sharia law are administered, but physical mutilation is not allowed, and no executions have occurred since the 1980s. The police routinely monitor the communications of sus- pects and security risks. Although warrants are usually required for searches, this does not apply in cases involving national security. The security forces reportedly have applied severe force and torture in investigating political and security-related cases. Suspects can be incarcerated without charge, although this is infrequent. The United States Department of State noted that standards of police conduct have improved in spite of a 1991 incident in which a group of Qataris were detained without charge for two months in connection with the unau- thorized publication of tracts and letters critical of the govern- ment; at least one member of the group, which included several members of the ruling family, is said to have been beaten. United Arab Emirates Background The numerous treaties that Britain concluded with the sev- 360 Regional and National Security Considerations eral gulf amirates in the nineteenth century provided, inter alia, that the British were responsible for foreign relations and protection from attack by sea. Until the early 1950s, the princi- pal military presence in the Trucial Coast states (sometimes referred to as Trucial Oman) consisted of British-led Arab security forces and the personal bodyguard units of the ruling shaykhs. In 1951 the British formed the Trucial Oman Levies (later called the Trucial Oman Scouts) under a British com- mander who reported to the British political agent of the gulf. Arabs from the Trucial Coast made up only about 40 percent of the strength; Omanis, Iranians, Pakistanis, and Indians made up the remainder. Organized as light armored cavalry, the scouts used British weapons, trucks, and armored cars in carry- ing out police functions and in keeping peace among the tribes of the various amirates. During its approximately two decades of existence, the unit was respected for its impartial role in maintaining public order on the coast. By the time the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became inde- pendent on December 2, 1971, the scouts had become a mobile force of about 1,600 men, trained and led by about thirty British officers assisted by Jordanian noncommissioned officers (NCOs). At the time of independence and federation, the Trucial Oman Scouts became the nucleus of the Union Defense Force (UDF), responsible to the federal minister of defense, the Supreme Council of the Union, and — ulti- mately — to the president of the federation, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, ruler of Abu Dhabi, who continued to fill this office in 1993. Separate amirate forces are also authorized by the provisional constitution, and the separate entities of the union — especially Abu Dhabi — have made clear that they intend to maintain their own forces. Drawing on tremendous oil wealth accumulated in the early 1960s, the amir of Abu Dhabi gave high priority to the development of the Abu Dhabi Defense Force (ADDF) when the British withdrawal from the gulf was announced. The ADDF — with 15,000 men and prima- rily British and Jordanian officers — consisted of three army bat- talions, an artillery battery, twelve Hawker Hunter fighter- bombers, and a sea defense wing of four fast patrol boats. Dubayy had a much smaller force of 2,000, Ras al Khaymah had 900, and Sharjah had even fewer. Personnel for the UDF and separate amirate forces were recruited from several countries of the region, but soon after independence enlistments from the Dhofar region in Oman and from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, 361 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies also seen as South Yemen) were curtailed out of fear that per- sonnel from these areas might spread dangerous revolutionary doctrines. As the largest in territory, the most populous, and by far the richest of the amirates, Abu Dhabi has borne the brunt of funding the federation's military establishment. A major step toward unification of forces occurred in 1976 when Abu Dhabi, Dubayy, and Ras al Khaymah announced the merger of their separate armed forces with the UDF. Sharjah had previ- ously merged its police and small military units into the UDF. Despite the promises and pledges of 1976, true integration and unification of the UAE armed forces has not occurred. The UDF is seen by some, particularly the amir of Dubayy, as merely an extension of Abu Dhabi power. Individual amirs view their forces as symbols of sovereignty no matter the size or com- bat readiness of the units. The separate forces therefore con- tinue as they had earlier, but they are called regional commands, only nominally part of the UDF. Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan's attempt to install his eighteen-year-old son as com- mander in chief in 1978 shook the fragile unity of the UDF. Although the appointment was rescinded, Dubayy strength- ened its resolve to maintain the autonomy of the Central Mili- tary Command, its own regional military command. As of 1992, the commander in chief of the UDF was Zayid ibn Sultan. The crown prince, Lieutenant General Khalifa ibn Zayid Al Nuhayyan, held immediate command as deputy com- mander in chief. The chief of staff with operational responsibil- ities was Major General Muhammad Said al Badi, a UAE national who replaced a Jordanian general in the post in the early 1980s. His headquarters was in Abu Dhabi. The minister of defense was Shaykh Muhammad ibn Rashid Al Maktum, son of the ruler of Dubayy. The ministry, located in Dubayy, con- cerned itself primarily with administrative, personnel, and logistic matters and apparently had little influence on opera- tional aspects of the UDF. In data published by the Department of State in mid-1991, the total strength of the UDF with responsibility for defense of six of the seven amirates was estimated at 60,000. Dubayy forces of the Central Military Command with responsibility for the defense of Dubayy were given as 12,000. The Department of State estimated that there were 1,800 in the UDF air force and 1,000 in the navy. Estimates of ground forces given in The Mili- tary Balance, 1992-1993 were significantly lower. The Military Balance stated that perhaps 30 percent of the armed services consist of foreigners, although other sources 362 ~ X ■■■■1 General H. Norman Schwarzkopf presents the Legion of Merit to Major General Muhammad Said al Badi, chief of staff United Arab Emirates Union Defense Force, for his contribution to the coalition during Operation Desert Storm. Courtesy United States Air Force claim that the forces have a much higher proportion of non- UAE nationals. Omanis predominate in the enlisted ranks, but there are also many Pakistanis among the more than twenty nationalities represented. Well into the 1980s, many mid-level officers were Britons under contract, as well as Pakistanis and Omanis. By 1991 the officer corps was composed almost exclu- sively of amirate nationals, according to the Department of State. The UAE lacks a conscription system and is unlikely to adopt one. It was announced in 1990 that all university stu- dents would undergo military training as a requirement for graduation. Although adopted as a reaction to the Iraqi inva- sion of Kuwait, the UAE authorities reportedly are considering continuation of the requirement as a possible prelude to reservist training. Organization and Equipment The principal units of the UDF in 1993 were one mecha- nized infantry brigade, one armored brigade, two infantry bri- gades, one artillery brigade, and the Royal Guard, organized along brigade lines. The Central Military Command of Dubayy 363 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies supplies one infantry brigade. Major weapons include French AMX-30 main battle tanks, of which an additional twenty-five tanks are on order. The Central Military Command separately purchased Italian OF-40 Mk 2 Lion tanks. French armor pre- dominates throughout the army; it includes reconnaissance vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, APCs, and 155mm self-pro- pelled howitzers (see table 41, Appendix). Negotiations were reportedly under way in 1992 for the purchase of 337 M1A1 tanks from the United States. The UAE also has a variety of older British armored vehicles, many of them in storage, as well as Brazilian APCs. The army's antitank guided wire missiles include twenty-five TOWs from the United States, some of them mounted on Urutu chassis, as well as French Milan and HOT and the older British Vigilant systems. Because of difficul- ties of coordination between air- and ground-based defenses, the operation of air defense missiles was shifted to the air force in 1988. The army's tactical air defense is limited to 20mm and 30mm guns. The most powerful units of the UDF navy are two Lurssen corvettes delivered by Germany in 1991, similar to those of the Bahraini navy. The corvettes are supplemented by fast-attack craft and large patrol boats. The air force is organized into two fighter-ground attack squadrons, one air defense squadron, and one counterinsur- gency squadron. The fighter-ground attack squadrons are equipped with Mirage Ills and British Hawks, the latter with a combined attack and training role. The fighter squadron is composed of Mirage 5s and Mirage 2000s. The counterinsur- gency squadron is equipped with the Italian Aermacchi. In addition, the air force has four early warning aircraft. A num- ber of French helicopters are armed with Exocet, HOT, and other air-to-ground missiles. In 1991 the United States agreed to the sale of twenty Apache attack helicopters after the admin- istration overcame objections in Congress by pointing out that the helicopters were needed to defend the UAE's oil platforms in the gulf and to enable the UAE to contribute more effec- tively to the deterrence of aggression by Iraq. The existing air defense system is based on one air defense brigade organized into thirteen batteries armed with Rapier, Crotale, and RBS-70 SAMs. Five batteries of improved Hawk missiles were being formed in 1992, with training provided by the United States. 364 Regional and National Security Considerations The Role of the United Arab Emirates in the Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf War The attitude of the UAE during attacks on international shipping in the Iran-Iraq War was ambivalent. The amirates were profiting from a brisk reexport trade with Iran; further- more, they felt vulnerable because their offshore oil facilities were exposed to the danger of Iranian attack. Dubayy and Ras al Khaymah in particular, with a substantial number of Iranians and native Shia, leaned toward Iran and were reluctant to aban- don their neutrality. Abu Dhabi, however, as the richest oil state, adopted a pro-Arab stance in the war favoring Iraq. An offshore oil platform belonging to Abu Dhabi was hit by Ira- nian missiles in 1987; although denying responsibility, Iran paid an indemnity. The Department of State credited the UAE with supporting the United States Navy during its convoy oper- ations despite Iranian threats of retaliation. Reversing its earlier policy of avoiding collaboration with foreign military powers, the UAE, according to the Depart- ment of State, was the first Persian Gulf state to propose com- bined military action to deter Iraq when it threatened war against Kuwait. An air refueling exercise between United States and UAE aircraft one week before the invasion of Kuwait was intended as a warning signal to Iraq. During the Persian Gulf War, UAE troops, reportedly numbering several hundred, par- ticipated in the conflict as part of the GCC Peninsula Shield force that advanced into the city of Kuwait. United States air- craft bombed Iraqi positions from the UAE, and United States ships, including aircraft carriers, operated out of UAE ports. The UAE air force also carried out strikes against Iraqi forces. A total of six UAE combat deaths were reported as a result of the fighting. The UAE defense budget remained fairly stable at about US$1.6 billion between 1988 and 1991. However, an additional US$3.3 billion represented UAE contributions and pledges in 1991 to other countries in connection with the war. Total UAE support to other countries participating in the Persian Gulf War was reported to have reached US$6 billion by mid-1991; payments of nearly US$3.8 billion had been made to the United States, US$500 million to Britain, and US$1.4 billion to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and seven other nations, combined, to offset their economic losses from the war. Oil prices and UAE oil production rose significantly after the outbreak of the gulf crisis; exports rose from US$15.5 billion in 1989 to US$21.0 bil- lion in 1990. However, the balance of payments was negative 365 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies for the first time as a result of UAE contributions to other countries affected by the crisis and large capital transfers out of the country during the period. Internal Security Problems In the past, internal dynastic rivalries within individual amirates were often sources of tension and even bloodshed. In part, this resulted from the absence of clearly established rules of succession. More recently, however, heirs apparent have usu- ally been designated, most often the eldest son of the amir. Intra-UAE rivalries no longer take a violent form, but the con- tinued existence of independent military forces and competi- tion in acquiring arms bring with them a costly proliferation of weapons that complicates training and logistics. The threat of subversion from resident Iranians and native Shia seems to be less acute in the UAE than in other gulf states in spite of the large Shia population in Dubayy. Dubayy and Sharjah have traditionally maintained good relations with Iran and enjoyed profits from maritime trade, particularly the trans- shipment of items officially banned in Iran to conserve foreign exchange. The provisional constitution authorizes federal police and security guard forces, which are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The strength of the police force has not been reported but is estimated as relatively large and vigilant in exer- cising control over political activities. Individual shaykhs had their own police forces before independence and maintained those forces after unification. Both the federal government and the amirate of Dubayy retain independent internal security organizations. The police forces of the other amirates are also involved in antinarcotic and antiterrorist activities. Criminal cases are tried either by sharia courts administered by each amirate or by civil courts of the federal system that exist in several amirates. Rights of due process are accorded under both systems. Defendants are entitled to legal counsel. No for- mal public defender system exists, but the judge has responsi- bility for looking after the interests of persons not represented by counsel. Under the Criminal Procedures Code adopted in 1992, the accused has the right to defense counsel, provided by the government, if necessary, in cases involving possible sen- tence of death or life imprisonment. There are no jury trials, but trials are open except in cases involving national security or morals offenses. No separate security courts exist, and military courts try only military personnel in a system based on Western 366 Lieutenant General Charles Homer presents Muhammad an Nahyan, a United Arab Emirates Union Defense Force air force officer, with a pistol in recognition of his performance during Operation Desert Storm. Courtesy United States Air Force military judicial principles. According to Department of State human rights reports, the criminal court system is generally regarded as fair. Despite the lack of a formal bail system, there are instances of release on deposit of money or passport. Detentions must be reported to the attorney general within forty-eight hours; the attorney general must decide within twenty-four hours whether to charge, release, or allow further limited detention. Most persons receive expeditious trials, although Iraqis and Palestinians had been held incommuni- cado in detention for one or two months in 1991. Others were being held in jail because they were unwilling or unable to return to their countries of origin. Oman Background As a regional commercial power in the nineteenth century, Oman held territories on the island of Zanzibar off the coast of East Africa, in Mombasa along the coast of East Africa, and until 1958 in Gwadar (in present-day Pakistan) on the coast of the Arabian Sea. When its East African possessions were lost, 367 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Oman withdrew into isolationism in the southeast corner of the Arabian Peninsula. Another of the Persian Gulf states with long-standing ties to the British, Oman became important in the British-French rivalry in the nineteenth century when France challenged the British Empire for control of the trade routes to the East. Although nominally an independent sultan- ate, Oman enjoyed the protection of the empire without being, de jure, in the category of a colony. With its external defenses guaranteed and its overseas territories lost, the sultanate had no need for armed forces other than mercenaries to safeguard the personal position of the sultan. In 1952 a small Saudi constabulary force occupied the Al Buraymi Oasis, where tribes from Oman and Abu Dhabi had traditionally resided. When arbitration failed, the British sent a force of Trucial Oman Scouts to expel the Saudis in 1955. Later in the same decade, the sultan called on British troops to aid in putting down a rebellion led by the former imam (see Glossary) of Oman, who attempted to establish a separate state free of rule from Muscat. British ground and air forces dis- patched to aid the Muscat and Oman Field Force succeeded in overcoming the rebels in early 1959. Nevertheless, instead of a minor intertribal affair in Oman's hinterland, the rebellion became an international incident, attracting wide sympathy and support among members of the League of Arab States (Arab League) and the UN. An agreement between Sultan Said ibn Taimur Al Said and the British government in 1958 led to the creation of the Sul- tan's Armed Forces (SAF) and the promise of British assistance in military development. The agreement included the detail- ing of British officers and confirmed the existing rights of Brit- ain's Royal Air Force to use facilities at Salalah in the Dhofar region and on Masirah, an island off the Omani coast in the Arabian Sea. Sultan Said ibn Taimur was ultraconservative and opposed to change of any kind. Kindled by Arab nationalism, a rebellion broke out in 1964 in Dhofar, the least developed area of Oman. Although begun as a tribal separatist movement against a reac- tionary ruler, the rebellion was backed by leftist elements in the PDRY Its original aim was the overthrow of Said ibn Taimur, but, by 1967, under the name of the Popular Front for the Lib- eration of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, which in 1974 was changed to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), it adopted much wider goals. Supported by the Soviet Union through the PDRY, the rebellion hoped to spread revo- 368 Regional and National Security Considerations lution throughout the conservative regimes of the Arabian Peninsula. Said ibn Taimur's reprisals against the Dhofari people tended to drive them into the rebel camp. In 1970, as the Dho- fari guerrilla attacks expanded, Said ibn Taimur's son, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, replaced his father in a coup carried out with the assistance of British officers. Qabus ibn Said, a Sandhurst graduate and veteran of British army service, began a program to modernize the country and to develop the armed forces. In addition to British troops and advisers, the new sultan was assisted by troops sent by the shah of Iran. Aid also came from India, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, all inter- ested in ensuring that Oman did not become a "people's republic." An Iranian brigade, along with artillery and helicop- ters, arrived in Dhofar in 1973. After the arrival of the Iranians, the combined forces consolidated their positions on the coastal plain and moved against the guerrillas' mountain stronghold. By stages, the Omanis and Iranians gradually subdued the guerrilla forces, pressing their remnants closer and closer to the PDRY border. In December 1975, having driven the PFLO from Omani territory, the sultan declared that the war had been won. Total Omani, British, and Iranian casualties during the final two and one-half years of the conflict were about 500. Mission of the Armed Forces After 1970 the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF; later renamed the Royal Armed Forces) became one of the more modern and better trained fighting forces among the Arab gulf states. Rec- ognizing its strategic importance guarding the Strait of Hor- muz (through which nearly one-fifth of the world's oil transited) and the Gulf of Oman, the sultanate has struggled to maintain a high degree of military preparedness in spite of its limited financial means. Its defense budget in 1992 was esti- mated at US$1.7 billion, exclusive of the GCC subsidy shared with Bahrain. It has periodically tested the capabilities of its armed forces by engaging in joint exercises with Western pow- ers, particularly in regular exercises with British forces. Oman has taken the initiative in efforts to strengthen regional collec- tive security through the GCC. At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War, it proposed the development of a GCC regional secu- rity force of 100,000 personnel. For many years after the defeat of the Dhofari insurgents, Oman regarded its southern border with the PDRY as the most likely source of future conflict. The PDRY provided the Dhofari 369 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies rebels with supplies, training camps, and refuge from attacks. Omani ground and air strength was concentrated at Salalah, Thamarit, and other towns near the PDRY border. The threat of PFLO dissident activity supported by the PDRY or border operations against Oman declined after reconciliation with the PDRY, marked by the exchange of ambassadors in 1987. Apart from its military role, the SAF carried out a variety of civic-action projects that, particularly in Dhofar, were an impor- tant means of gaining the allegiance of the people. Military engineers assisted road construction in mountain areas. The air force carried out supply operations and provided medical service to remote areas. The navy performed similar duties along Oman's long coastline. The navy also patrolled the sul- tanate's territorial waters and the 370-kilometer Exclusive Eco- nomic Zone to deter smuggling and illegal fishing. Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces Sultan Qabus ibn Said retained for himself the positions of prime minister and minister of defense. The sultan's uncle, Fahar ibn Taimur Al Said, served as deputy prime minister for security and defense. Between 1970 and 1987, the armed forces commander, as well as the heads of the air force and navy, were British generals and admirals on loan. As of early 1993, the chief of staff and the three service commanders were Omanis. As of 1992, personnel strength of the Royal Armed Forces (as they were renamed — RAF) had reached about 35,700, includ- ing 6,000 Royal Household troops (a 4,500 Royal Guard of Oman (RGO) brigade, two Special Forces regiments totaling 700, the Royal Yacht Squadron of 150, and 650 other person- nel) and foreign personnel, believed to number about 3,700. The army, known as the Royal Oman Land Forces (ROLF), is the largest of the service branches with a strength of 20,000. The ROLF is organized into regiments, although each regi- ment is of no more than battalion size. It includes two armored regiments composed of three tank squadrons; one armored reconnaissance regiment composed of three armored car squadrons; eight infantry regiments, three of which are staffed by Baluchis; four artillery regiments; one air defense regiment of two batteries; one infantry reconnaissance regiment com- posed of three reconnaissance companies; two independent reconnaissance companies; one airborne regiment; and one field engineering regiment of three squadrons. A small tribal militia of rifle company strength on the Musandam Peninsula is known as the Musandam Security Force. 370 Regional and National Security Considerations One divisional headquarters and two brigade headquarters are maintained, within which the independent regiments can be combined into larger fighting units. The separate Royal Household troops consist of the RGO, the Special Forces ele- ments (trained by British commandos), and personnel to staff the royal yacht and a number of transport aircraft and helicop- ters. The RGO, an elite corps with the primary function of pro- tecting the sultan and performing ceremonial duties, has a separate identity within the ROLF but is trained to operate in the field alongside other army formations. The two tank squadrons are equipped with United States M-60A1 and M-60A3 tanks and with British Chieftains. The armored car squadrons are outfitted with British Scorpion light tanks and French VBC-90s. The ROLF lacks armored equip- ment for troop movement, depending on Austrian Steyr cross- country vehicles. In July 1991, Oman ordered US$150 million worth of armored vehicles from the United States. The ROLF has a variety of towed artillery pieces; its principal antitank weapons are TOW and Milan guided missiles. Air defense is provided by a variety of guns and shoulder-fired SAMs (see table 42, Appendix) . Initially, nearly all the army officers and men were Baluchis from Pakistan, except for senior commanders, who were Brit- ish. As of early 1993, most of the officers were Omanis, although British involvement continued, especially in the armored regiment. The training battalion of the RAF conducts recruit training for all services at the RAF training center near Muscat. Officer candidates — who must serve at least one year in the enlisted ranks — attend the Sultan Qabus Military Col- lege and the Officers' Training School. In 1988 the first class of twenty officers graduated from the Sultan's Armed Forces Command and Staff College near Muscat. This is a tri-service school to prepare mid-ranking officers for senior command and staff appointments. Officers of other government security services and some civilian officials also attend. The Royal Oman Navy (RON), with a strength of 3,000 in 1992, has its headquarters at As Sib, thirty-six kilometers west of Muscat. The principal naval establishment is the Said ibn Sul- tan Naval Base, completed in 1987, at Wudham Aiwa near As Sib. One of the largest engineering projects ever undertaken in Oman, it provides a home port for the RON fleet, training facilities, and workshops for carrying out all maintenance and repair activities. The Naval Training Center, located at the base, offers entry-level courses for officers and enlisted person- 371 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies nel, as well as specialized branch training. Initially, the navy was staffed almost entirely by British officers and Pakistani NCOs. By the late 1980s, most ship commanders were Omanis, although many Pakistani and British technical personnel remained. The navy's main combat vessels are four Province-class mis- sile craft built by Vosper Thornycroft. Armed with Exocet anti- ship missiles and 76mm guns, the last ship was delivered in 1989. The navy also operates four Brook Marine fast-attack craft with 76mm guns and four inshore patrol craft. The navy is well equipped for amphibious operations and has one 2,500- ton landing ship capable of transporting sixty-ton tanks and three landing craft, mechanized. Oman has ordered two cor- vettes with eight Exocet missiles, scheduled for delivery from Britain in 1995-96, and hopes to remedy its lack of minesweep- ers. The Royal Oman Air Force (ROAF) had a strength of about 3,500 in 1992. Its forty-four combat aircraft of British manufac- ture consist of two fighter-ground attack squadrons of modern Jaguars, a ground attack and reconnaissance squadron of older Hunters, and a squadron of Strikemasters and Defenders for counterinsurgency, maritime reconnaissance, and training pur- poses. The air force is fairly well equipped with three transport squadrons and two squadrons of helicopters for troop trans- port and medical transport. Rapier SAMs are linked to an inte- grated air control and early warning network based on a Martello radar system. Skyvan aircraft fitted with radar and spe- cial navigational gear conduct maritime reconnaissance and antipollution patrols. The principal air bases are at Thamarit in the south and on Masirah. Others are co-located with the inter- national airport at As Sib, at Al Khasab on the Musandam Pen- insula, at Nazwah, and at Salalah. Officer and pilot training takes place at the Sultan Qabus Air Academy on Masirah. Pilots of fighter aircraft receive advanced training in Britain. Omani Role in the Persian Gulf War, 1991 Oman's perceptions of the strategic problems in the gulf diverge somewhat from those of the other Arab gulf states. Geographically, it faces outward to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, and only a few kilometers of its territory — the western coast of the Musandam Peninsula — border the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, sharing the guardianship of the Strait of Hormuz with Iran, Oman's position makes it of key importance to the security of the entire Persian Gulf. In its willingness to 372 Gunboat of the Royal Oman Navy prepares to transfer a crew member 373 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies enter into strategic cooperation with the United States and Britain, Oman has always stood somewhat apart from the other gulf states. In 1980 Muscat and Washington concluded a ten- year "facilities access" agreement granting the United States limited access to the air bases on Masirah and at Thamarit and As Sib and to the naval bases at Muscat, Salalah, and Al Khasab. The agreement was renewed for a further ten-year period in December 1990. Although some Arab governments initially expressed their disapproval for granting the United States bas- ing privileges, the agreement permitted use of these bases only on advance notice and for specified purposes. During the Iran- Iraq War, the United States flew maritime patrols from Omani airfields and based tanker aircraft to refuel United States car- rier aircraft. The United States Army Corps of Engineers car- ried out considerable construction at the Masirah and As Sib air bases, making it possible to pre-position supplies, vehicles, and ammunition. Hardened aircraft shelters were built at As Sib and Thamarit for use by the ROAF. Oman's traditionally good relations with Iran were strained by Iran's attacks on tanker movements in the Persian Gulf and Iran's emplacement of Chinese Silkworm antiship missile launchers near the Strait of Hormuz. The sultanate reinforced its military position on the Musandam Peninsula, which is only about sixty kilometers from Iranian territory. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Oman declared its sup- port for the multinational coalition ranged against Iraq. The facilities on Masirah became an important staging area for the movement of coalition forces to the area of conflict. Oman also contributed troops to Operation Desert Storm as part of the Arab contingent of Joint Forces Command East. A reinforced Omani brigade, along with Saudi, UAE, Kuwaiti, and other forces, participated in the ground assault paralleling the gulf coast that converged on the city of Kuwait. No Omani combat deaths were reported. Internal Security Oman has not been exposed to a significant internal threat since the defeat of the Dhofari insurgents in 1975. Tribal dis- sension, a factor in the past, is considered unlikely to recur because most tribal chiefs and leading families share the advan- tages of rising oil income. The foreign labor force is large — estimated at 60 percent of the working population — and most foreign workers are Indians and Pakistanis who are not politi- cally active. A few observers foresee an internal power struggle 374 Regional and National Security Considerations over the succession because Sultan Qabus ibn Said has no des- ignated successor, but others believe that the country is stable enough to avoid strife over the selection of a new ruler. The sultanate has not been the target of terrorist acts; it faces few problems from the narcotics trade and considers the level of general crime to be remarkably low. The security ser- vices are described as large and efficient but not overly intru- sive. The Royal Oman Police (ROP), commanded by the inspec- tor general of police and customs, is under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. The size of the force was estimated in 1992 at 7,000, but this number is believed to include customs, immigration, civil defense, firefighters, coast guard, and prison service. The principal crime fighting unit is the Directorate General of Criminal Investigation. An oil installation division has responsibility for security of the oil industry and patrols pipelines, oil rigs, and oil terminals. The mounted division patrols border areas on horseback and camel and also provides security control at airports and border points. The coast guard contingent numbers 400; it is equipped with fifteen AT-105 APCs and eighteen inshore patrol craft. The home guard (flrqat) units had been raised and trained for irregular counterinsurgency operations by troops of the British army's Special Air Services. Armed with small arms, firqat units serve as tribal police and defense forces for the mountain people engaged in herding cattle in areas infiltrated by the Dhofari insurgents during the rebellion. After the insur- gency, they remained as paramilitary tribal police, numbering about 3,500 in 1992. Oman's criminal court system provides for fair trials within the framework of Islamic judicial practice. The defendant in criminal trials is presumed innocent and cannot be detained for longer than twenty-four hours without review of the case by a magistrate, who may then allow the police to hold a suspect up to fourteen days — extended if necessary up to seventy days — to carry out further investigation. Some suits have been filed against police officers for illegal arrest. The accused can be represented by an attorney, but the gov- ernment does not pay for a public defender. There are no jury trials and no right to a public trial. The judge can release the accused on payment of bail. Only the judge questions witnesses at the trial. The verdict and sentencing are frequently pro- nounced within a day. Sentences of more than two months and more than US$1,300 in fines are subject to appeal. No execu- 375 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies tions have been carried out since 1975 and are, in any event, subject to the sultan's ratification. A rarely used security court system handles internal security cases. The government can search private residences and monitor telephones and private correspondence without a warrant but generally confines such actions to investigations of potential security threats and indi- viduals suspected of criminal activity. According to the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, torture, mistreatment, and cruel punishment are not systematically practiced, nor are they countenanced by Omani authorities. The traditional punish- ments authorized by Islamic law, such as amputation and ston- ing, are not imposed. The Department of State reported that some prisoners had complained of beatings by police in 1991, and other physical abuse had been reported in earlier years. Prison conditions are described as harsh, with extreme temper- atures in cells without proper ventilation. However, a practice of punitive hard labor under grueling desert conditions was discontinued in 1991. * * * Much of the foregoing data concerning the size and equip- ment of the armed forces of the Persian Gulf states is based on The Military Balance and on Jane's Fighting Ships. Some of the discussion of internal security practices and judicial systems is drawn from Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, prepared by the United States Department of State. Two general works, The Making of the Modern Gulf States by Rosemarie Said Zahlan and The Turbulent Gulf by Liesl Graz, provide background on security perceptions and problems fac- ing the smaller states of the gulf. Anthony H. Cordesman's The Gulf and the West contributes details on the individual armed forces, the military strengths and shortcomings of each state, and each state's involvement in the naval confrontation in the gulf in the 1980s. The Middle East, published by the Congres- sional Quarterly, treats numerous topics dealing with Persian Gulf security, including local disputes, United States military sales, and the events leading up to the 1990-91 gulf crisis. Studies of the military strategy employed in Operation Desert Storm in Desert Victory by Norman Friedman and Thun- der in the Desert by James Blackwell give limited mention to the role played by the Persian Gulf states. Several analyses of the geostrategic environment in the region, although dating from 376 Regional and National Security Considerations the mid-1980s, still have relevance. They include Arms and Oil by Thomas L. McNaugher and Saudi Arabia: The West and the Security of the Gulf hy Mazher A. Hameed. (For further informa- tion and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 377 Appendix Table 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 2 Kuwait: Population by Nationality, Selected Years, 1957-89 3 Kuwait: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education Level, Nationality, and Gender, Academic Year 1989-90 4 Kuwait: Number of Teachers, Students, and Schools, Se- lected Academic Years, 1962-63 to 1988-89 5 Kuwait: Government Medical Facilities and Personnel, Se- lected Years, 1979-88 6 Kuwait: Production of Crude Oil, Selected Years, 1946-92 7 Kuwait: Government Revenues, Fiscal Years 1985 and 1989 8 Kuwait: Principal Exports, 1983, 1984, and 1985 9 Kuwait: Principal Imports, 1986, 1987, and 1988 10 Kuwait: Major Trading Partners, 1990 and 1991 11 Kuwait: Balance of Payments, 1987, 1988, and 1989 12 Kuwait: Government Budget, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 13 Bahrain: Enrollment by Education Level and Gender, Se- lected Academic Years, 1977-78 to 1991-92 14 Bahrain: Government Budget, 1987-92 15 Bahrain: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 1984- 89 16 Bahrain: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Select- ed Years, 1982-90 17 Bahrain: Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1984 -89 18 Bahrain: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1988, and 1989 19 Qatar: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1975-76 to 1988-89 20 Qatar: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 1985- 89 21 Qatar: Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1984 and 1989 22 Qatar: Government Budget, Selected Fiscal Years, 1986-91 23 Qatar: Balance of Payments, 1984-89 24 Qatar: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1988, and 1989 25 United Arab Emirates: Official Estimated Population and Population Distribution by Amirate, 1991 26 United Arab Emirates: Enrollment by Education Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1980-81 to 1986-87 379 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 27 United Arab Emirates: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 1985-91 28 United Arab Emirates: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1982-87 29 United Arab Emirates: Federal Government Budget, 1987, 1988, and 1989 30 United Arab Emirates: Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985-90 31 United Arab Emirates: Major Trading Partners, 1986, 1988, and 1990 32 Oman: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1975-76 to 1989-90 33 Oman: Government Budget, 1987-92 34 Oman: Balance of Payments, 1987, 1988, and 1990 35 Oman: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1989, and 1990 36 Oman: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, 1988-91 37 Oman: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1987-91 38 Kuwait: Major Military Equipment, 1992 39 Bahrain: Major Military Equipment, 1992 40 Qatar: Major Military Equipment, 1992 41 United Arab Emirates: Major Military Equipment, 1992 42 Oman: Major Military Equipment, 1992 380 Appendix Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds Metric tons 0.98 long tons 1.1 short tons 2,204.0 pounds Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees (Centigrade) and add 32 Fahrenheit 381 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 2. Kuwait: Population by Nationality, Selected Years, 1957-89 Census Year and Nationality Population Percentage 1957 Kuwaiti 113,622 55.0 Non-Kuwaiti 92.851 45.0 Total 206,473 100.0 1961 Kuwaiti 161,909 50.3 Non-Kuwaiti 159.712 49.7 Total 321,621 100.0 1965 Kuwaiti 220,059 47.1 Non-Kuwaiti 247.280 52.9 Total 467,339 100.0 1970 Kuwaiti 347,396 47.0 Non-Kuwaiti 391,266 53.0 Total 738,662 100.0 1975 Kuwaiti 472,088 47.5 522.749 52.5 Total 994,837 100.0 1980 Kuwaiti 565,613 41.7 Non-Kuwaiti 792.339 58.3 Total 1,357,952 100.0 1985 Kuwaiti 681,288 40.1 Non-Kuwaiti 1.016.013 59.9 Total 1,697,301 100.0 1989 1 826,586 38.6 Non-Kuwaiti 1.316.014 61.4 Total 2,142,600 100.0 Estimated. Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstact, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Tables 11 and 12, 27. 382 Appendix Table 3. Kuwait: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education Level, Nationality, and Gender, Academic Year 1989-90 (ten years of age and older ) Education Level Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Primary Males 35,042 24,592 Females 34,619 24.525 69 661 49 117 Intermediate 31,601 30,325 Females 30.575 27,799 Total intermediate 62,176 58,124 Secondary Males 21,072 28,498 Females 23.033 25,314 Total secondary 44,105 53,812 Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1990-91, Kuwait, 1992, Table 269, 324. Table 4. Kuwait: Number of Teachers, Students, and Schools, Selected Academic Years, 1962-63 to 1988-89 1962-63 1967-68 1972-73 1977-78 1982-83 1988-89 Teachers Males 1,551 3,342 5,734 9,673 12,052 12,286 Females 1.390 3.053 5.771 10,101 13,085 16,145 Total teachers 2,941 6,395 11,505 19,774 25,137 28,431 Students Males 35,674 64,366 88,897 136,714 176,368 190,624 Females 23.877 47.655 71,334 116.498 158,574 182.063 Total students 59,551 112,021 160,231 253,212 334,942 372,687 Schools 140 195 273 394 519 642 Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Table 305, 355. 383 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 5. Kuwait: Government Medical Facilities and Personnel, Selected Years, 1979-88 1979 1982 1984 1986 1988 Hospitals and sanitoriums 9 15 17 16 16 Clinics 49 54 62 62 65 Dental clinics 78 114 140 169 193 Maternal care centers 15 18 21 22 23 Child care centers 24 28 32 38 42 Preventive health centers 16 23 25 28 29 School clinics 420 494 540 626 688 Physicians 1,555 2,254 2,442 2,548 2,641 Dentists 167 223 259 294 320 Nurses and assistant nurses 5,322 7,866 9.000 1 8,069 8.500 1 Pharmacists and assistant pharmacists 578 687 719 769 805 Estimated. Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Table 339, 397. Table 6. Kuwait: Production of Crude Oil, Selected Years, 1946-92 (in thousands of barrels) Year Production Year Production 1946 5,900 1970 1,090,600 1950 125,700 1975 760,700 1955 402,700 1980 607,268 1960 619,100 1985 387,363 1965 861,500 1992 41,061 Source: Based on information from M.W. Khouja and P.G. Sadler, The Economy of Kuwait, London, 1979, 26; Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Table 200, 210; and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1993, Vienna, 1993, 23. 384 Appendix Table 7. Kuwait: Government Revenues, Fiscal Years 1985 and 1989 (in thousands of Kuwaiti dinars)^ 1985 1989 Oil revenues 2,094,675 1,941,969 Taxes Customs duties and fees 59,481 65,877 Taxes on net income and profits of nonoil companies 11,634 13,000 Taxes on real estate property transfers 1,348 2,250 Taxes and fees on goods and services and entry and registration fees 477 538 Total taxes 72,940 81,665 Service charges Transportation and communications 67,014 89,425 Electricity and water 50,311 60,078 Housing and public utilities 10,645 10,038 Security and justice 9,091 7,733 Financial stamps revenue 6,410 14,800 Education 4,538 5,606 Health 581 720 Other 974 670 Total service charges 149,564 189,070 Miscellaneous revenues and fees 20,718 17,546 Sales of land and real estate 7,196 250 TOTAL 2,345,093 2,230,500 1 For value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1989, Kuwait, 1990, Table 257, 286. 385 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 8. Kuwait: Principal Exports, 1983, 1984, and 1 985 1 (in Kuwaiti dinars) 2 Commodity 1983 1984 1985 Food and live animals 30,905 36,152 28,290 Mineral fuels and lubricants Crude petroleum 1,578,171 1,920,958 n.a. 3 Refined petroleum products 1,259,269 1,258,690 n.a. Gas (natural and manufactured) 100,752 77,287 77,486 Other 15 Total mineral fuels and lubricants 2,938,207 3,256,935 2,845,178 Chemicals Manufactured fertilizers 18,352 33,237 22,258 Other 32,033 35,172 30,961 Total chemicals 50,385 68,409 53,219 Basic manufactures Nonmetallic mineral manufactures 36,255 18,848 10,094 Other 85.881 67,909 65.942 Total basic manufactures 122,136 86,757 76,036 Machinery and transportation equipment Transportation equipment 95,580 80,108 78,024 Other 48.967 45.379 52.871 Total machinery and transportadon equipment 144,547 125,487 130,895 Miscellaneous manufactured ardcles 50,157 44,301 40,234 Other 27,420 13,429 11,216 TOTAL 3,363,757 3,631,470 3,185,068 1 Free on board. Total exports were KD2.105 million in 1986; KD2.304.4 million in 1987, of which KD666.8 million consisted of crude petroleum out of a total of KD1.925.4 million for petroleum and petroleum products; KD2.166.2 million in 1988, of which KD524.6 million consisted of crude petroleum out of a total of KD1,783.2 million for petroleum and petroleum products; and KD3,378.0 million in 1989. Further breakdown not available. 2 For value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary. 3 n.a. — not available. Source: Based on information from The Middle East and North Africa, 1993, London, 1992, 606. 386 Appendix Table 9. Kuwait: Principal Imports, 1986, 1987, and 1988 (in thousands of Kuwaiti dinars) 2 Commodity 1986 1987 1988 Food and live animals 46,350 37,684 42,713 Grains and grain products 34,459 33,731 32,537 Fruits and vegetables 79,139 81,659 82,181 Other 106.498 115.440 121.899 266,446 268,514 279,330 Chemicals 98.872 110,489 132,027 Basic manufactures Paper, cardboard, and manufactures 24,382 29,904 37,051 Textile yarn and fabrics 75,150 80,642 92,126 Nonmetallic mineral manufactures 47,822 48,588 58,751 87,807 52,321 81,086 Other 85.229 81.034 103.625 qnn AQ(\ 4y4,4oy 9*70 can Machinery and transportation equipment Nonelectric machinery 147,844 131,750 107,714 285,230 213,108 152,873 Transportation equipment 213.408 171.036 234.140 Total machinery and transportation 0*10,104 4Q4 797 Miscellaneous manufactured articles Clothing (excluding footwear) 81,257 85,308 107,289 Scientific instruments and watches 43,307 40,573 43,023 Other 141.736 125.502 148.093 Total miscellaneous manufactured Other 266,300 62,741 251,383 91,942 298,405 137,028 TOTAL 1,661,231 1,530,711 1,714,156 1 Cost, insurance, and freight. Total imports in 1989 were KD1 ,849.4 million; breakdown not available. 2 For value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary. Source: Based on information from The Middle East and North Africa, 1993, London, 1992, 605. 387 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 10. Kuwait: Major Trading Partners, 1990 and 1991 (in percentages) Country 1990 1 1991 2 Exports Japan 20.6 12.3 Netherlands 13.0 n.a. 3 United States 7.5 7.9 Singapore 5.5 n.a. Pakistan 5.3 7.6 India 3.4 n.a. France n.a. 16.1 Italy n.a. 14.9 Britain n.a. 11.1 Egypt n.a. 10.0 Spain n.a. 5.0 Imports Japan 11.6 12.4 United States 11.1 34.8 Germany 9.1 4 7.8 Britain 8.5 8.8 Italy 6.2 n.a. Saudi Arabia 4.1 n.a. Canada n.a. 8.7 South Korea n.a 3.5 France n.a. 3.1 1 Figures based on partners' trade data to August 2, 1990, invasion. 2 Figures based on partners' trade data after February 1991 liberation. 3 n.a. — not available. 4 West Germany. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Kuwait [London], No. 1, 1992, 3; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Kuwait [London] , No. 1, 1993, 3. 388 Appendix Table 11. Kuwait: Balance of Payments, 1987, 1988, and 1989 (in millions of United States dollars) 1987 1988 1989 Merchandise exports, f.o.b. 2 8,221 7,709 11,383 - 4.945 - 6.064 - 5.746 3,276 1,645 5,637 Exports of services 1,030 1,158 1,328 - 4,073 - 4,204 - 4,228 Other income received 5,867 7,626 8,840 Other income paid -470 -487 -756 -1,102 - 1,179 -1,287 — 158 — 140 -211 Current account balance 4,371 4,419 9,323 Direct investment, net -115 -254 -507 Portfolio investment, net 219 -487 -330 Other capital, net -4.913 - 6.028 - 6.859 Capital account balance - 4,809 - 6,769 -7,696 Errors and omissions, net -1,409 355 -372 Overall balance -1,847 -1,996 1,255 Figures may not compute to balances because of rounding, f.o.b. — free on board. Source: Based on information from The Middle East and North Africa, 1993, London, 1992, 605. 389 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 12. Kuwait: Government Budget, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (in millions of Kuwaiti dinars)^ 1990 1991 Revenues 2,109 700 296 170 O AC\ti Z,4Ur> Expenditures AQ1 . . 4»1 4Hfi 4DO 4ftfi . . 'too 94K 450 2,641 41 n . . 41U 010 44t> 1 Q7 lo/ 937 1 OA iyo . . 233 91 7 21 1 9fl9 . . 2U2 937 23 / i nn 1UU Aft Do on yu 04 83 ins Information 69 57 Financial services 68 71 64 45 Transportation 24 17 21 15 Mining and exploration 16 24 Trade and industry 9 8 Unspecified 182 525 Total expenditures 3,634 6,087 Reserve Fund for Future Generations 240 87 TOTAL -1,469 -5,304 For value of the Kuwaiti dinar — see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Middle East Economic Digest [London] , 36, No. 3, January 17, 1992, 15. 390 Appendix Table 13. Bahrain: Enrollment by Education Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1977-78 to 1991-92 1 Education Level 1977-78 1980-81 1984-85 1986-87 1991-92 2 Primary^ Males 24,185 23,849 25,000 26,268 29,009 Females 19,042 20.305 25,180 25.953 28,165 Total primary 43,227 44,154 50,180 52,221 57,174 Intermediate Males 5,260 9,068 10,099 10,816 12,283 Females 4,513 7,394 8,777 9,740 11,804 Total 9,773 16,462 18,876 20,556 24,087 Secondary, secular and \jr\r 3 Mrinsa 1 VULtii-luiitii Males 4,885 4,561 7,614 7,824 8,518 Females 4,767 3,926 6,815 7,551 9,528 Total secondary, secular and 9,652 8,487 14,429 15,375 18,046 Secondary, religious 4 31 20 126 20 41 Higher education Males 485 1,255 1,381 1,898 1,837 Females 206 1.093 1,347 2,248 2.543 Total higher education 691 2,348 5 2,728 4,146 4.380 6 1 Until 1986-87 included only students in government schools; thereafter, included students in both government and religious schools. 2 1991-92 figures for government schools only. 3 Until 1986-87 included students in both government and religious schools. 4 Males only. 5 Figures for 1981-62 6 1988-89 figures for University of Bahrain only. Source: Based on information from Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, Landerbericht Bahrain, 1991, Wiesbaden, 1992, 38; and America-Mideast Educational and Training Services, Education in the Arab World, 1, Washingtron, n.d. 391 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 14. Bahrain: Government Budget, 1987-92 (in millions of Bahraini dinars)^ 1987 1988 1989 1990 2 1991 2 1992 2 Revenues Oil sector 247 210 n.a. 3 250 292 314 Other 180 191 n.a. 190 180 184 Total revenues 427 401 438 440 472 498 Expenditures Current 356 377 392 415 445 478 Development 111 105 104 125 145 145 Total expenditures 4 466 482 496 540 590 623 TOTAL - 39 -81 -58 -100 -118 -125 For value of the Bahraini dinar — see Glossary. 2 Projected. 3 n.a. — not available. 4 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 16. Table 15. Bahrain: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 1984-89 1984 1986 1988 1989 Crude oil production (in barrels per day) 39,835.0 39,578.0 39,595.0 39,033.0 Natural gas production (in millions of cubic meters per day) 15.2 19.9 19.9 20.5 Petroleum products exports (in millions of United States dollars) 2,712.0 1,970.0 1,774.0 2,129.0 Refinery capacities (in thousands of barrels per day) 250.0 250.0 250.0 250.0 Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 11. 392 Appendix Table 16. Bahrain: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1982-90 (in millions of Bahraini dinars at constant 1985 prices) 1 Sector 1982 1984 1985 1986 1990 Agriculture and fishing 22.2 20.3 19.9 20.0 14.3 Mining and quarrying 309.2 364.1 390.5 355.7 323.9 154.6 153.1 140.7 205.9 252.7 Electricity, gas, and water 17.9 24.4 25.8 23.3 28.7 123.0 166.5 133.7 115.3 94.1 Wholeasale and retail trade, restaurants, and hotels 202.5 136.2 119.2 111.6 147.9 Transportation and communications 142.0 174.3 167.1 143.0 140.2 Financial institutions and insurance 283.0 240.4 227.8 289.6 } 192.5 Real estate and business services 83.3 91.2 81.5 80.7 Other services 41.6 48.9 53.4 51.3 78.9 Government services 203.0 228.2 243.3 243.8 314.3 GDP at factor cost 1,582.3 1,647.6 1,602.9 1,640.2 1.587.5 2 1 For value of the Bahraini dinar — see Glossary. 2 GOP at current prices, 1990. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 8; and "Bahrain: Statistical Survey," in The Middle East and North Africa, 1994, London, 1993, 294. 393 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 17. Bahrain: Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1984-89 1 (in millions of United States dollars) 1984 1986 1988 1989 Merchandise exports, f.o.b 3,204.0 2,199,5 2,411.4 2,831.1 -3,131.6 - 2,164.6 - 2,334.0 - 2,820.2 Trade balance 72.3 34.8 77.4 10.9 812 o olo.o HCA A /04.4 oyy.o 872.9 Imports of services -555.1 -327.1 - 529.3 - 559.8 Inflows of IPD 4 335.6 277.9 263.0 494.1 Outflows of IPD -447.3 - 675.0 -694.1 -743.6 — 125.5 — Z04.0 — 193.1 - 195.7 Official transfers, net 124.5 120.7 366.5 102.1 Current account balance 218.4 -68.9 189.9 -19.1 Direct investment 140.7 -31.9 222.1 180.9 Other capital - 176.3 -41.8 -448.9 - 362.5 Capital account balance -35.6 -73.7 - 226.8 -181.6 Errors and omissions - 192.8 -36.9 136.7 12.3 Overall balance (- indicates inflow) 10.1 179.4 -99.7 188.5 Change in reserves (- indicates increase) 123.9 170.3 - 103.2 201.7 Figures may not compute to balances because of rounding. 2 f.o.b. — free on board. 3 c.i.f. — cost, insurance, and freight. 4 IPD — interest, profits, and dividends. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 20. 394 Appendix Table 18. Bahrain: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1988, and 1989 (in percentages) Country 1987 1988 1989 Exports Saudi Arabia 16.4 19.7 18.2 15.3 11.4 7.3 Japan 13.4 12.7 5.9 Kuwait 7.6 5.2 4.3 India 6.4 4.0 4.5 South Korea 3.2 4.7 4.0 9 A . . . Z.O Imports 19.2 11.6 12.4 Britain , 18.3 19.6 16.3 Japan 10.5 10.2 10.5 Australia 5.6 6.0 6.9 West Germany 5.3 6.2 6.9 Italy 3.9 4.0 4.7 Saudi Arabia 2.6 4.4 4.7 Excludes oil sector. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 19. 395 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 19. Qatar: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1975-76 to 1988-89 Education Level 1975-76 1979-80 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1988-89 Primary Males Females . . Total primary 11,150 12,452 10,252 11,796 21,402 24,248 15,285 16,014 13,941 14.501 29,226 30,515 16,573 15,271 31,844 48,097 Intermediate Males 2,737 4,328 5,331 5,659 6,028 n.a. Females 2,480 4,032 5,369 5,687 6,003 n.a. Total intermediate... 5,217 8,360 10,700 11,346 12,031 13,875 Secondary Males Females Total secondary Vocational, secular 3 Males Females Total vocational, secular 1,544 2,195 1,086 2,401 2,630 4,596 224 105 269 55 493 160 3,201 3,139 3,588 3,776 6,789 6,915 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 220 204 3,224 n.a. 4,251 n.a. 7,475 8,303 s n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 294 924 4 Vocational, religious Males 200 287 350 377 406 n.a. Females _0 _0 _0 n.a. Total vocational, religious 200 287 350 377 406 n.a. University of Qatar Males 355 722 1,582 1,799 1,875 n.a. Females 428 1,303 2,483 2,822 3,182 n.a. Total University 5,692 s of Qatar 783 2,025 4,065 4,621 5,057 n.a. — not available. 2 Includes intermediate and secondary schools. 3 Females are only admitted to the teacher training schools. 4 Includes secular and religious vocational schools. 5 1987-88. Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundes- amt, Landerbericht Katar, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 29; and "Qatar," in The Middle East and North Africa, 1993, London, 1992, 762. 396 Appendix Table 20. Qatar: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 1985-89 1985 1987 1988 1989 Crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per day) 290.0 291.0 319.0 395.0 Natural gas production, marketed (in billions of cubic meters per day) 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1 Crude oil exports 280.0 254.0 305.0 320.0 Oil export revenues (in billions of United States dollars) 3.1 1.8 1 1.7 1 2.0 1 Estimated. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 28. Table 21. Qatar: Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1984 and 1989 (in millions of Qatari riyals at current prices) 1 Sector 1984 1989 Agriculture and fishing 206 238 Oil and natural gas 11,330 7,117 Manufacturing industries 1,829 3,144 Electricity and water 165 368 Building and construction 1,411 1,152 Trade, restaurants, and hotels 1,506 1,457 Transportation and communications 480 667 Finance, insurance, and real estate services 1,919 2,350 Other services 6,162 7,715 TOTAL 257)08 24,208 For value of the Qatari rival — see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 26. 397 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 22. Qatar: Government Budget, Selected Fiscal Years, 1986-91 (in millions of Qatari riyalsj 2 1986 1988 1989 1990 2 1991 3 Revenues 5,884 7,688 9,057 7,786 8,438 Expenditures 8,949 12,694 9,358 9,920 9,911 Capital 1.484 1.689 1,013 1,789 1,795 Total expenditures 10,433 14,383 10,371 11,709 11,706 TOTAL -4,549 -6,695 -1,314 - 3,923 -3,268 1 Fiscal year followed Islamic calendar until 1989, when fiscal year changed to April 1-March 31 in Gregorian calen- dar. 2 For value of the Qatari riyal — see Glossary. 3 Projected. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 33. Table 23. Qatar: Balance of Payments, 1984-89 (in millions of Qatari riyalsj^ 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 2 Exports, f.o.b. 3 12,245 11,277 6,730 7,435 8,045 9,658 Imports, c.i.f. 4 - 4.230 -4.147 - 4.000 -4.128 -4.613 - 4.827 Trade balance 8,015 7,130 2,730 3,307 3,432 4,831 Services and private transfers, net - 4.995 -5,132 -3.417 - 3.923 -4.382 -4.977 Current account balance 3,020 1,998 -687 -616 -950 -146 Capital account balance - 2,005 - 2,360 -1,085 -1,031 - 1,286 -92 Change in reserves (- indicates increase) -1,015 362 1,772 1,647 2,236 238 For value of the Qatari riyal — see Glossary. Provisional. f.o.b. — free on board. c.i.f.— cost, insurance, and freight. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 36. 398 Appendix Table 24. Qatar: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1988, and 1989 (in percentages,) 1987 1988 1989 Exports 39.6 50.0 54.4 Singapore 13.5 10.0 4.0 South Korea 3.1 2.1 3.6 2.9 3.3 2.8 Saudi Arabia 2.6 2.8 2.5 United Arab Emirates 2.2 2.1 3.4 9 9 o.u Imports Japan 16.3 17.6 18.8 Britain 16.0 13.8 11.6 United States 11.9 9.3 8.8 West Germany 7.1 7.9 7.3 Italy 4.9 4.3 7.8 France 4.3 4.0 4.7 United Arab Emirates 3.0 3.1 4.4 Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bah- rain, Qatar, 1991-92, London, 1991, 35. Table 25. United Arab Emirates: Official Estimated Population and Population Distribution by Amirate, 1991 Amirate Population Percentage of Total Population Area 1 Density 2 Abu Dhabi 798,000 41.8 67,340 11.9 Ajman 76,000 4.0 259 293.4 Al Fujayrah 63,000 3.3 1,166 54.0 Dubayy 501,000 26.2 3,885 129.0 Ras al Khaymah 130,000 6.8 1,683 77.2 Sharjah 314,000 16.4 2,590 121.2 Umm al Qaywayn 27,000 1.4 777 34.7 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 3 1,909,000 100.0 77,700 24.6 In square kilometers. Excludes islands; approximate only because boundary with Saudi Arabia is undemarcated. 2 Inhabitants per square kilometer. Excludes islands. 3 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from 'The United Arab Emirates," in The Middle East and North Africa, 1993, London, 1992, 933. 399 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 26. United Arab Emirates: Enrollment by Education Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1980-81 to 1986-87 Education Level 1980-81 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 Primary Males 46,300 65,900 71,600 78,800 85,300 42,300 60.800 66.100 73.300 80.200 Total primary 88,600 126,700 137,700 152,100 165,500 Secondary Males 17,400 27,200 29,100 31,600 34,300 Females 14,500 24.100 27,000 29.900 33.300 31,900 51,300 56,100 61,500 67,600 Teacher training 422 615 607 604 638 Quran schools 1,770 1.930 1 n.a. 2 n.a. n.a. Higher education, university 1,393 2,854 2,851 3,152 3,295 Females 1.126 2.761 3.475 3.988 4.559 Total higher education, university 2,519 5,615 6,326 7,140 7,854 Higher education, other 35 14 30 50 n.a. 180 238 500 450 n.a. Total higher 215 252 530 500 n.a. Figures for 1982-83. n.a. — not available. Source: Based on information from Germany, Statist! sches Bundesamt, Landerbericht Vereinigte Arabische Emiraten, 1990, Wiesbaden, 1990, 31. 400 Appendix Table 27. United Arab Emirates: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, Selected Years, 1985-91 1985 1987 1989 1990 1991 Crude oil Production 788.0 1,058.0 1,470.0 1,650.0 1,946.0 Dubayy 351.0 365.0 431.0 435.0 434.0 Ras al Khaymah 9.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.8 64.0 45.0 35.0 37.0 25.0 Total production 1,212.0 1,495.0 1,946.0 2,132.0 2,405.0 Exports 1 978.0 1,250.0 1,650.0 1,865.0 2,195.0 Export revenues 2 11.8 8.7 11.5 15.0 n.a. 3 Natural gas Production 4 Marketed 13.2 18.9 22.4 22.1 25.9 Nonmarketed 9.2 8.2 7.4 7.7 n.a. Total production 22.4 27.1 29.8 29.8 n.a. Exports 4 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.5 In thousands of barrels per day. 2 In billions of United States dollars. 3 n.a. — not available. 4 In billions of cubic meters. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 16; and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1991, Vienna, 1991, 6, 14, 16. 401 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 28. United Arab Emirates: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1982-87 (in billions of UAE dirhams at current prices) ^ 1982 1983 1985 1986 1987 Agriculture and fishing 1,144 1,198 1,440 1,540 1,596 55,982 46,145 44,707 26,171 32,423 Mining 298 309 309 282 48 9,436 9,584 9,255 7,172 8,151 Electricity and water 1,851 1,746 2,143 2,132 2,063 Construction 10,168 10,520 8,882 8,945 8,400 Transportation, storage, and 5,465 4,780 4,224 4,582 4,746 Commerce and hotels 10,913 9,701 8,715 9,385 9,625 Finance and insurance 4,741 5,520 5,154 5,447 5,404 Real estate 6,634 6,587 5,176 4,525 4,672 Government services 9,632 9,847 11,001 10,542 10,972 Other 1,633 1,854 2,009 2,138 4,038 Less imputed bank service charges -2,243 -2,287 - 1,025 - 1,029 - 1,324 GDP at factor cost 115,654 105,504 101,990 81,832 89,218 For value of the UAE dirham — see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 12. 402 Appendix Table 29. United Arab Emirates: Federal Government Budget, 1987, 1988, and 1989 1 (in millions of UAE dirhamsj 1987 1988 1989 3 Revenues Taxes 473 479 573 9,865 10,950 11,298 Other 2.296 1,442 775 Total revenues 12.634 12.871 12,646 Expenditures Defense 5,827 5,827 5,827 1,773 1,882 1,985 Internal security 1,713 1,697 1,789 Health 912 919 916 670 582 572 Social security 423 420 420 Energy 401 324 329 Agriculture 106 105 96 Other 1.433 1,429 1,330 Total expenditures . 13,258 13,185 13,264 TOTAL* -624 -314 -618 1 As of December 31. 2 For value of the UAE dirham — see Glossary. 3 Provisional. 4 Belived to be exclusively from Abu Dhabi and Dubayy. 5 Financed exclusively from domestic sources. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 26. 403 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 30. United Arab Emirates: Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985-90 1 (in billions of UAE dirhams) 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 Exports, f.o.b. 3 543. 45X) 44/7 571 75.2 Imports, c.i.f. 4 -23.5 -26.0 -31.3 -36.7 -41.1 Trade balance 30.7 19.0 13.4 20.4 34.1 Services, private transfers, and official grants -4.7 -4.8 -4.8 -5.0 5 n.a. 6 Current account balance 26.0 14.2 8.7 14.8 5 n.a. Capital account balance -23.4 -8.0 -6.4 -9.3 n.a. Overall balance 2.6 6.2 2.3 5.5 n.a. 1 Figures may not compute to balances because of rounding. 2 For value of the UAE dirham — see Glossary. 3 f.o.b. — free on board. 4 c.i.f. — cost, insurance, and freight. 5 Unrevised Central Bank figures, which do not agree with revised trade figures. 6 n.a. — not available. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 31-32. 404 Appendix Table 31. United Arab Emirates: Major Trading Partners, 1986, 1988, and 1990 (in percentages) Country 1986 1988 1990 Exports Japan 34.8 30.7 35.1 United States 4.0 3.5 3.7 India 2.3 3.4 2.6 Singapore 0.6 3.6 5.8 South Korea 0.1 3.7 3.5 Oman 0.1 2.7 2.0 Imports Japan 18.3 16.4 14.2 Britain 11.2 9.7 9.6 United States 9.7 9.5 9.5 West Germany 8.6 7.1 9.2 1 France 5.3 3.4 5.2 Italy 4.6 4.5 5.0 1 Includes East Germany, beginning in July. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, 1991-92, London, 1991, 30. 405 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 32. Oman: Enrollment in Government Schools by Education Level and Gender, Selected Academic Years, 1975-76 to 1989-90 Education Level 1975-76 1981-82 1985-86 1988-89 1989-90 Primary Males 39,700 65,400 98,000 122,400 129,300 14,800 36,200 77,500 1 f\G. QAA 106,300 113,700 Total primary 54,500 101,600 175,500 228,700 243,000 Secondary, lower and upper Males 900 12,200 21,600 31,000 35,900 Females 200 4,400 11,100 20,300 25,300 Total secondary, lower and upper 1,100 16,600 32,700 51,300 61,200 Higher education Males 143 1,788 6,971 7,490 9,572 Females 57 696 3,763 7,700 9,689 Total higher education . . . 200 2,484 10,734 15,190 19,261 Source: Based on information from Germany, Statistiches Bundesamt, Landerbericht Oman, 1991, Wiesbaden, 1991, 34. 406 Appendix Table 33. Oman: Government Budget, 1987-92 (in millions of Omani riyalsj 2 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 3 Revenues Oil and gas 1,182 995 1,130 1,588 1,290 1,344 Other 245 203 220 270 281 283 Total revenues . . . 1,428 1,198 1,349 1,859 1,570 1,628 Expenditures Current Defense and national security 584 589 601 742 643 665 Civilian 500 535 600 660 674 625 Interest 73 84 95 92 69 100 Other 67 63 66 75 76 83 Total current 1,223 1,271 1,361 1,570 1,463 1,472 Capital Non-oil 240 204 177 163 241 252 Oil 99 76 94 123 151 157 Lending and equities, net 16 _9 13 14 -1 -6 Total capital 354 289 284 300 390 404 Total expenditures . . . 1,576 1,560 1,645 1,870 1,853 1,876 TOTAL -149 -362 -296 -11 -283 -248 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. For value of the Omani rival — see Glossary. Provisional. Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report, 1991, Mus- cat, 1992,41. 407 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 34. Oman: Balance of Payments, 1987, 1988, and 1990 (in millions of United States dollars) 1987 1988 1990 Merchandise exports, f.o.b 1 3,805 3,342 5,508 Merchandise imports, f.o.b - 1,769 -2,107 -2,519 Trade balance 2,036 1,235 2,989 -558 -824 -949 -694 -720 -874 Current account balance 784 -309 1,166 35 92 141 Other long-term capital of resident official sector -135 181 -403 Other short-term capital of deposit money banks -72 -86 -96 Other short-term capital of other sectors -18 34 -211 Reserves -108 467 -109 Capital account balance -298 688 -678 Errors and omissions, net -486 -379 -488 f.o.b— free on board. Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 1992, Washington, 1993, 520-21. 408 Appendix Table 35. Oman: Major Trading Partners, 1987, 1989, and 1990 (in millions of United States dollars ) Country or Region 1987 1989 1990 Exports Middle East 1,862 3,049 2,984 Asia 454 571 542 Britain 204 158 275 Japan 122 46 96 United States 99 150 168 Africa 61 45 193 West Germany 61 25 31 France 22 26 62 Imports Middle East 433 632 729 Japan 277 354 455 Britain 268 263 308 Asia 186 219 268 West Germany 146 124 130 United States 122 191 251 France , 66 76 115 Africa 2 3 10 Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Sta- tistics, 1992 Annual, Washington, 1992, 309-10. Table 36. Oman: Summary of Oil and Gas Statistics, 1988-91 1988 1989 1990 1991 Crude oil production (in thousands of barrels per day) 621.0 641.0 685.0 708.0 Crude oil exports (in thousands of barrels per day) 580.0 592 .0 628.0 644.0 Natural gas production, gross (in billions of cubic meters) 4.9 5.2 5.2 5.3 Natural gas production, marketed (in billions of cubic meters) 2.1 2.3 2.8 3.1 Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report, 1991, Mus- cat, 1992, 31-32; and Legaz naturel dans le monde, Paris, 1988-91. 409 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 37. Oman: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector, Selected Years, 1987-91 (in millions of Omani riyals at constant 1978 prices ) } Sector 1987 1989 1990 1991 Agriculture 63 75 78 83 Fishing 21 19 19 18 906 1,001 1,071 1,101 5 7 7 8 Natural gas 20 21 22 23 Mining and quarrying 10 10 8 9 Manufacturing 79 81 93 93 Construction 145 111 115 144 Utilities 95 131 157 160 80 90 103 113 Trade, restaurants, and hotels 192 228 257 304 Financial and business services and real estate 226 243 281 271 Government and other services 296 321 332 372 Import duties 16 17 18 22 Less imputed bank service charges -58 -67 -100 -75 GDP at factor cost 2 2,096 2,289 2,461 2,646 For value of the Omani rival — see Glossary. 2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Oman, Annual Report, 1991, Mus- cat, 1992, 146. 410 Appendix Table 38. Kuwait: Major Military Equipment, 1992 Type and Description Army Main battle tanks M-84 Other armored vehicles Ferret reconnaissance BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle M-113 personnel carrier Fahd personnel carrier Artillery M-101 105mm howitzer M-109A2 155mm self-propelled howitzer GCT 155mm self-propelled howitzer. . . . Antitank, guided missiles TOW/improved TOW, some self-propelled Country of Origin In Inventory Yugoslavia Britain Yugoslavia United States Egypt United States -do- France United States 200 n.a. 39 37 44 Navy Missile craft Lurssen 57-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles Germany 1 Lurssen 45-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles -do- 1 Air force Fighter-ground attack A-4TASkyhawk United States 22 F/A18 -do- 8 Fighters Mirage Fl France 15 Counterinsurgency and training Hawk 64 Britain 12 Shorts -do- 16 Helicopters AS-332 Super Puma and SA-330 Puma France 13 SA-342 Gazelle with HOT -do- 16 1 n.a. — not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 113-14; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 391. 411 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 39. Bahrain: Major Military Equipment, 1992 Type and Description Country of In Origin Inventory Army Main battle tanks M-60A3 United States 81 Other armored vehicles AML-90 reconnaissance France 22 AT-105 Saxon Britain 10 PanhardM-3 France 110 Artillery 105mm light Britain 8 155mm M-198 United States 14 Antitank guided missiles BGM-7 1 A-TO W -do- 15 Navy Corvettes Lurssen 62-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles Germany 2 Missile craft Lurssen 45-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles -do- 4 Patrol craft Lurssen 38-meter -do- 2 Air force Fighter-ground attack F-5E/F United States 12 Fighters F-16C/D -do- 12 Helicopters AB-212 Agusta-Bell (8 armed) Italy and 12 United States Bo-105 (armed) Germany 4 Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 105-6; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 37. 412 Appendix Table 40. Qatar: Major Military Equipment, 1992 Type and Description Co " ntr > ' of , * 3V r Origin Inventory Army Main battle tanks AMX-30 France 24 Other armored vehicles AMX-lOP infantry fighting vehicle -do- 30 VAB, wheeled armored personnel carrier -do- 160 Artillery G5 155mm howitzer South Africa 12 AMX Mk F-3 155mm, self-propelled France 6 Antitank guided missiles Milan -do- 100 HOT (mounted on VAB) -do- 24 Navy Missile craft La Combattante III, 56-meter, each with 8 Exocet missiles France 3 Patrol craft Inshore, Vosper Thornycroft 33-meter Britain 6 Air force Fighter-ground attack and training Alpha Jet France and 6 Germany Fighters Mirage Fl France 12 Attack helicopters SA-342L Gazelle with HOT -do- 12 Commando MK3 with Exocet missile Britain 8 Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 119-20; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 508. 413 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 41. United Arab Emirates: Major Military Equipment, 1992 Type and Description Army Tanks AMX-30 OF-40 Mk 2 Lion Scorpion, light Reconnaissance vehicles AML-90 Armored personnel carriers and fighting vehicles AMX-10P VCR PanhardM-3 EE-llUrutu Artillery and rocket launchers 105mm 130mm 155mm Mk F-3 self-propelled howitzers G-6 155mm howitzers FIROS 25 122mm multiple rocket launchers Antitank guided missiles Milan HOT, self-propelled Vigilant TOW Country of Origin In Inventory France Italy Britain France -do- -do- -do- Brazil Various -do- France South Africa Italy France -do- Britain United States 95 36 76 90 15 50 240 100 77 20 20 40 40 230 20 n.a. 1 25 Navy Corvettes Lurssen 62-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles, Crotale SAM, 76mm gun, and SA-316 Alouette helicopter Missile craft Lurssen 50-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles . . . Lurssen 45-meter, each with 4 Exocet missiles . . . Inshore patrol Vosper Thornycroft 33-meter Air force Fighter-ground attack Mirage III Hawk Mk 63 Fighters Mirage 5 AD Mirage 2000 EA Germany -do- -do- Britain France Britain France -do- 414 Appendix Table 41. United Arab Emirates: Major Military Equipment, 1992 Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory Counterinsurgency Aermacchi MB-326, MB-339A . . . . Italy 11 Reconnaissance Mirage 2000 . . . . France 8 Mirage 5-R -do- 3 Early warning CasaC212 Aviocar . . . . Spain 4 Helicopters AS-332F Super Puma with Exocet missile . . . . France 2 SA-342K Gazelle with HOT -do- 10 SA-316/319Alouettem -do- 7 Air defense missiles 5 batteries 2 Rapier . . . . Britain 12 Crotale . . . . France 8 RBS-70 13 n.a. — not available. 2 Being formed. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 125; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 714. 415 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Table 42. Oman: Major Military Equipment, 1992 Type and Description Army Tanks M-60A1/A3 Chieftain Scorpion (light) VBC-90 (light) Armored personnel carriers VAB PC and VAB VCI Artillery 105mm and 130mm guns, towed Antitank guided missiles TOW Milan Navy Fast attack craft Province-class 56-meter, one with 6 and three with 8 Exocet missiles Brook Marine 37-meter, each with 76mm gun Inshore patrol craft Vosper Thornycroft 25-meter Country of Origin In Inventory United States Britain -do- France -do- Various United States France Britain -do- -do- Air force Fighter-ground attack Jaguar Mk 1 -do- 15 Hunter FGA-73 -do- 10 Counterinsurgency and training BAC-167Strikemaster -do- 12 BN-2 Defender -do- 7 Helicopters Agusta-Bell 205, 206,212, and 214 (transport) Italy and 36 United States Air defense missiles Rapier Britain 28 Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 118-19; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992, 456. 416 Bibliography Chapter 1 Abu Saud, Abeer. 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Thunder in the Desert: The Strategy and Tactics of the Persian Gulf War. New York: Bantam, 1991. 430 Bibliography Braun, Ursula. "The Gulf Cooperation Council's Security Role." Pages 252-67 in B.R. Pridham (ed.), The Arab Gulf and the Arab World. London: Croom Helm, 1988. Capps, Alan P. "Gullivers and Lilliputians in the Mideast," Defense and Diplomacy, 9, Nos. 9-10, August-September 1991, 47-50. Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulf and the West: Strategic Relations and Military Realities. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1990-91. (Ed., Gerald R. Copley.) Alexandria, Virginia: International Media, 1990. Dickey, Christopher. Expats: Travels in Arabia, from Tripoli to Tehran. New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1990. Diller, Daniel C. (ed.). The Middle East. (7th ed.) Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1991. DMS Market Intelligence Reports: Foreign Military Markets: Middle East and Africa. Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group, 1989. Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Bahrain, Qatar, 1991-92. London: 1991. . Country Profile: Kuwait, 1991-92. London: 1991. . Country Profile: Oman, Yemen, 1991-92. London: 1991. . Country Profile: United Arab Emirates, 1991-92. London: 1991. Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapo- lis: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Fulghum, David A. "Allied Air Power, Forward Controllers Back Arabs to Make Their Drive Succeed," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 134, No. 16, April 22, 1991, 71-73. Gazir, Schlomo, and Zeev Eytan. The Middle East Military Bal- ance, 1988-1989. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989. Graz, Liesl. The Turbulent Gulf. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. Hameed, Mazher A. Saudi Arabia: The West and the Security of the Gulf. London: Croom Helm, 1986. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93. (Ed., Richard Sharpe.) Alexan- dria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group, 1992. Kechichian, Joseph A. "Oman and the World," American-Arab Affairs, No. 35, Winter 1990-91, 135-50. Keegan,John (ed.). World Armies. Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. 431 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Kuwait. Ministry of Information. Kuwait: Facts and Figures, 1992. Kuwait: 1992. McNaugher, Thomas L. Arms and Oil: Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985. Meacham, Jim. "A New Middle East Security Equation," Defense andDiplomacy, 9, Nos. 11-12, November 1991, 43-46. The Middle East. (7th ed.) Washington: Congressional Quar- terly, 1991. The Military Balance, 1992-1993. London: International Insti- tute for Strategic Studies, 1992. Oman. Ministry of Information. Oman, 1989. Muscat: 1989. Peterson, Erik R. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. Peterson, John E. Defending Arabia. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. Peterson, John E. (ed.). Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Work- shop Papers. Washington: Defense Academic Research Sup- port Program and Middle East Institute, 1988. Ramazani, R.K. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988. Sciolino, Elaine. The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis. New York: Wiley, 1991. Tetreault, Mary Ann. "Kuwait: The Morning After," Current His- tory, 91, No. 561, January 1992, 6-10. Tusa, Francis. "Defense No Longer 'Business as Usual' in UAE," Armed Forces fournal International, 128, No. 6, January 1991, 18-19. United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990. Washington: GPO, 1991. . Department of Defense. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, FY 1992. Washington: 1991. . Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991. (Report submitted to United States Con- gress, 102d, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Commit- tee on Foreign Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.) Washington: GPO, 1992. . Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990. Washington: 1991. 432 Bibliography Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. (Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: Congressional Quarterly, Econo- mist [London]; Facts on File, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East, South Asia; Joint Publications Research Service, Near East /South Asia Report; Keesing's Record of World Events [London]; Middle East International [London]; Middle East Journal; New York Times; United States Department of State, Dispatch; and Washington Post.) 433 Glossary Al — Uppercased, it connotes family of, or belonging to, as in Al Sabah, Al Khalifa, Al Thani, Al Nuhayyan, Al Maktum, Al Qasimi, and Al Said. Lowercased, it represents the definite article the, as in Ras al Khaymah. amir — Literally, commander. In many of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, amir often means ruler or prince. amirate — Political entity under the rule of an amir. Analogous to a shaykhdom and, if an independent state, to a king- dom. Bahraini dinar (BD) — Consists of 1,000 fils. Bahrain has main- tained a fixed exchange rate according to which in 1993 US$1 equaled BD0.376. barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum products is frequently measured in barrels per day. A bar- rel is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to tons depends on the density of the specific product. About 7.3 barrels of average crude oil weigh one ton. Heavy crude is about seven barrels per ton. Light products, such as gasoline and kerosene, average close to eight barrels per ton. downstream — The oil industry views the production, process- ing, transportation, and sale of petroleum products as a flow process starting at the wellhead. Downstream includes any stage between the point of reference and the sale of products to the consumer. Upstream (q.v.) is the converse. gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as one year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and investment are included because the values of primary and intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at fac- tor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. See also 435 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies gross national product (GNP). gross national product (GNP) — The gross domestic product (q.v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transac- tions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measure- ment of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indi- rect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsi- dies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies. hadith — Tradition based on the precedent of Muhammad's words and deeds that serves as one of the sources of Islamic law (sharia). hijra — Literally, to migrate, to sever relations, to leave one's tribe. Throughout the Muslim world, hijra refers to the migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers to Medina. In this sense, the word has come into European languages as hegira. The year of Muhammad's hijra consti- tutes the beginning of the Islamic calendar. ibn — Literally, son of; bint means daughter of; and bani is liter- ally sons of, hence clan or tribe. imam — Word used in several senses. In general use, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond sufficient education to carry out this function. It is also used figura- tively by many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean the leader of the Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.) the word takes on many complex meanings; in general, however, and par- ticularly when uppercased, it indicates that particular descendant of the Party of Ali who is believed to be God's designated repository of the spiritual authority inherent in that line. The identity of this individual and the means of ascertaining his identity have been major issues causing divisions among Shia. Among the Ibadis of Oman, the imam was elected to office and was regarded by all as the spiritual leader of the community and by some as the tem- poral ruler as well. Claims of various Omani imams to sec- ular power led to open rebellions as late as the 1950s. import-substitution industrialization — An economic develop- ment strategy that emphasizes the growth of domestic industries, often by import protection using tariff and non- 436 Glossary tariff measures. Proponents favor the export of industrial goods over primary products. International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsi- ble for stabilizing international exchange rates and pay- ments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and devel- oping countries) when they experience balance of pay- ments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. jihad — The struggle to establish the law of God on earth, often interpreted to mean holy war. Kuwaiti dinar (KD) — The national currency, consisting of 1,000 fils. The exchange rate of the Kuwaiti dinar to the United States dollar has fluctuated somewhat; in May 1993 the exchange rate was US$1 = KD0.30. majlis — Tribal council; in some countries the legislative assem- bly. Also refers to an audience with an amir (q.v.) or shaykh (q.v.) open to all citizens. Omani rial (RO) — Monetary unit of Oman, divided into 1,000 baizas. Oman has maintained a fixed exchange rate according to which in 1993 US$1 equaled RO0.3845. Qatari riyal (QR) — The national currency consisting of 100 dirhams. Qatar has maintained a fixed exchanged rate according to which in 1993 US$1 equaled QR3.64. shaykh — Leader or chief. Applied either to a political leader of a tribe or town or to a learned religious leader. Also used as an honorific. Shia (from Shiat Ali, or Party of Ali) — A member of the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia supported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate and leadership of the world Muslim community, and on this issue they divided from the Sunnis (q.v.) in the major schism within Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions among the Shia over the identity and number of imams (q.v.). Most Shia revere twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be in hiding. See also Twelve Imam Shia. 437 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies special drawing rights (SDR) — An International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.) unit of account made up of a basket of major international currencies consisting of the United States dollar, the German deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the British pound sterling, and the French franc. Sunni — The larger of the two great divisions of Islam. The Sun- nis, who rejected the claims of Ali's line, believe that they are the true followers of the sunna, the guide to proper behavior composed of the Quran and the hadith (q.v.). Twelve Imam Shia — The majority group among Shia (q.v.), who believe that the Imamate began with Ali, the fourth caliph, or successor ruler, in Islam. The line continued through his sons until the Twelfth Imam, who is believed to have ascended to a supernatural state to return to earth on Judgment Day. UAE dirham (Dh) — National currency of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), consisting of 100 fils. The UAE has main- tained a fixed exchange rate according to which in 1993 US$1 equaled Dh3.67l. ulama — Collective term for Muslim religious scholars. upstream — The converse of downstream (q.v.), it includes the exploration and drilling of wells in the petroleum produc- tion process. Wahhabi — Name used outside Saudi Arabia to designate adherents to Wahhabism (q.v.). Wahhabism — Name used outside Saudi Arabia to designate official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia. The faith is a puritanical concept of unitarianism (the oneness of God) that was preached by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wah- hab, whence his Muslim opponents derived the name. The royal family of Qatar and most indigenous Qataris are Wahhabis (q.v.). World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four affiliated international institutions that provide advice and assistance on long-term finance and policy issues to develop- ing countries: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary 438 Glossary purpose the provision of loans at market-related rates of interest to developing countries at more advanced stages of development. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The MIGA, which began operating in 1988, insures private for- eign investment in developing countries against various noncommercial risks. The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capi- tal. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.u). 439 Index Abbas I, 20 Abbasid Dynasty, 154; persecution of imams under, 14 Abd al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn, 24 Abduh, Muhammad, 1 65 abortion, 268 Abu Bakr, 1 1 Abu Dhabi (see also United Arab Emir- ates), 22; aid from, 238, 304; armed forces of, 361 , 362; border disputes of, 207, 246-47, 330; budget contributions by, 203, 236, 237; customs duties of, 238; education in, 210; electricity in, 228; exports by, 227; foreign aid from, 238; gas reserves in, 219; industry in, 226, 227; land area of, 204; oil in, 30, 168, 203, 216, 219-21, 226; as member of OPEC, 218; political options for, 33; population of, 209; representatives from, to Federal National Council, 241-42; ruling family in, 30, 243; sup- port of, for Iraq, 248, 365; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203 Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (Adco) (see also Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company; Trucial Coast Development Oil Company) , 220 Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, 238 Abu Dhabi Gas Industries, 221 Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company, 221 Abu Dhabi International Airport, 230 Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, 221 Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (ADMA), 220 Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Operating Company (ADMA-Opco) , 220 Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (AD- NOC), 219, 227, 244; established, 221; production, 221 Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution, 221 Abu Dhabi National Tankers Company, 230 Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) (see also Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations; Trucial Coast Development Oil Company), 220 Abu Hanifa, An Numan ibn Thabit, 1 3 Abu Musa (island): dispute over, xxvi, 248-49, 329 Abu Safah oil field, 127 Abu Zaby. See Abu Dhabi Adco. See Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations Ad Diriyah, 24 ADMA. See Abu Dhabi Marine Areas ADMA-Opco. See Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Operating Company Administrative Council (Bahrain), 137 Administrative Development Institute, 212 Adnan tribe, 37-38 ADNOC. See Abu Dhabi National Oil Company ADPC. See Abu Dhabi Petroleum Com- pany Advisory Council (Qatar): created, xxiv; members of, 183, 185-86; role of, 185 Afghanistan: materiel from, 356; Soviet invasion of, 247; workers from, 203 Africa: imams in, 19; Omani rule in, 22- 23, 297-98; spread of Islam into, 17; workers from, 52, 208-9, 263 Agha Khan, Karim al Husayni, 16 agriculture: in Bahrain, 122-23, 135; in Kuwait, 67-68; in Oman, xxvii, 258, 269, 281-84; in Qatar, 161, 177-78; in United Arab Emirates, 215, 232-33, 237 AGU. See Arabian Gulf University Ahmad al Jabir Air Base, 343 Ahmadiyyah School (Kuwait) , 55 AID. See United States Agency for Inter- national Development air bases: of Bahrain, 352; of Kuwait, 342, 343; of Oman, 374 air force of Bahrain: materiel of, 352; personnel strength of, 350 air force of Kuwait, 340, 342-44; in Per- sian Gulf War, 345 air force of Oman, 370, 372 air force of Qatar, 355-56 441 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies air force of United Arab Emirates, 362, 364 airports: in Oman, 269, 289, 375 Ajman (see also United Arab Emirates), 22, 246; industry in, 227; oil in, 222, 223; political options for, 33; popula- tion of, 209; representatives from, to Federal National Council, 241-42; rul- ing family in, 30-31, 243; schools in, 210; as trading center, 26; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203 Akhbar al KhaUj (Gulf News), 143 AlAhsa, 18 AlAlusi, 165 AlAnba (News), 87 AlArab (The Arab), 191 Al Awir, 232 AlAyam (The Days) , 143 Al Ayn: hospitals in, 212; population of, 209 Al Ayn International Airport, 230 Alba. Se^ Aluminum Bahrain Al Batinah coast, 207, 259, 261; agricul- ture in, 282; climate in, 262; electricity in, 293; religion in, 209, 264 AlBayan (The Official Report), 246 Al Bida, 154 Al Bunduq oil field (Qatar), 168 Al Buraymi Oasis, 207; agriculture in, 215; British occupation of, 313, 368; development in, 315; dispute over, 247, 313, 330-31, 368; industrial estate planned for, 288; population of, 209; religion in, 209 Al Burqan oil field (Kuwait) , 59; natural gas refinery in, 61 Alexander the Great, 48; conquests by, 8 Al Fujayrah (see also United Arab Emir- ates), 22, 207, 246; agriculture in, 232; industry in, 227; oil exploration in, 223; political options for, 33; popula- tion of, 209; representatives from, to Federal National Council, 241-42; rul- ing family in, 31 , 243; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203 Al Fujayrah International Airport, 230 Al Fuwayrit, 154 Al Hajar al Gharbi Mountains, 207, 227, 261 Al Hajar ash Sharqi Mountains, 207, 261 Al Hajar Mountains, 259 AlHisn, 301 Al Huwayla, 154 Al Huwaysah oil field (Oman), 275 Ali as Salim Air Base, 343 Ali ibn Abu Talib, 11, 12, 14, 16; Imam Ali, 15 Allttihad (Unity), 246 Al Jabal al Akhdar, 260, 261-62; agricul- ture in, 282; climate in, 262-63; miner- als in, 286 Aljahrah,51 Aljalahima, 154-57 Aljalahima, Rahman ibnjabir, 157 Al Jufayr: port of, 352-53 Aljulandaibn Masud, 19 Al Kamil: minerals in, 286 Al Khalifa, xxiii, 154-57, 329; conflicts of, with Al Thani, xxiv; dynastic feuding among, 111; expansion of, 25; in gov- ernment positions, 136, 137; landown- ership by, 123; migration of, to Bahrain, 74, 157; religious affiliation of, 1 13; as ruling family, 23, 30, 36, 39, 111, 137, 329; succession in, 111, 136- 37; threats to, 26; in trucial system, 26; wars of, 157 Al Khalifa, Abd Allah ibn Khalid, 137 Al Khalifa, Abd Allah ibn Salman, 350 Al Khalifa, Ahmad ibn Muhammad, 111 Al Khalifa, Ali ibn Khalifa, 1 1 1 Al Khalifa, Hamad ibn Isa, 112, 136, 159, 350 Al Khalifa, Isa ibn Ali, 111 Al Khalifa, Isa ibn Salman, 111, 120, 134, 136, 137, 350 Al Khalifa, Khalifa ibn Ahmad, 112, 137, 350 Al Khalifa, Khalifa ibn Salman, 112, 137 Al Khalifa, Muhammad ibn Khalifa, 137 Al Khalifa, Muhammad ibn Mubarak, 137 Al Khalifa, Salman ibn Hamad, 111, 112, 119-20 Al Khasab: industrial estate planned for, 288; radio in, 291 Al Khasab Air Base, 372 Al Khuwayr, 154 Al Khuwayr oil field (Oman), 275, 278 Al Liwa Oasis, 207, 243; agriculture in, 215, 233 Al Maktum: as ruling family, 31, 243 Al Maktum, Muhammad ibn Rashid, 244, 362 442 Index Al Maktum, Rashid ibn Said, 244 Al Maktum, Said ibn Maktum, 244 Al Maktum Hospital, 212 Al Mamun, 14 Al Mana family, 189 Al Man amah. See Manama Al Mualla: as ruling family, 31, 243 Al Mualla, Rashid ibn Ahmad, 246 Al Mubarraz, port of, 221 Al Muharraq (city), 117; population of, 119 Al Muharraq (island): air force base on, 352 Al Musallah, 227 Al Nuaimi: as ruling family, 30, 243 Al Nuaimi, Humayd ibn Rashid, 246 Al Nuhayyan, 243-44; as ruling family, 30, 243 Al Nuhayyan, Hamdan ibn Muhammad, 244 Al Nuhayyan, Khalifa ibn Zayid, 219, 243, 362 Al Nuhayyan, Muhammad ibn Khalifa, 243 Al Nuhayyan, Sarur ibn Zayid, 244 Al Nuhayyan, Shakhbut, 243 Al Nuhayyan, Tahnun ibn Muhammad, 243 Al Nuhayyan, Zayid ibn Sultan, 211, 236, 243, 361,362 Al Qabas (Firebrand), 87 Al Qasimi: attacks by British on, 25-26, 244, 323; attacks on British shipping by, xx, 323; religion of, 25; as ruling family, 24, 31, 33, 243, 244-46; threats to, 26 Al Qasimi, Abd al Aziz, 245 Al Qasimi, Khalid ibn Saqr, 244, 246 Al Qasimi, Saqr ibn Muhammad, 244-45, 246 Al Qasimi, Saqr ibn Sultan, 246 Al Qasimi, Sultan ibn Muhammad, 244, 245 Al Sabah, 111; criticism of, 78; diplomacy of, 74; exile of, during Persian Gulf War, 78, 94; in government positions, 79, 101, 342, 346; influence of, xxi; pearling by, 74; relationship of, with Britain, 74; relationship of, with Kuwaiti society, 79; as ruling family, 23, 30, 36, 47, 54, 73-79, 81, 101, 340; trade by, 74 Al Sabah, Abd Allah 11,74 Al Sabah, Abd Allah as Salim, 75, 84, 89 Al Sabah, Ahmad al Jabir, 59, 75 Al Sabah, Ali al Khalifa, 101 Al Sabah, Ali as Sabah as Salim, 342 Al Sabah, Jabir, 74 Al Sabah, Jabir al Ahmad al Jabir, 47, 75; accession of, 78, 79; assassination attempt on, 78; legislature under, 82 Al Sabah, Jabir branch of, xxi, 101 Al Sabah, Mubarak (the Great), xxi, 56, 74; concessions granted by, to Britain, 58; relations of, with Britain, 87, 89; succession to, 74-75 Al Sabah, Nawwaf al Ahmad, 101 Al Sabah, Saad al Abd Allah, xxiii, 84 Al Sabah, Saad al Abd Allah as Salim: as crown prince, 47, 78, 79; as prime minister, 47 Al Sabah, Sabah al Ahmad, xxiii, 84, 101 Al Sabah, Sabah as Salim, 75; legislature under, 82; succession to, 78 Al Sabah, Salim, 74 Al Sabah, Salim al Abd al Aziz, 98 Al Sabah, Salim as Salim, 101 Al Sabah, Salim branch of, xxi, 101 Al Said, 22; division of, 28-29, 297; founding of, 296; influence of, 24; role of, in government, 306; as ruling family, 31, 306; succession in, 307, 375 Al Said, Ahmad ibn Said, 22, 297 Al Said, Fahar ibn Taimur, 306, 307, 370 Al Said, Fahd ibn Mahmud, 306, 307 Al Said, Faisal ibn Ali, 306, 307 Al Said, Faisal ibn Turki, 298, 299 Al Said, Haitham ibn Tariq, 307 Al Said, Qabus ibn Said (sultan), 257, 262, 298, 301, 302-10; accession of, xxvi, 35, 258, 302, 369; background of, 301-2, 369; economic development under, xxvi, 258, 269; government posts of, 310, 370; modernization under, xxvi, 269; succession to, 375 Al Said, Qais ibn Tariq, 289 Al Said, Said ibn Ahmad, 23 Al Said, Said ibn Muhammad, 299 Al Said, Said ibn Sultan, 297-98 Al Said, Said ibn Taimur, 262, 298, 300- 302, 368; forced to abdicate, 35, 302, 369; isolationism under, 34 Al Said, Sayyid Said ibn Sultan, 23, 28, 443 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 157 Al Said, Shabib ibn Taimur, 307 AI Said, Sultan ibn Ahmad, 297 Al Said, Taimur ibn Faisal, 298, 300 Al Said, Tariq ibn Taimur, 306, 307 Al Said, Thuwaini ibn Said, 307 Al Said, Turki ibn Said, 298 Al Saud: threats from, 26 Al Saud, Khalid ibn Sultan ibn Abd al Aziz (general), 327 Al Sharqi, 246; as ruling family, 31 , 243 Al Sharqi, Hamad ibn Muhammad, 246 Al Thani, 188-89, 329; British assistance to, 28; business interests of, 190; con- flicts in, 190; conflicts of, with Al Khal- ifa, xxiv; control of government by, xxiv-xxv, 161, 183-85; control of mili- tary by, 356; expansion of, 25; as rul- ing family, 24, 30, 153, 170; succession in, 159 Al Thani, Abd al Aziz ibn Ahmad, 166-67 Al Thani, Abd Allah ibn Qasim, 159, 168; abdication of, 160; treaty of, with Brit- ain, xxiv, 158 Al Thani, Ahmad ibn Ali, 166, 355; acces- sion of, 161; deposed, 162, 188-89 Al Thani, Ali ibn Abd Allah, 159, 166, 170, 176, 188; abdication of, 160 Al Thani, Hamad ibn Abd Allah, 159, 165 Al Thani, Hamad ibn Khalifa, 355 Al Thani, Khalifa ibn Hamad, 153, 159, 355; accession of, 162, 188-89; as heir apparent, 160; political power of, 161; as prime minister, 161; social reforms under, 167 Al Thani, Muhammad ibn Thani, 158 Al Thani, Qasim ibn Muhammad, 158 Al Thani, Suhaym ibn Hamad, 190 Al Ubaid culture, 154 Aluminium Bahrain (Alba), 129 aluminum processing: in Bahrain, xxiii, 112; in Dubayy, 226; in Qatar, 175 Al Wafrah oil field (Kuwait) , 62 Al Wakrah: attack by, on Doha, 157; pop- ulation of, 164; port of, 162 Al Wasl Hospital (Dubayy), 213 Al Watan (The Nation), 312 Amal oil field (Oman), 275, 277 American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), 59; nationalized, 62 American Mission Hospital, 122, 212 American Oil Company (Amoco), 222, 276 American Petroleum Institute (API) rat- ings, 168 American University of Beirut, 121 Aminoil. See American Independent Oil Company amir, 39 Amiri Hospital, 56 Amnesty International, 355 Amoco. See American Oil Company Amoco Sharjah, 222 Anglo-Ottoman Convention (1913), 89- 90 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) (see also British Petroleum; Kuwait Oil Company): concession in Kuwait, 58; concession in Oman, 274; concession in Qatar, 159, 167, 168; oil exploration by, 58; oil production by, 29 An Najaf, 15 AOC. See Arabian Oil Company API. See American Petroleum Institute APOC. See Anglo-Persian Oil Company Arabia: control of, 1 7 Arabian American Oil Company ( Aram co ) , 59 Arabian Gulf University (AGU), 121 Arabian Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church, 122 Arabian Oil Company (AOC), 60 Arabian Sea, 3, 259 Arabic: broadcasts in, 87, 132, 134, 179, 230; education in, 165; publications in, 143, 191,246, 312 Arab-Israeli dispute, 333 Arab League. See League of Arab States Arabsat. See Arab Satellite Communica- tion Organization Arab Satellite Communication Organiza- tion (Arabsat): in Bahrain, 132; in Kuwait, 69; in Oman, 291; in Qatar, 179; in United Arab Emirates, 232 Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (ASRY), 119, 129 Arab Times, 87 Aram co. See Arabian American Oil Com- pany archaeological research, 4-7, 8, 154, 323 armed forces: attempts to improve, xxviii; joint military exercises of, xxviii; limits on, 331; military capabili- 444 Index ties of, 337-40; in Persian Gulf War, xxviii armed forces of Bahrain (Bahrain Defense Force): commander of, 136, 350; mission of, 350; subsidy for, 369; women in, 339-40 armed forces of Kuwait, 337-46; indigeni- zation of, xxii; joint training exercises of, xxii, 92 armed forces of Oman, 310, 368-71; buildup of, xxviii, 315; modernization of, 315; women in, 339-40 armed forces of Qatar, 355-60 armed forces of United Arab Emirates, 361-64; commander of, 241, 243; materiel of, xxvi, 215 army of Bahrain, 350-52, 353 army of Kuwait, 340, 343 army of Oman, 370-71 army of Qatar, 355 army of United Arab Emirates, 362 At Rawdatayn aquifer, 51 At Rawdatayn geological formation, 51 Ar Rayah (The Banner) , 191 ArRay alAmm (Public Opinion), 87 At Rayyan: population of, 164 At Rifaa, 119-20 Ar Rumaylah oil field (Kuwait and Iraq), 89 Ar Rusayl industrial estate, 286 Ar Ruways: industries at, 227; oil refin- ery, 221 Asab oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220, 221 Ash Shariqah. See Sharjah Ash Sharq (The East) ,191 Ash Sharqiyah, 262 Ash Shuaybah aquifer, 51 Ash Shuaybah Industrial Zone, 66; estab- lished, 66 Ash Shuaybah oil refinery, 61 Ash Shuwaykh: port of, 68 Ash Shuwaykh Industrial Zone, 68 Ashurbanipal, 8 Asia: exports to, 272, 286; workers from, 52, 130, 164 ASRY. See Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard As Saffaniyah oil field (Saudi Arabia) , 60 As Salwa Industrial Area, 173 As Sib Air Base, 316, 372 As Sib International Airport, 289, 290 As Sib Naval Base, 371 As Sila oil field, 223 Assyrian Empire: conquests by, 8 Attiyah, Abd Allah Khalid al, 180 Attiyah family, 190 Australia: trade with, 136 Austria: materiel from, 371 awqaf: administration of, 1 2 AZD Enterprises, 289 Az Zahirah, 262 Az Zubarah, 111, 145; Bahrain's claims to, 158, 159, 193, 329; destroyed, 158; founded, 154 Az Zuqum oil field (Abu Dhabi) , 220 Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party, 143, 325,330 Bab oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220, 221 Badi, Muhammad Said al, 362 Bahrain: agriculture in, 117, 122-23, 135; aid from, 210; air bases of, 352; armed forces of, 136, 339-40, 350, 353, 369; attack by, on Doha, 157; banking in, xxiii, 112, 134-35; British troops in, 325; bureaucracy of, 137; censorship in, 143; civil rights in, 139; claim of, to Az Zubarah, 158, 159, 193, 329; claim of, to Hawar and the adjacent islands, xxiv, 117, 159, 162, 329; climate of, 117-18; coup attempt in, 326, 354; courts in, 142, 354; currency of, 134; defense cooperation of, with United States, xxiv; defense spending in, 339, 352; democracy in, xxiii, 36; early con- trol of, 17; economy of, 111, 112, 129, 135, 136; education in, 112, 120-21; elections in, xxiii, 139; embargo by, against Qatar, 159; as entrepot, 26, 135; environmental damage in, 124; external claims to, 28; fishing in, 123- 24; foreign relations of, xxiv, 143-45; foreign residents in, xxiii, 113, 118, 129-30, 144, 215; geography of, 114- 17; in Gulf Cooperation Council, xxiv, 36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; Gulf Cooperation Council subsidy for, 369; health care in, 112, 121-22, 123; housing in, 119; human rights in, 354- 55; independence of, xx, 33, 112, 137, 350; industry in, xxiii, 112, 129; inter- nal security in, 353-55; in Iranian Empire, 111; Iranians in, 35, 329; and Iran-Iraq War, 113, 144, 353; Iran's 445 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies claim to, xxiii, xxiv, 28, 32, 329; Islamic sects in, xxiii, 18, 35; labor in, 113; land in, 119, 123; law in, 142-43; life expectancy in, 118-19, 121; literacy rate in, 120; materiel of, 350-52; media in, 132, 134, 143; migration to, 74, 157; military assistance to, 336, 352; national security of, 140, 144; natural gas in, xxiii, 128; Omani rule of, 22; oil in, xx, xxiii, 29, 30, 112, 114, 117, 124-28, 135-36; pearling in, 111, 112, 124; in Persian Gulf War, xxiv, 328, 353; police force of, 353, 354; political opposition in, 139, 143; population of, 118-20; ports in, 114, 132; relations of, with Britain, xxiv, 26; relations of, with Qatar, xxiv, 28, 144-45, 162, 192-93; relations of, with Saudi Arabia, 142; relations of, with United States, xxiv, 144, 145, 352-53; reads in, 117, 132; ruling family of, xxiii, xxiv, 23, 26, 30, 39, 74, 111, 136-37; security coopera- tion of, 321; social services of, 112, 121, 122; succession in, 111; suffrage in, 139; terrorism in, 353; territorial disputes of, 28; trade by, 1 11, 112, 135- 36; transportation in, 132-34, 179; treaties of, 111; in trucial system, 324; wars of, 111, 323; water in, 117, 118; women in, 339; workforce in, 114, 129- 32 Bahrain Aluminium Extrusion Company (Balexco), 129 Bahrain Defense Force (BDF). farmed forces of Bahrain Bahrain International Airport, 132, 352 Bahrain International School, 120-21 Bahrain Military Hospital, 122 Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA), 134 Bahrain National Gas Company (Bana- gas), 128 Bahrain Petroleum Company (Bapco), 127 Bahrain-Saudi Aluminium Marketing Company (Balco), 129 Bahwan, Suhail, 310 balance of payments: in Bahrain, 136; in Kuwait, 72; in Oman, 272-74; in United Arab Emirates, 365-66 balance of trade: of Bahrain, 136; of United Arab Emirates, 238 Balco. See Bahrain-Saudi Aluminium Marketing Company Balexco. See Bahrain Aluminium Extru- sion Company Baluchis, 263, 371 Banagas. See Bahrain National Gas Com- pany Bandar Jissah, 289 Bangladesh: aid to, 238; workers from, 130, 164, 203, 208 Bani Abd al Qais tribe, 17 Bani Ali tribe, 188 Bani al Murrah tribe, 37 Bani Hamad tribe, 188 Bani Khalid tribe, 47, 89, 188 Bani Utub tribe, xxiii, 23, 111; branches of, 154-57; in Kuwait, 54, 57, 73; migra- tion of, 73, 296; in Qatar, 154 Bani Yas tribe, 243, 244; origins of, 24; in trucial system, 26 Bank Dhofar al Omani al Fransi, 294-95 Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries (Oman), 296 banking: in Bahrain, 112, 134-35; in Kuwait, 69-70, 97-98, 99; in Oman, 291, 293-96; in Qatar, 180; in United Arab Emirates, 218, 234-36 banking, offshore: in Bahrain, xxiii, 134- 35 Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna- tional (BCCI), 218, 236, 294-95 Bank of Muscat, 295 Bank of Oman and the Gulf, 295 Banque Indosuez, 295 Bapco. See Bahrain Petroleum Company Barik gas field (Oman), 280 BCCI. SeeBznk of Credit and Commerce International BDF. See Bahrain Defense Force Bechtel Corporation, 128, 171 beduins: legacy of, xix Birba field (Oman), 280 BMA. See Bahrain Monetary Agency border problems: between Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, 207; between Dubayy and Sharjah, 207, 222; between Iraq and Kuwait, xxii, 89, 90-91; between Oman and Yemen, xxviii, 331, 332, 369; between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, xxv; between Qatar and United Arab Emir- ates, 204 borders {see also boundaries, tribal): demarcation of, 48, 91, 159, 207, 328; 446 Index of Iraq, 48, 89, 91; of Kuwait, 47, 48, 89, 91, 330, 332; of Oman, 3, 204, 369, 375; of Qatar, 163, 204; of Saudi Ara- bia, 48, 163, 204; of United Arab Emir- ates, 163, 204 boundaries, tribal (see also borders), xx, 31,38,328 Britain, 157; advisers from, 160; aid from, 215-16, 257, 300; attacks by, on Al Qasimi, 244, 323; attacks on ships of, xx, 323; competition for trade, 25; control of Trucial Coast foreign affairs by, 74, 203, 323, 340; defense agree- ments of, with Kuwait, xxii, 92, 322, 337; defense agreements of, with Oman, 374; departure of, from Per- sian Gulf, 32; Kuwaiti investment in, 71; in Iran-Iraq War, 340; materiel from, xix, xxii, 300, 342, 356, 364, 371; medical support from, 212; military assistance from, 32, 34, 74, 88, 89, 90, 262, 298, 315, 324, 325, 326, 368; mili- tary officers from, 345, 355, 361, 363; military training by, xix, 304, 339, 340, 346, 372, 375; occupation of Al Buraymi Oasis, 313, 368; oil conces- sions of, 58; oil exploration by, 158-59, 167, 323; payments to, for Persian Gulf War, 218, 365; in Persian Gulf War, 321, 327, 328; Portuguese driven from Persian Gulf by, 20-22; relations of, with Bahrain, xxiv, 145; relations of, with Iran, 313; relations of, with Kuwait, 87-88, 92; relations of, with Oman, xxviii, 28, 34, 299, 313, 314-15; relations of, with Qatar, 160, 193, 355; relations of, with ruling families, xxiv, 28, 31, 39, 74, 87, 89, 158, 328; rule, xix, xx, xxiv; schools built by, 210; sla- very opposed by, 228, 298; study in, 166, 193; trade by, 25-26, 136, 182; treaties of, with Kuwait, 74, 89; treaties of, with ruling families, xx, xxiv, 25-29, 30-31, 58, 111, 157-58, 159, 299, 323, 360-61; workers from, 203 British Airways, 132 British Bank of the Middle East, 134 British East India Company: destruction of Doha by, 157; treaties of, with rul- ing families, xxiv, 74, 157 British Indian Navy, 325 British Petroleum (see also Anglo-Persian Oil Company), 59, 60-61, 62, 220 Bubiyan (island), 47, 91; claims to, 48, 90, 91, 327, 330 budget: of Bahrain, 135; of Oman, 316; of Qatar, 180-82; of United Arab Emir- ates, xxv, 203, 236-38, 239 Bu Hasa oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220, 221 Bukha gas field (Oman) , 280, 281 bureaucracy: in Bahrain, 137; in Kuwait, 79-80; overstaffing of, 80; in Qatar, 160, 161 Bureau des Recherches Geologiques Minieres (France), 286 Bush, George H.W.: assassination attempt on, xxii Buyid Dynasty, 18, 19-20 cabinet: in Bahrain, 137-39; in Kuwait, 79-80, 84, 348; in Oman, 290, 310; in Qatar, xxv, 161, 175, 183, 185; in United Arab Emirates, xxvi, 241 Cable News Network (CNN), 232 camels, 8, 375 Camp David Accords (1979), 315 Canada: in Persian Gulf War, 191, 358; workers from, 209 censorship, in Bahrain, 143; in Kuwait, 87, 101; in Qatar, 183, 187, 191 Central Bank (United Arab Emirates) , 234-35, 237 Central Bank of Kuwait, 69, 98 Central Bank of Oman, 278, 293 CFP. See Compagnie Francaise des Petroles Chase Investment Bank, 271 Chevron Corporation (see also Standard Oil Company of California) , 1 24, 279 China: defense agreements of, with Kuwait, 92; relations of, with Qatar, 194; support of, for Dhofar rebellion, 305; trade with Abu Dhabi, 227; trade with Qatar, 174 Christianity, 9, 17, 164, 209 chromite, 285, 286 Chubu Electrical Power Company, 172- 73 citizenship: in Kuwait, 52, 86, 94; in Qatar, 189-90; qualifications for, 37, 39-40; in United Arab Emirates, 203, 229, 241 civil rights: in Bahrain, 139; in Kuwait, 78, 82, 86; in Qatar, 186, 187 447 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies civil service: in Kuwait, xxi, 80, 100; in Oman, 257, 302 climate: of Bahrain, 117-18; of Kuwait, 48-51, 67; of Oman, 262-63, 282, 293; of Qatar, 163; of United Arab Emir- ates, 207-8 CNN. See Cable News Network College of Health Sciences (Bahrain), 121 colonial rule, 20-24 Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP), 220 Compania Espanola de Petroleos (Span- ish Petroleum Company-Hispanoil) , 221 Constituent Assembly (Bahrain), 137- 39; elections for, xxiii, 137 Constituent Assembly (Kuwait): elec- tions for, 82, 84 Constitutional Movement (Kuwait), 82- 83, 86, 100; formed, 78 constitution, provisional, of Qatar (1970), xxiv, 161, 182-83; rights under, 186, 187, 188 constitution, provisional, of United Arab Emirates (1971), xxv-xxvi, 239-42 constitution of Bahrain (1973), xxiii, 139; armed forces under, 350; judi- ciary under, 142; succession in, 111 constitution of Kuwait (1962), 81-82, 84- 86 Consultative Council (Bahrain), xxiii- xxiv, 140 Consultative Council (Oman) (see also State Consultative Council), 288, 310- 12; created, xxviii, 302, 310 Continental Oil Company, 221 Contingency Fund (Oman), 271, 272 copper, 4, 285-86 Council for Education (Oman) , 265 Council of Ministers (Bahrain), 137-39 Council of Ministers (Kuwait), 348 Council of Ministers (Oman), 290, 310 Council of Ministers (Qatar), xxv, 161, 183,185 Council of Ministers (United Arab Emir- ates) , xxvi, 241 Council on Agriculture, Fisheries, and Industries (Oman), 311-12 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, 348, 376 coup d'etat, attempted: in Bahrain, 326, 354; in Sharjah, 237, 245 Court of Appeal (Bahrain), 142 court system: in Bahrain, 142, 354; in Kuwait, 348; in Oman, 375, 376; in Qatar, 177, 186, 360; in United Arab Emirates, 242, 366-67 Credit and Savings Bank (Kuwait), 69-70 Crescent Oil Company, 222 crime: in Kuwait, 348; in Oman, 375 Criminal Investigation Department (Qatar), 360 criminal justice system {see also court sys- tem; judiciary): of Kuwait, 347-48; of Oman, 375 Criminal Procedures Code (United Arab Emirates), 366 currency: of Bahrain, 134; of Kuwait, 69; of Qatar, 180; of United Arab Emir- ates, 234 Currency Board (Kuwait) , 69 Currency Board (United Arab Emir- ates), 234 Curzon, George Nathaniel, 299 customs duties: of Abu Dhabi, 238; of Dubayy, 238; imposed by GCC, 182; of Oman, 257; of Sharjah, 238 Daimler-Benz, 309; Kuwaiti investment in, 71 Dalma oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220 Damascus Declaration (1991), 92, 336-37 D'Arcy Exploration Company of Britain, 220 Darwish, Abd Allah, 1 89 Darwish, Muhsin Haidar, 310 Darwish family, 189 date palms, 114, 117; cultivation of, 122- 23, 158, 232-33; export of, 122 defense spending, 338-39; in Bahrain, 339, 352; in Oman, 369; in Qatar, 358; in United Arab Emirates, 236, 237, 365 democracy: in Bahrain, xxiii, 36; in Qatar, xxiv democracy movement in Kuwait, 75, 78, 84, 86, 100-101 Democratic Forum, 84, 100 Department of Education (Qatar), 165 Department of Labor (Qatar), 177 Department of Social Services (Abu Dhabi), 243 Department of State (Kuwait), 348 448 Index dhimmis (tolerated subject people), 17 Dhofar Liberation Front, 304 Dhofar rebellion, xxvii, 34, 35, 258, 274, 277, 302-5, 368-69; foreign military assistance against, 34, 35, 314, 315 Dhofar region, 22, 260, 262, 301, 361; agriculture in, 282; climate in, 263; development in, 304; electricity in, 293; factionalization in, 304-5; govern- ment in, 305; governor of, 306; miner- als in, 286; religion in, 264 Dibaal Hisn, 207 Difficult Credit Facilities Resettlement Program, 70 Dilmun, 4, 8, 47, 154 Diqdaqah, 232 Directorate General of Criminal Investi- gation (Oman), 375 Directorate General of Fisheries Resources (Oman), 285 Divided Zone (see also Kuwait-Saudi Ara- bia Neutral Zone) , 48 divorce, 16 Diwan Affairs (Oman), 305 Doha, 153, 157, 162, 163, 164, 178 Doha International Airport, 163, 178 DPC. See Dubai Petroleum Company Dubai. See Dubayy Dubai Aluminum Company (Dubai), 222, 226 Dubai Dry Docks, 226 Dubai Marine Areas (Duma), 221 Dubai Natural Gas Company (Dugas), 222, 226 Dubai Petroleum Company (DPC), 221 Dubai. See Dubai Aluminum Company Dubayy (see also United Arab Emirates), 22; agriculture in, 232; aid to, 215; alu- minum production in, 226; armed forces of, 361, 362; border disputes of, 207, 222, 223; Britain's treaties with, 26; budget contributions by, 237; con- cessions in, 221; currency in, 180; cus- toms duties of, 238; desalination in, 226; electricity in, 228; as entrepot, 26, 226; exports from, 222; foreign resi- dents in, 208; gas in, 222, 226; hospi- tals in, 212; industry in, 226-27; oil in, 30, 219, 221-22; oil revenues in, 203, 216; political options for, 33; popula- tion of, 208; port of, 214; relations of, with Iran, 366; representatives from, to Federal National Council, 241-42; ruling family in, 31, 243; schools in, 210; support of, for Iran, 248, 365; taxes in, 236; trade of, 238; treaties of, 26; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203; water in, 215, 226 Dubayy Creek, 239 Dubayy International Airport, 230, 236- 37 Dubayy Ports Authority, 230 Dugas. See Dubai Natural Gas Company Dukhan oil field (Qatar), 168 Duma. See Dubai Marine Areas Eastern Bank (Bahrain), 134 economic development: in Oman, xxvi, xxvii, 34, 35, 268, 269; promotion of, xxix; in United Arab Emirates, 218 economic diversification: in Bahrain, 112, 129, 135; in Kuwait, xxii, 64-67; in Oman, 257, 258, 281, 286, 289; in Qatar, xxv, 153, 161; in United Arab Emirates, 237 economy: in Bahrain, 111; in Kuwait, xxi, 85-86; in Oman, 268-96, 298; in United Arab Emirates, 216-18 education (see also schools): in Bahrain, 112, 120-21; in Kuwait, 54-56, 75, 80, 85, 96; in Oman, 265-66; in Qatar, 164- 66, 183, 187-88; in United Arab Emir- ates, 210-11, 212, 236, 237; of women, 165,210,211, 212 Education Council (Kuwait), 55 Egypt, 190; aid from, 210; aid to, 238; conquests by, 8; in Damascus meeting, 336-37; military training provided by, 304; payments to, for Persian Gulf War, 345, 365; peace of, with Israel, 247; in Persian Gulf War, 321, 328; physicians from, 56; relations of, with Kuwait, 92; relations of, with Qatar, 192; weapons industry, 336; workers from, 52, 130, 166, 208, 210, 247, 266 electric power: in Kuwait, 66; in Oman, 269, 293; in Qatar, 160; in United Arab Emirates, 228 elections: in Bahrain, xxiii, 139; in Kuwait, 75, 81,82, 83, 84, 101 Elf Aquitaine Qatar, 168, 276, 277, 292 Elphinstone Inlet (Khawr ash Shamm), 261 449 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Emirates Airlines, 230 Emirates General Petroleum Corpora- tion, 222 Emirates Industrial Bank, 226, 235 Emirates News, 246 employment: in Kuwait, 57, 80; in Oman, 258, 285 English: broadcasts in, 87, 132, 179, 232; education in, 165; publications in, 143,191,246,312 entrepot trade: of Bahrain, 26, 135; of Dubayy, 26, 226; of Kuwait, 57, 72; of Qatar, 182; of United Arab Emirates, 237 environmental pollution, 124; from Per- sian Gulf War, 96 Europe: investment in, 221; oil exported to, 63; protection by, in Iran-Iraq War, 36; workers from, 52, 203, 209 Exclusive Agreement (1882), 26 Exclusive Economic Zone (Oman), 370 executive branch (see also presidency): of United Arab Emirates, 239-41 Executive Council (Abu Dhabi), 243 exports (see also under individual prod- ucts): to Asia, 272, 286; from Bahrain, 135, 136; to China, 227, 278; from Dubayy, 222; to India, 23, 136, 174, 227; to Japan, 63, 72, 172-73, 221, 222, 239, 272, 278, 281, 286; of oil and gas, 72, 222, 238, 272, 278, 280-81; by Oman, 272; of pearls, 23; to Philip- pines, 278; by Qatar, 182; to Singa- pore, 278; to South Korea, 278; to Taiwan, 278; to Thailand, 278; by United Arab Emirates, 218; to United States, 278 Exxon, 220 Falah oil field (Dubayy) , 222 Falaj al Mualla, 232 falaj irrigation system (Oman), 282 FAO. See United Nations Food and Agri- culture Organization farming: in Kuwait, 67; in Qatar, 177; in United Arab Emirates, 233 Fasht ad Dibal (island): Qatari raid on, 144, 329 Fath oil field (Dubayy), 222 Fatima (Muhammad's daughter), 11, 14 Fatima (shaykha), 211 Faylakah (island), 47-48, 51 Federal National Council (FNC) (United Arab Emirates), xxvi, 239-42 fertilizer industry: in Abu Dhabi, 227; Qatar's investment in, xxv, 174 fishing: in Bahrain, 123-24; in Kuwait, 58, 67, 68; in Oman, xxvii, 258, 269, 281, 285; as percentage of gross domestic product, xix, 178, 284; in Qatar, 154, 158, 161, 175, 177, 178; in United Arab Emirates, 214, 232, 233- 34, 237 five-year development plans (Oman), 269-72,291,293 FNC. See Federal National Council food: in Bahrain, 135; in Kuwait, 57; in Oman, xxvii; in United Arab Emirates, 238 foreign aid: from Abu Dhabi, 238; from Britain, 215-16, 257, 300; from Egypt, 210; to Egypt, 238; for Iraq, 64, 73; from Kuwait, 64, 72-73, 89, 93 foreign investment: incentives for, xxix; by Kuwait, 71-72, 97; by Qatar, 182; reserves from, xxi foreign relations: of Bahrain, xxiv, 143- 45; British control of, 74, 203, 323, 340; of Kuwait, 92-93; of Oman, 312- 16; of Qatar, 153; of United Arab Emirates, 203, 246-49 foreign residents: in Bahrain, xxiii, 113, 118, 129-30, 144, 215; in Kuwait, xxi, 51-53, 56, 62, 80, 94-96, 113, 215; in Oman, 258, 264, 291, 374; as percent- age of population, xxi, xxiii, xxv, xxvii; in Qatar, xxv, 113, 161, 164, 177, 215, 358; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 113, 203,208-9, 213,228-229 forestry: in United Arab Emirates, 233 France: defense agreements with Kuwait, xxii, 92, 322, 337; gas exploration by, 171; investment by, 175; materiel from, xxii, xxvi, 342, 343, 364, 371; military personnel from, 358; military ties with, xxviii; military training by, 346; oil exploration by, 167; in Persian Gulf War, 191, 321, 327, 328, 358 Fuhud oil field (Oman), 275, 277, 278 Garmco. See Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company gas, natural: in Bahrain, xxiii, 128; in Dubayy, 222, 226; in Kuwait, 61 , 62; in 450 Index Oman, 279-81; in Qatar, xxv, 153, 171- 74, 180, 182, 280-81; in Ras al Khay- mah, 223; in United Arab Emirates, 219, 221, 222,223, 238 GCC. See Gulf Cooperation Council GDP. See gross domestic product General Administration of Public Secu- rity (Qatar), 360 General Organization of Social Insur- ance (GOSI) (Bahrain), 122 General Telecommunications Organiza- tion (Oman), 291 General Treaty of Peace (1820), 157 geography: of Bahrain, 114-117; of Kuwait, 47-51; of Oman, 259-62; of Qatar, 162-63; of United Arab Emir- ates, 204-8 Germany, Federal Republic of (West Germany), 302; Kuwaiti investment in, 71; materiel from, 344, 352, 364; trade with, 136, 182 Getty Oil Company: Kuwaiti concession of, 59 Ghanim al Kuwari, 190 GNP See gross national product GOSI. See General Organization of Social Insurance government of Bahrain, 137-42 government of Kuwait, 66 government of Oman, 310-12; budget of, 269-72; in Dhofar, 305; historical pat- terns of, 296-99; improvements in, 258; investment by, 275; relations of, with Omani people, 306 government of Qatar: control of, xxiv- xxv; transitional, 186-87 government of United Arab Emirates: budget of, 236-38 Great Depression: in Kuwait, 75; in Qatar, 159 Greater Tumb. SeeTunb al Kubra Greece: conquests by, 8 gross domestic product (GDP): in Bah- rain, 135; in Kuwait, xxi, 57; in United Arab Emirates, 216, 218 gross national product (GNP): defense spending as percentage of, 339; in Qatar, 165 Gulf Air, 132, 178-79 Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company (Garmco), 129 Gulf Company for Agricultural Develop- ment, 227 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 321- 22; Bahrain in, xxiv, 36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; collective security in, 333-37, 340; formed, xx, xxviii, 36, 113, 144, 314, 321, 326; headquarters of, xxix; intelligence assistance by, 114; joint military exercises of, 144, 336; materiel of, 114, 322; members of, xx, 36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321-22, 326; missions of, xxviii, 36, 191; Oman in, 36, 133, 144, 248, 269, 313, 314, 321, 326, 333; in Persian Gulf War, xxviii, 114, 327; Qatar in, xxv, 36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; security aims of, xxviii-xxix, 92, 248, 314, 322, 333-36; subsidies by, 352, 369; tariffs imposed by, 182; trade within, 285; United Arab Emirates in, 36, 104, 113, 144, 248,314, 321,326, 333 Gulf Daily News, 1 43 Gulf International Bank, 271 Gulf of Bahrain, 114 Gulf of Oman, 3,259, 369 Gulf Oil {see also Kuwait Oil Company), 58-61, 62 Gulf Polytechnic, 121 Gulf Technical College, 121 Gulf Times, 191 Gwadar, 298, 367 hadith, 10 hajj, 11 Halul (island), 162 Hamad General Hospital (Qatar), 167 Hammurabi, 323 Hanafi school of Islamic law, 13 Hanbal, Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn, 13 Hanbali school of Islamic law, 13, 186, 242-43 Harthi, Isa ibn Salih al, 300 Harthi, Salim ibn Rashid al, 299 Harun ar Rashid, 14 Hasan, 13 Hawar and the adjacent islands, 117; competing claims to, xxiv, 117, 144, 159, 162, 192-93, 329 Hawshi Huqf, 286 health care: in Bahrain, 112, 121-22, 123; in Kuwait, 56-57, 75, 85; in Oman, 266- 68, 269, 304; in Qatar, 166-67, 170, 187-88; in United Arab Emirates, 212- 451 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies 14, 237 Henjam gas field (Oman), 281 herding: in Qatar, 175, 177; in United Arab Emirates, 215 Higher Committee for Vocational Train- ing and Labor (Oman), 292 hijra, 1 Hispanoil. See Compama Espanola de Petroleos Hizballah, 347 Hoechst: Kuwaiti investment in, 71 Hotel and Catering Training Center (Bahrain), 121 housing: in Bahrain, 119; in Kuwait, 57; in Oman, xxvii, 269; in United Arab Emirates, xxvi, 214 Hughes Aircraft Company, xxii human resources, investment in: in Kuwait, 54; in Oman, 258 human rights: in Bahrain, 354-55; during Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, 93, 349; in Kuwait, 348-50; in Oman, 376; in United Arab Emirates, 367 Husayn, 14, 15; commemoration of mar- tyrdom of, 15-16 Husayn, Saddam, 91, 325, 327 Ibad, Abd Allah ibn, 1 6, 264 Ibadis. See Islam, Ibadi Shia Id al Adha festival, 12 Id al Fitr festival, 12 Idd ash Sharqi oil field (Qatar), 168 IDTC. See Industrial Development Tech- nical Centre imams {see also Islam; Muslims): Ibadi, 19; Ninth Imam, 15; persecution of, 14; role of, xxvi; Seventh Imam, 15; in Sunni Islam, 12; Twelfth Imam, 15 IMF. See International Monetary Fund imports: to Bahrain, 135-36; to Oman, 272, 281; to Qatar, 182; to United Arab Emirates, 215, 216, 238-39 independence, 30-35; of Bahrain, xx, 33, 112, 137, 350; of Kuwait, xx, 32, 75, 88; of Oman, xx; of Qatar, xx, xxiv, 33, 161-62, 171; of United Arab Emirates, xx India: exports to, 23, 136, 174, 227; imports from, 215; military assistance from, 369; spread of Islam to, 18; trade of, 4, 174, 227; workers from, 203, 208, 212, 228, 229, 266, 374 Indian Medical Service, 212 Indians: in armed forces, 345, 361; in Oman, 263; in Qatar, 164, 189; in United Arab Emirates, 228 indigenization: of Kuwait's armed forces, xxii; of Kuwait's work force, 95; of Oman's work force, xxvii, 177, 258, 264, 273, 281,291, 292; of Qatar's work force, 177 Indonesia: spread of Islam to, 18 Industrial Bank of Kuwait, 67, 70 industrial development: in Bahrain, 112; in Kuwait, xxii, 64, 66; in Oman, xxvii, 293 Industrial Development Committee (Kuwait), 67 Industrial Development Technical Cen- tre (IDTC) (Qatar), 173 industrial estates: in Abu Dhabi, 227; in Oman, xxvii, 269, 286, 288; in Qatar, 173 industry: in Kuwait, 66, 67; Kuwaiti investment in, 98; in Oman, 258, 269, 286-88; in Qatar, 173-75; in United Arab Emirates, 223-27, 229 inflation: in Qatar, 170; in United Arab Emirates, 216 infrastructure: damage, in Persian Gulf War, 96; in Kuwait, xx, 66, 96; in Oman, 257, 269, 272-73, 281, 293, 304, 315; in Qatar, 161, 170, 181; in United Arab Emirates, 203, 216, 236, 237 Inland Sea. See Khawr al Udayd Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- cations Satellite Corporation International Court of Justice: territorial disputes in, xxiv, xxvi, 144-45, 193, 329 International Hospital (Bahrain), 122 International Labour Organisation, 194 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 145 International Petroleum (Canada), 276, 280 International Petroleum Investment Corporation (IPIC), 221 International Telecommunications Sat- ellite Corporation (Intelsat): in Bah- rain, 132; in Kuwait, 69; in Oman, 291; in Qatar, 179; in United Arab Emir- ates, 232 Investment Bank of Kuwait, 67 452 Index IPC. See Iraq Petroleum Company IPIC. See International Petroleum Invest- ment Corporation Iran: claim of, to Bahrain, xxiii, xxiv, 28, 32, 329; claim of, to Persian Gulf islands, 33, 204, 246, 248-49, 329, 330; claim of, to Qatar, xxiv; demonstra- tions in support of, 36; expansion of, 24; exports to, 239; medical support from, 212; military assistance from, xxvii, 369; military buildup of, 333; military strength of, 322; oil produc- tion of, 222; relations of, with Kuwait, 93; relations of, with Oman, 374; rela- tions of, with Qatar, xxv, 192; relations of, with United Arab Emirates, 247, 248; as security threat, xxviii, 36, 143, 321, 340; territorial disputes of, xxvi, 247, 325; tribal wars of, 157; water exported by, 192; workers from, 130, 203, 208, 229 Iranian Empire, 111 Iranian Revolution (1979): as challenge to regional stability, 35, 247, 314, 332; as security threat, xx, 82, 143; support for, from gulf Shia, 53-54, 113, 143, 332 Iranian rule: in the gulf, xx, 323; of Oman, 17, 22 Iranians: in armed forces, 361; in Bah- rain, 35, 329; in Qatar, 163, 164, 192, 358; in United Arab Emirates, 228, 366 Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), 325-26; and Bahrain, 113, 144, 353; impact of, 78, 82, 88, 89, 113, 144, 347; and Kuwait, 53-54; Oman in, 313, 374; protection for shipping during, 36, 230, 365; andQatar, 355; support for Iraq in, xxv, 36, 72, 89, 340; trade during, 72, 238; United Arab Emirates during, 204, 238, 247, 248, 365 Iraq: aid for, 64, 73, 89, 326; attacks on, 18; borders of, 48, 89, 90, 330; claims of, to Kuwait, 48, 81, 88, 89, 90, 91, 327, 330; Islam in, 18, 19; Kuwaiti pris- oners of war in, xxii, 94; military strength of, 322; oil discovered in, 29; Omani rule of, 22; pressure on, to comply with United Nations resolu- tions, xxiii; relations of, with Kuwait, 88-92, 219-20; relations of, with United Arab Emirates, 219-20, 247; as security threat, xxviii, 32, 143, 191, 247, 321, 333, 340; support for, in Iran-Iraq War, xxv, 191; territorial disputes of, 325; as threat to Kuwait, xxii, 84, 88, 90; water from, 64; workers from, 52, 191 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 78, 84, 144, 204, 247, 327, 336; damage to Kuwaiti armed forces by, 340; effects of, 93, 100-102, 153, 180, 191, 218, 220, 235- 36, 269-70, 363; impetus for, 88, 91, 330; Kuwaiti resistance to, 344; Oman in, 374 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (see also Per- sian Gulf War), xxi, 47, 48, 91, 247, 327; atrocities in, 93; collaboration in, 347, 349, 367; damage to infrastruc- ture in, 69; effect of, 93; Kuwaiti econ- omy under, 71-72; media under, 87; and oil prices, 128; plunder during, 93; psychological impact of, 94; United Nations condemnation of, xxiii; Yemen's support for, 332 Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), 167, 221,275 irrigation: in Bahrain, 117; in Oman, 9, 282-84, 293 Islah al Muhammadiyyah (Qatar), 165 Islam (see also Muslims): conversion to, 17, 297, 323; early development of, 9- 18; great schism of, 12; in Kuwaiti con- stitution, 85; legal schools of, 13, 142, 186, 209, 242-43; in Oman, 264 Islam, Ibadi Shia, xix, xxvi, 17; imams under, 19, 22, 264, 297; in Oman, 18- 19, 22, 35, 264, 297 Islam, Ismaili Shia, 16, 18 Islam, Kharijite, 3, 16, 18, 25, 264 Islam, Qarmatian, 18 Islam, Seven Imam, 16 Islam, Shia (see also Islam; Muslims, Shia), xix, 3, 12-17, 18; in Bahrain, xxiii, 35; in United Arab Emirates, 25, 209 Islam, Sunni (see also Islam; Muslims, Sunni), 3, 12-13; in Bahrain, xxiii; in Oman, 264; in United Arab Emirates, 209 Islam, Twelve Imam Shia, 13-14, 15, 16, 19, 142, 243 Islam, Wahhabi Sunni, xix, 24-25; in Qatar, xxv, 25, 153; in United Arab 453 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Emirates, 209 Islamic Alliance, 100 Islamic Call Party, 354 Islamic Constitutional Movement (Kuwait), 84, 100 Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bah- rain, 354 Islamic National Alliance (Kuwait), 84 Islamic Parliamentarian Alliance (Kuwait), 84 Islamism: in Iran, 325; in Kuwait, 78 Ismail al Kazim, 16 Ismailis. See Islam, Ismaili Shia Israel: military doctrine of, 333; recogni- tion of, 247 Italy: trade with, 136, 182 Itoh, C, 280 Jaafar as Sadiq, 16, 142 Jaafari school of Islamic law, 142 Jaafar ibn Muhammad, 16, 142 Jabal ad Dukhan, 114 Jabal az Zannah, 221 Jaidah family, 1 90 Jalan, 262; minerals in, 286 Japan: exports to, 63, 72, 172-73, 221, 222, 239, 272, 278, 281, 286; imports from, 239, 273; investment in, 221; Kuwaiti investment in, 71; oil compa- nies from, 60; trade with, 136, 182 Japan Exploration Company (Japex Oman), 276; work force in, 292 Japan Oil Development Company, 220, 277 Japex Oman. Seejapan Exploration Company JaziratalAzl (island), 117 Jews, 17 Jibal oil field (Oman), 274, 275, 277, 278; gas from, 280 Jidd Hafs, 119 jihad, 1 1 Joint United States-Oman Commission, 285, 292, 316 Jordan: aid to, 93, 238; military assis- tance from, xxvii, 369; military person- nel from, 345, 358, 361; military training provided by, 304; payments to, for Persian Gulf War, 365; relations of, with Kuwait, xxiii; workers from, 266 Judaism, 9 judiciary: in Bahrain, 142; in Kuwait, 85, 347-48; in Oman, 312; in Qatar, 186; in United Arab Emirates, 239, 242-43 Kalba, 207 Karbala, 15 KFAED. See Kuwait Fund for Arab Eco- nomic Development Khalij Times, 312 Khalili, Muhammad ibn Abd Allah al, 301 Kharijites. See Islam, Kharijite Khawr al Udayd (Qatar), 162 Khawr Fakkan, 207; schools in, 210 Khimji Ramdas Group, 310 Khoja, 263-64 Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi (aya- tollah), 325 KNPC. See Kuwait National Petroleum Company Kobe Steel Company, 1 74 KOC. See Kuwait Oil Company Korea, Republic of (South Korea): mate- riel from, 344; trade with, 136, 286 KPC. See Kuwait Petroleum Corporation KUNA. See Kuwait News Agency Kuwait {see also Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; Iraqi occupation of Kuwait): agricul- ture in, 67-68; aid from, 314; air bases of, 342, 343; armed forces of, xxii, 92, 337, 339-40, 342-46; banking in, 69-70, 235-36; borders of, xii, 47, 48, 89, 90- 91, 330, 332; bureaucracy in, 79-80; cabinet in, 79-80, 84; citizens of, 86, 94; civil rights in, , 78, 82, 86; civil ser- vice in, xxi, 80, 100; climate of, 48-51, 67; constitution of, 81; court system in, 348; criminal justice system in, 347-48; currency of, 69; debt of, 99; defense of, xxii, 92, 322, 332, 337, 342; democ- racy in, 36; democracy movement in, 75, 78, 84, 86, 100-101; economic diversification in, xxii, 64-67; economy in, xxi, 85-86; education in, 54-56, 75, 80, 85, 96, 210; elections in, 75, 81, 82, 83, 84, 101; electricity in, 66; employ- ment in, 57, 80; as entrepot, 72; fish- ing in, 58, 67, 68; foreign aid from, 64, 72-73, 89, 93; foreign policy of, 74, 92- 93, 340; foreign residents in, xxi, 51- 53, 56, 62, 80, 94-96, 113, 215; gas in, 61, 62; geography of, 47-51; Great 454 Index Depression in, 75; gross domestic product in, xxi, 57; in Gulf Coopera- tion Council, 36, 92, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; health care in, 56- 57, 75, 85, 96; housing in, 57; human rights in, 93, 348-50; independence for, xx, 32, 75, 88; indigenization in, xxii, 95; industrial development in, xxii, 64, 66; industry in, 66, 68; infra- structure in, xx, 66, 96; internal secu- rity in, 94, 102, 336, 342, 346-47; investment by, 71-72; Iran-Iraq War and, 78, 82, 88, 89, 347; Iraq as threat to, xxii, 32, 84, 88, 90; Iraq's claim to, 48, 81, 88, 89, 90, 91, 327, 330; Islam- ism in, 78; judiciary in, 85, 347-48; labor in, 85; legislature in, xxi, 36, 75, 78, 80-84, 86; life expectancy in, 56-57; literacy in, 55, 57; living standards in, 58, 99-100; martial law in, 348, 349; materiel of, xxii, 342-43; media in, xxi, 69, 81, 85, 86-87, 101; medical support from, 212; merchant class in, 54, 55, 58, 75, 78, 79; military assistance from, 336; military assistance to, 32, 88; mili- tary background of, 340-42; military relations of, xxii, 92, 322, 337; nation- alization in, 59, 62; oil in, xx, xxii, 30, 32, 35, 47, 58-64, 66, 71, 72, 75, 79, 88, 90, 96-97; oil shared with Saudi Ara- bia, 48; Palestinians in, xxi, 94-95, 102, 346-47, 349; pearling in, 57, 58, 67, 75; in Persian Gulf War, xxi, 68, 327, 328, 344-45, 374; police in, 347-48; political opposition in, 78, 81, 82-83, 84, 86, 100, 102; political reform in, 75; popu- lation of, 51, 56, 94; ports in, 68; post- war reconstruction in, 96-100; prisoners of war from, in Iraq, xxii, 94; privatization in, xxi, 99; relations of, with Britain, 87-88, 92; relations of, with Egypt, 92; relations of, with Iran, 93; relations of, with Iraq, 88-92, 219- 20; relations of, with Jordan, xxiii; relations of, with Qatar, xxiii; relations of, with Russia, xxii, 92; relations of, with Saudi Arabia, 93; relations of, with Soviet Union, 88; relations of, with Syria, 92; relations of, with United States, 88, 92; roads in, 68; rul- ing family of, xxi, 23, 30, 47, 54, 73-79, 81, 94, 100; sectarian division in, 53; security concerns of, xx, 143, 332; shipbuilding in, 57, 58; ships of, reflagged, 326; social services in, 57, 75, 80; subsidies in, xxi, 55, 57, 66, 95, 98; succession in, 74-75, 78-79; suf- frage in, xxi, 84; taxes in, 86; telecom- munications in, 68, 99; tensions in, between foreigners and Kuwaitis, 346- 47; terrorism in, 332, 347; trade by, 57- 58, 66, 72-73, 98-99, 136; trade dispute of, with Saudi Arabia, 75; transporta- tion in, 68-69; treaties of, 74, 87, 89; troops stationed in, 322; in trucial sys- tem, 324; United Nations resolutions condemning Iraqi invasion of, xxiii; vulnerability of, 87, 91-92, 340; wages in, 66; water in, 51, 64, 66; welfare in, 57; work force in, 51-52, 66 Kuwait, city of: as entrepot, 57; popula- tion in, 51; settled, 47 Kuwait Airways, 69, 93 Kuwait Bay, 48 Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company, 62 Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting, and Investment Company, 98 Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Devel- opment (KFAED), 72-73, 290 Kuwaiti Military College, 346, 347 Kuwait International Airport, 69 Kuwait International Investment Com- pany, 98 Kuwait Investment Company, 98 Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC), 61 Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) , 87 Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), 59, 62, 75, 97 Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, 62 Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), 62-63 Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone {see also Divided Zone), 48, 59, 60 Kuwait State Security, 347 Kuwait Television, 87 Kuwait Times, 87 Kuwait University, 55 Kuwait Wafrah Oil Company, 62 Kuwari, Ghanim al, 190 Labor Law (Bahrain) (1993), xxiv Labor Law (Qatar) (1962), 177 455 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies labor relations: in Qatar, 170, 176-77 labor unions: in Bahrain, 113; in Kuwait, 85; in Qatar, 177 land: in Bahrain, 119, 123; in Qatar, 177- 78; in United Arab Emirates, 232 land area: of Abu Dhabi, 204; of Ajman, 204; of Kuwait, 47; of Oman, 259; of Qatar, 162; of United Arab Emirates, 104 law: civil, 142; customary, 142; in United Arab Emirates, 242 law, sharia, 11; in Bahrain, 142; in Kuwait, 85; in Oman, 312; in Qatar, 161, 186; in United Arab Emirates, 242-43 Law of Public Security (1965) (Bahrain) , 139 League of Arab States (Arab League), 32, 145, 192, 247; military assistance from, 32, 36, 88, 90, 330, 368 League of Nations, 90 Lebanon: civil war in, 247, 347; study in, 166; workers from, 52, 130 legislature: in Bahrain, 36; in Kuwait, xxi, 36, 75, 78, 80-84, 86; in Qatar, xxiv; in United Arab Emirates, 239-41 Lesser Tumb. SeeTunb as Sughra Libya, 190 life expectancy: in Bahrain, 118-19, 121; in Kuwait, 56-57; in Oman, 268; in Qatar, 167 limestone, 51, 162, 286 literacy rate: in Bahrain, 120; in Kuwait, 55, 57; in Qatar, 165; in United Arab Emirates, 211 livestock: exported, 272; imported, 136, 182, 238; in Kuwait, 67; in Oman, 261, 272, 293; in Qatar, 178, 182; in United Arab Emirates, 233, 238 living standards: attempts to improve, xxix, 268-69, 293; in Kuwait, 58, 99- 100; in Oman, 268-69, 293 Mabruk gas field (Oman) , 280 Madinatlsa, 119, 120 Mahmud, Amina, 165 majlis, 140-42 Majlis Movement, 75, 79, 90 Malaya, 18 Malcom Inlet (Ghubbat al Ghazirah), 261 Malik ibn Anas, Abu Abd Allah, 13, 142 Maliki school of Islamic law, 13, 142, 209, 242 Mamul oil field (Oman), 275, 278 Mana, Muhammad Abd al Aziz al, 165 Manama (Al Manamah), 114; popula- tion of, 119 M an nai family, 190 Margham oil field (Dubayy), 222 marriage: government subsidies for (Kuwait), 95; and tribal organization, 38 martial law: in Kuwait, 348, 349 Mashhad, 14, 15 Masirah Air Base, 315, 316, 368, 372 Masirah (island), 260, 262 Masqat. See Muscat materiel, xix, 337-38; from Afghanistan, 356; air force, 343, 352, 356, 364, 372; army, 343, 350-52; from Austria, 371; of Bahrain, 350-52; from Brazil, 364; from Britain, xix, xxii, 300, 342, 356, 364, 371; from France, xxii, xxvi, 342, 343, 364, 371; from Germany, 344, 352, 364; of Gulf Cooperation Coun- cil, 114, 322; from Italy, 364; of Kuwait, xxii, 342-43; navy, 352, 364, 372; of Oman, xxviii, 370, 371, 372; of Qatar, 356; from South Korea, 344; from the Soviet Union, 332; trade in, 215; of United Arab Emirates, xxvi, 215, 364; from United States, xxii, 342, 343, 350, 356, 364, 371; of Yemen, 332 Matrah, 259; port of, 261; religion in, 264; schools in, 265 Mauritania: aid to, 238 Maydan Mahzam oil field (Qatar), 168 Mecca, 11, 18 media: in Bahrain, 143; in Kuwait, 86-87; in Oman, 312; in Qatar, 183, 191; in United Arab Emirates, 246 Medina, 10, 18 Mediterranean Sea: access to, 7 merchant families: in Bahrain, 39; in Kuwait, 54, 55, 58, 73, 75, 78, 79, 82- 83; in Oman, xxvii-xxviii, 309-10; in Qatar, 189-90 Mesopotamia, 4, 7, 154 middle ages, 17-20 military capabilities, 337-40 military conscription: in Kuwait, xxii military training, xix; by Britain, xix, 304, 339, 340, 346, 372, 375; by Egypt, 456 Index 304; by France, 346; by United States, 339 Mina Abd Allah shipping terminal, 62 Mina al Ahmadi, 68-69 Mina al Fahl: oil port at, 289; refinery at, 278 Mina al Fujayrah, 230 Minajabal Ali, 222, 226, 230 Minajabal Ali Free Zone, 226, 288 Mina Khalid, 227, 230 Mina Qabus, 290 Mina Rashid, 230 Mina Salman, 114, 132 Mina Saqr, 230 Mina Zayid, 230 minerals: development of, xxvii; in Oman, 285-86 Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Oman), 288 Ministry of Communications (Oman), 289 Ministry of Defense (Oman), 310 Ministry of Defense (Qatar), 355 Ministry of Economy and Industry (United Arab Emirates) , 223 Ministry of Education (United Arab Emirates), 212 Ministry of Education and Youth (Oman), 265 Ministry of Electricity and Water (United Arab Emirates), 228 Ministry of Finance (Kuwait), 296 Ministry of Finance and Petroleum (Qatar), 180 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Oman), 291 Ministry of Health (Oman), 266, 268 Ministry of Health (United Arab Emir- ates), 212 Ministry of Information (Bahrain), 143 Ministry of Information (Kuwait) , 87 Ministry of Information and Culture (Qatar), 191 Ministry of Interior (Bahrain), 354 Ministry of Interior (Kuwait), 332, 347 Ministry of Interior (Oman), 291, 306, 310 Ministry of Interior (Qatar) , 360 Ministry of Interior (United Arab Emir- ates) , 366 Ministry of Islamic Affairs (Oman) , 291 Ministry of Justice (Oman) , 291 Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (Bahrain), 130 Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (United Arab Emirates) , 229 Ministry of National Heritage and Cul- ture (Oman), 289, 291 Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (United Arab Emirates), 218-19 Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals (Oman), 278, 280 Ministry of Petroleum, Fisheries, and Agriculture (Oman), 274 Ministry of Public Works and Housing (United Arab Emirates), 214 Ministry of Religious Endowments (Oman), 291 Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (Oman), 291 Ministry of Water Resources (Oman), 284 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, 226 missionaries, 18 Mitsubishi, 226, 280 Mitsui Engineering and Shipping Com- pany, 280, 309 Mobil Oil, 220 Mombasa, 298, 367 Morocco: aid to, 238 Muawiyah, 12, 16 Mubahathat (secret police) (Qatar), 360 Mubarakiyyah School (Kuwait) , 55 Mubarak oil field (Sharjah), 222 Mubarak the Great. See Al Sabah, Mubarak muezzin, 10 Muhammad, 9-10, 14; succession to, 11- 12 Mukhabarat (intelligence service) (Qatar), 360 Mukhaizna oil field (Oman), 275, 277 Musa al Kazim, 1 6 Musandam Peninsula (Ras Musandam), 207, 259; agriculture in, 282; develop- ment in, 315; dispute over, 331 Musandam Security Force, 370 Muscat, 22, 23, 259, 263; climate in, 262; development plan for, 290; electricity in, 293; gas use in, 279; governor of, 306; migration to, 257; navy of, 324-25; port of, 20, 261, 289; radio in, 291; religion in, 264; schools in, 265; tour- 457 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies ism in, 289; wars of, 323 Muscat and Oman, 29 Muscat and Oman Field Force, 368 Muslims, Ibadi. See Islam, Ibadi Shia Muslims, Shia (see also Islam): in Bah- rain, 113, 143, 353-54; in Kuwait, 53- 54, 78; support for, by Iran, xxiii; in United Arab Emirates, 366 Muslims, Sunni (see also Islam): in Bah- rain, 113; in Kuwait, 53, 54, 78; in Qatar, 164 Muslims, Wahhabi (see also Islam): claim of, to Qatar, xxiv; in Qatar, 192; rela- tions of, with ruling families, 74; terri- torial disputes of, 330; tribal wars of, 157 Nabi Salah (island), 117 Nairn tribe, 158, 159 Nasib, Yahya Muhammad, 310 Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 160 Natih oil field (Oman), 275, 277, 278; gas from, 280 National Assembly (Bahrain), xxiii, 113, 139, 140 National Assembly (Kuwait), xxi, xxii, 75, 78, 80-82, 84, 85, 86, 100 National Assistance Law, 214 National Bank of Bahrain, 134 National Bank of Kuwait, 69, 70, 97, 98 National Bank of Oman, 295 National Bloc (Kuwait), 82 National Cement Company (Dubayy), 226 National Council (Kuwait), 101; estab- lished, 83-84 National Defense Council (Oman), 310 National Development Council (Oman), 310 National Flour Mills (Dubayy) , 226 National Front for the Liberation of Bah- rain, 140, 354 National Guard (Kuwait), 342, 347 National Investments and Security Cor- poration (United Arab Emirates), 236 National Islamic Coalition (Kuwait), 100 nationalization: of American Indepen- dent Oil Company, 62; of Kuwait Oil Company, 59; of Qatar Petroleum Company, 171; of Shell Company of Qatar, 171 National Mariculture Center (Umm al Qaywayn), 234 National Oil Distribution Company, 171 National Unity Front (Qatar), 161 Naval Training Center (Oman), 371-72 navy of Bahrain: materiel of, 352; per- sonnel strength of, 350 navy of Kuwait, 340; fleet of, 344; person- nel strength of, 344 navy of Oman: bases of, 371; deployment of, 370; materiel of, 372; personnel strength of, 371 navy of Qatar, 355 navy of United Arab Emirates: materiel of, 364; personnel strength of, 362 Nazwah, 263; industrial estate planned for, 288 Nazwah Air Base, 372 Nebuchadnezzar II, 323 Netherlands: Portuguese driven from Persian Gulf by, 20-22 New Medical Centre (Abu Dhabi), 213 Nimr oil field (Oman), 275 nomads, 7, 328; in Qatar, 154; in United Arab Emirates, 215 Norsk Hydro of Norway, 174 North Field natural gas project (Qatar), xxv, 153,171,172, 175,192, 281 OAPEC. See Organization of Arab Petro- leum Exporting Countries oases, 261 OCC. See Oman Chrome Company Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 276, 277; work force in, 292 Officers' Training School (Oman), 371 oil, in Abu Dhabi, xxv, 30, 219, 220, 221- 26; in Ajman, 223; in Al Fujayrah, 223; in Bahrain, xx, xxiii, 29, 30, 117, 124- 28, 135-36; in Divided Zone, 48; in Dubayy, xxv, 30, 219, 221, 222; in Iran, 29; in Iraq, 29, 59; in Kuwait, xx, xxii, 32, 58-64, 66, 88, 90, 97; in Oman, xxvi.xxvii, 30, 258-59, 274-81, 291-92, 301; in Qatar, xxv, 30, 153, 159, 167-75; in Ras al Khaymah, xxv, 223; and rul- ing families, 39; in Saudi Arabia, 128; in Sharjah, xxv, 222; in Umm al Qay- wayn, 223; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203, 216, 219, 220 oil concessions, 328; to Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 58, 159; in Bahrain, 458 Index 124; in Kuwait, 58, 59, 60, 75; in Oman, 274; in Qatar, 158, 159, 167, 168; and ruling families, 31; in Shar- jah, 222; of Standard Oil Company of California, 29, 124 oil exports: from Bahrain, 127, 128, 135, 136; from Kuwait, 58, 59, 64, 72; from Oman, 257, 272, 277-78; from Qatar, 159, 170, 182; from Saudi Arabia, 135- 36; from United Arab Emirates, 218, 238 oil fields: in Kuwait, 30, 51, 59, 62; in Oman, 274, 275; in Qatar, 168; in United Arab Emirates, 220-21 oil industry facilities: damage to, in Per- sian Gulf War, 96-97; destruction of, 326; protection of, xxviii; rebuilding of, in Kuwait, xx, 96-97; vulnerability of, 321 oil prices: collapse in 1980s, 268, 269; increases in 1973, 35, 127; increases during Persian Gulf War, 128, 238, 269-70 oil production quotas, xx-xxi, 63-64, 88, 170, 220; in Bahrain, 127; in Dubayy, 222; in Kuwait, 64, 88; of United Arab Emirates, 219, 220 oil revenues, 30, 31, 35; in Abu Dhabi, 203, 216; in Bahrain, 35, 112, 127-28; in Dubayy, 203, 216; in Kuwait, 35, 47, 71, 72, 75, 79, 90; in Oman, 257, 259, 268-69, 270, 271, 727, 301, 305; in Qatar, 159, 160, 161, 162, 167, 180, 182, 187-88; in United Arab Emirates, 203, 216, 220, 229 Olcott Memorial Hospital (Kuwait), 56 Oman: agriculture in, xxvii, 9, 258, 269, 281-84, 293; aid to, 314; air bases of, 374; airports in, 269, 289, 375; armed forces of, xxviii, 310, 315, 339-40, 367- 72; Bahrain claimed by, 22, 28; border agreement with Saudi Arabia, xxviii; border dispute with Yemen, xxviii, 331, 332, 369; borders of, 3, 204, 369, 375; British troops in, 325; budget of, 316; civil service in, 257, 302; claim of, to Qatar, xxiv; climate of, 262-63, 282, 293; coastline of, xix-xx, 261, 262; court system of, 375; crime in, 375; customs duties of, 257; defense spend- ing by, 369; Dhofar rebellion in, xxvii, 34, 35, 304; economy in, xxvi, xxvii, 34, 35, 257, 258, 268-69, 298; educa- tion in, 265-66, 269, 304; electricity in, 269, 293; employment in, 258, 285; entitlement in, 258, 292; expansion of, 22-23; fishing in, xxvii, 258, 269, 281, 285; food production in, xxvii; foreign advisers in, 292; foreign relations of, 312-16; foreign residents in, 258, 264, 291, 374; gas, 279-81; geography of, 259-62; in Gulf Cooperation Council, 36, 133, 144, 248, 269, 313, 314, 321, 326, 333; Gulf Cooperation Council subsidy for, 369; health care in, 266-68, 269, 304; housing in, xxvii, 269; human resources in, 258; human rights in, 376; Ibadi population of, 35; independence, xx; indigenization in, xxvii, 258, 264, 273, 281, 291, 292; influence of, 28; infrastructure in, 269, 281, 289, 290, 293, 304, 315; internal security of, 374-76; as interna- tional mediator, xxviii; Iranian rule of, 22; Iranians expelled from, 17; in Iran- Iraq War, 313, 374; Islam in, 18-19, 22, 35, 264, 297; isolation of, 34, 259, 368; judiciary in, 312; legal system in, 312; life expectancy in, 268; livestock in, 261, 272, 293; living standards in, 268- 69, 293; materiel for, xxviii, 370, 371, 372; media in, 291, 312; merchant families in, xxvii-xxviii, 309-10; middle class in, 257, 270; military accord of, with United States, xxviii; military agreement of, with Britain, 374; mili- tary assistance by, xx; military assis- tance to, 304, 352; military facilities of, 262; military training in, 375; minerals in, 285-86; modernization in, xxvi, 34, 269, 301, 302; oil in, 30, 34, 257-58, 272, 274-81, 291-92, 301, 305; Persian Gulf War, 372-74; police in, 375; politi- cal reform in, 34; political stability in, 258; population of, xxvii, 263-64, 268; ports in, 289, 290; privatization in, xxvii; regions of, 259-62; relations of, with Britain, xxviii, 28, 34, 299, 313, 314-15; relations of, with France, 299; relations of, with Iran, 22, 374; rela- tions of, with Saudi Arabia, xxviii, 313, 330; relations of, with United States, xxviii, 374; rule by, in Africa, 22-23, 297-98; ruling family of, xxvii, 26, 31; 459 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies security concerns of, 143; security cooperation of, 321; slavery in, 263, 301; strategic location of, 262, 312, 314; telecommunications in, 290-91, 302; territorial disputes of, 247, 313, 330; tourism in, xxvii, 269, 289, 293; transportation in, 179, 289-90, 302; tribal wars of, 157; in trucial system, 26; unification of, 23, 298; urban migration in, xxvii, 257, 258, 284; utili- ties in, xxvii; wadis in, 261, 263; wars of, with Bahrain, 111; water in, 258, 269, 282, 292-93; welfare system in, 258, 259, 292; women in, 339-40; work force in, 258, 291 Oman Aviation Services, 295 Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisher- ies, 281, 294 Oman Banking Corporation, 295 Oman Cement Company, 286 Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 288 Oman Chrome Company (OCC), 286 Oman Currency Board, 294 Oman Daily Newspaper, 312 Oman Daily Observer, 312 Oman Development Bank, 294, 296 Oman Development Council, 290 Oman Fisheries Development and Man- agement Project, 285 Oman Housing Bank, 294, 296 Omani European Bank, 295 Omani Liberation Movement, 301 Oman International Development and Investment Company, 295 Oman Mining Company, 286 Oman News Agency, 291 Oman Oil Company (OOC), 278 Oman Oil Refinery Company, 278 Omar Zawawi Establishment (Omzest Group) , 309 Omzest Group. See Omar Zawawi Estab- lishment OOC. See Oman Oil Company OPEC. See Organization of the Petro- leum Exporting Countries Operation Desert Shield (1990), xix, 193, 327-28 Operation Desert Storm, 193, 247-48, 328; Bahraini forces in, 345, 353; bases for, 321; costs of, 99; Kuwaiti forces in, 344-45, 374; Omani forces in, 374; Qatari forces in, 345; Saudi forces in, 345, 374; United Arab Emirates forces in, 374 Organization of Arab Petroleum Export- ing Countries (OAPEC), 129 Organization of the Islamic Conference: Bahrain as member of, 145; United Arab Emirates as member of, 249 Organization of the Petroleum Export- ing Countries (OPEC): Abu Dhabi as member of, 218; Bahrain as member of, 145; compliance with quotas of, 63- 64, 170; price increases by, 35, 127; production quotas of, xx-xxi, 63-64, 170, 222; Qatar as member of, 170; United Arab Emirates as member of, 218, 249 ORKEM of France, 175 Ottoman Empire: claim of, to Bahrain, 28; claim of, to Kuwait, 28, 87, 330; claim of, to Qatar, xxiv, 28, 154; end of, 158; expansion of, 24, 158, 323, 324; Kuwait's independence from, 74, 87; relations of, with ruling families, 74, 89; tribal wars of, 157 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 304, 325, 329 Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 29 Pakistan: military assistance form, 369; military personnel from, 345, 361, 363, 371; military training provided by, 304; oil exported to, 63; workers from, 164, 203, 208, 229, 266, 374 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), xxiii; aid to, 93; decline in sup- port for, 153, 191 Palestinians, 247; in armed forces, 345; in Bahrain, 130; diaspora of, 39; in Kuwait, xxi, 52, 94-95, 102, 346-47, 349-50; in Qatar, 358; in United Arab Emirates, 367 Partex. See Participations and Explora- tions Parthian rule, xx, 8 Participations and Explorations (Par- tex), 220, 275, 280 PDO. See Petroleum Development Oman PDRY. See Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of pearling, xix, 23, 24, 28, 39, 47; in Bah- rain, 111, 112, 124; in Kuwait, 57, 58, 460 Index 67, 75; in Qatar, 153, 154, 158-59, 175, 176, 177; in United Arab Emirates, 214 Pelly, Lewis, 157-58 Peninsula Shield forces, 336; Bahrain in, 353; plans to expand, xxix; United Arab Emirates in, 365 People's Front for the Liberation of Oman, 304 Persian Empire, 8 Persian Gulf: Britain's withdrawal from, xxiv; proposed federation in, 161; role of, in culture, xx; role of, in trade, xx, 28; strategic importance of, 325 Persian Gulf War (1991), xix, 88-92, 326- 28; Bahrain in, xxiv, 328, 353; Canada in, 191, 358; costs of, xxi, 97, 358; damage to environment by, 96, 124; damage to infrastructure in, 68, 69, 96; and defense infrastructure, xxviii; effects of, on financial reserves, xxi; effects of, on Kuwait, xxi, 68; Egypt in, 321, 328; France in, 191, 321, 327, 328, 358; Gulf Cooperation Council in, 114; materiel losses in, 345; oil prices in, 128; Oman in, 372-74; psychologi- cal impact of, 96; Qatar in, xxv; ship- ping during, 230; United Arab Emirates in, xxvi, 365 Petrochemicals Industries Company (PIC), 62 Petroleum Concessions, 275 Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), 274, 275, 290; work force in, 292 Petroleum Development (Qatar) {see also Qatar Petroleum Company) , 1 67, 1 89; working conditions in, 176 Philippines: nationals of, in armed forces, 345; workers from, 130, 164, 203, 266 physicians: in Bahrain, 122; in Kuwait, 56; in Trucial Coast, 212; in United Arab Emirates, 213 PIC. See Petrochemicals Industries Com- pany piracy, 157, 158, 323; attempts to end, xxiv, 157, 158; participation in, 7, 24, 25 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organiza- tion police academy (Kuwait), 347 police force: of Bahrain, 353, 354; of Kuwait, 347-48; of Oman, 375; of Qatar, 160; of United Arab Emirates, 366 political demonstrations: in Kuwait, 83, 84; pro-Iranian, 36; in Qatar, 160 political opposition: in Bahrain, 113, 139, 143; in Kuwait, 78, 81, 82-83, 84, 86, 100, 102; in Qatar, 190-91 political reform: in Kuwait, 75; in Oman, 34 Popular Front for the Liberation of Bah- rain, 354 Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, 368-69 Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf, 247, 304 Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf, 304, 368-69 population: of Abu Dhabi, 209; of Bah- rain, xxiii, 118-20, 353-54; of Dubayy, 208, 229, 263; of Kuwait, xxi, 51, 53-54, 56, 93-94; of Oman, xxvii, 263-64, 268; of Qatar, 163-64; of Sharjah, 208; of United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203, 208-9, 229 ports: in Bahrain, 114, 132; in Kuwait, 68; in Oman, 289, 290; in United Arab Emirates, 230, 237 Port Services Corporation, 295 Portugal: exploration by, 20, 323; trade by, 20 Portuguese rule, xx; end of, xx, 22; of Iran, 20; of Oman, 20; of Qatar, 154 presidency: of United Arab Emirates, xxvi, 241 press (see also media): in Bahrain, 143; in Kuwait, xxi, 81, 85, 86, 87, 101; in Qatar, 187 Press and Publishing Law (1961) (Kuwait) , 86 prime minister: in Kuwait, 79; in Qatar, 183 privatization: in Kuwait, xxi, 99; in Oman, xxvii Q8.63 qadis (judges): appointment of, 12 Qafco. See Qatar Fertilizer Company Qahtan tribe, 37-38 Qalhat, port of, 20 461 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Qapco. See Qatar Petrochemical Com- pany Qarmat, Hamdan, 18 Qarmatians. See Islam, Qarmatian Qasco. See Qatar Steel Company Qatar: agriculture in, 158, 161, 177-78; aid from, 210, 215; armed forces, 339, 355-60; Bahrain's embargo against, 159; banking in, 180; birth rate in, 164; border disputes of, xxv, 204, 329; borders of, 163, 204; British advisers in, 160; budget of, 180-82; bureau- cracy of, 160, 161; business in, 173, 189-90; censorship in, 183, 187, 191; citizenship in, 189-90; civil rights in, 186, 187; claim of, to Hawar and the adjacent islands, xxiv, 117, 162, 204; climate of, 163; constitution of, xxiv, 161, 182-83; court system in, 186, 360; currency of, 180; defense cooperation agreement of, with United States, xxv; defense spending, 358; democracy in, xxiv; economic diversification in, xxv, 153, 161; education in, 164-66, 183, 187-88; electoral districts of, 185; elec- tricity in, 160; entrepot trade in, 182; fiscal year, 181; fishing in, 154, 158, 161, 175, 177, 178; foreign relations of, 153; foreign residents in, xxv, 113, 161, 164, 177, 215, 358; gas from, 73, 175, 192, 281; geography of, 162-63; Great Depression in, 159; gross national product in, 165; in Gulf Cooperation Council, xxv, 36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; health care in, 166-67, 170, 187-88; herding in, 175, 177; independence for, xx, xxiv, 33, 161-62, 171; indigenization in, 177; industry in, 173-75; inflation in, 170; infrastructure in, 161, 170; investment by, xxv, 1 82; and Iran-Iraq War, 355; Islam in, xxv, 25, 153, 164, 192; labor relations in, 170, 176-77; legal system in, 161, 186; legislature of, xxiv; life expectancy in, 167; liter- acy rate, 165; livestock in, 178, 182; media, 179, 183, 187, 191; merchant families in, 189-90; nationalization in, 171; nomads in, 154; oil in, xxv, 30, 153,158, 159, 167-72, 174-75, 180, 182, 187-88; Ottoman rule of, ended, 158; Palestinians in, 358; pearling in, 153, 154, 158, 175, 176, 177; in Persian Gulf War, xxv, 328, 345, 358; police force of, 160; political activity in, 160, 177; political opposition in, 190-91; population in, 163-64; relations of, with Bahrain, xxiv, 28, 144-45, 162, 192-93; relations of, with Britain, 160, 193; relations of, with China, 194; rela- tions of, with Egypt, 192; relations of, with Iran, xxv, 192; relations of, with Kuwait, xxiii; relations of, with Russia, 194; relations of, with Saudi Arabia, xxv, 192, 355; relations of, with Soviet Union, 194; relations of, with Syria, 192; relations of, with United States, xxv, 193-94; ruling family of, 23, 24, 30; slaves in, 154, 163, 176; social ser- vices in, 167; subsidies, 173; suffrage in, 183; support of Iraq by, in Iran-Iraq War, xxv, 191; telecommunications in, 160, 179; threats to, 26; trade, 158, 182; transportation in, 178-79; in tru- cial system, xxiv, 324; wages in, 176; water in, 160, 163, 192; welfare system in, 187-88; women in, 183; workforce, 164, 175-77 Qatar Broadcasting Service, 191 Qatar Fertilizer Company (Qafco), 173- 74 Qatar Hour Mills Company, 175 Qatargas. See Qatar Liquefied Gas Com- pany Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC),171, 174,175 Qatar Industrial Manufacturing Com- pany, 173 Qatar Islamic Bank, 180 Qatar Liquefied Gas Company (Qatar- gas), 172 Qatar Monetary Agency (QMA), 180 Qatar National Bank (QNB), 180 Qatar National Cement Company (QNCC),175 Qatar National Fishing Company, 178 Qatar National Islamic Bank, 180 Qatar National Petroleum Company, 171 Qatar News Agency, 191 Qatar Peninsula, 154 Qatar Petrochemical Company (Qapco), 173, 174-75 Qatar Petroleum Company (QPC), 168; labor relations of, 170 462 Index Qatar Steel Company (Qasco), 173, 174 Qatar Television Service, 191 QGPC. See Qatar General Petroleum Corporation QMA. See Qatar Monetary Agency QNB. See Qatar National Bank QNCC. See Qatar National Cement Com- pany Qom, 14, 15 QPC. See Qatar Petroleum Company Quran, 10 Quran schools: in Kuwait, 54-55 Quraysh tribe, 9 radio: in Bahrain, 132, 134; in Kuwait, 69, 87; in Oman, 291; in Qatar, 179 Radio Kuwait, 87 Ramadan, 10-11 Ramdas, Khimji, 310 Ras al Khaymah (see also United Arab Emirates), 22; agriculture in, 215, 232; armed forces of, 361, 362; borrowing by, 237; electricity in, 228; hospitals in, 212; industry in, 227; oil revenues in, 203, 216; political options for, 33; pop- ulation of, 209; representatives from, to Federal National Council, 241-42; ruling family in, 31, 243, 244, 246; schools in, 210; support for Iran by, 365; territorial disputes of, 249, 329; as trading center, 26; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203, 239 Ras Al Khaymah International Airport, 230, 236-37 Ras Al Khaymah Rock Company, 227 Rashid oil field (Dubayy), 222 Ras Laffan: gas production at, 172; port of, 162 Ras Musandam. See Musandam Penin- sula Raysut Cement Corporation, 286 Raysut Industrial Estate, 288, 309 Real Estate Bank of Kuwait, 70 recession: in Kuwait, 70, 75; in United Arab Emirates, 218 Red Sea, 8 regional instability, 35, 321, 323; Iran as threat to, 35, 36, 321; Iraq as threat to, 87, 321; and Kuwait, 87 regional security, 331-33; limits on, 331, 336 Republican Guard (Iraq), 327, 332 Reserve Fund for Future Generations (Kuwait) , 4; depletion of, xxi; estab- lished, 71 Reza (imam), 14; suspected treachery against, 15 Rima oil field (Oman), 275, 277 roads: in Bahrain, 117, 132; in Kuwait, 68; in Oman, 269, 289, 290, 304; in United Arab Emirates, 215, 230, 237 Robertson Group of Britain, 286 Roman Empire, 8 Royal Armed Forces. See armed forces of Oman Royal Dutch Shell Oil, 168, 220, 275, 280 Royal Guard of Oman, 370 Royal Hospital, 268 Royal Household Troops (Oman), 370, 371 Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, 301,339, 346, 355,369 Royal Oman Air Force. SeezXr force of Oman Royal Oman Land Forces. See army of Oman Royal Oman Navy. See navy of Oman Royal Oman Police, 310, 375 Royal Oman Police Pension Trust, 295 Royal Yacht Squadron (Oman), 290, 370 Rub al Khali, 207, 259, 262 ruling families, 30-31, 36, 38-39; in Abu Dhabi, 30, 243; in Dubayy, 31, 243; in Kuwait, xxi, 23, 30, 47, 54, 73-79, 81, 94, 100; in Oman, xxvii, 26, 31; rela- tions of, with British, xx, xxiv, 26, 28, 30-31, 39, 74, 87, 89, 158, 299, 323, 328; relations of, with Ottomans, 74; relations of, with Wahhabis, 74; in United Arab Emirates, 23, 30, 243-46, 366 Rumailah Hospital (Qatar), 166, 167 Rusayl Industrial Estate (Oman), 286 Russia (see also Soviet Union): defense agreements with Kuwait, xxii, 92; mili- tary ties with, xxviii; relations of, with Qatar, 194 Ruus al Jibal, 259, 260-61 Ruways Fertilizer Industries, 227 Saad, Majid Muhammad al Majid as, 180 Safavid Dynasty, 19-20 Saghyah oil field (Sharjah) , 222 Said ibn Sultan Naval Base, 371 463 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Salalah, 262, 263; industry in, 286; radio in, 291; schools in, 265 Salalah Air Base, 368, 372 Salmaniya Medical Center (Bahrain), 122 Santa Fe International Corporation, 62 Sargon, 323 Sassanian rule, xx, 8-9 Sath ar Ras Boot oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220 Saud, Abd al Aziz ibn, 158 Saud, Muhammad ibn, 24 Saudi Arabia, 190; aid from, 215, 314, 326; border agreement of, with Oman, xxviii, 313, 330-31; border agreement of, with Yemen, xxviii, 332; border dis- pute of, with Abu Dhabi, 247, 330; border dispute of, with Qatar, xxv; borders of, 48, 90; claim of, on United Arab Emirates, 32, 313; established, 25; exports to, 174, 239; foreign resi- dents in, 113; foreign workers in, 215; influence of, 82; Kuwaitis in exile in, 100; in Gulf Cooperation Council, xx, xxix, 36, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; military assistance provided by, 304, 336, 369; oil in, 29, 60, 128, 135- 36; oil shared with Kuwait, 48; in Per- sian Gulf War, 327, 328, 358; relations of, with Bahrain, 136, 143; relations of, with Iran, 313; relations of, with Kuwait, 93; relations of, with Oman, 313; relations of, with Qatar, xxv, 192, 355; relations of, with United Arab Emirates, 247; security concerns of, 143; trade dispute of, with Kuwait, 75 Sayh Halat: minerals in, 286 Sayh Nuhaydah oil field (Oman), 275, 278; gas from, 280 Sayh Rawl gas field (Oman), 280 schools: in Abu Dhabi, 210; in Bahrain, 120-21; British, 210; in Dubayy, 210; in Kuwait, 55; in Oman, 265, 269, 304; in Qatar, 164-66; in Sharjah, 210; in United Arab Emirates, 210-1 1 Schwarzkopf, H. Norman (general), 327 Scimitar Oils (Dubai), 222 SCR See Supreme Council for Planning (Qatar) SCQ See Shell Company of Qatar SCU. See Supreme Council of the Union (United Arab Emirates) Second of August Movement, 346 security, internal: in Bahrain, 353-55; in Kuwait, 94, 102, 336, 342, 346-47; in Oman, 374-76; in United Arab Emir- ates, 366-67 Security and Intelligence Service (Bah- rain) , 354 security concerns: of Bahrain, 140; of Kuwait, xx, 143, 332; of United Arab Emirates, xxvi, 144, 204 Security Court (Bahrain) , 354 Seven Imam Shia. See Islam, Seven Imam Shafii, Muhammad ibn Idris ash, 13, 142 Shafii school of Islamic law, 13, 142, 209, 242-43 Shamlan, Abd al Aziz, 1 39 Shanfari, Said Ahmd ash, 277, 309 Shanfari and Partners, 288, 309 sharia. See law, sharia Sharjah {see also United Arab Emirates), 22; agriculture in, 232; aid to, 215; armed forces of, 361, 362; British troops in, 325; border disputes of, 223; borrowing by, 237, 245; concessions in, 222; coup attempt in, 237, 245; electricity in, 228; hospitals in, 212; industry in, 226, 227; oil in, 203, 216, 222; political options for, 33; popula- tion of, 209; port of, 214; relations of, with Iran, 366; representatives from, to Federal National Council, 241-42; ruling family in, 31, 243, 244-45; schools in, 210; territorial disputes of, 248, 329; as trading center, 26; in United Arab Emirates, xxv, 203 Sharjah International Airport, 230, 236- 37 Shaybikah oil field (Oman), 275 Shell Company of Qatar (SCQ): conces- sion, 168 Shia. See Islam; Muslims ShiatAli, 11 Shihuh people, 264 shipbuilding, 47; in Kuwait, 57-58; as source of income, xix; in United Arab Emirates, 215 ships: drydock and repair facilities for, xxiii, 117, 132,226, 227 shrimp, 124, 234 Singapore: trade with, 182 Sitrah, 117, 119, 120; oil export termi- 464 Index nal, 117; oil refinery, 128, 135-36; port of, 132 slaves: in Oman, 263, 298, 301; in Qatar, 154, 158, 163, 176; in United Arab Emirates, 214, 215, 228 slave trade, 28, 157, 215, 297 Socal. See Standard Oil Company of Cali- fornia social services: in Bahrain, 112, 122; in Kuwait, 57, 75, 80; in Qatar, 167; in United Arab Emirates, 236 Somalia: United Nations peacekeeping forces in, xxvi South Korea. See Korea, Republic of South Yemen. See Yemen, People's Dem- ocratic Republic of Soviet Union (see also Russia): Afghani- stan invaded by, 247; in Iran-Iraq War, 340; materiel from, 332; military advis- ers from, 346; military assistance from, 326; relations of, with Kuwait, 88; rela- tions of, with Qatar, 194; support of, for Dhofar rebellion, 305, 368-69 Spanish Petroleum Company. See Com- pania Espanola de Petroleos Sri Lanka: workers from, 130, 203, 208 Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) (see also Chevron Corpora- tion): concessions of, 29, 124-27 State Consultative Council (Oman) (see also Consultative Council), xxviii, 302, 310; origins of, 311-12 State General Reserve Fund (Oman), 272 State Security Act (1974) (Bahrain), 354 State Security Court (Kuwait), 348 State Security Law (Kuwait), 348 steel industry: Qatar's investment in, xxv stock market crash of 1977 (Kuwait), 70 stock market crash of 1982 (Kuwait). See Suq al Manakh stockmarket crash Strait of Hormuz, 336, 369, 372 strikes: in Bahrain, 113; in Qatar, 176-77; in United Arab Emirates, 229 subsidies: from Britain, 257; in Kuwait, xxi, 55, 57, 66, 95, 98; in Oman, 257, 281, 285; in Qatar, 173; in United Arab Emirates, 214, 233, 234 succession: to amirs, 39; in Bahrain, 111, 136-37; in Kuwait, 74-75, 78-79; to Muhammad, 11-12 Sudan: aid to, 93; workers from, 266 Suez Canal: trade through, 28 suffrage: in Bahrain, 139; in Kuwait, xxi, 84; in Qatar, 183 Suhar, 263; industrial estate planned for, 288; ore processing at, 285-86 Sulayman ibn Suwaylim, 299 sultan of Oman, 23; role of, xxvi Sultan Qabus Air Academy, 372 Sultan Qabus Military College, 371 Sultan Qabus University, 265, 266 Sultan's Armed Forces. See armed forces of Oman Sultan's Armed Forces Command and Staff College, 371 sunna, 10 Sunningdale Oils, 222 Sunnis. See Islam; Muslims Supreme Council for Planning (SCP) (Qatar), 175 Supreme Council of the Judiciary (Kuwait), 85 Supreme Council of the Union (SCU) (United Arab Emirates) , xxvi, 239-41 , 361 Supreme Court of Appeal (Bahrain), 142-43, 354 Supreme Court of the Union (United Arab Emirates), 242 Supreme Petroleum Council (United Arab Emirates), 219 Suq al Manakh stock market crash (1982) (Kuwait), 70, 82,97 Sur, 264; industrial estate planned for, 288 Syria: aid to, 238; in Damascus meeting, 336-37; in Persian Gulf War, 321, 328; relations of, with Kuwait, 92; relations of, with Qatar, 192; troops of, sta- tioned in Kuwait, 322; workers from, 52 taaziya passion plays, 16 Taiwan: exports to, 286 Tanam hospital (Oman), 268 taxes: in Abu Dhabi, 236; in Dubayy, 236; in Kuwait, 86; in Oman, 257, 270 teachers: in Kuwait, 55, 96; in Oman, 265; in Qatar, 165, 166; in United Arab Emirates, 210 Technip Geoproduction, 171 telecommunications: in Bahrain, 112; in Kuwait, 68, 99; in Oman, 290-91, 302; 465 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies in Qatar, 179; in United Arab Emir- ates, 230-32, 237 telephones: in Kuwait, 69; in Oman, 290- 91; in Qatar, 160, 179; in United Arab Emirates, 230-32 television: in Bahrain, 132; in Kuwait, 69, 87; in Oman, 291; in Qatar, 179; in United Arab Emirates, 232 terrorism: in Bahrain, 353; in Kuwait, 332, 347 Texaco. See Texas Oil Company Texas Oil Company (Texaco), 127 Thailand: oil refining in, 279; trade with, 182; workers from, 203 Thamarit Air Base, 316, 372 Times of Oman, 312 Tokyo Boeki, 1 74 Total-Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, 275, 280 trade (see also exports; imports), 4-8, 24; by Bahrain, 111, 112, 135-36; with China, 18; competition, 25, 368; dis- putes, 75; by India, 4, 174, 227; with Japan, 136, 182; of Kuwait, 57, 66, 72- 73, 98-99, 136; land routes for, 7-8; of Oman, 34, 272-74; of Qatar, 158, 182; role of gulf in, xx; of United Arab Emirates, 136, 214, 218, 238-39; water routes for, 4-7, 28 transportation: in Bahrain, 132-34, 179; in Kuwait, 68-69; in Oman, 179, 289- 90, 302; in Qatar, 178-79; in United Arab Emirates, 179, 229-30 Treaty of Al Uqayr (1922) , 48 Treaty of As Sib (1920) , 300, 301 Treaty of Lausanne (1923), 90 Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity (1853), 203 Treaty of Al Uqayr (1899), 87, 89 tribes, 7, 31, 37-39 Trucial Coast, xx, 26, 157, 158, 203, 212, 239; slavery in, 228 Trucial Coast Development Oil Com- pany (see also Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations; Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company) , 220 Trucial Oman. See Oman Trucial Oman Levies, 361 Trucial Oman Scouts, 313, 325, 331, 361 Trucial States Development Fund, 212 trucial system: xxiv, 26, 361 324 Tunb al Kubra (Greater Tumb) (island): dispute over, xxvi, 246, 248-49, 329 Tunb as Sughra (Lesser Tumb) (island): dispute over, xxvi, 246, 248-49, 329 Tunisia, xxiii Turkey: payments to, for Persian Gulf War, 365; workers from, 203 Twelve Imam Shia. See Islam, Twelve Imam Shia Umar, 11 Umayyad Dynasty, 14 Umm ad Dalkh oil field (Abu Dhabi), 221 Umm al Qaywayn (see also United Arab Emirates), 22, 246; agriculture in, 232; aquaculture in, 234; industry in, 227; oil in, 222, 223; political options for, 33; population of, 209; representatives from, to Federal National Council, 241-42; ruling family in, 31, 243; schools in, 210; in United Arab Emir- ates, xxv, 203 Umm an Nar, 221 Umm an Nasan (island), 117 Umm ash Shayf oil field (Abu Dhabi), 220 Umm Said: industry in, 172-75; popula- tion of, 164; port of, 162, 178 Union Bank of the Middle East, 235 Union Bank of Oman, 295 Union Carbide, 226 Union Defense Force (United Arab Emirates) . See armed forces of United Arab Emirates United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see also under individual amirates) , 22; agricul- ture in, 215, 232-33, 237-38; aid from, 314; airports in, 230, 236, 237; armed forces of, 215, 241, 243, 339, 361-64; banking, 234-36; borders of, 163, 204; budget of, xxv, 203, 236-38, 239; citi- zenship in, 203, 229, 241; climate of, 207-8; constitution of, xxv-xxvi, 239; court system of, 242, 366-67; creation of, xxv; currency of, 234; defense of, xxv, 239; defense spending of, 236, 237, 365; disputes of, over Persian Gulf islands, 204; economy in, 216-18, 237-39, 365-66; education in, 210-11, 212, 236, 237; electricity, 228; entrepot trade in, 237; fishing in, 214, 232, 233- 34, 237; foreign relations of, 203, 361; 466 Index foreign residents in, xxv, 113, 203, 208-9, 213, 228-229; forestry, 233; gas in, 219, 221, 238; geography of, 204-8; in Gulf Cooperation Council, 36, 104, 113, 144, 248, 314, 321, 326, 333; health care in, 212-14, 237; herding in, 215; housing in, xxvi, 214; human rights in, 367; independence, xx; indi- genization, 223-27; industry in, 223- 26; infrastructure in, 203, 216, 236, 237; internal security in, 366-67; dur- ing Iran-Iraq War, 204, 238, 247, 248, 365; Islam in, 25, 209, 366; judiciary in, 239, 242-43; literacy in, 211; live- stock in, 233, 238; materiel for, xxvi, 215, 364; media in, 232, 246; members of, xxv, 203; military assistance from, 304, 369; negotiations to form, 33; nomads in, 215; oil, xxi, 203, 216, 218- 22, 238; payments by, for Persian Gulf War, 218, 365; pearling in, 214; in Per- sian Gulf War, xxvi, 365, 374; police in, 366; population of, xxv, 203, 208-9; ports of, 230, 237; relations of, with Iran, 247, 248; relations of, with Iraq, 219-20, 247; relations of, with Saudi Arabia, 247; relations of, with United States, 247, 248; revenues, 237; roads in, 215, 230, 237; ruling families of, 23, 30, 243-46, 366; Saudi claims to, 32; security concerns of, xxvi, 144, 204; shipbuilding in, 215; slaves in, 214, 215, 228; in Somalia, xxvi; strikes in, 229; subsidies in, 218, 233, 234; telecommunications in, 230-32, 237; territorial dispute with Iran, xxvi; trade of, 136, 214, 218, 238-39; trans- portation in, 179, 229-30; utilities in, 237; wages in, 226; water in, 207, 228, 233; welfare system in, 214, 236, 237, 237; women in, 211-12, 214; work force in, 212, 229 United Arab Emirates Broadcasting Ser- vice, 246 United Arab Emirates University, 211, 212; military training in, 363 United Fisheries of Kuwait, 68 United Nations, 21 1; Bahrain as member of, 145; demarcation of Kuwait's bor- ders by, 48, 91; and Dhofar rebellion, 34; peacekeeping forces, xxvi; Qatar as member of, 194; resolution condemn- ing Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, xxiii, 48; territorial disputes arbitrated by, xxvi; United Arab Emirates as member of, 249 United Nations coalition (Persian Gulf War), 327 United Nations Department of Techni- cal Cooperation for Development, 286 United Nations Development Pro- gramme, 57 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 120 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 124 United Nations Fund for Technical and Financial Assistance, 263 United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 288 United Nations Security Council Resolu- tion 687,91, 327 United States: defense cooperation agreement of, with Bahrain, xxiv, 144, 145, 353; defense cooperation agree- ment of, with Kuwait, xxii, 92, 322, 337, 342; defense cooperation agree- ment of, with Oman, 374; defense cooperation agreement of, with Qatar, xxv; defense cooperation agreement of, with United Arab Emirates, 248; embassy in Kuwait, bombed, 78; influ- ence of, on Oman, 315-16; in Iran-Iraq War, 340; joint military exercises of, with Kuwait, xxii, 92; materiel from, xxii, 342, 343, 350, 356, 364, 371; mili- tary agreements with Bahrain, 352-53; military agreements with Oman, xxviii; military assistance from, 326; military ties with, xxviii, 262, 333; mili- tary training by, 346, 364; payments to, for Persian Gulf War, 218, 345, 365; in Persian Gulf War, 191, 321, 327, 328, 345, 358; protection by, in Iran-Iraq War, 36; relations of, with Bahrain, xxiv, 145; relations of, with Kuwait, 88, 92; relations of, with Oman, xxviii; relations of, with Qatar, xxv, 193-94; relations of, with United Arab Emir- ates, 247; security role of, xxviii-xxix; study in, 55, 166, 246; trade with, 72, 136, 182; workers from, 52, 203, 209, 212 United States Agency for International 467 Persian Gulf States: Country Studies Development (AID), 316 United States Arms Control and Disar- mament Agency, 339 United States Army Corps of Engineers, 92 United States Middle East Force, 352-53 University College of Art, Science, and Education (Bahrain), 121 University of Bahrain, 121 University of Qatar, 166 urban migration: in Bahrain, 119; in Oman, xxvii, 257, 258, 284 urf. See law: customary Uthman, 11, 12, 16 utilities: in Kuwait, 57; in Oman, xxvii; in United Arab Emirates, 237 Wadi adh Dhayd, 232 Wadi al Batin, 51 Wadi Mughshin, 262 wadis: in Bahrain, 118; in Kuwait, 67; in Oman, 261, 263 Wadi Samail, 261 wages: in Kuwait, 66; in Qatar, 176; in United Arab Emirates, 226 wahhabis. See Islam, Wahhabi Sunni walayat (spiritual guidance), 13 Warbah (island), 47, 91; claims to, 48, 90, 327, 330 water: in Bahrain, 117, 118; from Iraq, 64; in Kuwait, 51, 64, 66; in Oman, 258, 269, 282, 292-93; pollution, in Bahrain, 124; in Qatar, 160, 163; in United Arab Emirates, 207, 215, 226, 228, 233 welfare system: in Bahrain, 121; in Kuwait, 57; in Oman, 258, 259, 292; in Qatar, 187-88; in United Arab Emir- ates, 214, 236, 237 West Germany. See Germany, Federal Republic of women: in armed forces, xxviii; in Bah- rain, 130-32, 139; under Islam, 10, 16; in Kuwait, 54, 55, 84, 347; in Oman, 339-40; in Qatar, 165, 177, 183; in United Arab Emirates, 210-12, 214 Women's Federation (United Arab Emir- ates), 211 Women's Hospital (Qatar), 167 work force (see also foreign residents): in Bahrain, xxiii, 113, 129-32; in Kuwait, 51-52, 66; in Oman, xxvii, 258, 291, 292; in Qatar, xxv, 175-77; in United Arab Emirates, 212, 229 World Bank: Bahrain as member of, 145; recommendations by, for Kuwait, xxi World War II, 30 Xerox, 226 Yahya Enterprises, 310 Yarubid Dynasty, 297 Yathrib, 10 Yemen: aid to, 93, 238; border agree- ment with Saudi Arabia, xxviii, 332; border dispute with Oman, xxviii, 331, 332, 369; materiel of, 332 Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of (South Yemen— PDRY), 362-63; sup- port by, for Dhofar rebellion, 34, 302, 304, 368-69 Zangid Dynasty, 19 Zanzibar: British takeover of, 34; Omanis in, 23, 34, 263, 297, 325, 367 Zawawi, Omar Abd al Munim az, 309 Zawawi, Qais Abd al Munim az, 309 Zaydjabir ibn, 18-19 Zoroastrianism, 9 Zubair Enterprises, 295 Zufar. See Dhofar region 468 Contributors Jill Crystal, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Uni- versity of Michigan, has published several works on Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. Eric Hooglund currently serves as Editor of the Middle East Jour- nal; he has taught courses on the Middle East at several universities. Helen Chapin Metz is Supervisor, Middle East/ Africa/Latin America Unit, Federal Research Division, Library of Con- gress. Fareed Mohamedi is Senior Economist, Petroleum Finance Company, and author of articles on the Middle East and international oil affairs. William Smyth is an independent author who writes on the Middle East; he served as Visiting Assistant Professor at Emory University from 1989 through 1991. Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer who has written extensively on the Middle East and Africa for the Country Studies series. Anthony Toth, who has lived in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, has written widely on the Middle East for a num- ber of publications. 469 Published Country Studies (Area Handbook Series) 550-65 Afghanistan 550-28 Ethiopia 550-98 Albania 550-167 Finland 550-44 Algeria 550-155 Germany, East 550-59 Angola 550-173 Germanv Fed Ren of \JV1U11U1 X VUi 1VVU. V/X 550-73 Argentina VJ 11 £4.1 let 550-169 Australia 550-87 Greece 550-176 Austria 550-78 Guatemala 550-175 Bangladesh 550-174 Guinea 55O-170 Belgium CtWVATM PTlii Rp1i7P VJ U V CLL Id CLLlxS X^wllXiVv 550-66 Bolivia 550-151 Honduras X 1V/11UU1 uo 550-20 Brazil 550-165 Hungary 550-168 Bulgaria 550-21 India 550-61 Burma 550-154 Indian Ocean 550-50 Cambodia CCA 1Q Indonesia JJu J.UVJ V^CUllCl UU11 CCA f o 550-68 T Iran 550-159 Chad CCA 1 jjU— 31 Iraq jj~ / / Chile C C/~\ o c 550-25 Israel 550-60 China 550-182 Italy 550-26 Colombia 550-30 Japan JJU JJ V^UlllillUIl W Cdl 111 v^dl 1U 550-34 Jordan hpan T