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Truthmakers and modality

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Abstract

This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form <Possibly, p> or <Necessarily, p>. In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 2 I criticise Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 3 I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 4 I discuss, and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In Sect. 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the problem.

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  1. School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK

    Ross Paul Cameron

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Correspondence to Ross Paul Cameron.

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Cameron, R.P. Truthmakers and modality. Synthese 164, 261–280 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9225-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9225-2

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