Abstract
Does the United States shape the content of International Monetary Fund conditionality agreements? If so, in pursuit of what goals does the United States use its influence? We present evidence that American interests do shape the content of IMF conditionality agreements. We find that American policymakers use their influence in the IMF to pursue American financial and foreign policy objectives. The IMF offers larger loans to countries heavily indebted to American commercial banks than to other countries. In addition, the IMF offers larger loans to governments closely allied to the United States.
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1The authors would like to thank Mark Crescenzi, Erica Gould, Joseph Joyce, Timothy McKeown, Brad Verthein, James Vreeland, and Thomas Willett for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Oatley, T., Yackee, J. American Interests and IMF Lending. Int Polit 41, 415–429 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800085
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800085