The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia

1. NATO's membership did not “expand” in October 1990 when East Germany was absorbed into West Germany and simultaneously brought into the alliance, as the number of NATO member states did not change.

2. Michael R. Gordon, “The Anatomy of a Misunderstanding,” The New York Times, May 25, 1997, p. E3.

3. House Committee on International Relations, U.S. Policy Toward NATO Enlargement: Hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., June 20, 1996, p. 31.

4. Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight, Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), pp. 85–86. For the relevant passage, see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 185–186.

5. Leon V. Sigal, Hang Separately: Cooperative Security Between the United States and Russia, 1985–1994 (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2000), p. 174.

6. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), pp. 236–242; James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), pp. 234–235. See also Gordon, “Anatomy of a Misunderstanding” (Baker's comments).

7. Philip Zelikow, “NATO Expansion Wasn't Ruled Out,” International Herald Tribune, August 10, 1995, p. 5, http://www.iht.com/articles/1995/08/10/edzel.t.php.

8. “A Conversation With Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister,” Charlie Rose Show, PBS, September 25, 2008.

9. George Friedman, “Georgia and the Balance of Power,” New York Review of Books 55, no. 14 (September 25, 2008), p. 24, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21772.

10. Among the archives holding valuable collections of declassified materials are the Arkhiv Gorbachev-Fonda (AGF) and Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI) in Moscow; the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPM0) and Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU) in Berlin; the Bundesarchiv, Abteilungen Potsdam (BAAP) in Potsdam; the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA II) in College Park, Maryland; the George Bush Presidential Library (GBPL) in College Station, Texas; and the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library (SGMML) at Princeton University, which houses the James A. Baker III Papers. Many of the declassified records have recently been published. For collections of crucial Soviet documents, see Aleksandr Galkin and Anatolii Chernyaev, eds., Mikhail Gorbachev i germanskii vopros: Sbornik dokumentov, 1986–1991 (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2006); A. Chernyaev, ed., V Politbyuro TsK KPSS: Po zapisyam Anatoliya Chernyaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiya Shakhnazarova (Moscow: Al'pina Biznes-Buks, 2006); A. Chernyaev, Sovmestnyi iskhod: Dnevnik dvukh epokh, 1972–1991 gody (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008), pp. 833–896; A. S. Chernyaev, “M. S. Gorbachev i germanskii vopros,” Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, no. 2 (March–April 2000): 98–128; V. M. Falin, Konflikty v Kremle: Sumerki bogov po-russki (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 1999). For anthologies of declassified West German and East German documents, see Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit—Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998); Auswärtiges Amt, Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1990/91: Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Friedensordnung eine Dokumentation (Munich: Bonn Aktuell, 1991); Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., Countdown zur deutschen Einheit: Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen 1987–1990 (Berlin: Dietz, 1996); Detlef Nakath, Gero Neugebauer, and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., “Im Kreml brennt noch Licht”: Spitzenkontakte zwischen SED/PDS und KPdSU, 1989–1991 (Berlin: Dietz, 1998). For excerpts from U.S. documents, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Zelikow and Rice, both of whom worked on the National Security Council staff in 1990, were given privileged access to U.S. records when preparing their book.

11. Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy ; Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed ; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed; Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Helmut Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Propylaen, 1996); Hans Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995); Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innen-ansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1993); Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993); Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Hans Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur, 1991); Hans Modrow, Ich wollte ein neues Deutschland (Berlin: Dietz, 1998); Igor Maksimychev and Hans Modrow, Poslednii god GDR (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1993); Vyacheslav Kochemasov, Meine letzte Mission: Fakten, Erinnerungen, Überlegungen (Berlin: Dietz, 1994); Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i reformy, vols. 1 and 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995); Mikhail Gorbachev, Kak eto bylo: Ob”edinenie Germanii (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999); Yulii, Kvitsinskii, Vor der Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten (Berlin: Siedler, 1993); A. S. Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym: Po dnevnikovym zapisyam (Moscow: Progress-Kultura, 1993); Aleksandr Yakovlev, Sumerki (Moscow: Materik, 2003); Valentin Falin, Bez skidok na obstoyatel'stva (Moscow: Respublika, 1999); Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, trans. Heddy Pross-Weerth (Moscow: Droemer Knaur, 1993); Vladimir Kryuchkov, Lichnoe delo (Moscow: Olimp, 1996); Georgii Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody: Reformatsiya Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika (Moscow: Rossika-Zevs, 1993); Georgii Shakhnazarov, S vozhdyami i bez nikh (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001); Vladimir Semyonov, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow: Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission, 1939–1991 (Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995); Raspad: Kak on nazreval v “mirovoi sisteme sotsializma” (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994); Sergei Akhromeev and Georgii Kornienko, Glazami marshala i diplomata: Kriticheskii vzglyad na vneshnyuyu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1992); Georgii Kornienko, Kholodnaya voina: Svidetel'stvo ee uchastnika (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994); Eduard Shevardnadze, Als der Eiserne Vorhang zerriss: Begegnungen und Erinnerungen, trans. Nino Sologashvili and Alexander Kartozia (Duisburg: Peter W. Metzler Verlag, 2007); Dmitrii Yazov, Udary sud'by: Vospominaniya soldata i marshala, rev. ed. (Moscow: Paleia-Mishin, 1999). As with all memoirs, these books need to be used with caution and to be cross-checked against declassified documents and against other memoirs.

12. For detailed assessments of eastern European perceptions of the new security environment that emerged in the wake of the 1989 upheavals, see Mark Kramer, “NATO, Russia, and East European Security,” in Russia: A Return to Imperialism? ed. Uri Ra'anan and Kate Martin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 105–161; Mark Kramer, “Neorealism, Nuclear Proliferation, and East-Central European Strategies,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 363–443; Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 178–256; Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part 2),” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 3–67; Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part 3),” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (Winter 2004–2005): 3–96.

13. “Mazowiecki: Bez dwuznacznosci w sprawie granic,” Gazeta wyborcza (Warsaw), February 22, 1990, p. 1; Janusz Reitter, “Po co te wojska,” Gazeta wyborcza (Warsaw), February 14, 1990, p. 1; Roman Stefanowski, “Soviet Troops in Poland,” Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe 1, no. 9 (March 2, 1990): 15–17. The one notable exception was Lech Walęsa, who unsuccessfully called on the government to pursue an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.

14. “NATO-válasz a Horn-nyilatkozatra: Magyarokra tartozik a döntés,” Népszava (Budapest), February 22, 1990, p. 1. See Külügyminisztérium Magyar Köztársaság (KMK), Magyarország és a NATO (Budapest: KMK, 2003), pp. 1–28; Celestine Bohlen, “Hungary Broaching a Role in NATO,” New York Times, February 24, 1990, p. 6; “Improvizáció—a NATO tag Magyarországról,” Beszélo (Budapest), March 3, 1990; Alfred Reisch, “The Hungarian Dilemma: After the Warsaw Pact, Neutrality or NATO?” Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe 1, no. 15 (April 13, 1990): 16–22; László Valki, “Hungary's Road to NATO,” Hungarian Quarterly 40, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 1–18. For Soviet coverage of Horn's statements, see V. Gerasimov, “Raznorechivye otkliki,” Pravda, February 24, 1990, p. 1; “Vengriya i NATO,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, February 28, 1990, p. 5; “Vengriya: Zayavlenie D. Khorna,” Sovetskaya Rossiya, March 6, 1990, p. 3.

15. For a transcription of the interview with Eagleburger, see “Eagleburger budapest tárgyarlásal: Támogató magatartásával szolgálhatná Washington a stabilitás megörzését,” Népszabadság (Budapest), February 22, 1990, p. 1.

16. Jan Rylukowski, “Nowe wyzwania, stare odpowiedzi—remanenty polskiej polityki zagranicznej,” Tygodnik Solidarnosć, no. 37 (September 14, 1990: 5. This proposal, like others, came after the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany.

17. See Kramer, “NATO, Russia, and East European Security.”

18. V. Dashichev, “Edinaya Germaniya v edinoi Evrope,” Svobodnaya mysl’, no. 7 (July 1999: p. 119.

19. Sergei A. Karaganov, “The Year of Europe: A Soviet View,” Survival 32, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 122.

20. “Zapis’ obsuzhdeniya germanskogo voprosa na uzkom soveshchanii v kabinete General'nogo sekretarya TsK KPSS v zdanii TsK na Staroi ploshchadi, 26 yanvarya 1990 goda,” Verbatim Notes (Secret), January 26, 1990, in AGF, Fond (F.) 2, Opis’ (Op.) 1, Dokument (Dok.) 17814, Listy (Ll.) 1-5. All comments cited here and in the next three paragraphs are from this document. For memoir accounts of this meeting, see Chernyaev, Shest’ let s Gorbachevym, pp. 346–347; Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody, pp. 125–127; Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, pp. 489–490.

21. In December 1989, the SED had restyled itself as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), but it kept both names as a hyphenated compound (SED-PDS) until February 4, 1990, when it dropped the SED portion altogether.

22. “Zapis’ besedy M. S. Gorbacheva s Kh. Modrovym, 30 yanvarya 1990 goda,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), January 30, 1990, in AGF, F. 1, Op. 1, Dok. 16313, Ll. 1-13; “Niederschrift des Gesprächs von Hans Modrow mit Michail Gorbatschow, KPdSU-Generalsekretär und Vorsitzender des Obersten Sowjets der UdSSR, am 30. January 1990,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), January 30, 1991in BAAP, DC 20, 4973. The Russian and German documents are essentially identical, and the quotations in this paragraph are from the latter.

23. For detailed coverage of the plenum and the subsequent debate in the USSR over policy in Eastern Europe, see Kramer, “Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions Within the Soviet Union (Part 3),” pp. 4–72.

24. “Rede des Bundesministers Genscher anläßlich der Tagung der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, ‘Zur deutschen Einheit im europäischen Rahmen,’ 31 January. 1990,” in Der Bundesminister des Auswärtigen informiert, Mitteilung für die Presse No. 1026/90. See also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 174–176.

25. “JAB Notes From 2/2/90 Press Briefing Following 2-1/2 hr Mtg. w/ FRG FM Genscher, WDC,” in James A. Baker III Papers (JABP), Series 12, Subseries 8c, Folder 14; Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 715–719; Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 145–146; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 176–177; Thomas L. Friedman, “Baker and West German Envoy Discuss Reunification Issues,” New York Times, February 3, 1990, p. A8; Serge Schmemann, “Kohl Will Visit Moscow to Calm Soviets’ Fears,” New York Times, February 8, 1990, p. A5.

26. “Genscher bei Baker in Washington: ‘Gespräche über NATO-Mitgliedschaft bisher zu statisch,’” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 3, 1990, p. 2. See also “Genscher erläutert in Washington Vorteile des KSZE-Prozesses für die deutsche Einigung: Keine Einwände gegen Bakers Bedingungen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 5, 1990, p. 4; “Genscher nach seinen Gesprächen in den USA: ‘Deutsche sollen Grenze verbürgen,’” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 5, 1990, p. 3.

27. See “GERMANY 2/8/90” in “JAB Notes from 2/7–9/90 Ministerial Mtgs. w/ USSR FM Shevardnadze, Moscow USSR, Moscow, USSR,” in SGMML, JABP, Series 12, Subseries 12b, Folder 13. See also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 181–182; Shevardnadze, Als der Eiserne Vorhang zerris, pp. 136–137; “Optimism at Arms Talks: Soviet Reforms Add to ‘Elements of Trust,’” Seattle Times, February 8, 1990, p. 7A.

28. “Stenograficheskaya zapis’ besedy M. S. Gorbacheva s Dzh. Beikerom, 9 fevralya 1990 g.,” Transcript of Conversation (Top Secret), February 9, 1990, in AGF, F. 1, Op. 1, Dok. 19166, Ll. 1-14; “JAB Notes from 2/9/90 Mtg. w/ USSR Pres. Gorbachev & FM Shevardnadze, Moscow, USSR,” in SGMML, JABP, Series 12, Subseries 12b, Folder 12. See also Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 182–184.

29. The comments here and in the next sentence are from the Soviet transcript. Nearly identical phrasing is used in the U.S. document.

30. “Schreiben des Präsidenten Bush an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 9. Februar 1990,” in Küsters and Hofmann, eds., Deutsche Einheit, Dok, no. 170, pp. 784–785.

31. “Schreiben des Außenministers Baker an Bundeskanzler Kohl, 10. Februar 1990,” in Küsters and Hofmann, eds., Deutsche Einheit, Dok, no. 173, pp. 793–794.

32. Friedman, “Baker and West German Envoy Discuss Reunification Issues,” p. A8.

33. For authoritative accounts, see Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 118–121; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 184–186.

34. “Zapis’ besedy M. S. Gorbacheva s G. Kolem, 10 fevralya 1990 goda,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), February, 10 1990, in AGF, F. 1, Op. 1, Dok. 19011, Ll. 1-21; “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Generalsekretär Gorbatschow, Moskau, 10. Februar 1990,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), February 10, 1990, in Küsters and Hofmann, eds., Deutsche Einheit, Dok. No. 174, pp. 795–807.

35. Even after the Ottawa meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers on February 11–12, 1990, Soviet officials continued for a while to use the designation they preferred, “4 + 2.” See “Vypiska iz protokola No. 178 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS: P. III. O podgotovke predlozhenii k vstreche ‘Chetyre + dva’—SSSR, SShA, Velikobritaniya, Frantsiya, GDR i FRG,” Resolution from CPSU Politburo (Top Secret), February 13, 1990, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 9, Delo 74, L. 1. However, by the time an interview with Gorbachev was published in Pravda on February 21, 1990, he had “conditionally” accepted the inverse “2 + 4.” See “Otvety M. S. Gorbacheva na voprosy korrespondenta ‘Pravdy,’” Pravda, February 21, 1990, p. 1.

36. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, Camp David, 24. Februar 1990,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), February 24, 1990, in Küsters and Hofmann, eds., Deutsche Einheit, Dok. No. 192] pp. 860–873; “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush, Camp David, 25. Februar 1990,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), February 25, 1990, in Küsters and Hofmann, eds., Deutsche Einheit, Dok. No. 194, pp. 874–877.

37. “Joint News Conference Following Discussions With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1990-02-25,” in Public Papers of the President of the United States: George Bush, 1990, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), bk. 1, pp. 293–296.

38. See Kramer, “Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 3).”

39. “Dokladnaya zapiska po Germanii (obsuzhdenie na Politbyuro),” Memorandum (Secret), May 4, 1990, from Chernyaev to Gorbachev, in AGF, F. 2, Op. 3, D. 41, Ll. 1-3.

40. For an interesting firsthand account of the continued resistance by Soviet officials that proved wholly futile, see Rodric Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River: The World Turned Upside Down (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 130–134. Braithwaite was the British ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1990–1991.

41. “Paradoksy bezopasnosti,” Literaturnaya Rossiya, no. 21 (May 26, 1990), p. 7.

42. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Gorbatschow, Moskau, 15. Juli 1990,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), July 15, 1990, in Küsters and Hofmann, eds., Deutsche Einheit, Dok. No. 350, pp. 1340–1348; “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Gorbatschow im erweiterten Kreis, Archys/Bezirk Stawropol, 16. Juli 1990,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), July 16, 1990, in Küsters and Hofmann, eds., Deutsche Einheit, Dok. No. 353, pp. 1355–1367; “Zapis’ besedy M. S. Gorbacheva s G. Kolem, v Moskve, 15 iyulya 1990 goda,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), July 15, 1990, in AGF, F. 1, Op. 1, Ll. 1-14; “Zapis’ besedy M. S. Gorbacheva s G. Kolem, Arkhyz, 16 iyulya 1990 goda,” Transcript of Conversation (Secret), July 16, 1990, in AGF, F. 1, Op. 1, Ll. 1-24.

43. Michael MccGwire, “NATO Expansion: ‘A Policy Error of Historic Importance,’” Review of International Studies 24, no. 1 (1998): 26, 39.

44. It was republished as “Appendix,” with a brief introduction by Michael Clarke but otherwise intact: Michael MccGwire, “NATO Expansion: ‘A Policy Error of Historic Importance,’” International Affairs 84, no. 6 (November 2008): 1281–1301.

45. For a reproduction of the nine points, drafted by Robert Zoellick, see Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 263–264.

46. Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, p. 251.

47. Gates, From the Shadows, p. 492.

48. Manfred Knapp, “Negotiating the Unification of Germany: International Dimensions,” in The Economics of German Unification ed. A. Ghanie Ghaussy and Wolf Schäfer (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1–17; Randall E. Newnham, Deutsche Mark Diplomacy: Positive Economic Sanctions in German-Russian Relations (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 227–289; Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 151–184.