Operation “Marita”: The Attack Against Yugoslavia in 1941

¹ Niemiecka kampania na Bałkanach. Atak na Jugosłowię w 1941 roku, translated by Dr. Harold S. Orenstein, Leavenworth, KS.

²The coup d’etat by Simović and withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the Axis.

³A Bosnian Serb, student, member of a national liberation organization. Organizer and participant in the attempted assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. Arrested and sentenced. Died in prison.

⁴The Serbs successfully began military operations against Bulgaria and Austro-Hungary. However, the assistance given by Germany allowed Austro-Hungarian units to conduct a counteroffensive in 1915, resulting in their occupation of all of Serbia. The remains of the army, together with the court and the government, took refuge on Corfu. There Serbian units were reconstituted and, together with Greek and French units, took part in the fighting in the Balkans. At the same time, partisan detachments, the so-called Chetniks, appeared in occupied Serbia. These partisans conducted sabotage against the occupiers.

⁵H. Baerlin: The Birth of Yugoslavia, Vols. 1, 2 (London: 1922).

⁶W. Felczak: Historia Jugoslawii [History of Yugoslavia] (Warsaw-Wrocław-Kraków: 1985), pp. 432–433.

⁷In the opinion of geographic circles, Yugoslavia belongs to the most differentiated regions of Europe. Both the surface of the terrain and the climate features are varied, which has a very significant influence not only on the life of the people, but also on the conduct of military operations.

⁸M. Krukowska: Jugosławia (Warsaw: 1975), p. 9.

⁹This situation arose from the time that the above-mentioned rivers were regulated, which began after 1945. See T. Lenczowski, Z. Parucki, and A. Żebrowski: Austria, Finlandia, Jugosławia, Szwajcaria, Vademecum (Warsaw: 1973).

¹⁰Krukowska, p. 11.

¹¹“Karst” is the name of an area of morphological and hydrographic phenomena typical for areas built from rock that is soluble in water (limestone and gypsum) and permeable due to a system of fissures. During rain, water forces its way through the fissures into the depth of the rocky massif, where it circulates. Thus, the karst area is characterized by the absence of both surface water and a river system.

¹²This is the so-called Iron Gate. More will be said about this passage when discussing hydrographic problems.

¹³In the area mentioned in this article, only the southern part of the range is located on Yugoslav territory. The northern part—the Alps and the Istria Peninsula, belong to Italy in accordance with the Treaty of Rappalo. See Felczak.

¹⁴A. Żebrowski: Jugosławia (Warsaw: 1973), pp. 121–125.

¹⁵Bora (Italian or Greek bura)—a cold, very violent wind (attaining speeds of as much as 40–60 meters per second); storms, mainly in winter, from rather low mountain ranges in the direction of a warm sea or large lake. It appears in, among others, the region of the Adriatic Sea.

¹⁶Krukowska, p. 19.

¹⁷Żebrowski, p. 312.

¹⁸Krukowska, p. 15.

¹⁹Lenczowski, Parucki, and Żebrowski, pp. 136–137.

²⁰Krukowska, pp. 10–11.

²¹Krukowska, p. 17.

²²Ibid.

²³The gorges are narrowings of the river channels, which, in addition, are characterized by great depth and faster current (for example, the Danube on the Pannon Plain has a breadth of 380–2000 meters and a depth of 4.7–19 meters, while in the Kazunia region the breadth decreases to 115–190 meters. This gorge is called the Iron Gate and is the most convenient “door” into the heart of the Balkans.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 134–135.

²⁵M. Tanty: Bałkany w XX wieku. Dzieje polityczne [The Balkans in the 20^th century. Political history] (Warsaw: 2003), p. 173.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Skowronek, Tanty, and Wasilewski, p. 628.

²⁸Tanty, p. 174.

²⁹Felczak and Wasilewski, pp. 435–438.

³⁰Ibid, p. 435.

³¹Satalecki, p. 11.

³²Skowronek, Tanty, and Wasilewski, pp. 628–629.

³³Ibid., p. 628.

³⁴Felczak and Wasilewski, p. 434.

³⁵Ores were the foundation of rather acute competition on the part of European countries such as Germany, Italy, and France. Germany especially, through 1933, identified building and deepening economic ties with Yugoslavia as a priority for its foreign economic policy. For this reason, among others, the German-Yugoslav Trade Agreement was signed in 1934. See A. Garlicka, Wielka Brytania a Bałkany 1935–1939, Warszawa 2001, pp. 65–66.

³⁶L. Podhorodecki: Jugoslawia. Dzieje narodów, państw i rozpad federacji [Yugoslavia. History of the people and countries, and fall of the federation] (Warsaw: 2000), p. 6.

³⁷Lenczowski, Parucki, and Żebrowski, pp. 160–176.

³⁸In addition to that which was found in Hungary, these deposits were necessary raw materials for Germany for its metallurgy (arms) industry. Any loss of control or access was a serious matter. Before the outbreak of war, Germany produced around 200,000 tons of aluminum. See J. Solarz: Bałkany 1940–1941 [The Balkans, 1940–1941] (Warsaw: 2001), pp. 154–155.

³⁹The Great Depression deepened the tragic situation with regard to agriculture even more, bringing 70 percent of the farms to the verge of bankruptcy or complete ruin. See Skowronek, Tanty, and Wasilewski, p. 646.

⁴⁰For example, consumption of fertilizer in Great Britain amounted to 83.5 kilograms, in Poland - 6.7 kilograms, and in Yugoslavia - 0.6 kilograms. The annual crop yield in Yugoslavia was 10.4 quintals per hectare, as compared with 23 quintals per hectare in Great Britain. See Podhorodecki, pp. 162–163.

⁴¹The zadruga was a system of joint family ownership, the features of which were joint production and consumption. It was widespread among the Balkan Slavs. This survived until the twentieth century. It was undoubtedly a relic of an ancestral system. See L. Leciejewicz (ed.); Mały Słownik kultury dawnych Słowian [Small dictionary of the culture of the ancient Slavs] (Warsaw: 1990), p. 418.

⁴²Satalecki, pp. 10–11.

⁴³Felczak and Wasilewski, p. 437.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵The difficult terrain conditions, together with the climate (it was winter), caused terrible losses to the Tito's units and practically eliminated them from the fighting for a period of time. On the other hand, the better equipped and trained occupation units achieved considerable success and gained the initiative during the first phase.

⁴⁶On that same day, however, Yugoslavia signed an agreement to transport airplanes for Poland from the West across its territory. Greece did the same on 13 September. Despite this, on 01 and 05 September the Yugoslav government assured Germany of its neutrality. See H. Batowski: Agonia pokoju i początek wojny [The agony of peace and the beginning of war] (Poznań: 1969), p. 381.

⁴⁷Yugoslav foreign policy was directed by Minister Cincar-Marković, a compliant man who was under the influence of German power. Regent Prince Paul exerted great influence on Yugoslavia's position. This quiet supporter of Great Britain attempted to not take any position, believing that in this way he could keep Yugoslavia out of all conflicts. See Batowski, p. 375.

⁴⁸Garlicka, p. 70.

⁴⁹Felczak and Wasilewski, p. 469.

⁵⁰The concept of organizing a base in the Balkans against Germany arose in French military circles in 1936. In September 1939, General Maxim Weygand visited the Balkans for talks with the Balkan countries and the Turkish mission. See B. Satalecki: Jugoslawia 41–45 (Warsaw: 1998), p. 8.

⁵¹Batowski, pp. 382–383.

⁵²H. Batowski: ‘Państwa bałkańskie wobec wojny włosko-grecki w latach 1940–1941′ [The Balkan countries in the face of the Italo-Greek War in 1940–1941], Wojskowy Przegłąd Historyczny [Military-Historical review, hereafter cited as WPH], 1962 (2), pp. 208–227. In the initial phase this plan was to lead to the occupation of Yugoslavia, and then Greece. In the face of Germany's resolute opposition, it was decided to occupy Greece. Earlier Italian troops had landed in Albania, which resulted in Albania's formal capitulation to Italy. See also Solarz, pp. 6–7, 9.

⁵³J. Kozeński: Agresja na Jugoslawię [Aggression against Yugoslavia] (Poznań: 1979), pp. 81–83.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 88–89.

⁵⁵This concerned, among other things, German guarantees of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, abandonment on the part of Rome and Berlin of the intention to march their forces across Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia's non-involvement in the war against Greece.

⁵⁶In July 1940, General Borivoje Mirković organized a group of Royal Army officers, together with General Dušan Simonović, Chief of the Yugoslav Air Force. See Judah, p. 115.

⁵⁷In 1940, foreseeing Germany's intention to subjugate the Balkan countries, Churchill recommended that assistance be given to a group of officers planning to overthrow the Yugoslav regent. The aim of this action was to pull Yugoslavia out from under the state of subordination to the interests of the Axis and to establish its cooperation with England and Greece, which, as a result, would have to lead to war between Yugoslavia and the Axis powers.

⁵⁸General Dušan Simonović was the Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav Air Force and the silent protector of the group of conspirators.

⁵⁹J. Tomasević: Chetniks. War and Revolution, Yugoslavia 1941–1945 (Stanford: 1975), p. 54.

⁶⁰In a memorandum dated 17 January 1941, the Soviet ambassador to Berlin stated that the USSR would consider Germany's further military involvement in the Balkans as hostile with regard to Soviet interests. See Solarz, p. 34.

⁶¹Ibid. Stalin continued to believe in Hitler's assurances of friendship. In addition, his decision was undoubtedly influenced by the unsuccessful Finnish Campaign, which underscored the weakness of the Red Army.

⁶²During the conference Hitler declared that Yugoslavia's position was uncertain with respect to both the planned German attack against Greece and the subsequent attack against the USSR. It was therefore necessary to “destroy Yugoslavia as a country by force of arms” before the attack against the USSR. He said that the war against Yugoslavia would be popular among its neighbors, especially Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. With this aim, Germany proposed a distribution of territorial gains: the Dalmatian coast to Italy, Baczka and Baranjaa to Hungary, and Macedonia to Bulgaria. See F. Halder: Dziennik Wojenny [War diary], Vol. II (Warsaw: 1973).

⁶³The name for the plan of attack against Russia.

⁶⁴Bulgarian units were not to take part in the aggression against Yugoslavia. They did, however, on the one hand, provide additional units for security against the USSR in the north and east, and, on the other hand, provide logistics assistance to General List's 12^th Army. See Tanty, p. 230.

⁶⁵Practically speaking, the Entente continued until Spring 1938, when the Czech Republic fell.

⁶⁶On 29 March, Simović was already trying to obtain both diplomatic and military assistance from the US. On behalf of President Roosevelt, the Secretary of State proposed to Yugoslav Ambassador Fotić military assistance within the framework of Lend-Lease. This initiative, which was to deter Hitler, did not, however, produce the desired effect—above all, time was necessary for its implementation. See Solarz, p. 38.

⁶⁷T. Rawski: ‘Agresja niemecka przeciwko Grecji i Jugoslawii, cz. II’ [German aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia, part II], WPH, 1966 (1), p. 84.

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 83–85.

⁶⁹The issue here is the Munich Conference and the Czechoslovakia's loss of the Sudetenland in 1938, and the further effect of Germany's taking the entire country by force, thereby leading to the dissolution of the Little Entente.

⁷⁰The principal concept of plan R-1940 was as follows (according to the then Chief of Staff, General Kosić: “Defense against German forces, which would be attacking from Austria and Hungary, and against Italian forces on our western front, including a front against Albania, so that Zadar is taken by an attack by our forces; obervation against Romania, if needed; and action against Bulgaria in the spirit of the Balkan Pact.” See W. F. Culinović: Slom stare Jugoslavije (1941) (Zagreb: 1958), p. 172.

⁷¹See Rawski, pp. 60–88.

⁷²Culinović, p. 176.

⁷³Rawski, pp. 155–156.

⁷⁴One can find more on the theme of the terrain in the first section of this article, including a commentary concerning the possibility of using it for various forms of military operations. In addition, see P. Kleut: Taktyce działań partyzantki jugosławianskiej [Tactics of Yugoslav partisan operations] (Warsaw: 1973), and Rawski.

⁷⁷This would make it possible to save the army and count on a repetition of 1918, liberating the country as a result of a counteroffensive.

⁷⁵It had come into being in antiquity, when Sremska Mitrovica (Sianium), Belgrad (Sindigunum) and Smederevo (Viminacium) closed the access (across the Danube) to the depth of the Balkans along the Great and South Morava Valley and further across the Wardar to Salonika. It constituted a barrier on the Constantinople (Byzantium), Sofia (Sardica), Niš (Naissus) route to Ljubljana (Emony) and Akvilei. See Rawski, Vol. II, pp. 87–88.

⁷⁶The fall of the Roman strongholds in this region opened the road into the depth of the Balkans for the Slavs. Tsar Vasilii II had this in mind for the purpose of closing the sally-port. Several centuries later Belgrade was the point around which was centered fighting against the Hungarians and later the Austrians and Turks. See M. Tanty: Historia Słowian poludnoivych i zachodnich [History of the South and West Slavs] (Warsaw: 1967); M. Tanty, Konflikty bałkańskie latach 1878–1918 [Balkan conflicts from 1878–1918]; H. Batowski, Państwa Bałkańskie [Balkan countries] (Kraków: 1938).

⁷⁸Solarz, p. 38.

⁷⁹Culinović, p. 173.

⁸⁰Solarz, p. 40.

⁸¹Rawski, pp. 88–89.

⁸²V. Terzić, Jugoslavija u aprilskom ratu [Yugoslavia in April 1941] (Titograd: 1963), pp. 260–273.

⁸³Rawski, p. 72.

⁸⁴Solarz, pp. 38–39.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 73–77.

⁸⁶Rawski, Vol. II, p. 95.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Rawski, Vol. III, pp. 146–147.

⁸⁹W. Hubatsch: Hitler's Weisungen über die Kriegsfürung 1939–1945 (Frankfurt: 1962), pp. 106–108.

⁹⁰F. Halder: Dziennik wojenny [War diary] (Warsaw: 1973), pp. 398–401.

⁹¹Rawski, p. 148.

⁹²This was in accordance with Directive No. 26.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴These units were formerly designated for operations in the south.

⁹⁵2^nd Army, which was envisioned as the second echelon for “BARBAROSSA,” was in a similar situation.

⁹⁶Terzić, pp. 222–229.

⁹⁷These data were given by Rawski and Terzić, but do not agree with reality. Each wing probably had 30 vehicles.

⁹⁸ Rawski, p. 176.

⁹⁹ Hindering Italian aspirations was the German veto in the face of preparations for the attack against Yugoslavia. Thus, this concentration was suspended. See Kozeński, pp. 52–53. See also H. Batowski: Agonia pokoju, początek wojny [The agony of peace, the beginning of war] (Poznań: 1969), pp. 372–384.

¹⁰⁰Solarz, pp. 41–43.

¹⁰¹The Italian 2^nd Army commander estimated that he had before him in the first echelon three Yugoslav divisions and four detachments (including two mountain detachments), and in the second echelon three infantry divisions, totaling around 230,000 men. In reality, on the Julius front the Yugoslavs had the “Triglavska” Infantry Division, the “Riśnjacki” detachment, and part of the “Triglavska” detachment, numbering around 50,000 men (together with the fort and border forces). The Italians estimated that the Yugoslav forces operating on the Albanian front numbered 60 battalions. This was an accurate estimate. In connection with this, they expected offensive operations from the Yugoslavs, especially on the Albanian front. See Terezić, pp. 246–247.

¹⁰²They also considered an evacuation from the Shkoder region. See Rawski, pp. 156–157.

¹⁰³General Halder stated that the Italians could not be treated as partners. See Halder, p. 337.

¹⁰⁴After 1918, relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary were characterized by many years of tension arising from, above all, border incidents, this despite a warming up of mutual relations and even an agreement signed at the beginning of the 1940s. Hungary's revisionist policy was a result of losses suffered by Hungary after the First World War, losses that were to the benefit of, among others, Yugoslavia.

¹⁰⁵On 12 October 1940, the Hungarian prime minister had concluded a pact of “eternal friendship” with Yugoslavia.

¹⁰⁶This led to a crisis in Hungary's ruling circle. Prime Minister Teleky committed suicide. The circumstances of the death of this eminent politician were not fully clarified. Many historians believe that Teleki committed suicide in connection with the German-Hungarian rapprochement and Hungary's planned participation in the aggression against Yugoslavia, which was a violation of the October 1940 understanding. See H. J. Kuberski: Sojusznicy Hitlera 1941–1945 [Hitler's allies, 1941–1945] (Warsaw: 1993), p. 46.

¹⁰⁷Hungarian 1^st Army was deployed in the border region with the USSR.

¹⁰⁸Rawski, pp. 159–160.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., pp. 160–161. Hungary's participation in the attack was countered by Romania; this was in regard to the divergent interests of the two countries in Banat. This therefore led to Hungarian-German talks and a complete modification in the use of forces on the part of Hungary.

¹¹⁰This is the agreement dated 31 July concerning the possibility of abolishing military restrictions (arising from the Treaty of Neuilly, dated 27 November 1919) for Bulgarian in exchange for its renouncement of the use of force in case of a conflict with the Pact countries. See J. Skowronek, M. Tanty, and T Wasilewski: Historia Słowian Południowych i Zachodniych [History of the Southern and Eastern Slavs] (Warsaw: 1988), p. 620.

¹¹¹This consisted of 36 Panzerkampfwagen II tanks and 38 French Renault R-35s, received from Germany by virtue of a secret annex to the agreement signed on 21 March 1938 and Bulgaria's entry into the Axis.

¹¹²Kuberski, p. 8.

¹¹³Rawski, p. 162.

¹¹⁴This was in accordance with Directive No. 25, which Hitler signed on 03 April. The chief of the German military mission in Romania received instructions to “influence” the military readiness undertaken by the Romanian command on the border with the USSR and the regrouping of Romanian forces from the Timosoara region further to the east so as to not complicate cooperation between German XXXXI Motorized Corps and Hungarian 2^nd Army. See Rawski, Vol. III, p. 162.

¹¹⁵By virtue of the Hitler-Stalin agreement, these units occupied a fortification belt in Bessarabia, which had been given up in favor of the USSR. This territory was finally given up in June 1940.

¹¹⁶Kuberski, pp. 30–31.

¹¹⁷In fact, probably nine divisions were sent there. The number of units increased in May only by four divisions (1^st and 3^rd Mountain Divisions 13^th Infantry Division and 1^st Tank Division) and three German divisions. See A. Hillgruber: Hitler, König Carol, und Marschall Antonescu (Wiesbaden: 1954), pp. 124–125.

¹¹⁸Despite talks undertaken on 31 march and 01 April, and then on the night of -2–03 April in Kenal, they were unable to come up with any concrete plan. The Yugoslavs were surprised by the paucity of British forces. From the Yugoslav point of view, the only real solution (and, after all, it was a Yugoslav one) was planning a joint attack with the Greeks in Albania (before 12 April). See Rawski (pp. 163–166) and Culinović (pp. 130–131).

¹¹⁹Solarz, p. 47.

¹²⁰The natural passage from Romania to Yugoslavia.

¹²¹And Belgrade with the same force. The Yugoslav capital was subjected to brutal air raids. Churchill wrote about the “atrocities and nightmares that the inhabitants of Belgrade lived through on 6 April 1941. See Judah, p. 114.

¹²²Halder, p. 421.

¹²³The German command had not paid attention to the fact that on 03 April the Yugoslav government had declared Belgrade an open city. The air attacks were accompanied by notes and declarations from the German and Italian authorities attempting to justify the air bombardment in the eyes of world opinion and of their own nations.

¹²⁴Nevertheless, despite difficult conditions, bomber aviation attacked German columns moving on the Kumanovo-Bujanovac and Skopje-Kacanik directions. See Rawski, Vol. IV, p. 138.

¹²⁵Bulgarian towns were also attacked, although this country's army was not taking part in the aggression.

¹²⁶During the fighting, Yugoslav aviation rebased from the area of the Southern and Great Morava to the Kraljeva and Čačaku region. See Rawski, pp. 139–141.

¹²⁷The purpose of holding this region was to assure the possibility of withdrawing to Greece.

¹²⁸The “Sumadijska” Infantry Division was in reserve, as well as smaller units. Reserves from 3^rd Army Group—the “Ibarska” Infantry Division—was concentrated in the Skopje region. See Rawski, pp. 232–234.

¹²⁹The mission of the German units was to advance in the direction of Skopje and Velasu, defeat the Yugoslav forces, and establish communications with Italian units in Albania. Subsequently, XXXX Motorized Corps was to shift to operations against Greek forces.

¹³⁰In accordance with modified Plan R-41, it was to deploy the “Zetska” Infantry Division, the “Komski” detachment, the “Kosovo” Infantry Division, and the “Vardarska” Infantry Division in the first echelon. The Army reserves were the “Hercegovina” Infantry Division, which was to concentrate behind the right flank, in the vicinity of Danilovgrad, and the “Dinarska” Infantry Division, part of the reserve of the Commander-in-Chief, which was to concentrate behind the “Hercegovina” Infantry Division near Nikśić. The Yugoslavs assigned five divisions for the attack against Albania.

¹³¹See Solarz, p. 52.

¹³²Rawski, pp. 249–250.

¹³³Rawski, pp. 164–165.

¹³⁴First 7^th Army and then 4^th Army began the maneuver.

¹³⁵It had the “Slavonia” Infantry Division in the Virovitica region, “Sava” Infantry Division in the Koprivnica region, the “Murska” Infantry Division near Varaždin, and the “Ormoški” detachment on the extreme left flank. Part of the forces of this detachment protected the Yugoslav wedge, lying in the foreground, that jutted between Hungary and Austria.

¹³⁶At the same time, under the influence of news about the beginning of the war, Ustashi activity intensified considerably. And so, for example, after a bombardment whose effects the Ustashi took advantage of in their well-distributed propaganda, of the two regiments from the “Murska” Infantry Division that were marching toward the border, only one battalion in each remained. 108^th Infantry Regiment, which after mobilizing in Belovar was massing toward the border to take up the defense in the Virovitica region, openly revolted on the night of 07–08 April. Officers, NCOs, and rank-and-fiule soldiers of Serbian nationality were arrested, and the regiment, in close order, turned in the direction of Belovar, near which 40^th Reserve Infantry Regiment and part of 42^nd Infantry Regiment joined up with it at about noon.

¹³⁷Ustasha (insurgent)—a Croatian nationalist organization, founded by Ante Pavelić, conducted terrorist-type activities against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, attempting to obtain independence for Croatia. Connected with the Hungarian, Italian, and German special services.

¹³⁸Halder, Vol. II, p. 428.

¹³⁹Rawski, pp. 168–170.

¹⁴⁰Tanty, p. 231.

¹⁴¹The desertion process in Yugoslav units on the western sector was not an isolated event. Earlier similar events took place among soldiers of Macedonian and Albanian origin.

¹⁴²Ante Pavelić, leader of the Croatian separatists, called for armed rebellion in Croatia even before the beginning of military operations. His emissaries came to Croatia from Italy, Germany, and Hungary, disseminating propaganda and carrying out diversionary and sabotage activities, which helped German forces considerably. Only the Norwegian fascists had such success. On 10 April Pavelić declared the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (Niezavisna Drzava Hrvatska/NDH), which exacerbated the tragic situation for Yugoslav forces in Croatia and Dalmatia.

¹⁴³Rawski, p. 256.

¹⁴⁴Rawski, Vol. IV, p. 170.

¹⁴⁵In 2^nd German Army XXXXIX Mountain Corps (1^st Mountain Division and 79^th Infantry Division) was to attack on the Dravograd direction and, after penetrating the defense, force the Sava. The mission of LI Army corps (132^nd and 183^rd Infantry Divisions) was to attack Zagreb across Maribor with LII Army Corps.

¹⁴⁶The term “ban” is of Turkish-Mongolian or Slovenian origin, meaning “king's governor” or “vojevod.” Originates from the tenth century southern Slavs. During the Habsburg, the king's deputy in Croatia, and after the First World War, the administrator of the Banovina District in the Kingdom. In 1939–1941, the governor of autonomous Croatia. See L. Leciejewicz (ed.): Mały słownik dawnych Słowian [Small dictionary of the ancient Slavs] (Warsaw: 1990), p. 26.

¹⁴⁷Solarz, p. 57.

¹⁴⁸Particularly bloody events took place at the Dinarska Division headquarters, where a meeting culminated in shooting between Serbian and Croatian officers. Seeing that their commanders were shooting at one another, the soldiers deserted their ranks. The Dinarska Division ceased to exist (it formed the Reserve of the High Command). See Solarz, p. 57.

¹⁴⁹The forces consisted of the “Jadranska” Infantry Division, which was to capture Zadar, crews from the Šibenik and Kotor strongholds, two field detachments, four regiments, and two separate reserve battalions deployed on the coast.

¹⁵⁰Rawski, pp. 172–173.

¹⁵¹Similar separatist symptoms appeared in Yugoslav army units comprised of soldiers of Slovenians, Macedonians, and Albanians.

¹⁵²In connection with this, XXXXIX Mountain Corps was to attack Celje and LI Army Corps was to advance to the south across the Drava, while XXXXVI Motorized Corps (14^th Tank Division) was to attack Zagreb to capture this city and 8^th Tank Division and 16^th Motorized Division were to advance toward Osijek and further to the southeast in the direction of Belgrade.

¹⁵³Soldiers from this division were arrested; some of them were murdered. Colonel Nikolič, section chief of the operations group, played no small role in this. He abandoned his position and went over to the Germans, issuing an order to the Yugoslav units that they should cease operations. See Rawski, p. 175.

¹⁵⁴L. Hory and H. Broszat: Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941–1945 [The Croatian Ustashi State, 1941–1945] (Stuttgart: 1964), p. 55.

¹⁵⁵J. Jareb: Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike [Half a century of Croatian politics] (Buenos Aires: 1960), pp. 83–85. The author assesses Mačka as a high-class politician, not a traitor to Yugoslavia.

¹⁵⁶The National Assembly attested that it ceased to recognize the Yugoslav government and seized supreme power on Slovenian territory. Attempts were made to establish contact with the Germans. The Assembly demanded of the Yugoslav military authorities that they become subordinate to it and that the soldiers return home. In fact, the demand was rejected, but these events eliminated 7^th Army. In this way, the next province fell.

¹⁵⁷Sixth Army was to defend the line from the direction of Romania on the sector from Brnice on the Danube to the Begej Canal in Banat and further on the Danube line in order to facilitate the withdrawal of 1^st Army beyond the Sava. Subsequently the army was to withdraw to the south (across Serbia and Macedonia) to Greece.

¹⁵⁸Its mission was to defend the northern belt from the direction of Hungary and secure the withdrawal of 1^st Army Group from the northwest part of the country.

¹⁵⁹According to information about the creation of the NHD, Croatian reservists began to leave the ranks. As a result, 2^nd Army's combat importance drastically decreased.

¹⁶⁰It is necessary to emphasize the active participation of the Ustashi in the fighting in Croatia and the unwillingness of the Slovenians to fight, which was manifested in, among other things, massive desertions and, in regard to the Croatians, fighting within the Yugoslav units. This was one of the main reasons that the Yugoslavs were defeated in the border fighting.

¹⁶¹10 April was a crucial day in the Yugoslav campaign. On this day the Yugoslav Army's concept of battle was shattered. German success made it impossible to implement the main principles of Plan R-41.

¹⁶²Terzić, pp. 505–506.

¹⁶³Rawski, p. 273.

¹⁶⁴The Hungarian authorities were waiting for the resolution of the question of Croatia's independence and, above all, Hitler's relationship to the emerging country. See Halder and Kozeński.

¹⁶⁵Rawski, pp. 277–279.

¹⁶⁶Halder, p. 436.

¹⁶⁷Rawski, pp. 226–227.

¹⁶⁸Rawski, pp. 282–283.

¹⁶⁹Čulinovič, p. 235.

¹⁷⁰Terzić, pp. 519–520, 531–532.

¹⁷¹Rawski, p. 285.

¹⁷²Terzić, p. 518.

¹⁷³Rawski, p. 286.

¹⁷⁴Rawski, p. 69.

¹⁷⁵Despite the name, these units had low combat capability and were incapable of resisting the enemy.

¹⁷⁶The Yugoslav “Vardarska” Infantry Division was taken prisoner practically in its entirety.

¹⁷⁷Rawski, p. 70.

¹⁷⁸The High Command issued Directive No. 179, which stated: “As a result of the lack of success on all fronts, the complete dissolution of our forces in Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slovenia, and the fact that after a thorough examination of the political and military situation we have concluded that any further resistance is impossible and can only lead to unnecessary bloodshed without any hope of success, and because neither the people nor their military leaders want war, we ask for a cessation of military operations against the German and Italian forces.” See Čulinović, p. 284.

¹⁷⁹Kozeński, pp. 140–142.

¹⁸⁰Rawski, pp. 291–294.

¹⁸¹The king and the government left Yugoslavia on 15 April 1941, making their way to Greece by airplane. See Tanty, p. 232.

¹⁸²Only one submarine and two torpedo boats carried out the order. The remaining did not because of Ustashi diversionary activities.

¹⁸³Rawski, Vol. V, p. 77.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁸⁵90 per cent of Yugoslav Army solders taken prisoner were Serbs. See Tanty, p. 232.

¹⁸⁶Terezic, p. 375.

¹⁸⁷The Macedonians and Albanians played a similar role in the south.