Volume 42, Issue 3 p. 431-458
Original Article

The Conditional Effect of Term Limits on Electoral Activities

Julie VanDusky-Allen

Julie VanDusky-Allen

Boise State University

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First published: 06 June 2014
Citations: 2
Acknowledgements: An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2007 Western Political Science Association meeting and the 2011 Midwest Political Science Association meeting. I wish to thank William Heller, Gregory Robinson, Michael McDonald, Michael Allen, the participants in the Comparative/American workshop at Binghamton University, and the anonymous referees and editors-in-chief at Politics & Policy for their useful feedback on earlier versions.

Abstract

en

In this article, I examine how term limits affect the amount of time that legislators focus on constituency service and fundraising. I use data from the 2002 U.S. State Legislative Survey conducted by Carey, Niemi, Powell, and Moncrief to provide support for my hypotheses. The results from the data analysis suggest that in the presence of term limits, legislators with long-term career goals in politics spend less time on constituency service activities and more time on fundraising with their caucus. For legislators with short-term career goals in politics, there is very little evidence to suggest that term limits have an effect on how much time they spend on constituency service activities and fundraising activities.

Abstract

es

En este artículo, analizo cómo los límites de tiempo afectan el número de ocasiones que los legisladores dedican al servicio de los miembros de su distrito y a la recolección de fondos para sus campañas. Utilizo datos de la Encuesta Legislativa de los estados le la Union Americana del 2002 conducida por Carey, Niemi, Powell, y Moncrief para proveer sustento a mi hipótesis. Los resultados del análisis de datos sugieren que en presencia de los límites de tiempo, los legisladores de carrera con metas políticas del largo plazo gastan menos tiempo en actividades de servicio a miembros de su distrito y más tiempo en actividades de recolección de fondos de sus campañas. Para legisladores con metas políticas de corto plazo hay muy poca evidencia para sugerir que los límites de tiempo tengan algún efecto en cuánto tiempo destinen a actividades de servicio a los miembros de su distrito y a la obtención de fondos para campañas.

Related Articles

Prier, Eric, and Kevin Wagner. 2009. “ Running Unopposed: Assessing the Impact of Term Limits on Competition in Florida and Maine.” Politics & Policy 37 (1): 101-125. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00163.x/abstract Day, Jonathan, and Keith Boeckelman. 2012. “ The Impact of Legislative Term Limits on State Debt: Increased Spending, Flat Revenue.” Politics & Policy 40 (2): 320-338. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00347.x/abstract Penning, James M. 1996. “ Planning Legislative Careers under Term Limits.” Southeastern Political Review 24 (2): 362-366. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1996.tb00447.x/abstract

Related Media

The Quantitative Peace. 2014. “ Mexico May Reform Term Limit Rules This Year.” January 2. http://www.quantitativepeace.com/blog/2014/01/mexico-is-considering-ending-term-limits.html NCSL. 2014. “ Term Limits and State Legislatures.” http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/term-limits.aspx

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