The Origins of the 'Teheran Formula' on Polish Frontiers

1. Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, II (London 1971), 651; Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (hereafter FRUS): The Conference of Cairo and Teheran 1943 (Washington 1961)) 594.

2. This was clearly expressed by the Union of Polish Patriots in their paper, Wolna Polska (Free Poland), on 24 December 1943.

We must realise, clearly and unequivocally, that in the East, White Ruthenia and the Ukraine will not relinquish territories which belong to them ethnographically ... The decisions which the new situation demands from the Poles are not easy. It is not easy to wipe out the Jagellonian traditions and to revert to the great traditions of the Piasts. However, in the history of peoples, if reactionary men or men who compromise with the past in a cowardly manner cannot rise up to great deeds in moments of great changes, then new men rise to power.

Cited in Gotthold Rhode and Wolfgang Wagner, eds., The Genesis of the Oder- Neisse Line in the Diplomatic Negotiations During World War II: Sources and Documents (Stuttgart 1959), 75.

3. For a more detailed account of the inter-relationship between diplo matic and military strategy, see Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford 1975), 1-28, 120-64.

4. See for example the statements and resolutions from the period November 1939 to December 1942 cited in Rhode and Wagner, op. cit., 11 and Louise W. Holborn, ed., War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, 1 September 1939-31 December 1942 (Boston 1943), 451-83 passim.

5. See Zoltan Michael Szaz, Germany's Eastern Frontiers: The Problem of the Oder-Neisse Line (Chicago 1960), 80.

6. For accounts of this conversation, see General Sikorski Historical Institute, ed., Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-45 (hereafter DPSR), I, 1939-1943 (London 1961), 264-65, 274-75, 365; Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (London 1948), 88-90; FRUS, 1942, (Washington 1961) III, 201.

7. The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London 1965), 282; Woodward, op. cit., 222.

8. See Stanislaw Kot, Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia (London 1963), 176; DPSR, I, 270-71, 365; Woodward, op. cit., 251.

9. Cited in Rhode and Wagner, op. cit., 27, 30.

10. DPSR, I, 457-58.

11. The main document cited below was apparently written in English and presented to the British government also on 1 December. It can be found in C 12169/464/55 of the Foreign Office papers. The second was kindly supplied to me by the Sikorski Museum. This was handed to the State Department on 4 December.

12. The second memorandum refers to a Polish 'sphere of interest east of the Oder-Lusatian (eastern) Neisse Line with bridgeheads on the left (west) bank.'

13. FRUS, 1942, III, 200-01; C 2098, 3679/231/55; C 12329/464/55.

14. See FRUS, 1943, III, 322; Ciechanowski, op. cit., 151.

15. Ibid., 154-55; FRUS, 1943, III, 328-29.

16. Churchill told Sikorski on 30 August 1942 that 'Britain had no military. victories to claim' but that 'at the first opportunity, as soon as the situation changes ... he would exert pressure to make Russia comply with the Polish demands'. DPSR, I, 427.

17. C 12169/464/55. On the MSC see Sharp, op. cit., 3.

18. C 849/231/55. The Polish memorandum is not explicit upon which areas of Pomerania were to be annexed. Sikorski is reported as having earlier considered alternative frontiers running from the Baltic at Koslin, Kolberg, and Stolpmünde. See Elizabeth Wiskemann, Germany's Eastern Neighbours: Problems Relating to the Oder-Neisse Line and the Czech Frontier (London 1956), 71; The Observer, 13 April 1947.

19. See Avon, op. cit., 370-71; WP(43)96; Ciechanowski, op. cit., 167.

20. See Robert E. Sherwood, ed., The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins: Volume II, January 1942-July 1945 (London 1949), 706-13, FRUS, 1943, III 21-23; Woodward, op. cit., 622-23; WM 53rd (43), 13 April 1943.

21. e Rhode and Wagner, op. cit., 38-44.

22. Memoirs of Dr Eduard Beneš: From Munich to New War and New Victory (London 1954), 184-85, 195; Ciechanowski, op. cit., 198-99.

23. C 7553, 9308/231/55.

24. See Woodward, op. cit., 638-40; FRUS, The Conference at Washington and Quebec 1943 (Washington 1970), 1113-16 ; C 10847/231/55; WP(43)438, 5 October 1943. Roosevelt's only direct conversation with Molotov would have been during the latter's visit to Washington in May-June 1942. One account says that Poland's frontiers were discussed at this meeting. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-42 (New Haven 1942), 399.

25. See Avon, op. cit., 402-03; DPSR, II, 1943-45 (London 1968), 40; Woodward, op. cit., 639; Ciechanowski, op. cit., 213. It seems highly unlikely that at this stage the British would have proposed and the Russians agreed to the 'Jagellon concept' of compensation. It is far more likely that the discussion also revolved around the Curzon Line.

26. DPSR, II, 49; C 10409/231/55; PHP(43)15; WP(43)413.

27. C 11633/231/55; WP(43)421, 27 September 1943; WP(43)438, 5 October 1943; WM 135th (43).

28. DPSR, II, 62-63; FRUS, 1943, I, (Washington 1963) 542, 632; The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II (London 1948), 1266, 1287.

29. See DPSR, II, 92, 722-23; Edward Raczynski, In Allied London (London 1962), 175.

30. See C 11491, 12044/231/55; DPSR, II, 76-77, 83-87, 92.

31. WP(43)528.

32. Ciechanowski, op, cit., 258; Avon, op. cit., 422.