Abstract
The importance of the size of a political community for the development of civic virtue has usually been related to the advantages of small size in the possibility of direct democracy and the fulfilment of the classical ideal of freedom as governing and being governed by turn. While these are important variables for the development of civic virtue, in this article it is argued that small size also matters because it allows the development of civic virtue by a reputation-building mechanism. The correlate of this argument is that as the political community grows in size, this mechanism turns increasingly unfeasible. However, the article also claims that certain institutional devices for the spread of information about people's preferences can help the development of civic virtue even in big republics. This argument is illustrated with the example of the Roman censorship, an institution that flourished during the Roman Republican period.
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1.
1. Richard Dagger (1997) Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism, p. 14. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2.
2. Benjamin Constant (1988) `The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns', in Constant. Political Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana, pp. 314—15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3.
3. See Maurizio Viroli (1995) For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism, p. 71. New York: Oxford University Press. Viroli (ibid. pp. 43—4) considers that the same argument was also advanced by Guicciardini. Regarding Montesquieu's vision of civic virtue as an anachronism, see also Iseult Honohan (2002) Civic Republicanism, pp. 81—2. New York: Routledge.
4.
4. Shelley Burtt (1993) `The Politics of Virtue Today: A Critique and a Proposal', American Political Science Review 87: 360—8. See also Shelley Burtt (1990) `The Good Citizen's Psyche: On the Psychology of Civic Virtue', Polity 23: 23—38.
5.
5. Dagger (n. 1), p. 100. See also Maurizio Viroli (1999) Repubblicanesimo, pp. 65—6. Rome: Editori Laterza.
6.
6. Montesquieu (1987) Del espíritu de las leyes, pp. 21, 29. Madrid: Tecnos.
7.
7. Maurizio Viroli (1988) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the `Well-Ordered Society', pp. 124—7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
8. In that sense, the conflict between the dominant strategy and the Pareto-optimal strategy in a prisoner's dilemma can be applied to Rousseau's distinction between `the will of all' and the `general will'. See W.G. Runciman and Amartya K. Sen (1965) `Games, Justice and the General Will', Mind 74: 554—62. A similar idea is in Joshua Cohen (1986) `Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy', Philosophy and Public Affairs 15(3): 275—97.
9.
9. Alexis de Tocqueville (1995) La democracia en América, p. 62. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
10.
10. See Viroli (n. 3), p. 73. Machiavelli also considered that in the republics the common good is easier to attain than in other political regimes, because the common good is the good of the majority of the population. Therefore, according to Machiavelli, for the majority of the population there is not a contradiction between private interests and the common good. Machiavelli (1996) Discursos sobre la primera década de Tito Livio, p. 186. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
11.
11. Aristotle (1997) Política, 1324a, 1332a, tr. Julián Marías and María Araújo. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. See also Antoni Domènech (1989) De la ética a la política, pp. 83—4. Barcelona: Crítica.
12.
12. Tocqueville (n. 9), pp. 109—10.
13.
13. Mogens Herman Hansen (1999) The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes, pp. 62, 318. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. In this sense, Cicero is an example of a classical republican who did not advocate the adjuration of self-interest, but only to act as `reasonable human beings, pursuing our own advantage in an enlightened and moderate manner'. Neal Wood (1991) Cicero's Social and Political Thought, p. 77. Berkeley: University of California Press.
14.
14. Quentin Skinner (1978) The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1, The Renaissance, p. 88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15.
15. Honohan (n. 3), p. 95.
16.
16. David McCullough (2002) John Adams, p. 223. New York: Touchstone.
17.
17. See Thomas Jefferson (1984) Writings, pp. 365—73. New York: The Library of America. See also Garret Ward Sheldon (1991) The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, p. 16. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
18.
18. See Machiavelli (n. 10), p. 104.
19.
19. Algernon Sidney (1996) Court Maxims, p. 196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
20.
20. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2004) Du Contrat social, p. 186. Paris: Gallimard.
21.
21. Hansen (n. 13), p. 150.
22.
22. Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte (1973) Size and Democracy: The Politics of the Smaller European Democracies. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
23.
23. Rousseau (n. 20), p. 208.
24.
24. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay (1987) The Federalist Papers, p. 141. London: Penguin. W.B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd (eds) (2002) The Essential Antifederalist, pp. 27, 96, 104, 111, 122, 171, 181. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
25.
25. Dagger (n. 1), p. 89. See also James Miller (1984) Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy, pp. 61, 182. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
26.
26. Cicero (2000) Sobre la república [De Re publica], tr. Álvaro D'Ors, 1. 39. Madrid: Gredos.
27.
27. Thomas Paine (1995) Rights of Man, pp. 218, 251. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Thomas Paine (1995) Common Sense, p. 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28.
28. Tocqueville (n. 9), p. 62.
29.
29. See Honohan (n. 3), p. 151.
30.
30. Dagger (n. 1), p. 112.
31.
31. Domènech (n. 11), pp. 92—3.
32.
32. Robert Axelrod (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
33.
33. Dahl and Tufte (n. 22), p. 5.
34.
34. Aristotle (n. 11), 1313b.
35.
35. Rousseau (n. 20), p. 209.
36.
36. See Nadia Urbinati (2002) Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government, pp. 104—22. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
37.
37. Machiavelli (1992) El Príncipe, p. 83. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
38.
38. Gordon S. Wood (1987) The Creation of the American Republic. 1776—1787, p. 500. Williamsburg, VA: University of North Carolina Press.
39.
39. See Robert Vincent Cram (1940) `The Roman Censors', Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 51: 71—110. Mommsen also considered the censorship as a mostly patrician magistracy. See Theodor Mommsen (1983) Historia de Roma, book 3, pp. 336—337. Madrid: Turner; [1856]. The same idea is in Arthur Rosenberg (1926) Historia de la República Romana, p. 55. Madrid: Revista de Occidente.
40.
40. Livy (2001) Historia de Roma desde su fundación [Ab Urbe Condita], tr. Jose Antonio Villar Vidal, 4. 8. 1—3. Madrid: Gredos.
41.
41. Ibid. 2. 1. 7—8.
42.
42. Ibid. 4. 24.
43.
43. W.E. Heitland (1909) The Roman Republic, pp. 87—8. New York: Greenwood Press. S.I. Kovaliov (1973) Historia de Roma, p. 125. Madrid: Akal.
44.
44. Alan E. Astin (1985) `Cicero and the Censorship', Classical Philology 80(3): 233—9.
45.
45. Cicero (2001) Sobre los deberes [De Officiis], tr. José Guillén Cabañero, 3.111. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
46.
46. Kovaliov (n. 43), p. 125.
47.
47. Cicero (n. 26), 4. 6.
48.
48. Livy (n. 40), 24. 18. 2—10.
49.
49. Jaakko Suolahti (1963) The Roman Censors: A Study on Social Structure, p. 49. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia.
50.
50. Lorne H. Ward (1990) `Roman Population, Territory, Tribe, City and Army Size from the Republic Founding to the Veientane War, 509 BC—400 BC', American Journal of Philology 111(1): 5—39.
51.
51. Elio Lo Cascio (1994) `The Size of the Roman Population: Beloch and the Meaning of the Augustan Census Figures', Journal of Roman Studies 84: 23—40.
52.
52. Hansen (n. 13), p. 60. Of course, the differences between Republican Rome and democratic Athens were not only those of size. The degree of political participation of the demos was much higher in Athens than in Rome. Rome was never considered as a democracy at all. Polybius considered it the major example of a mixed constitution, but it would probably be more accurate to consider Republican Rome as a type of oligarchy. However, my point here is just that, being a much larger political community than Athens, the problems associated with the reputation mechanism for the building of civic virtue should be logically much more severe in Rome than in Athens.
53.
53. Domènech (n. 11), p. 88.
54.
54. Aristotle (2000) Retórica, 1366b. Madrid: Gredos.
55.
55. Cicero (n. 45), p. 66.
56.
56. Skinner (n. 14), pp. 42—7, 163. See also J.G.A. Pocock (1975) The Machiavellian Moment, p. 135. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Felix Gilbert (1965) Machiavelli and Guicciardini. Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
57.
57. Montesquieu (n. 6), p. 33.
58.
58. See Viroli (n. 7), p. 161.
59.
59. Wood (n. 38), p. 52.
60.
60. See Carl J. Richards (1994) The Founders and the Classics. Greece, Rome and the American Enlightenment, p. 185. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
61.
61. Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1990) `The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs', Economics and Politics 2(1): 1—23.
62.
62. Montesquieu (n. 6), p. 18.
63.
63. Rousseau (n. 20).
64.
64. Astin (n. 44), p. 235.
65.
65. Heitland (n. 43), p. 88.
66.
66. Ibid. p. 328.
67.
67. Suolahti (n. 49), pp. 48—9.
68.
68. Constant (n. 2), p. 311.
69.
69. See Viroli (n. 7), p. 206.
70.
70. Heitland (n. 43), p. 121.
71.
71. See James Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin (2000) `The Quest for Deliberative Democracy', in Michael Saward (ed.) Democratic Innovation. Deliberation, Representation and Association, pp. 17—28. London: Routledge.
72.
72. For example, there is extensive empirical material in the economic voting literature that does not find evidence for the assumption of the theory that voters are primarily guided by self-interest. See Leif Lewin (1991) Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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